That is precisely where the ancient greeks went wrong. Science has
moved irreversibly in a different direction since then. Contemplating
your navel will not tell you anything about the laws of physics.
[Snip]
Franz Heymann
> > It might be possible to derive physics from logic.
>
> That is precisely where the ancient greeks went wrong. Science has
> moved irreversibly in a different direction since then. Contemplating
> your navel will not tell you anything about the laws of physics.
>
If we did not have the tools of logic, we could discern nothing about the
nature of reality. We use the tools of logic to discern the nature of events
and the relationship between facts. It would be inconsistent to then think
that reality could produce something illogical. That would negate the tools
themselves and leave you no method of discerning anything. We have already
accepted by its use that nature is ultimately logical as we have defined
logic. For otherwise we would not use it.
Buy the way, didn't the ancient Greeks deduce the existence of atoms long
before we could observe them? If there is an error in logic it is incurred
when they start applying contingencies to the principles. The error is
incurred when we start assuming the existence of things as the basis for the
existence of other things without even trying to discern the necessity of
the premise to begin with. But if something can be deduced from nothing more
than logic itself, no contingencies, then how can you argue with it? That
would be equivalent to arguing against the rules of argumentation itself.
And that would disqualify you from the debate altogether.
> That is precisely where the ancient greeks went wrong. Science has
> moved irreversibly in a different direction since then. Contemplating
> your navel will not tell you anything about the laws of physics.
Not so.
'I think therefore I am' must contain minimalist elements of computer
theory, and at least supply constraints on hardware possibilities.
Whether it is in fact possible to derive much physics from the above is
currently unknown, unless you have a working definition of the requirements
for consciousness.
Dirk
<snip repoat>
> It might be possible to derive physics from logic.
Not.
Goedel's Undecidability Theorem.
In brief, "all consistent axiomatic formulations of logic include
undecidable propositions."
Physics requires (through the Principle of Empiricism) all propositions to
be decidable through experimentation.
It follows that physics is not a "consistent axiomatic formulation of
logic."
Q.E.D.
Tom Davidson
Brighton, CO
You are missing the point that any logical sequence of deductions in
physics has to start with a set of postulates. The postulates, and
not the deductions from them, are what are being proposed as the laws
of nature.
Franz Heymann
>
>
You have not succeeded in proving any law of physics.
Franz Heymann
You don't consider that information processing capacity tells one anything
about any laws of physics? It tells me that (for example) at least one
dimension exists, given that the above statement is a sequence.
Dirk
It remains to be seen whether or not physics 'turtles all the way down' ala
Godel, or whether ultimately a TOE can be experimentally tested.
Dirk
And a TOE would have how many postulates?
Dirk
"Mike" <no....@please.com> wrote in message
news:hf8L7.54354$lV4.7...@e420r-atl1.usenetserver.com...
>
> You are missing the point that any logical sequence of deductions in
> physics has to start with a set of postulates. The postulates, and
> not the deductions from them, are what are being proposed as the laws
> of nature.
It would be presumptuous to just assume a set of postulates without reason
for them. But if you do have reason for the postulates, then you have
discovered new postulates. That is why we are continually revising our
theories, because our postulates keep changing. How can you deny that
logical consistency is not a postulate when you keep using it to determine
the nature of reality?
Godels theorem only applies to discrete, countable systems of arithmetic.
There's no evidence that his theorem applies to continuous systems.
<snip>
> It remains to be seen whether or not physics 'turtles all the way down'
ala
> Godel, or whether ultimately a TOE can be experimentally tested.
The implication of "turtles all the way down" is that physics cannot be
described by a finite set of axioms. There are no mathematical or logical
descriptions of systems in which there are infinite sets of axioms.
I would conjecture that such a system would exhibit a logical contradiction,
although it may not be possible to prove that any such system must contain a
logical contradiction.
The implication of empiricism is that any theory must in principle be
testable, that the test may in principle be carried out by any competent and
suitable equipped investigator, and that the results will be repeatable.
This property of testability is coextensive with the definition of "physical
theory;" any theory that is not in principle testable in this manner is not
a physical theory. One must, in principle, be able to test whether or not
there is a turtle who is standing on something other than another turtle.
Tom Davidson
Brighton, CO
<snip>
> And a TOE would have how many postulates?
As many as needed, and no more - Occam's Razor applies.
Tom Davidson
Brighton, CO
The work being done with respect to a TOE is generally moving in the
direction of discrete everything.
Dirk
Then as a worst case we might end up with no testable physics, but competing
sets of mathematical theologies.
Dirk
The "theories" are just mathematical expressions. And we hope measurements
will be as predicted by the theory.
Since when was Occam's Razor deduced from logic?
The quantized values are the result of differential equations with respect
to continuous variables.
I also felt at that time that breaking one's manuscript up into small
paragraphs of only a few simple sentences produces a great improvement in
readability. I still feel the same.
In physics it is of critical importance to be able to communicate precisely
and unambiguously. You use many phrases and word groupings that "sound"
scientific, but have no exact technical meaning: "atomic wake path", "twenty
four-orbit codes", "using the polymersase chain to conduct the alignment",
and many more.
There is no web site called "Franklin mint.con" (the phrase "Freudian slip"
comes to mind). The site "Franklinmint.com" contains no reference to "CE
CROSS RING" that their search engine could find.
You are evidently describing a graphic that is not provided, yet would seem
essential to grasping your meaning. Hence, you obfuscate you own ideas.
"Self-defeating" would be an understatement.
Whatever possessed you to believe this **** would be of interest to
physicists?
Tom Davidson
Brighton, CO
"Gregory C Wynacht" <genom...@interbel.net> wrote in message
news:9tk3no$518q$1...@news3.infoave.net...
> Sphinx, sacred geometry flower of life, High Gothic life-sized, statue.
The
> Gero Crucifix carved in Germany. High gothic architectural stained glass
> alignments, the mathematics of Sriyantra, Holy Grail. " But" the "CELTIC
> CROSS" stand in testifies. Look up, Franklin mint.con go to dazzling Gems,
> look for(the power emerald isle CE CROSS RING). I mead no more proof then
> this. There on the cross of rings illustrating is a three dimensional
atomic
> wake path, inscribed two dimensionally. My work is completely
'constructed'
> with this form. For the twenty four-orbit codes I gave to many freely. Is
> the sequence platform to genome sequencing. The twenty-four orbits consist
> of circles, if you are using the polymersase chain to conduct the
alignment.
<flush>
<snip repost>
If all such mathematical theologies produce the same predictions, then they
are mathematically equivalent. If not, then one contradicts the other which
we should hope would be over a prediction that IS testable.
And the crux of the problem is:
How do we know that is the minimum number?
Dirk
I don't really think that this approach will work in the end.
We may get a better theory, but not a TOE.
Without having any proof, I feel that Nature is discreet and finite.
Dirk
>> > I would conjecture that such a system would exhibit a logical
>> contradiction,
>> > although it may not be possible to prove that any such system must
>contain
>> a
>> > logical contradiction.
How so? Consider a consistent system S, complex enough to have an
undecidable proposition P_S. Add P_S or its negation as an axiom to
get a consistent system S'. Obviously this has an undecidable as well.
Continue in this way to get more elaborate systems. Take the union to
have an infinite but consistent set of axioms.
Assuming that at every step we just found 1 undecidable pair of
statements (each the other's negation), we can in fact get card(R)
distinct such infinite consistent sets of axioms!
--
Pbatenghyngvbaf! Ol qrpelcgvat guvf zrffntr lbh unir ivbyngrq gur Qvtvgny
Zvyyraavhz Pbclevtug Npg.
Take my handle, turn the space into an underscore, and add "@hotmail.com"
to get my email.
<snip>
> Then as a worst case we might end up with no testable physics, but
competing
> sets of mathematical theologies.
Physics exists. Testability exists. Without testability, what you are doing
is not physics.
The subject matter of mathematics is provable.
The subject matter of theology must be taken on faith.
Any questions?
Tom Davidson
Brighton, CO
<snip>
> Since when was Occam's Razor deduced from logic?
Since when is physics perfectly logical? Empiricism, as a principle of
physics, is not logical, but it ensures consistency - with what we like to
call "physical reality."
Tom Davidson
Brighton, CO
> > > The work being done with respect to a TOE is generally moving in the
> > > direction of discrete everything.
> >
> > The quantized values are the result of differential equations with
respect
> > to continuous variables.
>
> I don't really think that this approach will work in the end.
> We may get a better theory, but not a TOE.
> Without having any proof, I feel that Nature is discreet and finite.
Well, of course, we can use the Dirac delta function to make discrete values
out of continuous distribution.
How can you know if you have a consistent system if you don't know if you
have a complete system? The next axiom you add may be inconsistent with the
rest. So how can you justify the assumption that you have a consistent
system?
Since we have never observe or expect to ever observe a direct provable
contradition in the facts of reality.
> Empiricism, as a principle of
> physics, is not logical, but it ensures consistency - with what we like to
> call "physical reality."
Consistency is just another name for logic.
No, and this is precisely Franz's point. The Greeks were split into
two camps; one camp believed that you could subdivide indefinitely,
and the other that there was a limit to subdivision. Neither camp
had any evidence for their views, it was just a matter of philosophy
and aesthetics. We remember Democritus because he turned out to be
right in the end, but he was just lucky.
The success of science would not have been possible if we had retained
the Greek attitude that physical truth can be correctly determined
through contemplation and debate.
--
The Scarlet Manuka
It seems to me that the ancient Greeks failed because they were still
reasoning from contingency, applying logic to facts, without deriving facts
from logic. They did not have the tools to impose a math on logic to come up
with a necessary development of generalized facts. How can you argue with
logic? That would only disqualify one from the debate. For that would negate
the very principles of reason and discernment.
I'm not sure why you say this. At each stage we add an axiom that is not
decidable from the previous ones; that is, both S u {P_S} and S u {P_S'}
are consistent systems. There is a well-defined method for producing
such a P_S from S, given that S is complex enough. So the construction
works.
In other words, if S u {P_S} was not a consistent system, P_S would not
be undecidable in S.
--
The Scarlet Manuka
But it is well-known, for instance, that the current major accepted
theories (GR and QM) contradict each other when we get to the
interesting bits; thus, while we expect reality to be consistent,
it doesn't follow that the (partial) descriptions and theories we
develop will also be consistent. Indeed, removing inconsistencies
usually heralds a major advance, as for instance QM did in removing
such inconsistencies as the expected but not observed energy loss
of an orbiting charged particle.
--
The Scarlet Manuka
That's interesting; it seems to me that they failed because they did
precisely the reverse -- supposing that what seemed logical must be
factual. And conflating 'logical' and 'aesthetically appealing'.
> They did not have the tools to impose a math on logic to come up
> with a necessary development of generalized facts.
I'm not sure what you mean by that. What is a generalised fact?
> How can you argue with logic? That would only disqualify one from
> the debate. For that would negate the very principles of reason
> and discernment.
The problem is that there are usually very many logically consistent
possibilities, only one of which is correct. This one may not be one
that springs to mind naturally, so starting with a logical framework
and building on it may lead you to a completely different conclusion.
--
The Scarlet Manuka
> > > The success of science would not have been possible if we had retained
> > > the Greek attitude that physical truth can be correctly determined
> > > through contemplation and debate.
> >
> > It seems to me that the ancient Greeks failed because they were still
> > reasoning from contingency, applying logic to facts, without deriving
> facts
> > from logic.
>
> That's interesting; it seems to me that they failed because they did
> precisely the reverse -- supposing that what seemed logical must be
> factual. And conflating 'logical' and 'aesthetically appealing'.
If I'm not mistaken, they reasoned from what particular facts may already exist
to other things that they did not know. The trouble being that they may not
have correctly described the things that already exist. In other words, their
premises were wrong from which they drew their conclusions.
>
> > They did not have the tools to impose a math on logic to come up
> > with a necessary development of generalized facts.
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by that. What is a generalised fact?
A fact, when all is said and done, is discribed by a conjunction of properties
from all the possible properties that may exist. In other words, a fact is the
intersection of various sets into which we classify the various properties.
Thus an event (fact) is a region in set theory space over which we may impose
some arbitrary coordinate system to study the dynamics of it mathematically.
>
> > How can you argue with logic? That would only disqualify one from
> > the debate. For that would negate the very principles of reason
> > and discernment.
>
> The problem is that there are usually very many logically consistent
> possibilities, only one of which is correct. This one may not be one
> that springs to mind naturally, so starting with a logical framework
> and building on it may lead you to a completely different conclusion.
Yes, your conclusions can be false if your premises are incorrect. But if you
do not start with anything other than just pure principle, then your
conclusions cannot be wrong. And if no event can contradict the principles of
logic, as we assume, then it must be that all events can be derived from logic.
It may be that we have to assume that something approaches infinity or zero to
develop a workable equation for engineering purposes. It may not be exact, and
it may result in contradictions, but it may be the only way to derive a
workable equation.
However, finding equations to match the empirical data will never prove where
the equations came from to begin with. It will never answer why things are as
they are. And there will come a point where we cannot produce the energies high
enough to confirm the latest theory since it would take all the energy in the
universe to create the universe to confirm the theories of creation. But if we
always ask why and how things are logically consistent, then this is the same
as saying that things are derived from logic.
> > > How so? Consider a consistent system S, complex enough to have an
> > > undecidable proposition P_S. Add P_S or its negation as an axiom to
> > > get a consistent system S'. Obviously this has an undecidable as well.
> > > Continue in this way to get more elaborate systems. Take the union to
> > > have an infinite but consistent set of axioms.
> >
> > How can you know if you have a consistent system if you don't know if you
> > have a complete system? The next axiom you add may be inconsistent with
> the
> > rest. So how can you justify the assumption that you have a consistent
> > system?
>
> I'm not sure why you say this. At each stage we add an axiom that is not
> decidable from the previous ones; that is, both S u {P_S} and S u {P_S'}
> are consistent systems. There is a well-defined method for producing
> such a P_S from S, given that S is complex enough. So the construction
> works.
Complexity is not the issue, it is discrete countability so that you can assign
numbers to the operators that operate on numbers so that it is possible to
construct an expression that states with numbers that "this statement is not
provable".
>
> In other words, if S u {P_S} was not a consistent system, P_S would not
> be undecidable in S.
Is this saying that every inconsistent system is complete? We can describe
everything else with inconsistencies? I don't know about that.
Yes; "complex enough" seemed like a reasonable way of avoiding the details
while getting the essence of the idea across.
> > In other words, if S u {P_S} was not a consistent system, P_S would not
> > be undecidable in S.
> Is this saying that every inconsistent system is complete? We can describe
> everything else with inconsistencies? I don't know about that.
But this is trivial. In an inconsistent system every statement is provable
by contradiction. If S is inconsistent then for any proposition P, S u {~P}
is inconsistent, so S |= P (i.e. P is provable in S).
However, I wasn't actually saying this, only that by definition of
inconsistency, if S u {P} is inconsistent then P is provably false
in S. So if we take P to be an undecidable statement in a consistent
system S it is not possible for S u {P} to be inconsistent.
--
The Scarlet Manuka
[ancient Greeks]
> If I'm not mistaken, they reasoned from what particular facts may already
exist
> to other things that they did not know. The trouble being that they may
not
> have correctly described the things that already exist. In other words,
their
> premises were wrong from which they drew their conclusions.
This is no different from modern physics; we know that some aspects
of our descriptions of things are incorrect, and that we'll have
to change our theories as soon as we can find something that doesn't
have the same problems. (More or less.)
The main problem for the Greeks, as I see it, is that they believed
their intuition and aesthetic sense was a reliable guide to the areas
they did not understand. Circles are the most aesthetically appealing
shape, so the earth must be spherical (close enough for the time) and
orbits must be circular (not close enough for the time, hence all the
stuff about epicycles and so on). Hence also some of the problems
they ran into with infinitesimals, etc. Not that I blame them;
infinitesimals are tricky at best. But it's true in both mathematics
and physics that one's intuitive sense is usually highly misleading
until it has been trained properly (and often afterwards, too).
> A fact, when all is said and done, is discribed by a conjunction of
properties
> from all the possible properties that may exist. In other words, a fact is
the
> intersection of various sets into which we classify the various
properties.
I'd hate to have to interpret this with any degree of rigour.
I'd think that it would be impossible to prove that most properties
correspond to sets at all.
> Thus an event (fact) is a region in set theory space over which we may
impose
> some arbitrary coordinate system to study the dynamics of it
mathematically.
I doubt that this is ever going to be possible except for exceedingly
simple facts.
> > The problem is that there are usually very many logically consistent
> > possibilities, only one of which is correct. This one may not be one
> > that springs to mind naturally, so starting with a logical framework
> > and building on it may lead you to a completely different conclusion.
> Yes, your conclusions can be false if your premises are incorrect. But if
you
> do not start with anything other than just pure principle, then your
> conclusions cannot be wrong. And if no event can contradict the principles
of
> logic, as we assume, then it must be that all events can be derived from
logic.
No, that does not follow. As I said, logic leaves a great many
possibilities; it is the external world that rules out all but one.
From logic I can derive that either it is raining or it is not,
but I can't tell which unless I look out the window.
--
The Scarlet Manuka
Or, at least, such approximations may well be good enough for the
purpose, in the same manner that we still use Newtonian physics
for spacecraft orbits - the corrections are not significant
enough in the required domain for it to be worth calculating them.
> However, finding equations to match the empirical data will never prove
where
> the equations came from to begin with.
The equations come from human imagination. The question is where the
empirical data came from, and why it arrived the way it did; but I
think this is really what you mean.
> But if we
> always ask why and how things are logically consistent, then this is the
same
> as saying that things are derived from logic.
No, it is not; it is the same as saying that things are derived from
logic and observation. There is a huge difference.
The Greeks tried to replace observations they couldn't make with
intuitive or aesthetic ideals. It didn't really work very well.
Sometimes they were right, sometimes wrong, but the only truthful
answer would have been "not enough evidence to say". They thought
otherwise because they felt that the universe should have been
constructed on aesthetic as well as logical principles; but later
observations demonstrated that either this was not the case, or
the aesthetic principles in question didn't match the Greeks' own.
--
The Scarlet Manuka
Logic is not a fact deriving tool. It is only a machine you can use
to derive the truth value of statement based on the truth value of
other statements you fed into said machine. And it can say nothing
about the truth value of the initial statements.
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
me...@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Nonsense, axiomatic; propositional logic, syllogistic logic, first order
monadic predicate logic, higher order predicate logic with finite yet
undetermined domains, etc., are all consistent and without
undecidable propositions.
Owen
>
>Physics requires (through the Principle of Empiricism) all propositions to
>be decidable through experimentation.
>
>It follows that physics is not a "consistent axiomatic formulation of
>logic."
>
>Q.E.D.
>
>
>Tom Davidson
>Brighton, CO
>
>
The only proposal for a TOE of which I am aware is a theory which
would consolidate the elecrtoweak, strong and gravitational forces
into one. It would need just enough postulates to make it a viable
theory. The number will quite certainly be more than zero.
Franz Heymann
Nonsense. You seem to be inaware of the basics of the scientific
method.You are free to make any postulates you wish. You then make
deductions from them You then compare the deductions with
experimental observations. If there is a mismatch, you discard the
postulates and try again. If the observations agree with the
predictions, your postulates will live for another attempt to negate
them. That is the inevitable fate of any theory in physics. It can
never be proved, it can only continue to be subjected to more and more
tests. As time goes on, you gain more and more confidence in applying
the theory in domains in which it has survived experimental tests.
> But if you do have reason for the postulates, then you have
> discovered new postulates. That is why we are continually revising
our
> theories, because our postulates keep changing. How can you deny
that
> logical consistency is not a postulate when you keep using it to
determine
> the nature of reality?
I have never denied what you claim above. Logical consistency in a
theory is certainly one of the postulates which usually goes without
saying.
Franz Heymann
You are raising a particularly poor strawman. Nobody has ever
asserted that logic is not part of the armoury of the scientific
method. But it is only part of the armouty withal.
The reason for the many failures of the Greek philosophers to get to
grips with making scientific progress was that they had little notion
of the importance of an experimental approach towards learning about
the facts of nature.
Franz Heymann
So at last you admit that logic alone is powerless without premises,
hypotheses, postulates or whatever.
> >
> > > They did not have the tools to impose a math on logic to come up
> > > with a necessary development of generalized facts.
> >
> > I'm not sure what you mean by that. What is a generalised fact?
>
> A fact, when all is said and done, is discribed by a conjunction of
properties
> from all the possible properties that may exist. In other words, a
fact is the
> intersection of various sets into which we classify the various
properties.
> Thus an event (fact) is a region in set theory space over which we
may impose
> some arbitrary coordinate system to study the dynamics of it
mathematically.
To my untutored mind that sounds like gobbledegook On second
thoughts, it would sound like gobbledegook even to a tutored mind.
> >
> > > How can you argue with logic? That would only disqualify one
from
> > > the debate. For that would negate the very principles of reason
> > > and discernment.
> >
> > The problem is that there are usually very many logically
consistent
> > possibilities, only one of which is correct. This one may not be
one
> > that springs to mind naturally, so starting with a logical
framework
> > and building on it may lead you to a completely different
conclusion.
>
> Yes, your conclusions can be false if your premises are incorrect.
But if you
> do not start with anything other than just pure principle,
Please define the term "pure principle". It sounds like nonsense to
me.
> then your
> conclusions cannot be wrong. And if no event can contradict the
principles of
> logic, as we assume, then it must be that all events can be derived
from logic.
Franz Heymann
The existence of a sequence of computational steps tells me nothing
about the nature of space. To infer anything at all about space needs
an experimental observation of the properties of space.
>
Franz Heymann
I am not certain of that, but I lean towards the idea that you are
wrong. Last time I saw a proof of Godel's theorems, I did not notice
any reference to discreteness or countability. Perhaps both of us
need to reread the proof.
Franz Heymann
More often discrete than discreet :-)
Franz Heymann
And hence such musings would remain outside the boundaries of science.
Franz Heymann
On the contrary, the theories are the premises which form the starting
points from which mathematical deductions are made.
Franz Heymann
And this is exactly where science is going wrong. Such an approach is
doomed from the start. I don't know if you noticed but not much
progress has been made in fundamental physics for a very long time
now. Is it because there is nothing else to find? Of course not, the
models are far from perfect.
The method used to investigate is faulty. You can not base a new
theory on postulates. You base a theory on facts you observe. You put
all the facts you can observe from reality and you put them together.
You can not go the other way. Its like trying to solve a puzzle by
guessing what the end result looks like. The end result is already
there!!! look at it...and put the pieces together...
neoprog
That's all I'd ask of any theory derived from pure logic.
> The main problem for the Greeks, as I see it, is that they believed
> their intuition and aesthetic sense was a reliable guide to the areas
> they did not understand.
Don't confuse logic with intuition. Logic is a strict disciple just as much
as mathematics.
> > A fact, when all is said and done, is discribed by a conjunction of
> properties
> > from all the possible properties that may exist. In other words, a fact
is
> the
> > intersection of various sets into which we classify the various
> properties.
>
> I'd hate to have to interpret this with any degree of rigour.
> I'd think that it would be impossible to prove that most properties
> correspond to sets at all.
properties, catagories, sets... they are all the same thing.
> > > The problem is that there are usually very many logically consistent
> > > possibilities, only one of which is correct. This one may not be one
> > > that springs to mind naturally, so starting with a logical framework
> > > and building on it may lead you to a completely different conclusion.
> > Yes, your conclusions can be false if your premises are incorrect. But
if
> you
> > do not start with anything other than just pure principle, then your
> > conclusions cannot be wrong. And if no event can contradict the
principles
> of
> > logic, as we assume, then it must be that all events can be derived from
> logic.
>
> No, that does not follow. As I said, logic leaves a great many
> possibilities; it is the external world that rules out all but one.
> From logic I can derive that either it is raining or it is not,
> but I can't tell which unless I look out the window.
Your logic made no conclusion about whether it was raining that could be
tested.
> > > > They did not have the tools to impose a math on logic to come up
> > > > with a necessary development of generalized facts.
> > >
> > > I'm not sure what you mean by that. What is a generalised fact?
> >
> > A fact, when all is said and done, is discribed by a conjunction of
> properties
> > from all the possible properties that may exist. In other words, a
> fact is the
> > intersection of various sets into which we classify the various
> properties.
> > Thus an event (fact) is a region in set theory space over which we
> may impose
> > some arbitrary coordinate system to study the dynamics of it
> mathematically.
>
> To my untutored mind that sounds like gobbledegook On second
> thoughts, it would sound like gobbledegook even to a tutored mind.
Are you saying that things and events cannot be describe as having a
particular set of various properites? Are you saying that properites are not
synonymous with catagories or sets? If we are trying to derive what
properties are available to discribe events to begin with, then we must
start with the assumption that we do not know what those particular
properties are. And we must study the dynamics of how properites in general
(regions in set space) change. The above discribes a procedure to do so.
> > > Yes, your conclusions can be false if your premises are incorrect.
> But if you
> > do not start with anything other than just pure principle,
>
> Please define the term "pure principle". It sounds like nonsense to
> me.
general principles valid for any particulars whatsoever, which particulars
we cannot presume to know to begin with when we are trying to discern how
those particular properties (gravitation, electromagnetics, space-time,
mass-energy) came into being to start with.
> You are raising a particularly poor strawman. Nobody has ever
> asserted that logic is not part of the armoury of the scientific
> method. But it is only part of the armouty withal.
> The reason for the many failures of the Greek philosophers to get to
> grips with making scientific progress was that they had little notion
> of the importance of an experimental approach towards learning about
> the facts of nature.
By all means, do test the validity of any consequences derived from any
theory.
But when we are trying to derive the very first facts (how the universe came
into being, etc.), then it is not possible to start with know facts yet. We
can only rely on general principles that apply to any supposed facts
whatsoever.
Who knows?
I may have spelled it correctly!
Anyway, that's really what this thread is about.
Dirk
Possibly.
However, what are the minimum requirements for a Turing Machine (as an
analogy to consciousness)?
Dirk
Dirk
Not necessarily.
One possibility is that of the All Universes Hypothesis.
That is, everything exists - all possible mathematical constructs have a
physical reality.
The rest is a selection effect based around the Anthropic Principle that
would yield an ensemble of viable possibilities for this reality.
Dirk
> However, I wasn't actually saying this, only that by definition of
> inconsistency, if S u {P} is inconsistent then P is provably false
> in S. So if we take P to be an undecidable statement in a consistent
> system S it is not possible for S u {P} to be inconsistent.
In other words, you impose the ASSUMPTION that S is consistent before even
knowing all the axioms?
Well, I'm hopoing that m Brane theory will pan out experimentally.
Then we'll be off to a riproaring new start in physics.
Even if it comes to nothing, it seems like the situation almost exactly a
century back.
'Just a few loose ends'.
The biggest visible one being GTR+QM
And a lesser one that may or may not be relevenet, Consciousness + Computer
Theory.
Dirk
Please fill in the instances in which physics has gone wrong and has
not subsequently been corrected by the further progress of the
subject.............................................................
> Such an approach is
> doomed from the start.
On the contrary, no other way of progressing in physics has ever been
successful.
> I don't know if you noticed but not much
> progress has been made in fundamental physics for a very long time
> now.
Not as long as the time between Copernicus or Galileo and Newton.
> Is it because there is nothing else to find?
Has it not struck you that the next step is simply very difficult to
take?
> Of course not, the
> models are far from perfect.
That is precisely why physics is still very much a live subject, as
distinct from religion.
>
> The method used to investigate is faulty.
More than one method is used to investigate physical phenomena are in
use. Please fill in a list of the ones which are faulty
...................................................................
> You can not base a new
> theory on postulates.
On the contrary, one cannot formulate a theory without having
postulates on which to base it. If you believe otherwise, please base
any new postulate-free theory of your choice in the space provided
here......................................................
> You base a theory on facts you observe.
> You put all the facts you can observe from reality and you put them
together.
> You can not go the other way. Its like trying to solve a puzzle by
> guessing what the end result looks like. The end result is already
> there!!! look at it...and put the pieces together...
Franz Heymann
Mike wrote:
>
> That's all I'd ask of any theory derived from pure logic.
What about theories who semantics make no references to
the physical world?
Bob Kolker
> I don't really think that this approach will work in the end.
> We may get a better theory, but not a TOE.
> Without having any proof, I feel that Nature is discreet and finite.
> Dirk
I say the following in conjunction with the concurrently runing thread on
TOE and agree with Dirk. --- Everything from logic, to Goedel & Turing, to
Greeks, philosophy to the entire panoply of math constructs etc. was
discussed in this thread, with no discernable novel, operational thought
being introduced to shed light on, much less answering the subject
question. Don't huff. A truly novel thought is EXTREMELY rare. Evolution
sees to that.
What appears to me is that in any and all posts the anthropic element is
still present, actually was jealously preserved to be present as the prime,
secondary and tertiary investigator. Everything was discussed from a pov by
addressing it directly or indirectly still with the entire human system
(ego, paradigm, culture etc.) as the observer.
In order to go beyond this obstacle, we must remove the direct connection
of the human observer from the to be observed object/subject and put a
layer of inquiry in between, like a looking glass and ask:
What can we, the human observer, learn from the observing element which
observes the object, we the human observer ultimately wants to obverse,
describe, understand (for the purpose of manipulation, of cousre).
However, anytime somebody introduces an off beat, let alone a novel
thought, the flies on the horse apple get shy and take off in a hurry,
because that new thing is scary, doesn’t have a right look and doesn't
smell familiar.
I remember few months back, when Nemesis suggested that we must begin to
"become" and think as particles in order to understand the next level of
inquiry into nature everybody buzzed of and cursed him from a distance.
When I asked even before that a similar question,
***** Why and how is a 3 pound lump of a specific architecture of
polycondensates of simple, non-sentient amino acids capable to contemplate,
comprehend and control and manipulate events in very remote xDyT domains?.
At which level of (molecular) complexity does this phenomenon of 'remote
contemplation' (not just sensing and respoinding, absorbing and emitting)
occur for the first time? etc, etc, etc, and of course, etc. *******
...everybody politely looked the other way and took off. The only comment I
ever got on it was from spaceman who said: "I don't know, do you?"
So, who does? Seems to me that tackling such a question would be at least a
departure point from the well trampled and congested trail of inquiry which
so many feel only leads us around in circles in a dark cul de sac.
hanson
It may take some clever insight to recognize the physical interpretation of
such a theory. We know we are close when we discover mathematical entities
that mimic the relationships between space-time and mass-energy. When we
find similar mathematical relationships, we should be able to derive
consequences that are testable in the physical world.
> When I asked even before that a similar question,
>
> ***** Why and how is a 3 pound lump of a specific architecture of
> polycondensates of simple, non-sentient amino acids capable to
contemplate,
> comprehend and control and manipulate events in very remote xDyT domains?.
> At which level of (molecular) complexity does this phenomenon of 'remote
> contemplation' (not just sensing and respoinding, absorbing and emitting)
> occur for the first time? etc, etc, etc, and of course, etc. *******
There are a few semi-plausible off-beat conjectures.
The most famous one is probably that of Penrose, who suggests consciousness
is directly tied in with the laws of physics at a deep level, and that it is
possible to access truths by direct apprehension.
Of course, taking it to an extreme might suggest that physics will
eventually merge with mysticism.
I have doubts as to whether a TOE can be successfully constructed without
taking into account consciousness. Still, as nobody knows how to do it
easily (or at all, probably) the conventional approach is continued.
Dirk
The Axiom of Replacement in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory is generally
seen as being an infinite family of axioms.
>>
>> You are missing the point that any logical sequence of deductions in
>> physics has to start with a set of postulates. The postulates, and
>> not the deductions from them, are what are being proposed as the laws
>> of nature.
>>
>> Franz Heymann
>>
>
>And this is exactly where science is going wrong. Such an approach is
>doomed from the start. I don't know if you noticed but not much
>progress has been made in fundamental physics for a very long time
>now. Is it because there is nothing else to find? Of course not, the
>models are far from perfect.
I agree. Major advances are taking place in all areas of science
except fundamental physics. People like Heymann will claim that,
compared to advances in the past, we are making giant strides. But
this is not true. In the centuries before and after Newton, only a
handful of physicists were trying to understand nature. Now, given the
amazing leap in human communication and widespread literacy, there are
tens of thousands of people involved in physics research. So why don't
we see a much more rapid pace of progress. Heck, here we are close to
a century after relativity and we still have no idea what causes
gravity, a million relativists claiming otherwise notwithstanding.
The problem, as I see it, is that the top-down, observer-centric
approach to understanding nature has reached a brick wall. So instead
of progress, we see chicken feather voodoo physics sprouting all
around: what with time travel, wormholes, black holes, infinite
parallel universes, quantum computing and the like?
What is needed is a bottom-up, particle-centric approach to physics.
We need to conduct sensible thought experiments and put ourselves in
the place of the particles themselves: be the particle! Only then will
the right questions and solutions come to the surface. Only then will
we have the proper perspective from which to ask relevant questions
such as, how does a particle move? how can a particle "know" about its
position or motion relative to other particles? etc...
>The method used to investigate is faulty. You can not base a new
>theory on postulates. You base a theory on facts you observe. You put
>all the facts you can observe from reality and you put them together.
>You can not go the other way. Its like trying to solve a puzzle by
>guessing what the end result looks like. The end result is already
>there!!! look at it...and put the pieces together...
IMO, we need a fundamental ontology of substance. In my own research,
I have come to the realization that the only ontology of substance
that does not lead to an infinite regress is one where everything
comes from nothing and is made of nothing, in such a way that the net
sum of all substances in the universe is zero or nothing. This is what
I call the Conservation of Nothing, the mother of all conservation
principles.
Nemesis
Nasty Little Truth About Spacetime Physics:
http://home1.gte.net/res02khr/crackpots/notorious.htm
Franz Heymann
More gobbledegook.
Franz Heymann
You are prevaricating. I am an experimentalist, born and bred. My
point was that *the Greeks* did not get to grips with the importance
of testing their philosophising by experimentation.
Franz Heymann
But what is the starting statement of your logical process? It
inevitably has to be some postulate or other.
>
>
In the time honoured way, it is now up to you to provide a test which
is capable of falsifying the theory if it is untrue, otherwise it is
not a theory.
Franz Heymann
On the contrary, a great deal of progress has been made. Lets see, it
took about 2000 years to get from Aristotle to Newton. Since then,
over just a tad more than 300 years, we got the Lagrangian-Hamiltonian
formulation, EM theory, relativity, QM and QED, then the Standard
model. Pretty much lightning fast. What do you expect, an ew theory
of everything every year. This is science, not modern art.
> Is it because there is nothing else to find? Of course not, the
>models are far from perfect.
>
Nobody claims they're perfect. Now, how would you say in what way
they're imperfect?
>The method used to investigate is faulty. You can not base a new
>theory on postulates. You base a theory on facts you observe.
Yes and no. You induce postulates besed on observed facts (where sid
you think the postulates come from?). Then you deduce the consequences
of these postulates and compare with additional facts. That's how you
build a theory.
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
me...@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Mike wrote:
>
> It seems to me that the ancient Greeks failed because they were still
> reasoning from contingency, applying logic to facts, without deriving facts
> from logic
It is impossible to deduce all facts from purely logical principles.
Some facts ARE contingent. The just happen to be true in the
world we live in, but might have been otherwise in another
possible world.
Any attempt to get a valid and complete theory of physical reality
by massaging logic is doomed to failure.
Bob Kolker
GR and QM indeed. I'd even go as far as saying QM is mankinds most
horrible creation :)
neoprog
Mike wrote:
>
> If I'm not mistaken, they reasoned from what particular facts may already exist
> to other things that they did not know. The trouble being that they may not
> have correctly described the things that already exist. In other words, their
> premises were wrong from which they drew their conclusions.
Some of the problems with Greek science and cosmology were
the a priori assumptions of a metaphysical nature. Aristotle presumed
that natural motion in the etherial realm would be circular. This
assumption of circular motions hobbled astronomy from the
time of Aristotle to the time of Kepler, who finally tumbled onto
the correct orbit of a planet in a two body system.
Bob Kolker
As for Conciousness and computer theory, i don't quite see what they
have to do with observing objective reality.
Conciousness is not understood yet. We "feel" its effects but its
cause is not known. And i have difficulties seeing where Computer
theory fits in at all.
neoprog
Mike wrote:
I say, old chap given all that, derive the relative masses of protons
and electrons a priori. Do you think you can do that. How about
the gravitational constant? Do you think you can pull that out of
a logician's hat?
>
> It might be possible to derive physics from logic. How? We need a method of
> discerning what is logical that is common to the various methods such as
> propositional logic, predicate logic, set theory, probabilities, and the
> mathematics that physicist use, such as tensor analysis, etc. It turns out
> that such a common method exists. We can use Venn diagrams to describe and
> derive the principles of predicate logic and propositional logic and set
> theory. An element of a set implies the probabilities of its inclusion in
> one set and not another. And in the study of probabilities, a region in this
> sample space defines an event in general. We need a mathematical tool in
> which to describe this sample space or Venn diagram space. For if we impose
> some sort of coordinate system over this sample space, then we can study the
> mathematical dynamics of how these generalized events, defined as regions in
> sample space, change from one event to another. But these principles must
> not depend on the arbitrary choice of coordinate system we may impose on the
> space. So the principles must be described with tensor equations which are
> invariant under a change of coordinates. It turn out the divergence theorem,
> which relates the volume of a region to the surface that enclose this
> region, can be describe using tensors and is invariant with a change of
> coordinates. Also, the Laplacian can be described with tensors and is
> invariant with a change of coordinates. The Laplacian is used in the wave
> equations involved with quantum mechanics. And when we recognize that the
> probability must be zero on the surface of these region, since the region
> inside is where the probability of the event is not zero, then this gives a
> boundary condition of a differential equation produced by the Laplacian. And
> these boundary conditions for differential equations produce quantized
> values and a set of equations that may the basis for the quantization of
> quantum mechanics.
>
> It may be possible to discern very fundamental properties of nature this
> way, such as the number of dimensions of reality and the relationship
> between space-time and mass-energy. For instance, how can a region in space
> change? It can change in size, shape, and position. And every change in an
> event is a combination of these. Does this give rise to the three dimension
> that we observe in space? Do they give rise to the force of nature? Or both?
> Good luck.
That may well be the fate of a TOE.
After all, theories are merely data compression algorithms.
Hence Occams Razor.
Dirk
Because irrespective of what consciousness turns out to be, it is
intimiately connected with brains, which are information processing devices.
If, for example, Penrose is correct it is tied together very deeply with a
TOE.
Dirk
Not bad;-) Descartes beat you to this punch though long ago. Every event
is the sum of its parts, which is the interactions of the particles.
>
> >The method used to investigate is faulty. You can not base a new
> >theory on postulates. You base a theory on facts you observe. You put
> >all the facts you can observe from reality and you put them together.
> >You can not go the other way. Its like trying to solve a puzzle by
> >guessing what the end result looks like. The end result is already
> >there!!! look at it...and put the pieces together...
>
> IMO, we need a fundamental ontology of substance. In my own research,
> I have come to the realization that the only ontology of substance
> that does not lead to an infinite regress is one where everything
> comes from nothing and is made of nothing, in such a way that the net
> sum of all substances in the universe is zero or nothing. This is what
> I call the Conservation of Nothing, the mother of all conservation
> principles.
Still on target. Space and matter are one in the same. Each charged
quanta is a spatial extension, a region of curved space
(hyperbolic/eliptical) through which other particles move. Net neutral
matter projects a flat space on average WRT charges moving through it,
which is verified by direct observation. Conversely charged matter
projects a curved space WRT charges moving through it, and (barring
induction) it projects a flat space WRT a neutral particle moving
through it, both also verified by direct observation. This should have
been an obvious conclusion centuries ago. My equation 1-27 is simply a
description of the resultant interaction in terms of force, from a flat
FOR.
--
Richard Perry
A Galilean Invariant Electromagnetic Synthesis
Http://www.cswnet.com/~rper
Mike wrote:
>
> "neoprog" <sweet...@hotmail.com> wrote
> >
> > If you were to use of logic alone, you'd have to generate your own
> > premisses which of course would lead nowhere since you'd have nothing
> > to fuel logic with except premisses you elaborate on your own. The
> > result is easily imaginable :)
> > (nothing of interrest).
A relevant post, but not many takers here based upon direct experience.
Logic has been abandoned in favor of the dramatic.
They may speak the speak, but they just don't seem to know, or perhaps
value, the rules. Of course they hold their math to be correct, which is
itself only a reflection of the ignorance that math is a very small
subset of logic in general. Moreover the rules of math are themselves
derived directly from the premise of the validity of the syllogistic
form, but this much seems to escape them. I predict that it's only a
matter of time before the mathematical laws are themselves abandoned in
favor of personal preference;-)
Ideally, but what premises is the conclusion of the "quark" for instance
drawn from.
Couldn't we as easily propose that each quark is itself a composite of
particles with charge 1/6, or 1/12, or 1/24 ad infinitum? What basis,
what "real" basis is there for this theory? None. This is how modern
physics is proceeding, ad hoc presumptions, anything that cannot be
disproved, to what end? Personal advancement. Where is the methodology
in this?
The "quark" is a premise, not conclusion. By definition, a premise is
not "drawn from something".
>Couldn't we as easily propose that each quark is itself a composite of
>particles with charge 1/6, or 1/12, or 1/24 ad infinitum?
We could propose anything we wish, the proof of the pudding is in the
eating. Your premises are affirmed (though not proven) if the
predictions generated using said premises agree with empirical
evidence. And, they're disproven, if the predictions disagree with
experimental evidence. This is all.
> What basis, what "real" basis is there for this theory?
Read above. That's the only basis you can ever get. A question along
the lines of "how do you prove that the axioms are true" makes no
sense.
>None. This is how modern physics is proceeding, ad hoc presumptions,
That's how physics proceeded since Newton's time and it works
beautifully. The previous approach of gazing at your navel and
deciding how the world "should" work, failed.
>anything that cannot be disproved, to what end? Personal advancement.
You appear to be projecting:-)
>Where is the methodology in this?
There is no methodology to induction, only to deduction. Still, the
process can be described, though not formalized. Consider the
following.
How do you build a mathematical theory? You generate an axiom base,
i.e. a set of statements which within your theory are *true by
definition*. There are no specific rules telling you what axioms to
use (though there are considerations of "usefullness"). They have to
be independent (i.e. you can't prove one from the others, since if you
can, it is not an axiom) and free of contradictions (which *does not*
mean "not contradicting your concepts of what's appropriate" only "not
contradicting one another"). No demands beyond this. Then, you
proceed to deduce as many logical conclusion stemming from the axioms
as you can. These are the results of the theory. Now, yes (I'm
trying to avoid being sidetracked here) I know that the mathematicians
posting here will tell you that historically a theory may be in
development for quite a while before it is axiomatized. That's true,
but the historical timeline is not relevant here. What matters is
that in a mathematical theory the axioms are not in doubt, though some
of the results may be.
The situation in physics is different. Here you have access to
various results (i.e. empirical observations) but you don't know the
underlying axioms and *you'll never know, for sure*. There are no
stone tablets to be found, with the axioms carved on them. What you
can do is make a guess at what the axioms are. Of course, we mean
"educated guess" here, not any silly guess, but it still is a guess.
That's the induction part. Then, after you've made your guess, you
proceed to deduce the consequences of said guess and compare these
deduced consequences with observed results. If there is an agreement,
you got a confirmation of your guess. Again, not a proof, just a
confirmation. If there is a disagreement, it is "back to the drawing
board". Note that the "guess" istself does not need to be justified
a priori, only a posteriori, by the results. It is nobody's business
whetehr you attribute your guess to deep thought, a vision you've seen
in a dream or to divine inspiration. The only thing that matters is
"does it work or doesn't it".
If you think that this is a kludgy way of doing things and that you
can do better, same rules apply. Meaning, you can prove that you're
doing better by generating a theory which accounts for *all* observed
data *and*, preferably, predicts some new results not predicted by
existing theories (please, do not even try to use this opportunity to
plug your web page, I won't even comment on it). Till you manage to
achieve the above, your opinions count for pretty much nothing.
Note to other posters: yes, I know that I posted same stuff in the
past, more than once. But it iappears that it needs to be reiterated,
once in a while.
You have reiterated nothing that was not already well known. But
induction is equivalent to a stab in the dark. What with the possibility
of infinite such stabs at the same phenomenon what do the odds of
correctness work out to be?
Deduction "can" be used to ferret out the workings of nature. The truth
is that nobody seems interested in this approach. "A priori" premises
abound. It is fortunate that the same illogical inductive approach was
not taken by mathematicians through the ages. A look back at the
history of "natural philosophy" reveals, at least to those who are not
still drowning in superstition, that very sound arguments regarding
space and the nature of space were rejected in favor of the preservation
of religious bents. Aren't we past that ignorance?
I have derived several "necessary" conditions myself, based upon pure
logic alone. No. 1: that matter and space are equivalent. This was also
a general conclusion drawn by Einstein, and by the Greeks well before
that.
The arguments are sound, and yet are rejected. Why is this? Ignorance
seems to spring to mind:-)
Richard Perry
Glad to hear this.
> But induction is equivalent to a stab in the dark.
Indeed.
> What with the possibility of infinite such stabs at the same phenomenon
>what do the odds of correctness work out to be?
"Correctness" is measured by agreement of the results with
observations. By this measure, we're not doing too poorly. Of course
this is not "absolute correctness", only "hasn't been disprooved yet".
And that's all you're ever going to get. It is not only that the odds
of "absolute correctness" can't even be estimated, but that even if by
any chance you'll happen to get an "absolutely correct" theory, you
won't be able to verify that this is indeed the case.
>
>Deduction "can" be used to ferret out the workings of nature.
Nothing can be deduced from nothing. You've to "prime the pump of
deduction", i.e. to have some basic assumptions which you use as the
starting point of your deduction. So, where do your starting
assumptions come from and on what's the basis of your certainty that
they're correct.
>I have derived several "necessary" conditions myself, based upon pure
>logic alone. No. 1: that matter and space are equivalent. This was also
>a general conclusion drawn by Einstein, and by the Greeks well before
>that.
There is nothing derived here, especially not from "pure logic". You
confuse logic for "it makes sense to me that it is so" which is just
another form of "My guess is that it is so".
>The arguments are sound, and yet are rejected. Why is this? Ignorance
>seems to spring to mind:-)
>
The ploy of "they're just too stupid to grasp how brilliant my ideas
are" is too stale to offer even entertainment value. You'll have to
do better than this to be worth reading.
See my original post of 11/21/01
> > > Please define the term "pure principle". It sounds like nonsense
> to
> > > me.
> >
> > general principles valid for any particulars whatsoever, which
> particulars
> > we cannot presume to know to begin with when we are trying to
> discern how
> > those particular properties (gravitation, electromagnetics,
> space-time,
> > mass-energy) came into being to start with.
>
> More gobbledegook.
Thanks for paying attention.
The method I would propose would only derive how events in general would
proceed to other events. It would not predict any particular fact. We are
prevented from that by the simple fact that we are dealing with
probabilities. I would start with general principles and end with general
laws of physics.The only difference would be that we would know WHY physics
is as it is, and we might be able to deduce the fate of the universe more
accurately.
So what you are saying in effect is that it is theoretically impossible to
understand the very first facts because we have no other facts to use as the
premise in our logic? And what you are saying is that there is no basis
whatsoever for the existence of the very first facts so that the first
particle of creation is totally illogical?
Mike wrote:
I am challenging your position by implying a counter example. Outline
how you would derive the gravitational constant from purely logical
principles, without going through all that messy stuff the Cavendish
did.
Bob Kolker
We've been over this make times here. First, try to define
"understanding". If you define it as "based on logical derivation
from premises known to be true" then yes, by definition, it is
impossible to understand the basic premises. If you loosen up a bit
and define "understanding" along the lines of "makes sense to me" then
you'll find that familiarity brings understanding but said
understanding is not very meaningful, as there is hardly anything that
didn't make sense to somebody, somewhere.
> And what you are saying is that there is no basis
>whatsoever for the existence of the very first facts so that the first
>particle of creation is totally illogical?
Not illogical, just "having nothing to do with logic". I explained
already what logic can or cannot do. No point in repeating it.
That's too specific. We would first have to derive, or recognize in the
equations, the structure of space-time and then mass-energy before we could get
to specific forms of energy. But again, shouldn't what is logical be pursued
for its own sake. We are using it as a tool, aren't we?
As a first guess, I suspect that there are principles independent of the size
of the event region in sample space that can be recognized as forces and that
distance is an interpretation of the difference in size in sample space between
two events. The same forces are at work with respect to each event, only the
less likely event, smaller region, seems more distant because it has less
influence on the outcome than does the more probable event, larger region. And
I suspect force and energy are descriptions of events more likely than others.
The more likely an event, the more potential it has to occur. Time would then
be any change at all with respect to anything at all, in other words, the
derivative of some function.
I would be interested to hear what purely logical argument you used to
deduce that matter and space are equivalent. Of course, you should
provide either explicit definitions of 'matter', 'space', and
'equivalent', or axioms characterizing those concepts.
That's the wonderful thing about it, or the kicker, depending on your
point of view. It wouldn't be "the" theory of everything, only "a" theory
of everything. I think it just means we have to be careful about starting
to believe too much in our own theories.
--
"'No user-serviceable parts inside.' I'll be the judge of that!"