FOREWORD: The following article though dated relates fully to the
Atomic Espionage of the 1950s and also to what is taking place
currently with missile technology being channeled to the Communist
Chinese. There is a distinct undeniable pattern that shows!
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR Monday, May 22, 1989
Damage Caused by 'Friendly' Spies
By Stephen Green
THE arrest and conviction of Jonathan Pollard for "conspiracy to
commit espionage" for Israel against the United States was an event
freighted with emotion and bitterness in both countries. Nor did the
hard feelings cease when, in March of 1987, Mr. Pollard was sentenced
to, life imprisonment. He has been out of sight since then, hut the
issues surrounding the case continue to fester.
Many Israeli's resent their government's cooperation in providing US
investigators with some of the evidence that persuaded Pollard to
plead guilty. At the same time, many American Jews have felt betrayed
by the Israeli government as, in the months after Pollard's arrest,
one Israeli official was formally indicted in connection with the
case, four others were named as unindicted, coconspirators, and
reports surfaced linking the operation to the office of the Israeli
prime minister The US intelligence and military communities were
initially puzzled by the arrest, but have since become increasingly
angry and mistrustful of the Israelis as their own internal
investigations revealed the size of the operation, the enormous damage
to US national security, and belatedly, similar past instances of
In sum, the Pollard case has had and continues to have a strong
negative effect on the working relations between these two close
It is therefore not surprising that a substantial effort is under way
to "reexamine" the case and to engender sympathy and support for
Pollard and his wife, who pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of
"conspiracy to receive embezzled government property" and serving a
A Justice for the Pallards movement in New York and a mirror Citizens
for Pollard group in Israel work to vindicate the couple and to raise
funds to defray their legal expenses. Jonathan's father, Dr. Morris
Pollard, along with Alan Dershowitz, the Pollard's well-known
attorney, have been pleading the cause on television.
Bernard Henderson, Mrs. Pollard's father, has written a book entitled
"A Spy's Story," which understandably minimizes the crimes committed
and makes a passionate case for the couple's early release on
Hardly less subjective is the recently published book "Territory of
Lies," written by the Washington correspondent of the Jerusalem Post,
Wolf Blitzer. A candid subtitle informs the reader that the author was
given "exclusive" access to the Pollards. The methodology here is to
allow Jonathan Pollard to pick apart selected portions of the US
government's case while ignoring or misrepresenting other portions.
A central theme in these revisionist efforts is that the classified
documents stolen by Pollard and sold to a special intelligence unit of
the Israeli Defense Ministry were essential to Israel's survival, Mr.
Blitzer, quoting Pollard's attorneys, indicates that the stolen
material includes documents an weapons systems, intelligence
structures and capabilities of Arab countries, analysis of Arab
leaders' political intentions, and details of Soviet weapons about to
be delivered to Israel's enemies.
Israel's 40-Year History of Espionage Against the United States
THE pattern of Israeli spying on the United States may be shown by a
review of selected cases going back to the founding of the state of
Israel. To the best of my knowledge, with one exception none of the
cases below have previously been publicized. They are based on either
documents released under the Freedom of Information Act or interviews
with current counter intelligence agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, or with retired FBI and Justice Department officials.
1940s - The first Israeli military attache sent to Washington in June
1948, Efraim Ben-Artzi, set up a four-man board to conduct espionage
in the US. The board was composed of Ben-Artzi himself, a member of
the Israeli US delegation in New York, a US citizen who was a New York
lawyer, and a professional intelligence agent who came and went from
Tel Aviv, operating as a case officer.
Early projects included a training center in New York which taught
recruited agents the craft of espionage - such things as street and
electronic surveillance and the use of disappearing inks, codes, and
ciphers - and the bugging of the hotels and automobiles of key Arab
United Nations delegations. There were from the outset, however,
American targets as well. This probably included the acquisition" and
shipment to Czechoslovakia of a US prototype of a small, mobile,
early-approach radar, in exchange for Czech arms for the Haganah, the
armed Jewish forces in Palestine.
1950s - In 1956 a "high Israeli official" in Tel Aviv whose name was
Eisenstadt approached American Embassy official Earl L. Jensen,
offering to pay him for classified information and documents. Mr.
Jensen pretended to accept the bait, and under the guidance of the FBI
and the' Justice Department, passed carefully selected material to two
Israeli contacts named Abramski and Nevoth (these names are from a
declassified State Department document in which only last names are
When Jensen was reassigned to Washington, Abramski and Nevoth followed
to continue the arrangement. As the Israelis had no diplomatic
immunity in this country, the State and Justice Departments concurred
in writing that prosecution should proceed under both the Foreign
Agent Registration Act and applicable US espionage laws. Nevertheless,
for reasons I have so far been unable to determine, Abramski and
Nevoth apparently were not arrested and prosecuted.
1960s - In the mid-1960s the FBI expanded an existing Atomic Energy
Commission investigation of the Nuclear Materials and Energy
Corporation (NUMEC) in Apollo, Pa., for possible diversion of
reprocessed uranium to Israel. The FBI's primary concern was the
safety of classified documents on weapons-related technology, which
were stored at Apollo. Frequent visitors from Israel had access to the
documents, and one of those visitors, Rafael Eitan, was known to have
Israeli intelligence connections. (Yes, it's the same Rafael Eitan
involved in the, Pollard case.)
In 1969, following recommendations of the FBI, NUMEC's US uranium
reprocessing contracts were canceled, and it was decertified as a
repository for weapons-related documents. Further, the security
clearances of Dr. Zalman Shapiro, NUMEC's president, were lifted.
1970s - Perhaps the most abrasive and persistent person ever sent by
Israel to spy upon America was Col. Yosef Langotsky, who came to the
FBI's attention shortly after his assignment in mid-1976 to the
Israeli Embassy in Washington as assistant army attaché. Langotsky
repeatedly wandered into secure areas at the Pentagon, and clumsily
tried to recruit pentagon employees to commit espionage. After several
warnings to the Israeli Embassy, the Defense Department simply refused
him all cooperation and any access to the Pentagon. In early 1979,
Langotsky was quietly recalled to Israel by his government.
1980s - In 1983, the Defense Intelligence Agency's security office
searched the workplace and home of a senior staff member of the
Defense Intelligence College. Several of his colleagues had reported
the individual for what they thought were security improprieties
involving Israeli military and intelligence officials. No classified
material was located during the search, though hundreds of the
college's library books were found which had been obtained
fraudulently and subsequently mutilated or destroyed. The
Defense Department turned the matter over to a federal prosecutor.
In an arrangement with the prosecutor, the individual pleaded guilty
in federal district court in Alexandria, Va., in November 1983 to
"injuring government property" and was convicted, fined, and sentenced
to a term of community work. The arrangement included his immediate
resignation as a civilian staff member of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, of which the college is part. None of the security aspects of
the case were ever brought to trial. Nevertheless, according to agency
officials, "important" classified material was found to be missing
from the college library during the investigation. The individual
involved is currently director of Mideast studies at a university in
the Washington, D.C., area.
On a recent "ABC Night line" show, Dr. Pollard said he could
understand his son's feelings when he learned the US was not sharing
with Israel the intelligence information it had on gas plants in Syria
[and] impending PLO attacks from Lebanon.
The image here is of a bright young American Jew deeply torn between
his concern about the survival of Israel and his duty as a US
intelligence official to protect his own country's security secrets.
There's a certain logic to this image, and even some elements of
truth. But this is not why Jonathan Pollard is serving a life
sentence. There is more to the story.
SOON after Pollard's arrest in November 1985, his Defense
Investigative Service and FBI interrogators became convinced that much
if not most of the "take" in fact had nothing to do with Israel's
essential national security interests. This worried the US government
even more than the incredible amount of documents involved,
approximately 850,O0O pages - or even the classification level, well
over half of it was TOP SECRET or higher. The problem was essentially
this, The Defense Investigative Service and the FBI knew from lists
hidden in Pollard's desk that he had been very specifically
tasked. That is, his Israeli handlers had developed intelligence
requirements for particular documents, by name and number. Initially,
this indicated the possibility of another agent - the infamous "Mr. X"
- who was pointing the operation toward the documents Pollard was to
steal. In a polygraph interrogation, however, Pollard confirmed what
US defense officials already suspected: One of the first documents
he'd been asked to take was a huge compendium of current classified
military documents which is updated every three months. This lists and
describes tens of thousands of documents - a virtual road map for
Pollard's handlers. No need for Mr. X.
So what Pollard took was exactly what the Israelis wanted. But what
did they want? The initial shock came when the FBI analyzed the 25
documents found in a suitcase Anne Pollard had removed from their
apartment on her husband's instructions, after he was first questioned
at the Pentagon. Many of them were classified TOP SECRET, and
virtually all dealt with US weapons and military capabilities. The
question "Is there a Mr. X?" had pretty well been answered. Now there
was a new question: "Why do the Israelis want this
SENIOR defense officials and FBI counterespionage agents who have
reviewed the Pollard debriefing transcripts confirm this is still a
major focus of the investigation. The transcripts, together with
computer records at the Defense Intelligence Agency (and within the
agency, at the Defense Intelligence College), where Pollard gained
access to many of the stolen documents, have subsequently revealed
that much of the operation's take had nothing to do with the Middle
East at all - it contained details of US and Soviet intelligence,
communications and military capabilities. This included, according to
the government's Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, "details about US
ship positions, aircraft stations, tactics, and training operations."
Much of this material could have been of interest to only one
country - the Soviet Union.
This concern was heightened when, during the Pollard investigation, a
Soviet defector in US hands revealed that in addition to the two
Soviet spies serving prison terms in Israel (Shabtai Kalmanovitch and
Marcus Klingberg), there was a third who had not been caught. He was
well placed in the Defense Ministry, and still "active." Quite
possibly, secrets Pollard sent to Israel were passed on to Moscow,
whether or not that had been intended.
A second theme of Pollard's supporters is that the sentence was too
harsh because the compromised documents, however voluminous and
important, were sent to an ally. They question whether much damage was
in fact done. The issue is fairly joined here, because it was almost
certainly Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's 46-page classified
to the court about damage to US security which led Judge Aubrey
Robinson to issue a life sentence.
In the months since Pollard went to prison, his supporters have taken
Mr. Weinberger to task for his role in the sentencing process. Mr.
Dershowitz has characterized Weinberger's statements as "dirty pool."
In an op-ed piece he added: "The Defense Department cannot expect the
American people to accept its gross exaggerations at face value,
especially when they fly in the face of common sense.
Wolf Blitzer is a bit more circumspect in his book, admitting that
Pollard had indeed damaged national security. But he adds the curious
caveat that much of the damage had been contained, "because of the
exposure of the operation" and because "US and Israeli intelligence
-officials have cooperated - albeit not completely - to repair the
What all these statements share, aside from a generous amount of
wishful thinking, is a fundamental misunderstanding of the imperatives
of any national security apparatus. Among the things Pollard sent to
the Israelis, according to government submissions, were:
"Data about technical, systems for the collection of intelligence, as
well as the intelligence product collected by the systems."
"Detailed analytical studies containing technical calculations,
graphs, and satellite photographs in which the authors of the analyses
"Information from human sources whose identity could be inferred by a
reasonably competent intelligence analyst."
"Three separate categories of daily message or cable traffic for
approximately 17 months."
JONATHAN POLLARD admits he did not excise a single document he
transmitted to the Israelis. None of the documents recouped in his
apartment were excised: None of the (163) documents returned by the
Israeli government had been excised. The compromised documents, in
other words, revealed all details about the intelligence sources and
methods used to collect the information. Even if Pollard had tried
to-excise sources and methods, he did not have the competence to do
so. We are speaking about hundreds of thousands of pages, thousands of
documents, and hundreds of subjects.
One example: The information compromised included US military
satellite photographs. If a foreign intelligence organization simply
sees the photograph in a technical journal, all it has is the subject
in the photo, the fact that the National Security Agency is
interested, and some indication of the power and resolution of the
satellite cameras. But if foreign analysts get their hands on the
original or even a good photocopy of the photo itself, they also get
all the telemetry data that was printed around the edges - the
location, distance, altitude, altitude and degree of angle of the
satellite, among other things. With this information in foreign hands,
the NSA must reposition, or even change the orbit of the
satellite, at great expense, and the element of surprise is lost.
This is what Weinberger meant when he referred to "[the loss of]
national assets which have taken many years, great effort, and
enormous national resources to secure," Three separate Defense
Department sources who took part in the Pollard operation damage
exercise have been unable or unwilling to put a specific dollar figure
on the loss. But all three have, independently referred to "several
billions of dollars" as a rough estimate, with the vast majority of
that loss occurring to the technical collection resources of the NSA.
And at that, we haven't counted the networks destroyed and the extreme
personal risks caused for spies whose identities, locations, and
activities were revealed.
It makes virtually no difference that the pages went to Israel as
opposed to, say, Czechoslovakia. No modern national security apparatus
would risk many lives or billions of dollars on operations whose
security it no longer controlled. Once it is gone, it's gone. If
Pollard had taken half the material and mailed it to KGB headquarters
in Moscow, and had merely given the other half to a friend in
Bethesda, Md. to store in his house, the effect would have been
virtually the same for purposes of damage assessment.
In this case, the material went to a foreign power whose intelligence
services the US had reason to believe were already penetrated by the
Soviets. Former CIA director Richard Helms was recently asked in
connection with Pollard, whether the US should distinguish between
those who sell secrets to friends on the one hand, or enemies on the
other. His answer was, no, it shouldn't, "for the simple reason that
we don't know about the security of those other governments." Mr.
Helms's comment underscores another important point about the "take"
in the Pollard operation: It is only the government of Israel, meaning
the entirety of its security establishment, that could have used the
voluminous material stolen in this case.
Rafael Eitan, the director of LEKEM, the Defense Ministry unit that
managed the Pollard operation, served as an adviser on intelligence
and counter terrorism to both Yitzhak Shamir and Shimon Peres during
the time that he ran Pollard. In his book, Mr. Blitzer is very careful
to point out that when Mr. Peres became prime minister in September
1984 (shortly after Pollard was recruited), Mr. Eitan "was asked to
give up his counter terrorism responsibility." What Blitzer neglects
to say is that Eitan retained his intelligence role in the prime
minister's office until the time Jonathan Pollard was arrested.
My source for this is Thomas Pickering, then US ambassador to Israel,
who, when Eitan's name became connected to the case, was asked by the
State Department about the man's ties to the prime minister. He
responded as indicated above in a "Secret" telegram (No. 17246 dated
Nov., 26, 1985) to the secretary of state. It was declassified in 1986
in response to a freedom of information request from this writer.
Perhaps the most embarrassing aspect of the Pollard matter, from
Israel's standpoint, and the primary reason that those directly
involved would like to see the Pollards released and the issue
permanently resolved and out of the news, is the question of the
policy context for the operation. Was Pollard the first person to spy
for Israel against the US, or was he only the first one to be caught
doing so, or was he only the first one to be
caught and prosecuted!
You would be correct if you answered "none of the above." Psllard was
not the first Israeli spy here, nor was he the first caught or even
the first prosecuted. Blitzer distinguishes between "friendly
espionage" and the nasty kind where agents are recruited and money is
paid for information. The former is collected by overt technical means
or by the reports of military and other accredited attaches. This
Israel has done to America, and the US does to Israel, and everybody
does to everybody else,-But for decades, Blitzer maintains, the US and
Israel have abided by an agreement not to spy on each other the nasty
way. That is provable nonsense.
The Israeli government is even less equivocal on this matter than
Blitzer. Shortly after Pollard's arrest, Prime Minister Peres issued a
statement which said, in part: "Spying on the US stands in total
contradiction to our policy." Not so. Not now, not when Pollard was
recruited, and not at any time going back to the very establishment of
Israel's first embassies in Washington and at the United Nations in
The list in the accompanying article is by no means complete.
Documentary evidence exists of similar cases. Why are they not better
known! Because prior to Jonathan Pollard, according to one senior FBI
counterespionage official, "95 percent of the cases developed resulted
in declinations [to prosecute]." The official added that he himself
had readied two such files in which he believed he had a clear
preponderance of evidence. The cases were dropped at the last moment.
POLLARD was certainly not the first and he probably won't be the last
Israeli spy in America: He was just the most effective. That said, my
sense is that many if not most in the US intelligence and military
communities would be delighted to accommodate Pollard's family and
supporters, and release the man and his wife to their adopted country.
It would depend on what the US could get in trade, perhaps in a
three-way deal involving the Soviets and their spies now in Israeli
jails. There is generally no rancor in Washington toward Pollard
personally. And in any event, the damage is already done. But you can
be sure that whatever has happened in the past, the next Israeli
caught spying in America will be treated as a spy.
Stephen Green is the author of "Living by the Sword; America and
Israel in the Middle East." He is writing a book on Israeli
intelligence activities in America.
~~~~~~~ END ~~~~~~~
For more on acts of individual Jews undermining our very own national
security read the following archival links:
"Treason! Selling of our National Security! Jews Once Again Involved
in Giving Communists Our Technology!"
"Jewish Julius Rosenberg Spied for Moscow!"
" >>Jewish COMMUNISM'S Aggression Against America<<"
"The Amerasia Case": In early 1945 the FBI arrested six
persons for stealing 1700 highly classified State Department
documents. Three of the six were Jews:
Philip Jaffe, a Russian Jew who was the former editor of the
communist paper, "Labor Defense". He was convicted and
Andrew Roth, a Brooklyn Jew, was a lieutenant in Naval
Mark Gayn, a Russian Jew, (real name is Julius Ginsberg),
was a writer.
"Alger Hiss Case": Hiss, although a communist, was one of
the most influential men in the State Department and an
advisor to FDR. He was a protege of Jewish Supreme Court
Justice, Felix Frankfurter. Despite Frankfurter's court
appearance as a character witness, Hiss was convicted of
perjury and sentenced to five years.
"Gerhard Eisler Case": Eisler, a Jew and the highest-ranking
member of the communist party ever brought to trial, was the
secret boss of the communist party between 1935 and 1947. In
May of 1950, while free on bail, Eisler fled the U.S. and
later became the propaganda chief of communist Eastern
Germany. His sister, Ruth, was a communist agent for a
number of years.
"The Hollywood Ten": In 1950 ten leading film writers of the
Hollywood Film Colony were convicted of contempt of Congress
and sentenced to prison. Nine of the ten were Jews:
Alvah Bessie, a screen writer, wrote for the party
publication, New Masses.
Herbert Biberman, a communist party member.
Lester Cole, a communist party member.
Edward Dmytryk, belonged to fifteen communist fronts.
Ring Lardner, Jr., a communist party member.
John Lawson, a Broadway playwrite and communist party
Albert Maltz, a screen writer and communist party member.
Samuel Ornitz, a screen writer.
Adrian Scott, nationality unknown.
Dalton Trumbo, a communist party member.
"The American Politburo": The case exposed the fact that at
least six of eleven members of the National Secretariat of
the American Communist Party were Jewish. Those identified
as Jews were:
Jacob Sachel, John Gates (real name, Israel Regenstreif),
Gilbert Green (real name, Greenberg), Gus Hall (real name,
Arvo Mike Halberg), Irving Potash, and Carl Winter. The
racial identity of Eugene Dennis (real name, Waldron),
Robert Thompson, and John Williamson are unknown.
"Fuchs-Gold Spy Ring": Atomic scientist, Klaus Fuchs, (not a
Jew), was brought to America at the personal instigation of
Albert Einstein. While working on the Manhattan Project,
Fuchs had access to our innermost atomic secrets from 1942
to 1945. Based upon information obtained from Fuchs, the FBI
began investigations which resulted in the arrest of nine
other members of the spy ring. Of the nine, who were all
convicted, eight were Jewish:
Harry Gold, pivotal ring member along with Fuchs, was
arrested in 1950, pleaded guilty to espionage, and sentenced
to thirty years.
David Greenglass, passed atomic secrets to Gold and Julius
Rosenberg. Greenglass's wife worked as a courier, passing
information between her husband and the Rosenbergs. He was
released from prison in 1960.
Abraham Brothman, headed an engineering firm and supplied
Gold with secret information on aviation gasoline, turbo
aircraft engines, and synthetic rubber. He was convicted of
conspiracy aginst the U.S.
Miriam Moscowitz, an associate of Brothman, was convicted.
Julius Rosenberg, an electrical engineer, stole plans for
the highly secret proximity fuse. He also aided in the theft
of other atomic secrets. He was convicted and sentenced to
Ethel Rosenberg, wife of Julius, was convicted of the same
charges. She was the sister to David Greenglass. Ethel and
her husband were executed on June 19,1953.
Morten Sobell, passed secret radar information to Rosenberg.
He was convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage and
sentenced to thirty years.
It should be noted that the chief of the Los Alamos atomic
installation was Robert Oppenheimer, a Jew, who was recently
confirmed as a communist agent by former high-ranking KGB
official, Pavel Sudoplatov (not a Jew, but married to a
Jewess), in his book - Special Tasks.
"Cold War Espionage - Jewish? Yes, Indeedy, It Was!"
"#1 Atomic Spies - Best Example of False Dual-Loyalty Subterfuge!"
"#2 Atomic Spies - Best Example of False Dual-Loyalty Subterfuge!"
"Mainly Jews Loyal To Moscow Gave Up Our Atomic Secrets!"
"Supplement to Mainly Jews Loyal To Moscow Gave Up Our Atomic
"Kheifetz said that Oppenheimer, the son of a German-Jewish immigrant,
was deeply moved by the information that a secure place for Jews in
the Soviet Union was guaranteed."
"THE KEEPER OF VITAL SECRETS
Even before J. Robert Oppenheimer's first days at Los Alamos, the U.S.
government had suspicions about his loyalties. And the doubts followed
him until he was finally denied his Q clearance in 1954.
Like many liberal intellectuals of the time, Oppenheimer was quite
taken with the idealism he believed to underpin the new Soviet state."
"It Was Jews that Gave Soviets our Atomic Secrets!"
All fully documented and irrefutable!