C&R and Deductive Science - Beginning of Infinity

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Subject: Re: [BoI] C&R and Deductive Science
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From: Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us>
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Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2012 12:29:29 -0800
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On Feb 21, 2012, at 9:58 AM, Steve Push wrote:

>=20
> On Feb 20, 6:16 pm, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
>> On Feb 20, 2012, at 2:14 PM, Steve Push wrote:
>>=20
>>> On Feb 20, 9:23 am, David Deutsch <david.deut...@qubit.org> wrote:
>>>> On 20 Feb 2012, at 1:14pm, Steve Push wrote:
>>=20
>>>>> On Feb 19, 9:10 am, David Deutsch <david.deut...@qubit.org> wrote:
>>>>>> [In your view], any way of obtaining a theory that isn't =
deduction is induction, by definition, right?
>>=20
>>>>> I don=92t think we can conclude that a theory is obtained by =
induction
>>>>> based solely on the elimination of deduction as an option.  And I
>>>>> doubt that physicists could have induced a new theory of =
gravitation.
>>>>> But in the absence of a theory, might not they have induced that =
the
>>>>> deflection measured by Eddington conforms to a law
>>=20
>>>> A law of physics is an explanation. In the absence of a theory =
there would have been an absence of any good explanation or law.
>>=20
>>>> They could have *guessed* that there was a new law to be found. =
They could have (and some did) guess this before, during and after the =
actual experimental results, and they could (and would have) guessed it =
before, during and after those hypothetical results too.
>>=20
>>>> They could also have guessed (and many did in fact guess) that =
there was something wrong with the experiment. In fact, if I recall =
correctly, the consensus until recently seems to have been that =
Eddington's experiment *did not* actually obtain any results: its =
apparent results were experimental errors that conformed to the theory =
by luck or unconscious selection effects. But more recently, that =
explanation has been overturned by further analysis and argument.
>>=20
>>>>> that might have
>>>>> become part of the background knowledge leading to a new theory?
>>=20
>>>> In your view, whenever a theory was obtained in a way that wasn't =
deduction, it *might* have been induction?
>>=20
>>> No.
>>=20
>>> In my view, theories explain why certain phenomena exist.  And
>>> theories can be used to deduce expected observations.  If the =
outcome
>>> of an observation differs from the expectation (assuming the
>>> observations was not a result of error, bias, or fraud), then there
>>> must be something wrong with the theory, which constitutes the
>>> premises of the argument.
>>=20
>>> But I believe that sometimes observations are used to predict
>>> unobserved phenomena in the absence of a theory.  (*Not* in the
>>> absence of background knowledge; just in the absence of a theory =
that
>>> explains why the observations must be as they are.)
>>=20
>> So, it's not the absence of a theory. It's the presence of many =
relevant and necessary theories, and their critical application. Why do =
you want to describe that as "the absence of a theory"?
>=20
> As I said, "in the absence of a theory *that explains why the
> observations must be as they are.*"
>=20
>>> I believe this second kind of reasoning fits the definition of =
induction.
>>=20
>> But we've been over this. Induction is about "inducing" ideas from =
data (with no answer to the question of which ideas to induce from the =
logically compatible set). Induction is not interpreting data according =
to one's existing ideas, finding some problem, conjecturing solutions =
according to one's existing explanatory knowledge, and then criticizing =
the conjectures until one is satisfied with a solution. What's going on =
here is straight out of Popper but is not accurately described in any =
inductivist book.
>>=20
>> Could you cite any inductivist book which isn't substantially wrong =
or vague/incomplete? You've already conceded enough points that your =
view is incompatible with the philosophy of induction yet you still =
defend it.
>=20
> If you think I=92m not an inductivist, we may be making progress.

I wouldn't go that far. But I think you've accepted some points that =
contradict induction.


>  From
> the beginning of this discussion I have wondered whether our
> differences were semantic.  Perhaps one person=92s induction is =
another
> person=92s conjecture.

I don't think so.

> In previous posts, I have cited three recent books by philosophers of
> science that define induction and provide examples of its use in
> science and everyday life (Okasha, Godfrey-Smith, and Hacking).  My
> views are influenced by these authors and appear to be compatible with
> their views.  If I=92m mistaken about that, perhaps you could show me
> how.

Which is the *best book* which you have read and think contains *no =
serious mistakes* in what it says about induction (judged by your =
*current* understanding)? So that if I point out *one serious mistake* =
you'll consider your position refuted? And if I point out instances of =
the book having *poor quality arguments*, you'll be quite surprised and =
rethink your judgment of inductivists?

If there is no such book, or if you prefer, then could you give a =
statement of some kind which, if I point out *one serious mistake* =
you'll consider your position refuted? What specifically do *you* think =
needs further criticism, and what kind of criticism would you consider =
decisive?


> You have said that I have broken with inductivists, but you haven=92t
> cited specific examples, other than saying that Bacon said we should
> empty our minds before observing nature.  I=92m not familiar enough =
with
> Bacon=92s writings to say whether that characterization is correct.  I
> thought he was arguing against the blind acceptance of ancient ideas
> to the exclusion of observation and experiment.  (If you could give me
> a citation, I=92d like to investigate further.)

Popper talks about Bacon in Conjectures and Refutations, in the =
Introduction.

It also talks about Hume, Descartes, and various others.

-- Elliot Temple
http://fallibleideas.com/
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