science just a faith?

[Dale]

what can you really know besides that you exist?

we don't know much else for sure, so we infer, and place faith in status
quo inference until we have better inference

science comes from the latin word scientia meaning "knowing"

we can know by deduction, deciphering the parts from the WHOLE
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deductive_reasoning

we can know by induction, getting the whole from ALL the parts
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning

but we really don't know the WHOLE or ALL the parts, so we use partial
forms of these like observation, theorems, ANOVA, etc.

even modern science is just a faith and follows the philosophy of faith,
just like all other faiths

we infer, and place faith in status quo inference until we have better
inference, the caveats are conservative status quos and aggressive
pursuits of better status quos

if we don't know much besides that we exists, forms of the philosophy of
the self and living would seem to be the priority and therefor religion
is not that far off and considering a far majority of people on earth
believe in a religion this rings true to me, at least

this said, it all depends on whether illogic exists

if we are given a logical realm to develop
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maya_%28illusion%29
maybe we avoid illogic to the most degree

but if illogic exists in the higher realm, all bets on the faith of
science are off, and we just live in the day there

--
Dale

[MarkA]

It is well known that science, like all human knowledge, suffers from the
problem of the "inductive turkey": a turkey is being raised on a farm,
and, after many, many confirming examples, concludes (inductively) that
the farmer is his friend, protecting him, and giving him food, while
expecting nothing in return. The turkey doesn't know that tomorrow is
Thanksgiving.....

However, until we come up with something better, we are stuck using the
tools we have.

--
MarkA
Keeper of Things Put There Only Just The Night Before
About eight o'clock

[sbalneav]

In alt.atheism Dale <inv...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> what can you really know besides that you exist?

You can't even know that. How do you know you're not simply the dream of some
other being?

> we don't know much else for sure, so we infer, and place faith in status
> quo inference until we have better inference
>
> science comes from the latin word scientia meaning "knowing"
>
> we can know by deduction, deciphering the parts from the WHOLE
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deductive_reasoning
>
> we can know by induction, getting the whole from ALL the parts
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning
>
> but we really don't know the WHOLE or ALL the parts, so we use partial
> forms of these like observation, theorems, ANOVA, etc.
>
> even modern science is just a faith and follows the philosophy of faith,
> just like all other faiths

Stop right there.

There's a *fundamental* difference. Science tries to understand the natural
universe as best it can, within the bounds of this reality. Sure, we could all
be the dreams of some superbeing. Sure, I could be the only thing that
actually exists, and everyone and everything else is a figment of my
imagination. But if you're going to descend into philosophical solipsism, then
you can't know *anything*.

Science only makes a *few* assumptions:

1) That the universe *actually* exists.
2) That we *actually* exist within this universe, as separate entities.
3) That our senses, or the mechanical extentions to our senses, can (to within
some limits) accurately communicate information about the universe to us.
4) That by studying these observations, we can learn useful information.

That's a pretty small list of assumptions.

If you're going to play the "we can't really know anything about anything"
card, that's fine. But it simply boomerangs right back at you: how do you know
that what you believe about your faith is accurate? How do you know you've
perceived it *at all*, let alone *properly*?

> we infer, and place faith in status quo inference until we have better
> inference, the caveats are conservative status quos and aggressive
> pursuits of better status quos
>
> if we don't know much besides that we exists, forms of the philosophy of
> the self and living would seem to be the priority and therefor religion
> is not that far off and considering a far majority of people on earth
> believe in a religion this rings true to me, at least

You've failed right on your first assumption. You don't *know* you exist. If
you're going to doubt *everything*, you have to doubt *that* as well.
Otherwise, it's just special pleading.

> this said, it all depends on whether illogic exists
>
> if we are given a logical realm to develop
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maya_%28illusion%29
> maybe we avoid illogic to the most degree
>
> but if illogic exists in the higher realm, all bets on the faith of
> science are off, and we just live in the day there

Word salad. Go be a Solipsist somewhere else. Some of us want to find out
things about our universe, instead of sitting in a corner imagining we're just
part of some grand dream of some cosmic dreamer.

--
__ _ | There are many causes I am prepared to die for,
(_ |_) | but no causes I am prepared to kill for.
__)|_) | -- Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi

[Immortalist]

On Feb 27, 9:38 pm, Dale <inva...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> what can you really know besides that you exist?
>

Are you saying that it is impossible for some machine to produce an
experience that seems like it is you experiencing something. What if
it is not really you but instead is just some algorithms on some
future device that produce and experience that claims it is you?

I mean you seem to be claiming that you can produce evidence that you
exist.

> we don't know much else for sure, so we infer, and place faith in status
> quo inference until we have better inference
>

Science does the same thing and only with instruments and people.

> science comes from the latin word scientia meaning "knowing"
>

Scientific Method

A science project is an investigation using the scientific method to
discover the answer to a scientific problem. Before starting your
project, you need to understand the scientific method. This section
uses examples to illustrate and explain the basic steps of the
scientific method. The scientific method is the "tool" that scientists
use to find the answers to questions. It is the process of thinking
through the possible solutions to a problem and testing each
possibility to find the best solution. The scientific method involves
the following steps: doing research, identifying the problem, stating
a hypothesis, conducting project experimentation, and reaching a
conclusion.

Research is the process of collecting information from your own
experiences, knowledgeable sources, and data from exploratory
experiments. Your first research is used to select a project topic.
This is called topic research. For example, you observe a black growth
on bread slices and wonder how it got there. Because of this
experience, you decide to learn more about mold growth. Your topic
will be about fungal reproduction. (Fungal refers to plant-like
organisms called fungi, which cannot make their own food, and
reproduction is the making of a new offspring.) CAUTION: If you are
allergic to mold, this is not a topic you would investigate. Choose a
topic that is safe for you to do.

After you have selected a topic, you begin what is called project
research. This is research to help you understand the topic, express a
problem, propose a hypothesis, and design one or more project
experiments—experiments designed to test the hypothesis. An example of
project research would be to place a fresh loaf of white bread in a
bread box and observe the bread over a period of time as an
exploratory experiment. The result of this experiment and other
research give you the needed information for the next step—identifying
the problem.

Do use many references from printed sources—books, journals,
magazines, and newspapers—as well as electronic sources—computer
software and online services.

Do gather information from professionals—instructors, librarians, and
scientists, such as physicians and veterinarians.

Do perform other exploratory experiment related to your topic.

Problem

The problem is the scientific question to be solved. It is best
expressed as an "open-ended" question, which is a question that is
answered with a statement, not just a yes or a no. For example, "How
does light affect the reproduction of bread mold on white bread?"

Do limit your problem. Note that the previous question is about one
life process of molds—reproduction; one type of mold—bread mold; one
type of bread—white bread; and one factor that affects its
growth—light. To find the answer to a question such as "How does light
affect molds?" would require that you test different life processes
and an extensive variety of molds.

Do choose a problem that can be solved experimentally. For example,
the question "What is a mold?" can be answered by finding the
definition of the word mold in the dictionary. But, "At room
temperature, what is the growth rate of bread mold on white bread?" is
a question that can be answered by experimentation.

Hypothesis

A hypothesis is an idea about the solution to a problem, based on
knowledge and research. While the hypothesis is a single statement, it
is the key to a successful project. All of your project research is
done with the goal of expressing a problem, proposing an answer to it
(the hypothesis), and designing project experimentation. Then all of
your project experimenting will be performed to test the hypothesis.
The hypothesis should make a claim about how two factors relate. For
example, in the following sample hypothesis, the two relating factors
are light and bread mold growth. Here is one example of a hypothesis
for the earlier problem question:

"I believe that bread mold does not need light for reproduction on
white bread. I base my hypothesis on these facts:

Organisms with chlorophyll need light to survive. Molds do not have
chlorophyll.

In my exploratory experiment, bread mold grew on white bread kept in a
dark bread box."

Do state facts from past experiences or observations on which you base
your hypothesis.

Do write down your hypothesis before beginning the project
experimentation.

Don't change your hypothesis even if experimentation does not support
it. If time permits, repeat or redesign the experiment to confirm your
results.

Project Experimentation

Project experimentation is the process of testing a hypothesis. The
things that have an effect on the experiment are called variables.
There are three kinds of variables that you need to identify in your
experiments: independent, dependent, and controlled.

The independent variable is the variable you purposely manipulate
(change). The dependent variable is the variable that is being
observed, which changes in response to the independent variable. The
variables that are not changed are called controlled variables.

The problem in this section concerns the effect of light on the
reproduction of bread mold. The independent variable for the
experiment is light and the dependent variable is bread mold
reproduction. A control is a test in which the independent variable is
kept constant in order to measure changes in the dependent variable.
In a control, all variables are identical to the experimental
setup—your original setup—except for the independent variable. Factors
that are identical in both the experimental setup and the control
setup are the controlled variables. For example, prepare the
experiment by placing three or four loaves of white bread in cardboard
boxes the size of a bread box, one loaf per box. Close the boxes so
that they receive no light. If, at the end of a set time period, the
mold grows, you might decide that no light was needed for mold
reproduction. But, before making this decision, you must determine
experimentally if the mold would grow with light. Thus, control groups
must be set up of bread that receives light throughout the testing
period. Do this by placing an equal number of loaves in comparable-
size boxes, but leave them open.

The other variables for the experimental and control setup, such as
the environmental conditions for the room where the boxes are
placed—temperature and humidity—and the brand of the breads used must
be kept the same. These are controlled variables. Note that when
designing the procedure of your project experiment, you must include
steps for measuring the results. For example, to measure the amount of
mold growth, you might draw 1/2-inch (1-cm) squares on a transparent
sheet of plastic. This could be placed over the bread, and the number
of squares with mold growth could be counted. Also, as it is best to
perform the experiment more than once, it is also good to have more
than one control. You might have one control for every experimental
setup.

Do have only one independent variable during an experiment.

Do repeat the experiment more than once to verify your results.

Do have a control.

Do have more than one control, with each being identical.

Do organize data. (See A Sample Project for information on organizing
data from experiments.)

Project Conclusion

The project conclusion is a summary of the results of the project
experimentation and a statement of how the results relate to the
hypothesis. Reasons for experimental results that are contrary to the
hypothesis are included. If applicable, the conclusion can end by
giving ideas for further testing.

If your results do not support your hypothesis:

DON'T change your hypothesis.

DON'T leave out experimental results that do not support your
hypothesis.

DO give possible reasons for the difference between your hypothesis
and the experimental results.

DO give ways that you can experiment further to find a solution.

If your results support your hypothesis:

You might say, for example, "As stated in my hypothesis, I believe
that light is not necessary during the germination of bean seeds. My
experimentation supports the idea that bean seeds will germinate
without light. After seven days, the seeds tested were seen growing in
full light and in no light. It is possible that some light reached the
'no light' containers that were placed in a dark closet. If I were to
improve on this experiment, I would place the 'no light' containers in
a light-proof box and/or wrap them in light-proof material, such as
aluminum foil."

http://school.discovery.com/sciencefaircentral/scifairstudio/handbook/scientificmethod.html

> we can know by deduction, deciphering the parts from the WHOLE http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deductive_reasoning
>
> we can know by induction, getting the whole from ALL the parts http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning
>

Two views of Deduction & Induction:

View 1: conclusion;
Deduction = infers particular from general truths
Induction = infers general from particular truths

View 2: conclusion;
Deduction = follows with absolute necessity
Induction = follows with some degree of probability

In defense of view 2:

Deduction and Induction From
Introduction to Logic Irving M. Copi
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0130749214/

1.6 Deduction and Induction

Arguments are traditionally divided into two different types,
deductive and inductive. Every argument involves the claim (noted
earlier) that its premisses provide some grounds for the truth of its
conclusion, but only a deductive argument involves the claim that its
premisses provide conclusive grounds for its conclusion. When the
reasoning in a deductive argument is correct, we call that argument
valid; when the reasoning of a deductive argument is incorrect, we
call that argument invalid.

We may therefore define validity as follows. A deductive argument is
valid when its premisses, if true, do provide conclusive grounds for
the truth of its conclusion. In a valid deductive argument (but not in
an inductive argument), premisses and conclusion are so related that
it is absolutely impossible for the premisses to be true unless the
conclusion is true also.

In every deductive argument, either the premisses succeed in providing
conclusive grounds for the truth of the conclusion, or they do not
succeed. Therefore, every deductive argument is either valid or
invalid. This is a point of some importance: If a deductive argument
is not valid, it must be invalid; if it is not invalid, it must be
valid. But note that the terms "valid" and "invalid" do not apply to
inductive arguments; for inductive arguments, other terms of appraisal
are required.

In the realm of deductive logic, the central task is to clarify the
relation between premisses and conclusion in valid arguments, and thus
to allow us to discriminate valid from invalid arguments...

An inductive argument makes a very different claim: not that its
premisses give conclusive grounds for the truth of its conclusion, but
only that its premisses provide some support for that conclusion.
Inductive arguments, therefore, cannot be "valid" or "invalid" in the
sense in which these terms are applied to deductive arguments. Of
course, inductive arguments may be evaluated as better or worse,
according to the degree of support given to their conclusions by their
premisses. Thus, the greater the likelihood, or probability, that its
premisses confer on its conclusion, the greater the merit of an
inductive argument. But that likelihood, even when the premisses are
all true, must fall short of certainty. The theory of induction and
the methods of calculating probabilities are presented in Part 3 of
this book.

The distinction between deductive and inductive arguments is sometimes
drawn in a different way-centering on the relative generality of their
premisses and conclusions. Deductive inferences, it is sometimes said,
move from the general to the particular, while inductive inferences
move from the particular to the general. On analysis, this way of
distinguishing them proves unsatisfactory. ["William Whewell, in The
Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840), put it thus: ". . . in
Deduction we infer particular from general truths; while in Induction
we infer general from particular."]

In that tradition, the classical example of a deductive argument:

All humans are mortal.
Socrates is human.
Therefore Socrates is mortal.

does indeed have a particular conclusion, inferred validly from two
premisses of which the first is a general or universal proposition.
[The term "particular" was used by Whewell, and other logicians in his
tradition, to refer to propositions about a single thing (e.g.,
Socrates) as well as to propositions about some but not necessarily
all members of a given class (e.g., some humans). More recent logical
practice uses the phrase "particular propositions" to refer only to
the latter group. At this point, we are examining Whewell's view and
therefore follow his usage.] It is also true that a very common form
of inductive argument is one in which a general or universal
conclusion is inferred from a group of premisses, all of which are
particular, as in this example:

Socrates is human and mortal.
Xanthippe is human and mortal
Sappho is human and mortal.
Therefore probably all humans are mortal.

But this method of distinguishing between deduction and induction does
not always work. The difficulty lies in the fact that a valid
deductive argument may have universal propositions for its conclusion
as well as for its premisses, as in:

All animals are mortal.
All humans are animals.
Therefore all humans are mortal.

And a valid deductive argument may have particular propositions for
its premisses as well as for its conclusion, as in:

If Socrates is human then Socrates is mortal.
Socrates is human.
Therefore Socrates is mortal.

Moreover, an inductive argument need not rely only on particular
premisses but may have universal (i.e., general) propositions for its
premisses as well for its conclusions, as in:

All cows are mammals and have lungs.
All whales are mammals and have lungs.
All humans are mammals and have lungs.
Therefore probably all mammals have lungs.

And further, an inductive argument may have a particular proposition
as its conclusion, as in:

Hitler was a dictator and was ruthless.
Stalin was a dictator and was ruthless.
Castro is a dictator.
Therefore Castro is probably ruthless.

These counterexamples show that it is not satisfactory to characterize
deductive arguments as those in which particular conclusions are
inferred from general premisses; nor is it satisfactory to
characterize inductive arguments as those in which general conclusions
are inferred from particular premisses.

The fundamental difference between these two kinds of argument lies in
the claims that are made about the relations between premisses and
conclusion. Deductive arguments are those in which a very strict or
close relationship is claimed to hold between the premisses and the
conclusions. If a deductive argument is valid, then, given the truth
of its premisses, its conclusion must be true no matter what else may
be the case.

For example, if it is true that all humans are mortal, and if it is
true that Socrates is a human, then it must be true that Socrates is
mortal no matter what else may be true in the world and no matter what
other premisses are added or other information discovered. If we find
that Socrates is ugly, or that angels are immortal, or that cows give
milk, this finding affects the validity of the argument not one bit;
the conclusion that Socrates is mortal follows from any enlarged set
of premisses with deductive certainty, just as it did from the two
premisses originally given. If an argument is valid, nothing
additional in the world can make it more valid; if a conclusion is
validly inferred from some set of premisses, nothing can be added to
that set to make that conclusion follow more validly or more strictly
or more logically.

But the relation between premisses and conclusion claimed for even the
best inductive argument is much less strict and very different in
kind. Consider the following inductive argument:

Most corporation lawyers are conservatives.
Barbara Shane is a corporation lawyer.
Therefore Barbara Shane is probably a conservative.

This is a pretty good inductive argument; its first premiss is true,
and if its second premiss is also true, its conclusion is more likely
true than false. But in this case, if new premisses are added to the
original pair the resulting argument may be substantially weakened or
(depending on the premisses added) strengthened. Suppose we add the
premiss that

Barbara Shane is an officer of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU).

and also add the (true) premiss that:

Most officers of the ACLU are not conservatives.

Now the conclusion [that Barbara Shane is a conservative] no longer
seems very probable; the original inductive argument has been greatly
weakened by the presence of this additional information about Barbara
Shane. Indeed, if the final premiss were transformed into the
universal proposition:

No officers of the ACLU are conservatives.

the opposite of the original conclusion would now follow deductively,
that is, validly, from the set of premisses affirmed.

On the other hand, if we enlarge the original set of premisses by
adding the following additional premisses instead:

Barbara Shane served in the cabinet of President Ronald Reagan.

and

Barbara Shane has long been an officer of the National Rifle
Association.

then the original conclusion follows with a greater likelihood from
this enlarged set of premisses than it did from the original set.

The strength of the claim about the relation between the premisses and
the conclusion of the argument is the nub of the difference between
deductive and inductive arguments. We characterize the two types of
arguments as follows: A deductive argument is one whose conclusion is
claimed to follow from its premisses with absolute necessity, this
necessity not being a matter of degree and not depending in any way on
whatever else may be the case; in sharp contrast, an inductive
argument is one whose conclusion is claimed to follow from its
premisses only with probability, this probability being a matter of
degree and dependent upon what else may be the case.

Although probability is the essence of the relation between premisses
and conclusion in inductive arguments, such arguments do not always
acknowledge explicitly that their conclusions are inferred only with
some degree of probability. On the other hand, the mere presence of
the word "probability" within an argument is no sure indication that
the argument is inductive, because there are some strictly deductive
arguments about probabilities themselves. Arguments of this kind, in
which the probability of a certain combination of events is deduced
from the probabilities of other events, are discussed in Chapter 14.

SUMMARY OF SECTION 1.6

In this section, we discuss the essential nature of deductive and of
inductive arguments. The core of the difference between deductive and
inductive arguments lies in the strength of the claim that is made
about the relation between the premisses of the argument and its
conclusion.

In deductive arguments, the conclusion is claimed to follow from its
premisses with absolute necessity; in inductive arguments, the
conclusion is claimed to follow from its premisses only with some
degree of probability.

A deductive argument is valid if its premisses do provide conclusive
proof of its conclusion; otherwise it is invalid. But the terms
"validity" and "invalidity" do not apply to inductive arguments, which
are appraised with other terms.

The addition of new premisses may alter the strength of an inductive
argument, but a deductive argument, if valid, cannot be made more
valid or invalid by the addition of any premisses.

Introduction to Logic
by Irving M. Copi, Carl Cohen
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0130749214/qid=1095180612/

> but we really don't know the WHOLE or ALL the parts, so we use partial
> forms of these like observation, theorems, ANOVA, etc.
>
> even modern science is just a faith and follows the philosophy of faith,
> just like all other faiths
>

If that is true and you have established some sort of moral
equivalence of all ways of human reasoning and producing evidence for
anything then why do most scientific theories still seem to have
better evidence than your Theory of God?

Universal skepticism is usually stated in one of two ways.

------------------------------------
[1] - Positive Universal Skepticism:

In its positive form it consists
of the doctrine that man
can know nothing.

This belief can be easily dismissed, because anyone who defends it
finds himself immersed in hopeless absurdities.

In asserting that there is no knowledge, the skeptic is asserting a
knowledge claim—which according to his own theory is impossible.

The universal skeptic wishes to
claim truth for a theory that
denies man's ability to arrive
at truth, and this puts the
skeptic in the unenviable
position of uttering
nonsense.

...he cannot even begin to argue for his position, because the
"possibility of knowledge is presupposed in the very possibility of
argument, in the very possibility of having recourse to reasons." [8]
As Francis Parker explains:

There is such a
thing as knowledge.

The assertion of this proposition is necessarily true if there is to
be any assertion at all, for its contradictory is self-contradictory.

If the assertion
"There is no knowledge"
is true, then it is false

...for that assertion itself purports to be an instance of knowledge.
Thus the only alternative to the recognition of the existence of
knowledge is, as Aristotle said, a return to the vegetative state
where no assertions whatever can be made.

---------------------------------------
[2] - Negative Universal Skepticism:

The second form of universal skepticism
consists of the doctrine that we must
doubt every alleged instance
of knowledge.

Through this negative formulation,

the universal skeptic seeks to avoid
the contradiction of asserting a
knowledge claim while denying
the existence of knowledge.

But the doctrine that we should doubt every knowledge claim
translates_into the positive assertion that man can never attain
certainty—and this version of skepticism fares no better than the
preceding.

We must ask if this "principle of
universal doubt" is itself certain,
or is it open to doubt as well?

If it is known with certainty, at
least one thing is beyond doubt,
which makes the principle false.

If, however, the principle is
open to doubt—i.e., if it
is not certain—then on what
grounds can the skeptic claim
greater plausibility for his
theory than any other?

The logician C. N. Bittle elaborates on this problem:

Skeptics either have valid reasons for their universal doubting, or
they have no valid reasons for it.

If they have valid reasons, they
surely know something that is
valid, and they no longer
are real skeptics.

If they have no valid reasons,
they have no reason to doubt.

In the first case their position is inconsistent, and in the second
case their position is irrational. Whichever way they turn, their
position is untenable.

Why, according to the universal skeptic, should every knowledge claim
be doubted? "Because," he will reply, "man is capable of error, and it
is possible in any given instance that he has committed an error." We
must remember, however, that

"error" (or falsehood) is the
opposite of "truth"—and the
skeptic who appeals to error
implicitly admits that a
proposition cannot be true
and false, correct and
incorrect, at the same
time and in the same
respect.

Thus, whether he likes it or
not, the skeptic must surrender
to the logical principle known
as the Law of Contradiction (which
states that a proposition cannot
be true and false at the same
time and in the same respect).

...therefore, the skeptic must
concede the validity of the Law
of Contradiction and its corollaries:

the Law of Identity (A is A,
a thing is itself) and

the Law of the Excluded Middle
(something is either A or not-A).

...the main source of confusion in the skeptical approach: the
equation of knowledge and certainty with infallibility.

When the skeptic claims that every knowledge claim should be doubted
because man is capable of making mistakes, he is simply pointing out
the obvious: that man is a fallible being.

No one, not even the most resolute
antiskeptic, will deny the point
that man is fallible. (We must
wonder, though, how the skeptic
arrived at this knowledge. Is
he certain that man is fallible?)

The skeptic fails to realize that it is precisely man's fallibility
that generates the need for a science of knowledge. If man were
infallible—if all knowledge were given to him without the slightest
possibility of error—then the need for epistemological guidelines with
which to verify ideas, with which to sort the true from the false,
would not arise. Man requires a method to minimize the possibility of
error, and this is the function of epistemology. A science of
knowledge enables us to discriminate between justified and unjustified
beliefs; and since the beliefs of an infallible being would not stand
in need of verification, he could have no use for epistemological
standards. Where infallibility is involved, concepts such as truth,
falsity, certainty and uncertainty are stripped of any possible
application.

Consider the basic argument of the skeptic. We have seen that
fallibility gives rise to epistemological guidelines used to
distinguish truth from falsity, certainty from uncertainty, and so
forth. The skeptic, however, starts from the same premise—that man is
fallible—and uses it to argue that man can never achieve truth and
certainty. It is because man is capable of error that he must
distinguish truth from falsehood, certainty from doubt. "But," argues
the skeptic, "it is because man is capable of error that he can never
attain truth and certainty."

The skeptic thus turns epistemology
on its head by using the foundation
for a science of knowledge—human
fallibility—as a weapon to argue,
in effect, that a science of
knowledge is impossible
to man.

Even if the universal skeptic could consistently adhere to his
position (which he cannot), his victory would be an empty one. His
claim that man cannot acquire knowledge and certainty reduces to the
claim that man is fallible—and this tells us nothing new, except that
the skeptic prefers to use epistemological terms while totally
ignoring their context.

Since man is not infallible, any
concepts of "knowledge" or "certainty"
that require infallibility are, for
that very reason, inapplicable to man
and totally irrelevant to
human epistemology.

Even if the skeptical position made sense, it would fail to tell us
anything concerning human knowledge and human certainty—which removes
it from the realm of serious consideration.

In summary, we have indicted universal skepticism on two counts:
first, because it cannot be maintained without contradiction and,
second, because it commits what we shall hereafter refer to as

The Infallibilist Fallacy;

the equation of episte-mological
terms, such as "knowledge" and
"certainty," with a standard of
infallibility, which is completely
inappropriate to man and to the
science of knowledge in general.

Atheism: The Case Against God
George H. Smith
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/087975124X/
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.philosophy/msg/b86ea8051203c7f6
----------------------------------------

> we infer, and place faith in status quo inference until we have better
> inference, the caveats are conservative status quos and aggressive
> pursuits of better status quos
>

Now your talking. The Human Zoo/Scientific/Military/Media complex is a
joke and tarnishes he good human with various pathologies and
fetishes. Oh can you smell em'?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Na9-jV_OJI

> if we don't know

LOL how do you know you don't know and how is this not knowing not
some sort of non-science idiot?

> much besides that we exists, forms of the philosophy of
> the self and living would seem to be the priority and therefor religion
> is not that far off and considering a far majority of people on earth
> believe in a religion this rings true to me, at least
>
> this said, it all depends on whether illogic exists
>

David Hume qualified his own Scepticism by pointing out that to live
at all we have perpetually to make choices, decisions, and this forces
us to form judgements about the way things are, whether we like it or
not. Since certainty is not available to us we have to make the best
assessments we can of the realities we face - and this is incompatible
with regarding all alternatives with equal scepticism. Our Scepticism
therefore needs to be, as he put it, mitigated. It is indeed doubtful
whether anyone could live on the basis of complete Scepticism - or, if
they could, whether such a life would be worth living. But this
refutation of Scepticism, if refutation it is, is not a logical
argument.

In practical life we must steer a middle course between demanding a
degree of certainty that we can never have and treating all
possibilities as if they were of equal weight when they are not.

Story of Philosophy
by Bryan Magee
http://www.amazon.com/Story-Philosophy-Bryan-Magee/dp/078947994X

> if we are given a logical realm to develophttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maya_%28illusion%29

> maybe we avoid illogic to the most degree
>
> but if illogic exists in the higher realm, all bets on the faith of
> science are off, and we just live in the day there
>

Your making science into something it's not. The politics of science
can be as bad as any other politics but the method of science isn't
the politics asshole. The method of science is as simple as Sherlock
Holme my dear Watson.

The method of agreement involves ascertaining a "common factor. The
common factor should be one that is present whenever the effect is
present.

The method of difference involves evaluating two cases, one in which
the effect is present, and one where it is absent. If when the effect
is absent, the possible cause "X" is also absent, the test lends
support to "X" as the cause.

The joint method involves combining the first two methods.

The method of concomitant variation involves showing that as one
factor varies, another varies in a corresponding way.

The method of residues involves "subtracting out" those aspects of the
effect whose causes are known and concluding that the rest of the
effect ("the residue") is due to an additional cause.

http://www.ehow.com/how_4857860_identify-mills-methods-of-induction.html

"If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have
only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all
the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given
phenomenon."

"If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs,
and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in
common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the
circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect,
or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the
phenomenon."

"If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one
circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does
not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that
circumstance: the circumstance in which alone the two sets of
instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the
cause, of the phenomenon."

"Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon
varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of
that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of
causation."

"Deduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous
inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of
the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents."

http://www.ehow.com/how_4857860_identify-mills-methods-of-induction.html

-----------------------------------------------

The METHOD OF AGREEMENT involves ascertaining a "common factor. The
common factor should be one that is present whenever the effect is
present.

"If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have
only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all
the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given
phenomenon."

For a property to be a necessary condition, it must always be present
if the effect is present. So, any properties that are absent when the
effect is present cannot be necessary conditions for the effect.

Symbolically, the method of agreement can be represented as:

: A B C D occurs together with w x y z:
A E F G occurs together with w t u v:
------------------:
Therefore A is the cause, the effect, or part of the cause of w.

The METHOD OF DIFFERENCE involves evaluating two cases, one in which
the effect is present, and one where it is absent. If when the effect
is absent, the possible cause "X" is also absent, the test lends
support to "X" as the cause.

"If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs,
and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in
common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the
circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect,
or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the
phenomenon."

A B C D occur together with w x y z
B C D occur together with y w z
------------------
Therefore A is the cause, or the effect, or a part of the cause of x.

The JOINT METHOD involves combining the first two methods.

"If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one
circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does
not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that
circumstance: the circumstance in which alone the two sets of
instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the
cause, of the phenomenon."

Symbolically, the Joint method of agreement and difference can be
represented as:

A B C occur together with x y z
A D E occur together with x y w also B C occur with y z
------------------
Therefore A is the cause, or the effect, or a part of the cause of x.

The METHOD OF CONCOMITANT VARIATION involves showing that as one
factor varies, another varies in a corresponding way.

"Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon
varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of
that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of
causation."

Symbolically, the method of concomitant variation can be represented
as (with ^ representing an increase):

A B C occur together with x y z
A^ B C results in x^ y z.
---------------------
Therefore A and x are causally connected

The METHOD OF RESIDUES involves "subtracting out" those aspects of the
effect whose causes are known and concluding that the rest of the
effect ("the residue") is due to an additional cause.

The method of residues is applied when some of the causes of a
phenomenon have already been tested and verified; we then conclude
that a remaining factor completes the causal account. The method of
residues could almost be referred to as the method of elimination.

"Deduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous
inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of
the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents."

Symbolically, the Method of residues can be represented as:

A B C occur together with x y z
B is known to be the cause of y
C is known to be the cause of z
------------------
Therefore A is the cause x.

http://www.ehow.com/how_4857860_identify-mills-methods-of-induction.html

The science method is just how us dumb apes think naturally but the
politics of science is a crime against nature.

> --
> Dale

[harry k]

On Feb 27, 9:38 pm, Dale <inva...@invalid.invalid> wrote:

> what can you really know besides that you exist?
>
> we don't know much else for sure, so we infer, and place faith in status
> quo inference until we have better inference
>
> science comes from the latin word scientia meaning "knowing"
>

> we can know by deduction, deciphering the parts from the WHOLEhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deductive_reasoning
>
> we can know by induction, getting the whole from ALL the partshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning

>
> but we really don't know the WHOLE or ALL the parts, so we use partial
> forms of these like observation, theorems, ANOVA, etc.
>
> even modern science is just a faith and follows the philosophy of faith,
> just like all other faiths
>
> we infer, and place faith in status quo inference until we have better
> inference, the caveats are conservative status quos and aggressive
> pursuits of better status quos
>
> if we don't know much besides that we exists, forms of the philosophy of
> the self and living would seem to be the priority and therefor religion
> is not that far off and considering a far majority of people on earth
> believe in a religion this rings true to me, at least
>
> this said, it all depends on whether illogic exists
>

> if we are given a logical realm to develophttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maya_%28illusion%29

> maybe we avoid illogic to the most degree
>
> but if illogic exists in the higher realm, all bets on the faith of
> science are off, and we just live in the day there
>
> --
> Dale

Science studies known FACTS to arrive at conclusions. Those
conclusions are always subjec to change as new
facts are discovered.

Your juvenile reasoning boils down to: "It is only an inference that
my coffee cup will hit th floor if I knock it off the table"
"faith" has zero to do with science.

Harry K

[Bobbie Sellers]

On 02/28/2013 06:08 AM, MarkA wrote:
> On Thu, 28 Feb 2013 00:38:24 -0500, Dale wrote:
>

snip

>> even modern science is just a faith and follows the philosophy of faith,
>> just like all other faiths

The faith is in the validity of the scientific method.
Not in any particular aspect of science or any scientist.
snip

>>
>> this said, it all depends on whether illogic exists
>>

Oh illogical thinking exists but in human persons not
in the rest of the universe.

>> but if illogic exists in the higher realm, all bets on the faith of
>> science are off, and we just live in the day there

What higher realm? The facts of the Universe, the imaginary
numbers and strange constants do not have to conform to the rules
of human logic. They simply are givens, discovered by science in
its search for knowledge.

If there was/is a "higher" realm as posited by theologians
and other meta-physicists, we should not expect it to conform to
the logic of mere humans with a mere 4 dimensions to exist in and
mere 3 dimensions to move around in. After all the best bet is
that about 11 dimensions are involved in producing the 4 dimensional
universe we investigate with science and otherwise.

snip

You can tell by the cross-posting that a Troll is at
work in this nonsensical attack on human logic and science.
Granted human logic are not much but better than any religion
at explaining the place we find ourselves in.

bliss - hag of Eris, minion of Maya

[chelloveck]

On 2/27/2013 11:38 PM, Dale wrote:
> what can you really know besides that you exist?

How do you know you exist? Because likewise the evidence for "you" is
"you" being presented as co-existing in that very same reality with
everything else. "Reality" is the one exhibited in external experience.
Unlike inconsistent dreams, reality hangs together: It follows its own
rules rather than ours (is objective); and is interpersonal (real).
Perceptual manifestations of the same Eiffel Tower are available to each
of us that empirically advances to its location ("Yes, I perceive /
touch it too").

Which is to say, contrary to popular belief, the evidence for reality
does not depend upon a duplicate of itself (either similar or radically
different) inferred as being outside the then "representations" of
consciousness. If we had to wait for that "invisible world" to be
directly confirmed it would be hopeless, since even the arrival of death
as the surest means of "getting outside ourselves" in turn eliminates us
as observers. And would simply verify (even if the contradiction was
possible) that this supposed "mind-independent" existence was indeed
just the absence of everything, lacking such presented "appearances" as
it exists in itself (at least, if one is an anti-afterlife materialist).

As for science, it is a tool, not humanity's master:

"Science is a wonderful thing in its place. Because science is so
successful in its own territory, however, scientists and their allied
philosophers sometimes get bemused by dreams of world conquest. Paul
Feyerabend put it best: 'Scientists are not content with running their
own playpens in accordance with what they regard as the rules of the
scientific method, they want to universalize those rules, they want them
to become part of society at large, and they use every means at their
disposal--argument, propaganda, pressure tactics, intimidation,
lobbying--to achieve their aims.' Samuel Johnson gave the best answer to
this absurd imperialism. 'A cow is a very good animal in the field; but
we turn her out of a garden.'" PHILIP E. JOHNSON

[Immortalist]

On Feb 28, 9:32 am, chelloveck <rm...@dcemail.com> wrote:
> On 2/27/2013 11:38 PM, Dale wrote:
>
> > what can you really know besides that you exist?
>
> How do you know you exist? Because likewise the evidence for "you" is
> "you" being presented as co-existing in that very same reality with
> everything else.

Do you mean directly presented of by a series of presentations in the
form of representations passing the patterns between various regions
of the brain?

The Cogito and its discontents...

Your trying to create a foundationalist philosophy based on a single,
undeniable truth which you seem to imply is fixed and assured.

Your first principle that "we cannot deny that something exists
without first accepting that thing exists to deny, i.e. without
contradiction" depends upon a logical structure which is really a
second postulate.

Your unjustifiably claiming that the capacity to judge correctly, to
distinguish the true from the false and to determine what is
contradictory or non-contradictory cannot be mistaken or has no chance
for error, and this non-contradictory identification remains
theoretical, but theoretically it is the best theory, that is all.

----------------------

Cogito, Ergo Sum (The Circle Game) Descartes

THE CIRCLE GAME: "Descartes was a philosophical disaster!" Attacking
Descate's Cogito from within Descartes's own logical structure rather
than from a modern context.

Examining Descartes's philosophy from within its own logical
structure, we see that Descartes is unable to escape the necessity of
an observer in his attempt to find a foundation for his philosophy. As
I will show, he grounds his philosophy on the postulates of his
ability to discern truth from fiction and his own existence. Descartes
foundationalist philosophy fails, as a result, because neither the
infallibility and integrity of the observer nor the observer's
existence are certain.

Descartes attempts to create a foundationalist philosophy based on a
single, undeniable truth which he knows to be "fixed and assured". He
takes "I think, therefore I am" "as the first principle of the
philosophy I was seeking", believing that this is the only truth which
is necessary to found a philosophy. His logical structure , however,
relies on a second postulate. He claims that "the capacity to judge
correctly and to distinguish the true from the false is naturally
equal in all men". This postulate is more fundamental to his logical
structure than the cogito because without it, he cannot escape the
skepticism of his foundationalist structure.

Unpacking the significance of this postulate is somewhat of a
metaphysical thicket, but the effort is well rewarded. There is no
question that by thinking "I think, therefore I am", Descartes is
thinking. Beyond the statement of his existence, however, Descartes
cannot form any other conclusion unless he has the ability to discern
the truth of a thought-except the conclusion that he is, there is no
method to discern a true thought from a thought implanted into his
head by an other being unless he can make the distinction himself. If
he is to make any progress in his philosophy, he must rely on this
second postulate.

Even with this condition, Descartes's philosophy remains unstable. His
first postulate, the cogito, fails because it depends on the integrity
of the subject, the ego. Unlike a similar postulate of mathematics,
such as x+0=x, which does not depend on the integrity of the observer
in order to be true, Descartes's postulate is singularly tied to the
subject because the subject, the "I", is an integral part of the
statement. In the postulate, the "I" must be distinct since the cogito
makes no claims about the existence of anything outside the mind.
Descartes admits, however, that the mind is subject to failings caused
by the body:

"the mind depends so much on the temperament and on the disposition of
the organs of the body, that if it is possible to find some means of
rendering men as a whole wiser and more dexterous than they have been
hitherto, I believe it must be sought in medicine".

Furthermore, the mind cannot be sure of even its own state. Descartes
admits that "there are no conclusive signs by means of which one can
distinguish clearly between being awake and being asleep". Most
significantly, however, Descartes requires the fallibility of his mind
in order to prove the existence of God. Within his proof, Descartes
gives as an antecedent to his argument the observation that "my being
was not completely perfect" when it was created. But the infallible
ability to discern truth is, by nature of its indisputeability, a form
of perfection. He appears to be directly contradicting his second
postulate, the ability to discern truth from fiction. This logical
breakdown within Descartes's argument hints at a much greater problem,
however.

Descartes has a problem of authorship. That he exists and that he
conceives of his existence are synonymous according to the cogito
postulate. Furthermore, the existence of anything outside of his mind
depends on his own existence. He is assured of the existence of the
rest of the Universe by his perception of thinking of it. If the
observer stops observing himself, he ceases to exist, however. Thus
the reality of the Universe within Descartes's system depends on his
ability to conceive of it, which in turn requires that he exist. This
introduces a rather interesting problem in to his philosophy.

By the time he has completed his proof of the existence of God,
Descartes concludes that his own existence is dependent of the
existence of God. Because he creates a foundationalist philosophy,
Descartes must believe that the laws of the Universe are deriveable
from the cogito postulate. After attempting to establish the existence
of God, however, he admits that "I have observed certain laws which
God has so established in nature and of which he has impressed such
notions in our souls". According to his postulates, all that is in
Descartes's mind is the result of the fact that he thinks, yet here he
seems to be adding yet another subject to the set of actors upon which
his philosophy rests. The validity of the claims he has already made
are again questioned by further doubt over the author of existence:

"And who can give me the assurance that this God has not arranged that
there should be no earth, no heaven, no extended body, no figure, no
magnitude, or place, and that nevertheless I should have the
perception of all these things, and the persuasion that they do not
exist other than as I see them?"

Clearly, Descartes would not want to add dependency on a second
subject to his philosophy but he nonetheless accepts the notion that
not all existence can be attributed to his thoughts alone. God, he
qualifies, must also have authorship:

"if the objective reality of any one of my ideas is such that I know
clearly that it is not within me, either formally or eminently, and
that consequently I cannot myself be its cause, it follows necessarily
from this that I am not alone in the world, but that there is besides
some other being who exists, and who is the cause of this idea."

It is illogical that such a being, whose existence in the Universe is
dependent on the thoughts and observations of an observer could also
be the author of the same observer's thoughts. Surely Descartes
realized this but he seems to ignore its significance. He declares
"God is necessarily the author of my existence" and so falls into a
circular dependency, where his own existence is dependent on a God
whose existence in the Universe is dependent on Descartes's ability to
conceive of God and to determine the truth of such a perception.
Because the observer is thus permanently trapped within Descartes's
web of logic, the entire foundation of the structure is unsound.

With the foundation of Descartes carefully laid structure crumbling in
front of close examination, it appears, a philosophical failure. Such
an evaluation is made strong if it comes from within the logical
structure that Descartes presents. The job is easy, however, because
Descartes establishes such a dependent, recursive structure that his
entire fabrication falls under its own twisted weight.

http://www.stanford.edu/~bwark/papers/circle_game.html

> "Reality" is the one exhibited in external experience.
> Unlike inconsistent dreams, reality hangs together: It follows its own
> rules rather than ours (is objective); and is interpersonal (real).

You are asking us to accept by faith based only on the giveness of
sense data, in that you claim if we cannot control the incoming data
it is therefore real?

-------------------------

The Myth of the Given

Many empiricists claim that there is a sort of knowledge that is
directly presented to our consciousness (by sense data) and call this
knowledge the given. The given, to which each of us has privileged
access, presupposes no learning and no forming of associations, but
provides the foundation for empirical knowledge. It offers the
ultimate court of appeal for all our knowledge claims about the world.
All other forms of knowledge are derived from the given according to
certain rules.Sellars labels the alleged existence of such know-ledge
as “the myth of the given.”

The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as
that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that
episode or state, we are placing it in the logical space of reasons,
of justifying and being able to justify what one says. (EPM, 169)

Once it is acknowledged that the senses per se grasp no facts, that
all knowledge that something is such-and-so (all “subsumption of
particulars under universals”) presupposes learning, concept
formation, and even symbolic representation, it follows that “…
instead of coming to have a concept of something because we have
noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to notice a sort of
thing is already to have the concept of that sort of thing, and cannot
account for it.”

http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405106795_chunk_g978140510679514_ss1-218
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sellars/

> Perceptual manifestations of the same Eiffel Tower are available to each
> of us that empirically advances to its location ("Yes, I perceive /
> touch it too").
>

The Rooster might have accused you of trying to disprove the theory of
solipsism which is equivalent to trying to prove a negative.

> Which is to say, contrary to popular belief, the evidence for reality
> does not depend upon a duplicate of itself (either similar or radically
> different) inferred as being outside the then "representations" of
> consciousness.

You forgot to provide a way to gather evidence for reality. Sense
experience is probably regulated by events in the external world. When
does this representation become not a representational relay of
incoming information?

> If we had to wait for that "invisible world" to be
> directly confirmed it would be hopeless, since even the arrival of death
> as the surest means of "getting outside ourselves" in turn eliminates us
> as observers. And would simply verify (even if the contradiction was
> possible) that this supposed "mind-independent" existence was indeed
> just the absence of everything, lacking such presented "appearances" as
> it exists in itself (at least, if one is an anti-afterlife materialist).
>
> As for science, it is a tool, not humanity's master:
>

Science method is a mapping of available orientation strategies onto a
pre wired human nature, not the other way around.

> "Science is a wonderful thing in its place. Because science is so
> successful in its own territory, however, scientists and their allied
> philosophers sometimes get bemused by dreams of world conquest. Paul
> Feyerabend put it best: 'Scientists are not content with running their
> own playpens in accordance with what they regard as the rules of the
> scientific method, they want to universalize those rules, they want them
> to become part of society at large, and they use every means at their
> disposal--argument, propaganda, pressure tactics, intimidation,
> lobbying--to achieve their aims.' Samuel Johnson gave the best answer to
> this absurd imperialism. 'A cow is a very good animal in the field; but
> we turn her out of a garden.'" PHILIP E. JOHNSON

Poppycock

[Ben Kaufman]

On Thu, 28 Feb 2013 00:38:24 -0500, Dale <inv...@invalid.invalid> wrote:

>what can you really know besides that you exist?

<SNIP>

The internet would not exist without science, or did you use a ouija board to
type that?.

[Dale]

On 02/28/2013 10:23 AM, Immortalist wrote:
> I mean you seem to be claiming that you can produce evidence that you
> exist.

I have conscious

--
Dale

[Dale]

On 02/28/2013 12:32 PM, chelloveck wrote:
> How do you know you exist?

[Dale]

everything is existential, when you dream you are experiencing another
reality with another state of conscious

unless you want to add an imaginary axis and an illogical axis to the 4
dimensions of spacetime, etc., illogical might be more fitting than
imaginary since everything is existential not imaginary or non-existential

--
Dale

[Dale]

[Dale]

On 02/28/2013 12:09 PM, harry k wrote:
> Science studies known FACTS to arrive at conclusions. Those
> conclusions are always subjec to change as new
> facts are discovered.

facts are not derived by inference

inference leads to hypotheses, theories and more supporting inference

facts can only come from PURE deduction and induction which only God does

--
Dale

[Dale]

On 02/28/2013 09:08 AM, MarkA wrote:
> However, until we come up with something better, we are stuck using the
> tools we have.

I agree, but I don't think we should leave out logical visions from
religion (living good)

--
Dale

[Dale]

could have equally resulted from a logical vision from religion (living
good)

--
Dale

[Dale]

On 02/28/2013 01:36 PM, Ben Kaufman wrote:

do you think that nothing went on before Descartes? How about the pyramids?

--
Dale

[sbalneav]

In alt.atheism Dale <inv...@invalid.invalid> wrote:

Can you prove that to me? To me, you just look like a philosophical zombie.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

--
__ _ | The question is not, Can they reason?
(_ |_) | nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?
__)|_) | -- Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) on animal rights

[sbalneav]

In alt.atheism Dale <inv...@invalid.invalid> wrote:

No.

Facts come from OBSERVATION.

--
__ _ | Our species needs, and deserves, a citizenry with minds wide
(_ |_) | awake and a basic understanding of how the world works.
__)|_) | -- Carl Sagan

[casey]

On Mar 1, 7:16 am, Dale <inva...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> On 02/28/2013 02:49 PM, Dale wrote:
>
> > On 02/28/2013 10:23 AM, Immortalist wrote:
> >> I mean you seem to be claiming that you can produce evidence that you
> >> exist.
>
> > I have conscious
>
> everything is existential, when you dream you are experiencing another
> reality with another state of conscious

There is only one reality and it includes physical brains.
The state of reality doesn't change the state of your brain does.
We have deep sleep states, dream states and waking states.



> Dale
>
>

[Brian E. Clark]

In article <kgoia6$t8u$1...@dont-email.me>,
sbal...@alburg.net says...

> > I have conscious
>
> Can you prove that to me? To me, you just look like a philosophical zombie.

...the zombie of Descartes, to be precise. :)

--
-----------
Brian E. Clark

[Dale]

On 02/28/2013 04:31 PM, sbalneav wrote:
> In alt.atheism Dale <inv...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
>> On 02/28/2013 12:09 PM, harry k wrote:
>>> Science studies known FACTS to arrive at conclusions. Those
>>> conclusions are always subjec to change as new
>>> facts are discovered.
>>
>> facts are not derived by inference
>>
>> inference leads to hypotheses, theories and more supporting inference
>>
>> facts can only come from PURE deduction and induction which only God does
>
> No.
>
> Facts come from OBSERVATION.
>

observation can be an hallucination

--
Dale

[Virgil]

In article <6cld3d....@news.alt.net>,

Dale <inv...@invalid.invalid> wrote:

> On 02/28/2013 04:31 PM, sbalneav wrote:
> > In alt.atheism Dale <inv...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> >> On 02/28/2013 12:09 PM, harry k wrote:
> >>> Science studies known FACTS to arrive at conclusions. Those
> >>> conclusions are always subjec to change as new
> >>> facts are discovered.
> >>
> >> facts are not derived by inference
> >>
> >> inference leads to hypotheses, theories and more supporting inference
> >>
> >> facts can only come from PURE deduction and induction which only God does
> >
> > No.
> >
> > Facts come from OBSERVATION.
> >
>
> observation can be an hallucination

One can be, but enough observations, all in agreement, are very unlikely
to be.

And the point of science is that any alleged observation should be
repeatable, and usually repeated, to be persuasive.
--

[chelloveck]

On 2/28/2013 12:20 PM, Immortalist wrote:
> On Feb 28, 9:32 am, chelloveck <rm...@dcemail.com> wrote:
>> On 2/27/2013 11:38 PM, Dale wrote:
>>
>>> what can you really know besides that you exist?
>>
>> How do you know you exist? Because likewise the evidence for "you" is
>> "you" being presented as co-existing in that very same reality with
>> everything else.
>
> Do you mean directly presented of by a series of presentations in the
> form of representations passing the patterns between various regions
> of the brain?
>
> The Cogito and its discontents...
>
> Your trying to create a foundationalist philosophy based on a single,
> undeniable truth which you seem to imply is fixed and assured.
>
> Your first principle that "we cannot deny that something exists
> without first accepting that thing exists to deny, i.e. without
> contradiction" depends upon a logical structure which is really a
> second postulate.
>
> Your unjustifiably claiming that the capacity to judge correctly

What are you responding to? You have expressed doubt that you perceive
and think anything, or have any accurate judgements about what you are
perceiving and thinking. Another jackass who cuts his own legs off as
soon he as he gets out of the starting gate. Like a recluse who has
spent his whole life confined to a dark room, then outlandishly proceeds
to tell everyone else "what the world is like" or "what's going on". You
confess you have no evidence of anything, no source for knowledge, no
foundation, yet proceed to erect an elaborate castle of linguistic
babble accordingly resting on not even sand. At least that other one,
Dale, believes he is having a bloody dream. Please do not continue to
engage in the cognitive dissonance of believing that your judgements are
invalid, while at the same time acting with confidence that there are
usenet posts to reply to. Simply remember that you are essentially
equivalent to a deceased person, or one who is brain-dead. IOW, you
perceive and think nothing, there are actually no direct or indirect
presentations of anyone for you to annoy with sprawling, shanty-town
frameworks of self-negating gibberish.

[chelloveck]

On 2/28/2013 2:16 PM, Dale wrote:
> On 02/28/2013 02:50 PM, Dale wrote:
>> On 02/28/2013 12:32 PM, chelloveck wrote:
>>> How do you know you exist?
>>
>> I have conscious
>>
>
> everything is existential, when you dream you are experiencing another
> reality with another state of conscious

How many times does it have to be repeated? Reality hangs together, it
is lawful. A bloody dream is inconsistent and chaotic; sometimes you can
even willfully control the events, which you cannot do with Reality.
Free yourself from the fetish of both "invisible gods" and "invisible
worlds", both part of the silly tradition that "external" is some other
"place" besides your and everyone else's interpersonal, external
perceptions. This centuries-long pretense that the immediate environment
which you're actually living in is only an illusionary duplicate of a
"real world" in a metaphysical substance, mumbo-jumbo version of the
literal "outside" exhibited in every waking moment.

[Dale]

On 02/28/2013 06:55 PM, Virgil wrote:
> One can be, but enough observations, all in agreement, are very unlikely
> to be.

a logical fallacy, argument from incredulity

face it, science is just a sophisticated form of inference

--
Dale

[Dale]

[Immortalist]

This response shows your ignorance of logic and rhetoric. Can you show
me anywhere where I did what you claim or is this accusitory style
supposed to be what works for you when you abuse other more ignorant
people in your groups?

[Arindam Banerjee]

On Mar 1, 1:13 pm, chelloveck <rm...@dcemail.com> wrote:
> On 2/28/2013 2:16 PM, Dale wrote:
>
> > On 02/28/2013 02:50 PM, Dale wrote:
> >> On 02/28/2013 12:32 PM, chelloveck wrote:
> >>> How do you know you exist?
>
> >> I have conscious
>
> > everything is existential, when you dream you are experiencing another
> > reality with another state of conscious
>
> How many times does it have to be repeated? Reality hangs together, it
> is lawful.

It hangs together by laws physical and social, yes. But our knowledge
of such laws is never quite right or complete, so reality has its
severe limitations that imagination of various sorts seeks to
overcome.

> A bloody dream is inconsistent and chaotic; sometimes you can
> even willfully control the events, which you cannot do with Reality.
> Free yourself from the fetish of both "invisible gods" and "invisible
> worlds",

A bad idea, that will make reality even more intolerable as reality
will not encompass imagination save of the crude commercial kind; and
cut down on hope and inspiration.

> both part of the silly tradition that "external" is some other
> "place" besides your and everyone else's interpersonal, external
> perceptions.

External relates to the unknown, and death is the key to same.
Overcome the mystery of death, what if anything happens after as
opposed to blankness, and then reality will hang together
constructively. Since the mystery of death remains, the tradition of
other planes of existence also remains.

This centuries-long pretense that the immediate environment
> which you're actually living in is only an illusionary duplicate of a
> "real world" in a metaphysical substance, mumbo-jumbo version of the
> literal "outside" exhibited in every waking moment.

Well-expressed; but unless the mystery of death is satisfactorily
solved, the reason for existence made clear, metaphysical speculations
about superior or inferior existences will remain, and continue to be,
a source for understanding the deepest truths about ourselves and our
place in the universe.

Cheers,
Arindam Banerjee

[chelloveck]

LOL, so now something is "given", after all? What the hell is "reason
and rhetoric" if experience of them can be doubted? What value are your
judgements about their validity if your inferences are suspect that
there really is empirical or perceptual evidence for there being
activities and formulas for "proper" thinking and conclusion outputting?
Dumbass anti-foundationalists and eliminativists still believing that
their own piles of #### will levitate on their own after they yank the
"old school" supporting structure from under it! Hahahahaha...

[Arindam Banerjee]

On Mar 1, 10:55 am, Virgil <vir...@ligriv.com> wrote:
> In article <6cld3d.6p7.1...@news.alt.net>,

>
>
>
>
>
>  Dale <inva...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> > On 02/28/2013 04:31 PM, sbalneav wrote:

> > > In alt.atheism Dale <inva...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> > >> On 02/28/2013 12:09 PM, harry k wrote:
> > >>> Science studies known FACTS to arrive at conclusions.  Those
> > >>> conclusions are always subjec to change as new
> > >>> facts are discovered.
>
> > >> facts are not derived by inference
>
> > >> inference leads to hypotheses, theories and more supporting inference
>
> > >> facts can only come from PURE deduction and induction which only God does
>
> > > No.
>
> > > Facts come from OBSERVATION.
>
> > observation can be an hallucination
>
> One can be, but enough observations, all in agreement, are very unlikely
> to be.
>
> And the point of science is that any alleged observation should be
> repeatable, and usually repeated, to be persuasive.

This is invalid when the observers are all corrupt or blindly making
the same mistake.
Cheers,
Arindam Banerjee

[Ben Kaufman]

Except it couldn't. Religion can't build anything tangible, such as planes or
buildings, only motivate people to fly the planes into the buildings.

[Ben Kaufman]

The pyramids were built with science developed over the centuries of pryamid
building.

[Arindam Banerjee]

On Feb 28, 4:38 pm, Dale <inva...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> what can you really know besides that you exist?

You need to eat and think also maybe.

[Immortalist]

That's like asking what worth could there possibly be to life if I
cannot determine the exact time and way that I will die. Like asking
what worth can be derived from betting a million dollars on the flip a
coin since not knowing the outcome, heads or tails, ensures that I
will lose?

So your claiming that it is impossible to make reliable judgments
about anything if we are not certain of everything. Even if something
is currently un-determinable your suggesting that it is impossible for
any judgements even based upon observations and explanations. Can you
provide any examples?

> What value are your
> judgements about their validity if your inferences are suspect that
> there really is empirical or perceptual evidence for there being
> activities and formulas for "proper" thinking and conclusion outputting?

Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/

C) New Knowledge as Undefeated Justification:
A Revisionist Alternative to the Skeptic
and the Epistemist

Let us reflect on the dispute between the skeptic and the epistemist.
The skeptic has proven that our perceptual beliefs and corrigible
beliefs generally are not completely justified in any way that
guarantees the truth of those beliefs and excludes all chance of
error. Must we concede the day to the skeptic? The arguments_of the
skeptic are formidable. What have we learned from her? We have learned
that all justification runs some risk of error. Any justification for
what we believe is fallible. When we seek a justification for what we
believe, the best we can find will inevitably fall short of
guaranteeing the truth of what we believe. Justification can aim at
truth but cannot eliminate the risk of error. If our search for
knowledge is the quest for complete justification and a guarantee of
truth, we must admit our ignorance and concede the day to the skeptic.
There is another way, however.

We can revise our conception of knowledge. We may redefine knowledge
without committing the redefinist fallacy by admitting that our new
conception is a revision. We can construct a new conception of
knowledge and make this new knowledge the object of our philosophical
quest. How can we do this? We begin by admitting that our
justification for what we believe remains fallibIe and falls short of
a complete justification. We continue by noting that the fallible
justification we do have tor our beliefs, the sort appealed to by the
internalist, for example, may prove a trustworthy and reliable guide
to truth. Such justification may lead us to truth without being based
on any false premise or assumption. These reflections show us how to
revise our conception of knowledge. The revisionist takes fallible
justification rather than complete justification as the basis of
knowledge, and affirms that when fallible justification for our
beliefs does not depend on error and leads us to truth, we attain a
new kind of knowledge. This kind of knowledge based on fallible
justification becomes the legitimate object of philosophical and
scientific inquiry. In this way, revisionism transcends epistemism and
skepticism, combining the insights of both. We have not been able to
prove the skeptical hypotheses to be false. We believe, however, that
those hypotheses are fanciful, false constructions of the imagination,
rather than a truthful account of our world. We believe that our
perceptual beliefs about the objects we see, hear, and touch inform us
in a trustworthy way about the truth of those objects. We believe,
therefore, that beliefs that are justified by our internal standards
of justification, though those standards be fallible guides to truth,
are also externally connected with truth in a trustworthy and reliable
manner. We believe all this.

Suppose, in fact, that our fallible internal justification for our
perceptual beliefs and other corrigible beliefs does not rest on error
but instead leads us to truth in some trustworthy and reliable manner,
as the externalist maintains. Then a revised conception of knowledge
lies shining before us. One component is fallibilism, which we take
from the skeptic. Another component is internal justification, which
we take from the epistemist and the internalist. The final component,
which we take from the epistemist and the externalist, is that of
justification that is undefeated by error and that connects us with
truth in a trustworthy and reliable manner. It is easy to assemble the
components, as we have seen, to obtain a revised conception of
knowledge. Undefeated fallible justification is the new knowledge that
we seek.

It is the object of our inquiry. We cannot prove, as the skeptic has
taught us, that our justification is undefeated by error. We have
learned from her that some forms of error are invincible and beyond
detection. If some skeptical hypothesis of invincible deception is
true, then our justification is defeated and our perceptual beliefs
are errors. In that case, our situation is epistemically desperate,
and we must remain ignorant. If, however, we are right in thinking
that our perceptual beliefs will lead us to truth in a trustworthy
manner, as our internal standards of justification tell us, then our
fallible justification is undefeated, and we have new knowledge, If
there is an appropriate match between our beliefs about ourselves and
our perceptual relation to the external world, then internal
justification matches external justification, fallible justification
goes undefeated, and we obtain a new kind of knowledge.

We must, in conclusion, thank the skeptic for undermining our
dogmatism and our arrogance. She has shown us our fallibility. We may,
nevertheless, seek reasoning and justification that lead us to truth
in a reliable manner. The nobility of the goal of truth sustains the
undertaking. We enoble ourselves in seeking truth, even when we
realize that we may fail to obtain that noble objective. If the
justification we find does not rest on error and enables us to reach
the truth, we shall have attained our revised kind of knowledge. This
new knowledge is based on a fallible quest for truth without any
guarantee of sucess; we may attain it, though we cannot prove that we
will. To the skeptic who asks for proof that we shall succeed, we must
put our hands over our mouths in silence. We have no proof. We may,
however, invite her to join our quest for truth and the new kind of
knowledge we seek. Once we admit to the skeptic that she is right and
we have no guarantee of success, she, being a woman of insight and
character, who has, moreover, freed us of our dogmatism and arrogance,
may join as a sympathetic friend in our noble undertaking. We may say
to her, "Let us reason further with one another to find some fallible
justificafion to lead us to the truth in what interests us, concerning
freedom, mind, God and morals," and she, our brilliant adversary, will
become a friend to our philosophical undertaking. The modesty
resulting from a recognition of our own fallibility becomes us, opens
the road to inquiry and removes the roadblocks to understanding.
Revisionism combines the insights of skepticism and epistemism in
harmony.

Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/

> Dumbass anti-foundationalists and eliminativists still believing that

> their own piles of #### will levitate on their own ...

Coherence theory: "An empirical belief is realatively true if and only
if it coheres with a system of other beliefs, which together form a
comprehensive account of reality."

Stephen J. Gould, the Harvard Paleontologist, offers this definition:
In science, "fact" can only mean "confirmed to such a degree that it
would be perverse to withhold provisional assent."

Succesfully Competitive Inductive Cogency:
Depends upon the evidential and conceptual ("context") of reasoning.
An inductive argument from evidence to hypothesis is inductively
cogent if and only if the hypothesis is that hypothesis which, of all
the competing hypothesis, has the greatest probability of being true
on the basis of the evidence. Thus, whether it is reasonable to accept
a hypothesis as true, if the statements of evidence are true, is
determined by whether that hypothesis is the most probable, on the
evidence, of all those with which it competes.

Philosophical Problems and Arguments : An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0872201244/104-9938841-0500749

Epistemologists find a number of problems with finding an meta-
justification standard for justifying emperical beliefs.

http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm

1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose
justification does not depend on that of any further emperical
beliefs.

2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a
reason why it is likely to be true.

3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive
possession of such a reason.

4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he
believes with justification the premises from which it follows that
the belief is likely to be true.

5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least
one empirical premise.

6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting 1.

7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs including completely
justified sceptical beliefs.

The 7 propositions seem to eliminate the possibility of emperical
justification of any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to
this untruthfullness of human beliefs in three ways which deal with
the apparent "regress" of one belief depending upon another which
depends upon another and so on:

If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:

(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs

(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)

(3) circle back upon itself in some way.

If we think about justification moving in a linear direction, with one
proposition becomeing the justification for another we run into an
viscious regress that doesnt seem to end. It can be open ended and go
on forever or it can become circular where each support depending on
the last leads to the same supports over time. This is how scepticism
defeated foundationalism. It seems that all we were left with a hope
for escape from this dilemma of no certain knowledge is a modified
version of the circular argument. Instead of a linear regress of
justifiactions we seek a nonlinear context of groups of evidences or
propositions emerging more evidence than other means of gaining
supports from evidences and propositions. Though we close the circle,
different circlular arguments, corespond to, predict, and manilulate,
events in the world, than other such arguments. If we have a
competition amoungst such partial certainties, we gain at least the
best knowledge we can find.

................................

> after they yank the
> "old school" supporting structure from under it! Hahahahaha
>

In science, a theory is an explanation. Evolution is a theory, just
like gravitation. Gravity is not a law of nature but an explanation of
observations. If you drop something, it's going to fall. That's an
observation: unsupported things fall. But you explain that observation
with the theory of gravity, which is that the mass of what whatever it
is you dropped, a pencil or a pen or something, is attracted by the
mass...it's really a theory of gravity? But remember, a theory is an
explanation.

Can you give an example of this old school sporting structure?

Foundationalism is any theory in epistemology (typically, theories of
justification, but also of knowledge) that holds that beliefs are
justified (known, etc.) based on what are called basic beliefs (also
commonly called foundational beliefs). Basic beliefs are beliefs that
give justificatory support to other beliefs, and more derivative
beliefs are based on those more basic beliefs. The basic beliefs are
said to be self-justifying or self-evident, that is, they are
justified, although not justified by other beliefs. Typically and
historically, foundationalists have held either that basic beliefs are
justified by mental events or states, such as experiences, that do not
constitute beliefs (these are called nondoxastic mental states), or
that they simply are not the type of thing that can be (or needs to
be) justified.

Hence, generally, a foundationalist might offer the following theory
of justification:

A belief is epistemically justified if and only if (1) it is justified
by a basic belief or beliefs, or (2) it is justified by a chain of
beliefs that is supported by a basic belief or beliefs, and on which
all the others are ultimately based.

A basic belief, on the other hand, does not require justification
because it is a different kind of belief than a non-foundational one.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundationalism

Anti-foundationalism is a term applied to any philosophy which rejects
a foundationalist approach, i.e. an anti-foundationalist is one who
does not believe that there is some fundamental belief or principle
which is the basic ground or foundation of inquiry and knowledge. Anti-
foundationalists use logical or historical/genealogical attacks on
foundational concepts (see especially Nietzsche and Foucault), often
coupled with alternative methods for justifying and forwarding
intellectual inquiry, such as the pragmatic subordination of knowledge
to practical action or Otto Neurath's boat metaphor, according to
which human knowledge is like a ship at sea which can never be
dismantled and rebuilt, but rather must be repaired by workmen who, in
order to replace any one plank, have to stand on planks which
themselves may later have to be replaced.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-foundationalism

http://www.iscid.org/encyclopedia/Foundationalism

................................

> ... Hahahahaha
>

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6BKZ02L9erQ

[MarkA]

On Thu, 28 Feb 2013 17:35:45 -0500, Brian E. Clark wrote:

> In article <kgoia6$t8u$1...@dont-email.me>, sbal...@alburg.net says...
>
>> > I have conscious
>>
>> Can you prove that to me? To me, you just look like a philosophical
>> zombie.
>
> ...the zombie of Descartes, to be precise. :)

I think, therefore, I think I am?

--
MarkA
Keeper of Things Put There Only Just The Night Before
About eight o'clock

[Dale]

religion focuses on issue of the psyche and living good

--
Dale

[Dale]

then you admit that science did not start with Descartes or Newton and
passed theories should be considered today?

--
Dale

[Barry OGrady]

On Fri, 01 Mar 2013 17:28:32 -0500, Dale <inv...@invalid.invalid>

wrote:

>On 03/01/2013 01:39 AM, Ben Kaufman wrote:
>> On Thu, 28 Feb 2013 15:49:05 -0500, Dale <inv...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
>>
>>> On 02/28/2013 01:36 PM, Ben Kaufman wrote:
>>>> On Thu, 28 Feb 2013 00:38:24 -0500, Dale <inv...@invalid.invalid>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> what can you really know besides that you exist?
>>>> <SNIP>
>>>>
>>>> The internet would not exist without science, or did you use a ouija
>>>> board to type that?.
>>>>
>>>
>>> could have equally resulted from a logical vision from religion (living
>>> good)
>>
>> Except it couldn't. Religion can't build anything tangible, such as planes or
>> buildings, only motivate people to fly the planes into the buildings.
>>
>
>religion focuses on issue of the psyche and living good

Religion focuses on controling people and getting their money.

>--
>Dale

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Gladys says first life has nothing to do with evolution
and that
first life is the very basis of evolution

[A Really Really Large Number]

On Mar 1, 3:46 pm, Barry OGrady <athe...@hotmail.com.au> wrote:


> Religion focuses on controling people and getting their money.

As long as the religion is real.
Sacrifice to obtain.

[Virgil]

In article <6cnvm8....@news.alt.net>,

That much knowledge, whether garnered by science or ortherwise, has been
lost, is well known. Present day science is a tried and true method of
gathering new knowledge, and in the process may improve itself as method
of gathering new knowledge.
--

[A Really Really Large Number]

On Mar 1, 3:53 pm, Virgil <vir...@ligriv.com> wrote:

> That much knowledge, whether garnered by science or ortherwise, has been
> lost, is well known. Present day science is a tried and true method of
> gathering new knowledge, and in the process may improve itself as method
> of gathering new knowledge.

You can stupidly do that, or GOD can tell you everything.

[Ben Kaufman]

Except when they are cutting off people's heads or oppressing women, gays and
perceived rivals from other religions.

Ben

[Ben Kaufman]

Theories and knowledge should be considered based upon their merit, not their
age.

Ben

[raven1]

On Thu, 28 Feb 2013 00:38:24 -0500, Dale <inv...@invalid.invalid>
wrote:

>what can you really know besides that you exist?
>

>we don't know much else for sure

While it is true that all knowledge is provisional, actually, we do
"know" quite a bit with a considerable degree of confidence. Solipsism
will get you nowhere fast, Dale.

[Dale]

I think you are wrong

but out of fear of the illogical, put faith in science

--
Dale

[raven1]

On Mon, 04 Mar 2013 17:44:47 -0500, Dale <inv...@invalid.invalid>
wrote:

>On 03/04/2013 08:17 AM, raven1 wrote:
>> On Thu, 28 Feb 2013 00:38:24 -0500, Dale <inv...@invalid.invalid>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> what can you really know besides that you exist?
>>>
>>> we don't know much else for sure
>>
>> While it is true that all knowledge is provisional, actually, we do
>> "know" quite a bit with a considerable degree of confidence.
>> Solipsism will get you nowhere fast, Dale.
>>
>
>I think you are wrong

You think a great many silly things.

>but out of fear of the illogical, put faith in science

You're confusing faith with confidence. They are not synonyms.

---
raven1
aa # 1096
EAC Vice President (President in charge of vice)
BAAWA Knight

[Free Lunch]

On Fri, 1 Mar 2013 16:17:26 -0800 (PST), A Really Really Large Number
<t2jud...@gmail.com> wrote in alt.talk.creationism:

Why do so many believers portray their god as an ignorant,
tantrum-filled fool?

[Brian E. Clark]

In article <pan.2013.03.01.15.20.31.624247
@nowhere.invalid>, nob...@nowhere.invalid says...

> >> Can you prove that to me? To me, you just look like a philosophical
> >> zombie.
> >
> > ...the zombie of Descartes, to be precise. :)
>
> I think, therefore, I think I am?

"I think, therefore....braiiiiines!"

--
-----------
Brian E. Clark

[linuxgal]

Because they create God in their own image?

[Devils Advocaat]

On 28 Feb, 05:38, Dale <inva...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> what can you really know besides that you exist?
>

> we don't know much else for sure, so we infer, and place faith in status
> quo inference until we have better inference
>
> science comes from the latin word scientia meaning "knowing"
>
> we can know by deduction, deciphering the parts from the WHOLEhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deductive_reasoning
>
> we can know by induction, getting the whole from ALL the partshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning
>
> but we really don't know the WHOLE or ALL the parts, so we use partial
> forms of these like observation, theorems, ANOVA, etc.
>
> even modern science is just a faith and follows the philosophy of faith,
> just like all other faiths
>
> we infer, and place faith in status quo inference until we have better
> inference, the caveats are conservative status quos and aggressive
> pursuits of better status quos
>
> if we don't know much besides that we exists, forms of the philosophy of
> the self and living would seem to be the priority and therefor religion
> is not that far off and considering a far majority of people on earth
> believe in a religion this rings true to me, at least
>
> this said, it all depends on whether illogic exists
>
> if we are given a logical realm to develophttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maya_%28illusion%29
> maybe we avoid illogic to the most degree
>
> but if illogic exists in the higher realm, all bets on the faith of
> science are off, and we just live in the day there
>
> --
> Dale

So you doubt the input of your senses do you?

[Yap]

On Mar 1, 4:44 am, Dale <inva...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> On 02/28/2013 12:09 PM, harry k wrote:
>
> > Science studies known FACTS to arrive at conclusions.  Those
> > conclusions are always subjec to change as new
> > facts are discovered.
>
> facts are not derived by inference
>
> inference leads to hypotheses, theories and more supporting inference
>
> facts can only come from PURE deduction and induction which only God does
>

> --
> Dale

From the question of personal existence you jump to pixie........

Define this god of yours.

No one has ever done so, you may be the first.

[MarkA]

Hmmm....I wonder if zombies have a high rate of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease?

[Dale]

could be an illusion but most of the time I have no choice

--
Dale

[raven1]

In Dale's case, anything his senses tell him could be a flashback.

[Shaun aRe]

If at all we can learn through experience, then this is what it's taught me
about; science, fact, fiction, imagination and the true nature of reality:

Life itself is just reality/the universe/the all (apply your preferred tag)
experiencing itself - it exists where the experienced and the experiencer
meet.

The very laws governing the *entirety of creation were present even at the
moment of this universe's creation; the complex intaractions between
energies that would describe their evolution into energies of all kinds
including the more condensed, 'material' forms with their own relatively
simple rules of co-interaction, are coded into the very stuff-of-stuff
itself.

From the very outset, physical life somewhere in this 'all' was inevitable.

*The exception I feel that may apply to this is the 'aware spirit of life'
(again - choose your own label(s) as they apply) - that actual energy
contained in the moments that the 'all-experiences-the-all', and the power
of creative imagination this is capable of developing.

Physics has shown the conection between the subject and object, that
observing a system effects the outcome. In essence, the experiencing of a
thing changes its nature and behaviour = to some small extent we create our
reality - all is one, barriers are all illusory. You, I, the rest of
creation all are one and the same thing, are the same machine.

To what degree is it possible to alter reality by alering one's perception?
Using one's imagination? - Well it /is more than/ possible, however, the
numbers don't appear to be in yet, heh...

Experiences of all the kinds I have ever had have shown the basic
immutability of numbers and mathematics; however - /they are the language of
the language/, the rules for the rules for the rules, the matrix within the
matrix within which all resides.


So IMHO and IMEXp faith and science aren't even disparate things - there's a
science to faith too, esp. if you take science as a quest for understanding
the rules and behaviours of our universe in it's entirety.

As for higher levels of perception/reality/being/ etc. well, I am fairly
sure there are (gulp!), but our reality is all too often taken as what our
major 'sensory kit' is experiencing - to a naturally blind creature the
existance of light is not part of their level of experience, and for us
humans, well, we have aspects of our physicalty that are capable of picking
up more types of natural energy than some narrow band of photons/EMR and
pressure changes - we are capable of suspending or dismissing many of the
filters we have needed to cope with the world we find ourtselves in, and
then seeing a lot more of what's going on around us. I would say you could
call such states 'higher' levels of being/awareness.

In fact it is my firm belief that often what is ascribed to a psychotic
break, can often just be the unplanned and unexpected, sudden
dismissal/failure/suspension/or some such of these 'filters'/our reaction to
a massive insurge of new types of information/energy/stimuli/awareness, and
the confusion associated with a limited experiences attempts to make it fit
it's more 'normal'/habitual mode/system of beliefs. More of an enforced
Shamanic Awakening than anything else.



Anyways that's about all for now LOL! What was the question again?!?
Heheheh...

Shaun aRe - Personally I find that I don't cope too well when too aware too
often as my old ways don't allow me to enjoy such transparency easily - I
need the security of my walls and filters sometimes or I go f'n *nuts*,
heheheh...

[Shaun aRe]

"Shaun aRe" <shaun@-beatsnheat.plus.com> wrote in message
news:cdadnR81mPvrcaDM...@brightview.co.uk...

> *The exception I feel that may apply to this is the 'aware spirit of life'
> (again - choose your own label(s) as they apply) - that actual energy
> contained in the moments that the 'all-experiences-the-all', and the power
> of creative imagination this is capable of developing.

ETA - I believe the rules governing this (above) to have existed, *long*
before the eternity, for which the other rules had existed.

Heheh...

',;~}~

Shaun aRe - The Wise Man and the Fool are but Flip Sides of the Same Coin.

[M Purcell]

On Feb 28, 7:36 pm, Dale <inva...@invalid.invalid> wrote:
> On 02/28/2013 06:55 PM, Virgil wrote:
>
> > One can be, but enough observations, all in agreement, are very unlikely
> > to be.
>
> a logical fallacy, argument from incredulity
>
> face it, science is just a sophisticated form of inference

It's a rigorous form of inference without exceptions or personal bias.
Such inferences are applied as deductive premises to make very
successful predictions.

[Dakota]

Scientific theories are falsifiable. Faith isn't falsifiable.

[M Purcell]

Faith is sufficently ambigous.

[Virgil]

In article
<6ef0ad8a-2f9c-447a...@f5g2000pbs.googlegroups.com>,

Whenever a faith can be pinned down unambiguously, it becomes
falsifiable, and sometimes can be falsified.
--