general negative attack: justification
Tom Keating
Justification
When to use: Against ANY case that does not adress Russia's recent
problems:
Economic Collapse; Workers not getting paid; the threat of a return to
Communism.
"The negative believes this case is not justified to implement at this
time. Russia has much, much worse problems to adress and for the United
States to
(insert Aff's case here) would be an insult to Russians that the U.S.
dosn't care, and has its priorities way out of line."
OBSERVATION 1: Russia's economy is collapsing.
CNN September 17, 19998
"We, all of us, believed in the reform process," chamber head Scott
Blacklin
said. "And now it turns out we were wrong."
The ruble, which lost some 30 percent of its value on
the streets of Moscow
on Wednesday, was weaker again. On the SELT electronic
trading system
of the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange, it was
traded 15.80 per dollar
compared with an official 12.4509 on Wednesday. It was
worth 6.5 a month ago.
OBSERVATION 2: Russian workers aren't recieving pay.
(CNN) --September, 98
Some Russians wait for months to be paid. Workers, and
even state enterprises, resort to bartering to
survive. Discontent is
widespread, and revolt is a possibility. The troubles
in Russia
already have sent ripples through the world economy,
and could
trigger much worse.
One in two Russian workers receives no check on
payday.
Most wait for months. The Russian government owes 77
billion rubles to its employees, a third of all
rubles in circulation.
The private sector owes another 70 billion.
OBSERVATION 3: Russia's lawmakers are accomplishing no reforms to the
economy.
Page A02 of the Boston Globe on September 29, 1998.
Since the end of the Soviet Union, Russian governments
have insisted that there was `A Plan' to lead the
country toward
prosperity. Not the current Cabinet of Prime Minister
Yevgeny Primakov.
In the three weeks since Primakov took office, various
advisers have offered
a wide range of solutions to save Russia from the
financial paralysis that set
in when the previous government devalued the ruble and
defaulted on its
debt payments Aug. 17. Some have suggested paying the
government's
debts to workers and industry by printing rubles;
others advocate cutting
government spending and asking the International
Monetary Fund for new
loans.
But if there is consensus on anything in the new government, it is
that there is
no consensus on a single plan.
''All of the members of the new government understand that whatever
moves
they make will be terribly unpopular,'' the official
said. ''So they are trying to
put off doing anything as long as possible.''
OBSERVATION 4:Russia is looking to the U.S. for help
RUSSIA TODAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1998
"Everyone must understand that in the modern world,
global problems
cannot be resolved unilaterally," Yeltsin said in a thinly-veiled
criticism of
U.S. dominance of world affairs.
"IN CONCLUSION: There is no way to Justify (insert aff's case here)
with these serious problems facing Russia. Implementing (aff's case)
would be a slap on the face to Russian government and its citizens who
call on the U.S. to help face its crisis with real solutions, not (aff's
case)"
-Tom Keating
Email me for .txt format and the igloo font (it drives the point home
that you are talking about russia)
Also feel free to send suggestoins, critisism or mabey some evidence to
kea...@midusa.net
M. Williams
> When to use: Against ANY case that does not adress Russia's recent
> problems:
> Economic Collapse; Workers not getting paid; the threat of a return to
> Communism.
Who says those are the problems that should be addressed? You? The Great
Debate Gods? Why isn't the threat of accidental nuclear launch included? Why
isn't envirnmental collapse included? What about NATO? There are many authors
that say NATO is the biggest issue. What are the standards for which "recent
problems" should be addressed?
> "The negative believes this case is not justified to implement at this
> time. Russia has much, much worse problems to adress and for the United
> States to
> (insert Aff's case here) would be an insult to Russians that the U.S.
> dosn't care, and has its priorities way out of line."
Why do priorities matter? The resolution only asks that the affirmative prove
that the United States should substantially change its foreign policy toward
Russia. If this is proved with some minor harm, then the affirmative has
filled their burden.
> OBSERVATION 1: Russia's economy is collapsing.
<snippage>
> OBSERVATION 2: Russian workers aren't recieving pay.
<snippage>
> OBSERVATION 3: Russia's lawmakers are accomplishing no reforms to the
> economy.
<snippage>
> OBSERVATION 4:Russia is looking to the U.S. for help
<snippage>
Great, you just proved that there are at least 4 other reasons for the US to
change fp toward Russia. How does that help you as the negative? If I read an
economy add-on, am I "justified" under this absurd argument?
Furthermore, it is hypocritical for the negative to get up and whine about all
these problems when I'm seeing no CP in this wonderful strategy.
Where is the analysis that these 4 problems are the biggest? My acc. nuclear
launch cards say my harms are the greatest threat.
> "IN CONCLUSION: There is no way to Justify (insert aff's case here)
> with these serious problems facing Russia. Implementing (aff's case)
> would be a slap on the face to Russian government and its citizens who
> call on the U.S. to help face its crisis with real solutions, not (aff's
> case)"
I'm done for now. If some one actually defends this J argument, I'll make more
arguments against it.
NEGSTORY: You shouldn't vote aff because there are lot's of major problems in
Russia. We, as the negative, don't do a damned thing about said problems.
Vote for us! Oh yeah, and you don't want to slap Russia.
Matthew Williams
Bonneville Debate
Idaho Falls, Idaho
P.S. What's the impact to slapping Russian citizens in the face?
Robert Abel
debate theory. Although the strat posted wasnt of what you would consider high
calliber i feel the thought behind it idealisticly is something debaters like you
and myself and alot of other people should do more of: he shared a position he
thought was good with no wish to get something in return. I can only think of one
other person on this group who has in the past done a similar gesture. Matt
although i find no flaw in your theory argument perhaps its delivery and over all
presentation should be re adressed. By the way heres some evidence for the group
ive stumbled upon in the past: (by the way i firmly believe more people should do
this.)
Robert
FLHS debate
ps. the evidence is after the quote of matts post
M. Williams wrote:
REALISM KRITIK
1. WHAT REALISTS BELIEVE
Ole Holsti, George V. Allen Prof of Int'l Relations - Duke University,
Controversies in International Relations Theory, 1995, p.36-37.
Although realists do not constitute a homogeneous school - any more than do any of
the others discussed in this essay - most of them share at least five core premises
about international relations. To begin with, they consider the central questions
to be the causes of war and the conditions of peace. They also regard the structure
of the system as a necessary if not always sufficient explanation for many aspects
of international relations. According to classical realists, "structural anarchy",
or the absence of a central authority to settle disputes, is the essential feature
of the contemporary system. It gives rise to the "security dilemma": In a self-help
system, one nation's search for security often leaves its current and potential
adversaries insecure; any nation that strives for absolute security leaves all
others in the system absolutely insecure; and it can provide a powerful incentive
for arms races and other types of hostile interactions. Consequently, the question
of relative capabilities is a crucial factor. Efforts to deal with this central
element of the international system constitute the driving force behind the
relations of units within the system; those that fail to cope will not survive.
Thus, unlike "idealists" or "liberals", classical realists view conflict as a
natural state of affairs rather than a consequence that can be attributed to
historical circumstances, evil leaders, flawed sociopolitical systems, or
inadequate international understanding and education.
2. REALISM IS EMPIRICALLY UNSUPPORTED.
Dougherty, James E., University Scholar in Residence - St. Joseph's University
and Pfaltzgraff,
Robert L., Jr., Prof. of in'tl security studies - Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey,
1997, p.91.
Such behavior, according to Schroeder, has been more common than resorting to
self-help in the form of balancing, especially in the ease of smaller states. For
example, during
the Napoleonic wars, states large and small at some point either hid or engaged in
bandwagoning
rather than fighting or balancing France. In the years leading to World War II,
states such
as the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway refused either to arm or to join an
alliance to oppose Nazi
Germany. Instead, they remained strictly neutral. Great Britain and France sought
not to
balance, but instead to appease, Germany by abandoning Czechoslovakia, which
otherwise might
have contributed to a balance of power against Germany. Schroeder concludes that
the
major problem with neorealism is its effort to prescribe and predict a "determinate
order for
history without having adequately checked this against the historical evidence."
The result is
said to be a theory that obstructs new insights and hypotheses, while overlooking
"large bodies of
inconvenient facts.
3. CREDIBILITY THEORY HAS BEEN EMPIRICALLY DISPROVEN.
Jonathan Mercer, Institute of Security and Arms Control - Stanford University,
Reputation and
International Politics, 1996, pp.23-24.
Ted Hopf's work also casts doubt on deterrence's interdependence assumption. It
appears that Soviet decision-makers continued to view the United States as a highly
credible
adversary even after U.S. defeats ' in the Third World. The Soviets reasoned that
the United
States would continue to respond vigorously to roll back Soviet gains.34 Hopf's
findings of
Soviet perceptions of American resolve may be generalizable to American
policy-makers' perceptions
of Soviet resolve. Like their Soviet counterparts, American decision-makers did not
seem
to infer that behavior in one area results in similar behavior m another area. For
example, it
does not appear that the Reagan administration inferred from the Soviet withdrawal
from
Afghanistan that Gorbachev would behave similarly in Eastern Europe. Indeed,
Gorbachev's actions
in Afghanistan were taken to be those of a wily Leninist who would rather retreat
in an unimportant area in order to fight in an important one. According to one
Reagan
administration official: "If they do get out, we'd have to applaud. But we'd also
say, 'Watch out this
Kremlin rug salesman is going to try to parlay the new situation into a
denuclearization of Europe, a
new role for the Soviet Union in the Middle East, and so on.' "3s This anecdote
suggests that
behavior may not be interdependent and that it may be hard for an adversary to lose
its threatening
reputation.
4. CREDIBILITY THEORY IS FLAWED.
Jonathan Mercer, Institute of Security and Arms Control - Stanford University,
Reputation and
International Politics, 1996, p. 22.
Is it rational for decision makers to worry about their reputations for resolve?
If decision-makers give reputations to other states or actors, then it would be
foolish not to be
concerned with one's own reputation. Despite its importance to deterrence theory,
scholars have
uncovered little empirical evidence to support the assumption that commitments are
interdependent
and that reputations form. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing found only one instance in
which
a decision-maker gave another state a reputation. From this they concluded that
''statesman are apparently overly concerned about resolve reputation." They
speculate that a reputation for
resolve may be acquired or lost in specific geographic regions or on similar
issues.
5. GAME THEORY CANNOT EXPLAIN THE ROLE OF CREDIBILITY
Jonathan Mercer, Institute of Security and Arms Control, Stanford University,
Reputation and
International Politics, 1996, p. 39.
By addressing specific but not general reputations, game theorists miss an
aspect of reputation that has preoccupied decision-makers and traditional
deterrence theorists: the
possibility that observers draw general conclusions about our likely future
behavior based on
past behavior. For example, because many strategists and decision-makers believe it
is difficult to
make a threat to use nuclear weapons credible, they sometimes try to bolster their
reputation for
resolve at one level by being resolute in lower levels of conflict. For example,
Americans did
not fight and die in Vietnam simply to avoid future challenges in the same region
or over similar
issues, but to keep the United States from getting a general reputation as an
unreliable ally
or an irresolute adversary. John McNaughton advocated sending more ground troops to
Vietnam in
part "to show [the] world [the] lengths to which [the] U.S. will go to fulfill
commitments"
and to "firm up U.S. commitment in [the] eyes of all Reds, allies and neutrals." By
defining a
reputation as having validity only in the same situation, formal approaches so
truncate the concept
that it misses most of what we are interested in.
6. DETERRENCE IS FLAWED.
Jonathan Mercer, Institute of Security and Arms Control - Stanford University,
Reputation and
International Politics, 1996, p. 23.
Paul Huth and Bruce Russett make a significant contribution to the study of
deterrence success and failure by including past behavior as one of their
independent variables.
Their 1984 study found that past behavior had no impact on the outcome of crises.
Their more
recent studies suggest that Snyder and Diesing were on the right track. Huth and
Russett found
that the defender's past behavior and reputation are important only when the two
combatants have a continuing rivalry with prior confrontations. These later works
suggest that A's
past behavior toward B. C, and D is irrelevant to E, which infers A's future
behavior only
from A's past behavior toward E. Huth's recent case studies provide causal weight
to Huth and
Russett's 1984 study. Huth found that the defender's reputation affects deterrence
outcomes
only when the two combatants have a continuing rivalry with prior confrontations.
This finding is
important, but it has problems. Huth found that if A retreated from B's challenge
in one crisis, B
often challenged A in the next crisis. However, Huth also found that if A defeated
B's challenge
in one crisis, B often challenged A again in the next crisis. The only way to
prevent another
challenge by B is to end the crisis in stalemate. If a history of prevailing or
backing down prompts
a challenge, then a state's reputation cannot be the cause of these outcomes.30 The
answer may be to
examine what reputations decision makers give to their adversaries.
7. RATIONAL-ACTOR FOCUS OF REALISM IS INADEQUATE FOR A THEORY OF
CREDIBILITY.
Jonathan Mercer, Institute of Security and Arms Control - Stanford University,
Reputation and
International Politics, 1996, p. 44.
When a state abandons a commitment, how will its allies and adversaries explain
this behavior? Will they think it reveals an irresolution certain to reappear; will
they
explain it away by referring to unique circumstances; or win their explanations
differ?
To understand when reputations form we need to know how people tend to explain one
another's behavior. Rational-actor theories do not address perceptions of cause.
Social
psychological theories do.
8. NOW IS A KEY TIME FOR EVALUATING COMPETING INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORIES.
Kegley, Charles W., Jr., Prof of int'l relations - University of South Carolina,
Controversies in
International Relations Theory , 1995, p. 17.
The foregoing countervailing and discouraging developments suggest not the need
for the unrestrained re-embrace of realism alongside the repudiation of the new
liberal
approaches, but for a melding of the two. The post-Cold War setting described by
the essays in
this book will challenge students and scholars to resume the search (recall Herz,
1951; Wright,
1952) for that hybrid combination of both realist and liberal concepts around which
a new
paradigm might be organized The global system's evolving character encourages
considering how a
reconstructed theory that integrates the most relevant Matures of both theoretical
traditions
might be built, or, alternatively, if an altogether different theoretical framework
that transcends
them needs to be constructed
9. IF WE DO NOT RE-EVALUATE REALISM WE WILL BE UNABLE TO COPE WITH
NEW INTERNATIONAL REALITIES.
Kegley, Charles W., Jr., Prof of int'l relations - University of South Carolina,
Controversies in
International Relations Theory, 1995, p. 8.
As liberal theorists challenging realism warn, ff an increasingly outmoded
paradigm is religiously worshiped and new rationales are concocted for old
theoretical practices, our
ability to prepare productively for the emerging new realities will diminish. "It
is time," they
contend (Kober, 1990: 9), "for a new, more rigorous idealist alternative to
realism."
10. REALISM AND IDEALISM COMPETE AS THEORETICAL BASES FOR POLICY
MAKING.
Sheldon W. Simon, Prof of Political Science - Arizona State University, "Realism
and
neoliberalism: international relations theory and Southeast Asian security", ,
1995, p. 6.
Students of international politics have debated the efficacy of alternative
theories of state behaviour for decades. Among the most prominent of these debates
is the question
of whether world politics is a zero-sum conflict in which all state-actors view one
another
as unmitigated competitors versus the less gloomy vision of a world in which states
can best
achieve security and prosperity through cooperation rather than conflict. Put
simply, advocates
of the first school see international politics as a struggle for relative gains in
which the power
and status of states are determined hierarchically. The second school disagrees,
insisting that all
members of the system benefit when absolute gains are achieved across the system,
virtually
regardless of their distribution. Those who follow the first approach are called
realists; their
more optimistic rivals take the label: neoliberalists. These alternative visions
currently compete for
the attention of many statesmen in the post-cold war world, who are searching for
policies to
secure and advance their governments' fortunes.
11. REALISM PURPORTS TO BE A TOOL FOR FOREIGN POLICY MAKING.
Paul R. Viotti, Prof of Political Science - Univ. Colorado ~ Colorado Springs,
Mark V. Kauppi,
Defense Intelligence College - Washington, DC, International Relations Theory:
Realism,
Pluralism. Globalism, 1993, p.61.
Another reason for the longevity of realism is that this particular image of the
world most closely approximates the imaged held by practitioners of statecraft.
Realism has always
had a strong policy-prescriptive component, as we have already noted. Machiavelli's
The
Prince, for example, was expressly presented as a guide for the ruler. Nor is it
mere coincidence
that two of the best known American academics who held high positions in the U.S.
foreign policy
establishment in the 1970s, Henry A. Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, are both
self-professed
realists. The realist as academic speaks much the same language as the realist as
statesman:
power, force, national interest, and diplomacy.
12. REALISM FAILS TO ACCURATELY DESCRIBE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
HAS AN IDEOLOGICAL AGENDA
Dougherty, James., University Scholar in Residence -St. Joseph's University and
Pfaltzgraff,
Robert L., Prof. of Int'l Security Studies - Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey,
1997, p.92.
Realist writers, it has been noted, have been criticized for their efforts to
draw from the Eurocentric system of the past a series of political concepts for the
analysis
of a vastly different contemporary global international system. The pursuit of
limited national
objectives, the separation of foreign policy from domestic politics, the conduct of
secret
diplomacy, the use of balance of power as a technique for the management of power,
and the pleas for
nations to place reduced emphasis on ideology as a conditioner of international
conduct have
little relevance to the international system today. By urging that nations return
to the practices
of an earlier period, some realist writers overestimate the extent to which such
change in the present
international system is possible. If nations obey laws of nature, which the realist
purports
to have discovered, why is it necessary to urge them, as realists do, to return to
practices
supposedly based on such laws? Although history provides many examples of
international behavior that
substantiate classical realist theory, historical data offer deviant cases. In
calling on
state leaders to alter their behavior, the realist becomes normative in theoretical
orientation and fails to
provide an adequate explanation as to why political leaders sometimes do not adhere
to realist
tenets in foreign policy.
13. REALISM FAILS IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD - WE CANNOT BASE POLICY
ON IT.
Kegley, Charles W., Jr., Prof of int'l relations - University of South Carolina,
Controversies in
International Relations Theory, 1995, p. 6-7.
Third, to realism's challengers, the field of study cannot rest contently in
reaffirmation of familiar realist premises and rejection of new ones without first
demonstrating either
the advantages of the old or the inadequacies of the new. It must face the
question of whether
realism can account meaningfully for the new issues and cleavages that define
today's global agenda.
In the critics' view, in the wake of the Cold War conflict a window has opened to
expose a view
of international relations that realism largely ignores. 'lithe problem . . .
today
. . . is not new challengers for hegemony; it is the new challenge of transnational
interdependence" (Nye, 1992: 320), and it appears probable that "welfare, not
warfare, will shape the rules
land] global threats like ozone holes and pollution will dictate the agenda" Joffe,
1992: 35). As a
result of the pressures of these changes in global issues, the broadened global
agenda goes
beyond what realism can realistically be expected to address: International
relations have
parts which realist theory cannot reach" (Scholte 1993: 8). As one Bride complains,
realist
preoccupations operate as a gigantic distraction from the deeper challenges
associated with [the]
political, economic and social restructuring [occurring]" (Falk, 1992: 227). Given
this limitation, "the
approach of classical realism," Robert Jervis (1992: 26ti) predicts, "will not be
an adequate guide for the
future of international politics..."
14. REALISM CANNOT EXPLAIN THE END OF THE COLD WAR; IT MUST BE
INFORMED BY NEOLIBERALISM.
James L. Ray, Prof. of poli. sci-Florida State, Controversies in International
Relations Theory ,
1995, p. 350.
However, just as meteorologists can explain hurricanes quite well in theory, and
in retrospect, international relations theory is not without concepts and theories
that
"postdate," as it were, the end of the Cold War, without depending entirely on post
hoc reconstructions.
Surely, Rummel's theory of international conflict as developed in Understanding
Conflict and War,
for example (or any of the theoretical frameworks focusing on the peaceful nature
of
relationships between democratic states) imply that the autocratic protagonist in a
conflict like the
Cold War moves toward democracy, antagonism between the parties to that conflict
should
decrease significantly. Keeping this in mind, as well as the fact that even in
retrospect neither
realism nor neorealism is able to anticipate or explain the end of the Cold War in
this way, provides a
strong basis for an argument that, at the very least, the predominant paradigm in
international
relations is in need of important modifications to which neoliberalism can
contribute.
15. REALISM IS HOPELESS AS A POST COLD WAR THEORY
Ole Holsti, George V. Allen Professor of Int'l Relations - Duke University,
Controversies in
International Relations Theory , 1995, p. 57-58.
Recent events appear to have created an especially acute challenge to structural
realism. Although'~structural realism provides a parsimonious and elegant theory,
its
deficiencies are likely to become more rather 'than less apparent in the post-Cold
War world. Its
weaknesses in dealing with questions of system change and in specifying policy
preferences
other than survival and security are likely to be magnified. Moreover, whereas
classical realism
espouses a number of attractive prescriptive features (caution, humility, warnings
against
mistaking one's preferences for the moral laws of the universe), neorealism is an
especially
weak source of policy-relevant theory (George, 1993). Indeed, some of the
prescriptions put
forward by neorealists seem reckless; for example, the suggestion to let Germany'
join the
nuclear club (Mearsheimer, 1990). In addition to European economic cooperation,
specific
events that seem inexplicable by structural realism include Soviet acquieseenee in
the collapse
of its empire and peaceful transformation of the system structure. These
developments are
especially telling because structural realism is explicitly touted as a theory of
major powers
(Waltz, 1979). Consequently, even as distinguished a realist as Robert Tucker
(1992-1993: 36)
has characterized the structural version of realism as "more questionable than
ever."
16. REALISM IS USELESS FOR POLICY-MAKING
Kegley, Charles W., Jr., Prof of int'l relations - University of South Carolina,
Controversies in
International Relations Theory, 1995, p.8.
These reawakened liberal theorists warn that if policy makers steadfastly seek
to navigate the uncharted seas of the post-Cold War disorder with a realist
cartography, their
blind devotion could compromise their ability to prescribe viable policy paths to a
more
orderly and just global system. Alexander George's (1993) critique of neorealism's
severe limitations as
a policy-relevant theory is but one among many recent attacks of realism's policy
usefulness (for
example, see Hitchens, 1991).
17. REALISM FAILS TO EXPLAIN HOW THE WORLD REALLY WORKS - IT MUST BE
REJECTED.
Kegley, Charles W., Jr., Prof of int'l relations - University of South Carolina,
Controversies in
International Relations Theory, 1995, p. 7.
Fourth, mounting proof' has accumulated that "the realist paradigm does not
properly either describe or explain the world" (Banks, 1986: 16). An impressive
body of
empirical research has aggregated to reveal realism's "failure to provide an
adequate understanding of
the dynamics of peace and war [which are] at the heart of the paradigm (on the
topics that
realism claims to provide the best answers).... The dominant realist paradigm ...
has simply not
been up to the task. It has not been able to explain inconsistencies in a
satisfactory manner," and
this failure, John A. Vasquez (1993: 3-4, 10, 85) summarizes, has suggested that
"an entirely new
theoretical approach may be needed, one that will put both existing findings and
unresolved
questions into a perspective that makes sense of both."
18. REALISM'S FOCUS ON "NATIONAL INTEREST" IS MEANINGLESS FOR
EVALUATING FOREIGN POLICY ACTIONS.
Dougherty, James E., University Scholar in Residence - St. Joseph's University,
and Pfaltzgraff,
Robert L., Jr., Prof of Int'l Security Studies - Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Contending
Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 1997, p.91.
For several reasons, the national-interest concept has been the object of
criticism. According to one critic, "That national interest is a necessary
criterion of policy is
obvious and unilluminating. No statesman, no publicist, no scholar would seriously
argue that foreign policy
ought to be conducted in opposition to, or in disregard of, the national interest.
Moreover,
it is difficult to give operational meaning to the concept of national interest.
State leaders are
constraints, or given freedom, by many forces in interpreting the national
interest. They are
often the captive of their predecessors' policies. They interpret national interest
as a result of
their cultural training, values, and the data made available to them as decision
makers. According to
Michael Joseph Smith, realists, having adopted Max Weber's ethic of responsibility,
discussed
earlier this chapter, have not presented a competent set of criteria for judging
responsibility. Although, and perhaps because, they minimize the relevance of
ethics to international
relations, they appear not to recognize that "their judgement of morality and their
definition of the
national interest rested on their own hierarchy of values."
19. STATIST FOCUS OF REALISM IGNORES OTHER RELEVANT ACTORS.
Paul R. Viotti, Prof of Political Science - Univ. Colorado ~ Colorado Springs,
Mark V. Kauppi,
Defense Intelligence College - Washington, DC, International Relations Theory:
Realism
Pluralism. Globalism, 1993, p .63.
The state is the centerpiece of realist work. Few persons would disagree as to
the importance of the state in international affairs. The criticism, however, is
that realists are
so obsessed with the state that they ignore other actors and other issues not
directly related to the
maintenance of state security. Other nonstate actors multinational corporations,
banks, terrorists,
and international organizations are either excluded, downplayed, or trivialized in
the realist
perspective. Furthermore, given the national security prism through which realists
view the
world, other concerns such as the socioeconomic gap between rich and poor societies
or international
pollution rarely make the realist agenda. At best, such issues are dealt with in a
derivative
manner. A preoccupation with national security and the state by definition
relegates other
issues to secondary importance or bans them entirely from the realist agenda.
20. REALISM'S CONCEPT OF POWER IS FLAWED
Dougherty, James E., University Scholar in Residence: St. Joseph's University
and Pfaltzgraff,
Robert L., Jr., Prof. of in'tl security studies - Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey,
1997, p. 92.
In emphasizing power as the principal motivation for political behavior, realist
theory has not produced an acceptable definition of power. Similarly, the term
balance of power has numerous meanings, as discussed in Chapter 1. There are
formidable problems of measuring power, as noted earlier in this chapter. There is
no common unit into which power is converted for measurement in realist writings.
Moreover, power is necessarily related to the objective for which it is to be used.
The amount and type of power vary with national goals. In addition, realists have
been criticized for allegedly having placed too much emphasis on power, to the
relative exclusion of other important variables. In Stanley Hoffmann's view, "It is
impossible to subsume under one word variables as different as: power as a
condition of policy and power as a criterion of policy; power as a potential and
power in use; power as a sum of resources and power as a set of processes.''
M. Williams
> Matt
> although i find no flaw in your theory argument perhaps its delivery and over
all
> presentation should be re adressed.
Granted. My tone was harsher than it should have been. Sorry for any hurt
feelings. There were none intended.
Robert Abel
was sent to via e-mail and i didnt know so now i expect all of you to not read my
former message and not copy any of it
Robert
Tom Keating
4th...(http://cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9810/03/RB000359.reut.html) Zadornov
said on Friday that Russia was counting on getting loans worth $2.5
billion from IMF, World Bank and the government of Japan by the end
of this year to help stabilise its economy.
The IMF, which paid $4.8 billion from the new international aid package
in
July, has held off on the disbursement of a second $4.3 billion tranche
until it
sees a coherent economic programme presented by the Russian government.
I asked a person running for Kansas's Senate a week ago what he would do if he had 1
policy change he could make towards Russia, uncontended. He said that he would send the
brightest group of economists the U.S. has to offer over to Russia to hold a
restructuring sumit-- or something to that effect. (obviously a democrat) My question is,
could someone use the fact that if Russia had a "coherent economic programme presented"
then, the IMF would continue funding-- to lead to their advantages? Or would that be
extra fx or something like that?
Robert Abel wrote:
> oops its come to my attention this is harvex evidence and it is illegal to post. It
> was sent to via e-mail and i didnt know so now i expect all of you to not read my
> former message and not copy any of it
Harvez evidence is illegal to post? If that is so, everyone please send me all your good
harvex evidence so I may educate the public on what is illegal to post.
-Tom Keating
Robert Abel
the fines we'll talk
Tom Keating wrote:
> FROM CNN-October
> 4th...(http://cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9810/03/RB000359.reut.html) Zadornov
> said on Friday that Russia was counting on getting loans worth $2.5
> billion from IMF, World Bank and the government of Japan by the end
> of this year to help stabilise its economy.
>
> The IMF, which paid $4.8 billion from the new international aid package
> in
> July, has held off on the disbursement of a second $4.3 billion tranche
> until it
> sees a coherent economic programme presented by the Russian government.
>
> I asked a person running for Kansas's Senate a week ago what he would do if he had 1
> policy change he could make towards Russia, uncontended. He said that he would send the
> brightest group of economists the U.S. has to offer over to Russia to hold a
> restructuring sumit-- or something to that effect. (obviously a democrat) My question is,
> could someone use the fact that if Russia had a "coherent economic programme presented"
> then, the IMF would continue funding-- to lead to their advantages? Or would that be
> extra fx or something like that?
>
> Robert Abel wrote:
>
> > oops its come to my attention this is harvex evidence and it is illegal to post. It
> > was sent to via e-mail and i didnt know so now i expect all of you to not read my
> > former message and not copy any of it
>