US military brass warned of drone flaws in 2004
shyster1
capable of exploiting the design flaws. SR)
Officers Warned of Flaw in U.S. Drones in 2004
By Yochi J. Dreazen, August Cole and Siobhan Gorman
The Wall Street Journal
December 18, 2009
Senior U.S. military officers working for the Joint Chiefs of Staff
discussed the danger of Russia and China intercepting and doctoring
video from drone aircraft in 2004, but the Pentagon didn't begin
securing the signals until this year, according to people familiar
with the matter.
The disclosure came after The Wall Street Journal reported insurgents
in Iraq had intercepted video feeds from drones, downloading
unencrypted communications from the unmanned planes.
Members of the Pentagon's Joint Staff discussed the potential security
shortfall of drone feeds in 2004 and 2005, according to two officers
with direct knowledge of the deliberations.
Officers at the time weren't concerned about adversaries intercepting
the signals in Iraq or Afghanistan because drones weren't yet common
there and militants weren't thought to be technically sophisticated.
Instead, some officers worried that such potential U.S. adversaries as
Russia or China could manipulate the drone video feeds to hide
battlefield movements. "The main concern was that the video feeds were
being intercepted, manipulated and then fed to the commanders in the
field," one of the officers said. "The fear was a commander looking on
a feed, seeing nothing, and then having an enemy tank brigade come
roaring into your command post."
The concerns were largely dismissed by more senior members of the
Joint Staff, who were more worried about roadside bombs and other more
immediate battlefield dangers in Iraq and Afghanistan, the two
officers said.
The U.S. uses drones to track and kill militants in Afghanistan, Iraq
and Pakistan, especially in regions too dangerous or politically
complicated to insert ground forces. The drones have been responsible
for killing nine high-profile terrorists in the past year, according
to the Long War Journal, which tracks statistics on drone attacks.
On Thursday, Pentagon officials confirmed militants in Iraq had
recorded drone video feeds several times in the past year. They said
the feeds have since been secured. Officials said militants never took
control of a drone or interfered with its flight.
Bryan Whitman, a Pentagon spokesman, told reporters the Defense
Department was constantly re-evaluating the security of its drones and
other surveillance systems. He said the military worked to close any
shortfalls that were discovered as part of those reviews.
Journal Community
Senior defense and military officials first became aware of the
vulnerability of video feeds in the 1990s, during the U.S. campaign in
Bosnia. But Pentagon officials acknowledge they didn't start
encrypting the video feeds until April, according to a person familiar
with the matter.
Some current and former officials say they believe that all feeds
haven't yet been fully encrypted, given the expense and technological
complexity. Rep. Norm Dicks (D., Wash.), vice chairman of the House
Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, said adequate encryption was a
major concern.
Rep. Dicks said there was "a very good chance we're going to have
hearings" on the matter next year.
Drones aren't the only U.S. systems that transmit unencrypted video
signals. The military's Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver, or
Rover, is part of a widely used system that allows drones, helicopters
and planes to transmit live video footage to nearby troops on the
ground. Former military officials say the signals aren't encrypted,
which means the tactical information can be intercepted.
One drone used in Iraq and Afghanistan is the Scan Eagle made by
Insitu, a subsidiary of Boeing Co. It is used by the U.S. Special
Operations Command, Marines and Navy, and lacks encryption, according
to a person familiar with the matter.
An Insitu spokeswoman said the company was in the "advanced stages of
development of a technical solution for video data encryption for
ScanEagle."
The Scan Eagle can stay aloft for 24 hours and carries electro-optical
and infrared cameras up to an altitude of 16,000 feet. Its video feed
hasn't been encrypted because military officials have long assumed no
one would make the effort to try to intercept it, according to a
person familiar with the matter.
U.S. forces use so many high-tech surveillance and communications
systems that Iraq and Afghanistan are awash in digital and analog
signals, according to former military officials. In the rush to adopt
these systems, less attention has been paid to encrypting signals.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126109611986796377.html?mod=googlenews_wsj