determinism and epiphenomenalism

[Patrick Ramsey]

I had submitted this as a follow-on question on the site, but it seems
to belong here instead.

In this post (http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/3236), Dr.
Nahmias argues that determinism, properly understood, is compatible
with 'free will' in the morally relevant sense; and in clarifying how
that can be so he indicates that determinism does not entail the
epiphenomenalism of conciousness (I think that is what he means by
'bypassing').

I understand that the relationship of entailment does not obtain. But
I'm worrying at the thought that there is a different close connection
between them -- put roughly: the considerations that could plausibly
lead one to believe in determinism, also imply epiphenomenalism of
consiousness. For example, one might think:

1) All physical events are caused by prior physical events, according
to natural laws.
2) All mental events are related to physical events in law-like ways.
3) There are no events that are neither mental nor physical.

The premises 1) through 3) imply

4) All events follow lawfully from prior events. [determinism]

and they also seem to imply

5) All events follow lawfully from prior physical events.
[epiphenomenalism or eliminative reduction of the mental]

One might deny the premises of this argument in a number of ways, but
more broadly, I don't see how the metaphysical thesis of determinism
can inherit its epistemic warrant from the success of the physical
sciences (as surely it needs to do), without also inheriting at least
the most deeply entrenched metaphysical assumptions of that science
(if not exactly 1 and 2 above, some other statement of the causal
priority of the physical). That atrocious sentence was a concealed
question.

In the above, I've supressed any reference to quantum indeterminacy,
thinking it at best marginally relevant to the physical processes that
underlie consciousness, and no help in establishing the causal
efficacy of phenomenal consciousness anyway. If either is wrong I'd
be glad to be corrected. But in the above, 'determinism' should be
regarded as short for 'determinism of the macroscopic-enough domain
that is relevant to consciousness.'

I'd be very grateful for the insights of the panel on this. Thank
you!

- philosophy fan

[Prem Das]

So If you dispense with the scholerly doctoral thesis speak, you are left with
the statement that we are the product of the circumstance of our birth, the
enviroment that birth occurs in, status and financial position of that birth, 
including the effects of race, gender and education adding another dimension.
 
I would warrant the effect of the above would have a profound influence
on our present and decidely be the prime mover of the future. This is eminently
evident. One only has to be alive to realise it. I guess that would be determinism
in action. But why should it be compatible with 'free will' ?
 
Does 'free will' really exist ? Is this not the construct of the religionists who had
to have some way of reconciling the fact that the Universe, created by their
ALL KNOWING, INFALLIBLE, Omnipotent GOD also contain this quantity called EVIL.
What makes it especially crucial is that their Holy Books in banner proclamation
does state "IN the begining there was nothing and God created everything between the
heavens and the earth". No way were they going to allow evil come to us via the hand
of GOD inspite of what their Holy Books might contain.
 
 
I am not an atheist. Just that I do not need the device 'free will' to make sense of it all.
I do not have 'sacred cows' that need protecting. But that is another story.
 
No two human being is the same. This one truth would make 'free will' redundant. The
influence of a singular experience would have vastly different effects on different people.
Even identical twins have differing nature and character. 
 
I do not know if I have gone off on a tangent. If I have, I apologise. I am just replying 
to an email in my inbox that had taken my fancy. Bye. 
 
  
 
   
 
> Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2010 09:51:57 -0700
> Subject: [AskPhilosophers] determinism and epiphenomenalism
> From: pramse...@hotmail.com
> To: askphil...@googlegroups.com

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