Free will in MWI

[David]

I got rid of my belief in free will a long time ago, as a determinist
I just cannot phatom how free will could exist.

Now I know David Deutsch believe that somehow his MWI gives him free
will, but this cannot be.

In the single universe view, whether I will go through door A or door
B has been decided since big bang.
In the many worlds view, I will go through both doors and since I am
really both persons, there can obviously not be a choice, I have no
choice, I will go through both...

So for the proponents of fungible-MWI who holds Deutsch's view, defend
your view, as it makes no sense to me.

[Rami Rustom]

On Wed, May 2, 2012 at 8:37 AM, David <davids...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I got rid of my belief in free will a long time ago, as a determinist
> I just cannot phatom how free will could exist.
>
> Now I know David Deutsch believe that somehow his MWI gives him free
> will, but this cannot be.

Really? MWI explains free will? Cool! Can somebody explain how?

> In the single universe view, whether I will go through door A or door
> B has been decided since big bang.

I never heard that one before.

> In the many worlds view, I will go through both doors and since I am
> really both persons, there can obviously not be a choice, I have no
> choice, I will go through both...

But you're not both people. You are only one of them. And you choose
which universe you want to be in. [Wait is this the explanation to my
question above about how MWI explains free will?]

-- Rami

[Elliot Temple]

What you're saying is basically true, as far as it goes.

But the theory of free will -- properly conceived -- does not contradict determinism.

Determinism is (or at least should be) a theory *in physics only*.

Free will, on the other hand, is a theory *in morality*.

They make no conflicting claims.


Consider the question: if free will doesn't exist, doesn't that mean that morality doesn't exist, either?

Yet we can do moral philosophy. There are moral truths to figure out, e.g. that murder is wrong. What good is "murder is wrong" without people who can choose to use it?

This is what free will is getting at. And it can do this without specifying the physics that support humans making choices.


One of the big mistakes people make is to think that (physical) determinism implies *lack of (moral) responsibility for one's choices* because physics-fate makes them, not you. But as long as we make sure to keep the physics and moral issues separate, where's the problem?

-- Elliot Temple
http://fallibleideas.com/

[David]

On May 2, 6:37 pm, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:


> One of the big mistakes people make is to think that (physical) determinism implies *lack of (moral) responsibility for one's choices* because physics-fate makes them, not you. But >as long as we make sure to keep the physics and moral issues separate, where's the problem?

I have no problem with the free will-morality issues, and I agree with
your general summary.
My reasoning for opening this thread is that David Deutsch has
repeatedly claimed that free will somehow survives in MWI and claims
that free will can not work in a single universe.

This might only be Deutsch's personal view which noone else shares,
but if someone does I'd love to hear their defense

[Elliot Temple]

This should answer Rami too:

That is in his other book, The Fabric of Reality. See the chart on page 339 and surrounding text.


One issue is that free-will related statements like, "I could have gone to the park last saturday, but chose to go to the museum instead," bring up the issue of *counterfactuals*. Counterfactuals make sense in MWI but are problematic in classical physics.


-- Elliot Temple
http://curi.us/

[David]

On May 2, 7:01 pm, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:

> One issue is that free-will related statements like, "I could have gone to the park last saturday, but chose to go to the museum instead," bring up the issue of *counterfactuals*. >Counterfactuals make sense in MWI but are problematic in classical physics.

They only make sense as in "both happen", it still does not change the
fact that you did not choose between 2 options, decided on one and did
that.
You were determined to do both, so free will is nonexistent.

For any sort of "free will" to ever exist, would require you to be
able to not do the things you do no want to do.
Obviously indeterminism does not give us this, it only gives us random
will, so the entire idea of free will is a illusion that could never
exist, with perhaps the exception of solipsism where you will whatever
into existence and physics do not apply, but then again solipsism is
incoherent in and of itself, so let's not digress into that.

My point is: single universe or multiverse, determinism or
indeterminism, free will still cannot exist.

[Elliot Temple]

Now you're interpreting "free will" as making claims about physics, which can conflict with physics (actually, in this case, you're interpreting "free will" as conflicting with the very concept of having laws of physics of any type at all, rather than conflicting with any specific theory of physics). But that's simply a misunderstanding of the concept of "free will" which (correctly understood) does not say that and is physics-agnostic.

The implication of your view is that morality doesn't exist. Yet it does. That proves there is a legitimate meaning for free will (which is necessary for morality to be meaningful).

[Rami Rustom]

On Wed, May 2, 2012 at 11:50 AM, David <davids...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On May 2, 6:37 pm, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
>
>
>> One of the big mistakes people make is to think that (physical) determinism implies *lack of (moral) responsibility for one's choices* because physics-fate makes them, not you. But >as long as we make sure to keep the physics and moral issues separate, where's the problem?
>
> I have no problem with the free will-morality issues, and I agree with
> your general summary.
> My reasoning for opening this thread is that David Deutsch has
> repeatedly claimed that free will somehow survives in MWI and claims
> that free will can not work in a single universe.

In a single universe, even the idea of probabilities is not possible.
I understood this with respect to non-moral issues like genes. An
example is the question of whether or not a child will have a genetic
disease. Lets say its just one gene and that its a recessive gene that
causes the gene. That means there is a 25% chance of getting the
disease, i.e. two recessive alleles for that gene, and a 75% chance of
being a carrier of the bad allele. These 4 possibilities means 4 sets
of universes.

But this idea works for moral issues too. I had the possibility of
choosing to get married and have kids. Because I did so, I now exist
in this universe. Had I not chosen to do so, I would exist in another
universe where my life and others would be very different.

The point is that I chose to exist in one universe instead of another.

-- Rami

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 02.05.2012 15:37 David said the following:

> I got rid of my belief in free will a long time ago, as a determinist
> I just cannot phatom how free will could exist.
>
> Now I know David Deutsch believe that somehow his MWI gives him free
> will, but this cannot be.
>
> In the single universe view, whether I will go through door A or door
> B has been decided since big bang.

The question however remains what was the reason for Big Bang.

Evgenii

--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru

[David]

On May 2, 7:26 pm, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:

> Now you're interpreting "free will" as making claims about physics, which can conflict with physics (actually, in this case, you're interpreting "free will" as conflicting with the very >concept of having laws of physics of any type at all, rather than conflicting with any specific theory of physics). But that's simply a misunderstanding of the concept of "free will" which >(correctly understood) does not say that and is physics-agnostic.

No...
Free will is the "ability" of a senitience to make a decision between
2 or more alternatives. This by default requires that not all
alternatives are chosen, which is not the case in MWI.
So no free will for MWI'ers either...

> The implication of your view is that morality doesn't exist. Yet it does. That proves there is a legitimate meaning for free will (which is necessary for morality to be meaningful).

This makes no sense

[Alan Forrester]

On 2 May 2012, at 19:36, David wrote:

>
>
> On May 2, 7:26 pm, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
>
>> Now you're interpreting "free will" as making claims about physics, which can conflict with physics (actually, in this case, you're interpreting "free will" as conflicting with the very >concept of having laws of physics of any type at all, rather than conflicting with any specific theory of physics). But that's simply a misunderstanding of the concept of "free will" which >(correctly understood) does not say that and is physics-agnostic.
>
> No...
> Free will is the "ability" of a senitience to make a decision between
> 2 or more alternatives. This by default requires that not all
> alternatives are chosen, which is not the case in MWI.

> So no free will for MWI'ers either…

Consider two distinct versions of Bob. One version of Bob learns to play to oboe (Bob 1), the other beats up a midget (Bob 2). What difference between Bob 1 and Bob 2 causes their different actions?

>> The implication of your view is that morality doesn't exist. Yet it does. That proves there is a legitimate meaning for free will (which is necessary for morality to be meaningful).
>
> This makes no sense

Suppose that Jim doesn't understand Karen's intellectual position. If Jim asks Karen a question about her position, then he might learn something about the position of people who disagree with him. He may learn that he is wrong, or he may learn something about how to argue better against Karen's position. If he blankly states that Karen is wrong without making an argument as to why she is wrong, then he won't understand her position any better than he did before he made that remark.

Alan

[David]

On May 2, 11:18 pm, Alan Forrester

<alanmichaelforres...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Consider two distinct versions of Bob. One version of Bob learns to play to oboe (Bob 1), the other beats up a midget (Bob 2). What difference between Bob 1 and Bob 2 causes >their different actions?

The thing is, up until the moment of choice Bob 1 and Bob 2 are
fungible (in this reading of everett), so there is no "bob1 and bob2"
they are fungible. At the decision-making moment this Bob chooses
both, maybe in 99,9999999999999999% of the branches he decides to play
oboe, but at least in 1 branch does he indeed "randomly" choose to
beat up a midget instead because that's what the neurons in his brain
decided on through some spontneous quantum rearrangement of neurons.

We know through classical physics and monitoring peoples brains that
given 2 options, classical physics alone can tell us which one will be
chosen, so the chance that you will pick the other alternative hinges
upon enough particles changing to make that decision. In a single
universe, the chance of this occuring is so close to 0% we can call it
impossible, but in MWI it HAS to happen...

[Alan Forrester]

That's not an answer to the question I asked.

Alan

[Brett Hall]

Sent from my iPad

On 03/05/2012, at 7:18 AM, "Alan Forrester" <alanmichae...@googlemail.com> wrote:

>
>
> Consider two distinct versions of Bob. One version of Bob learns to play to oboe (Bob 1), the other beats up a midget (Bob 2). What difference between Bob 1 and Bob 2 causes their different actions?
>

Bob 1 and Bob 2 are just different people. I don't see that this is substantially different to asking why Bob and Alan choose to do different things?

They're different people having different experiences. So what? Certain observations are made by Bob 1 and so he has one experience and he conjectures theories and criticises others and settles on Oboe. But why does he do this? He wants to. Why? Why does he want to? He just does. It's his preference. He has no control over that.

Bob 2 - apparently he prefers to beat up a midget. Why? He preferred to. Why? He can't explain it. Maybe the midget hit his girlfriend. But why did he hit him and not go to the police? He can't explain it. He just thought it was better at the time and discarded any other theory that entered his head (perhaps none others did).

Bob 1 and 2 are just witnessing things going on in their heads. Like we all do. I just witness my thoughts. I am just a conscious witness of my own thoughts and perceptions. A thought is something I perceive actually.

I think you are the subject of your experience. Subject *of* them. In other words - a tsunami occurs and you do not control it. The bus goes left - and you go with it. You are aware of these things and you do not control them. Somehow people think that when the "event" occurs in your subjectivity that somehow you have more control. But actually - everything is occurring in the subjectivity of our consciousness otherwise we would not be aware of it. So the bus may well go left in the external world - but you only know about this because a chain of causation leads to the representation of this event in your consciousness. You have no control over the fact that as a matter of subjectivity - you *experience* the bus going left.

What about your thoughts? Well don't you just perceive them in much the same way? I say you do. You have the *experience of having* a thought. You are not identical with your thoughts. The thought arises out of your control as the perception that the bus just went left did. It seems to me the only difference here is the fact that people associate the bus with things outside and over there and the thoughts somehow with "being me". But you are not your thoughts. You *have a thought* - just like you *have* any experience. You are aware of experiences.

I have been challenged a couple of times now to provide a refutation of the theory that we are universal explainers. I do not see that what I say here calls for that. The universality of our explanatory capacity is just that - a capacity. But it is not us. It is mysterious - how we have this capacity and how creativity works - but to say that I am "nothing but" a universal explainer I think is reductionistic. You might wish to define - as DD in BoI does - that a person = universal explainer, and fine. Then I am a person + more. Importantly, I am conscious. We don't know enough to say what the relationship between being a universal explainer and being conscious is. I guess that the former depends lawfully on the latter - but who knows? As DD has said 'there cannot be more than one kind of person'. But then there *might* be universal explainers without consciousness. Can there be? On page 415 of the hardback of BoI I get the impression that perhaps UKC must be conscious - but I'm not sure. Consciousness might be a pre-requisite for being a universal explainer. So we are "people". But if being a person means being a universal explainer and being a universal explainer means being conscious then fine. I still do not think that refutes anything I say here...yet I feel that the idea that a person is nothing but a universal explainer may have some problems...

For in my moment to moment experience I am not *constantly explaining things*. I can be conscious and yet without thought. Have I ceased to be a person at such moments? I would want to say "no". So I think there's something wrong with the argument in BoI to that extent.

It is merely that I have the "potential" to be a universal explainer? I don't get such arguments from the "potential" to do anything. After all - given knowledge we don't yet possess - any sufficiently large lump of silicon could probably be a universal explainer. Given the right circumstances - any cell in your body could be genetically engineered one day into a universal explainer.

Now - if I am right (I follow Sam Harris in this) then what matters for free will is not whether a person is a universal explainer - but rather whether you in your moment-to-moment experience control your own will.

What does "will" even mean? I've asked this before. Doesn't it mean desire? Urge? Want? *Preference*? How can I control my urges? Sure I can have an urge for a donut - but then I also have an urge to say "No - I'd rather not give in to that. I'd rather eat well so I'll have a banana instead". But this is just one preference being discarded in favor of a better one. And why? Well, following the chapter on choices - I have some conjecture that this preference is better than that because I criticise the donut preference and go in favor of the banana. But why should I find one preference more appealing and find the criticism of the other compelling at all? It begins to become inscrutable to me and any story I tell is necessarily *post hoc*. After all the taste of the donut is preferred over the banana and yet criticisms against the donut cause me to reject it.

So why the banana? Ultimately I preferred the banana. My will was for the banana. I did not choose the will. Indeed I believe I have given my will too much credence here. How often do we think deeply like this about mundane things? Mundane or not - I criticised the donut and it was rejected. And I *felt* I *preferred* the banana. In this case the feeling of the preference is identical to the *thought* of a preference for the banana. Either way - I just notice this thought enter my consciousness - I did not choose it to. It chose me. And the choice was made to eat a banana and I was a witness to all this. Later - I come to write a story about what happened. Post hoc.

Indeed consider the fact that there was a large number of foods I might have thought of but simply did not. Where's the freedom in that? And what about all the foods I did not even know about? I could have walked down the shop and bought a durian. This is a fruit I may well not have even known existed. So was I free to choose to think of eating a durian before I even knew what it was? What about a punnet of strawberries. I do know about them and they were in my fridge - but they just did not enter my mind. So was I free to "will" the thought of strawberries? Yes? How? How could I have control over what enters my mind at any time?

Rami has suggested before that I could take actions prior to doing stuff that make my other actions more free and that these simple examples about whether to drink tea or coffee aren't good. So donut or banana is not a good example - but I should scrutinise something deeper like my motivations for eating things.

So in the "What shall I eat?" example above the idea here is that:

I normally eat bad stuff and get fat.

I want to get thin and more healthy.

I remove all donuts from my house and stock my pantry with healthy foods after doing research of what they are. And I replace my television with an exercise bike.

But the *urge* - the *will* I have to do all that stuff that makes eating donuts less likely - that itself is *not free* anymore than any other choice has been. I don't know why I have the preference to live healthy. It's an urge I just have. Why didn't I have that urge yesterday? Sure I can tell a causal story. Perhaps I read an article about how bananas and exercise bikes make people healthy and healthy people will live longer and I want to live longer because I just got a boyfriend and made a breakthrough in my research. But this breakthrough came through chance when I reflect on it. And so did my new relationship - started through a chance meeting. So much chance. So much out of my control. And these things make me feel I want new things. All out of my control. I can tell causal stories but at no point am I freely choosing the contents of my will.

Making choices about what the future is going to be like just returns us to the problem with full force once more. Why should I care about my future states? This itself is a preference, of course. Some people do not have the preference to care much about the future. Some people live more for the moment than others - eating, drinking - taking pleasure now with little regard for tomorrow. Their will is all about the present moment. Some care too much about the future and too little about the present moment.

You may delay your pleasure and choose instead to think about your preferred future states. But why? Isn't it because you feel the desire to do this? Where did that desire come from? Did it not just arise in your mind, unbidden by you?

You are not responsible for this.

Now Elliot is concerned about the consequences of this for morality. I do not see why. It is true, what I say here means that people are ultimately not responsible for their actions. They are victims of what occurs. You are conscious of what happens to you. You are conscious (i.e: aware) of your own thoughts and actions. You are aware of what your will is. You are powerless to act against your will unless someone else coerces you. If you think "Well that is ridiculous and just to prove to Brett that he is wrong - I want to reply but now I will act against that will right...now" that is hardly the case, is it? After all - the will to act against one's will is just another way of saying you just did what you wanted to. You had no control. You deliberated between replying and not and decided not to. Because that was your will. But you - as the conscious subject of that process was merely *aware that the decision was made*.


This does not mean *choice* is not real. Or unimportant. Choice is both real and important. There are good and bad choices. But this doesn't give us free will. Admitting that choices are real and important does not mean we have to lie to ourselves about the source of our will. The will arises for reasons that we have no control over. At one level - because of events in our lives like...we saw a pretty girl or boy and now choose to follow them. At another level - which does not contradict the first - our preferences arise because this or that pattern of neurones fired rather than some other. Again - we've no control over that.

If you think you are *identical to your thoughts* then none of this will speak to you. Of course I think that the idea that we *are* our stream of thoughts is patently false. Again you can cease to think, but not cease to be as a result. You might *feel* identical to some stream of thoughts going through your head - to the words that enter your mind. But this is simply wrong. The thoughts your mind has are no more you than the blood which might pound in your ears after exercise. Once relaxed, your pulse may become so quiet as to be unable to be heard. Quieter still then your thoughts vanish likewise. Yet you can still notice yourself there. Not explaining. Not conjecturing. Not thinking. But existing. As the subject of whatever happens next. Maybe a sound or flash of colour. A bird tweets, a car goes by. You are not in control. A thought. You did not control it enter your mind. You think "this is ridiculous" - and yet you did not *decide* to have that thought. It just *appeared in consciousness* like the bird or car.

So you are not responsible for your thoughts. Or those thoughts we call 'preferences'. Or that thing we call "will".

Yet choices are made. And people make bad choices. And although they are not responsible for them - if the choices are bad enough then we need to protect ourselves. We need to imprison dangerous people. Perhaps kill them. Is this the domain of morality? How to live the good life?

If the choices of a person lead towards the bad life and it's violent and destructive - lock them up. I need invoke no notion of "responsibility" here. As I said before - following Sam - we would imprison tornadoes and earthquakes if we could. We need attribute no "free will" to them to regard them as dangerous and in need of guarding against and acting when they threaten.

If your choices are about learning more and making lots of progress and money - great. Actions you take to make this all possible - how wonderful. But why do you have this will to do any of it? Will you congratulate yourself for being so motivated?

I feel some people congratulate themselves for not being born disabled. For being born into a rich family. I feel some people congratulate themselves for not having Downs Syndrome and the number of chromosomes for a human being. They feel - or act - or speak - as if they are somehow responsible for all this and deserve to feel proud.

But you're in control of none of it. You're not responsible for it. And it's those things which actually have direct effects on the kind of thoughts you have and the preferences you have. The preferences (desires) of a starving African child are for food.

A billionaire has a preference to buy another Yacht.

Where's the freedom in any of that? They seem to just prefer what they do given their circumstance. A circumstance over which they had no control and which they just witness. Actions taken, they witness. Things happen to them. Thoughts enter their mind or not. The billionaire might never even know the African child exists. So are they free to donate food and money to them? The African child might never know there's a town just walking distance away where they could find refuge and sustenance. Are they free to walk in a direction they aren't in a position to know anything about?

A moment's reflection on just how thoughts arise in your own mind likewise reveal this. You have no clue how thoughts arise in the mind. At least - I don't know what I am about to type next and yet I seem to be freely typing. What freedom is there in my choice of what to type next? Why didn't I think I writing a different reply? I could go back and delete all of this - but I don't feel like I want to. Where's the freedom in that? Where's my free will? I can't choose to want to delete what I just don't want to. What's the will if not this desire over which I have no control? Isn't it just what I want to do? Why do I want what I want? A regress begins...and I'm not freely choosing any of my wants.

Brett

[Alan Forrester]

On 2 May 2012, at 23:48, David wrote:

>
>
> On May 2, 11:18 pm, Alan Forrester
> <alanmichaelforres...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Consider two distinct versions of Bob. One version of Bob learns to play to oboe (Bob 1), the other beats up a midget (Bob 2). What difference between Bob 1 and Bob 2 causes >their different actions?
>
> The thing is, up until the moment of choice Bob 1 and Bob 2 are
> fungible (in this reading of everett), so there is no "bob1 and bob2"
> they are fungible. At the decision-making moment this Bob chooses
> both, maybe in 99,9999999999999999% of the branches he decides to play
> oboe, but at least in 1 branch does he indeed "randomly" choose to
> beat up a midget instead because that's what the neurons in his brain
> decided on through some spontneous quantum rearrangement of neurons.

Have you read Chapter 4 of BoI? Your position that an action that is highly adapted to achieve a particular end is random is similar in substance to spontaneous generation and, therefore, to creationism. So your position is a bad explanation.

Alan

[steve whitt]

Finally a discussion worth having! Thanks for bringing it up.

Professor Deutsch's brilliant explanation of free will is actually in
Fabric of Reality. The essence of the idea goes to the heart of what
shadow photons tell us about the multiverse. It's a lesson that is
essentially the opposite of classical physics. In classical physics,
everything is determined, and the idea of free will is nonsense. But
classical physics doesn't describe the real world.

In the real world of the multiverse, every possibility occurs an
uncountably infinite number of times. However (and I'll admit I still
don't understand this), the uncountably infinite multiverse possesses
something Deutsch calls "measure", such that it still makes sense to
talk about some events as more likely than others.

First consider a multiverse in which no knowledge exists. As defined
by Professor Deutsch, “(K)nowledge is information which, when it is
embodied in a suitable environment, tends to cause itself to remain
so.” (BoI, p 123) Where there is no knowledge, there is no
differentiation of path A from path B - on a microscopic level, all
are equally likely. A superbeing who was able to observe the entire
multiverse would see a uniform fog with no obvious structures.

Now consider a multiverse in which knowledge has arisen, in the form
of life. An observer of this multiverse would see structures that are
more common than expected across the multiverse. A plant, for
instance, obeys the laws of physics, but its placement of chlorophyll
is not haphazard. Chlorophyll is placed by the plant in locations
where it helps the plant survive. These locations become regularities
across the multiverse.

How did this knowledge arise? Via variation and selection. Those
plants that didn't put their chlorophyll in the right place didn't
survive. Those that did thrived. Variation and selection provides this
very limited sort of free will present in the living world before
people arose.

Finally, consider a multiverse containing not just knowledge, but
universal explainers (people). Again, people make choices that are not
haphazard. Instead, we use conjecture and criticism (analogous to and
yet much more powerful than variation and selection) to create
knowledge, and we use that knowledge to make choices about the world.
At one point Deutsch quotes Popper as saying something like, we allow
our ideas to die in our place.

In such a multiverse, one containing people, those people make
choices, based on conjecture and criticism of their ideas. And this,
Deutsch argues, is the heart of free will. Here’s his argument, which
he presents in a chart in Chapter 13 of FoR:

After careful thought I chose to do X; I could have chosen otherwise;
it was the right decision; I am good at making such decisions. What do
each of these statements mean when looked at through the multiversal
lens?

After careful thought I chose to do X: in the multiverse view, this
means that some proportion of all the versions of me, including the
one speaking, chose to do X.

I could have chosen otherwise: in the multiverse view, some other
versions of me did choose otherwise.

It was the right decision, I am good at making such decisions: in the
multiverse view, a large majority of all the versions of me made this
decision – I have molded the multiverse by my decision-making.

From a deterministic world in which we really have no choices, Deutsch
has given us a uniform cloud called the multiverse. It’s up to us to
mold and shape that cloud into the form we choose. The multiverse is
ours for the making.

Like you, I was a free will skeptic before I read Professor Deutsch.
He convinced me. What do you think of this argument?

Steve

[Rami Rustom]

On May 3, 2012 3:01 AM, "Brett Hall" <brha...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> On 03/05/2012, at 7:18 AM, "Alan Forrester" <alanmichae...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
> >
> >
> > Consider two distinct versions of Bob. One version of Bob learns to play to oboe (Bob 1), the other beats up a midget (Bob 2). What difference between Bob 1 and Bob 2 causes their different actions?
> >
>
> Bob 1 and Bob 2 are just different people. I don't see that this is substantially different to asking why Bob and Alan choose to do different things?

Before the divergence event, the Bobs had the same ideas, preferences,
etc. But Bob and Alan never had the same ideas, preferences.

> They're different people having different experiences. So what? Certain observations are made by Bob 1 and so he has one experience and he conjectures theories and criticises others and settles on Oboe. But why does he do this? He wants to. Why? Why does he want to? He just does. It's his preference. He has no control over that.
>
> Bob 2 - apparently he prefers to beat up a midget. Why? He preferred to. Why? He can't explain it. Maybe the midget hit his girlfriend.

If Bob 2 saw the midget hit his girlfriend, then he *can* explain it.

> But why did he hit him and not go to the police? He can't explain it. He just thought it was better at the time and discarded any other theory that entered his head (perhaps none others did).

If he was indeed made that mistake, it might be because he's never
been presented with that situation and that emotion before. But he
could choose to reflect on that situation, his emotion, and his
response so the next time, he makes a better choice. Or he could
choose to think that he is not in control of his emotions and so he
doesn't reflect and he doesn't do better next time. In either case, he
*chose* [to change or not to change]. This is free will.

> Bob 1 and 2 are just witnessing things going on in their heads. Like we all do. I just witness my thoughts. I am just a conscious witness of my own thoughts and perceptions. A thought is something I perceive actually.

No. If you only *witness* your thoughts then you are consciously
choosing to not criticize them. Responsible people do more than just
*witness* their thoughts. They consciously criticize them in order to
discover the underlying ideas.

> I think you are the subject of your experience. Subject *of* them. In other words - a tsunami occurs and you do not control it. The bus goes left - and you go with it. You are aware of these things and you do not control them. Somehow people think that when the "event" occurs in your subjectivity that somehow you have more control. But actually - everything is occurring in the subjectivity of our consciousness otherwise we would not be aware of it. So the bus may well go left in the external world - but you only know about this because a chain of causation leads to the representation of this event in your consciousness. You have no control over the fact that as a matter of subjectivity - you *experience* the bus going left.
>
> What about your thoughts? Well don't you just perceive them in much the same way? I say you do. You have the *experience of having* a thought. You are not identical with your thoughts. The thought arises out of your control as the perception that the bus just went left did. It seems to me the only difference here is the fact that people associate the bus with things outside and over there and the thoughts somehow with "being me". But you are not your thoughts. You *have a thought* - just like you *have* any experience. You are aware of experiences.

You are describing a passenger of a bus. The passenger moves with the
bus and has no control over where the bus goes. But that analogy is
not accurate. A better one is that we are the driver of a bus. We
choose the acceration and direction of the bus. And there are of
course many other factors that we are not in control of. A truck could
mess up the rules of the road and blind side the bus in which case we
move with the bus. And if we noticed the truck in time, we could
change the direction of the bus and avoid a collision.

> I have been challenged a couple of times now to provide a refutation of the theory that we are universal explainers. I do not see that what I say here calls for that. The universality of our explanatory capacity is just that - a capacity. But it is not us. It is mysterious - how we have this capacity and how creativity works - but to say that I am "nothing but" a universal explainer I think is reductionistic. You might wish to define - as DD in BoI does - that a person = universal explainer, and fine. Then I am a person + more. Importantly, I am conscious. We don't know enough to say what the relationship between being a universal explainer and being conscious is. I guess that the former depends lawfully on the latter - but who knows? As DD has said 'there cannot be more than one kind of person'. But then there *might* be universal explainers without consciousness. Can there be? On page 415 of the hardback of BoI I get the impression that perhaps UKC must be conscious - but I'm not sure. Consciousness might be a pre-requisite for being a universal explainer. So we are "people". But if being a person means being a universal explainer and being a universal explainer means being conscious then fine. I still do not think that refutes anything I say here...yet I feel that the idea that a person is nothing but a universal explainer may have some problems...
>
> For in my moment to moment experience I am not *constantly explaining things*. I can be conscious and yet without thought. Have I ceased to be a person at such moments? I would want to say "no". So I think there's something wrong with the argument in BoI to that extent.

Your explanation is reductionist. UKC does not necessitate creating
explanations every second of every day. It only means that we *do*
create explanations.

> It is merely that I have the "potential" to be a universal explainer? I don't get such arguments from the "potential" to do anything. After all - given knowledge we don't yet possess - any sufficiently large lump of silicon could probably be a universal explainer. Given the right circumstances - any cell in your body could be genetically engineered one day into a universal explainer.

No. A cell is not complex enough to provide the necessary complexity
of the human brain.

> Now - if I am right (I follow Sam Harris in this) then what matters for free will is not whether a person is a universal explainer - but rather whether you in your moment-to-moment experience control your own will.

I think that definition of free will doesn't make sense. Consider the
driver of a bus. The driver has the steering wheel pointed straight
ahead. There is a bump in the road that sends the bus slightly to the
left. The driver notices this and steers right to correct the
deviation. That is free will.

What you're saying is that because the bump in the road caused the bus
to go left, and the driver didn't know that was going to happen, that
he doesn't have free will. But this explanation doesn't make sense
because the driver can *choose* to correct the deviation. And if he
didn't choose to do so, and he got into an accident, then he may lose
his job because he made a bad choice.

> What does "will" even mean? I've asked this before. Doesn't it mean desire? Urge? Want? *Preference*? How can I control my urges? Sure I can have an urge for a donut - but then I also have an urge to say "No - I'd rather not give in to that. I'd rather eat well so I'll have a banana instead". But this is just one preference being discarded in favor of a better one. And why? Well, following the chapter on choices -  I have some conjecture that this preference is better than that because I criticise the donut preference and go in favor of the banana. But why should I find one preference more appealing and find the criticism of the other compelling at all?

Because these things are based on your knowledge, your ideas. If the
donut idea was inline with your knowledge and the banana wasn't, then
you would choose to eat the donut.

> It begins to become inscrutable to me and any story I tell is necessarily *post hoc*. After all the taste of the donut is preferred over the banana and yet criticisms against the donut cause me to reject it.

You chose to criticize your donut idea. Some people choose not
criticize it at all. And still other choose to criticize in the
opposite way siding with the donut over the banana because they don't
believe that the donut will hurt their health only negligibly.

> So why the banana? Ultimately I preferred the banana. My will was for the banana. I did not choose the will.

You said yourself that you criticized the donut idea. You *chose* to
criticize the donut idea and that led you to the banana idea.

> Indeed I believe I have given my will too much credence here. How often do we think deeply like this about mundane things? Mundane or not - I criticised the donut and it was rejected. And I *felt* I *preferred* the banana.

Why do you say *felt*? Feelings are not thoughts. *Feel* is not
equivalent to *think*. To feel means to have a preference without
explicitly knowing why. But your explanation is clearly explicit. So
you *thought* you preferred the banana.

> In this case the feeling of the preference is identical to the *thought* of a preference for the banana.

What do you mean by *identical*? Do you mean that they happen to
coincide? If so I agree. But I wouldn't say they are identical.

> Either way - I just notice this thought enter my consciousness - I did not choose it to. It chose me. And the choice was made to eat a banana and I was a witness to all this. Later - I come to write a story about what happened. Post hoc.

Are you suggesting that you could not choose to delay your action in
order to think more about your donut/banana choice?

> Indeed consider the fact that there was a large number of foods I might have thought of but simply did not. Where's the freedom in that? And what about all the foods I did not even know about?

If you want to know about more food, you can choose to google it.

> I could have walked down the shop and bought a durian. This is a fruit I may well not have even known existed. So was I free to choose to think of eating a durian before I even knew what it was?

No. But so what? Why do you think that means that you don't have free
will? Consider the bus driver. He has a map in compartment. But he
chose not to look at it. And he got lost. Does this mean he doesn't
have free will?

> What about a punnet of strawberries. I do know about them and they were in my fridge - but they just did not enter my mind. So was I free to "will" the thought of strawberries? Yes? How? How could I have control over what enters my mind at any time?

If you intend to eat strawberries daily because of a diet or
something, you could create a task in your task system on your
smartphone that reminders daily at a certain time to eat strawberries.

>
> Rami has suggested before that I could take actions prior to doing stuff that make my other actions more free and that these simple examples about whether to drink tea or coffee aren't good. So donut or banana is not a good example - but I should scrutinise something deeper like my motivations for eating things.
>
> So in the "What shall I eat?" example above the idea here is that:
>
> I normally eat bad stuff and get fat.
>
> I want to get thin and more healthy.
>
> I remove all donuts from my house and stock my pantry with healthy foods after doing research of what they are. And I replace my television with an exercise bike.

I think the tv and exercise bike go well together.

> But the *urge* - the *will* I have to do all that stuff that makes eating donuts less likely - that itself is *not free* anymore than any other choice has been. I don't know why I have the preference to live healthy. It's an urge I just have.

No. You *want* to live healthy because of an underlying idea you have
that you seem to have not discovered yet. That idea is that you don't
want to die. Or at least that you don't want to die younger than the
average person. So lets criticize that. Why do you care about that?
Why don't you instead want to enjoy your food more and accept that
dying young is ok?

> Why didn't I have that urge yesterday? Sure I can tell a causal story. Perhaps I read an article about how bananas and exercise bikes make people healthy and healthy people will live longer and I want to live longer because I just got a boyfriend and made a breakthrough in my research. But this breakthrough came through chance when I reflect on it. And so did my new relationship - started through a chance meeting. So much chance. So much out of my control. And these things make me feel I want new things. All out of my control. I can tell causal stories but at no point am I freely choosing the contents of my will.

No. That whole explanation assumes that you *want* to live longer.

> Making choices about what the future is going to be like just returns us to the problem with full force once more. Why should I care about my future states? This itself is a preference, of course. Some people do not have the preference to care much about the future. Some people live more for the moment than others - eating, drinking - taking pleasure now with little regard for tomorrow. Their will is all about the present moment. Some care too much about the future and too little about the present moment.
>
> You may delay your pleasure and choose instead to think about your preferred future states. But why? Isn't it because you feel the desire to do this? Where did that desire come from? Did it not just arise in your mind, unbidden by you?

No. You seem to not have criticized your *wants* on this matter. So
ask yourself: Why do you *want* to live longer? Is it because you want
to *be* with your family longer? Are you afraid of death?

> You are not responsible for this.

You *are* responsible for discovering why you think and feels things.

-- Rami

[Alan Forrester]

On 3 May 2012, at 08:53, Brett Hall wrote:

>
>
> Sent from my iPad
>
> On 03/05/2012, at 7:18 AM, "Alan Forrester" <alanmichae...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Consider two distinct versions of Bob. One version of Bob learns to play to oboe (Bob 1), the other beats up a midget (Bob 2). What difference between Bob 1 and Bob 2 causes their different actions?
>>
>
> Bob 1 and Bob 2 are just different people. I don't see that this is substantially different to asking why Bob and Alan choose to do different things?
>
> They're different people having different experiences. So what? Certain observations are made by Bob 1 and so he has one experience and he conjectures theories and criticises others and settles on Oboe. But why does he do this? He wants to. Why? Why does he want to? He just does. It's his preference. He has no control over that.

Two things.

(1) Bob 1 could abandon any particular preference he holds if there was a criticism of that preference.

(2) If you're saying he just does want to learn the oboe does that mean you think the BoI chapter on objective aesthetics is wrong? If aesthetics is objective he might choose the oboe because it is objectively the best choice he can make at the time.

> Bob 2 - apparently he prefers to beat up a midget. Why? He preferred to. Why? He can't explain it. Maybe the midget hit his girlfriend. But why did he hit him and not go to the police? He can't explain it. He just thought it was better at the time and discarded any other theory that entered his head (perhaps none others did).

It is not necessary for Bob 2 to know the explanation for why he wants to commit a particular act at the time he has the thought. What is important is that he could choose to reject a thought that seems bad and that he can

> Bob 1 and 2 are just witnessing things going on in their heads. Like we all do. I just witness my thoughts. I am just a conscious witness of my own thoughts and perceptions. A thought is something I perceive actually.

You say above that Bob 2 discarded some theories and kept the idea that he should beat up a midget, and now you say that he just witnesses his thoughts. Those two statements contradict one another.

Alan

[Manolis.A.C.]

Steve, I'm still not convinced. DD just passes the baton along in my humble opinion. What determines the probability distribution of me choosing X or otherwise in each universe?

Is it random? If so, then that's not free will either.

If there is an actual thought process at work by which I weigh alternatives and choose based on my mind's state and knowledge, then that exact same state and knowledge should produce the exact same decision each and every time. Why isn't that decision/action then uniform in the entire multiverse?

That to me is a major paradox inherent in the MWI that still does not allow me to embrace its broader interpretation of QM.

Manolis

[Brett Hall]

On 04/05/2012, at 8:18 AM, "Alan Forrester" <alanmichae...@googlemail.com> wrote:

>
> On 3 May 2012, at 08:53, Brett Hall wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Sent from my iPad
>>
>> On 03/05/2012, at 7:18 AM, "Alan Forrester" <alanmichae...@googlemail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Consider two distinct versions of Bob. One version of Bob learns to play to oboe (Bob 1), the other beats up a midget (Bob 2). What difference between Bob 1 and Bob 2 causes their different actions?
>>>
>>
>> Bob 1 and Bob 2 are just different people. I don't see that this is substantially different to asking why Bob and Alan choose to do different things?
>>
>> They're different people having different experiences. So what? Certain observations are made by Bob 1 and so he has one experience and he conjectures theories and criticises others and settles on Oboe. But why does he do this? He wants to. Why? Why does he want to? He just does. It's his preference. He has no control over that.
>
> Two things.
>
> (1) Bob 1 could abandon any particular preference he holds if there was a criticism of that preference.

Agreed.

>
> (2) If you're saying he just does want to learn the oboe does that mean you think the BoI chapter on objective aesthetics is wrong? If aesthetics is objective he might choose the oboe because it is objectively the best choice he can make at the time.

Agreed. I don't get your point. He might choose to Oboe because it's objectively the best choice. Maybe he beats up a midget because it's objectively the best choice. Maybe he does it for reasons other than this. Maybe there are more than just two choices - he could beat up a midget, play the oboe or watch the sunset. Or maybe there are 4 choices. Maybe an uncountable number? Maybe many of them are equally objectively good or beautiful or whatever. I'm still not getting you. The fungible Bobs do different things. Indeed they become Bob 1, 2,..., n precisely because they do different things. But they were all the same Bob once. And reflecting on why they did what they did...they just felt that they wanted to do whatever it is they ended up doing. Each one will have a different story to tell. Oboe Bob will tell a story about how beautiful it sounds and it was certainly the best choice for him to make. But so will violin Bob.

>
>> Bob 2 - apparently he prefers to beat up a midget. Why? He preferred to. Why? He can't explain it. Maybe the midget hit his girlfriend. But why did he hit him and not go to the police? He can't explain it. He just thought it was better at the time and discarded any other theory that entered his head (perhaps none others did).
>
> It is not necessary for Bob 2 to know the explanation for why he wants to commit a particular act at the time he has the thought. What is important is that he could choose to reject a thought that seems bad and that he can

He is aware of the fact that there are options available to him. He knows the difference between these choices. He is aware of deliberating between the choices. A choice is made that he witnesses. As the conscious witness of his experience he notices that a story can be told about why a particular choice was rejected.

This is a difficult way to explain things. We commonly want to say "Bob makes the choice". I don't want to say that. I want to say "Bob witnesses the choice made" as a matter of fact. But we are so used to the idea that Bob is identical to his thoughts - and so his choices - that we just always say that "Bob made the choice".

Choice is important. It's just that Bob *as the conscious subject of his experience* did not make the choice. He witnessed the choice made in his mind.

Again - if you think a person is identical to their thoughts - this makes no sense.

Mind is more than just thoughts. A mind which is not thinking - is still a mind. It's a mind empty of thoughts - but not of content. You still exist even if you are not thinking. So you cannot be your thoughts. If you were your thoughts you would cease to be when you ceased *thinking*. But that cannot be, because throughout the day - even though most of the time you are thinking - you are sometimes not thinking. Meditators are conscious of this. Most of us just never notice when we aren't thinking. It's hard to "catch yourself" not thinking and it seems to entail a contradiction. It doesn't.

>
>> Bob 1 and 2 are just witnessing things going on in their heads. Like we all do. I just witness my thoughts. I am just a conscious witness of my own thoughts and perceptions. A thought is something I perceive actually.
>
> You say above that Bob 2 discarded some theories and kept the idea that he should beat up a midget, and now you say that he just witnesses his thoughts. Those two statements contradict one another.

I agree. It's the difficulty I have with arguing with people who believe they are identical to their thoughts. Hence the digression above. It's easier to more loosely speak about you or me or Bob making choices and being the ultimate and final cause in their decisions. But they never are. The choice is just one link in a chain of events that stretches back to the big bang and which brings the future into being.

You just happen to be the conscious thing at that moment aware of a particular link in the chain. Aware of the thought - and how that is causal - of future actions.

Of course this now gets into that curly issue of how consciousness is tied up with the present moment. What is it about the present moment that is different to all others? What makes it special? Just that consciousness is of the present moment.

Anyways - you are right. I contradicted myself. To clarify: Bob 2 did not discard some theories and keep others - he witnessed in his own head the discarding of some theories and keeping of others. It's just that appending that qualification to every single thing - even though it's true - gets so cumbersome. I am apt to slip between these three forms of the word "you" which almost everyone does:

You = you the subject of your experience (most correct)

You = your mind (whatever this means. If it means something like "your stream of thoughts" which is what most people seem to mean by it - then in reality this is not what you are as I've argued).

You = your body. Most people speak this way. So if you are laying on the couch and taking up all the room and I say "Would you please move?" I actually mean "Move your legs please" but your legs aren't you. I don't have to be more specific though do I? Your legs moved even though I asked *you* to move. But I can see how in these discussions it can get tricky.

Brett.

[steve whitt]

On May 4, 3:04 am, "Manolis.A.C." <manolis....@gmail.com> wrote:


> If there is an actual thought process at work by which I weigh alternatives and choose based on my mind's state and knowledge, then that exact same state and knowledge should produce the exact same decision each and every time. Why isn't that decision/action then uniform in the entire multiverse?

> Manolis

Hi Manolis. Yes, I wondered about the same thing. Elliot helped me
work this out a while ago. Indeed, the scenario you describe would be
the case in a deterministic universe. But the multiverse is of an
entirely different character. The state will never be the same across
the multiverse. There is an irreducibly random element. This is the
complete reversal of our conception of the world brought on by the
multiverse view, rather than the "clockwork universe" of classical
physics.

Consider an Earth in the (hopefully not too distant) future, where our
technology is such that we can deflect asteroids. If for some reason
the Earth were without people, it would be unable to avoid an asteroid
on a collision course. Perhaps in one instance of the multiverse that
asteroid approaches from the direction of Ursa Major. In another
instance a different asteroid approaches from the direction of the
Southern Cross. In both instances the Earth will be hit (though of
course the details of each collision will be wholly different in these
two different instances).

Now consider the same scenario, but include people with technology in
the equation. We might well choose to deflect the Ursa Major asteroid
one way in the first instance, the Southern Cross asteroid another way
in a different instance. In only a tiny fraction of instances (one
would hope) would we make a mistake and deflect the asteroids the
wrong way. The result of people with technology, then, would be an
Earth that avoids asteroid collision across a wide swath of the
multiverse.

The point is, given widely varying initial inputs (something made
inevitable by the nature of the multiverse), we make decisions that
result in similar-looking outcomes. How do we do it? Unlike knowledge-
free entities (like a lifeless Earth), we do not react in a single,
predictable way to an input. We are more like entities with a little
knowledge (plants, for instance, which store their knowledge in their
genetic code). In a single universe, various plants "choose" distinct
survival strategies based both on random input from their instance of
the multiverse and on the program found in their genes. Sometimes,
that random input overwhelms the genetic program and causes the plant
to do something dumb. Across the multiverse, however, a large number
of instances of a well-adapted plant will make the same "choice"
because the genetic program overwhelms the random input from the
various instances of the multiverse. That's what "well-adapted"
means.

Now consider conscious beings. Randomness is still there - you can't
eliminate that, due to the nature of the multiverse. However, not only
our genetic program but also our conscious minds allow us to be
selective about our actions even given random input. I, a conscious
being, can choose to ignore a particular input, or react to it in a
variety of ways. This is based on my ideas - I can try out various
courses of action in my mind (or on my computer simulation) and decide
on the course I want - again, based on my ideas and experience of what
I want. "We can allow our theories die in our place."

I know what you're getting at. Isn't this still deterministic? Yes, in
some sense in each instance of the multiverse our brains must of
course obey the laws of physics. But the depth of knowledge
instantiated in our consciousness allows us a wide variety of
potential responses to input, each of which still obeys the laws of
physics. Yes, at some point there's some trigger that causes this
particular chain of events, and we don't control that trigger (the
random nature of the multiverse does). But our consciousness, if it's
working well, makes us much less sensitive to those random triggers.
My daughter might come home and give me a hug, or she might tell me
she hates my guts. Either way, I'm not going to shoot her. On some
level, I'm insensitive to random inputs because my consciousness, my
knowledge, my experience, allow me to conjecture and criticize
possible courses of action.

And you're right, this is not classical free will. Classically, we
live in a deterministic universe, but we are free agents, able somehow
to make choices outside the shackles of determinism. But that universe
doesn't exist (and really, outside of supernaturalism, how could it?).
Instead, we live in a random, chaotic multiverse that is an even fog
of possibility. Only knowledge-bearing entities, and people in
particular, have the ability to make some order out of that chaos, by
discovering its nature and realizing that we can apply our knowledge
to make choices that transform the world. It might not be classical
free will, but it's the best we've got.

[Manolis]

On Fri, May 4, 2012 at 3:54 PM, steve whitt <smw...@gmail.com> wrote:

On May 4, 3:04 am, "Manolis.A.C." <manolis....@gmail.com> wrote:

The point is, given widely varying initial inputs (something made
inevitable by the nature of the multiverse), we make decisions that
result in similar-looking outcomes.

Here is my first gripe with your explanation. "Widely varying initial inputs"? What makes them widely varied? (You do reply to that further down, but that "explanation" bugs me even more!). ;-)

 

How do we do it? Unlike knowledge-
free entities (like a lifeless Earth), we do not react in a single,
predictable way to an input. We are more like entities with a little
knowledge (plants, for instance, which store their knowledge in their
genetic code).  In a single universe, various plants "choose" distinct
survival strategies based both on random input from their instance of
the multiverse and on the program found in their genes. Sometimes,
that random input overwhelms the genetic program and causes the plant
to do something dumb. Across the multiverse, however, a large number
of instances of a well-adapted plant will make the same "choice"
because the genetic program overwhelms the random input from the
various instances of the multiverse. That's what "well-adapted"
means.

Random input from the various instances of the multiverse? Am I missing something here? I thought the multiverse does away with the randomness inherent in the Copenhagen Interpretation and realigns QM with Determinism. Can you explain random to me? I mean, really, really random. As in ontological, not epistemic uncertainty. Is there such a thing in the universe as truly random? If there is one thing it's the random decay of atoms, but here we go back to what interpretation you give to QM. If you stick with CI, then yes, it's somehow magically random. But MWI should be deterministic, should it not?

 

Now consider conscious beings. Randomness is still there - you can't
eliminate that, due to the nature of the multiverse. However, not only
our genetic program but also our conscious minds allow us to be
selective about our actions even given random input. I, a conscious
being, can choose to ignore a particular input, or react to it in a
variety of ways. This is based on my ideas - I can try out various
courses of action in my mind (or on my computer simulation) and decide
on the course I want - again, based on my ideas and experience of what
I want. "We can allow our theories die in our place."

Again, same gripe with "randomness". 

 

I know what you're getting at. Isn't this still deterministic? Yes, in
some sense in each instance of the multiverse our brains must of
course obey the laws of physics. But the depth of knowledge
instantiated in our consciousness allows us a wide variety of
potential responses to input, each of which still obeys the laws of
physics. Yes, at some point there's some trigger that causes this
particular chain of events, and we don't control that trigger (the
random nature of the multiverse does). But our consciousness, if it's
working well, makes us much less sensitive to those random triggers.
My daughter might come home and give me a hug, or she might tell me
she hates my guts. Either way, I'm not going to shoot her. On some
level, I'm insensitive to random inputs because my consciousness, my
knowledge, my experience, allow me to conjecture and criticize
possible courses of action.

Your consciousness depends on the patterns of your neurons firing which in turn depend on physical laws. Your reaction, based on the neural pathways you have already formed and the definitiveness of your sensory inputs cannot produce different outcomes. We may not know beforehand how exactly you will react to a given stimulus, but you will react in some definitive way. And yes, I do believe that free will is an illusion, or rather, is a much more developed case of "free will" than your plants example. (Where their genetic code decides how they react to each stressor/stimulus). 

 

And you're right, this is not classical free will. Classically, we
live in a deterministic universe, but we are free agents, able somehow
to make choices outside the shackles of determinism.

Actually, (as said above) I find that kind of "free will" to be nonsensical. 

If you can explain random to me, then I might see what it is I'm missing. But as long as we simply push back the problem to that, (things being "random" at some fundamental level), the more I tend to find the "consciousness" explanations of CI equally plausible or implausible. 

Manolis

 

But that universe
doesn't exist (and really, outside of supernaturalism, how could it?).
Instead, we live in a random, chaotic multiverse that is an even fog
of possibility. Only knowledge-bearing entities, and people in
particular, have the ability to make some order out of that chaos, by
discovering its nature and realizing that we can apply our knowledge
to make choices that transform the world. It might not be classical
free will, but it's the best we've got.

--
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[steve whitt]

On May 4, 1:38 pm, Manolis <manolis....@gmail.com> wrote:

> Here is my first gripe with your explanation. "Widely varying initial
> inputs"? What makes them widely varied? (You do reply to that further down,
> but that "explanation" bugs me even more!). ;-)

> Random input from the various instances of the multiverse? Am I missing
> something here? I thought the multiverse does away with the randomness
> inherent in the Copenhagen Interpretation and realigns QM with Determinism.
> Can you explain random to me? I mean, really, really random. As in

> *ontological,
> *not* epistemic *uncertainty. Is there such a thing in the universe as

> truly random? If there is one thing it's the random decay of atoms, but
> here we go back to what interpretation you give to QM. If you stick with
> CI, then yes, it's somehow magically random. But MWI should be
> deterministic, should it not?

This was the shift for me, as well. I'd thought of QM as adding a
little randomness here and there to a more-or-less deterministic
universe. But both DD books made me see that just the opposite is
true. I just finished reading "QED: the Strange Theory of Light and
Matter" by Feynman and he puts it beautifully. Photons of a particular
color (say, from a laser beam) are identical. Yet shine them at a half-
silvered mirror and half go through, half bounce off. How can two
identical photons display such disparate behaviors? Feynman says
physics has given up trying to explain it.

The answer from Professor Deutsch is that from a multiverse
perspective the behavior of the photons is completely predictable. In
half the instances, the photon goes through. In the other half, it
bounces off. But in any one instance (and we observers are "stuck" in
just one instance) we have no way of predicting which we'll observe
for any one photon. In essence, we have no way of predicting which
instance we'll find ourselves in. This is not just a small effect
having to do with radioactive decay or laser pointers; it is in fact
intrinsic to the nature of the multiverse. In some parts of the
multiverse, an asteroid just smashed into the Earth. In other parts, a
cosmic ray just passed through my body, producing a defect that will
lead to cancer and my eventual death. In still others, a long chain of
unlikely coincidences led supermodel Kate Upton to call me up for a
date (these are likely a quite small fraction of the whole!).

>
>

> Your consciousness depends on the patterns of your neurons firing which in
> turn depend on physical laws. Your reaction, based on the neural pathways

> you have already formed and the definitiveness of your sensory inputs *
> cannot* produce different outcomes. We may not *know* beforehand how
> exactly you will react to a given stimulus, but you *will* react in some

> definitive way. And yes, I do believe that free will is an illusion, or
> rather, is a much more developed case of "free will" than your plants
> example. (Where their genetic code decides how they react to each
> stressor/stimulus).

Yes, I agree with this completely. This was my struggle for a long
time. How do you get free will out of deterministic inputs (even those
we can't "know")? From a single universe perspective, I don't believe
you can. But it is the collection of "tools" (knowledge, experiences,
ideals) that I have built up over time that make me in a certain sense
resistant to the varying inputs of the multiverse. In the example I
gave earlier, my daughter may give me a hug or tell me she hates me.
Either way, my collection of tools enable me to not shoot her. This is
the essence of free will in the multiverse. I have knowledge. That
knowledge allows me to make decisions that mold and shape the world in
ways that knowledge-free entities never can. In a sense, it is "just"
a much more developed case of the genetic code. I don't have to
produce a million seeds, each with slight variations, to see which one
will survive. I can try out a million conjectures, criticize them in
my mind, and come to a course of action.

> If you can explain random to me, then I might see what it is I'm missing.
> But as long as we simply push back the problem to that, (things being
> "random" at some fundamental level), the more I tend to find the
> "consciousness" explanations of CI equally plausible or implausible.
>
> Manolis

I hope we're getting closer. This was a shocker for me, too. Brian
Greene talks about the multiverse in "The Hidden Reality" as removing
the dice rolls of CI. Yes, sort of, when seen from the grand
perspective of the whole multiverse. But from our perspective, trapped
in a single instance, the randomness is a fundamental feature. We
can't know where a cosmic ray will hit, because in traveling through
space it has spread out to be larger than the Earth. Only when
decoherence occurs can we see that it hit me, or the table near me, or
the ocean thousands of miles away, or that it missed the Earth
entirely. Our particular instance of the multiverse is irreducibly
random.

What do you think? Have I made things better, or worse?

Steve

[Brett Hall]

> I hope we're getting closer. This was a shocker for me, too. Brian
> Greene talks about the multiverse in "The Hidden Reality" as removing
> the dice rolls of CI. Yes, sort of, when seen from the grand
> perspective of the whole multiverse. But from our perspective, trapped
> in a single instance, the randomness is a fundamental feature. We
> can't know where a cosmic ray will hit, because in traveling through
> space it has spread out to be larger than the Earth. Only when
> decoherence occurs can we see that it hit me, or the table near me, or
> the ocean thousands of miles away, or that it missed the Earth
> entirely. Our particular instance of the multiverse is irreducibly
> random.
>
> What do you think? Have I made things better, or worse?

Better. Thanks Steve. I've found your most recent two posts on this topic - including this one - some of the clearest explanations of the way that randomness and determinism are to be understood in light of quantum theory. Such things might have been said before but your way of explaining things was convincing to me.

But for everything I still don't see that it adds to the question of whether we have free will or not. After all from a god's eye view things are set in place and choices are just events in a causal chain no different to any others except that we are aware of them going on inside our head. But they are part of the chain of events - caused by other things of which we are *not conscious*. We did not choose the causes of our choices. That's clear in a deterministic multiverse. Whatever it is that makes us feel like we want (will) one thing over others after deliberation occurs outside our minds and we always act in accordance with our will unless someone coerces us.

At the level of the individual observer things can seemingly occur randomly. And from the perspective of that conscious observer - genuinely randomly as you say. It's a fundamental feature. This includes some of the choices I witness being made inside my head. Much of the time I might be able to tell a story about why I did what I did. I explain why my actions were rational...but no matter what story I tell I am saying my choice was determined by prior things over which I had no control. But other times I might have no reason. This is still because things are determined by prior causes but sometimes the outcome from my perspective genuinely is random. That also gives me no control.

With the asteroid heading towards Earth it's heading towards Earth from my perspective entirely randomly because the distribution of matter and energy throughout space and time in my universe is in that particular configuration that caused it to head my way. From the perspective of the multiverse I am just in one of those places where the asteroid as a matter of ontological certainty given our laws of physics must head towards Earth. On othe Earths other things happen and no asteroid is heading my way and so all my actions and apparent choices will be different because the circumstances there which I did not choose will be different too.

My choice about what to do next in my universe with the asteroid occurs just because there is an asteroid heading towards Earth. I had no choice over the asteroid heading my way and so I have no choice in the matter about what my will shall be about next. It will be about the asteroid. It may be to help in the effort to deflect it or it may be to ignore it but the asteroid will enter my consciousness and over that I have no control and I have no control about how I feel about it. I will simply feel some way and i will obey this feeling that i call my will over which I have no control. I may notice that I think long and hard and arrive at the conclusion that I should help. But I simply felt that I should think long and hard and I felt I should help. I witnessed all that. I had no control. Such feelings impinge on my senses just like the asteroid itself does. And again these feelings enter my head ultimately because of the random event of the asteroid in my universe heading my way. I did not choose to be in this universe. If I did not choose this universe, how can I choose the next? It chooses me.

So admitting that there is *both* determinism and randomness inherent in reality cannot solve the chimera of a 'problem' that is free will.

Brett.

>
> Steve
>
> --
>

[Manolis]

On Fri, May 4, 2012 at 10:09 PM, steve whitt <smw...@gmail.com> wrote:

On May 4, 1:38 pm, Manolis <manolis....@gmail.com> wrote:

> Here is my first gripe with your explanation. "Widely varying initial
> inputs"? What makes them widely varied? (You do reply to that further down,
> but that "explanation" bugs me even more!). ;-)

> Random input from the various instances of the multiverse? Am I missing
> something here? I thought the multiverse does away with the randomness
> inherent in the Copenhagen Interpretation and realigns QM with Determinism.
> Can you explain random to me? I mean, really, really random. As in

> *ontological,
> *not* epistemic *uncertainty. Is there such a thing in the universe as

> truly random? If there is one thing it's the random decay of atoms, but
> here we go back to what interpretation you give to QM. If you stick with
> CI, then yes, it's somehow magically random. But MWI should be
> deterministic, should it not?

This was the shift for me, as well. I'd thought of QM as adding a
little randomness here and there to a more-or-less deterministic
universe. But both DD books made me see that just the opposite is
true. I just finished reading "QED: the Strange Theory of Light and
Matter" by Feynman and he puts it beautifully. Photons of a particular
color (say, from a laser beam) are identical. Yet shine them at a half-
silvered mirror and half go through, half bounce off. How can two
identical photons display such disparate behaviors? Feynman says
physics has given up trying to explain it.

OK, so w2hat you're saying is that MWI-QM still retains a "first principle" of randomness in nature, with the only distinction being that the photons not collapsing in our universe, collapsing in some other? That's not the way I had understood it. If that is the case, then MWI would just be substituting the random nature of the subatomic world where part of the particle-wave collapses and the rest remains in potentia, with an explanation that says it all collapses in various universes with a specific distribution. Which universe we end up in, still remains "random". "Random" to me is akin to saying "a wizard did it" as DD has so eloquently said in the past. 

So, still, what is "random"? And what determines the probability distribution of how the particle-wave will collapse? 

Sorry for being so stubborn, but I still don't get this explanation.

 

The answer from Professor Deutsch is that from a multiverse
perspective the behavior of the photons is completely predictable. In
half the instances, the photon goes through. In the other half, it
bounces off.

OK, but this assumes a uniform distribution which I can understand and almost semi-accept. Anything more than a uniform distribution though adds at least a bit of information there as a more elaborate "instruction" in the universe's code. If it isn't uniform, what force or process generates and determines that instruction?

 

But in any one instance (and we observers are "stuck" in
just one instance) we have no way of predicting which we'll observe
for any one photon. In essence, we have no way of predicting which
instance we'll find ourselves in. This is not just a small effect
having to do with radioactive decay or laser pointers; it is in fact
intrinsic to the nature of the multiverse. In some parts of the
multiverse, an asteroid just smashed into the Earth. In other parts, a
cosmic ray just passed through my body, producing a defect that will
lead to cancer and my eventual death. In still others, a long chain of
unlikely coincidences led supermodel Kate Upton to call me up for a
date (these are likely a quite small fraction of the whole!).

I can understand epistemic uncertainty and randomness from our perspective. So either you give me that, and explain the probability distribution (if not uniform), or you still claim that even that is "random", (ontological uncertainty), which begs for more explanation. 

> Your consciousness depends on the patterns of your neurons firing which in
> turn depend on physical laws. Your reaction, based on the neural pathways

> you have already formed and the definitiveness of your sensory inputs *
> cannot* produce different outcomes. We may not *know* beforehand how
> exactly you will react to a given stimulus, but you *will* react in some

> definitive way. And yes, I do believe that free will is an illusion, or
> rather, is a much more developed case of "free will" than your plants
> example. (Where their genetic code decides how they react to each
> stressor/stimulus).

Yes, I agree with this completely. This was my struggle for a long
time. How do you get free will out of deterministic inputs (even those
we can't "know")? From a single universe perspective, I don't believe
you can. But it is the collection of "tools" (knowledge, experiences,
ideals) that I have built up over time that make me in a certain sense
resistant to the varying inputs of the multiverse. In the example I
gave earlier, my daughter may give me a hug or tell me she hates me.
Either way, my collection of tools enable me to not shoot her. This is
the essence of free will in the multiverse. I have knowledge. That
knowledge allows me to make decisions that mold and shape the world in
ways that knowledge-free entities never can. In a sense, it is "just"
a much more developed case of the genetic code. I don't have to
produce a million seeds, each with slight variations, to see which one
will survive. I can try out a million conjectures, criticize them in
my mind, and come to a course of action.

We agree here. We have the appearance of free-will,but only if things happening in the universe have clockwork determinism from a "Laplacian Demon's" point of view. If however there is an underlying force that makes the inputs we receive ontologically or in this case, even epistemically (just from our universe's POV) random, than that same force should produce random outputs as well. So we have an elaborate choice-making machinery on top of a random-generator, which in this case makes free-will deeply problematic for me. 

Manolis

[steve whitt]

On May 4, 8:34 pm, Brett Hall <brhal...@hotmail.com> wrote:

>
> But for everything I still don't see that it adds to the question of whether we have free will or not. After all from a god's eye view things are set in place and choices are just events in a causal chain no different to any others except that we are aware of them going on inside our head. But they are part of the chain of events - caused by other things of which we are *not conscious*. We did not choose the causes of our choices. That's clear in a deterministic multiverse. Whatever it is that makes us feel like we want (will) one thing over others after deliberation occurs outside our minds and we always act in accordance with our will unless someone coerces us.
>
> At the level of the individual observer things can seemingly occur randomly. And from the perspective of that conscious observer - genuinely randomly as you say. It's a fundamental feature. This includes some of the choices I witness being made inside my head. Much of the time I might be able to tell a story about why I did what I did. I explain why my actions were rational...but no matter what story I tell I am saying my choice was determined by prior things over which I had no control. But other times I might have no reason. This is still because things are determined by prior causes but sometimes the outcome from my perspective genuinely is random. That also gives me no control.
>
> With the asteroid heading towards Earth it's heading towards Earth from my perspective entirely randomly because the distribution of matter and energy throughout space and time in my universe is in that particular configuration that caused it to head my way. From the perspective of the multiverse I am just in one of those places where the asteroid as a matter of ontological certainty given our laws of physics must head towards Earth. On othe Earths other things happen and no asteroid is heading my way and so all my actions and apparent choices will be different because the circumstances there which I did not choose will be different too.
>
> My choice about what to do next in my universe with the asteroid occurs just because there is an asteroid heading towards Earth. I had no choice over the asteroid heading my way and so I have no choice in the matter about what my will shall be about next. It will be about the asteroid. It may be to help in the effort to deflect it or it may be to ignore it but the asteroid will enter my consciousness and over that I have no control and I have no control about how I feel about it. I will simply feel some way and i will obey this feeling that i call my will over which I have no control. I may notice that I think long and hard and arrive at the conclusion that I should help. But I simply felt that I should think long and hard and I felt I should help. I witnessed all that. I had no control. Such feelings impinge on my senses just like the asteroid itself does. And again these feelings enter my head ultimately because of the random event of the asteroid in my universe heading my way. I did not choose to be in this universe. If I did not choose this universe, how can I choose the next? It chooses me.
>
> So admitting that there is *both* determinism and randomness inherent in reality cannot solve the chimera of a 'problem' that is free will.
>
> Brett.

OK. Now we're getting away from me trying to faithfully report how I
interpret Professor Deutsch and into my own, surely flawed, analysis.
But I'll give it a shot.


You said, "We did not choose the causes of our choices."

I agree to a point. We are who we are because of our genetics and our
experiences. As experiences build, a feedback loop starts to work. But
you're right, it begins with determinism.

You said, "I had no choice over the asteroid heading my way and so I

have no choice in the matter about what my will shall be about next."

I agree with the first part of your statement, but disagree with the
second. You are the sum of your experiences (plus genetics). Your
experiences plus genetics have resulted in a complex mechanism called
consciousness. The amazing thing about consciousness is that it can
modify response to input. More on this below.

You said, " If I did not choose this universe, how can I choose the
next? It chooses me."

This I disagree with. While it is true that I can't decide whether I
find myself in the instance of the multiverse in which the photon goes
through the glass or is reflected from the glass, what I can do is
take action to change the circumstances. I can break the glass.

I just reread Professor Deutsch's section on free will in FoR. He
makes a point of discussing that in a deterministic world, not only
the past but the future is determined. In such a world, free will is
nonsense.

But we do not live in such a world.

In BoI, Deutsch makes one of his most profound statements: Life will
end on our planet, unless people decide otherwise.

This gets at the heart of the issue. The future is not determined. We
(you and I, sitting in front of computers) have the power to choose
our future. As I said above, I can break the glass. We can choose to
modify the universe. Given the right knowledge, we can even preserve
the Earth as an abode for life, or create a new habitat for Earthly
life far out in space. The future instance of the multiverse in which
we find ourselves in really is up to us, because our choices are and
can be such a powerful force for molding that instance.

I know you're still not satisfied. Everything you've said about the
determinism of the past moving into the future is, in my opinion,
correct. We start off as our genes, plus perhaps experiences from the
womb. Choices others make affect us. At some point, we make a first
choice - which itself was deterministic ("We do not choose the causes
of our choices.") This choice, as well as the actions of others, begin
to shape our experiences. Eventually we are a complex amalgam of genes
and experiences, yet still the way we react to any input (even if we
can't predict it) is pre-determined by the laws of physics. I think
that's exactly true, and so this sort of free will perhaps will never
satisfy you.

But consider this. In chapter 4 of BoI, Deutsch discusses the process
of creation (as in creating a good explanation) as being
unpredictable. Why? Because any account of that process of discovery
would itself be the discovery. When Einstein created general
relativity, he began with previous experience and inputs. If we had
known exactly all those previous experiences and all those inputs, as
well as the beginning geometry of Einstein's conscious mind, we could
have put it all into a universal simulator and come out with general
relativity. But such a simulator would itself be Einstein!

So what has the multiverse given us that classical physics never
could?

1) Unlike classical physics, in the multiverse our particular slice of
history is not determined, because (fundamentally, ontologically)
unpredictable events will connect us to one or another history,
outside of our choosing (the photon will be transmitted or reflected,
the asteroid will approach from Ursa Major or the Southern Cross).

2) Unlike classical physics, once we find ourselves in one instance,
we can choose how the future of that instance will play out (we can
choose to deflect the asteroid or die). Because the fundamentally,
ontologically unpredictable set of circumstances led to this
particular instance we happen to be in, our epistemically uncertain
thought processes have never been "tried out" on these inputs. Trying
them out would be that history. We can choose to deflect the asteroid,
and that will lead to one history. We can choose to ignore the
asteroid, and that will lead to another, quite different, history.

It's a little like "robot wars" with the added twist of a truly random
selector for determining which robots match up. What universe will we
end up in? No one can know. How will our "program" deal with the
curveballs we're sure to get? Because of the answer "no one can know"
to the first question (and the variety is infinite), the second
becomes "no one can know", as well. No, it isn't classical free will
(but that was always a chimera), but it is kind of exciting. Don't you
think?

[steve whitt]

On May 5, 3:19 am, Manolis <manolis....@gmail.com> wrote:

> OK, so w2hat you're saying is that MWI-QM still retains a "first principle"
> of randomness in nature, with the only distinction being that the photons
> not collapsing in our universe, collapsing in some other? That's not the
> way I had understood it. If that is the case, then MWI would just be
> substituting the random nature of the subatomic world where part of the
> particle-wave collapses and the rest remains in potentia, with an
> explanation that says it all collapses in various universes with a specific
> distribution. Which universe we end up in, still remains "random". "Random"
> to me is akin to saying "a wizard did it" as DD has so eloquently said in
> the past.
>
> So, still, what is "random"? And what determines
> the probability distribution of how the particle-wave will collapse?
>
> Sorry for being so stubborn, but I still don't get this explanation.

I don't think anyone does yet. Keep in mind that "we" end up in all
the universes. So if you observe a photon bouncing off and ask why,
there could be another instance of you observing the photon passing
through and asking why, as well. Instances of us observe all the
possibilities, but due to decoherence very quickly lose contact with
one another. So asking why you end up in one universe and not the
other is sort of like asking why you are not your twin.

>
>
>
> > The answer from Professor Deutsch is that from a multiverse
> > perspective the behavior of the photons is completely predictable. In
> > half the instances, the photon goes through. In the other half, it
> > bounces off.
>
> OK, but this assumes a uniform distribution which I can understand and

> almost semi-accept. Anything more than a uniform distribution though adds *at
> least* a bit of information there as a more elaborate "instruction" in the

> universe's code. If it isn't uniform, what force or process generates and
> determines that instruction?

I don't know the answer to this, either. It's called the "measure"
problem. Both Brian Greene ("The Hidden Reality") and Colin Bruce
("Schroedinger's Rabbits) discuss it extensively, but I don't have a
good understanding of why distributions are what they are.

I'm not sure why a 50/50 split is ok with you, but nothing else is.
The key thing to remember is that a "split" is not into just two
worlds, but into an uncountably infinite number of worlds. This is
necessary so that splits such as 74.675 and 25.325 (I think I did that
math right) make sense.

>
> I can understand *epistemic* uncertainty and randomness from our
> perspective. So either you give me that, and *explain* the probability
> distribution (if not uniform), or you still claim that even *that* is
> "random", (*ontological* uncertainty), which begs for more explanation.

I think it's a matter of seeing that small effects can in fact have
very large consequences. The cosmic ray-cancer example is the easiest
for me to wrap my head around. A cosmic ray particle (an electron,
say) is a fundamentally multiversal object. It spreads out like an
inkblot until it becomes entangled with other entities in a particular
history. Randomly (and this really is "ontological" randomness) it
either hits a cell in my body, entangling with this particular
instance of me, or it doesn't. I can't explain why I happen to be in
the history where the electron hit me. In most histories, it missed
not just me but the entire Earth. Many other instances of me see
something very different happen (or not happen) and also can't explain
why. But that small and truly random event has macroscopic
consequences. Some percentage of instances of me that were hit by the
particle develop cancer and die. Why did I get cancer? Due to a truly
(ontological) random event.

We have the appearance of free-will,but only if things
> happening in the universe have clockwork determinism from a "Laplacian
> Demon's" point of view. If however there is an underlying force that makes

> the inputs we recally* (just

> from our universe's POV) random, than that same force should produce random

> outputs as well.eive *ontologically* or in this case, even
> *epistemic So we have an elaborate choice-making machinery on top of

> a random-generator, which in this case makes free-will deeply problematic
> for me.


>
> Manolis

Life, and consciousness, are different because they can take random
inputs and turn them into more regular outputs. If I get cancer, I can
try to get better. Knowledge-free entities can't do that. That's what
makes us different.

Steve

[Richard Fine]

On 5/2/2012 5:37 PM, Elliot Temple wrote:
> What good is "murder is wrong" without people who can choose to use it?

Yeah. Something that has always puzzled me about the free will (meaning
"can make choices") discussion is this: If you conclude that you don't
have free will, what do you do next?

You can't choose to do anything differently, because you can't choose,
because you don't have free will. So what do people hope to gain by
drawing the conclusion?

Some people use it in the form of "We don't have free will, therefore we
should not be held accountable for our actions," but doesn't that imply
that there exists someone with a choice about whether to hold us
accountable, i.e. someone with free will? (Maybe this is a religious
thing - God has free will but nobody else does).

- Richard

[Elliot Temple]

In classical physics, one inch contains infinitely many points. Two inches also contains infinitely many points. But despite both having infinitely many points, one is bigger -- it has a measure (length) that's twice as big.

[steve whitt]

On May 31, 7:33 pm, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:

> In classical physics, one inch contains infinitely many points. Two inches also contains infinitely many points. But despite both having infinitely many points, one is bigger -- it has a measure (length) that's twice as big.
>
> -- Elliot Templehttp://curi.us/

Yes, that makes sense to me. And so if I set up an experiment such
that 90% of photons pass through a piece of glass and 10% bounce off,
then create a photon generator that produces exactly one photon, in
the multiverse there are an infinite number of universes in the 10%
bounce off category and an infinite number in the 90% bounce off
category, yet even though both numbers are infinite the ratio is still
9 to 1. The effect is that 90% of the time I find myself in a "pass
through" universe rather than a "bounce off" universe. The one inch to
two inches analogy definitely helps, thanks.

Steve