How the mind learns
Rami
I joined the group today and started reading The Beginning of
Infinity. I read about Fallibilism and immediately realized that my
recent article falls directly inline with this philosophy. I think
I've come up with a methodology that systematically employs
Fallibilism and I've found that it is simple enough for even
uneducated people to understand and apply. I think that I've also
introduced a new philosophy although my newness to this field makes me
feel shaky to claim that I've created a philosophy. I know that my
methodology works because I've been applying it on my children and
employees; I am a homeschooler and an entrepreneur. I imagine that I
inadvertently learned Fallibilism during my University years studying
Physics, Chemistry, and Biology.
How the mind learns: A theory of knowledge employing philosophical and
symbolic logic:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1zttc-vzxF_Ckx0i40R7v2FkXUZvjjQOQcCwF80Y_Vkw/edit?hl=en_US.
Here is an exert:
How do children learn?
Most of them learn randomly. First a child experiences a situation: I
touched the stove, and I got hurt. Very soon she learns a rule to
prevent such situations: Don’t touch stoves. Then she experiences
similar situations and begins to improve her rule: Don’t touch things
that make fire or turn red. This new rule works for more than the just
situations with stoves. It helps her in dealing with far more
situations than her first rule did. So with rules, situations are
easier to understand which means that with rules, situations are more
easily controlled, even if one has never experienced a specific
situation before.
Then she learns a logic: Beware of electric and gas lines and machines
because our flesh is conductive and not flame-retardant. Notice that a
logic works for more than one rule; some logics apply to only a few
rules while others apply to billions or more. So with logic, rules are
easier to understand which means that situations are even more
controllable, rules are more easily understood, the task of
determining which rules to apply in certain situations is made much
simpler, and finally rules are more effortlessly applied in those
situations.
But this process of learning is far too chaotic. There is far too much
entropy, i.e. the amount of chaos, in this method of learning. More
chaos means more possibilities. Consider language. The more
possibilities that a statement could be interpreted into, the more
ambiguous the statement is. More ambiguity equates to more error in
understanding, which slows the learning process. So how do we make
this less random? How do we reduce entropy in the educative process?
Let’s revisit the process of learning. First a newborn learns
situations like, ‘When I touch the stove, I get hurt.’ Imagine these
as points in the empty space of a newborn’s mind (see Figure 1). Then
they learn more situations and they begin to learn some rules like,
‘Don’t touch hot things.’ These are vectors in the space (see Figure
2). A vector is a geometric entity that has both length and direction;
think of it as an arrow. Note that when a rule changes from ‘Don’t
touch the stove,’ to ‘Don’t touch things that make fire or turn red,’
this change is represented as the lengthening and/or realigning of a
vector.
Note that the more similar situations you learn, the more likely you
are to realize that you should make a new rule, i.e. the more points
you’ve learned that lie along a straight path in your knowledge
network, the more likely you are to realize that you should put a
vector along that path. If your mind makes this realization, then a
new vector is installed along that line. Hence you’ve learned a new
rule by projecting and more importantly, you’ll be able to tackle new
similar situations that you’ve never experienced nor heard of
previously.
Then the newborn learns logic as in, ‘Beware of electric and gas lines
and machines because our flesh is conductive and not flame-retardant.’
This is represented by the localized superstructure of vectors (see
Figure 3).
Note that the more similar rules you learn, the more likely you are to
realize that you should make a new logic, i.e. the more vectors you’ve
learned that are connected with each other, the more likely you are to
realize that you should make a superstructure of the those vectors. If
your mind makes this realization, then a new superstructure of logic
is installed along those vectors. Hence you’ve learned a new logic by
projecting and more importantly, you’ll be able to tackle new similar
situations and rules that you’ve never experienced nor heard of
previously.
With a logic, rules and situations are less necessary to be learned
because they can now be projected instantaneously, i.e. on the fly.
What does it mean to be able to project rules and situations? Well
most of this article is my mind's projections. I did not learn these
things from a teacher, nor by reading. Instead, I learned them by
projecting. The more logic one learns, the more accurately she will be
able to project rules and situations, i.e. learn rules and situations
without the help of teachers or even reading. So how does the mind
learn logic? Or rather, how does the mind learn knowledge? First lets
look at some examples of various terminology in various fields
regarding knowledge.
What is knowledge?
Knowledge is all that can be learned by a mind. Therefore, knowledge
is the entire set of situations, rules, and logic in the Universe. So
a person’s education is the complete set of situations, rules, and
logic learned by their mind. Each mind has its own set of situations,
rules, and logic as its knowledge set. Think of knowledge as the
untapped raw material from a mine; untapped only by newborns that is.
Note that the mine occupies a 3-dimensional space (actually its N-
dimensional but we’ll discuss that later).
-Situations are points in this space; situations are 0th order
knowledge.
-Rules are the vectors that project points; rules are 1st order
knowledge.
-Logic is the superstructure of the vectors; logic is 2nd order
knowledge.
-The Knowledge Network is the graphical representation of all the
points and vectors representing all knowledge in the universe (see
Figure 4).
-A person’s knowledge set is that person’s version of the knowledge
network.
-Note that all knowledge is connected either directly or indirectly to
all other knowledge, i.e. all knowledge is connected. What connects
it? Logic.
-It stands to reason that all logic is at least partially the same
since logic is pure, i.e. it is completely void of situations and
rules. Well, not all logic is void of field-specific terminology
though. It seems we must define 2 types of logic.
-2nd order knowledge containing field-specific terms
is.......................................... Field-specific Logic
-2nd order knowledge void of field-specific terms
is....................................................... General
Logic
-0th, 1st, and 2nd order material of a specific field
is...................................... Field-specific Knowledge
-0th, 1st, and 2nd order material irrespective of any field
is.................................... General Knowledge
-It stands to reason that we could interchange 0th and 1st order
general knowledge with 0th and 1st order field-specific knowledge in
order to postulate new knowledge in other fields; that is to say that
we could interchange rules and situations from one field into those of
another while keeping the logic constant.
-Every general logic should be applied to every situation and rule in
a field before dubbing that general logic as unusable for said
situation or rule in said field. This is the Socratic Method, a
negative process of hypothesis elimination.
-More specifically, every field-specific logic should be converted
into its general form, and then systematically attempted in other
situations and rules in all other fields. This is interpolation and
extrapolation. This is the most efficient way to discover knowledge.
Elliot Temple
On Dec 3, 2011, at 1:56 PM, Rami wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I joined the group today and started reading The Beginning of
> Infinity. I read about Fallibilism and immediately realized that my
> recent article falls directly inline with this philosophy. I think
> I've come up with a methodology that systematically employs
> Fallibilism
Awesome. You might appreciate my website!
> and I've found that it is simple enough for even
> uneducated people to understand and apply. I think that I've also
> introduced a new philosophy although my newness to this field makes me
> feel shaky to claim that I've created a philosophy.
The most important people to read in the field are Deutsch and Popper. Most educational philosophy is not very good, but it's hard to make useful progress in the field without knowing Popperian ideas (because they're such a big step forward compared to previous ideas, so one should build on them instead of starting again separately).
> I know that my
> methodology works because I've been applying it on my children and
> employees; I am a homeschooler and an entrepreneur. I imagine that I
> inadvertently learned Fallibilism during my University years studying
> Physics, Chemistry, and Biology.
I too value homeschooling (when it doesn't mimic school, simply done somewhere else), entrepreneurship and scientific study.
But I don't agree with your argument that your methodology works. Let me ask you a question:
Are there teachers who:
1) have some sort of methodology, original or not
2) use it in their teaching
3) believe it works
4) believe they've seen it working firsthand, every school day, for the last decade
5) but are mistaken
?
-- Elliot Temple
http://beginningofinfinity.com/
Rami
> But I don't agree with your argument that your methodology works. Let me ask you a question:
>
> Are there teachers who:
>
> 1) have some sort of methodology, original or not
> 2) use it in their teaching
> 3) believe it works
> 4) believe they've seen it working firsthand, every school day, for the last decade
> 5) but are mistaken
>
> ?
Hi Elliot, I'm soo appreciative that you replied. Thank you so much. I
will read all that you suggested. Anyway, I will try to answer your
question as best I can. Keep in mind that I am new to philosophy, so I
fear that I may not have understood your question, or rather the
grounding on which your question stands. So to answer your question:
Absolutely there are. Why? Because something else could have been the
cause of the results; something other than the teacher's methodology.
It could be that the results were caused by the teacher's enthusiam of
the methodology rather than the implementation of it; by results I
mean the increased understanding that the teacher measured in the
students (by measured I mean sensed). And now that I said 'measured,'
I realize also there could be, or rather IS, error in the measuring
too; the teacher could have been wrong about the increased
understanding. For example, the teacher could be experiencing
Cognitive Dissonance which could have lead to an error in
understanding of the meaning of the measurement.
But I'm having a hard time resting on the idea that my statement is
false. I still feel (think) that your argument does not necessarily
negate my original statement that, 'I know that my methodology works,'
unless we are disagreeing on the meaning of the terms, 'know' or
'works'. So let me rephrase my statement and I beg you to examine it
again and give me your opinion.
I 'know' that my methodology 'works' in so far as I, and others, have
measured the results.
Now I feel very confused. I wonder if your argument rests on the
philosophy of fallibilism which I think states that knowledge can not
be known because it can be falsified in the future. So if this is the
case, then how can my statement be tweaked so that it reconciles with
fallibilism?
Rami Rustom
Elliot Temple
On Dec 3, 2011, at 4:13 PM, Rami wrote:
> On Dec 3, 4:16 pm, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
>> But I don't agree with your argument that your methodology works. Let me ask you a question:
>>
>> Are there teachers who:
>>
>> 1) have some sort of methodology, original or not
>> 2) use it in their teaching
>> 3) believe it works
>> 4) believe they've seen it working firsthand, every school day, for the last decade
>> 5) but are mistaken
>>
>> ?
>
> Hi Elliot, I'm soo appreciative that you replied. Thank you so much. I
> will read all that you suggested. Anyway, I will try to answer your
> question as best I can. Keep in mind that I am new to philosophy, so I
> fear that I may not have understood your question, or rather the
> grounding on which your question stands. So to answer your question:
>
> Absolutely there are.
OK. I agree.
> Why? Because something else could have been the
> cause of the results; something other than the teacher's methodology.
> It could be that the results were caused by the teacher's enthusiam of
> the methodology rather than the implementation of it; by results I
> mean the increased understanding that the teacher measured in the
> students (by measured I mean sensed). And now that I said 'measured,'
> I realize also there could be, or rather IS, error in the measuring
> too; the teacher could have been wrong about the increased
> understanding. For example, the teacher could be experiencing
> Cognitive Dissonance which could have lead to an error in
> understanding of the meaning of the measurement.
I agree.
> But I'm having a hard time resting on the idea that my statement is false.
Your method may or may not be effective.
But the argument that it is effective, because it worked for you in your experience, is not a compelling argument.
That same argument can be -- and sometimes is -- used by many people who are mistaken. It doesn't differentiate between people who are mistaken or not.
Part of the appeal of the argument is empiricism: it's appealing to the authority of experience. However, experience is fallible and requires interpretation, so appeals to one's experience are really just assertions that one's interpretation of his experience is correct.
One's interpretation of one's experience may be correct or incorrect, and assertions won't tell us which. What's needed are explanations and arguments. And usually those should focus more directly on the topic (e.g. does a particular educational philosophy make sense?) instead of on personal examples.
It's as you say: a teacher might measure success incorrectly, or have the wrong criteria that he's looking for. Or he might have success but misinterpret which of his actions caused it. There are various ways his apparent experience of success, and his beliefs about its causes, could be mistaken or even be a rationalization.
To judge the issue, one needs to consider something like:
1) what is the method, and what is it trying to accomplish?
2) is that a good thing to accomplish? why?
3) how and why will it work?
4) are there any criticisms?
5) (A special case of criticism) are there any rival/contradictory ideas to consider? If so, are there any criticisms of them? If not, then the issue is unresolved and, basically, one should be neutral instead of arbitrarily siding with his own idea.
The role of experience in the process is a critical role, as follows:
If anyone says anything which seems to contradict experience, you can point out the contradiction and use it as a criticism. Then either that criticism will be criticized (e.g. by pointing out a way it incorrectly interpreted experience) or it could stand.
> I still feel (think) that your argument does not necessarily
> negate my original statement that, 'I know that my methodology works,'
> unless we are disagreeing on the meaning of the terms, 'know' or
> 'works'. So let me rephrase my statement and I beg you to examine it
> again and give me your opinion.
>
> I 'know' that my methodology 'works' in so far as I, and others, have
> measured the results.
>
> Now I feel very confused. I wonder if your argument rests on the
> philosophy of fallibilism which I think states that knowledge can not
> be known because it can be falsified in the future. So if this is the
> case, then how can my statement be tweaked so that it reconciles with
> fallibilism?
We do have knowledge. It is fallible knowledge (Popper calls it "conjectural knowledge"), and there's nothing wrong with that, and I don't object to saying we "know" our fallible knowledge.
But not all arguments are sufficient to know stuff. Some arguments are mistaken. They may be self-contradictory, contain a non sequitur, or have a variety of other flaws. In this case, the flaw is that the reason given for X is also compatible with X being false.
The argument had a form like: X because I experienced X.
And that is compatible with (partial list):
A) X is true
B) X is false, and one misinterpreted his experience
So the argument given cannot tell us if X is true or false.
When an argument is compatible with multiple possibilities, we should be neutral between them unless/until we come up with some further argument that differentiates between them.
-- Elliot Temple
http://elliottemple.com/
Rami
> To judge the issue, one needs to consider something like:
> 1) what is the method, and what is it trying to accomplish?
by systematically reducing the error in the transaction between the
teacher and student. The teacher is to decrease ambiguity in her
statements while the student is to decrease ambiguity by learning the
logic of assumption.
> 2) is that a good thing to accomplish? why?
My method includes employing dynamic visual representations of logic
so as to further reduce the ambiguity of the teachers' arguments. In
this way, the student is less likely to get confused with regard to
what the teacher is referring to, i.e. whether each phrase of each
statement of each argument is a situation, a rule, or a logic. In my
theory, situations are 0th order knowledge, rules are 1st order, while
logic is 2nd order. If the student can label each phrase with the
correct order of knowledge, then the student will be more likely to
understand said argument. And it is the teacher that must ensure the
student correctly labels the phrases.
> 3) how and why will it work?
>
> 4) are there any criticisms?
No one has given me any. Its very new though. And I don't think too
many people that have read it are capable of refuting it. Or maybe
there are people that did, but for whatever reason, have chosen not to
tell me about it. Would you be so kind as to critique it?
> 5) (A special case of criticism) are there any rival/contradictory ideas to consider? If so, are there any criticisms of them? If not, then the issue is unresolved and, basically, one should be neutral instead of arbitrarily siding with his own idea.
I've been searching for rival theories but have found none, or at
least I have not found any that I thought are rival or contradictory.
I do intend to learn about Popperian ideas but it will take me a lot
of time because I find it very difficult to comprehend. Actually I
find much of philosophy difficult to comprehend. I did, or at least I
think I did, understand your responses, which are philosophical.
> The role of experience in the process is a critical role, as follows:
I've been searching for rival theories but have found none, or at
least I have not found any that I thought are rival or contradictory.
I do intend to learn about Popperian ideas but it will take me a lot
of time because I find it very difficult to comprehend. Actually I
find much of philosophy difficult to comprehend. I did, or at least I
think I did, understand your responses, which are philosophical.
> If anyone says anything which seems to contradict experience, you can point out the contradiction and use it as a criticism. Then either that criticism will be criticized (e.g. by pointing out a way it incorrectly interpreted experience) or it could stand.
So after going through your process, I've concluded that 'I should be
neutral instead of arbitrarily siding with my own idea.'
So I think that my statement should be rephrased to: I have much
experiencial evidence to support my theory.
Elliot Temple
On Dec 3, 2011, at 7:24 PM, Rami wrote:
> On Dec 3, 6:58 pm, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
>> To judge the issue, one needs to consider something like:
>> 1) what is the method, and what is it trying to accomplish?
> My method is one that decreases the entropy in the educative process
> by systematically reducing the error in the transaction between the
> teacher and student. The teacher is to decrease ambiguity in her
> statements while the student is to decrease ambiguity by learning the
> logic of assumption.
An issue you don't mention, but which I consider very important, is that some of the teacher's ideas may be mistaken. If the student learns those anyway, that is a shame.
If the student learns a mistaken idea, and then in turn teaches the idea to the next generation, which in turn teaches it to the next generation, and so on, forever, that is a disaster.
It's important to correct errors not only in communication, but in the ideas themselves.
How does your method approach this issue?
>> 2) is that a good thing to accomplish? why?
> My method includes employing dynamic visual representations of logic
> so as to further reduce the ambiguity of the teachers' arguments. In
> this way, the student is less likely to get confused with regard to
> what the teacher is referring to, i.e. whether each phrase of each
> statement of each argument is a situation, a rule, or a logic. In my
> theory, situations are 0th order knowledge, rules are 1st order, while
> logic is 2nd order. If the student can label each phrase with the
> correct order of knowledge, then the student will be more likely to
> understand said argument. And it is the teacher that must ensure the
> student correctly labels the phrases.
The teacher must ensure that? What if the student doesn't want to?
>> 3) how and why will it work?
>>
>> 4) are there any criticisms?
> No one has given me any. Its very new though. And I don't think too
> many people that have read it are capable of refuting it. Or maybe
> there are people that did, but for whatever reason, have chosen not to
> tell me about it. Would you be so kind as to critique it?
Maybe. I don't want to raise too many issues at once.
>
>> 5) (A special case of criticism) are there any rival/contradictory ideas to consider? If so, are there any criticisms of them? If not, then the issue is unresolved and, basically, one should be neutral instead of arbitrarily siding with his own idea.
> I've been searching for rival theories but have found none, or at
> least I have not found any that I thought are rival or contradictory.
> I do intend to learn about Popperian ideas but it will take me a lot
> of time because I find it very difficult to comprehend. Actually I
> find much of philosophy difficult to comprehend. I did, or at least I
> think I did, understand your responses, which are philosophical.
Many philosophers do not focus on writing clearly, but are instead pretentious or vague. This can make it difficult to comprehend. Also, sometimes they have nothing to say, so one's attempt to figure out their point may fail.
Rami Rustom
> An issue you don't mention, but which I consider very important, is that some of the teacher's ideas may be mistaken. If the student learns those anyway, that is a shame.
> If the student learns a mistaken idea, and then in turn teaches the idea to the next generation, which in turn teaches it to the next generation, and so on, forever, that is a disaster.
> It's important to correct errors not only in communication, but in the ideas themselves.
> How does your method approach this issue?
explicitly articulated that fact into my argument. I have a section in
my article titled, 'What is ambiguity?' where I define the term
ambiguity quantitatively and in doing so, I define the error in each
event of the transaction between the teacher and student. One of the
error terms defined manifests from the fact that the teacher's
knowledge network, the visual representation of the points, vectors,
and superstructure of vectors, contains error as compared to the
universe's knowledge network. So the teacher and the student is aware
of that error. I'm not really sure that I've answered your question
sufficiently. I will now attempt to build this idea into my method.
Hopefully I'll have something soon.
Btw, in my theory, situations are points, rules are vectors, and
logics are superstructures of vectors, in the mind's knowledge
network. Any situation, rule, or logic could be incorrect as compared
to the 'real' knowledge network, i.e. the universe's knowledge
network.
> The teacher must ensure that? What if the student doesn't want to?
Hmmm. I haven't run into this problem. I have found that my girls
absolutely love when we have our question/answer sessions. They love
asking questions, learning new words, and learning the causes of their
experiences. And I make it very clear to them that most of their
questions have answers that I am not aware of. I make it explicit how
little I know.
This makes me remember a saying that I've always believed and have
been fascinated with, 'True knowledge exists in knowing that you know
nothing.' And another thought, why were philosophers of the past
using absolute terms like 'nothing?' It renders Socrates' statement
false, however beautiful the statement is.
> Many philosophers do not focus on writing clearly, but are instead pretentious or vague. This can make it difficult to comprehend. Also, sometimes they have nothing to say, so one's attempt to figure out their point may fail.
Thats very interesting. I've been attempting to understand philosophy,
or rather its purpose and methodology, and the entire time that I've
been doing this, which is only a few months, I've been at a loss. I've
been trying to understand philosophy from the greats of history and
trying to reconcile it with my theory (which I came up with before
learning any philosophy). As soon as I read the first section of The
Beginning of Infinity, my confusion was gone. Those words matched up
with my theory very very well. That feeling is what caused me to start
this post.
Elliot Temple
On Dec 4, 2011, at 10:14 AM, Rami Rustom wrote:
> On Dec 4, 11:53 am, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
>> An issue you don't mention, but which I consider very important, is that some of the teacher's ideas may be mistaken. If the student learns those anyway, that is a shame.
>> If the student learns a mistaken idea, and then in turn teaches the idea to the next generation, which in turn teaches it to the next generation, and so on, forever, that is a disaster.
>> It's important to correct errors not only in communication, but in the ideas themselves.
>> How does your method approach this issue?
> While I haven't built that specifically into my article, I have
> explicitly articulated that fact into my argument. I have a section in
> my article titled, 'What is ambiguity?' where I define the term
> ambiguity quantitatively and in doing so, I define the error in each
> event of the transaction between the teacher and student. One of the
> error terms defined manifests from the fact that the teacher's
> knowledge network, the visual representation of the points, vectors,
> and superstructure of vectors, contains error as compared to the
> universe's knowledge network. So the teacher and the student is aware
> of that error. I'm not really sure that I've answered your question
> sufficiently. I will now attempt to build this idea into my method.
> Hopefully I'll have something soon.
So, suppose a student and a teacher disagree about whether an idea being taught is true. What should happen next?
> Btw, in my theory, situations are points, rules are vectors, and
> logics are superstructures of vectors, in the mind's knowledge
> network. Any situation, rule, or logic could be incorrect as compared
> to the 'real' knowledge network, i.e. the universe's knowledge
> network.
Are the points/vectors/superstructures intended as an illustrative metaphor, or something else?
>> The teacher must ensure that? What if the student doesn't want to?
>
> Hmmm. I haven't run into this problem.
I think an educational philosophy should address the issues in the field, whether one has personally run into them or not. It should have enough generality and reach to do that. And students not wanting to do things is a common scenario which many teachers are familiar with. If other people were persuaded of your philosophy, some of them would run into this scenario and have to figure out what to do.
Could you apply your philosophy to address this question, and see what answer you get?
If it doesn't apply, then I would criticize it as limited in scope, or I could have misunderstood the intended scope.
PS Please include a blank line between quoted paragraphs and your own paragraphs. Thanks :)
-- Elliot Temple
http://curi.us/
Rami Rustom
> So, suppose a student and a teacher disagree about whether an idea being taught is true. What should happen next?
Every transaction between teacher and student should follow the
Socratic Method whereby the teacher excepts any claims from the
student on the grounds of the valid and sound logic rather than the
field-specific situations or rules. In this way, the student's ideas
are equal in authority to the teacher's ideas. Another way to say this
is that the student has as much authority as the teacher. Or rather,
that neither of them as any authority. Only the arguments themselves
have authority, insofar as those arguments hold their ground in logic.
> Are the points/vectors/superstructures intended as an illustrative metaphor, or something else?
Something else. I've been able to explain cognitive symptoms such as
curiosity and confusion. I'll include an exerpt from my article:
The mine (metaphor for the universe's knowledge network) is a 3-
dimensional space (actually its an N-dimensional space but lets not go
there yet). There is only one starting point that feeds into the
knowledge network. This point and those closest to it are grouped
together into Philosophy. Emanating downward from that is Mathematics.
Below that is Physics, then Chemistry, then Biology, then others. Then
Psychology, Sociology, Political Science, Economy, etc. There are many
other fields and many of them lay alongside other fields in their
tier. All of these fields provide a wealth of knowledge just waiting
to be mined. So what is mining? Mining means to model, read, write,
and debate. So mining installs and aligns points and vectors. After
much mining, the points and vectors begin to align so much so that the
overall stress on the knowledge network begins to reduce dramatically.
When the sum of the stress approaches zero, the strain is effectively
eliminated. What does it mean to eliminate the stress and strain on
the knowledge network?
A stress can result in a strain; stress is the force on a point or
vector while strain is the movement of that point or vector. When your
unconscious senses the strain in the knowledge network, it registers
as a feeling; the feeling is confusion. Confusion causes mistakes and
worry because things ‘feel’ unresolved. This leads to underlying
emotions that serve to affect all parts of a person’s life. The
unconscious attempts to resolve this conflict with various irrational
tactics, one of which is to trigger certain behaviors such as
‘rationalizing that you didn’t want any ice cream anyway, when in fact
you know you wanted it beforehand, but you just found out that your
dad finished the last bit of it.’ It is your unconscious that is
responsible for producing this thought because it is attempting to
reduce the uncomfortable feeling that your unconscious sensed when you
(your conscious) found out that you were wrong about there being any
ice cream left. This is Cognitive Dissonance theory. Instead of
allowing your unconscious to play these tricks on you, it is you (your
conscious) that must address this feeling, realize that it is
confusion, understand that there is a point or vector that is
misaligned, and align it.
Now I'll include a portion of my journal that I haven't added to my
article yet:
I have no more questions. At least none that are not convergent on my
network. Each loose end is just the last point of a long line of my
network and since I can get to them when ever I want to, I don’t
consider them questions because I no longer worry about them. Why?
Because its no longer interesting. When it converges then it is no
longer interesting. Curiosity is a higher order effect of the fact
that some points and vectors are not convergent with the rest of my
network. So the mind is eager to make it reconcile, to figure it out.
When there are too many loose ends and not sufficient enough inter-
and extrapolations, then the mind gives up attempting to reconcile
because it is now experiencing far too much cognitive dissonance. It
occupies the mind with retarding side effects. Curiosity wanes.
> I think an educational philosophy should address the issues in the field, whether one has personally run into them or not. It should have enough generality and reach to do that. And students not wanting to do things is a common scenario which many teachers are familiar with. If other people were persuaded of your philosophy, some of them would run into this scenario and have to figure out what to do.
I've been following parenting/teaching techniques that I learned from
'The Well-Trained Mind: A Guide to Classical Education at Home,' that
have resulted in my girls love of learning. And yes those techniques
do fall directly inline with my theory. So I will add another section
to my theory which will illustrate those techniques and more
importantly, how my theory derives them.
Elliot Temple
On Dec 4, 2011, at 2:37 PM, Rami Rustom wrote:
> On Dec 4, 12:31 pm, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
>> So, suppose a student and a teacher disagree about whether an idea being taught is true. What should happen next?
>
> Every transaction between teacher and student should follow the
> Socratic Method whereby the teacher excepts any claims from the
> student on the grounds of the valid and sound logic rather than the
> field-specific situations or rules. In this way, the student's ideas
> are equal in authority to the teacher's ideas. Another way to say this
> is that the student has as much authority as the teacher. Or rather,
> that neither of them as any authority. Only the arguments themselves
> have authority, insofar as those arguments hold their ground in logic.
If the student and teacher are equal in authority (sounds good so far), and only the merits of the arguments themselves matter, then what happens if/when the student and teacher disagree about the merits of various arguments?
Perhaps step 1 is to discuss it and try to agree. Let's suppose they still disagree. What next?
Do they go their separate ways? (Regarding this particular issue, and more generally if it happens for many issues.) Or something else?
>> Are the points/vectors/superstructures intended as an illustrative metaphor, or something else?
>
> Something else. I've been able to explain cognitive symptoms such as
> curiosity and confusion. I'll include an exerpt from my article:
> The mine (metaphor for the universe's knowledge network) is a 3-
> dimensional space (actually its an N-dimensional space but lets not go
> there yet).
Is this a literal space, a metaphorical space, or a mathematical abstraction of your devising?
> There is only one starting point that feeds into the
> knowledge network. This point and those closest to it are grouped
> together into Philosophy. Emanating downward from that is Mathematics.
> Below that is Physics, then Chemistry, then Biology, then others. Then
> Psychology, Sociology, Political Science, Economy, etc. There are many
> other fields and many of them lay alongside other fields in their
> tier. All of these fields provide a wealth of knowledge just waiting
> to be mined. So what is mining? Mining means to model, read, write,
> and debate. So mining installs and aligns points and vectors.
If a person debates (real world), that doesn't "install" anything (mathematical world), right? Rather, it is mathematically *modeled* (by you) as such?
> After much mining, the points and vectors begin to align
How do points align with vectors? I would, first guess, think of aligning vectors as getting them all pointing the same direction, but points don't point.
> so much so that the
> overall stress on the knowledge network begins to reduce dramatically.
> When the sum of the stress approaches zero, the strain is effectively
> eliminated. What does it mean to eliminate the stress and strain on
> the knowledge network?
>
> A stress can result in a strain; stress is the force on a point or
> vector while strain is the movement of that point or vector.
What force is this? Not gravity. A metaphorical force? A mathematical one you devised?
> When your
> unconscious senses the strain in the knowledge network, it registers
> as a feeling; the feeling is confusion.
Always, in all people?
Don't some people react to the strains of problems with their thinking in order ways? For example rationalizing it and blaming others. Not everyone reacts to the same stuff with the same emotions, or necessarily any emotions.
> Confusion causes mistakes and worry because things ‘feel’ unresolved.
Always? Sometimes? Some people learn to relax instead of worry (without eliminating all their confusion and mistakes in thinking).
>>>>> And it is the teacher that must ensure the student correctly labels the phrases.
>>>>
>>>> The teacher must ensure that? What if the student doesn't want to?
>>>
>>> Hmmm. I haven't run into this problem.
>>
>> I think an educational philosophy should address the issues in the field, whether one has personally run into them or not. It should have enough generality and reach to do that. And students not wanting to do things is a common scenario which many teachers are familiar with. If other people were persuaded of your philosophy, some of them would run into this scenario and have to figure out what to do.
>
> I've been following parenting/teaching techniques that I learned from
> 'The Well-Trained Mind: A Guide to Classical Education at Home,'
Does it answer my question about students not wanting to? (which was deleted from quoting. i re-added it.) If so, how does it answer it?
-- Elliot Temple
http://fallibleideas.com/
Rami Rustom
> If the student and teacher are equal in authority (sounds good so far), and only the merits of the arguments themselves matter, then what happens if/when the student and teacher disagree about the merits of various arguments?
> >> Are the points/vectors/superstructures intended as an illustrative metaphor, or something else?
>
> > Something else. I've been able to explain cognitive symptoms such as
> > curiosity and confusion. I'll include an exerpt from my article:
> > The mine (metaphor for the universe's knowledge network) is a 3-
> > dimensional space (actually its an N-dimensional space but lets not go
> > there yet).
>
> Is this a literal space, a metaphorical space, or a mathematical abstraction of your devising?
> > There is only one starting point that feeds into the
> > knowledge network. This point and those closest to it are grouped
> > together into Philosophy. Emanating downward from that is Mathematics.
> > Below that is Physics, then Chemistry, then Biology, then others. Then
> > Psychology, Sociology, Political Science, Economy, etc. There are many
> > other fields and many of them lay alongside other fields in their
> > tier. All of these fields provide a wealth of knowledge just waiting
> > to be mined. So what is mining? Mining means to model, read, write,
> > and debate. So mining installs and aligns points and vectors.
> If a person debates (real world), that doesn't "install" anything (mathematical world), right? Rather, it is mathematically *modeled* (by you) as such?
> > After much mining, the points and vectors begin to align
>
> How do points align with vectors? I would, first guess, think of aligning vectors as getting them all pointing the same direction, but points don't point.
> > so much so that the
> > overall stress on the knowledge network begins to reduce dramatically.
> > When the sum of the stress approaches zero, the strain is effectively
> > eliminated. What does it mean to eliminate the stress and strain on
> > the knowledge network?
>
> > A stress can result in a strain; stress is the force on a point or
> > vector while strain is the movement of that point or vector.
>
> What force is this? Not gravity. A metaphorical force? A mathematical one you devised?
> > When your
> > unconscious senses the strain in the knowledge network, it registers
> > as a feeling; the feeling is confusion.
>
> Always, in all people?
>
Rationalizing it and blaming others does not mean that they did not have a feeling. In fact, according to Cognitive Dissonance theory, it is the unconscious that experiences the dissonance and attempts to alleviate the feeling by rationalizing.
Is it possible to experience dissonance and not have a feeling associated with it? No. At least not according to my theory. And actually I think Cognitive Dissonance theory also says no.
> > Confusion causes mistakes and worry because things ‘feel’ unresolved.
>
> Always? Sometimes? Some people learn to relax instead of worry (without eliminating all their confusion and mistakes in thinking).
Relaxing means to stop thinking about the problem by thinking about other things. The dissonance is only felt while the thought is being experienced. Once the thought no longer exists, then the feeling stops.
> >>>>> And it is the teacher that must ensure the student correctly labels the phrases.
>
> >>>> The teacher must ensure that? What if the student doesn't want to?
>
> >>> Hmmm. I haven't run into this problem.
>
> >> I think an educational philosophy should address the issues in the field, whether one has personally run into them or not. It should have enough generality and reach to do that. And students not wanting to do things is a common scenario which many teachers are familiar with. If other people were persuaded of your philosophy, some of them would run into this scenario and have to figure out what to do.
>
> > I've been following parenting/teaching techniques that I learned from
> > 'The Well-Trained Mind: A Guide to Classical Education at Home,'
>
> Does it answer my question about students not wanting to? (which was deleted from quoting. i re-added it.) If so, how does it answer it?
Elliot Temple
On Dec 5, 2011, at 3:05 PM, Rami Rustom wrote:
> On Dec 5, 11:24 am, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
>> If the student and teacher are equal in authority (sounds good so far),
>> and only the merits of the arguments themselves matter, then what happens
>> if/when the student and teacher disagree about the merits of various
>> arguments?
>
> I'm not sure why disagreement matters. Why should either party care whether
> they agree?
Teachers normally care quite a bit, and even "test" children to see if they agree about the answers to various questions.
If the child doesn't agree with the idea of taking the test, they'll generally be pressured or forced.
> This occurs often and is a necessary part of learning. If they
> disagree, then there are more questions to be asked. If they agree, then
> the conversation is over, at least with respect to that debate topic. If
> the debate ends quickly, it is because of agreement, and this is boring.
I don't agree that agreement is boring.
Agreement about some topics allows for productive discussion of other topics which depend on the agreed-on topics. (E.g. people can go on to more advanced or subtle issues using agreement about more basic stuff.)
>>>>>>> And it is the teacher that must ensure the student correctly labels
>>>>>>> the phrases.
>>
>>>>>> The teacher must ensure that? What if the student doesn't want to?
>>
>>>>> Hmmm. I haven't run into this problem.
>>
>>>> I think an educational philosophy should address the issues in the
>>>> field, whether one has personally run into them or not. It should have
>>>> enough generality and reach to do that. And students not wanting to do
>>>> things is a common scenario which many teachers are familiar with. If other
>>>> people were persuaded of your philosophy, some of them would run into this
>>>> scenario and have to figure out what to do.
>>
>>> I've been following parenting/teaching techniques that I learned from
>>> 'The Well-Trained Mind: A Guide to Classical Education at Home,'
>>
>> Does it answer my question about students not wanting to? (which was
>> deleted from quoting. i re-added it.) If so, how does it answer it?
>
> Do you mean 'not want to' instantaneously or ever? I imagine you mean
> instantaneously. My answer depends on the reason for not wanting to. Lets
> say the student is tired or bored. Then the student should change
> activities and the subject should be revisited later. But sometimes a 3
> year old might say, 'I don't want to do this lesson,' but there is no
> apparent reason. The teacher should make attempts to push forward
Could you expand on what it means to attempt to "push forward" in doing something to/with a child that the child does not want?
> while
> paying very close attention to the child's emotional state. Most of the
> time this can be done by saying, 'Come on lets just do one page and then
> we'll go outside on the swing and I'll push you as high as you want,'
Does pushing forward mean implicitly threatening to withhold swing-pushing (or any other of a child's rights), or limit the height, if a child doesn't do another unwanted page?
Who is benefiting, and how, from a child doing another unwanted page?
Rami Rustom
> On Dec 5, 2011, at 3:05 PM, Rami Rustom wrote:
>
> > On Dec 5, 11:24 am, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
> >> If the student and teacher are equal in authority (sounds good so far),
> >> and only the merits of the arguments themselves matter, then what happens
> >> if/when the student and teacher disagree about the merits of various
> >> arguments?
>
> > I'm not sure why disagreement matters. Why should either party care whether
> > they agree?
>
> Teachers normally care quite a bit, and even "test" children to see if they agree about the answers to various questions.
Ah. Yes testing is useless. Actually it has negative side effects.
> If the child doesn't agree with the idea of taking the test, they'll generally be pressured or forced.
>
> > This occurs often and is a necessary part of learning. If they
> > disagree, then there are more questions to be asked. If they agree, then
> > the conversation is over, at least with respect to that debate topic. If
> > the debate ends quickly, it is because of agreement, and this is boring.
>
> I don't agree that agreement is boring.
>
> Agreement about some topics allows for productive discussion of other topics which depend on the agreed-on topics. (E.g. people can go on to more advanced or subtle issues using agreement about more basic stuff.)
Thats right. Agreement should be there sometimes so that it can reveal
the disagreements.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >>>>>>> And it is the teacher that must ensure the student correctly labels
> >>>>>>> the phrases.
>
> >>>>>> The teacher must ensure that? What if the student doesn't want to?
>
> >>>>> Hmmm. I haven't run into this problem.
>
> >>>> I think an educational philosophy should address the issues in the
> >>>> field, whether one has personally run into them or not. It should have
> >>>> enough generality and reach to do that. And students not wanting to do
> >>>> things is a common scenario which many teachers are familiar with. If other
> >>>> people were persuaded of your philosophy, some of them would run into this
> >>>> scenario and have to figure out what to do.
>
> >>> I've been following parenting/teaching techniques that I learned from
> >>> 'The Well-Trained Mind: A Guide to Classical Education at Home,'
>
> >> Does it answer my question about students not wanting to? (which was
> >> deleted from quoting. i re-added it.) If so, how does it answer it?
>
> > Do you mean 'not want to' instantaneously or ever? I imagine you mean
> > instantaneously. My answer depends on the reason for not wanting to. Lets
> > say the student is tired or bored. Then the student should change
> > activities and the subject should be revisited later. But sometimes a 3
> > year old might say, 'I don't want to do this lesson,' but there is no
> > apparent reason. The teacher should make attempts to push forward
>
> Could you expand on what it means to attempt to "push forward" in doing something to/with a child that the child does not want?
Rami: 'Ok Lulu lets work on lesson X.'
Lulu: 'No I want to do lesson Y.'
Rami: 'Oh come on lets do lesson X and then we'll do lesson Y.'
Lulu: 'No I want to do lesson Y.'
I give in here.
> > while
> > paying very close attention to the child's emotional state. Most of the
> > time this can be done by saying, 'Come on lets just do one page and then
> > we'll go outside on the swing and I'll push you as high as you want,'
>
> Does pushing forward mean implicitly threatening to withhold swing-pushing (or any other of a child's rights), or limit the height, if a child doesn't do another unwanted page?
No not at all. But because a 3 year old doesn't think it through that
far, she will sometimes comply. And if she doesn't oh well, we move on
as described above. And we still do the stuff she wants. We still do
the swinging and go as high as she wants. No strings attached.
> Who is benefiting, and how, from a child doing another unwanted page?
I don't think that she necessarily doesn't want to. It might be that
at the moment, she didn't want to. But 1 second later, she does want
to because the lesson is very engaging.
Elliot Temple
On Dec 13, 2011, at 4:10 PM, Rami Rustom wrote:
>> Could you expand on what it means to attempt to "push forward" in doing something to/with a child that the child does not want?
>
> Rami: 'Ok Lulu lets work on lesson X.'
> Lulu: 'No I want to do lesson Y.'
> Rami: 'Oh come on lets do lesson X and then we'll do lesson Y.'
> Lulu: 'No I want to do lesson Y.'
>
> I give in here.
Why not give in two lines earlier? (Or better yet, before the first line. Why doesn't the parent learn to stop routinely suggesting things that his child won't like? Why doesn't he get better at judging what will be a helpful suggestion or not? And why doesn't he phrase his suggestions as suggestions for the child to take or leave?)
What is the meaning of the third line? It does not give any reason to prefer X. "Oh come on" sounds like pressure but not an argument. What is the point of trying not to do what a child wants?
Why is a child required to say "no" twice to be heard? What kind of sense does that make? How does repeating himself add anything of value?
>> Does pushing forward mean implicitly threatening to withhold swing-pushing (or any other of a child's rights), or limit the height, if a child doesn't do another unwanted page?
>
> No not at all. But because a 3 year old doesn't think it through that
> far, she will sometimes comply.
So, why trick him instead of helping him think it through?
>> Who is benefiting, and how, from a child doing another unwanted page?
>
> I don't think that she necessarily doesn't want to. It might be that
> at the moment, she didn't want to. But 1 second later, she does want
> to because the lesson is very engaging.
I disagree with methods of treating people whereby one does the opposite of what they want, and then denies they have the preferences that they clearly express.
When someone says "no" and then you go "well, maybe no doesn't mean no, so I can just push forward" that is disrespectful and worse.
i don't agree with the "do stuff kids hate now, but maybe they'll thank me later" approach. people's preferences *now* matter. hurting someone now is bad, even if they later seem to change their mind (or perhaps simply adjust to the situation where expressing preferences that will be thwarted doesn't benefit them, so they don't do it).
How come when a child says something the parent disagrees with, it doesn't count, must be repeated, is assumed to not be a serious sentiment, etc... But when a child says something the parent likes then all these penalties and mistreatment don't happen?
If anything, it's the reverse: when children know their parents will disagree with things, and say them anyway, then those things have gotten extra consideration and are more serious than usual. whereas if a child is saying something his parents approve of, he'll more often do it casually.
Rami Rustom
> On Dec 13, 2011, at 4:10 PM, Rami Rustom wrote:
>
> >> Could you expand on what it means to attempt to "push forward" in doing something to/with a child that the child does not want?
>
> > Rami: 'Ok Lulu lets work on lesson X.'
> > Lulu: 'No I want to do lesson Y.'
> > Rami: 'Oh come on lets do lesson X and then we'll do lesson Y.'
> > Lulu: 'No I want to do lesson Y.'
>
> > I give in here.
>
Ok. So no coercion is ok. Yes parents should get better at judging
what will be a helpful suggestion because this is part of error
correction.
So instead I should say, "Would you like to do X?"
> Why doesn't the parent learn to stop routinely suggesting things that his child won't like?
I didn't think she didn't like it. I assumed something I guess.
Behavior doesn't change until knowledge changes. So a parent can't
change his behavior to match TCS until he has learned TCS knowledge.
> What is the meaning of the third line? It does not give any reason to prefer X. "Oh come on" sounds like pressure but not an argument. What is the point of trying not to do what a child wants?
>
> Why is a child required to say "no" twice to be heard? What kind of sense does that make? How does repeating himself add anything of value?
I hate repeating myself too. Even as a child.
> >> Does pushing forward mean implicitly threatening to withhold swing-pushing (or any other of a child's rights), or limit the height, if a child doesn't do another unwanted page?
>
> > No not at all. But because a 3 year old doesn't think it through that
> > far, she will sometimes comply.
>
> So, why trick him instead of helping him think it through?
>
> >> Who is benefiting, and how, from a child doing another unwanted page?
>
> > I don't think that she necessarily doesn't want to. It might be that
> > at the moment, she didn't want to. But 1 second later, she does want
> > to because the lesson is very engaging.
>
> I disagree with methods of treating people whereby one does the opposite of what they want, and then denies they have the preferences that they clearly express.
>
> When someone says "no" and then you go "well, maybe no doesn't mean no, so I can just push forward" that is disrespectful and worse.
>
> i don't agree with the "do stuff kids hate now, but maybe they'll thank me later" approach. people's preferences *now* matter. hurting someone now is bad,
I might have misunderstood this one. You used the word hurt. But does
my example constitute hurt? I imagine that you might be saying that
doing something that you didn't want to do constitutes hurt. But it
seems that this is an absolute. My default is not absolute until there
is a good reason. So in this case, where it seems that there is very
little hurt, does this hurt have a significant negative effect, now or
in the future?
This makes me think of entropy. If error is allowed to enter a system,
that error (hurt) can not be removed without energy consumption. And
the longer the error exists in the system, the larger the error
manifests into (Numerical Methods). So is it the case that the little
error that I'm allowing to be introduced in the beginning of the
educative process could have a significant negative outcome?
> ...even if they later seem to change their mind (or perhaps simply adjust to the situation where expressing preferences that will be thwarted doesn't benefit them, so they don't do it).
I do understand this now. Changing preferences is a result of
coercion.
> How come when a child says something the parent disagrees with, it doesn't count, must be repeated, is assumed to not be a serious sentiment, etc... But when a child says something the parent likes then all these penalties and mistreatment don't happen?
I see. Action Reaction. If I continued on this path, my children would
realize this discrepancy and will be upset and resentful.
> If anything, it's the reverse: when children know their parents will disagree with things, and say them anyway, then those things have gotten extra consideration and are more serious than usual. whereas if a child is saying something his parents approve of, he'll more often do it casually.
Yes I've learned this. Which is why most of our lessons are
orchestrated based on their intuition. And I think TCS says that all
the lessons have to be this way, right?
Elliot Temple
On Dec 18, 2011, at 5:07 AM, Rami Rustom wrote:
> On Dec 18, 12:15 am, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
>
>> i don't agree with the "do stuff kids hate now, but maybe they'll thank me later" approach. people's preferences *now* matter. hurting someone now is bad,
>
> I might have misunderstood this one. You used the word hurt. But does
> my example constitute hurt?
Outcomes contrary to Joe's preferences are what constitute (psychological) hurt for Joe.
> I imagine that you might be saying that
> doing something that you didn't want to do constitutes hurt. But it
> seems that this is an absolute. My default is not absolute until there
> is a good reason.
There are important and good reasons to insist on voluntary action, and to consider violations (even for the victim's "own good") to be hurt. Szasz discusses some.
If someone has mistaken preferences, simply violating those preferences is not helping that person. What would be helpful to them is persuasion: voluntary action which *they consider to help* (they only change their mind if they agree with your criticism and suggestions), not involuntary actions which they consider to hurt.
> So in this case, where it seems that there is very
> little hurt, does this hurt have a significant negative effect, now or
> in the future?
That's not how I judge these things. The future is hard to predict. And I may predict it one way, and someone else another. My prediction is no reason to use force and call it benefit (it is not benefit for someone to do what they predict will turn out badly). My prediction could turn out to be false; a fallibilist must use persuasion.
Also people are permitted to live in the moment or whatever. It's up to each person how to value the present vs the future, or how to make sure there is no conflict between the two. If someone is doing it wrong (you think), only voluntary persuasion is help (which means if the idea you're suggesting is wrong, or you're both wrong, they have the chance to use their judgment and catch this error).
>> ...even if they later seem to change their mind (or perhaps simply adjust to the situation where expressing preferences that will be thwarted doesn't benefit them, so they don't do it).
>
> I do understand this now. Changing preferences is a result of
> coercion.
Can be.
>> If anything, it's the reverse: when children know their parents will disagree with things, and say them anyway, then those things have gotten extra consideration and are more serious than usual. whereas if a child is saying something his parents approve of, he'll more often do it casually.
>
> Yes I've learned this. Which is why most of our lessons are
> orchestrated based on their intuition. And I think TCS says that all
> the lessons have to be this way, right?
I don't see that I was advocating basing life lessons on intuition.
Rami Rustom
> On Dec 18, 2011, at 5:07 AM, Rami Rustom wrote:
>
> > On Dec 18, 12:15 am, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
>
> >> i don't agree with the "do stuff kids hate now, but maybe they'll thank me later" approach. people's preferences *now* matter. hurting someone now is bad,
>
> > I might have misunderstood this one. You used the word hurt. But does
> > my example constitute hurt?
>
> Outcomes contrary to Joe's preferences are what constitute (psychological) hurt for Joe.
psychological hurt that occurs when coercion is used. And that a
person sometimes changes their preferences in an attempt to relieve
the hurt.
But in the case of Joe, I don't think this happened. I'll give one
example of something he did that he no longer does after having our
talks. Joe is a very smart guy who sometimes is impatient when other
employees call him for technical help and they don't immediately
understand his explanation. When this occurs, his impatience causes
him to be snippy. The other employee gets negative feelings from this.
I've been explaining to him for years that this is something that he
must be working on. But recently I've learned that he is no better
than in previous years. I realized that he has not been error
correcting his process. But I didn't know exactly why this was
happening, or rather I didn't know why his process was not improving
but mine was. I had the same issues with employees but I've since
mastered the skill of being patient when explaining situations so that
I don't sound snippy and so they don't get negative feelings from my
explanation.
A bit of background knowledge: My company ethos involves a primary
goal of happiness for all. And one of the 7 guidelines to meet that
goal is change; driving change. Joe is making employees unhappy. And
he is not working at changing his process so that they can be happy.
So I started to ask him questions about a certain interaction that he
had with another employee. I asked him questions that lead him to ask
himself, "Why am I able to do so well with customers but I still am
impatient with coworkers?" Joe gets raving reviews from customers.
But not from coworkers.
He confirmed that the reason for the disparity is that he thought that
there was nothing to fix because he thought that this is just the way
it is; that Joe gets impatience when explaining things to coworkers
and there is no better way. I reminded him that I too had the same
trouble that he has, but that I've since fixed my method and I no
longer get snippy with employees when they don't understand my
explanations. So I asked, "Why aren't you able to do that? To correct
your process?" He said, "Its because I haven't been trying. I didn't
think I could fix it. I thought it was just me." I asked, "Now what
do you think?" He said, "I am able to improve my process and I will.
I'll learn the Socratic Method and I'll begin error correcting my
process of explaining things to others."
I thought that this would take a long time to fix his process. But I
was wrong. His coworkers were calling me within days saying, "WOW what
happened to Joe? He's completely different now. He's so nice."
Now there is a lot more that happened. But this was just one of the
issues. At least for this issue, did I use coercion or persuasion?
> > I imagine that you might be saying that
> > doing something that you didn't want to do constitutes hurt. But it
> > seems that this is an absolute. My default is not absolute until there
> > is a good reason.
>
> There are important and good reasons to insist on voluntary action, and to consider violations (even for the victim's "own good") to be hurt. Szasz discusses some.
>
> If someone has mistaken preferences, simply violating those preferences is not helping that person. What would be helpful to them is persuasion: voluntary action which *they consider to help* (they only change their mind if they agree with your criticism and suggestions), not involuntary actions which they consider to hurt.
>
> > So in this case, where it seems that there is very
> > little hurt, does this hurt have a significant negative effect, now or
> > in the future?
>
> That's not how I judge these things. The future is hard to predict. And I may predict it one way, and someone else another. My prediction is no reason to use force and call it benefit (it is not benefit for someone to do what they predict will turn out badly). My prediction could turn out to be false; a fallibilist must use persuasion.
thinking is fallible.
> Also people are permitted to live in the moment or whatever. It's up to each person how to value the present vs the future, or how to make sure there is no conflict between the two. If someone is doing it wrong (you think), only voluntary persuasion is help (which means if the idea you're suggesting is wrong, or you're both wrong, they have the chance to use their judgment and catch this error).
>
> >> ...even if they later seem to change their mind (or perhaps simply adjust to the situation where expressing preferences that will be thwarted doesn't benefit them, so they don't do it).
>
> > I do understand this now. Changing preferences is a result of
> > coercion.
>
> Can be.
attempt to relieve it by changing their preferences. And on the
surface, this may look like they are happy, but in reality they are
not.
Persuasion does not involve psychological hurt. It involves a person
changing their preferences based on their own knowledge set, i.e. on
their own terms.
> >> If anything, it's the reverse: when children know their parents will disagree with things, and say them anyway, then those things have gotten extra consideration and are more serious than usual. whereas if a child is saying something his parents approve of, he'll more often do it casually.
>
> > Yes I've learned this. Which is why most of our lessons are
> > orchestrated based on their intuition. And I think TCS says that all
> > the lessons have to be this way, right?
>
> I don't see that I was advocating basing life lessons on intuition.
I'll refrain from suggesting what TCS is until I finish reading the
TCS site. Btw, I didn't realize that I had missed reading the TCS
site. I didn't notice the menu at the right. :)
Elliot Temple
On Dec 21, 2011, at 3:27 AM, Rami Rustom wrote:
> On Dec 18, 12:28 pm, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
>> On Dec 18, 2011, at 5:07 AM, Rami Rustom wrote:
>>
>>> On Dec 18, 12:15 am, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
>>
>>>> i don't agree with the "do stuff kids hate now, but maybe they'll thank me later" approach. people's preferences *now* matter. hurting someone now is bad,
>>
>>> I might have misunderstood this one. You used the word hurt. But does
>>> my example constitute hurt?
>>
>> Outcomes contrary to Joe's preferences are what constitute (psychological) hurt for Joe.
>
> Could you help me understand this part. I've been reading about the
> psychological hurt that occurs when coercion is used. And that a
> person sometimes changes their preferences in an attempt to relieve
> the hurt.
>
> But in the case of Joe, I don't think this happened.
I'll give an example following the form I criticized above.
Joe's preference is to play the video game Grand Theft Auto 3 (GTA).
Joe's parent takes away GTA, contrary to Joe's preference.
Joe's parent says, "You'll thank me later". Joe's parent thinks taking away the video game will help Joe to become an astronaut, chemist, senator, or other great thing, instead of a loser.
The parent imagines the preferences of Joe as an adult, about what he did previously, will be to have learned the periodic table, or whatever, instead of to have played GTA.
This (psychologically) hurts Joe to have GTA taken away from him when he wants to play it. Whether or not it violates his future preferences (which isn't really predictable), it violates his *current* preferences.
> I'll give one
> example of something he did that he no longer does after having our
> talks. Joe is a very smart guy who sometimes is impatient when other
> employees call him for technical help and they don't immediately
> understand his explanation. When this occurs, his impatience causes
> him to be snippy. The other employee gets negative feelings from this.
> I've been explaining to him for years that this is something that he
> must be working on.
It's not up to you to tell him what he "must" do. He may prefer to work on something else first, or, for now, nothing. It is false that he must do the thing you think would be a good idea.
And you shouldn't repeat your advice over and over for years. If he rejects your advice, then he doesn't want it. You should drop the subject unless you have a new idea to say and you get his genuine consent to tell him.
> But recently I've learned that he is no better
> than in previous years. I realized that he has not been error
> correcting his process. But I didn't know exactly why this was
> happening, or rather I didn't know why his process was not improving
> but mine was. I had the same issues with employees but I've since
> mastered the skill of being patient when explaining situations so that
> I don't sound snippy and so they don't get negative feelings from my
> explanation.
>
> A bit of background knowledge: My company ethos involves a primary
> goal of happiness for all. And one of the 7 guidelines to meet that
> goal is change; driving change. Joe is making employees unhappy. And
> he is not working at changing his process so that they can be happy.
Their happiness is their own responsibility, not Joe's. Don't blame Joe for their feelings. He's right not to consider their feelings to be his problem.
They are mistaken to get unhappy because someone like Joe
A) exists
B) talks to them when they want help, being somewhat helpful but less helpful than they'd like
C) doesn't perform some rituals, follow some social conventions, etc, in ways they would like
They have no legitimate grievance against Joe. And if they don't find his help helpful, they can stop asking him to explain stuff to them.
> So I started to ask him questions about a certain interaction that he
> had with another employee. I asked him questions that lead him to ask
> himself, "Why am I able to do so well with customers but I still am
> impatient with coworkers?" Joe gets raving reviews from customers.
> But not from coworkers.
>
> He confirmed that the reason for the disparity is that he thought that
> there was nothing to fix because he thought that this is just the way
> it is; that Joe gets impatience when explaining things to coworkers
> and there is no better way.
I doubt this is the whole story. Introspection is often incomplete, and the stuff openly shared even more incomplete.
For example, Joe might have some conception of the idea that his coworkers are responsible for being competent, and the fault (when they don't understand his sophisticated explanations) is theirs not his. Whereas customers do not have a responsibility of that sort and part of his role with customers is to be the expert so they don't have to.
Whether he knows how to articulate this idea or not, and wants to say it to you or not, he might at least partly know or believe it.
There are various other possibilities as well.
> I reminded him that I too had the same
> trouble that he has, but that I've since fixed my method and I no
> longer get snippy with employees when they don't understand my
> explanations. So I asked, "Why aren't you able to do that? To correct
> your process?" He said, "Its because I haven't been trying. I didn't
> think I could fix it. I thought it was just me." I asked, "Now what
> do you think?" He said, "I am able to improve my process and I will.
> I'll learn the Socratic Method and I'll begin error correcting my
> process of explaining things to others."
>
> I thought that this would take a long time to fix his process. But I
> was wrong. His coworkers were calling me within days saying, "WOW what
> happened to Joe? He's completely different now. He's so nice."
>
> Now there is a lot more that happened. But this was just one of the
> issues. At least for this issue, did I use coercion or persuasion?
The main event sounds like persuasion. I don't see what it has to do with thwarting someone's preference now and saying they'll thank you later. For example, you were *not* punishing Joe every time he interacted in ways you disapprove of, and saying he'd thank you later once he learned his lesson.
>>>> If anything, it's the reverse: when children know their parents will disagree with things, and say them anyway, then those things have gotten extra consideration and are more serious than usual. whereas if a child is saying something his parents approve of, he'll more often do it casually.
>>
>>> Yes I've learned this. Which is why most of our lessons are
>>> orchestrated based on their intuition. And I think TCS says that all
>>> the lessons have to be this way, right?
>>
>> I don't see that I was advocating basing life lessons on intuition.
>
> I was referring to any kind of lesson.
The main issue here, for me, is intuition, not what sort of lesson. I wasn't advocating intuition and TCS doesn't do advocacy for intuition.
We may mean partially different things by "intuition".
Rami Rustom
> On Dec 21, 2011, at 3:27 AM, Rami Rustom wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Dec 18, 12:28 pm, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
> >> On Dec 18, 2011, at 5:07 AM, Rami Rustom wrote:
>
> >>> On Dec 18, 12:15 am, Elliot Temple <c...@curi.us> wrote:
>
> >>>> i don't agree with the "do stuff kids hate now, but maybe they'll thank me later" approach. people's preferences *now* matter. hurting someone now is bad,
>
> >>> I might have misunderstood this one. You used the word hurt. But does
> >>> my example constitute hurt?
>
> >> Outcomes contrary to Joe's preferences are what constitute (psychological) hurt for Joe.
>
> > Could you help me understand this part. I've been reading about the
> > psychological hurt that occurs when coercion is used. And that a
> > person sometimes changes their preferences in an attempt to relieve
> > the hurt.
>
> > But in the case of Joe, I don't think this happened.
>
> I'll give an example following the form I criticized above.
>
> Joe's preference is to play the video game Grand Theft Auto 3 (GTA).
>
> Joe's parent takes away GTA, contrary to Joe's preference.
>
> Joe's parent says, "You'll thank me later". Joe's parent thinks taking away the video game will help Joe to become an astronaut, chemist, senator, or other great thing, instead of a loser.
>
> The parent imagines the preferences of Joe as an adult, about what he did previously, will be to have learned the periodic table, or whatever, instead of to have played GTA.
>
> This (psychologically) hurts Joe to have GTA taken away from him when he wants to play it. Whether or not it violates his future preferences (which isn't really predictable), it violates his *current* preferences.
changed his preferences.
But I was referring to what actually happened between Joe and I. You
mentioned that "Outcomes contrary to Joe's preferences are what
constitute (psychological) hurt for Joe." But I don't know exactly
what was contrary to Joe's preferences.
Joe took on the job of tech lead. Actually he suggested and pushed to
take the job from me. Then he asked for a raise for having the bigger
job and I agreed. So now he is responsible for answering tech
questions and that includes doing it without being snippy with his
coworkers.
> > I'll give one
> > example of something he did that he no longer does after having our
> > talks. Joe is a very smart guy who sometimes is impatient when other
> > employees call him for technical help and they don't immediately
> > understand his explanation. When this occurs, his impatience causes
> > him to be snippy. The other employee gets negative feelings from this.
> > I've been explaining to him for years that this is something that he
> > must be working on.
>
> It's not up to you to tell him what he "must" do. He may prefer to work on something else first, or, for now, nothing. It is false that he must do the thing you think would be a good idea.
back from him. And I know, because he has told me, that this is not
what he wants because that would constitute a lower salary.
> And you shouldn't repeat your advice over and over for years. If he rejects your advice, then he doesn't want it. You should drop the subject unless you have a new idea to say and you get his genuine consent to tell him.
I was not able to give a good explanation of why its happening or how
to fix it. The 3rd time, I was able to. But there were many many
occasions where I witnessed Joe and a coworker on the phone and Joe
getting snippy and then upset about the coworker not knowing
something; and I had to explain that the coworker doesn't know such
things and I had to calm Joe down.
> > But recently I've learned that he is no better
> > than in previous years. I realized that he has not been error
> > correcting his process. But I didn't know exactly why this was
> > happening, or rather I didn't know why his process was not improving
> > but mine was. I had the same issues with employees but I've since
> > mastered the skill of being patient when explaining situations so that
> > I don't sound snippy and so they don't get negative feelings from my
> > explanation.
>
> > A bit of background knowledge: My company ethos involves a primary
> > goal of happiness for all. And one of the 7 guidelines to meet that
> > goal is change; driving change. Joe is making employees unhappy. And
> > he is not working at changing his process so that they can be happy.
>
> Their happiness is their own responsibility, not Joe's. Don't blame Joe for their feelings. He's right not to consider their feelings to be his problem.
feelings?
> They are mistaken to get unhappy because someone like Joe
>
> A) exists
>
> B) talks to them when they want help, being somewhat helpful but less helpful than they'd like
>
> C) doesn't perform some rituals, follow some social conventions, etc, in ways they would like
>
> They have no legitimate grievance against Joe. And if they don't find his help helpful, they can stop asking him to explain stuff to them.
Joe, then they ask me, the secondary tech lead. And in most
situations, I'm not able to help because I'm out of practice and the
job has outgrown me. And I rarely answer my phone.
> > So I started to ask him questions about a certain interaction that he
> > had with another employee. I asked him questions that lead him to ask
> > himself, "Why am I able to do so well with customers but I still am
> > impatient with coworkers?" Joe gets raving reviews from customers.
> > But not from coworkers.
>
> > He confirmed that the reason for the disparity is that he thought that
> > there was nothing to fix because he thought that this is just the way
> > it is; that Joe gets impatience when explaining things to coworkers
> > and there is no better way.
>
> I doubt this is the whole story. Introspection is often incomplete, and the stuff openly shared even more incomplete.
times over the years after a coworker called Joe for tech help, Joe
would be upset about it and say, "How could s/he not know that?" Each
time I would explain but it seems my explanations were not enough for
Joe to learn this logic; that each person's knowledge set is
different, which is the main cause of most misunderstandings. Joe was
assuming that the coworker knew as much as Joe did. And each time that
Joe learned about a new thing that coworkers didn't know, he was
upset, and his reaction was snippy.
> For example, Joe might have some conception of the idea that his coworkers are responsible for being competent, and the fault (when they don't understand his sophisticated explanations) is theirs not his. Whereas customers do not have a responsibility of that sort and part of his role with customers is to be the expert so they don't have to.
they are responsible for seeking help for tech help (learning) from
Joe. And Joe is responsible for explaining (teaching).
have said that the lessons are based orchestrated around their
*interest*.
And the reason that I mistakenly said intuition is because that is
part of my learning process. And I just looked up the definition of
intuition and its not even close to what I thought it was. I thought
that intuition was the unconscious mind using implicit logic to learn.
So is there a term for this?