Avoidant personality disorder
ThePuttKing
I've got it though.
Hypersensitivity to criticism or rejection (YES)
Self-imposed social isolation (YES, WHEN I'M NOT WORKING)
Extreme shyness in social situations, though feels a strong desire for
close relationships[4] (YES TO THE FIRST BIT)
Avoids physical contact because it has been associated with an
unpleasant or painful stimulus (NO)
Avoids interpersonal relationships (YES)
Feelings of inadequacy (YES ROMANTICALLY)
Severe low self-esteem (YES)
Self-loathing (NOT AT ALL. I THINK I'M GREAT !)
Mistrust of others (PROBABLY)
Emotional distancing related to intimacy (DON'T KNOW)
Highly self-conscious (SOMETIMES)
Self-critical about their problems relating to others (DON'T KNOW)
Problems in occupational functioning (NO)
Lonely self-perception (YES)
Feeling inferior to others (AGAIN REGARDING ATTRACTING OTHER PEOPLE)
Utilizes fantasy as a form of escapism and to interrupt painful
thoughts[5]
(YES I'M AFRAID, I SEEM TO OBSESSED ABOUT WINNING LOTTERY, ALWAYS
THINKING ABOUT IT, NOT REALLY THE MONEY BUT HOW I COULD TREAT PEOPLE
AND THE ATTENTION)
phy
ad31-15a...@w19g2000yqk.googlegroups.com:
> Just been reading this on Wikipedia. Interesting subject. Not sure
> I've got it though.
I have some of these traits, but I think it's more social anxiety than APD.
Look up schizoid personality disorder and schizotypal personality disorder.
One of these fits me better than avoident, but I don't remember which.
-phy
Mxsmanic
phy
news:uipfg5pio6895gt93...@4ax.com:
> What is it that compels people to invent endless new diseases and
> disorders?
>
I don't think of them as a disease or disorder, just a group of personality
traits that are outside the norm.
-phy
Gunter Glieben Glauchen Globen
> What is it that compels people to invent endless new diseases and disorders?
Psychologists are just like naturalists before Darwin. They don't have
any principles to simplify what they observe, so they just create
whatever categories they can think of.
If we understood how the brain works (or doesn't work) then the
categories could be simplified and restructured.
Gunter Glieben Glauchen Globen
> Mxsmanic <mxsma...@gmail.com> wrote innews:uipfg5pio6895gt93...@4ax.com:
>
> > What is it that compels people to invent endless new diseases and
> > disorders?
>
> I don't think of them as a disease or disorder, just a group of personality
> traits that are outside the norm.
Something is a disorder if it prevents a person from performing
significant life tasks.
Mxsmanic
> Something is a disorder if it prevents a person from performing
> significant life tasks.
Who defines "significant life tasks"?
I've seen lots of "disorders" that don't prevent anyone from doing anything,
except a few things that someone else considers important. So-called
Asperger's syndrome is a classic example.
Mxsmanic
> If we understood how the brain works (or doesn't work) then the
> categories could be simplified and restructured.
We can never completely understand how the brain works as long as we must use
our brains to exercise that understanding.
Bernd Jendrissek
> We can never completely understand how the brain works as long as we must use
> our brains to exercise that understanding.
Citation needed.
Mxsmanic
> Citation needed.
Perhaps for you, but not for me.
No complex system can completely describe itself, just as you cannot build a
100%-accurate scale model of the universe within that universe.
Thus, the functioning of the human brain can only be completely understood by
an entity with a superior brain.
binkmeister
Dr. Phil?
Gunter Glieben Glauchen Globen
We design new computers with the last generation of less powerful
computers. There's something wrong with your belief.
I can write the equation for the mandelbrot set down, and therefore
can describe it in one sense, even though I can't describe all the
details of its appearance.
Michaela Mackenzie
> I don't think of them as a disease or disorder, just a group of personality
> traits that are outside the norm.
>
> -phy
Do you judge them as being good or bad?
- Michaela
Bernd Jendrissek
> No complex system can completely describe itself
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine
or even
phy
news:2400f9c1-e237-4778...@o10g2000yqa.googlegroups.com:
Good or bad doesn't enter into it, but from the perspective of fitting in
to most social circles, they are definitely undesirable.
-phy
Michaela Mackenzie
> Michaela Mackenzie
> > phy wrote:
> >> I don't think of them as a disease or disorder, just a group of
> >> personality traits that are outside the norm.
>
> >> -phy
>
> > Do you judge them as being good or bad?
>
> > - Michaela
>
> Good or bad doesn't enter into it,
but from the perspective of fitting in
> to most social circles, they are definitely undesirable.
> -phy
Sounds like good/bad might enter into it after all. I bet there are
advantages too tho.
Mxsmanic
> Good or bad doesn't enter into it, but from the perspective of fitting in
> to most social circles, they are definitely undesirable.
This statement contradicts itself. Which good or neutral things are also
undesirable?
Mxsmanic
> We design new computers with the last generation of less powerful
> computers. There's something wrong with your belief.
No. We design new computers using old computers ... and our brains. Our brains
are still superior to existing computers, so we are able to do this. We will
not be able to design computers superior to ourselves in terms of complexity.
> I can write the equation for the mandelbrot set down, and therefore
> can describe it in one sense, even though I can't describe all the
> details of its appearance.
You can describe atoms, but you can't build a model of an atom with an atom.
You need multiple atoms to build a model of one atom.
Mxsmanic
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine
A Turing machine cannot actually be build, because it requires infinite memory
and an infinitely long tape.
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation
See above.
August Pamplona
That statement does not contradict itself because most things
in life are not monolithic. Something can be not all good and not all
bad. Things are not black or white, for that matter, there are shades of
gray almost always. In fact, the degree of goodness or badness may be
context dependent. Something could be good in one situation and bad in
another situation.
In fact, phy qualified his statement well by mentioning one
specific context: that of fitting into most social circles (one which
happens to be of great importance and interest to the average a.s.s.
reader but which may not be that important to some other folk).
August Pamplona
--
If you could prove religious beliefs with the scientific
method, it would be science.....and nobody would believe it.
- Stephen Colbert
a.a. # 1811 apatriot #20 Eater of smut
Proud member of the reality-based community.
The address in this message's 'From' field, in accordance with
individual.net's TOS, is real. However, almost all messages
reaching this address are deleted without human intervention.
In other words, if you e-mail me there, I will not receive your message.
To make sure that e-mail messages actually reach me,
make sure that my e-mail address is not hot.
phy
news:nf0ug5hpbqcvcdfil...@4ax.com:
The list of 'bad' things that are desirable is probably a LOT longer.
-phy
Bernd Jendrissek
> Which good or neutral things are also undesirable?
Things which are desireable in other, more important (whoever makes
this judgement), contexts.
Bernd Jendrissek
> No. We design new computers using old computers ... and our brains.
No. We design new (computer + brain) systems using old (computer +
brain) systems.
> Our brains
> are still superior to existing computers, so we are able to do this. We will
> not be able to design computers superior to ourselves in terms of complexity.
Argument by assertion.
> You can describe atoms, but you can't build a model of an atom with an atom.
You don't need to build a model of an atom if you have an atom: the
atom is already the complete modelled system - it is both the modelled
system and its own (perfect!) model.
> You need multiple atoms to build a model of one atom.
Argument by assertion. You simply don't know what you're talking
about here. There's nothing transcendent or magical about a brain;
it's just a bunch of atoms put together in interesting ways.
You probably have Goedel's incompleteness theorem in mind and are
assuming it to imply some sort of inaccessibility of some "level" of
description by a "lower" level. While I don't grok that theorem, I'm
pretty sure you don't either, and that it doesn't mean what you think
it means, if this is the source of your assertions.
Bernd Jendrissek
> Bernd Jendrissek writes:
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine
>
> A Turing machine cannot actually be build, because it requires infinite memory
> and an infinitely long tape.
It's only the tape that is infinite. The machine itself can be built.
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypercomputation
>
> See above.
It means that you can substitute time for complexity. It means that
humans could, in principle, build a computer that is more powerful
than the most powerful human brain, given enough time (to the
computer's builders).
Mxsmanic
> Mxsmanic wrote:
> > phy writes:
> >
> >> Good or bad doesn't enter into it, but from the perspective of fitting in
> >> to most social circles, they are definitely undesirable.
> >
> > This statement contradicts itself. Which good or neutral things are also
> > undesirable?
>
> That statement does not contradict itself because most things
> in life are not monolithic.
If something is definitely undesirable, good and bad definitely enters into
it.
> In fact, phy qualified his statement well by mentioning one
> specific context: that of fitting into most social circles (one which
> happens to be of great importance and interest to the average a.s.s.
> reader but which may not be that important to some other folk).
He invalidated his own generalization, making me wonder what his point is
supposed to be. Does good or bad enter into it, or doesn't it? He makes both
(contradictory) assertions in one sentence.
Mxsmanic
> There's nothing transcendent or magical about a brain;
> it's just a bunch of atoms put together in interesting ways.
Whether or not this statement is true, the fact remains that something of one
level of complexity cannot understand something of greater complexity.
> You probably have Goedel's incompleteness theorem in mind and are
> assuming it to imply some sort of inaccessibility of some "level" of
> description by a "lower" level. While I don't grok that theorem, I'm
> pretty sure you don't either, and that it doesn't mean what you think
> it means, if this is the source of your assertions.
I believe G�del had similar ideas. But it also seems rather intuitively
obvious.
Michaela Mackenzie
>
> Psychologists are just like naturalists before Darwin. They don't have
> any principles to simplify what they observe, so they just create
> whatever categories they can think of.
>
> If we understood how the brain works (or doesn't work) then the
> categories could be simplified and restructured.
Forget about brain. The ego drives the brain.
- Michaela
Michaela Mackenzie
Pft. It's only necessary to figure out how the brain works when
talking from a material
pov.
When you look at it from a spiritual pov you realise the brain is just
another non-entity.
- Michaela
Michaela Mackenzie
I'm not crazy about Dr Phil (that voice!), but I doubt he'd say summat
like that.
- Michaela
o, you were joking..
Michaela Mackenzie
>
> > We design new computers with the last generation of less powerful
> > computers. There's something wrong with your belief.
>
> No. We design new computers using old computers ... and our brains.
Agreed.
Our brains
> are still superior to existing computers,
Superior? Wait, I have to finish rotflol...
Michaela Mackenzie
> Mxsmanic wrote:
> > phy writes:
>
> >> Good or bad doesn't enter into it, but from the perspective of fitting in
> >> to most social circles, they are definitely undesirable.
>
> > This statement contradicts itself. Which good or neutral things are also
> > undesirable?
>
> That statement does not contradict itself because most things
> in life are not monolithic. Something can be not all good and not all
> bad. Things are not black or white, for that matter, there are shades of
> gray almost always. In fact, the degree of goodness or badness may be
> context dependent. Something could be good in one situation and bad in
> another situation.
>
> In fact, phy qualified his statement well by mentioning one
> specific context: that of fitting into most social circles (one which
> happens to be of great importance and interest to the average a.s.s.
> reader but which may not be that important to some other folk).
>
> August Pamplona
Fancy talk, but he still mentioned a disadvantage. Which in my book
means
bad. Perhaps we need to define 'good' and 'bad'?
- Michaela
Mxsmanic
> On Nov 27, 12:35�am, Mxsmanic <mxsma...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Our brains
> > are still superior to existing computers,
>
> Superior? Wait, I have to finish rotflol...
Do you see a lot of computers participating in this conversation?
August Pamplona
> On Nov 24, 3:02 am, Mxsmanic <mxsma...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Gunter Glieben Glauchen Globen writes:
>>
>>> If we understood how the brain works (or doesn't work) then the
>>> categories could be simplified and restructured.
>> We can never completely understand how the brain works as long as we must use
>> our brains to exercise that understanding.
>
> Pft. It's only necessary to figure out how the brain works when
> talking from a material
> pov.
In a very ral sense, there's no other valid pov than a material
pov. I'm not saying, per se, that it isn't valid to look at things from
a perspective of consciousness or whatever but rather that all these
non-material things are but emergent properties of matter arranged in a
particular way. Without having matter arranged in a particular way, they
do not (and, indeed, cannot) exist.
>
> When you look at it from a spiritual pov you realise the brain is just
> another non-entity.
You have it exactly reversed. It is the "spiritual" which is
illusory (or a non-entity, if you wish), in the sense that it is
strictly dependent on the material.
>
> - Michaela
Limerent Oil
I am a computer.
phy
The words 'good' and 'bad' implies value a value judgement. Let me give
an example. A kid I know, he is pretty avoidant and definitely does not
fit in with his peers. So in one way, that is undesirable. But on the
other hand, he is thoughtful, he loves to learn and his parents don't
have to worry about him getting mixed up in with a bad crowd. In my
opinion, good or bad doesn't enter into it. He just has personality
traits that are outside the norm.
-phy
-phy
phy
.
>
> Forget about brain. The ego drives the brain.
>
> - Michaela
>
The ego drives the brain?! wtf?
-phy
Jared
> Gunter Glieben Glauchen Globen writes:
>
> > We design new computers with the last generation of less powerful
> > computers. There's something wrong with your belief.
>
> No. We design new computers using old computers ... and our brains. Our brains
> are still superior to existing computers, so we are able to do this. We will
> not be able to design computers superior to ourselves in terms of complexity.
Well, nobody designed our brains. Their complexity comes from a fairly
simple program, not from a detailed blueprint. The human genome is
only about 750 MB, so it can't have a description of every neuron. I
think the information necessary to make a new computer CPU probably is
larger.
Mxsmanic
> Well, nobody designed our brains. Their complexity comes from a fairly
> simple program, not from a detailed blueprint. The human genome is
> only about 750 MB, so it can't have a description of every neuron. I
> think the information necessary to make a new computer CPU probably is
> larger.
Hardly. The number of possible brain designs that can be represented by a 750
MB index contains more than a quarter-billion digits. You'd need a book of
about 100,000 pages just to represent this number (to say nothing of the
actual individual designs it might index).
Mxsmanic
> Pft. It's only necessary to figure out how the brain works when
> talking from a material
> pov.
Is it?
> When you look at it from a spiritual pov you realise the brain is just
> another non-entity.
From a metaphysical standpoint, the brain is not only a free-standing
computer, but also an interface.
Mxsmanic
> I am a computer.
No, you aren't.
Limerent Oil
Why do you say I aren't?
Michaela Mackenzie
> Michaela Mackenzie wrote
> > Forget about brain. The ego drives the brain.
>
> > - Michaela
>
> The ego drives the brain?! wtf?
>
> -phy
It's just a pov. We can't work the brain out from a physical pov but
if we know what
drives us we can narrow it down to just two emotions. The one is fear
and the other
love.
To experiment with this, I'll ask a question or two.
So, why do you post here?
Or even more specifically, why did you choose to respond to my comment
that the
ego drives the brain?
- Michaela
Michaela Mackenzie
> Mxsmanic wrote:
> > Michaela Mackenzie writes:
>
>
> >>> Our brains
> >>> are still superior to existing computers,
> >> Superior? Wait, I have to finish rotflol...
>
> > Do you see a lot of computers participating in this conversation?
>
> I am a computer.
I too respond unconsciously.
- Michaela
Michaela Mackenzie
> Michaela Mackenzie wrote:
> > On Nov 24, 3:02 am, Mxsmanic <mxsma...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> Gunter Glieben Glauchen Globen writes:
>
> >>> If we understood how the brain works (or doesn't work) then the
> >>> categories could be simplified and restructured.
> >> We can never completely understand how the brain works as long as we must use
> >> our brains to exercise that understanding.
>
> > Pft. It's only necessary to figure out how the brain works when
> > talking from a material
> > pov.
>
> In a very ral sense, there's no other valid pov than a material
> pov. I'm not saying, per se, that it isn't valid to look at things from
> a perspective of consciousness or whatever but rather that all these
> non-material things are but emergent properties of matter arranged in a
> particular way. Without having matter arranged in a particular way, they
> do not (and, indeed, cannot) exist.
>
>
>
> > When you look at it from a spiritual pov you realise the brain is just
> > another non-entity.
>
> You have it exactly reversed. It is the "spiritual" which is
> illusory (or a non-entity, if you wish), in the sense that it is
> strictly dependent on the material.
>
>
>
> > - Michaela
>
> August Pamplona
I'd say they depend on each other's existence and that they cancel
each other
out.
- Michaela
Michaela Mackenzie
> Michaela Mackenzie writes:
>
> > > Our brains
> > > are still superior to existing computers,
>
> > Superior? Wait, I have to finish rotflol...
>
> Do you see a lot of computers participating in this conversation?
And this conversation is superior to anything a computer can do?
- Michaela
Michaela Mackenzie
> Mxsmanic wrote:
> > phy writes:
>
> >> Good or bad doesn't enter into it, but from the perspective of fitting in
> >> to most social circles, they are definitely undesirable.
>
> > This statement contradicts itself. Which good or neutral things are also
> > undesirable?
>
> That statement does not contradict itself because most things
> in life are not monolithic. Something can be not all good and not all
> bad.
Yes, and if it's undesirable it also has some kind of pay-off or he
wouldn't
use that behaviour (which he sees as a trait).
I mean, I was pretty isolated as a kid and this left me with a lot of
time to
think about things. I didn't like being alone much, but I wouldn't
have it any
other way cos that's what led me to where I am today.
Things are not black or white, for that matter, there are shades of
> gray almost always. In fact, the degree of goodness or badness may be
> context dependent. Something could be good in one situation and bad in
> another situation.
It doesn't even need to be a different situation for there to be goods
and bads
in a situation. There's the obvious goodsbads and the hidden ones.
That's why
the yin-yang symbol has a dot of white in the black 'fish' and a dot
of black in
the white 'fish'...
> In fact, phy qualified his statement well by mentioning one
> specific context: that of fitting into most social circles (one which
> happens to be of great importance and interest to the average a.s.s.
> reader but which may not be that important to some other folk).
>
> August Pamplona
Ok.
- Michaela
Mxsmanic
> And this conversation is superior to anything a computer can do?
Yes.
August Pamplona
Yes, of course you would. And you'd be wrong.
Michaela Mackenzie
> Michaela Mackenzie wrote:
> > On Nov 28, 3:55 am, August Pamplona <cosmic...@hotmail.com> w
> Yes, of course you would. And you'd be wrong.
>
> August Pamplona
Well, when you put it like that..
- Michaela
phy
> On Nov 28, 6:08�am, phy wrote:
>> Michaela Mackenzie wrote
>> > Forget about brain. The ego drives the brain.
>>
>> > - Michaela
>>
>> The ego drives the brain?! wtf?
>>
>> -phy
>
> It's just a pov. We can't work the brain out from a physical pov but
> if we know what
> drives us we can narrow it down to just two emotions. The one is fear
> and the other
> love.
Every day, Science is getting closer and closer how to figuring out how
the brain works from a mechanical, physical point of view. The whole
fear and love thing is something I always hear about from a metaphysical
pov. The first time was when I read Conversations With God by Neil
Donald Welsh (iirc). The last time was today during the sermon at the
church I have been going to lately. I still don't buy it completely, but
from a certain angle is makes sense I guess.
> To experiment with this, I'll ask a question or two.
>
> So, why do you post here?
Why do I post here now, or why did I start posting here? Right now I
read this group mainly out of boredom and curiosity. I usually just post
when I have a comment to make about something.
>
> Or even more specifically, why did you choose to respond to my comment
> that the
> ego drives the brain?
Because that comment didn't make any sense to me and I was like "wtf?".
I was hoping you would explain further.
-phy
Jared
> Jared writes:
> > Well, nobody designed our brains. Their complexity comes from a fairly
> > simple program, not from a detailed blueprint. The human genome is
> > only about 750 MB, so it can't have a description of every neuron. I
> > think the information necessary to make a new computer CPU probably is
> > larger.
>
> Hardly. The number of possible brain designs that can be represented by a 750
> MB index contains more than a quarter-billion digits.
Well, yes, but what does that have to do with DNA? You think that DNA
is just a pointer to somewhere else where the actual information is
stored? Where would that be?
Mxsmanic
> Well, yes, but what does that have to do with DNA? You think that DNA
> is just a pointer to somewhere else where the actual information is
> stored? Where would that be?
It could be. We still don't really have any idea how life gets from DNA
encoding to the complete organism. There isn't enough data in 750 MB to fully
describe a complete organism, so clearly it is functioning as some sort of
index to at least some extent. It can key into a virtually infinite number of
possible designs, but as a self-contained blueprint it's only about the
equivalent of a CD.
Mxsmanic
> Every day, Science is getting closer and closer how to figuring out how
> the brain works from a mechanical, physical point of view.
There are some things it will never figure out, because they are metaphysical.
The most obvious example is consciousness.
phy
news:v8o6h5dneh8uqbdkl...@4ax.com:
I wouldn't be so bold as to say Science will never figure it out. There are
a LOT of things that people said would never happen. Take flying or landing
on the moon for example. You might be right about consciousness though. I
read a person who speculated that consciousness was a property of life in
the same way wet was a property of water.
-phy
Mxsmanic
> I wouldn't be so bold as to say Science will never figure it out.
I would.
Science describes the physical world, and everything in the physical world is
observable, in practical fact or in theory. Consciousness, however, cannot be
observed; it can only be experienced. Science makes no provision for
experience. Science is based exclusively upon observation. Anything that
physically exists can be observed; anything that can be observed physically
exists. Since consciousness can only be experienced, not observed, and since
the physical universe known to science is that which can be observed,
consciousness, if it exists, is outside the physical universe, and therefore
metaphysical. And we know that consciousness exists because we experience it.
In fact, since it's the only thing we experience, and since experience is
proof of existence in itself (whereas observation is not--we can hallucinate),
consciousness is the only thing the existence of which is certain for us, even
though it is metaphysical, and not physical.
Thus, a metaphysical reality exists--because we experience it and it cannot be
physical--in the form of consciousness. QED.
Furthermore, it's unscientific to recognize consciousness, since consciousness
has no physical existence. No physical observations require consciousness as
an explanation, so acknowledging its existence requires going outside science,
for better or for worse.
Michaela Mackenzie
I like that.
- Michaela
Michaela Mackenzie
again
On Nov 28, 3:55 am, August Pamplona wrote:
> >>> If we understood how the brain works (or doesn't work) then the
> >>> categories could be simplified and restructured.
> >> We can never completely understand how the brain works as long as we must use
> >> our brains to exercise that understanding.
>
> > Pft. It's only necessary to figure out how the brain works when
> > talking from a material
> > pov.
>
> In a very ral sense, there's no other valid pov than a material
> pov. I'm not saying, per se, that it isn't valid to look at things from
> a perspective of consciousness or whatever but rather that all these
> non-material things are but emergent properties of matter arranged in a
> particular way. Without having matter arranged in a particular way, they
> do not (and, indeed, cannot) exist.
I'm not sure what you're saying -it's that word 'emergent' that I let
get me
every time. And then there's the word 'consciousness'. I see myself as
being conscious when I manage to --and it's not something that happens
too often-- make a choice to come from my 'right' mind. e.g. if I'm
chatting
with someone else, I am conscious when I am able to say or do
something
that allows the other to feel comfortable in my presence.
As soon as I say something that doesn't take your values into
consideration
I am no longer conscious and I cause a rift between us.
Let's just leave it out and see if I can make sense here:
I have had sufficient evidence in my life to prove (to me at least0
that the spiritual
world supports (these aren't my own words, other people seem to be so
much
better than me at putting things into words) our material world.
The one is the 'inside out' of the other. And in the same way, that
was what I
was trying to get at when phy spoke about his potential 'disorder'
traits.
> > When you look at it from a spiritual pov you realise the brain is just
> > another non-entity.
>
> You have it exactly reversed. It is the "spiritual" which is
> illusory (or a non-entity, if you wish), in the sense that it is
> strictly dependent on the material.
That's not how I see it. It might be that way for you but not for me.
- Michaela
Michaela Mackenzie
Well, the way I see it everything has an element of good and bad
within it.
And you seem to be saying exactly that.
I mean, surely in some ways he is sad that he doesn't fit in? And yet
in other
ways he has found a way to fill his time: he is making the most of his
situation.
He is perhaps off-balance when it comes to his peers, but he doesn't
seem
to spend an unnecessary amount of time on worrying about it.
It's a bit late and I have much to do still and I'm sure I could have
come up
with a better response than this.
This'll have to do for now.
- Michaela
Michaela Mackenzie
> Michaela Mackenzie <michaelamackenzie05072...@yahoo.com> wrote innews:8dabdeb2-fd9a-4ddd...@o10g2000yqa.googlegroups.com:
>
> > On Nov 28, 6:08 am, phy wrote:
> >> Michaela Mackenzie wrote
> >> > Forget about brain. The ego drives the brain.
>
> >> > - Michaela
>
> >> The ego drives the brain?! wtf?
>
> >> -phy
>
> > It's just a pov. We can't work the brain out from a physical pov but
> > if we know what
> > drives us we can narrow it down to just two emotions. The one is fear
> > and the other
> > love.
>
> Every day, Science is getting closer and closer how to figuring out how
> the brain works from a mechanical, physical point of view.
I don't really have a pov on this so I shan't discuss it further.
The whole
> fear and love thing is something I always hear about from a metaphysical
> pov. The first time was when I read Conversations With God by Neil
> Donald Welsh (iirc). The last time was today during the sermon at the
> church I have been going to lately. I still don't buy it completely, but
> from a certain angle is makes sense I guess.
It's a whole different mindset. A shift in the way one looks at the
world.
I'll be back.
- Michaela
August Pamplona
Bullshit! Science looks at subjective experience all the time.
It just happens to be the case that it is not cool, hard science, for
the most part, and that we might not be very good at it. Actually,
sometimes we can even "see" it (such as with PET &, more often these
days, fMRI), since as I've mentioned before, these sorts of things do
not have an independent existence and, instead, emerge from physical
phenomena.
August Pamplona
--
August Pamplona
> Jared writes:
>
>> Well, yes, but what does that have to do with DNA? You think that DNA
>> is just a pointer to somewhere else where the actual information is
>> stored? Where would that be?
>
> It could be. We still don't really have any idea how life gets from DNA
> encoding to the complete organism.
We have an increasing understanding of this, yes (down to the
molecular level).
> There isn't enough data in 750 MB to fully
> describe a complete organism, so clearly it is functioning as some sort of
> index to at least some extent.
Not for the sorts of understanding of the word "index" that a
computer scientist might have. In other words, no.
> It can key into a virtually infinite number of
> possible designs, but as a self-contained blueprint it's only about the
> equivalent of a CD.
August Pamplona
Mxsmanic
> We have an increasing understanding of this, yes (down to the
> molecular level).
We still have no clue. We are "down to the molecular level" in part because we
don't understand it at any other level. Getting from the molecular level to a
theory that explains the entire process from DNA to finished organism has
proven very problematic.
Mxsmanic
> Bullshit! Science looks at subjective experience all the time.
No, it does not. Science is based on observation alone, not experience.
Experience isn't even acknowledged by science. And since consciousness
consists exclusively of experience, it has no physical existence. The entire
physical universe can exist without consciousness. There is no evidence for
its existence, and it is not required to explain any aspect of the universe.
> Actually, sometimes we can even "see" it (such as with PET &, more
> often these days, fMRI) ...
No, we do not. What you describe is observation of brain activity. There is no
proven connection between that and consciousness.
This concept is very difficult for some people to understand, which is why
some scientists and others doggedly insist that consciousness can be
physically explained. They don't understand the problem, so they cannot
conceive of a solution. In the case of consciousness, it's what we are, so for
some it is difficult to think about it in the abstract.
August Pamplona
> August Pamplona writes:
>
>> We have an increasing understanding of this, yes (down to the
>> molecular level).
>
> We still have no clue. We are "down to the molecular level" in part because we
> don't understand it at any other level.
Wrong! Try again.
> Getting from the molecular level to a
> theory that explains the entire process from DNA to finished organism has
> proven very problematic.
I didn't say that we know everything. I said we have an
increasing (and I'll add now, non trivial) understanding of the process.
You clearly know little about developmental biology if you say
we have no clue. We have lots of clues. The fact that Mxsmanic has no
clue does not mean that people who do study developmental biology have
no clue.
August Pamplona
> August Pamplona writes:
>
>> Bullshit! Science looks at subjective experience all the time.
>
> No, it does not. Science is based on observation alone, not experience.
> Experience isn't even acknowledged by science. And since consciousness
> consists exclusively of experience, it has no physical existence. The entire
> physical universe can exist without consciousness. There is no evidence for
> its existence, and it is not required to explain any aspect of the universe.
I was actually referring to subjective experience since you are
claiming that it is the fact that science cannot address experience
which precludes it from ever learning anything about consciousness.
Again, you are wrong. I can certainly make observations about
your subjective experience. It's really not all that complicated. The
most basic way would be to simply ask you what you are feeling (that's
the nice things about human subjects: they usually can talk or otherwise
communicate with the investigator). It's not a perfect tool but it is a
tool and it provides real measurable information. If I'm interested in
specific aspects of subjective experience, I can develop questionnaires
(involving some process of validation) and end up with an instrument
which provides some measure of repeatability. People do this all the
time in the squishy sciences.
But actually, you don't even have to go there. Most clinical
drug trials, in fact, are probably going to involve some level of
measurement of subjective experience (certainly, any drug which is
specifically expected to provide pain relief). You can't tell me that
that particular aspect of a drug trial is not scientific. Actually, you
could; but you'd be wrong.
>
>> Actually, sometimes we can even "see" it (such as with PET &, more
>> often these days, fMRI) ...
>
> No, we do not. What you describe is observation of brain activity. There is no
> proven connection between that and consciousness.
Again, I was addressing subjective experience. We certainly can
find fMRI correlates of various experiences. It's a good start. On the
other side of things, inducing experiences (including those of
transcendence) by altering electrical patterns in the brain is trivial
these days.
>
> This concept is very difficult for some people to understand, which is why
> some scientists and others doggedly insist that consciousness can be
> physically explained. They don't understand the problem, so they cannot
> conceive of a solution. In the case of consciousness, it's what we are, so for
> some it is difficult to think about it in the abstract.
August Pamplona
Mxsmanic
> I didn't say that we know everything. I said we have an
> increasing (and I'll add now, non trivial) understanding of the process.
We don't understand the process at all. More specifically, our understanding
of the process is similar to the understanding of television by a person who
notes that kicking the TV set sometimes fixes it when it malfunctions.
> You clearly know little about developmental biology if you say
> we have no clue. We have lots of clues. The fact that Mxsmanic has no
> clue does not mean that people who do study developmental biology have
> no clue.
Fine. Explain the process from start to finish. I'd like to hear the details
from someone who has the "clues."
Mxsmanic
> I was actually referring to subjective experience since you are
> claiming that it is the fact that science cannot address experience
> which precludes it from ever learning anything about consciousness.
That is actually self-evident. Since experience is excluded from science,
something that consists solely of experience cannot be addressed by science.
That's the problem with consciousness.
> I can certainly make observations about your subjective experience.
No, you cannot. My subjective experience is mine alone. You cannot and do not
experience it. You don't even know if I have any subjective experience, and
you cannot prove that I do or I don't.
> The most basic way would be to simply ask you what you are feeling ...
How do you know that I'm telling the truth? How do you know that you're
talking to something that actually does experience consciousness, and not to a
robot? There is no test that allows you to distinguish between the two
through observation.
> You can't tell me that that particular aspect of a drug trial is not
> scientific.
It's scientific, but it's based on observation, not experience, so it is
useless for dealing with consciousness.
> Again, I was addressing subjective experience.
Subjective experience is consciousness. And it cannot be observed.
> We certainly can find fMRI correlates of various experiences.
We can neither prove a correlation nor prove cause and effect. There is no way
whatsoever to distinguish between a conscious and a non-conscious entity.
Bernd Jendrissek
> Do you see a lot of computers participating in this conversation?
I do: they enable us to participate at all. They are the sine qua non
of internet discussions. Computers are not apart from the system just
because their computations are implemented in silicon rather than in
sodium/potassium gradients.
Bernd Jendrissek
> It could be. We still don't really have any idea how life gets from DNA
> encoding to the complete organism. There isn't enough data in 750 MB to fully
> describe a complete organism, so clearly it is functioning as some sort of
> index to at least some extent. It can key into a virtually infinite number of
> possible designs, but as a self-contained blueprint it's only about the
> equivalent of a CD.
Or perhaps it just isn't necessary to "fully describe a complete
organism" just to build one?
Jared
> There isn't enough data in 750 MB to fully
> describe a complete organism, so clearly it is functioning as some sort of
> index to at least some extent.
I think that reasoning is a mistake.
The Mandlebrot set comes from a very simple equation, but there is
more detail in the output than there is in any organism.
The detail in the output is not stored anywhere; if you copy the
equation, you have copied everything.
Mxsmanic
> I do: they enable us to participate at all. They are the sine qua non
> of internet discussions. Computers are not apart from the system just
> because their computations are implemented in silicon rather than in
> sodium/potassium gradients.
Could this conversation take place in any form without computers? Could it
take place in any form without people?
Mxsmanic
> Or perhaps it just isn't necessary to "fully describe a complete
> organism" just to build one?
What sorts of things can be built without a fully detailed plan?
Bernd Jendrissek
> What sorts of things can be built without a fully detailed plan?
Arbitrarily exact approximations to a Sierpinski triangle.
Arbitrarily detailed ones of a Mandelbrot set. Arbitrarily
representative models of weather patterns.
It doesn't have to be fully detailed to be useful.
Bernd Jendrissek
Bernd Jendrissek
> There are some things it will never figure out, because they are metaphysical.
Argument by assertion. No evidence offered? Claim fails!
> The most obvious example is consciousness.
Obvious to whom?
Bernd Jendrissek
> And since consciousness
> consists exclusively of experience, it has no physical existence.
Your entire world view seems to consist of (untested) assertions which
you are unwilling to either defend with more than just other untested
assertions, or to question.
Michaela Mackenzie
An ego?
- Michaela
August Pamplona
Let me get this cleared up. You want me to write (or copy) a
developmental biology textbook & post it to a.s.s. for your amusement?
August Pamplona
> August Pamplona writes:
>
>> I was actually referring to subjective experience since you are
>> claiming that it is the fact that science cannot address experience
>> which precludes it from ever learning anything about consciousness.
>
> That is actually self-evident. Since experience is excluded from science,
> something that consists solely of experience cannot be addressed by science.
> That's the problem with consciousness.
No, experience is not excluded from scientific observation. I
have already shown you how this is not the case. Restating that it is
otherwise does not make it so.
>
>> I can certainly make observations about your subjective experience.
>
> No, you cannot. My subjective experience is mine alone. You cannot and do not
> experience it. You don't even know if I have any subjective experience, and
> you cannot prove that I do or I don't.
I don't have to experience what you experience to make
observations about what you experience. I also cannot experience a
single electron. So what?
>
>> The most basic way would be to simply ask you what you are feeling ...
>
> How do you know that I'm telling the truth?
I don't know if you are telling the truth. Just because a
measuring instrument (in this case saying "how are you feeling today,
Mxsmanic?") is not perfect does not render it without value. The fact is
that asking "how are you feeling today, Mxsmanic?" is of value in
accessing your subjective experience. Yes, there are issues with it (as
any doctor taking a patient history knows) but that does not mean it is
without value.
And, actually, if lying is a concern, there are ways to deal
with it (though they only apply to groups).
> How do you know that you're
> talking to something that actually does experience consciousness, and not to a
> robot? There is no test that allows you to distinguish between the two
> through observation.
I don't give a fuck if you are conscious or not. Now you are
just being evasive. I'm only addressing your patently false claim that
subjective experience is not amenable to scientific observation
(something which you claim to be a prerequisite to the gaining of any
scientific knowledge on the subject of consciousness).
>
>> You can't tell me that that particular aspect of a drug trial is not
>> scientific.
>
> It's scientific, but it's based on observation, not experience, so it is
It's an observation of subjective experience. The case of pain
is, in fact, the quintessential subjective experience. If you want to
find out if a patient is in pain, you ask the patient (and this is
considered to have the standard rather than some neurological correlate
--which, in addition to being useless, is also not something that anyone
would look at in a drug trial).
> useless for dealing with consciousness.
>
>> Again, I was addressing subjective experience.
>
> Subjective experience is consciousness. And it cannot be observed.
How did it feel to make yet another baseless assertion today,
Mxsmanic? Subjective experience alone is not consciousness.
>
>> We certainly can find fMRI correlates of various experiences.
>
> We can neither prove a correlation nor prove cause and effect. There is no way
> whatsoever to distinguish between a conscious and a non-conscious entity.
I don't know how to do it but I'm not going to make a baseless
assertion on this post and claim that it is, in principle, possible or
impossible. Mostly I like to leave that for philosophers, but my general
feeling is that if it behaves like it has consciousness, it does. This,
rather than give an answer, redefines the problem to the question of
what it means to behave like one has consciousness.
Mxsmanic
> Let me get this cleared up. You want me to write (or copy) a
> developmental biology textbook & post it to a.s.s. for your amusement?
I want you to explain how to get from a DNA molecule to a finished organism,
for validation of your own argument.
Mxsmanic
> Arbitrarily exact approximations to a Sierpinski triangle.
> Arbitrarily detailed ones of a Mandelbrot set. Arbitrarily
> representative models of weather patterns.
Give an example from start to finish.
Mxsmanic
> The Mandlebrot set comes from a very simple equation, but there is
> more detail in the output than there is in any organism.
No, there is not. The actual information content of the set is extremely
small, no greater than the information contained in the equation that
generates it.
You can build a checkerboard of any size, but its information content does not
increase with its size.
> The detail in the output is not stored anywhere; if you copy the
> equation, you have copied everything.
The detail--the information content--is in the equation, and it is minimal.
Remember, patterns have very low information content. The highest information
content is in random numbers.
Mxsmanic
> To what?
To the metaphysical being who "owns" the body.
Mxsmanic
> No, experience is not excluded from scientific observation.
Give me a scientific method for distinguishing between a conscious and a
non-conscious entity.
> I don't have to experience what you experience to make
> observations about what you experience.
You cannot observe what I experience, so you cannot make any comment on it at
all.
> I also cannot experience a single electron. So what?
So consciousness is metaphysical.
> The fact is that asking "how are you feeling today, Mxsmanic?"
> is of value in accessing your subjective experience.
Prove that there is a connection between the two. In fact, prove that I have
a subjective experience. Or prove that you do, for that matter. It cannot be
done.
> I don't give a fuck if you are conscious or not.
Now you don't, because you realize that you cannot prove it either way. It's
more satisfying to you to swear and feign indifference than to admit that
consciousness is not amenable to the scientific method. You hope to divert
attention from this fact, but I am not easily distracted.
> Now you are just being evasive.
I'm not the one being evasive. See above.
> I'm only addressing your patently false claim that
> subjective experience is not amenable to scientific observation
> (something which you claim to be a prerequisite to the gaining of any
> scientific knowledge on the subject of consciousness).
Prove it. Explain how to distinguish between a conscious and unconscious
object through observation.
> It's an observation of subjective experience.
There is no such thing. You cannot observe experience.
> How did it feel to make yet another baseless assertion today,
> Mxsmanic? Subjective experience alone is not consciousness.
They are one and the same, and neither can be scientifically proven to exist
or not exist.
> I don't know how to do it ...
It cannot be done. Nobody knows how to do impossible things.
> ... but I'm not going to make a baseless
> assertion on this post and claim that it is, in principle, possible or
> impossible.
It is self-evidently impossible.
> Mostly I like to leave that for philosophers, but my general
> feeling is that if it behaves like it has consciousness, it does.
In other words, you don't really know, and you cannot test it, so you guess.
That's not scientific.
Mxsmanic
> Your entire world view seems to consist of (untested) assertions which
> you are unwilling to either defend with more than just other untested
> assertions, or to question.
Your reply consists entirely of a personal attack. Who's making the better
arguments here?
You can prove me wrong by explaining how to distinguish between a conscious
and unconscious entity through observation.
Mxsmanic
> Argument by assertion. No evidence offered? Claim fails!
What evidence have you offered?
My assertion should be trivial to invalidate. Simply explain how to
distinguish between a conscious entity and an unconscious entity through
observation. But I already know that you cannot do that.
> Obvious to whom?
As I've said, some people understand it, and some don't. It's a bit like the
distinction between animals who are aware of their own existence, and those
who are not. Obviously, people who don't understand it are incapable of
investigating it and will reject all explanations of it as mumbo-jumbo.
August Pamplona
> August Pamplona writes:
[snip]
>> Now you are just being evasive.
>
> I'm not the one being evasive. See above.
Yes, you are being evasive. Though I do not see why we
shouldn't be able study consciousness in principle, I have not been
addressing that issue. I have been addressing your statement that "it's
unscientific to recognize consciousness, since consciousness
has no physical existence." because it implies that one cannot study
things which do not have a physical existence*. I think you understand
that that is what I was addressing and that is why I am claiming that
you are being evasive.
Like I said, observations can be made of subjective experience
and they can be made trivially. If it were not so, you would not be able
to draw conclusions as to whether a pain reliever works (since pain, as
a subjective experience, would not be amenable to observation).
[snip]
August Pamplona
* Where I wrote "you are claiming that it is the fact that science
cannot address experience..." I should have written "cannot address
things without a physical existence..." since my intent was to use
subjective experience as a trivial example of something which can be
observed which has no physical existence.
Jared
> Jared writes:
> > The Mandlebrot set comes from a very simple equation, but there is
> > more detail in the output than there is in any organism.
>
> No, there is not. The actual information content of the set is extremely
> small, no greater than the information contained in the equation that
> generates it.
Well, I think your definition of "information content" may be
dangerously slippery. But in any case, my point remains that if
something with as much organic-appearing detail as the mandelbrot set
can have as little of what you call "actual information content" as
the equation z = z^2 + c, then why can't the human organism have less
than a gigabyte of "actual information content"?
Look at this site; it's really mind-blowing.
http://www.bugman123.com/Hypercomplex/index.html#Nebulabrot3D
August Pamplona
Mxsmanic
> Well, I think your definition of "information content" may be
> dangerously slippery. But in any case, my point remains that if
> something with as much organic-appearing detail as the mandelbrot set
> can have as little of what you call "actual information content" as
> the equation z = z^2 + c, then why can't the human organism have less
> than a gigabyte of "actual information content"?
There are already nearly a gigabyte of individuals on the planet, and they are
all different, which implies that there is far more than just one gigabyte of
information content in a human being. And obviously a gigabyte is a lot more
than 750 MB.
Mxsmanic
> Yes, you are being evasive. Though I do not see why we
> shouldn't be able study consciousness in principle, I have not been
> addressing that issue. I have been addressing your statement that "it's
> unscientific to recognize consciousness, since consciousness
> has no physical existence." because it implies that one cannot study
> things which do not have a physical existence*.
Which things are we studying scientifically that have no physical existence?
Limerent Oil
> On Nov 28, 4:49 am, Limerent Oil <stevem...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> Mxsmanic wrote:
>>> Michaela Mackenzie writes:
>>>> On Nov 27, 12:35 am, Mxsmanic wrote:
>>>>> Our brains
>>>>> are still superior to existing computers,
>>>> Superior? Wait, I have to finish rotflol...
>>> Do you see a lot of computers participating in this conversation?
>
> I too respond unconsciously.
>
What does that suggest to you?
August Pamplona
You can study subjective experience. An example might be pain
(which has no physical existence) but it could be anything.
August Pamplona
August Pamplona
Awesome application of the pigeonhole exclusion principle! Too
bad that it's so horribly mistaken.
First, there is no one to one relationship between DNA and
organism (identical twins are never identical). Second, and by far most
important here, you made a colossal mathematical error. What you say
assumes that you can count to 256 with one byte (so far so good), to 512
with two bytes, to 1024 with three bytes, etc.. I hope you see where
this is going because that thinking is obviously very, very wrong.
Limerent Oil
> Jared writes:
>> Well, I think your definition of "information content" may be
>> dangerously slippery. But in any case, my point remains that if
>> something with as much organic-appearing detail as the mandelbrot set
>> can have as little of what you call "actual information content" as
>> the equation z = z^2 + c, then why can't the human organism have less
>> than a gigabyte of "actual information content"?
I agree with Mxs on this one. Since the Mandelbrot set is completely
specified by a short algorithm, its actual information content is very
small. Another way to think of it: A program for computing the
membership of points in the Mandelbrot set constitutes a highly
compressed representation of the entire set.
> There are already nearly a gigabyte of individuals on the planet, and they are
> all different, which implies that there is far more than just one gigabyte of
> information content in a human being. And obviously a gigabyte is a lot more
> than 750 MB.
750MB of data can represent 2^6,000,000,000 (or about 10^1,806,179,974)
distinct values. [Per recent convention, I take 1MB to be equal to 10^6
bytes; 2^20 bytes is denoted 1MiB.]
Anyway, 2^6,000,000,000 is such a vast number that it's not surprising
that no two humans have ever been found to be completely identical. Even
if only the minutest fraction of those values represent a viable human
organism, I would wager there are still far more viable humans in that
space than there are atoms in the entire known universe.
Jared
> Mxsmanic wrote:
> > Jared writes:
>
> >> Well, I think your definition of "information content" may be
> >> dangerously slippery. But in any case, my point remains that if
> >> something with as much organic-appearing detail as the mandelbrot set
> >> can have as little of what you call "actual information content" as
> >> the equation z = z^2 + c, then why can't the human organism have less
> >> than a gigabyte of "actual information content"?
>
> > There are already nearly a gigabyte of individuals on the planet, and they are
> > all different, which implies that there is far more than just one gigabyte of
> > information content in a human being. And obviously a gigabyte is a lot more
> > than 750 MB.
>
> Awesome application of the pigeonhole exclusion principle! Too
> bad that it's so horribly mistaken.
>
> First, there is no one to one relationship between DNA and
> organism (identical twins are never identical). Second, and by far most
> important here, you made a colossal mathematical error. What you say
> assumes that you can count to 256 with one byte (so far so good), to 512
> with two bytes, to 1024 with three bytes, etc.. I hope you see where
> this is going because that thinking is obviously very, very wrong.
To put it another way, if each person in the world is different, there
must be at least _33 bits_ of information in a human being. Or about 6
letters.
Of course, how do we know there aren't duplicates? Has anyone checked?
Jared
> Mxsmanic wrote:
> > Jared writes:
> >> Well, I think your definition of "information content" may be
> >> dangerously slippery. But in any case, my point remains that if
> >> something with as much organic-appearing detail as the mandelbrot set
> >> can have as little of what you call "actual information content" as
> >> the equation z = z^2 + c, then why can't the human organism have less
> >> than a gigabyte of "actual information content"?
>
> I agree with Mxs on this one. Since the Mandelbrot set is completely
> specified by a short algorithm, its actual information content is very
> small.
You're not addressing or disagreeing with what I'm saying. I'm saying,
let us assume the "actual information content" _is_ very small
(whatever that really means). Given how complex and non-repetitive it
_appears_, it makes it plausible that the human organism also has a
small amount of "actual information content".
What I'm arguing is that it's not incredible for the "actual
information content" of a person to be less than a gigabyte, when a
fractal appears to have unending complexity and the genome is hundreds
of millions of times larger than the code for simple equations.
August Pamplona
Exactly! Quite a bit less than 4 bytes and a bit. A far, far
cry from 750 MB.
>
> Of course, how do we know there aren't duplicates? Has anyone checked?
Identical twins would be duplicates barring mutations. In
practice, things aren't that simple. You can see, however, that you are
sampling such a huge probability space that duplicates are essentially
impossible (other than homozygotic twins which are identical only
because they constitute a single sampling event).
Bernd Jendrissek
Get a sheet of graph paper and mark the axes in the margins from, say,
-2 to +2 (this is arbitrary but will give a pretty picture). These
will represent your real and imaginary components of the complex
numbers represented by the points on the paper. We'll limit ourselves
to the intersections between the rulings on the paper - it is only an
approximation we will construct. Next, for each such intersection,
start the following process:
1. Define complex number c to be the point represented by the
intersection.
2. Choose z_0 = 0, and n = 1
3. Calculate z_n = (z_(n-1))^2 + c
4. If the magnitude of z_n exceeds 2, mark point as red and repeat
process at an unmarked intersection.
5. If n exceeds 20, mark point as green and repeat process at an
unmarked intersection.
6. If all intersections are marked, you are finished.
Congratulations! You have a representation of an approximation to the
Mandelbrot set over your chosen interval - and it's in green!
7. Increment n by 1
8. Go back to step 3
Bernd Jendrissek
> Jared writes:
> > The Mandlebrot set comes from a very simple equation, but there is
> > more detail in the output than there is in any organism.
>
> No, there is not. The actual information content of the set is extremely
> small, no greater than the information contained in the equation that
> generates it.
So how much actual information content is manifested in an organism?
> Remember, patterns have very low information content. The highest information
> content is in random numbers.
Sufficiently complicated patterns are inditinguishable from random
numbers.