#Brits thought Saddam WMD threat was pure crap
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Pre-war intelligence doubted chemical weapons threat, Chilcot inquiry
told
Inquiry into Iraq war hears that earlier intelligence on WMDs was
'sporadic and patchy'
Iraqis decorate a huge mural of Saddam Hussein, 2002.
Saddam Hussein's regime was not a natural ally of al-Qaida, the
Chilcot inquiry has been told. Photograph: Awad Awad/AFP/Getty Images
The government had intelligence days before the invasion of Iraq in
2003 that Saddam Hussein might not be able to use chemical weapons,
the inquiry into the war was told today.
But a senior official said this would not have affected the case for
war over the dictator's refusal to give up weapons of mass destruction
and to co-operate with UN inspectors.
Sir William Ehrman, who was director of international security at the
Foreign Office, revealed that earlier intelligence about Iraq's
programmes of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles had
proved "sporadic and patchy".
He said briefings for ministers included major caveats. In April 2000
the picture was described as "limited to chemical weapons"; in May
2001 the knowledge of WMD and ballistic missile programmes was
"patchy"; and in March 2002 the intelligence was "sporadic and
patchy".
In August 2002 a briefing noted that "we know very little" about
Iraq's chemical and biological weapons work since late 1998, and in
September 2002 the intelligence "remained limited". In March 2003,
however, Tony Blair told the Commons Saddam had chemical and
biological weapons. Later it was found that Saddam had no WMDs, having
failed to rebuild programmes from the first Gulf war.
Ehrman, now ambassador to China, said: "We did, I think on March 10,
get a report that chemical weapons might have remained disassembled
and Saddam had not yet ordered their assembly. There was also a
suggestion that Iraq might lack warheads capable of effective
dispersal of agents."
He did not think it made any difference to case for war. "From the
counter-proliferation point of view it just proved that he had been
lying and that he had prohibited items."
Following the invasion, he said, there was "surprise and concern" that
no WMDs had been found. "It wasn't what we had expected."
But Tim Dowse, who was head of counter-proliferation at the Foreign
Office, told the inquiry he had been confident WMDs would be found.
"My concern was that we should not announce things until we were
absolutely sure of our ground because it would have been a disaster,
frankly, in PR terms."
When asked about Blair's assertion of "massive evidence of a huge
system of clandestine laboratories", Dowse said: "I didn't advise him
to use those words."
Earlier, the inquiry was told there was no evidence of any serious
co-operation between Saddam Hussein's regime and al-Qaida after the
9/11 attacks, and contacts before had been sporadic. Iraq did not want
to be associated with the attacks and was not a natural ally of the
terrorists, civil servants said, as they confirmed that Baghdad was
not "top of the list" when it came to concerns over weapons capacity
in 2001. Iran, Libya and North Korea were considered greater threats.
Saddam had supported Palestinian terrorists but his regime's contacts
with groups linked to al-Qaida were sporadic, according to Dowse.
"There had been nothing that looked like a relationship between the
Iraqis and al-Qaida. In fact, after 9/11 we concluded that Iraq
actually stepped further back. They did not want to be associated with
al-Qaida. They weren't natural allies."
Dowse said he was not surprised by the notorious claim in the
government dossier to justify the 2003 invasion that Iraq could deploy
weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes.
"Speaking personally, when I saw the 45 minutes report, I did not give
it particular significance because it didn't seem out of line with
what we generally assessed to be Iraq's intentions and capabilities
with regard to chemical weapons."
He took the 45-minute claim to refer to a multi-barrelled rocket
launcher kept ready for deployment by Iraqi forces in the event of
conflict. "It certainly took on a rather iconic status that I don't
think that those of us who saw the initial report really gave � it
wasn't surprising," Dowse said.
Asked about suggestions that the 45 minutes referred to a possible WMD
strike against another nation, Dowse said: "I don't think we ever said
that it was for use in a ballistic missile in that way."
The inquiry panel member Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman replied: "But
you didn't say it wasn't."
Phlip
> with groups linked to al-Qaida were sporadic, according to Dowse.
> "There had been nothing that looked like a relationship between the
> Iraqis and al-Qaida. In fact, after 9/11 we concluded that Iraq
> actually stepped further back. They did not want to be associated with
> al-Qaida. They weren't natural allies."
Further, Saddam has enough experience with psychological warfare
against deluded populaces to know that an Al Qaeda attack against the
US would open the door for a Bushie move against Iraq. If he had known
anything about Al Qaeda plans for 9/11, he would have quietly but
ruthlessly defeated them.
Oh, and - guess what, wingnuts - he wouldn't have had any qualms about
messy operations that kill innocents, or torturing any captives,
either.