Bob Vines
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This is Part 2 of the article from CJL.
Bob
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[Continued from Part 1]
5) The 1 MB DECmate II XPU board.
The obscure DECmate II XPU option board is a superset of the nearly as
obscure APU board, which consists of 64 KB of memory and a Z80 CPU
chip. All members of this family are interfaced to the 6120 chip at
the heart of all DECmates which performs all of the I/O functions the
Z80 requires.
However, the XPU board also sports an 8086 chip which can run MS-DOS
faster than the original 8088 IBM PC or PC-XT. While not totally PC-
compatible, a release of MS-DOS 2.1 was created for this configuration
which is capable of running a fair number of programs. A goodly
amount of them overlap with the Rainbow such as the precise
implementation of SEDT, which takes advantage of many of the features
found on the DECmate II with XPU and also on the Rainbow such as 132
column mode and the ability to support reverse video screen font.
Sold models can be had with either 256K or 512K. However, the 512K
board is only 1/2 populated. One wonders what technical snags came
about that prevented populating the board further. Due to the way
memory was allocated,it is likely the chips used couldn't be used for
a 768K implementation which is unfortunate. Additionally, a memory
controller needs to turn off memory when the memory address is
allocated for other than storage; apparently the XPU board designers
failed to take these points into account, thus every 512K XPU board
must have half the memory chips left off the board. No MS-DOS
configuration can have the entire [first] 1 MB address space totally
devoted to memory. However, the size of reserved memory would be
especially small since none of it was devoted to memory-mapped
peripherals.
The 64K memory space used as RAM by the Z80 maps 64K of the 1.0 MB
space. MS-DOS operations are implemented as in-memory transactions
carried out [as a middleman] by the Z80, which in turn has the
specifics carried out by the 6120 that has command of all available
peripherals.
Had a proper memory scheme been implemented, the maximum memory
available to MS-DOS would have been 960 KB. With a different memory
chip configuration, 768 KB would have been perfectly reasonable. This
has been done in other 808x-based systems. Perhaps they were confused
with the IBM-PC's upper memory limit of 640 KB which is not actually a
design limit of MS-DOS. [The real limitation is the need to allocate
part of the memory space to various graphics devices, reserved areas
for peripherals, and 64K for a BIOS ROM. None of these applies to the
DECmate II, just the inter-CPU memory map to the Z80 CPU chip.
6) The XPU board for the DECmate III series.
The smaller footprint DECmate III series was marketed with an optional
APU board of its own. The one for the DECmate II is compatible with
the one for the DECmate III with one nitpick exception: CP/M-80 is
created for both machines using a starter diskette that can boot up on
either family of machines [DECmate II versus DECmate III or III+ .]
There are apparently ways to tell the difference between an APU-only
machine and an XPU machine [or at least this diskette creates a
working copy system diskette that bothers to find out].
Thus, if CP/M-80 is created for an APU option board-based machine, the
resulting working copy can run on any APU-based model. However, if
the target is a machine with an XPU board, CP/M-80 will not boot
there. This situation is vice versa for CP/M-80 created for XPU-based
systems. [This is an irrational consideration. CP/M-80 doesn't use
the 8086 chip if it even is there, so why bother to create a needless
compatibility!] [WPS has features that will be available if any of
these modules is present without any otherwise distinction.]
The same aberration applies even if the target is for the DECmate II
or DECmate III+ bootable hard disk CP/M-80 volume. Master Menu is a
collection of utility programs that allows any and all operating
systems to run on any DECmate II or III+ system with a hard-disk [sold
as an option on the DECmate II but integral to the DECmate III+ .]
Master Menu can backup any hard disk volume to a series of diskettes.
The backup can be restored to a different machine. All transfers will
work perfectly except that CP/M-80 bootable volumes will not work if
the APU versus XPU considerations is violated in the analogous manner
to the diskette configurations.
As delivered, the only way to create a DM III+ bootable hard disk
volume is to first create it on a DECmate II with specifically the APU
option. Then master menu can be used to backup and restore the volume
on the hard disk within the DECmate III+ . The reason for this is
that the very same CP/M-80 generator diskette can only create hard
disk volumes using a diskette drive 0, which is not available on a
stock DECmate III+ . However, Master Menu can restore a volume using
diskette 0 that was specifically created on a DECmate II with hard
disk and specifically the APU option board. [Note: The DECmate III+
controller supports two drives, just not in the small chassis as
delivered. By bringing out the drive and power cables, it is possible
to jury-rig a pair of drives which will look to all software as a
complete dual RX50 drive. Thus, if the hardware is configured in this
impromptu fashion, CP/M-80 can be installed as intended.]
Apparently there was an intent to implement a DECmate III series XPU
board to round out the collection. However, it was relatively late in
the marketing life of the DECmates and was never implemented. [Thank
You VAXmate fools who never produced a viable product with a hard disk
at all, yet backstabbed your way into getting the DECmates cancelled
yet you never even had a product. The glorious PDP-8 history at
Digital was ended because of a non-viable attempt at a product that
should not have even been started. Since this is so heinous, it won't
even be otherwise given a place in this document. They simply didn't
do their homework, took literally years to not actually produce the
product, and then when it was attempted, it had to be withdrawn simply
because the plastic chassis didn't provide adequate cooling! Simply
no excuse considering all of the prior generation machines from the
DEC Professional to the Rainbow to the DECmate II and III+ had proper
cooling for the exact same 20 MB Seagate MF disk DEC used in all of
these designs! And this of course over and above the fact that it was
obsolete in the PC world even before it was started.]
7) The "fast" LA36.
This is somewhat of a success story, just not for DEC. The LA36 ran
at a maximum speed of 300 baud/30 CPS to accomplish only one design
goal: To obviate the need for special handling of the wide carriage
LA36 printing terminal design. In earlier designs, it was necessary
to perform special handling for functions such as vertical tab or form-
feed or in some cases just a carriage return when positioned at the
extreme right of the page. No reverse channel support is provided or
needed; it just works.
The reason is that the actual raw printing speed of the LA36 is far
faster than 30 CPS for most printing. If some relatively time-
consuming functions were being performed, the terminal was buffered
sufficiently that virtually any print situation could be handled by
eventually catching up at the raw speed of the printing unit. Thus,
performance was far better than older devices such as the model 35
teletype which required special handling for such as form-feed that
just works perfectly fine on the LA36.
As good as all of this sounds, there is a major flaw in the
reasoning: If the engine of the terminal is so much faster, why is it
printing at only 30 CPS? Why indeed!
On the LA36 control board there is a curious "test socket" which
apparently has control signals that seem to serve no purpose as far as
the stock LA36 is concerned. However, the chief designer created this
socket with an agenda:
a) He left the company after they refused to implement anything any
better; he felt his work was somewhat wasted as a result.
b) He formed his own company to market a replacement board for the
second control board mounted on the rear panel of the LA36. His
replacement board includes an embedded microprocessor and the
resultant board is far smaller than the DEC original that does far
less but takes more space and power. This smaller board is attached
to the rear panel using only a few of the mounting spacers available;
certainly sufficient for proper fastening considerations.
c) As part of the replacement, a provided cable is run between a
similar socket on the replacement board and the "test socket" on the
primary control board within the LA36 chassis. Since the unit will be
driven much harder, a heatsink is attached to the LA36 head in
anticipation of far more heat being produced when the unit prints much
faster, etc.
d) The resultant device is now designated as the DEC-sounding LS120.
While much later DEC released an even better device [not so in some
ways, just in others] called the LA180, it was only a bit faster than
the result achieved here. And it was scandalously more expensive.
e) As with the even newer DEC offering, these terminals needed to be
driven at much faster baud rates. 1200 baud was fully supported, but
hardly taking advantage of the printing speed. It was recommended to
use 2400, 4800 or even 9600 baud to maintain a partially full buffer
at all times until done printing. All DEC terminals from this point
forward used the familiar DC1/DC3 Control-S/Control-Q start-stop
protocol found in all DEC video terminals past the VT05.
Since the buffer was always ahead of the printing capabilities, the
printer always runs at maximum speed until it eventually catches up
[or the printing ceases entirely].
Additionally, the carriage is never wastefully returned as long as
there is something further to do. As necessary, printing occurs while
the head is traveling in reverse. Thus, while a section of print
might be sent as a string of characters followed by CR/LF followed by
similar text, this doesn't describe the actual printing: The first
line might be printed left to right, then the LF is performed followed
by the second line printed in reverse order until the carriage is now
back to the left margin, then the second LF is performed. Both CR
operations are virtually removed.
Since the raw speed of the printing device is about twice what the
LA36 could do, the effective speed is just about 4 times as fast as
the LA36 [not counting the overhead of LF characters]. The operating
system has to support the reverse protocol to be totally successful.
The author modified the OS/8 KL8E handler recast as a device 65/66 [or
40/41] serial printer where the only functionality of the keyboard is
to potentially pause the output by inserting Control-S into the
reverse channel [but not by the on-board microprocessor which would
eventually send Control-Q when the buffer was less than 1/4 full].
The terminal could also be used in P?S/8 as the device 03/04 console
because, unlike OS/8, P?S/8 fully supports the reverse protocol on the
console. [The P?S/8 Logical Console Overlay can be configured to
recognize the reverse protocol on the system line-printer as a
standard option; the default support is for the device 66 printer
which as a parallel device does not use the reverse protocol at all.]
The original LA36 has an exepnsive option to support the APL character
set. This can be used with such as APL-10 which exactly matches the
original IBM/360 implementation that requires IBM 2741 terminals with
APL typeballs applied. And of course the LA36 is a fully implemented
ASCII text terminal as well.
The LS-120 speed-up board comes standard with the APL character set
feature; a dip-switch can be set to defeat it if desired.
Again, a product DEC never marketed, but another company benefited
from doing their thinking for them and profiting by it.
8) The "PDP-16".
No discussion of DEC quirks and follies such as this can be complete
without mentioning the next-generation DEC design for a 16-bit
machine. [It is not clear if it would actually be called the PDP-16
because it was never actually made - by DEC.]
Edson De Castro, chief engineer on the straight PDP-8 project [and
many other successful DEC products] had designed, proposed and had
gotten approval for a 16-bit machine that was arguably a cross between
the PDP-8 and the PDP-15 with a few extra features added, but with a
16-bit word orientation instead of either 12 or 18 bits. It retains
the PDP-8 notion of indirectly referencing memory through locations
0010-0017 causing auto-indexing instead of merely indirect addressing.
[Indirect addressing means using a pointing word without modifying the
pointer. Auto-indexing is the term to describe what happens in the
PDP-8 where the pointer is first updated then used to point to the
operand. This leads to the notion of calling 10-17 octal "registers"
even though they are merely memory locations with a special property.
But this is reminiscent of actual registers as defined in other
machines such as the PDP-15 and of course the -11.]
Many [including the author] have discussed over the years why exactly
what happened in fact did happen. Suffice to say, all of the
following are true:
a) De Castro assembled a design team of about 200 people to implement
the hardware of the new product. [Note: At the time, DEC was just
starting to realize the importance of SOFTWARE to computer design;
perhaps that was not in the proper forefront as it would be at DEC in
all subsequent years.] [No one would argue that Edson De Castro was a
hardware guy.]
b) Some form of celebration of the coming event the next week was
being openly done for all parties invited on a Friday afternoon.
c) By Monday, the entire project was cancelled.
d) The PDP-11 was ingratiated instead despite serious design flaws.
Papers have been written about this. Clearly the design was not fully
vetted. Quirks existed in the design such as performing an ADD
instruction with the operand of exactly 1 does NOT create exactly the
same results as the INCREMENT instruction. [And similarly, the
SUBTRACT instruction with the same operand does not create the same
exact results as the DECREMENT instruction. So much for the "wonders"
of "symmetry".] The instruction set is so inefficient at performing
loops [all methods of counting off loop iterations are equally clumsy]
that an asymmetrical instruction was added that is analogous to the
PDP-8 ISZ operation to more efficiently count off loops. However,
earlier models do not support it, thus hampering software design which
still cannot use the improvement if the earlier models are to be
supported. [I thought this kind of nonsense was only to happen with
the PDP-8/s, but I was mistaken.]
e) Within a short measure of time, Data General Corporation was
formed primarily from the now FORMER DEC personnel of the 200 people
involved. Edson De Castro was the president of the company.
f) Data General was quite successful at making the original design,
now dubbed the Nova. Eventually a 32-bit extension was designed and
the resultant machine was dubbed the Eclipse. The book 'The Soul of a
New Machine' by Tracy Kidder became a best seller in the 1980's that
discusses this later aspect [with only a few sketchy details of what
happened in the time frame from step a) through step d). It is
telling that the Eclipse engineers got a look inside the early VAX
models at a trade show and smiled because they knew that their machine
was technologically superior; DEC was using older logic in the design.
DG's machine was the original home of the WordPerfect program, which
is why PC versions do not exist prior to Version 4.2.
g) DEC lost money to DG on various projects of significant worth such
as an open bid to create a network of small status sensing machines
throughout Disney theme parks such as Disney World Florida. The
project could have easily been implemented by some form of PDP-8, but
DEC presented a needlessly complicated PDP-11-based system. DG easily
won the contract with a much more sensible Nova-based system. [Note:
Richard Lary of DEC participated in the design of the LSI-11 based on
a small collection of chips from Western Digital known as the WD-16.
He also designed what should have been called the LSI-8 but DEC
refused to market it because it would undercut the market for the
LSI-11. Such a machine would have been perfectly adequate for Disney'
needs, and would have easily won over the DG offering which was
actually technologically backward by comparison. But by using the
PDP-11 at the center of their design, it became far too expensive. It
is noteworthy that eventually Disney abandoned this project in favor
of a more appropriate Intel 8080-based still cheaper product.
However, DEC might have gotten that newer contract had they been on
better terms with Intersil, developer of the IM6100 PDP-8-on-a-chip.
Instead they never bid and Intel won out.
Somewhat later, embarrassed by this and other "bad-blood" issues, one
of which involves your author personally, DEC refused to even talk to
Intersil and instead went to second-source provider Harris
Semiconductor. This was the basis for the extremely slow VT78, which
is even slower than the 6100 chip ought to run at. It is not known
exactly why DEC couldn't run their design at full speed [instead only
a bit over 3/4 normal clock speed], but clearly a second-source
manufacturer knows very little about the product design compared to
the design company. Had DEC swallowed its pride, it could have dealt
with Intersil directly and perhaps learned how to make the 6100 chip
run at full speed. Third-party machines at the time available from
Intersil [the "Intercept"] and machine packager Pacific CyberMetrix
[the "PCM12" and "PCM12A" at least one of which was available in kit
form with the above mentioned DSD-210 as a storage option] ran the
chip at the full 4.0 MHz standard CPU speed. The VT78 is so slow that
it has the dubious distinction as being the only machine where OS/8 on
RX01 runs with throughput 13 times as slow as all other DEC 12-bit
models. By fully taking advantage of the superior memory model, P?S/8
prevents the throughput loss on the same configuration. But OS/8
cannot remedy this situation.
Worse still, DEC awarded the contract for the next-generation 6120
chip to Harris without any participation from Intersil. Through a
pure bungling of handling the technical negotiation, design quirks
were allowed to creep in that eventually made the DECmates
incompatible with much PDP-8 software, including OS/8. Kludged and
buggy variants such as OS/278 V2 exist as testimony to these major
mistakes. [However, despite all of this, P?S/8 has conquered even
this needless incompatibility using techniques foreign to OS/8, but it
was a thankless job necessitated only because of this needless and
incompetent decision. Members of the PDP-8 programming group were
aware of the problem, yet it all fell on deaf ears.]
While DEC eventually went under for a variety of reasons [especially
too much management and driving away technical talent while being
manipulated by sales types], it is interesting to see the flawed
reasoning that made some of these quirky products never see the light
of day in users' systems. In part, this little slice of history
points the way to the ultimate end of the company.
Regardless of this, enthusiasts for the machines of the "good old
days" are perhaps at an all-time high. It is largely on account of
this, the author continues his labor of love producing independent
software and of course documenting everything for the future.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
cjl
--
"In the future, OS/2 will be on everyone's desktop"
Bill Gates, 1992