The relativity of simultaneity
Rupert
<rupertmccallum@yahoo.com>came to discussing modern physics. Perhaps I should have a look at his
book "Space and Time". I'd be interested in Swinburne's take on the
following issue. According to relativity theory the question of
whether two space-time events are simultaneous is not an absolute
matter, but depends which frame of reference you are in. Yet Swinburne
also claim that God exists eternally in time. So presumably it must
make sense to ask whether or not two space-time events are
simultaneous in God's frame of reference. In this way we get a
privileged frame of reference. Furthermore we can ask this question
about any two events in the space-time continuum. I'm not even sure
that that can be reconciled with general relativity given what we know
about the large-scale structure of the universe. Doesn't this
constitute a lack of parsimony in theism - the need to postulate a
special, privileged frame of reference without giving any explanation
of why this particular frame of reference? Can the account of God
playing an essential causal role in the evolution of the universe over
time be reconciled with cosmological theories about the large-scale
structure of the space-time continuum?
Brock
<brockorgan@gmail.com>On Feb 4, 10:54 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> According to relativity theory the question of
> whether two space-time events are simultaneous is not an absolute
> matter, but depends which frame of reference you are in. Yet Swinburne
> also claim that God exists eternally in time. So presumably it must
> make sense to ask whether or not two space-time events are
> simultaneous in God's frame of reference.
Actually, one has to even ask if the term has meaning in God's frame
of reference.
> In this way we get a
> privileged frame of reference.
Or simpler, a non-humanistic frame.
> Doesn't this
> constitute a lack of parsimony in theism - the need to postulate a
> special, privileged frame of reference
Or perhaps it simply indicates that God is not bound by the same
limitations human reason has.
Regards,
Brock
zencycle
<zencycle@bikerider.com>>
> Or perhaps it simply indicates that God is not bound by the same
> limitations human reason has.
Or, that god can simply be whatever you want it to be.
Brock Organ
<brockorgan@gmail.com>I consider the objective nature of reality to be independent of
personal aesthetic. :)
Regards,
Brock
zencycle
<zencycle@bikerider.com>On Feb 8, 3:30 pm, Brock Organ <brockor...@gmail.com> wrote:
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>of light becomes bound up with the definition of simultaneity. Events
in physics have "light cones." The reason our definition of
simultaneity depends on the speed of light is that we are always bound
to a location in space-time, and judge all events relative to our
location. We cannot be in two places at once. But God can. God is
simultaneously present at my space-time location, and at another space-
time location 5 billion light-years distant from mine. For me, then,
to observe an event happening at that distant location, I would be
observing an event 5 billion years in the past. The same is true in
reverse for a being similar to myself at that distant location
observing me. (He wouldn't be able to observe me, unless he waited
another 5 billion years.) But God, simultaneously present at both, is
not bound by relativity. Relativity addresses the comparison of
different reference-frames based on space-time location, and God is
not bound to any particular space-time location, and so has no need
for a Theory of Relativity.
Things are only relative for limited beings, so only a limited being
has use for a Theory of Relativity.
On Feb 4, 10:54 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
Brock Organ
<brockorgan@gmail.com>> It's all a matter of perspective, brock.
Humankind is not the measure of all things.
Regards,
Brock
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>in the future at all time. He knows what decisions I will make in
particular. So while I think your explanation solves the problem of
simultaneity it introduces the free will problem. If god knows what
decisions we will make then we are not free to make decisions that he
knows we will not make.
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>experience is thus a measure of all things that you can experience.
Since your experience is a part of humanity, it is certainly true that
humanity is a measure of all things that we can experience. And all
those things that we cannot experience are meaningless and
irrelevant.
On Feb 8, 10:07 pm, Brock Organ <brockor...@gmail.com> wrote:
zencycle
<zencycle@bikerider.com>canned responses, and that's one of them. He claims that the goodness
of god is an objective quality, denying the fact that goodness itself
is a subjective assesment. Brocks reply to this will be "the objective
truth of the Bible is independent of my beliefs"
Brock Organ
<brockorgan@gmail.com>> You can never experience anything that you cannot experience. Your
> experience is thus a measure of all things that you can experience.
But the objective nature of reality is independent of any particular
person's experience of it.
> And all
> those things that we cannot experience are meaningless and
> irrelevant.
However, your statement contradicts itself: If you would assert that
something you did not experience is "meaningless and irrelevant" then
you don't do so from personal experience. :)
Regards,
Brock
Brock Organ
<brockorgan@gmail.com>> He claims that the goodness
> of god is an objective quality, denying the fact that goodness itself
> is a subjective assesment.
:)
Regards,
Brock
Neil Kelsey
<neil_kelsey@hotmail.com>> Relativity accounts for the speed of light. It is thus that the speed
> of light becomes bound up with the definition of simultaneity. Events
> in physics have "light cones." The reason our definition of
> simultaneity depends on the speed of light is that we are always bound
> to a location in space-time, and judge all events relative to our
> location. We cannot be in two places at once. But God can.
Argument by assertion fallacies are not evidence that God exists, or
that the laws of physics can be violated.
> God is
> simultaneously present at my space-time location, and at another space-
> time location 5 billion light-years distant from mine.
You have no valid evidence that God is present at any location, let
alone all locations.
> For me, then,
> to observe an event happening at that distant location, I would be
> observing an event 5 billion years in the past. The same is true in
> reverse for a being similar to myself at that distant location
> observing me. (He wouldn't be able to observe me, unless he waited
> another 5 billion years.) But God, simultaneously present at both, is
> not bound by relativity.
Argument by assertion fallacies are not evidence that God exists, or
that the laws of physics can be violated.
> Relativity addresses the comparison of
> different reference-frames based on space-time location, and God is
> not bound to any particular space-time location, and so has no need
> for a Theory of Relativity.
Argument by assertion fallacies are not evidence that God exists, or
that the laws of physics can be violated.
> Things are only relative for limited beings, so only a limited being
> has use for a Theory of Relativity.
You have no valid evidence that an "unlimited being" exists.
> On Feb 4, 10:54 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> > Simonsaysbye told me that Swinburne was not out of his depth when it
> > came to discussing modern physics. Perhaps I should have a look at his
> > book "Space and Time". I'd be interested in Swinburne's take on the
> > following issue. According to relativity theory the question of
> > whether two space-time events are simultaneous is not an absolute
> > matter, but depends which frame of reference you are in. Yet Swinburne
> > also claim that God exists eternally in time. So presumably it must
> > make sense to ask whether or not two space-time events are
> > simultaneous in God's frame of reference. In this way we get a
> > privileged frame of reference. Furthermore we can ask this question
> > about any two events in the space-time continuum. I'm not even sure
> > that that can be reconciled with general relativity given what we know
> > about the large-scale structure of the universe. Doesn't this
> > constitute a lack of parsimony in theism - the need to postulate a
> > special, privileged frame of reference without giving any explanation
> > of why this particular frame of reference? Can the account of God
> > playing an essential causal role in the evolution of the universe over
> > time be reconciled with cosmological theories about the large-scale
> > structure of the space-time continuum?- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Treebeard
<allan_c_cybulskie@yahoo.ca>On Feb 9, 12:08 pm, Sebastian <mezna...@gmail.com> wrote:
> If god is at all space-time points at then god knows what will happen
> in the future at all time. He knows what decisions I will make in
> particular. So while I think your explanation solves the problem of
> simultaneity it introduces the free will problem. If god knows what
> decisions we will make then we are not free to make decisions that he
> knows we will not make.
This presumes that the outcome of a free choice cannot be known by any
method before it occurs. This is not a safe presumption. If the
method is reliant on the choice being made freely, then it would still
be -- and have to be -- a free choice even if known beforehand.
Knowing the outcome of a free choice by actually observing the choice
that was made freely in a future timeframe seems to fit that bill.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>On Feb 9, 12:08 pm, Sebastian <mezna...@gmail.com> wrote:
> If god is at all space-time points at then god knows what will happen
> in the future at all time.
Yes, we already know that; He is omniscient, remember?
> He knows what decisions I will make in
> particular.
Indeed.
> So while I think your explanation solves the problem of
> simultaneity it introduces the free will problem.
How is it a problem?
> If god knows what
> decisions we will make then we are not free to make decisions that he
> knows we will not make.
>
You are not free to make a decision you do not in fact make because
you are not free to produce a contradiction, and to make a decision
that you don't make is a contradiction. That is true about your
decisions even if nobody knows about them, so God's omniscience is
superfluous here.
Neil Kelsey
<neil_kelsey@hotmail.com>> You're tired, Neil. Go to bed.
Disdainful non sequitur fallacies are not evidence that God exists or
that the laws of nature can be violated, but they are yet more
evidence that besides being a schizophrenric -which is relevant when
considering your wild claims about God - you also have a Narcissistic
Personality Disorder:
"People who are overly narcissistic commonly feel rejected, humiliated
and threatened when criticised. To protect themselves from these
dangers, they often react with disdain, rage, and/or defiance to any
slight criticism, real or imagined."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narcissistic_personality_disorder
> > > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>Neil Kelsey
<neil_kelsey@hotmail.com>> <yawn>
Disdainful argument from emotion fallacies - you're "bored" - are not
evidence that God exists, or that the laws of nature can be violated,
but they are yet more
evidence that besides being a schizophrenric (which is relevant when
considering your wild, unsupported claims about God), you also have a
Narcissistic
Personality Disorder:
"People who are overly narcissistic commonly feel rejected,
humiliated
and threatened when criticised. To protect themselves from these
dangers, they often react with disdain, rage, and/or defiance to any
slight criticism, real or imagined."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narcissistic_personality_disorder
Psychological defects are a rational explanation for why you make
wild, unsubstantiated claims about God.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>record.
Neil Kelsey
<neil_kelsey@hotmail.com>On Feb 9, 10:50 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
> For you, nothing is evidence that God exists.
Valid evidence would be evidence that God exist. It is not my fault if
you think you can prove God exists by using logical fallacies.
> You are like a broken record.
Stop making wild, unsupported assertions I'll stop seeking a rational
explanation for why you would make wild, unsupported assertions.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>On Feb 9, 2:04 pm, Neil Kelsey <neil_kel...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 9, 10:50 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > For you, nothing is evidence that God exists.
>
> Valid evidence would be evidence that God exist.
For you, no evidence can be valid.
> It is not my fault if
> you think you can prove God exists by using logical fallacies.
>
> > You are like a broken record.
>
> Stop making wild, unsupported assertions I'll stop seeking a rational
> explanation for why you would make wild, unsupported assertions.
It is neither wild nor unsupported to assert, about you, that for you,
no evidence can possibly be considered valid.
Neil Kelsey
<neil_kelsey@hotmail.com>On Feb 9, 11:37 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 9, 2:04 pm, Neil Kelsey <neil_kel...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Feb 9, 10:50 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > For you, nothing is evidence that God exists.
>
> > Valid evidence would be evidence that God exist.
>
> For you, no evidence can be valid.
That's simply not true. I've been convinced by lots of things when
presented with valid evidence.
> > It is not my fault if
> > you think you can prove God exists by using logical fallacies.
>
> > > You are like a broken record.
>
> > Stop making wild, unsupported assertions I'll stop seeking a rational
> > explanation for why you would make wild, unsupported assertions.
>
> It is neither wild nor unsupported to assert, about you, that for you,
> no evidence can possibly be considered valid.
Reality contradicts you, as always.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>On Feb 9, 2:45 pm, Neil Kelsey <neil_kel...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 9, 11:37 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Feb 9, 2:04 pm, Neil Kelsey <neil_kel...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Feb 9, 10:50 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > For you, nothing is evidence that God exists.
>
> > > Valid evidence would be evidence that God exist.
>
> > For you, no evidence can be valid.
>
> That's simply not true. I've been convinced by lots of things when
> presented with valid evidence.
>
But never God.
> > > It is not my fault if
> > > you think you can prove God exists by using logical fallacies.
>
> > > > You are like a broken record.
>
> > > Stop making wild, unsupported assertions I'll stop seeking a rational
> > > explanation for why you would make wild, unsupported assertions.
>
> > It is neither wild nor unsupported to assert, about you, that for you,
> > no evidence can possibly be considered valid.
>
> Reality contradicts you, as always.
>
Specify what evidence you would consider valid for the existence of
God.
(Watch Neil dodge this one!)
Neil Kelsey
<neil_kelsey@hotmail.com>On Feb 9, 11:47 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 9, 2:45 pm, Neil Kelsey <neil_kel...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Feb 9, 11:37 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Feb 9, 2:04 pm, Neil Kelsey <neil_kel...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On Feb 9, 10:50 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > For you, nothing is evidence that God exists.
>
> > > > Valid evidence would be evidence that God exist.
>
> > > For you, no evidence can be valid.
>
> > That's simply not true. I've been convinced by lots of things when
> > presented with valid evidence.
>
> But never God.
You haven't presented any valid evidence.
> > > > It is not my fault if
> > > > you think you can prove God exists by using logical fallacies.
>
> > > > > You are like a broken record.
>
> > > > Stop making wild, unsupported assertions I'll stop seeking a rational
> > > > explanation for why you would make wild, unsupported assertions.
>
> > > It is neither wild nor unsupported to assert, about you, that for you,
> > > no evidence can possibly be considered valid.
>
> > Reality contradicts you, as always.
>
> Specify what evidence you would consider valid for the existence of
> God.
>
> (Watch Neil dodge this one!)
I would consider objective, verifiable and falsifiable evidence as
being valid, as you are already perfectly aware. I have no idea why
you think I would dodge this answer.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>So far you haven't specified anything at all.
Specify, please, what evidence you would consider objective,
verifiable, and falsifiable, for the existence of God.
Thanks for defining "valid," but you still haven't answered the
question.
Neil Kelsey
<neil_kelsey@hotmail.com>I have specified that I would consider evidence that is objective,
verifiable, and falsifiable to be valid evidence that God exists.
> Specify, please, what evidence you would consider objective,
> verifiable, and falsifiable, for the existence of God.
I'm not making the claim that God exists, you are. You make the claim,
you provide the evidence. I can't provide any because I see none.
> Thanks for defining "valid," but you still haven't answered the
> question.
Shifting the burden of proof fallacies are not evidence that God
exists. Getting back to your original argument, neither is your
special pleading fallacy that God can violate the laws of nature.
Simon Ewins
<sjewins@gmail.com>> But the objective nature of reality is independent of any particular
> person's experience of it.
Very true. Problem is we have no way to determine what this objective
reality is, so it is completely useless to us.
--
"Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity;
and I'm not sure about the universe." - Einstein
"[T]hings are entirely what they appear to be and behind them... there
is nothing."
[Jean Paul Sartre, Nausea]
Simon Ewins
<sjewins@gmail.com>> This presumes that the outcome of a free choice cannot be known by any
> method before it occurs. This is not a safe presumption. If the
> method is reliant on the choice being made freely, then it would still
> be -- and have to be -- a free choice even if known beforehand.
>
> Knowing the outcome of a free choice by actually observing the choice
> that was made freely in a future timeframe seems to fit that bill.
Depends if the one doing the seeing can be mistaken. If so, then sure,
free will is not hampered. If not, then free will in the one observed is
not possible.
--
"Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity;
and I'm not sure about the universe." - Einstein
"The moment a little boy is concerned with which is a jay and which is a
sparrow, he can no longer see the birds or hear them sing."
[Eric Berne]
Brock Organ
<brockorgan@gmail.com>> [Brock Organ]
>>
>> But the objective nature of reality is independent of any particular
>> person's experience of it.
>
> Very true. Problem is we have no way to determine what this objective
> reality is, so it is completely useless to us.
Fallacy by "Row, Row, Row your boat"[1].
Regards,
Brock
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Row,_Row,_Row_Your_Boat#Lyrics
Rupert
<rupertmccallum@yahoo.com>On Feb 9, 8:39 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Relativity accounts for the speed of light. It is thus that the speed
> of light becomes bound up with the definition of simultaneity. Events
> in physics have "light cones." The reason our definition of
> simultaneity depends on the speed of light is that we are always bound
> to a location in space-time, and judge all events relative to our
> location. We cannot be in two places at once. But God can. God is
> simultaneously present at my space-time location, and at another space-
> time location 5 billion light-years distant from mine. For me, then,
> to observe an event happening at that distant location, I would be
> observing an event 5 billion years in the past. The same is true in
> reverse for a being similar to myself at that distant location
> observing me. (He wouldn't be able to observe me, unless he waited
> another 5 billion years.) But God, simultaneously present at both, is
> not bound by relativity. Relativity addresses the comparison of
> different reference-frames based on space-time location, and God is
> not bound to any particular space-time location, and so has no need
> for a Theory of Relativity.
>
> Things are only relative for limited beings, so only a limited being
> has use for a Theory of Relativity.
>
You still have to define the *meaning* of simultaneity for two
arbitrary space-time points, which was precisely my point. There has
to be some way of giving meaning to the concept of simultaneity for
arbitrary points in the space-time continuum.
Simon Ewins
<sjewins@gmail.com>>>> But the objective nature of reality is independent of any particular
>>> person's experience of it.
>>
>> Very true. Problem is we have no way to determine what this objective
>> reality is, so it is completely useless to us.
>
> Fallacy by "Row, Row, Row your boat"[1].
Rather, you need to post an example of something that is a member of an
objective reality that has not been perceived by your mind and, when
presented, does not need to processed by my mind. Anything less would
merely be your subjective view and my subjective view.
It is an easy proof of a truly objective reality. Go for it. If you do
it you will be the first and fame and fortune await you.
--
"Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity;
and I'm not sure about the universe." - Einstein
"It is better to conquer yourself than to win a thousand battles. Then
the victory is yours. It cannot be taken from you, not by angels or by
demons, heaven or hell."
[Buddha]
Brock Organ
<brockorgan@gmail.com>> [Brock Organ]
>>>>
>>>> But the objective nature of reality is independent of any particular
>>>> person's experience of it.
>>>
>>> Very true. Problem is we have no way to determine what this objective
>>> reality is, so it is completely useless to us.
>>
>> Fallacy by "Row, Row, Row your boat"[1].
>
> Rather, you need to post an example of something that is a member of an
> objective reality that has not been perceived by your mind and, when
> presented, does not need to processed by my mind.
That's simplistic. A person doesn't have to perceive or understand
the theory of internal combustion to successfully get into their car
and drive off in it. :)
Regards,
Brock
Simon Ewins
<sjewins@gmail.com>Didn't think you could. Concession accepted (as you like to claim).
[Brock Organ]
--
"Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity;
and I'm not sure about the universe." - Einstein
"To keep the body in good health is a duty... otherwise we shall not be
able to keep our mind strong and clear."
[Buddha]
Brock Organ
<brockorgan@gmail.com>> Didn't think you could. Concession accepted (as you like to claim).
I just note that road-runner solipsism/colipsism fails:
"The coyote leaps all the way into the air and rejoins his napkin, and
both are hung up on another branch. The entire tree then falls down,
pounding the coyote through the ground and into a waterfall. Wile
cannot fight the flow, and is swept downstream, under a bridge, and
through an entire network of progressively thinner pipes before his
arm protrudes out of a spigot. He twists the spigot and the rest of
himself comes out, leaving Wile staring at the Road Runner, still
standing on the floating piece of rock.
Wile, depressed and embarrassed, holds up a sign to the Road Runner
and the audience: "I wouldn't mind - except that he defies the law of
gravity!" The camera cuts to the Road Runner's response on a second
sign: "Sure - but I never studied law!" The Road Runner speeds off the
floating rock onto a safe haven to the right as the cartoon fades."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fastest_with_the_Mostest
Regards,
Brock
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>Yes. Now we have a working definition of valid from you. Thank you
for that.
Now kindly specify what evidence you would consider objective,
verifiable, and falsifiable, for the existence of God.
Or --- what you will actually do --- just dodge the question again, as
artfully as you can.
> > Specify, please, what evidence you would consider objective,
> > verifiable, and falsifiable, for the existence of God.
>
> I'm not making the claim that God exists, you are.
I believe in God, as you know.
>You make the claim,
> you provide the evidence. I can't provide any because I see none.
>
Apparently, you don't even have any idea what you'd be looking for.
> > Thanks for defining "valid," but you still haven't answered the
> > question.
>
> Shifting the burden of proof fallacies are not evidence that God
> exists.
O.K., that is one example of something you *wouldn't* consider valid
evidence. Now give an example of something you *would*, if it could
be produced.
> Getting back to your original argument, neither is your
> special pleading fallacy that God can violate the laws of nature.
Well, as we both know, the basis of your statement isn't real in the
first place. We can go there AGAIN, but it gets tedious.
But, you have now given two examples of things you wouldn't consider
valid evidence. I have only asked you for one example of something
you would. Still waiting on that.
But of course, I know you don't have an answer, and you are too
wrapped up in your own ego to admit it, so, you will again dodge the
question, as artfully as you can. As a bonus, you will shift the
burden of your inadequacy on to me.
Simon Ewins
<sjewins@gmail.com>> On Tue, Feb 9, 2010 at 6:32 PM, Simon Ewins<sje...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Didn't think you could. Concession accepted (as you like to claim).
>
> I just note that road-runner solipsism/colipsism fails:
You keep doing that you polytheist/Christian.
Keep it up and I'll twit you, seriously. This pisses me off. Your
polytheistic views notwithstanding.
--
"A casual stroll through the lunatic asylum shows that faith does not
prove anything." - Nietzsche
"Begin at the beginning and go on till you come to the end; then stop."
[Lewis Carrol, Alice in Wonderland]
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>Simultaneity already has a meaning. Two *events* are simultaneous if
they happen at the same time. The concept applies to events, not
locations.
This is intuitively non-problematic. The discrepancy only arises when
we try to *determine* and *measure* simultaneity for two space-time
events. Then, we necessarily judge simultaneity relative to our
chosen reference frame, and we measure only the observed phenomena.
Phenomena are the appearances of things. We cannot determine whether
two events are "really" simultaneous, only whether they *appear*
simultaneous from one particular chosen reference frame. It is
possible --- in fact, it has been shown to happen --- that two events
A and B are ordered temporally in a sequence A, B, from one reference
frame, and B, A, from a different reference frame. Our concept of
simultaneity is so bound up with the velocity of light that it is in
fact meaningless to discuss which event "really" happened first. But
that is *our* concept of simultaneity as it relates to *our* judgment
of events.
God has an entirely different take on things, not directly accessible
to us. God, in fact, causes all events whatsoever that occur. So for
God, the definition of simultaneity is a bit simpler. Two events are
simultaneous if God does them both at the same time.
Because of relativity, these two simultaneous (i.e. really) events can
possibly appear to us as simultaneous, or as ordered A, B, or as
ordered B, A, depending on our particular frame of reference.
Rupert
<rupertmccallum@yahoo.com>Simultaneity does *not* have an absolute meaning in the special theory
of relativity. You say "two events are simultaneous if they happen at
the same time". But in the special theory of relativity, you would
have to answer the question, in what frame of reference. In order to
give an absolute meaning to simultaneity you need to assume a
"privileged" frame of reference.
> This is intuitively non-problematic. The discrepancy only arises when
> we try to *determine* and *measure* simultaneity for two space-time
> events. Then, we necessarily judge simultaneity relative to our
> chosen reference frame, and we measure only the observed phenomena.
In the theory of relativity simultaneity itself is relative to the
reference frame.
> Phenomena are the appearances of things. We cannot determine whether
> two events are "really" simultaneous, only whether they *appear*
> simultaneous from one particular chosen reference frame. It is
> possible --- in fact, it has been shown to happen --- that two events
> A and B are ordered temporally in a sequence A, B, from one reference
> frame, and B, A, from a different reference frame. Our concept of
> simultaneity is so bound up with the velocity of light that it is in
> fact meaningless to discuss which event "really" happened first. But
> that is *our* concept of simultaneity as it relates to *our* judgment
> of events.
>
> God has an entirely different take on things, not directly accessible
> to us. God, in fact, causes all events whatsoever that occur. So for
> God, the definition of simultaneity is a bit simpler. Two events are
> simultaneous if God does them both at the same time.
>
> Because of relativity, these two simultaneous (i.e. really) events can
> possibly appear to us as simultaneous, or as ordered A, B, or as
> ordered B, A, depending on our particular frame of reference.- Hide quoted text -
Neil Kelsey
<neil_kelsey@hotmail.com>How on earth could I possibly know what valid evidence would look like
if I haven't seen it yet?
> Or --- what you will actually do --- just dodge the question again, as
> artfully as you can.
Just because your grasp of logic is flimsy does not mean I am dodging
your question.
> > > Specify, please, what evidence you would consider objective,
> > > verifiable, and falsifiable, for the existence of God.
>
> > I'm not making the claim that God exists, you are.
>
> I believe in God, as you know.
The point is, you would have to provide evidence that your God exists,
not me.
> >You make the claim,
> > you provide the evidence. I can't provide any because I see none.
>
> Apparently, you don't even have any idea what you'd be looking for.
Sure I do - the alleged Creator of the Universe.
> > > Thanks for defining "valid," but you still haven't answered the
> > > question.
>
> > Shifting the burden of proof fallacies are not evidence that God
> > exists.
>
> O.K., that is one example of something you *wouldn't* consider valid
> evidence. Now give an example of something you *would*, if it could
> be produced.
Something that objectively, verifiably, and falisfiably violated the
laws of nature.
> > Getting back to your original argument, neither is your
> > special pleading fallacy that God can violate the laws of nature.
>
> Well, as we both know, the basis of your statement isn't real in the
> first place.
Please don't presume to speak for me. In fact, I do know that God
would have to use magic (i.e. violate the laws of nature) to be in two
different locations simultaneously.
> We can go there AGAIN, but it gets tedious.
Arguments from emotion fallacies (you are "weary") are not evidence
that the universe does not run by magic if God exists.
> But, you have now given two examples of things you wouldn't consider
> valid evidence. I have only asked you for one example of something
> you would. Still waiting on that.
Still waiting for you to provide valid evidence, and for you to stop
shifting the burden of proof on to me.
> But of course, I know you don't have an answer, and you are too
> wrapped up in your own ego to admit it,
Red herring fallacies are not evidence that it is my responsibility to
provide evidence for your claim that God exists. It has nothing to do
with "ego;" it is simply the rules of logic:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burden_of_proof
> so, you will again dodge the
> question, as artfully as you can.
If you call applying the rules of logic "dodging the question," then
yes, I am artfully dodging the question.
> As a bonus, you will shift the
> burden of your inadequacy on to me.
You may have just reached a new low in obfuscation. Red herring
fallacies are not evidence that God exists, and can violate the laws
of nature by being in two distant places simultaneously.
> ...
>
> read more »- Hide quoted text -
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>particular
person's experience of it. "
Taking only your own experience as a starting point, how can you ever
reliably arrive at that conclusion?
Brock: "However, your statement contradicts itself: If you would
assert that
something you did not experience is "meaningless and irrelevant" then
you don't do so from personal experience. :) "
I said something we CANNOT experience is meaningless not something I
DID not. I do not know that something I did not experience is
meaningless (although it could well be).
On Feb 9, 5:33 pm, Brock Organ <brockor...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 9, 2010 at 12:10 PM, Sebastian <mezna...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > You can never experience anything that you cannot experience. Your
> > experience is thus a measure of all things that you can experience.
>
> But the objective nature of reality is independent of any particular
> person's experience of it.
>
> > And all
> > those things that we cannot experience are meaningless and
> > irrelevant.
>
> However, your statement contradicts itself: If you would assert that
> something you did not experience is "meaningless and irrelevant" then
> you don't do so from personal experience. :)
>
> Regards,
>
> Brock
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>by any
method before it occurs. This is not a safe presumption. If the
method is reliant on the choice being made freely, then it would still
be -- and have to be -- a free choice even if known beforehand. "
If a choice is the only possible choice then it can no longer be
called choice nor is it free. Free choice implies there is a CHOICE,
i.e. there are multiple possible outcomes and the particular decision
depends on your own free will. If it can be predicted then it is not
choice.
TB: "Knowing the outcome of a free choice by actually observing the
choice
that was made freely in a future timeframe seems to fit that bill. "
Not if you can transfer the information backwards through time.
On Feb 9, 5:49 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> On Feb 9, 12:08 pm, Sebastian <mezna...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > If god is at all space-time points at then god knows what will happen
> > in the future at all time. He knows what decisions I will make in
> > particular. So while I think your explanation solves the problem of
> > simultaneity it introduces the free will problem. If god knows what
> > decisions we will make then we are not free to make decisions that he
> > knows we will not make.
>
> This presumes that the outcome of a free choice cannot be known by any
> method before it occurs. This is not a safe presumption. If the
> method is reliant on the choice being made freely, then it would still
> be -- and have to be -- a free choice even if known beforehand.
>
> Knowing the outcome of a free choice by actually observing the choice
> that was made freely in a future timeframe seems to fit that bill.
>
>
>
> > On Feb 8, 9:39 pm, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > Relativity accounts for the speed of light. It is thus that the speed
> > > of light becomes bound up with the definition of simultaneity. Events
> > > in physics have "light cones." The reason our definition of
> > > simultaneity depends on the speed of light is that we are always bound
> > > to a location in space-time, and judge all events relative to our
> > > location. We cannot be in two places at once. But God can. God is
> > > simultaneously present at my space-time location, and at another space-
> > > time location 5 billion light-years distant from mine. For me, then,
> > > to observe an event happening at that distant location, I would be
> > > observing an event 5 billion years in the past. The same is true in
> > > reverse for a being similar to myself at that distant location
> > > observing me. (He wouldn't be able to observe me, unless he waited
> > > another 5 billion years.) But God, simultaneously present at both, is
> > > not bound by relativity. Relativity addresses the comparison of
> > > different reference-frames based on space-time location, and God is
> > > not bound to any particular space-time location, and so has no need
> > > for a Theory of Relativity.
>
> > > Things are only relative for limited beings, so only a limited being
> > > has use for a Theory of Relativity.
>
> > > On Feb 4, 10:54 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > Simonsaysbye told me that Swinburne was not out of his depth when it
> > > > came to discussing modern physics. Perhaps I should have a look at his
> > > > book "Space and Time". I'd be interested in Swinburne's take on the
> > > > following issue. According to relativity theory the question of
> > > > whether two space-time events are simultaneous is not an absolute
> > > > matter, but depends which frame of reference you are in. Yet Swinburne
> > > > also claim that God exists eternally in time. So presumably it must
> > > > make sense to ask whether or not two space-time events are
> > > > simultaneous in God's frame of reference. In this way we get a
> > > > privileged frame of reference. Furthermore we can ask this question
> > > > about any two events in the space-time continuum. I'm not even sure
> > > > that that can be reconciled with general relativity given what we know
> > > > about the large-scale structure of the universe. Doesn't this
> > > > constitute a lack of parsimony in theism - the need to postulate a
> > > > special, privileged frame of reference without giving any explanation
> > > > of why this particular frame of reference? Can the account of God
> > > > playing an essential causal role in the evolution of the universe over
> > > > time be reconciled with cosmological theories about the large-scale
> > > > structure of the space-time continuum?- Hide quoted text -
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>because
you are not free to produce a contradiction, and to make a decision
that you don't make is a contradiction. That is true about your
decisions even if nobody knows about them, so God's omniscience is
superfluous here. "
If
anyone can know in advance with 100% reliability what my decision
will be then I am not free to make any other decision than the one
they know I will take. The problems only occur when the decision is
known with perfect reliability in advance. If the reliability is not
100% or the knowledge is not advance then no free will problems occur.
Thus the contradiction does not occur for any decision at all because
the outcome of most decisions is not known in advance perfectly
reliably.
On Feb 9, 6:11 pm, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 9, 12:08 pm, Sebastian <mezna...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > If god is at all space-time points at then god knows what will happen
> > in the future at all time.
>
> Yes, we already know that; He is omniscient, remember?
>
> > He knows what decisions I will make in
> > particular.
>
> Indeed.
>
> > So while I think your explanation solves the problem of
> > simultaneity it introduces the free will problem.
>
> How is it a problem?
>
> > If god knows what
> > decisions we will make then we are not free to make decisions that he
> > knows we will not make.
>
> You are not free to make a decision you do not in fact make because
> you are not free to produce a contradiction, and to make a decision
> that you don't make is a contradiction. That is true about your
> decisions even if nobody knows about them, so God's omniscience is
> superfluous here.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>On Feb 10, 4:03 pm, Sebastian <mezna...@gmail.com> wrote:
> JFG: "You are not free to make a decision you do not in fact make
> because
> you are not free to produce a contradiction, and to make a decision
> that you don't make is a contradiction. That is true about your
> decisions even if nobody knows about them, so God's omniscience is
> superfluous here. "
> If
> anyone can know in advance with 100% reliability what my decision
> will be then I am not free to make any other decision than the one
> they know I will take.
This is a classic example of the modal fallacy. You are confusing
truth with necessary truth.
If you in fact make choice A, that renders it true that you make
choice A. It does not render it necessary that you make choice A.
We've been over this before, a detailed cogent explanation of your
fallacy is here:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/foreknow/
"
The argument (Logical Determinism) that a proposition’s being true
prior to the occurrence of the event it describes logically precludes
free will ultimately rests on a modal fallacy. And the ancillary
argument that a proposition’s being true prior to the occurrence of
the event it describes causes the future event to occur turns on a
confusion (i) of the truth-making (semantic) relation between an event
and its description with (ii) the causal relation between two events.
The argument (Epistemic Determinism) that a proposition’s being known
prior to the occurrence of the event it describes logically precludes
free will, as in the case of logical determinism, ultimately rests on
a modal fallacy.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>Do you know what a unicorn would look like? What would you consider
valid evidence for the existence of unicorns?
> > Or --- what you will actually do --- just dodge the question again, as
> > artfully as you can.
>
> Just because your grasp of logic is flimsy does not mean I am dodging
> your question.
>
If your antecedent were true, it would not imply my assertion; that
much is true. However, I did not offer your antecedent as support for
my assertion, so this is a straw man. My assertion was bare,
predictive, and true.
> > > > Specify, please, what evidence you would consider objective,
> > > > verifiable, and falsifiable, for the existence of God.
>
> > > I'm not making the claim that God exists, you are.
>
> > I believe in God, as you know.
>
> The point is, you would have to provide evidence that your God exists,
> not me.
>
The fact is, I've already done so, many, many times. You rejected the
evidence I provided on the basis of your judgment that it was not
valid. So I believe I am well within the bounds of propriety to ask
you what evidence you *would* consider valid.
> > >You make the claim,
> > > you provide the evidence. I can't provide any because I see none.
>
> > Apparently, you don't even have any idea what you'd be looking for.
>
> Sure I do - the alleged Creator of the Universe.
>
Him, you can find very easily. You are seeking, not Him, but evidence
for Him. And you can't specify what that might possibly be, ergo you
don't have any idea what you would be looking for.
> > > > Thanks for defining "valid," but you still haven't answered the
> > > > question.
>
> > > Shifting the burden of proof fallacies are not evidence that God
> > > exists.
>
> > O.K., that is one example of something you *wouldn't* consider valid
> > evidence. Now give an example of something you *would*, if it could
> > be produced.
>
> Something that objectively, verifiably, and falisfiably violated the
> laws of nature.
>
Begging the question that nature has inviolable laws.
We've been over this. You have no valid evidence that there are any
such things as inviolable laws of nature. All you have is our
observations, and inductive logic. To treat inductive logic as
certain is to commit the Black Swan fallacy.
I know you won't appreciate this, but I feel a duty to dumb it down
for you, since you seem incapable of grasping this simple point.
Suppose you knew my habits by observation. Suppose you knew that
every morning, for the past twenty-five years, I have had at least one
cup of coffee. If inductive logic were capable of producing
certainty, you could state it is a law of my behavior, that every
morning in the future, I will have at least one cup of coffee. But
obviously, your assertion of a law would not require my conformity to
your stated law. I might drink tea tomorrow. There is in fact, no
law stopping me from doing so.
But you believe that, just because God has consistently willed Mars
toward the Sun for all of our history, and we can state it as a law of
gravitation, God cannot tomorrow will Mars in a different direction,
because our statement of a law stops Him. This is the Black Swan
fallacy. Just because, for centuries, no one in Europe had observed
any black swans, does not mean that necessarily, all swans are white.
It could be stated as a law, that no swan is black, but that law would
be violated by the observation of the Australian Black Swan. Does
that imply that there really was an actual law that was violated, or
does it not rather imply that there really was no such law?
> > > Getting back to your original argument, neither is your
> > > special pleading fallacy that God can violate the laws of nature.
>
> > Well, as we both know, the basis of your statement isn't real in the
> > first place.
>
> Please don't presume to speak for me.
Sorry. Gave you way too much credit, there.
> In fact, I do know that God
> would have to use magic (i.e. violate the laws of nature) to be in two
> different locations simultaneously.
>
Several problems with this. First, it is not impossible, even for a
limited being such as me, to be in two different locations
simultaneously. I am simultaneously in my chair, and at my keyboard,
and the space I occupy above my chair and the space I occupy above my
keyboard are two distinct locations in space-time. The only reason I
can't be here and across the street at the same time is, I'm not big
enough. So you seem to be asserting that God (the Infinite Being) is
limited in size. That is inconsistent with the definition of God.
Secondly, you are abusing the word 'magic.' I know we've been over
this several times before, but you still don't get it. Magic is the
work of a mage, a human being with the understanding and ability to
work natural forces in accordance with his will. Since, by
definition, magic is the use of natural forces, it could not at the
same time "violate the laws of nature," assuming there were any laws
of nature to begin with. The proper term you are resisting using, is
'miracle.'
And third, of course, as we've discussed before, what we call laws of
nature are no more or less than our understanding of the logical
consistency of God's ordinary Will. They are not "laws" in the sense
that they would be binding on God. Extraordinary actions on God's
part are called miracles, whereas His ordinary actions are called
nature. We ordinarily speak of "laws of nature," but you are
confounding law as consistent observation with law as inviolable
decree.
> > We can go there AGAIN, but it gets tedious.
>
> Arguments from emotion fallacies (you are "weary") are not evidence
> that the universe does not run by magic if God exists.
>
My objection to making the arguments that I have again repeated above
is that they consistently fall on deaf ears. That does get tedious.
I wonder what it would take to open your ears?
> > But, you have now given two examples of things you wouldn't consider
> > valid evidence. I have only asked you for one example of something
> > you would. Still waiting on that.
>
> Still waiting for you to provide valid evidence, and for you to stop
> shifting the burden of proof on to me.
>
Waiting for you to specify clearly, what you want. "Valid evidence,"
I have presented, and you have rejected, so now we are waiting for
information from you, about what valid evidence *you* would consider
valid. It would be pointless to offer you more evidence that you
would just reject again. And, the available evidence for God is
infinite, so it would be impossible for me to present all of it.
> > But of course, I know you don't have an answer, and you are too
> > wrapped up in your own ego to admit it,
>
> Red herring fallacies are not evidence that it is my responsibility to
> provide evidence for your claim that God exists. It has nothing to do
> with "ego;" it is simply the rules of logic:
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burden_of_proof
>
Well, the conventions of argument, anyway. Not rules of logic.
But, I have met the burden of proof, and then you claimed that the
proof I presented wasn't valid. So now it is up to you to specify
what you want.
I present your reticence to articulate what you want as evidence that
you don't actually know what you want.
> > so, you will again dodge the
> > question, as artfully as you can.
>
> If you call applying the rules of logic "dodging the question," then
> yes, I am artfully dodging the question.
>
Rejecting valid proof is actually your disregard for the rules of
logic, not your respecting them.
> > As a bonus, you will shift the
> > burden of your inadequacy on to me.
>
> You may have just reached a new low in obfuscation. Red herring
> fallacies are not evidence that God exists, and can violate the laws
> of nature by being in two distant places simultaneously.
See above. That wouldn't violate anything.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>below your replies.
Neil Kelsey
<neil_kelsey@hotmail.com>A horse with a horn sticking out of it's head.
> What would you consider
> valid evidence for the existence of unicorns?
Objective, verifiable, and falsifiable evidence of a unicorn, like a
fossil, or an actual unicorn.
> > > Or --- what you will actually do --- just dodge the question again, as
> > > artfully as you can.
>
> > Just because your grasp of logic is flimsy does not mean I am dodging
> > your question.
>
> If your antecedent were true, it would not imply my assertion; that
> much is true. However, I did not offer your antecedent as support for
> my assertion, so this is a straw man. My assertion was bare,
> predictive, and true.
If you are referring to your previous assertion that no evidence would
convince me that God exist, your latest assertion is false. Just
because you haven't got any valid evidence doesn't mean that I
wouldn't be convinced if you did. I have a track record of being
swayed by valid evidence.
> > > > > Specify, please, what evidence you would consider objective,
> > > > > verifiable, and falsifiable, for the existence of God.
>
> > > > I'm not making the claim that God exists, you are.
>
> > > I believe in God, as you know.
>
> > The point is, you would have to provide evidence that your God exists,
> > not me.
>
> The fact is, I've already done so, many, many times.
Bare assertion fallacies are not evidence that you have presented
valid evidence that your God exists, ever. Your evidence to date has
consisted of logical fallacies, third party testimonials, narcissistic
delusions, and schizophrenic hallucinations. That does not constitute
valid evidence.
> You rejected the
> evidence I provided on the basis of your judgment that it was not
> valid.
I rejected your evidence on the basis that it is neither objective,
nor verifiable, nore falsifiable - when I am not rejecting it on the
basis that it does not meet the standards of logic.
> So I believe I am well within the bounds of propriety to ask
> you what evidence you *would* consider valid.
I already told you, a thousand times. It would have to be objective,
verifiable, and falsifiable. I don't care about propriety, I care
about being rational. It is rational to follow the rules of logic -
you make the assertion, you supply the evidence.
> > > >You make the claim,
> > > > you provide the evidence. I can't provide any because I see none.
>
> > > Apparently, you don't even have any idea what you'd be looking for.
>
> > Sure I do - the alleged Creator of the Universe.
>
> Him, you can find very easily.
No, I can't. That is one reason why I'm an atheist.
> You are seeking, not Him, but evidence
> for Him.
When I seek him I can't find him. So I must rely on others, believers
like you, to provide valid evidence that he exists, otherwise I'm
inclined to think that all believers are delusional.
> And you can't specify what that might possibly be, ergo you
> don't have any idea what you would be looking for.
Which is why I'm relying on believers, like you, to provide valid
evidence that God exists, otherwise I'm inclined to believe that all
believers are delusional.
> > > > > Thanks for defining "valid," but you still haven't answered the
> > > > > question.
>
> > > > Shifting the burden of proof fallacies are not evidence that God
> > > > exists.
>
> > > O.K., that is one example of something you *wouldn't* consider valid
> > > evidence. Now give an example of something you *would*, if it could
> > > be produced.
>
> > Something that objectively, verifiably, and falisfiably violated the
> > laws of nature.
>
> Begging the question that nature has inviolable laws.
You're asking me what I think would be evidence of God, and I'm giving
you my answer. If nature doesn't have invioable laws, then it isn't
nature. It's magic.
> We've been over this. You have no valid evidence that there are any
> such things as inviolable laws of nature.
Hilarious that you would make an idiotic statement like that after
your original post about relativity.
> All you have is our
> observations, and inductive logic.
That's plenty for me to make a conclusion that the laws of nature are
universal. If you don't want to make this same conclusion, that's your
problem.
>To treat inductive logic as
> certain is to commit the Black Swan fallacy.
Go leap off a bridge and see if the laws of gravity have been
rescinded.
> I know you won't appreciate this, but I feel a duty to dumb it down
> for you, since you seem incapable of grasping this simple point.
> Suppose you knew my habits by observation. Suppose you knew that
> every morning, for the past twenty-five years, I have had at least one
> cup of coffee. If inductive logic were capable of producing
> certainty, you could state it is a law of my behavior, that every
> morning in the future, I will have at least one cup of coffee. But
> obviously, your assertion of a law would not require my conformity to
> your stated law. I might drink tea tomorrow. There is in fact, no
> law stopping me from doing so.
Man, you certainly did dumb it down.
Hey, genius. You drinking coffee every morning is not one of the laws
of nature. But it does fall under a broader law of nature - you must
drink or you will die.
> But you believe that, just because God has consistently willed Mars
> toward the Sun for all of our history, and we can state it as a law of
> gravitation, God cannot tomorrow will Mars in a different direction,
> because our statement of a law stops Him.
I don't believe that, at all, since I lack belief that God exists.
> This is the Black Swan
> fallacy. Just because, for centuries, no one in Europe had observed
> any black swans, does not mean that necessarily, all swans are white.
> It could be stated as a law, that no swan is black, but that law would
> be violated by the observation of the Australian Black Swan. Does
> that imply that there really was an actual law that was violated, or
> does it not rather imply that there really was no such law?
It means they were wrong that it was a law that there was no black
swans.
Just because some people were mistaken about black swans doesn't meant
that they are mistaken about gravity. But like I said, I choose to
believe that gravity is universal, based on evidence. I don't choose
to believe that God exists, based on a complete lack of valid
evidence, and a plethora of evidence that those who believe he exists
suffer from one psychological defect or another.
> > > > Getting back to your original argument, neither is your
> > > > special pleading fallacy that God can violate the laws of nature.
>
> > > Well, as we both know, the basis of your statement isn't real in the
> > > first place.
>
> > Please don't presume to speak for me.
>
> Sorry. Gave you way too much credit, there.
>
> > In fact, I do know that God
> > would have to use magic (i.e. violate the laws of nature) to be in two
> > different locations simultaneously.
>
> Several problems with this. First, it is not impossible, even for a
> limited being such as me, to be in two different locations
> simultaneously. I am simultaneously in my chair, and at my keyboard,
> and the space I occupy above my chair and the space I occupy above my
> keyboard are two distinct locations in space-time.
Good grief. Now you're even quibbling against your own original post.
> The only reason I
> can't be here and across the street at the same time is, I'm not big
> enough. So you seem to be asserting that God (the Infinite Being) is
> limited in size. That is inconsistent with the definition of God.
Oh, so you were originally arguing that God is just really big, not
that he was in two different locations. Why didn't you say so?
> Secondly, you are abusing the word 'magic.' I know we've been over
> this several times before, but you still don't get it. Magic is the
> work of a mage, a human being with the understanding and ability to
> work natural forces in accordance with his will.
I believe I thought you were full of shit then, and I believe I think
you are full of shit now.
mag·ic - noun (from dictionary.com)
1. The art that purports to control or forecast natural events,
effects, or forces by invoking the supernatural.
If we encountered an alien civilization, I am sure that at some point
in their history that they too would have had members of their species
making the same claims that they could perform magic. Magic is the
work of a con artist, whether human or otherwise.
> Since, by
> definition, magic is the use of natural forces, it could not at the
> same time "violate the laws of nature," assuming there were any laws
> of nature to begin with. The proper term you are resisting using, is
> 'miracle.'
God violating, er "controlling" the laws of nature by miraculously
making a bush talk would require magical abilities.
> And third, of course, as we've discussed before, what we call laws of
> nature are no more or less than our understanding of the logical
> consistency of God's ordinary Will.
Just because we've discussed your unsupported assertions before does
not mean that they are suddenly supported. Please provide valid
evidence that God exists, then we can get around to agreeing on
whether or not the laws of nature have anything to do with God's
will.
> They are not "laws" in the sense
> that they would be binding on God.
Special Pleading fallacies are not evidence that God exists.
> Extraordinary actions on God's
> part are called miracles, whereas His ordinary actions are called
> nature.
Please provide valid evidence that God exists, and if you do I will
cease to believe that nature exists.
> We ordinarily speak of "laws of nature," but you are
> confounding law as consistent observation with law as inviolable
> decree.
I've been given enough objective, verifiable, and falsifiable evidence
to convince me that the laws of nature are universal. This is also
evidence that I can be swayed by valid evidence, which contradicts
your earlier claim that I can't.
> > > We can go there AGAIN, but it gets tedious.
>
> > Arguments from emotion fallacies (you are "weary") are not evidence
> > that the universe does not run by magic if God exists.
>
> My objection to making the arguments that I have again repeated above
> is that they consistently fall on deaf ears.
Just because I disagree with you does not mean that I am not listening
to you.
> That does get tedious.
> I wonder what it would take to open your ears?
Agreeing with you does not equate not being deaf. Perhaps if you tried
submitting valid evidence you would see that I can hear perfectly
well.
> > > But, you have now given two examples of things you wouldn't consider
> > > valid evidence. I have only asked you for one example of something
> > > you would. Still waiting on that.
>
> > Still waiting for you to provide valid evidence, and for you to stop
> > shifting the burden of proof on to me.
>
> Waiting for you to specify clearly, what you want. "Valid evidence,"
> I have presented
It is pathologically narcissistic of you to think that just because
something pops out of your mouth then it must be valid.
> and you have rejected, so now we are waiting for
> information from you, about what valid evidence *you* would consider
> valid.
Shifting the burden of proof fallacies are not evidence that I need to
support your claims that God exists.
> It would be pointless to offer you more evidence that you
> would just reject again.
Unless it were objective, verifiable, and falsifiable evidence.
> And, the available evidence for God is
> infinite, so it would be impossible for me to present all of it.
The available evidence for God, and I've seen lots, can be rejected as
testimonials, bare assertions, scientific ignorance, superstition,
delusion, social propaganda, and logical fallacies such as argument by
force and argument by ignorance.
> > > But of course, I know you don't have an answer, and you are too
> > > wrapped up in your own ego to admit it,
>
> > Red herring fallacies are not evidence that it is my responsibility to
> > provide evidence for your claim that God exists. It has nothing to do
> > with "ego;" it is simply the rules of logic:
>
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burden_of_proof
>
> Well, the conventions of argument, anyway. Not rules of logic.
It is absurd to think that the opponent should prove your case for
you.
> But, I have met the burden of proof,
You have submitted evidence that is not objective, verifiable, or
falsifiable, so your evidence to date can be rationally rejected. It
is pathologically narcissistic of you to think that just because you
submit evidence that it must be true.
> and then you claimed that the
> proof I presented wasn't valid. So now it is up to you to specify
> what you want.
I already have. I want valid evidence - evidence that is objective,
verifiable, and falsifiable. If your evidence fits that criteria, then
I will accept that God exists.
> I present your reticence to articulate what you want as evidence that
> you don't actually know what you want.
I present your obtuseness as evidence that you haven't got any valid
evidence for God, and instead you are cooking up a dorky red herring
fallacy to try to make it seem like my fault.
Alan Wostenberg
<awosty@gmail.com>phrase. E-ternal is latin for non-temporal. What does Swinburne mean
by it? For in God's there is no succession at all. As Boethius put it
"Eternity is the entire and perfect possession of endless life at a
single instant."
Regarding your comments about special relativity and privileged frames
of reference, I was reading something the other night on this that
might interest you. according to Anthony Rizzi in _the science before
science_, there is no reason we can't select one frame as special,
because "Special relativity, in it's purely empiriometric form,
assigns equal value to all reference frames, but we can, without
changing the mathematics or predictions, determine one frame to be a
preferred frame. There is an analogy to this in general relativity in
the big bang cosmology discussed in a later section; there the
preferred frame is one at rest with respect to the cosmological
background radiation. For definiteness, let's use a frame that is at
'rest with respect to the universe'. Special relativity allows this
choice, because any frame can be picked as my favorite and predictions
about events from that frame will be correct. " (page 210, _the
science before science_) He goes on to point out we would /not/ do
this to improve the theory as empiriometric science, for the choice,
by definition, does not change predictions. But "We'd only do it to
move beyond the empiriometric in and effort to understand the
underlying physical causes manifested by the empiriometric. Remember
the world is not just quantity".
On Feb 4, 7:54 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Simonsaysbye told me that Swinburne was not out of his depth when it
> came to discussing modern physics. Perhaps I should have a look at his
> book "Space and Time". I'd be interested in Swinburne's take on the
> following issue. According to relativity theory the question of
> whether two space-time events are simultaneous is not an absolute
> matter, but depends which frame of reference you are in. Yet Swinburne
> also claim that God exists eternally in time. So presumably it must
> make sense to ask whether or not two space-time events are
> simultaneous in God's frame of reference. In this way we get a
> privileged frame of reference. Furthermore we can ask this question
> about any two events in the space-time continuum. I'm not even sure
> that that can be reconciled with general relativity given what we know
> about the large-scale structure of the universe. Doesn't this
> constitute a lack of parsimony in theism - the need to postulate a
> special, privileged frame of reference without giving any explanation
> of why this particular frame of reference? Can the account of God
> playing an essential causal role in the evolution of the universe over
> time be reconciled with cosmological theories about the large-scale
> structure of the space-time continuum?
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>confusing
truth with necessary truth.
If you in fact make choice A, that renders it true that you make
choice A. It does not render it necessary that you make choice A.
We've been over this before, a detailed cogent explanation of your
fallacy is here: "
No, no. This would be a modal fallacy if I were claiming that just
because it is true that that will happen it is necessary that that
will happen. This is not the reasoning I am following. What I am
claiming is that *given* that we CAN know what will happen with
certainty means that we have no choice regarding the future. The truth
of a particular outcome does not in itself guarantee that we can know
the outcome in advance with certainty. There is always a probability
attached to it.
I am also not claiming that knowing the future is the cause of the
future. If you think something will happen (but could be wrong) then
there is no problem.
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>It is impossible that (God knows what we will do & We have free will).
I am not saying that the statement "we have free will" cannot take
both of the truth values independently of the premise.
Treebeard
<allan_c_cybulskie@yahoo.ca>On Feb 10, 4:00 pm, Sebastian <mezna...@gmail.com> wrote:
> TB: "This presumes that the outcome of a free choice cannot be known
> by any
> method before it occurs. This is not a safe presumption. If the
> method is reliant on the choice being made freely, then it would still
> be -- and have to be -- a free choice even if known beforehand. "
>
> If a choice is the only possible choice then it can no longer be
> called choice nor is it free. Free choice implies there is a CHOICE,
> i.e. there are multiple possible outcomes and the particular decision
> depends on your own free will. If it can be predicted then it is not
> choice.
Um, you miss the point. The point is that if my method of knowing
what choice you made DEPENDS on you making the choice and making it
freely, then that choice is still free even though I know it already.
Imagine as a thought experiment a universe where at the Big Bang all
possible outcomes were, in fact, resolved. All choices made and the
entire timeline was defined. But the choices were in fact all free
ones, but in that split second all of them were, in fact MADE AND
RESOLVED (a chain reaction, as it were). Now, at any point in this
timeline you can only experience the present, and so are walking along
that line, making the free -- by definition -- choices that that split
second resolved. However, if I could hope ahead to a later point, I
could observe the choice you make, and hop back. Of course, under
this I'd have already decided -- freely -- to do that, too, but I
could get that knowledge. But recall that these are formed from free
choices. I only know what you will do because that is the free choice
that you will make. Since my knowledge is dependent on you actually
MAKING a free choice, for my knowledge to remove your ability to make
a free choice would be a contradiction. Thus, it is not the case that
my knowledge does so.
You still seem to be hung up on HOW we know, and are translating that
as WHAT is known. Which doesn't work; we can't presume a specific
method is the only way to know.
>
> TB: "Knowing the outcome of a free choice by actually observing the
> choice
> that was made freely in a future timeframe seems to fit that bill. "
>
> Not if you can transfer the information backwards through time.
That would only apply if the information had a causal effect on your
choice. Otherwise, it is not possible for my action to impact your
choice if there is no causal connection -- and in this case it must be
DETERMINATE -- between my action and your choice.
> > > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
Brock Organ
<brockorgan@gmail.com>> [Brock Organ]
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 9, 2010 at 6:32 PM, Simon Ewins<sje...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Didn't think you could. Concession accepted (as you like to claim).
>>
>> I just note that road-runner solipsism/colipsism fails:
>
> You keep doing that you polytheist/Christian.
>
> Keep it up and I'll twit you, seriously. This pisses me off. Your
> polytheistic views notwithstanding.
You've certainly not offered anything that distinguishes colipsism
from corporate solipsism. I'm just clear regarding the fallacy of
humanism.
Regards,
Brock
Brock Organ
<brockorgan@gmail.com>> Brock: "But the objective nature of reality is independent of any
> particular
> person's experience of it. "
>
> Taking only your own experience as a starting point, how can you ever
> reliably arrive at that conclusion?
Clearly I don't articulate such a humanistic premise. :)
> Brock: "However, your statement contradicts itself: If you would
> assert that
> something you did not experience is "meaningless and irrelevant" then
> you don't do so from personal experience. :) "
>
> I said something we CANNOT experience is meaningless not something I
> DID not. I do not know that something I did not experience is
> meaningless (although it could well be).
Well, you noted:
> Your
> experience is thus a measure of all things that you can experience.
But the objective nature of reality is not bound or limited by human
experience regarding it.
Regards,
Brock
Rupert
<rupertmccallum@yahoo.com>On Feb 11, 10:18 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I answered your objections, in the part you didn't reply to. Read
> below your replies.
>
My comments still apply. We must be postulating a "privileged" frame
of reference for God.
Rupert
<rupertmccallum@yahoo.com>On Feb 11, 7:23 pm, Alan Wostenberg <awo...@gmail.com> wrote:
> To say "God exists eternally in time" is an interesting turn of
> phrase. E-ternal is latin for non-temporal. What does Swinburne mean
> by it? For in God's there is no succession at all. As Boethius put it
> "Eternity is the entire and perfect possession of endless life at a
> single instant."
>
Swinburne says that God exists at each moment of time.
> Regarding your comments about special relativity and privileged frames
> of reference, I was reading something the other night on this that
> might interest you. according to Anthony Rizzi in _the science before
> science_, there is no reason we can't select one frame as special,
> because "Special relativity, in it's purely empiriometric form,
> assigns equal value to all reference frames, but we can, without
> changing the mathematics or predictions, determine one frame to be a
> preferred frame. There is an analogy to this in general relativity in
> the big bang cosmology discussed in a later section; there the
> preferred frame is one at rest with respect to the cosmological
> background radiation. For definiteness, let's use a frame that is at
> 'rest with respect to the universe'. Special relativity allows this
> choice, because any frame can be picked as my favorite and predictions
> about events from that frame will be correct. " (page 210, _the
> science before science_)
Yes, this is true, but if you are going to pick one special reference
frame and say "This is God's reference frame", then it's a bit of a
puzzle because the question arises what is so special about that
reference frame.
Alan Wostenberg
<awosty@gmail.com>Well, do you find big bang cosmology puzzling in that there, the
preferred frame of reference is the one at rest with respect to the
cosmological background radiation? As (http://www.astro.ubc.ca/people/
scott/faq_basic.html) explains, "the crucial assumption of Einstein's
theory is not that there are no special frames, but that there are no
special frames where the laws of physics are different. "
Rupert
<rupertmccallum@yahoo.com>Well, at least in that case you can explain what is special about the
reference frame. The observed facts require you to single out a
special reference frame over all others. There don't appear to be any
observed facts that justify us in privileging one special reference
frame as "God's reference frame", so the fact that we have to do so is
a lack of parsimony in the theory.
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>big bang time then at any point in time all the choices have been
made. Whoever/whatever made the choices at big bang time is no longer
free to make any choices from that time onwards. Your subsequent
knowledge of the choices does not change anything. If you were able to
time travel and if everything was guaranteed to repeat in exactly the
same way then there was no choice to begin with. Determinism excludes
free will.
"You still seem to be hung up on HOW we know, and are translating that
as WHAT is known. Which doesn't work; we can't presume a specific
method is the only way to know. "
If I know 100% ahead of time that every time I release a ball in the
air it will fall down to the ground then it stands to reason that the
ball has no choice in the matter. This is the reasoning I am applying.
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>own experience. Thus it is an assertion hanging in the air. In other
words, you cannot tell whether your experience of nature is
incomplete, complete, whether the nature even exists or whether it is
only your own experience that exists. Experience alone cannot
differentiate between these alternatives. So how do you know?
On Feb 12, 12:53 am, Brock Organ <brockor...@gmail.com> wrote:
Brock Organ
<brockorgan@gmail.com>> The problem is that you cannot arrive at this conclusion through your
> own experience. Thus it is an assertion hanging in the air.
No, it simply means that humanistic experience is not an adequate
basis for measure or evaluation. :)
> In other
> words, you cannot tell whether your experience of nature is
> incomplete, complete, whether the nature even exists or whether it is
> only your own experience that exists. Experience alone cannot
> differentiate between these alternatives. So how do you know?
Certainly an appeal to humanistic evaluation is not tenable. Of
course, for example, the issue of whether or not I know "1 + 1 = 2" is
academic with respect to its truth.
Regards,
Brock
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>adequate
basis for measure or evaluation. :) "
But do we have anything else than experience to guide us?
Brock: "Certainly an appeal to humanistic evaluation is not tenable.
Of
course, for example, the issue of whether or not I know "1 + 1 = 2" is
academic with respect to its truth. "
What you call humanistic evaluation is well aware of its limitations
(and this is, indeed, the only way it should be). But you still did
not answer my question. If you do not consider your experience, what
other methods do we have available?
On Feb 12, 4:10 pm, Brock Organ <brockor...@gmail.com> wrote:
Brock Organ
<brockorgan@gmail.com>> Brock: "No, it simply means that humanistic experience is not an
> adequate
> basis for measure or evaluation. :) "
>
> But do we have anything else than experience to guide us?
Well, it depends upon what specifically do you mean by experience?
Some famously articulated possibilities:
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peripatetic_axiom
* http://modern-thinker.co.uk/4%20-%20subjective%20idealism.htm
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existentialism
Maybe you are thinking of one of them, or maybe you are thinking of
something else.
> Brock: "Certainly an appeal to humanistic evaluation is not tenable.
> Of
> course, for example, the issue of whether or not I know "1 + 1 = 2" is
> academic with respect to its truth. "
>
> What you call humanistic evaluation is well aware of its limitations
> (and this is, indeed, the only way it should be). But you still did
> not answer my question.
Of course I answered the question, even if you didn't like the answer. :)
> If you do not consider your experience, what
> other methods do we have available?
I don't consider personal experience, method, algorithm, process or
decision tree adequate nor competent.
Alternatively, I consider that the Bible teaches that truth is not a
method, He is a person. :)
Regards,
Brock
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>Well, it depends upon what specifically do you mean by experience?
Some famously articulated possibilities:
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peripatetic_axiom
* http://modern-thinker.co.uk/4%20-%20subjective%20idealism.htm
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existentialism
Maybe you are thinking of one of them, or maybe you are thinking of
something else. "
I mean simply that the set of statements that a particular person can
possibly know for sure to be true are those based on experience
combined with deductive reasoning. Many people will accept the
inductive reasoning as well but it is always good to remember that
induction is not absolute.
As an example, I know for a fact that I am right now experiencing the
typing of a message on a web form. Now neither deductive nor inductive
reasoning can be used to make me conclude that the web or the message
is anything more than a figment of my imagination.
Brock: "Of course I answered the question, even if you didn't like the
answer. :) "
Can you make it obvious for me? If it were in the form "Apart from
experience, deduction and possibly induction, we can rely on
____________" it would make most sense to me.
Brock: "I don't consider personal experience, method, algorithm,
process or
decision tree adequate nor competent.
Alternatively, I consider that the Bible teaches that truth is not a
method, He is a person. :) "
So a part of your experience involved reading a book. But you have not
even established that anything in this experience is anything other
than a figment of your imagination. You need to make this step first
and then you can start trying to convince me that the book you read
has any connection to the objective reality outside you.
On Feb 12, 5:54 pm, Brock Organ <brockor...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 12, 2010 at 11:49 AM, Sebastian <mezna...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Brock: "No, it simply means that humanistic experience is not an
> > adequate
> > basis for measure or evaluation. :) "
>
> > But do we have anything else than experience to guide us?
>
> Well, it depends upon what specifically do you mean by experience?
>
> Some famously articulated possibilities:
>
> *http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peripatetic_axiom
> *http://modern-thinker.co.uk/4%20-%20subjective%20idealism.htm
> *http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism
> *http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existentialism
Brock Organ
<brockorgan@gmail.com>> Brock: "
> Well, it depends upon what specifically do you mean by experience?
>
> Some famously articulated possibilities:
>
> * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peripatetic_axiom
> * http://modern-thinker.co.uk/4%20-%20subjective%20idealism.htm
> * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism
> * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existentialism
>
> Maybe you are thinking of one of them, or maybe you are thinking of
> something else. "
>
> I mean simply that the set of statements that a particular person can
> possibly know for sure to be true are those based on experience
> combined with deductive reasoning. Many people will accept the
> inductive reasoning as well but it is always good to remember that
> induction is not absolute.
>
> As an example, I know for a fact that I am right now experiencing the
> typing of a message on a web form. Now neither deductive nor inductive
> reasoning can be used to make me conclude that the web or the message
> is anything more than a figment of my imagination.
I consider that you've articulated something similar to:
"The rise and fall of British empiricism is probably philosophy's most
dramatic example of pushing premises to their logical and fatal
conclusions. ... What started as "common sense" dualism in Locke
dwindled into the optimistic idealism of Berkeley, and thence into the
disintegrating skepticism of Hume. In just fifty years the men who
claimed that all knowledge derives from experience, from the testimony
of the senses, had shown that if this is really so we lose not only
the material world. the "law" of cause and efffect", and other people,
but also our own selves: the "I" becomes no more than a succession of
sensations."
Is that accurate or do you mean something different?
> Brock: "Of course I answered the question, even if you didn't like the
> answer. :) "
>
> Can you make it obvious for me?
I've been blindingly obvious regarding the inadequacy of humanistic
reasoning. As Russell noted:
"Another conclusion which was forced upon me was that not only
science, but a great deal that no one sincerely doubts to be
knowledge, is impossible if we only know what can be experienced and
verified."
http://www.basicincome.com/bp/ireturnedto.htm
similarly did Aristotle:
"Our own doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrative: on the
contrary, knowledge of the immediate premises is independent of
demonstration. (The necessity of this is obvious; for since we must
know the prior premises from which the demonstration is drawn, and
since the regress must end in immediate truths, those truths must be
indemonstrable.) Such, then, is our doctrine, and in addition we
maintain that besides scientific knowledge there is its originative
source which enables us to recognize the definitions."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinite_regress
So an appeal to humanistic demonstration-ism is not tenable.
> If it were in the form "Apart from
> experience, deduction and possibly induction, we can rely on
> ____________" it would make most sense to me.
I'm happy as a first step to make very clear that humankind cannot
rely upon humanistic reasoning.
> Brock: "I don't consider personal experience, method, algorithm,
> process or
> decision tree adequate nor competent.
>
> Alternatively, I consider that the Bible teaches that truth is not a
> method, He is a person. :) "
>
> So a part of your experience involved reading a book.
The objective truth of reality is independent of my experience regarding it. :)
> But you have not
> even established that anything in this experience is anything other
> than a figment of your imagination.
Its worse, I note that from humanistic principles one cannot
objectively do so. This doesn't mean objective reality doesn't exist,
it means that human-centered epistemological principles are inadequate
to measure and evaluate it.
> You need to make this step first
> and then you can start trying to convince me that the book you read
> has any connection to the objective reality outside you.
But its a rigged game (or a kangaroo court) if one would measure God's
existence or properties by using methods and processes that are
inappropriate. I consider its like using a thermometer to measure the
radioactivity of a sample, and concluding that there is no radiation
because the thermometer indicated no measurement.
So if you handed me a thermometer (humanistic reasoning) and asked me
to measure radioactivity (God's existence) with it, instead of trying
to pretend the measuring device was adequate, I would note what I have
been clear about noting: You would be using the wrong tool for the
job, and the first step away from conclusions using that error is to
stop using the faulty standard.
Regards,
Brock
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>On Feb 11, 11:38 am, Sebastian <mezna...@gmail.com> wrote:
> JFG: "his is a classic example of the modal fallacy. You are
> confusing
> truth with necessary truth.
>
> If you in fact make choice A, that renders it true that you make
> choice A. It does not render it necessary that you make choice A.
>
> We've been over this before, a detailed cogent explanation of your
> fallacy is here: "
>
> No, no. This would be a modal fallacy if I were claiming that just
> because it is true that that will happen it is necessary that that
> will happen. This is not the reasoning I am following. What I am
> claiming is that *given* that we CAN know what will happen with
> certainty means that we have no choice regarding the future.
Differentiate "P necessarily chooses B" from "P has no choice but to
choose B."
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>"The rise and fall of British empiricism is probably philosophy's most
dramatic example of pushing premises to their logical and fatal
conclusions. ... What started as "common sense" dualism in Locke
dwindled into the optimistic idealism of Berkeley, and thence into the
disintegrating skepticism of Hume. In just fifty years the men who
claimed that all knowledge derives from experience, from the testimony
of the senses, had shown that if this is really so we lose not only
the material world. the "law" of cause and efffect", and other people,
but also our own selves: the "I" becomes no more than a succession of
sensations."
http://www.amazon.com/Empiricists-Concerning-Understanding-Principles...
Is that accurate or do you mean something different?"
Not at all, I am saying that we have no way of knowing whether or not
we are more than a succession of sensations. Since you are claiming
that we do, please explain how. In a way that will be obvious to
people other than yourself preferably.
Brock: "I've been blindingly obvious regarding the inadequacy of
humanistic
reasoning. As Russell noted:
"Another conclusion which was forced upon me was that not only
science, but a great deal that no one sincerely doubts to be
knowledge, is impossible if we only know what can be experienced and
verified." "
If you allow inductive reasoning then science is included. This would
be true if one were to take only experience and deductive reasoning as
the basis of knowledge.
Brock: ""Our own doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrative:
on the
contrary, knowledge of the immediate premises is independent of
demonstration. (The necessity of this is obvious; for since we must
know the prior premises from which the demonstration is drawn, and
since the regress must end in immediate truths, those truths must be
indemonstrable.) Such, then, is our doctrine, and in addition we
maintain that besides scientific knowledge there is its originative
source which enables us to recognize the definitions."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinite_regress "
Yes, and the immediate premises here are given by experience. For
instance "I am experiencing typing a mailing group message" is a valid
premise as it draws directly from one's experience.
Brock: "So an appeal to humanistic demonstration-ism is not tenable. "
Forget humanism, my beliefs do not necessarily fit into what you think
a humanist should belief. Concentrate on what I said and tell me how
to derive knowledge and assumptions without relying on experience.
Experience is the only immediate and obvious fact - this is my claim.
Your claim is this is not the case. Explain.
Brock: "
I'm happy as a first step to make very clear that humankind cannot
rely upon humanistic reasoning. "
So you are saying that experience does NOT lead to knowledge? Or are
you saying that experience is not the ONLY thing that leads to
knowledge? Maybe trying to get it into that form would get us beyond
confusion.
Brock: "Its worse, I note that from humanistic principles one cannot
objectively do so. This doesn't mean objective reality doesn't exist,
it means that human-centered epistemological principles are inadequate
to measure and evaluate it. "
I agree! Experience is insufficient to deduce or induce that objective
reality exists. It is also insufficient to show that it does not
exist. This is one of the things we do not know. And I claim further
that this is one of the things we cannot know. If this were a matrix
or imagination, could you tell? And how would you? This is the problem
and I do not see a solution. Since you claim that you know the
solution, I am eager to learn it.
Brock: "But its a rigged game (or a kangaroo court) if one would
measure God's
existence or properties by using methods and processes that are
inappropriate. I consider its like using a thermometer to measure the
radioactivity of a sample, and concluding that there is no radiation
because the thermometer indicated no measurement.
So if you handed me a thermometer (humanistic reasoning) and asked me
to measure radioactivity (God's existence) with it, instead of trying
to pretend the measuring device was adequate, I would note what I have
been clear about noting: You would be using the wrong tool for the
job, and the first step away from conclusions using that error is to
stop using the faulty standard. "
Yeah, we are on the same wavelength here. You cannot use experience to
deduce anything about god. It all converges to the question that I
asked in the previous post: "What else can you use?". Try to put it
into the form I suggested since I think that would be very clear to
me.
On Feb 12, 6:27 pm, Brock Organ <brockor...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 12, 2010 at 1:06 PM, Sebastian <mezna...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Brock: "
> > Well, it depends upon what specifically do you mean by experience?
>
> > Some famously articulated possibilities:
>
> > *http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peripatetic_axiom
> > *http://modern-thinker.co.uk/4%20-%20subjective%20idealism.htm
> > *http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism
> > *http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existentialism
>
> > Maybe you are thinking of one of them, or maybe you are thinking of
> > something else. "
>
> > I mean simply that the set of statements that a particular person can
> > possibly know for sure to be true are those based on experience
> > combined with deductive reasoning. Many people will accept the
> > inductive reasoning as well but it is always good to remember that
> > induction is not absolute.
>
> > As an example, I know for a fact that I am right now experiencing the
> > typing of a message on a web form. Now neither deductive nor inductive
> > reasoning can be used to make me conclude that the web or the message
> > is anything more than a figment of my imagination.
>
> I consider that you've articulated something similar to:
>
> "The rise and fall of British empiricism is probably philosophy's most
> dramatic example of pushing premises to their logical and fatal
> conclusions. ... What started as "common sense" dualism in Locke
> dwindled into the optimistic idealism of Berkeley, and thence into the
> disintegrating skepticism of Hume. In just fifty years the men who
> claimed that all knowledge derives from experience, from the testimony
> of the senses, had shown that if this is really so we lose not only
> the material world. the "law" of cause and efffect", and other people,
> but also our own selves: the "I" becomes no more than a succession of
> sensations."
>
> http://www.amazon.com/Empiricists-Concerning-Understanding-Principles...
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>P to not choose B and for god to know that he will choose B.
Rupert
<rupertmccallum@yahoo.com>On Feb 13, 4:18 pm, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 11, 11:38 am, Sebastian <mezna...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > JFG: "his is a classic example of the modal fallacy. You are
> > confusing
> > truth with necessary truth.
>
> > If you in fact make choice A, that renders it true that you make
> > choice A. It does not render it necessary that you make choice A.
>
> > We've been over this before, a detailed cogent explanation of your
> > fallacy is here: "
>
> > No, no. This would be a modal fallacy if I were claiming that just
> > because it is true that that will happen it is necessary that that
> > will happen. This is not the reasoning I am following. What I am
> > claiming is that *given* that we CAN know what will happen with
> > certainty means that we have no choice regarding the future.
>
> Differentiate "P necessarily chooses B" from "P has no choice but to
> choose B."
>
To say "P has no choice but to choose B" is a contradiction in terms.
If P really *chose* B then he must have had a *choice* about it.
Alan Wostenberg
<awosty@gmail.com>Well suppose God announced the frame of reference preferred by big
bang cosmologists -- the one at rest with respect to the cosmic
background radiation -- is the The Official Reference frame. Events
that are simultaneous with respect to that reference frame, are in
fact simultaneous. Would you be raising your hand "Excuse me, God,
but there is a lack of parsimony in choosing that particular reference
frame...".
Rupert
<rupertmccallum@yahoo.com>No, God is quite welcome to make that announcement, but I can't recall
the last time I heard an announcement from God, which is sort of the
whole point really.
klytu
<jazzyjeff34@hotmail.com>> If P really *chose* B then he must have had a *choice* about it.- Hide quoted text -
>
klytu: OK. What's the distinction between the following sets of
statements?
(For past tense ...)
"A chose B." and "It could not possibly have been false that A chose
B."
(For future tense ...)
"A will choose B." and "It cannot possibly be false that A will choose
B."
Treebeard
<allan_c_cybulskie@yahoo.ca>On Feb 12, 10:39 am, Sebastian <mezna...@gmail.com> wrote:
> In the big bang case that you mention, if all choices are made at the
> big bang time then at any point in time all the choices have been
> made. Whoever/whatever made the choices at big bang time is no longer
> free to make any choices from that time onwards. Your subsequent
> knowledge of the choices does not change anything. If you were able to
> time travel and if everything was guaranteed to repeat in exactly the
> same way then there was no choice to begin with. Determinism excludes
> free will.
Yes, all the choices were made: freely, and by the free agents that we
are asking if they have free will. Essentially, it's like someone
filmed a bunch of actions on the street, and then brought all those
people in and showed it to them. Would the fact that they are now
seeing what they've already done mean that they didn't make free
choices? Not at all. And my contention is exactly that: the free
choices can be known "beforehand" because the choices are already
made, and the participants are just now watching them in slow motion.
No, they can't change choices they've already made, but that doesn't
mean that their choices are not free.
This, in fact, is NOT a deterministic view, because it posits that the
actions were NOT determined causally by previous actions taken. The
actions were free, but are merely already done, and we're just
watching them again.
>
> "You still seem to be hung up on HOW we know, and are translating that
> as WHAT is known. Which doesn't work; we can't presume a specific
> method is the only way to know. "
>
> If I know 100% ahead of time that every time I release a ball in the
> air it will fall down to the ground then it stands to reason that the
> ball has no choice in the matter. This is the reasoning I am applying.
Which is the precise thing I'm accusing you of getting hung up on.
You're arguing about WHAT happens -- ie the ball falls when released
-- and us knowing that without ever considering that that would be a
choiceless case only because of HOW we can know that. In short, the
method of knowing that a ball will fall to the ground is a
deterministic one, but that does not mean or imply that ANY way of
knowing that would have the same implications.
Note that you missed the comment that any method of knowing that has
no causal impact on the choice CANNOT remove free will in and of
itself, so you have to argue about the background of the universe to
prove that there is, in fact, a contradiction with free will there,
which you generally do not do.
(As an aside, I don't know if you've noticed but I DID reply to your
last post in that debate thread, if you're still interested in
replying to that).
Simon Ewins
<sjewins@gmail.com>> Yes, all the choices were made: freely, and by the free agents that we
> are asking if they have free will. Essentially, it's like someone
> filmed a bunch of actions on the street, and then brought all those
> people in and showed it to them. Would the fact that they are now
> seeing what they've already done mean that they didn't make free
> choices? Not at all.
If you only believe in one reality, and that reality is the one where
the people are shown the film then yes, that is what it means.
If this is the only reality that exists then your mother and father had
no choice but to act as they did in order to give rise to you.
Likewise if events on June 1st 2045 in a single reality is a natural
consequence of this single reality then all things now must lead to make
that date as it will be. No choice.
However, if you allow for multiple realities with constant splits of
time-lines due to choice then none of the above applies.
--
"A casual stroll through the lunatic asylum shows that faith does not
prove anything." - Nietzsche
"
We are shaped by our thoughts; we become what we think. When the mind is
pure, joy follows like a shadow that never leaves."
[Buddha]
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>The alternative is to place God, who is omnipresent, in the same frame
as ourselves, who are local. How would that be better?
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>On Feb 10, 8:26 pm, Neil Kelsey <neil_kel...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 10, 3:14 pm, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Feb 10, 9:15 am, Neil Kelsey <neil_kel...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > On Feb 9, 4:53 pm, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On Feb 9, 4:00 pm, Neil Kelsey <neil_kel...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > On Feb 9, 11:56 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > On Feb 9, 2:51 pm, Neil Kelsey <neil_kel...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > On Feb 9, 11:47 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > On Feb 9, 2:45 pm, Neil Kelsey <neil_kel...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > > On Feb 9, 11:37 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > > > On Feb 9, 2:04 pm, Neil Kelsey <neil_kel...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > > > > On Feb 9, 10:50 am, JFG <thelemiccatho...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > > > > > For you, nothing is evidence that God exists.
>
> > > > > > > > > > > Valid evidence would be evidence that God exist.
>
> > > > > > > > > > For you, no evidence can be valid.
>
> > > > > > > > > That's simply not true. I've been convinced by lots of things when
> > > > > > > > > presented with valid evidence.
>
> > > > > > > > But never God.
>
> > > > > > > You haven't presented any valid evidence.
>
> > > > > > > > > > > It is not my fault if
> > > > > > > > > > > you think you can prove God exists by using logical fallacies.
>
> > > > > > > > > > > > You are like a broken record.
>
> > > > > > > > > > > Stop making wild, unsupported assertions I'll stop seeking a rational
> > > > > > > > > > > explanation for why you would make wild, unsupported assertions.
>
> > > > > > > > > > It is neither wild nor unsupported to assert, about you, that for you,
> > > > > > > > > > no evidence can possibly be considered valid.
>
> > > > > > > > > Reality contradicts you, as always.
>
> > > > > > > > Specify what evidence you would consider valid for the existence of
> > > > > > > > God.
>
> > > > > > > > (Watch Neil dodge this one!)
>
> > > > > > > I would consider objective, verifiable and falsifiable evidence as
> > > > > > > being valid, as you are already perfectly aware. I have no idea why
> > > > > > > you think I would dodge this answer.
>
> > > > > > So far you haven't specified anything at all.
>
> > > > > I have specified that I would consider evidence that is objective,
> > > > > verifiable, and falsifiable to be valid evidence that God exists.
>
> > > > Yes. Now we have a working definition of valid from you. Thank you
> > > > for that.
>
> > > > Now kindly specify what evidence you would consider objective,
> > > > verifiable, and falsifiable, for the existence of God.
>
> > > How on earth could I possibly know what valid evidence would look like
> > > if I haven't seen it yet?
>
> > Do you know what a unicorn would look like?
>
> A horse with a horn sticking out of it's head.
>
> > What would you consider
> > valid evidence for the existence of unicorns?
>
> Objective, verifiable, and falsifiable evidence of a unicorn, like a
> fossil, or an actual unicorn.
>
So if God left traces, that would be valid evidence of His existence,
or if I could point out to you where God can be found, that would also
be valid.
Yet, you reject, both the traces that God has left, and the actual God
I have pointed you to many, many times.
> > > > Or --- what you will actually do --- just dodge the question again, as
> > > > artfully as you can.
>
> > > Just because your grasp of logic is flimsy does not mean I am dodging
> > > your question.
>
> > If your antecedent were true, it would not imply my assertion; that
> > much is true. However, I did not offer your antecedent as support for
> > my assertion, so this is a straw man. My assertion was bare,
> > predictive, and true.
>
> If you are referring to your previous assertion that no evidence would
> convince me that God exist, your latest assertion is false. Just
> because you haven't got any valid evidence doesn't mean that I
> wouldn't be convinced if you did. I have a track record of being
> swayed by valid evidence.
>
Not when it comes to God.
> > > > > > Specify, please, what evidence you would consider objective,
> > > > > > verifiable, and falsifiable, for the existence of God.
>
> > > > > I'm not making the claim that God exists, you are.
>
> > > > I believe in God, as you know.
>
> > > The point is, you would have to provide evidence that your God exists,
> > > not me.
>
> > The fact is, I've already done so, many, many times.
>
> Bare assertion fallacies are not evidence that you have presented
> valid evidence that your God exists, ever. Your evidence to date has
> consisted of logical fallacies, third party testimonials, narcissistic
> delusions, and schizophrenic hallucinations. That does not constitute
> valid evidence.
>
Your rejection of valid evidence does not in fact render it invalid.
> > You rejected the
> > evidence I provided on the basis of your judgment that it was not
> > valid.
>
> I rejected your evidence on the basis that it is neither objective,
> nor verifiable, nore falsifiable - when I am not rejecting it on the
> basis that it does not meet the standards of logic.
>
It is not valid to demand objective evidence of Who is not a physical
object.
But the testimonies of the Saints are verifiable. Your refusal to
investigate them leaves you blaming me for your inadequacy.
> > So I believe I am well within the bounds of propriety to ask
> > you what evidence you *would* consider valid.
>
> I already told you, a thousand times. It would have to be objective,
> verifiable, and falsifiable. I don't care about propriety, I care
> about being rational. It is rational to follow the rules of logic -
> you make the assertion, you supply the evidence.
>
It is irrational to demand objective evidence of Who is not a physical
object.
A unicorn would be physical. If one existed, you would be able to see
it, if you looked at it.
God, is not physical. If He exists, you could look right at Him, and
not see Him.
> > > > >You make the claim,
> > > > > you provide the evidence. I can't provide any because I see none.
>
> > > > Apparently, you don't even have any idea what you'd be looking for.
>
> > > Sure I do - the alleged Creator of the Universe.
>
> > Him, you can find very easily.
>
> No, I can't.
Not because you haven't been told where He is, but because you refuse
to believe.
> That is one reason why I'm an atheist.
>
Cart-before-the-horse. Your atheism is the *cause* of your spiritual
blindness, not its result.
> > You are seeking, not Him, but evidence
> > for Him.
>
> When I seek him I can't find him.
You don't seek Him at all.
> So I must rely on others, believers
You don't rely on believers at all.
> like you, to provide valid evidence that he exists, otherwise I'm
> inclined to think that all believers are delusional.
>
That is your choice. Man up and acknowledge your own responsibility
for having chosen, rather than trying to blame it on something beyond
your control.
> > And you can't specify what that might possibly be, ergo you
> > don't have any idea what you would be looking for.
>
> Which is why I'm relying on believers, like you, to provide valid
> evidence that God exists, otherwise I'm inclined to believe that all
> believers are delusional.
>
Valid evidence has already been given you many, many times. You have
rejected it, by your own will.
> > > > > > Thanks for defining "valid," but you still haven't answered the
> > > > > > question.
>
> > > > > Shifting the burden of proof fallacies are not evidence that God
> > > > > exists.
>
> > > > O.K., that is one example of something you *wouldn't* consider valid
> > > > evidence. Now give an example of something you *would*, if it could
> > > > be produced.
>
> > > Something that objectively, verifiably, and falisfiably violated the
> > > laws of nature.
>
> > Begging the question that nature has inviolable laws.
>
> You're asking me what I think would be evidence of God, and I'm giving
> you my answer. If nature doesn't have invioable laws, then it isn't
> nature. It's magic.
>
It is impossible to discuss magic with someone who doesn't know what
the word means.
> > We've been over this. You have no valid evidence that there are any
> > such things as inviolable laws of nature.
>
> Hilarious that you would make an idiotic statement like that after
> your original post about relativity.
>
Nature operates by God's Will. That is its Law. Obviously, God is
sovereign over His own Law.
> > All you have is our
> > observations, and inductive logic.
>
> That's plenty for me to make a conclusion that the laws of nature are
> universal. If you don't want to make this same conclusion, that's your
> problem.
>
I don't have a problem with my conclusion, so you are incorrect in
your assessment.
> >To treat inductive logic as
> > certain is to commit the Black Swan fallacy.
>
> Go leap off a bridge and see if the laws of gravity have been
> rescinded.
>
God wills things towards the planets. I have no reason to think He
would make an exception for me if I jumped off a bridge. My faith in
gravity is my faith in God, not in some inviolable law passed by no
one.
> > I know you won't appreciate this, but I feel a duty to dumb it down
> > for you, since you seem incapable of grasping this simple point.
> > Suppose you knew my habits by observation. Suppose you knew that
> > every morning, for the past twenty-five years, I have had at least one
> > cup of coffee. If inductive logic were capable of producing
> > certainty, you could state it is a law of my behavior, that every
> > morning in the future, I will have at least one cup of coffee. But
> > obviously, your assertion of a law would not require my conformity to
> > your stated law. I might drink tea tomorrow. There is in fact, no
> > law stopping me from doing so.
>
> Man, you certainly did dumb it down.
>
To no avail.
> Hey, genius. You drinking coffee every morning is not one of the laws
> of nature. But it does fall under a broader law of nature - you must
> drink or you will die.
>
Black Swan fallacies are what they are. You commit them.
> > But you believe that, just because God has consistently willed Mars
> > toward the Sun for all of our history, and we can state it as a law of
> > gravitation, God cannot tomorrow will Mars in a different direction,
> > because our statement of a law stops Him.
>
> I don't believe that, at all, since I lack belief that God exists.
>
That is your lack.
> > This is the Black Swan
> > fallacy. Just because, for centuries, no one in Europe had observed
> > any black swans, does not mean that necessarily, all swans are white.
> > It could be stated as a law, that no swan is black, but that law would
> > be violated by the observation of the Australian Black Swan. Does
> > that imply that there really was an actual law that was violated, or
> > does it not rather imply that there really was no such law?
>
> It means they were wrong that it was a law that there was no black
> swans.
>
Just like you are wrong that there is a law of gravity that is binding
on God, the actual source of gravity.
> Just because some people were mistaken about black swans doesn't meant
> that they are mistaken about gravity. But like I said, I choose to
> believe that gravity is universal, based on evidence. I don't choose
> to believe that God exists, based on a complete lack of valid
> evidence, and a plethora of evidence that those who believe he exists
> suffer from one psychological defect or another.
>
Your low opinions of your fellow human beings are evidence that you
are willing to have low opinions, not anything else.
> > > > > Getting back to your original argument, neither is your
> > > > > special pleading fallacy that God can violate the laws of nature.
>
> > > > Well, as we both know, the basis of your statement isn't real in the
> > > > first place.
>
> > > Please don't presume to speak for me.
>
> > Sorry. Gave you way too much credit, there.
>
> > > In fact, I do know that God
> > > would have to use magic (i.e. violate the laws of nature) to be in two
> > > different locations simultaneously.
>
> > Several problems with this. First, it is not impossible, even for a
> > limited being such as me, to be in two different locations
> > simultaneously. I am simultaneously in my chair, and at my keyboard,
> > and the space I occupy above my chair and the space I occupy above my
> > keyboard are two distinct locations in space-time.
>
> Good grief. Now you're even quibbling against your own original post.
>
I'm pointing out your flaw.
> > The only reason I
> > can't be here and across the street at the same time is, I'm not big
> > enough. So you seem to be asserting that God (the Infinite Being) is
> > limited in size. That is inconsistent with the definition of God.
>
> Oh, so you were originally arguing that God is just really big, not
> that he was in two different locations. Why didn't you say so?
>
God is universal. I assumed you knew what that meant, but again, I
gave you too much credit.
> > Secondly, you are abusing the word 'magic.' I know we've been over
> > this several times before, but you still don't get it. Magic is the
> > work of a mage, a human being with the understanding and ability to
> > work natural forces in accordance with his will.
>
> I believe I thought you were full of shit then, and I believe I think
> you are full of shit now.
>
> mag·ic - noun (from dictionary.com)
>
> 1. The art that purports to control or forecast natural events,
> effects, or forces by invoking the supernatural.
>
False definition. Magic does not invoke the supernatural, but the
natural. Prayer invoked the supernatural.
Note well that supernatural doesn't mean what you think it means,
either. The only supernatural being is God.
> If we encountered an alien civilization, I am sure that at some point
> in their history that they too would have had members of their species
> making the same claims that they could perform magic. Magic is the
> work of a con artist, whether human or otherwise.
>
Magic is the art and science of causing intentional change.
> > Since, by
> > definition, magic is the use of natural forces, it could not at the
> > same time "violate the laws of nature," assuming there were any laws
> > of nature to begin with. The proper term you are resisting using, is
> > 'miracle.'
>
> God violating, er "controlling" the laws of nature by miraculously
> making a bush talk would require magical abilities.
>
It is impossible to discuss this with you, since you insist on false
definitions of your terms.
> > And third, of course, as we've discussed before, what we call laws of
> > nature are no more or less than our understanding of the logical
> > consistency of God's ordinary Will.
>
> Just because we've discussed your unsupported assertions before does
> not mean that they are suddenly supported. Please provide valid
> evidence that God exists, then we can get around to agreeing on
> whether or not the laws of nature have anything to do with God's
> will.
>
I've provided plenty of valid evidence for God, all of which you
reject. It isn't my fault you reject it, nor does your rejection of
it render it invalid.
> > They are not "laws" in the sense
> > that they would be binding on God.
>
> Special Pleading fallacies are not evidence that God exists.
>
A special pleading fallacy only applies to a non-special case that is
unjustifiedly treated as special.
> > Extraordinary actions on God's
> > part are called miracles, whereas His ordinary actions are called
> > nature.
>
> Please provide valid evidence that God exists, and if you do I will
> cease to believe that nature exists.
>
That would be stupid of you. The existence of God would not cause
nature to disappear. Nature, in fact, exists *because* God created
it.
It is a good thing you are an atheist, then. We wouldn't want people
going around thinking nature does not exist.
> > We ordinarily speak of "laws of nature," but you are
> > confounding law as consistent observation with law as inviolable
> > decree.
>
> I've been given enough objective, verifiable, and falsifiable evidence
> to convince me that the laws of nature are universal. This is also
> evidence that I can be swayed by valid evidence, which contradicts
> your earlier claim that I can't.
>
Did you once disbelieve that your "laws of nature" were universal? I
don't think you ever did. So you have set up a straw man, about
yourself. Nice going!
> > > > We can go there AGAIN, but it gets tedious.
>
> > > Arguments from emotion fallacies (you are "weary") are not evidence
> > > that the universe does not run by magic if God exists.
>
> > My objection to making the arguments that I have again repeated above
> > is that they consistently fall on deaf ears.
>
> Just because I disagree with you does not mean that I am not listening
> to you.
>
You listen, but do not hear.
> > That does get tedious.
> > I wonder what it would take to open your ears?
>
> Agreeing with you does not equate not being deaf. Perhaps if you tried
> submitting valid evidence you would see that I can hear perfectly
> well.
>
Been there, done that. Falls on deaf ears.
> > > > But, you have now given two examples of things you wouldn't consider
> > > > valid evidence. I have only asked you for one example of something
> > > > you would. Still waiting on that.
>
> > > Still waiting for you to provide valid evidence, and for you to stop
> > > shifting the burden of proof on to me.
>
> > Waiting for you to specify clearly, what you want. "Valid evidence,"
> > I have presented
>
> It is pathologically narcissistic of you to think that just because
> something pops out of your mouth then it must be valid.
>
Straw man.
> > and you have rejected, so now we are waiting for
> > information from you, about what valid evidence *you* would consider
> > valid.
>
> Shifting the burden of proof fallacies are not evidence that I need to
> support your claims that God exists.
>
I am simply asking you what evidence you would accept. If you don't
know, then I certainly don't know.
> > It would be pointless to offer you more evidence that you
> > would just reject again.
>
> Unless it were objective, verifiable, and falsifiable evidence.
>
The Saints outlines definite methods of pursuing holiness, which work
to that end. Your refusal to put those methods into practice does
only one thing for you: it keeps you away from holiness.
If you aren't interested in pursuing holiness at all, then you will
probably be an atheist. In fact, you'd have to be. Anything else
would be too much cognitive dissonance.
> > And, the available evidence for God is
> > infinite, so it would be impossible for me to present all of it.
>
> The available evidence for God, and I've seen lots, can be rejected as
> testimonials, bare assertions, scientific ignorance, superstition,
> delusion, social propaganda, and logical fallacies such as argument by
> force and argument by ignorance.
>
Any valid evidence for anything can be rejected. That doesn't mean it
must be, nor that it should be.
You can believe in God, unless you have already rejected Him with
finality. You don't have to: you have free will. The evidence for
God is such that if you are bent on choosing to reject Him, you can.
But why would anyone want to?
> > > > But of course, I know you don't have an answer, and you are too
> > > > wrapped up in your own ego to admit it,
>
> > > Red herring fallacies are not evidence that it is my responsibility to
> > > provide evidence for your claim that God exists. It has nothing to do
> > > with "ego;" it is simply the rules of logic:
>
> > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burden_of_proof
>
> > Well, the conventions of argument, anyway. Not rules of logic.
>
> It is absurd to think that the opponent should prove your case for
> you.
>
I am asking my opponent to specify what he would like to see.
> > But, I have met the burden of proof,
>
> You have submitted evidence that is not objective, verifiable, or
> falsifiable, so your evidence to date can be rationally rejected.
Can be, but not necessarily must be nor should be.
> It
> is pathologically narcissistic of you to think that just because you
> submit evidence that it must be true.
>
Straw man.
> > and then you claimed that the
> > proof I presented wasn't valid. So now it is up to you to specify
> > what you want.
>
> I already have. I want valid evidence - evidence that is objective,
> verifiable, and falsifiable. If your evidence fits that criteria, then
> I will accept that God exists.
>
God is not a physical object.
> > I present your reticence to articulate what you want as evidence that
> > you don't actually know what you want.
>
> I present your obtuseness as evidence that you haven't got any valid
> evidence for God, and instead you are cooking up a dorky red herring
> fallacy to try to make it seem like my fault.
It is your fault that you don't believe in God. I am not a Calvinist.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>On Feb 13, 12:31 pm, Sebastian <mezna...@gmail.com> wrote:
> They both imply no free will in the sense that it is inconceivable for
> P to not choose B and for god to know that he will choose B.
>
It is inconceivable for P to not choose B simultaneously with the fact
that he does choose B. God's knowledge of the fact, or anyone's, is
superfluous to the fact.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>On Feb 13, 2:00 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@yahoo.com> wrote:
Yes. So, what is the difference among these three statements?
1. P chooses B.
2. I know that P chooses B.
3. God knows that P chooses B.
There have been some ideas advanced to the effect that 3 contains a
contradiction, but 2 doesn't.
Simon Ewins
<sjewins@gmail.com>> It is inconceivable for P to not choose B simultaneously with the fact
> that he does choose B. God's knowledge of the fact, or anyone's, is
> superfluous to the fact.
Only if God can be mistaken. If God cannot be wrong then all actions
leading up to an event that God knows correctly must take place in such
a way as to ensure that what God knows is correct.
Plus "thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven" clearly relinquishes
the efficacy of any will other than God's.
--
"Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity;
and I'm not sure about the universe." - Einstein
"When one has the feeling of dislike for evil, when one feels tranquil,
one finds pleasure in listening to good teachings; when one has these
feelings and appreciates them, one is free of fear."
[Buddha]
Simon Ewins
<sjewins@gmail.com>> 1. P chooses B.
> 2. I know that P chooses B.
> 3. God knows that P chooses B.
1. At t1 P chooses B
2. At t0 God knew P would choose B
3. God cannot be mistaken
4. P must choose B
--
"Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity;
and I'm not sure about the universe." - Einstein
"You, yourself, as much as anybody in the entire universe, deserve your
love and affection."
[Buddha]
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>On Feb 14, 5:54 pm, Simon Ewins <sjew...@gmail.com> wrote:
> [JFG]
>
> > 1. P chooses B.
> > 2. I know that P chooses B.
> > 3. God knows that P chooses B.
>
> 1. At t1 P chooses B
> 2. At t0 God knew P would choose B
> 3. God cannot be mistaken
> 4. P must choose B
>
"Must choose" is contradictory. Either P chooses B, or P does B
without choosing. If God knows that P chooses B, then P chooses B.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>On Feb 14, 5:51 pm, Simon Ewins <sjew...@gmail.com> wrote:
> [JFG]
>
> > It is inconceivable for P to not choose B simultaneously with the fact
> > that he does choose B. God's knowledge of the fact, or anyone's, is
> > superfluous to the fact.
>
> Only if God can be mistaken. If God cannot be wrong then all actions
> leading up to an event that God knows correctly must take place in such
> a way as to ensure that what God knows is correct.
>
"Do take place," not "must take place." You are confusing fact with
necessary fact, and committing the modal fallacy, again.
> Plus "thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven" clearly relinquishes
> the efficacy of any will other than God's.
>
Not if God does His Will through the free co-operation of other
wills.
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>Yes, all the choices were made: freely, and by the free agents that we
are asking if they have free will. Essentially, it's like someone
filmed a bunch of actions on the street, and then brought all those
people in and showed it to them. Would the fact that they are now
seeing what they've already done mean that they didn't make free
choices? Not at all. And my contention is exactly that: the free
choices can be known "beforehand" because the choices are already
made, and the participants are just now watching them in slow motion.
No, they can't change choices they've already made, but that doesn't
mean that their choices are not free. "
YES, it does mean that the people in the film do not have any choice!
Obviously! Do you really think that the film has free will in how it
will be played out? The actors may have had the choice at the time of
filming but at the time of screening there is no free will.
TB: "This, in fact, is NOT a deterministic view, because it posits
that the
actions were NOT determined causally by previous actions taken. The
actions were free, but are merely already done, and we're just
watching them again. "
Causality is not a pre-requisite for determinism. And indeed, if you
do actions first freely and then watch them being done then there may
have been free choice first but at the time of the watching there is
no free will. Now in the real world the time of the watching is the
same time as the time when the actions are being taken. Thus there can
be no free will. It is like being a participant in a film that has
already been filmed. There is only one possible outcome.
TB: "Which is the precise thing I'm accusing you of getting hung up
on.
You're arguing about WHAT happens -- ie the ball falls when released
-- and us knowing that without ever considering that that would be a
choiceless case only because of HOW we can know that. In short, the
method of knowing that a ball will fall to the ground is a
deterministic one, but that does not mean or imply that ANY way of
knowing that would have the same implications. "
Obviously it is important how you know it. If you do a free choice and
then I say "well I saw you do that choice so I know the choice you
made so you had no free will" I would still know the choice but you
could have free will since I know only subsequently what happened. The
free will argument only applies when you know ahead of time and with
perfect reliability (So if I know with 99.9% probability that you will
do something it may still be that you have free will. But if I know
absolutely and infallibly then free will is excluded).
TB: "Note that you missed the comment that any method of knowing that
has
no causal impact on the choice CANNOT remove free will in and of
itself, so you have to argue about the background of the universe to
prove that there is, in fact, a contradiction with free will there,
which you generally do not do. "
Causality does not come into it. This is too strong a requirement.
Determinism is enough. And determinism is guaranteed by the
possibility of knowing ahead of time the progression of events.
TB: "(As an aside, I don't know if you've noticed but I DID reply to
your
last post in that debate thread, if you're still interested in
replying to that). "
Yeah, I noticed. I just feel that it is repeating a lot. Sorry I am
taking my time :). I will reply maybe tomorrow.
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>OF TIME and with perfect reliability is what takes away free will, not
his mere knowledge. This is why this is not a modal fallacy which is
of the form "We know P is true therefore P cannot be false".
Simon Ewins
<sjewins@gmail.com>> "Do take place," not "must take place." You are confusing fact with
> necessary fact, and committing the modal fallacy, again.
You wish I was, but I am not. As I pointed out in another post if God
knows at t0 that P will choose B at t1 then at t1 P must choose B or God
would have been mistaken. If God can be mistaken at t0 then no problem.
> Not if God does His Will through the free co-operation of other
> wills.
Then that cooperation would not be free because it would be carrying out
God's will, regardless. Even if God's will was that they be free to
carry out his will without coercion it would still be his will that they
carry out, not their own. What God wants, God gets, even if it it is via
the creation of an illusion of individual choice.
--
"A casual stroll through the lunatic asylum shows that faith does not
prove anything." - Nietzsche
"Each forward step we take we leave some phantom of ourselves behind."
[John Lancaster Spalding]
Simon Ewins
<sjewins@gmail.com>>>> 1. P chooses B.
>>> 2. I know that P chooses B.
>>> 3. God knows that P chooses B.
>>
>> 1. At t1 P chooses B
>> 2. At t0 God knew P would choose B
>> 3. God cannot be mistaken
>> 4. P must choose B
>>
>
> "Must choose" is contradictory. Either P chooses B, or P does B
> without choosing. If God knows that P chooses B, then P chooses B.
Right, and if God cannot be mistaken then P must choose B or else P
would prove that God was incorrect when he knew at t0 that P would
choose B if P did not. If P chooses A at t1 when God knew at t0 that P
would choose B then at t1 God would have been wrong in the knowledge
that he had at t0.
If you allow God to be wrong, no problem. If you don't, then big problem.
--
"A casual stroll through the lunatic asylum shows that faith does not
prove anything." - Nietzsche
"Some people have views of God that are so broad and flexible that it is
inevitable that they will find God wherever they look for him. One hears
it said that 'God is the ultimate' or 'God is our better nature' or 'God
is the universe'. Of course, like any other word, the word 'God' can be
given any meaning we like. If you want to say 'God is energy', then you
can find God in a lump of coal."
[Steven Weinberg]
Rupert
<rupertmccallum@yahoo.com>Doesn't sound right to me.
Rupert
<rupertmccallum@yahoo.com>Oh, there is no alternative except not postulating the existence of
God at all, but I am just remarking that the need to do this makes the
God-theory lacking in parsimony.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>Nor me, but, if somehow, God's omniscience contradicts free will, then
it must be the case that 3 hides a contradiction. But I can't find it
either.
It seems to me that God's omniscience does not contradict free will,
quite simply.
Rupert
<rupertmccallum@yahoo.com>I would say that both (2) and (3) are self-contradictory. It is not
logically possible to know in advance without the possibility of
mistake what someone will freely choose to do in the future.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>On Feb 14, 8:00 pm, Simon Ewins <sjew...@gmail.com> wrote:
> [JFG]
>
> >>> 1. P chooses B.
> >>> 2. I know that P chooses B.
> >>> 3. God knows that P chooses B.
>
> >> 1. At t1 P chooses B
> >> 2. At t0 God knew P would choose B
> >> 3. God cannot be mistaken
> >> 4. P must choose B
>
> > "Must choose" is contradictory. Either P chooses B, or P does B
> > without choosing. If God knows that P chooses B, then P chooses B.
>
> Right, and if God cannot be mistaken then P must choose B or else P
> would prove that God was incorrect when he knew at t0 that P would
> choose B if P did not. If P chooses A at t1 when God knew at t0 that P
> would choose B then at t1 God would have been wrong in the knowledge
> that he had at t0.
>
> If you allow God to be wrong, no problem. If you don't, then big problem.
>
The infallibility of God's omniscience does not imply that anything
God knows could not have been different, only that whatever it is, God
knows it. Thus it does not imply that at t1 P must choose B, only
that at t1 P does choose B. The modal fallacy is still the modal
fallacy, no matter how you dress it up.
Your antecendent,
"If P chooses A at t1 when God knew at t0 that P would choose B,"
is contradictory.
If P chooses A at t1, then God knew at t0 that P would choose A. It
is impossible that both "P chooses A at t1" and "God knew at t0 that P
would choose B."
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>For me, maybe. Why would the same apply to God?
Rupert
<rupertmccallum@yahoo.com>It just seems to me to be clearly implied by the nature of free
choice. If the outcome is known in advance, then it's not free choice.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>On Feb 14, 7:57 pm, Simon Ewins <sjew...@gmail.com> wrote:
> [JFG]
>
> > "Do take place," not "must take place." You are confusing fact with
> > necessary fact, and committing the modal fallacy, again.
>
> You wish I was, but I am not.
If you are confusing bare fact with necessary fact, then that is the
fallacy you are committing.
> As I pointed out in another post if God
> knows at t0 that P will choose B at t1 then at t1 P must choose B or God
> would have been mistaken. If God can be mistaken at t0 then no problem.
>
God cannot be mistaken. The problem is your use of necessity where
you would appropriately use actuality. It is not the case that, "if
God knows at t0 that P will choose B at t1 then at t1 P must choose
B." Rather, it is the case that if at t1 P chooses B, then at t0 God
knows that at t1 P will choose B. "Will choose" is future actuality.
"Must choose" is future necessity. What can you possibly mean by P
must choose B? Correct me if I'm wrong, here. I cannot imagine that
you could mean anything apart from, P is forced to choose B. And
asked, what is forcing him? it seems your reply can only be, "God's
foreknowledge of his choice." How could the existence of knowledge in
the mind of God be a causal force on P's action? The proper causal
relationship between those two facts is that P's action causes God's
knowledge of P's action, not the reverse.
Perhaps you are confused about what we should call trans-temporal
causality. P's action at t1 causes God's foreknowledge of that action
at t0, contravening the ordinary temporal sequence of cause and
effect. For us, there is an ordered sequence of events, and we
experience a solitary point in time as the present. For God, by
contrast, all times are present. So that God sees the decision at t1
when P makes it, and knows it eternally, including at t0. Similarly
as we are each conscious of a solitary point of perspective in space,
while God is present everywhere, so, while we are conscious of a
solitary point in time, the now, God is simultaneously conscious of
all of it.
> > Not if God does His Will through the free co-operation of other
> > wills.
>
> Then that cooperation would not be free because it would be carrying out
> God's will, regardless. Even if God's will was that they be free to
> carry out his will without coercion it would still be his will that they
> carry out, not their own. What God wants, God gets, even if it it is via
> the creation of an illusion of individual choice.
>
It is true on the face of it that what God wants, God gets, and if
your only route to that conclusion is to think your freedom an
illusion, I am nearly inclined to let you stay with it, but, there is
potential harm in believing you are not free. The phrase, "God's
Will" is actually used two different ways. To be more clear, we
should introduce the term, "God's Commandment."
Now a commandment is, as the word implies, an order from someone else,
in this case God, commanding us to obey His Law. Yet, plainly, we are
free not to. Do we thus escape God's Will? No, not in the least.
Because, God wills all of reality, and there is nothing except reality
in existence. So the Scripture says,
Proverbs 16:4 The Lord has made all things for himself: the wicked
also for the evil day.
and,
Isaiah 45:7 I form the light, and create darkness, I make peace, and
create evil: I the Lord that do all these things.
Free will is fact, and God's use of both good and evil wills in His
good will is also fact. But He commands no evil. So there is no
escaping doing God's Will, whatever you do, but there is a difference
between good and evil, and you choose one or the other, freely. If
you choose good, He works His Will through your will. If you choose
evil, He uses your evil as an instrument, just as He did with Pharaoh
and with Judas.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>You are confusing perception with reality. The theory of relativity
is about our perception of reality, not about reality itself. God
sees reality as it is. We see a perspective tied to a particular
reference frame. Other reference frames have a perspective that is
different from ours. Thus, the theory of relativity, to reconcile all
the conflicting perceptions of one, selfsame reality. God's
perspective is actually much simpler. Einstein's theory in the first
place was to reconcile the apparent discrepancy between the principle
of relativity, which say that physical laws are invariant across
reference frames, with the experimentally confirmed constancy of the
speed of light. There is an inherent contradiction there, without the
theory of relativity. Einstein gave his theory to restore parsimony
that would have been lost, if we had to come up with varying physical
laws for each different reference frame. And the speed of light is a
physical law. It is how we define time and space.
God knows everything, so it follows that He knows each of our
perspectives, as well as every other possible perspective. Why would
He need a privileged one?
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>On Feb 14, 5:54 pm, Simon Ewins <sjew...@gmail.com> wrote:
> [JFG]
>
> > 1. P chooses B.
> > 2. I know that P chooses B.
> > 3. God knows that P chooses B.
>
> 1. At t1 P chooses B
> 2. At t0 God knew P would choose B
> 3. God cannot be mistaken
> 4. P must choose B
>
Modal Fallacy.
Analysis: Let e = "P chooses B." Let K(e) = "God knows that e."
1. At t1, e.
2. At t0, K(e).
3. Necessarily, K(e) -> e.
4. Necessarily, e. (not valid)
4 does not follow. The necessity by which God's knowledge of e
renders e true does not render e necessary. That would be invalidly
transferring the necessity operator. K(e) is contingent upon e; the
necessity applies only to the implication, IFF e. K(e) -> e refers to
logical implication only, not causality.
JFG
<thelemiccatholic@gmail.com>Why? If it seems clear to you, explain it clearly to me, please.
Simon Ewins
<sjewins@gmail.com>> If P chooses A at t1, then God knew at t0 that P would choose A. It
> is impossible that both "P chooses A at t1" and "God knew at t0 that P
> would choose B."
Which is to say that God cannot be wrong, therefore all choices are made
according to what God knows. Even if you suggest backward causation such
that P's action at t1 causes God's knowledge at t0 P is still required
to act at t1 such that God was not wrong at t0. Essentially you are
creating a link that cannot be broken if God cannot be wrong, whether by
forward or backward causation the result is still the same. With an
infallible god, P's actions are not freely chosen.
--
"A casual stroll through the lunatic asylum shows that faith does not
prove anything." - Nietzsche
"The road was new to me, as roads always are going back."
[Sarah Orne Jewett, The Country Road of Pointed Firs, 1896]
Simon Ewins
<sjewins@gmail.com>
[JFG]
--
"A casual stroll through the lunatic asylum shows that faith does not
prove anything." - Nietzsche
"The best weapon against an enemy is another enemy."
[Nietzsche]
Simon Ewins
<sjewins@gmail.com>[JFG]
--
"A casual stroll through the lunatic asylum shows that faith does not
prove anything." - Nietzsche
"Believe those who are seeking the truth. Doubt those who find it."
[Andre Gide]
Sebastian
<meznaric@gmail.com>not". It is the same thing. Then your argument above is clear, it is
certainly not inconceivable that e is false, as it stands. But it is
inconceivable that (e and not K(e) and K(e) -> e). Free will means
that there exists a decision where there is a choice until the
decision is made between at least two mutually exclusive
possibilities, A and B. Now if at t0 god knows that A then at t1 it is
inconceivable that (B and god knows that A). Thus it is necessary that
(A or god does not know that A). So, provided that god knows A, you
cannot have freedom of choice (since exactly the same argument can be
made to derive the above statement for B). Formally, it is
inconceivable that (freedom of choice and god's foreknowledge).