obscuredbymind
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In response to my question:
Is it paradoxical to ask what existence is without already knowing the
meaning of the term "is"? A statement such as "there is a crate of
oranges in front of me" seems like a statement about the "existence of
oranges." But at the same time what does it mean to say that the
"crate of oranges" exists? Existence seems like the most intuitive and
indubitable metaphysical pronouncement and yet at the same time it
evades clear definition. I suppose you can say "the orange crate
exists because you can pick an orange up or it exists because you can
observe it." But it seem like their is something more to saying
something exists than that, but I can't put my finger on it.
Gordon Marino on July 3, 2010
I see your point - asking, "What is existence?" does seem to be like
asking about the existence of existence. That is, the question seems
to presuppose the very "thing" that is being inquired about. Existence
surely does seem to evade clear definition. Maybe we define things in
terms of attributes and to exist is to be a kind of place holder for
predicates. Got me. Thanks for a great question
Alexander George on July 3, 2010
Yes, we do think that things exist which we cannot pick up or see.
(For instance, we say that numbers exist, or that the center of mass
of the solar system does.) What precisely do we mean by "exists" then?
That's one problem you raise. I'm not sure how to answer it: the
notion of "existence" seems so basic, it's hard to imagine much light
being shed on it from other, yet clearer, notions.
But you raise another question: whether there's something problematic
in even asking what "exists" means. Your thought is that there is,
since the question itself involves the notion of existence. I'm not
sure that it does: In asking for clarification of a notion, we're not
asking whether that notion exists (whatever that means). You might say
that we're asking what "exists" means. And although it's not clear
exactly what we're doing when we ask what a word means, it doesn't
seem right to say that we're asking whether something exists.
Of course, your paradox could perhaps be reinstated by shifting our
focus to the word "means". What does "means" mean, you might now ask.
Here you might argue as follows: either we know what "means" means, in
which case, there's no point in asking this question; or we don't know
what "means" means, in which case we don't even understand the
question. In sum, if we understand the original question then there's
no point in asking it. This issue has been kicking around since
Plato's day! It's sometimes known as the paradox of analysis. You can
find some information about it here.
George wrote,
"Yes, we do think that things exist which we cannot pick up or see.
(For instance, we say that numbers exist, or that the center of mass
of the solar system does.) "
But numbers are exactly something which we say doesn't exist. When we
say that it is a nominal entity, we say that it exists in name only.
(I am assuming that "exists in name" isn't meant to be taken
literally)* The center of mass at the center of the galaxy might be
said to exist by analogy with our experience with the orange even if
we can't literally touch and interact with it. But like I said I don't
think that touch-ability of interact-ability are the essential
criterion of what makes things exist. Though those features might be
central to a purely scientific conception of existence. But I am still
searching for a criteria of existence that upholds the intuitive sense
of existence.
Marino wrote,
"Maybe we define things in terms of attributes and to exist is to be
a kind of place holder for predicates."
Perhaps this statement has some validity, but this doesn't necessarily
help us distinguish between entities which are nominal and entities
which are actual. The number 7 has numerous predicates but it does not
follow that the number 7 can in any proper sense of the word be said
to "exist". Or if it can be said to exist, its existence is not
univocal with the kind of existence involved in the pronouncement
"there is a crate of oranges in front of me."
George wrote,
"In asking for clarification of a notion, we're not asking whether
that notion exists (whatever that means)."
I may have misunderstood my own question. I wrongly attributed the
same sense of meaning to the word IS in the question "What is
existence" to the statement "there is a crate of oranges." You are
correct that the word IS in the question might be translated better to
"What is the meaning of the word 'existence'." A paradox still
remains in that their seems to be the ability to determine the status
of an objects existence without a clear guideline.