REPOST-The Gleiwitz Fraud
Joe Bruno
691-694:
Hitler and his Army chiefs, in 1939,...concerned themselves by
concocting an incident, which would, at least in their opinion, justify
the planned aggression against Poland.
According to Alfred Naujocks, a former member of the SS:
"On or about Aug 10, 1939,Heydrich,personally ordered me to simulate an
attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz near the Polish border and to
make it appear that the attacking force consisted of Poles".
.....12 or 13 convicted criminals were killed by injection, dressed in
Polish uniforms and their bodies left scattered on the ground near the
radio station." Later they were also given gunshot wounds before the
press was taken to the spot to view evidence of the "Polish attack"."
Reply
morghus
> This is from "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 1992 edition, pages
>
>
>
> 691-694:
>
>
> Hitler and his Army chiefs, in 1939,...concerned themselves by
> concocting an incident, which would, at least in their opinion, justify
>
>
>
> the planned aggression against Poland.
>
>
> According to Alfred Naujocks, a former member of the SS:
>
Any description of the fabled German attack on Gleiwitz radio station
has to be "according to Alfred Naujocks" simply because the one
affidavit signed by Naujocks is the only evidence supporting the
holocaust promoters' claims that the Germans faked the attack. The
German records show that in fact the Polish military brutally killed
the unarmed German radio station employees. So who is telling the
truth? Is it the German records or the post war affidavit of a man
named Naujocks obtained by the Allied vigilantes manning the prisons at
Nuremberg.
Well, it turns out that Naujocks deserted the German army and went over
to the Allies well before the war ended. He never testified in any
court. in fact, the affidavit supposedly signed by him is the only
thing we know about him after the war. He was never prosecuted for war
crimes. This affidavit is certainly suspicious since it is the only
evidence of the claim that it was the Germans who attacked the Gleiwitz
station.
Yet the German-hating holohucksters flash the affidavit like it is
gospel truth and have made up detailed stories of how the Germans made
the attack on the radio station look like it was the Poles doing the
attacking and killing. The Naujocks affidavit is just more anti-German
false propaganda endless spread by the holocaust crowd.
Gassen Burnham
claim to mental health.
phil...@aol.com
> Joe Bruno wrote:
> > This is from "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 1992 edition, pages
> >
> >
> >
> > 691-694:
> >
> >
> > Hitler and his Army chiefs, in 1939,...concerned themselves by
> > concocting an incident, which would, at least in their opinion, justify
> >
> >
> >
> > the planned aggression against Poland.
> >
> >
> > According to Alfred Naujocks, a former member of the SS:
> >
>
>
> Any description of the fabled German attack on Gleiwitz radio station
> has to be "according to Alfred Naujocks" simply because the one
> affidavit signed by Naujocks is the only evidence supporting the
> holocaust promoters' claims that the Germans faked the attack.
A typical desperate lie from the German hating Morghus.
On August 22, 1939, 9 days before the Nazi staged incident, Hitler
spoke of the plan to create a pretext for invasion in a speech to
Officers at Obersalzburg.
This has been posted by Eugene Holman in the past. The translation is
his.
Source: http://www.h-ref.de/dk/krieg/polen/gleiwitz/gleiwitz.shtml
<quote>
Ich werde propagandistischen Anlass zur Auslösung des Krieges geben,
gleichgültig, ob glaubhaft. Der Sieger wird später nicht danach
gefragt, ob er die Wahrheit gesagt hat oder nicht.
Adolf Hitler am 22. August 1939
zit. n. August '39, S. 21
</quote>
Translation (EH):
"I will give a propagandistic pretext for unleashing the war,
regardless of whether credible. Later, the victor will not be asked
whether he told the truth or not."
Adolf Hitler, August 22, 1939
Furthermore, mention was made of the fake attack by Walter Schellenberg
in his memoirs.
(quote)
Mehlhorn's voice grew more excited as he told me that Heydrich had
asked him to come to his office and, surprisingly, had confided to him
one of Hitler's secret orders. Before 1 September, if possible, an
absolutely irreproachable cause for war had got to be created, one that
would stand in history as a complete justification and would brand
Poland in the eyes of the world as the aggressor against Germany. It
had therefore been planned to dress troops in Polish uniforms and
attack the Gleiwitz radio transmitter. Hitler had assigned Heydrich
and Admiral Canaris, Chief of Army Intelligence, to carry out this
operation. [.].
(end quote)
Walter Schellenberg, German Foreign Intelligence Service. Schellenberg
Memoirs, The (The Labyrinth) edited by Louis Hagen. Deutsch, 1956;
Harper
1957.
The War, 1939-1945
Flower & Reeves
Da Capo Press, 1997
p. 1-2
--
Philip Mathews
morghus
That ridiculous piece of propaganda pap comes from the files of the
British Foreign Office in London. The British claimed that a "secret"
speech made by Hitler on August 22, 1939 was smuggled out of Germany a
couple of days later. The report contained this fine bit of British
bull:
"The speech was received with enthusiasm. Goring jumped on the table,
thanked blood-thirstily and made blood-thirsty promises. He danced like
a wild man."
Amazingly, people actually accepted such nonsense in 1939, when the
British war-mongering hate-the-Germans campaign was in full swing.
Today, the only people still repeating such garbage are the
hate-the-Germans holocaust hucksters, and the only people dumb enough
to accept such tripe are the people dumb enough to still believe in the
holocaust.
But we know what really happened at that meeting of German leaders on
August 22, 1939; we have the testimony of two German leaders who were
there. General Von Brauchitsch,Germany's top army chief testified at
Nuremberg about that same meeting. Here's what he had to say:
<quote>
DR.LATERNSER: The conference on 23 May 1939 is of particular
importance. Did you, at that time, gain the impression that war had
been decided upon?
DR. LATERNSER: Was a plan of attack against Poland ever worked out
before that time, before May 1939?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, never.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you, on 22 August 1939, still hope that war would be
avoided?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: The reasons for that, which I have already mentioned,
remained unchanged. An additional reason was that the trade agreement
signed with the Soviet Union would, in my view, convince Poland that to
settle differences by negotiations was the best way. Moreover, it was
my opinion that the isolation of which Hitler had spoken would also
result in Poland's readiness to negotiate. The decisive point was that
Hitler expressly said the negotiations with Poland were continuing.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the purpose of that speech, that speech of 22
August, as you saw it?
VON BRAUCHITSCH: In my view, that conference was first of all the
consequence of the objections which I had made to Hitler. Secondly it
was, in my view, Hitler's intention to increase the confidence of the
leaders under him in the policy which he was pursuing, and to convince
them completely of the logic of his intentions.
<end quote>
Von Brauchitsch's testimony was confirmed by the testimony of von
Manstein, chief of the General Staff of Army Group South, who was also
present at the conference:
<quote>
DR.LATERNSER: When you were informed of the military preparations
against Poland, did you have the impression that an aggressive war was
intended?
VON MANSTEIN: I was chosen for the position of chief of the General
Staff of Army Group South in the mobilization plan for the Polish
campaign. When I received the plans for the concentration, I realized
that it was really a strategic concentration for an attack, but there
were various very essential points which militated against any
aggressive gesture.
The first one was that in the spring of - 1939 and, by order of the
Fuehrer, a sudden start was made with the erection of the strongest;
fortifications along all the Eastern border. Not only thousands of
workers, but entire divisions were employed there to build these
fortifications, and the entire material from the Czech fortification
was transported there and built in. A broad strip of the most fertile
land in Silesia was taken up by these fortifications, and that, of
course, would indicate anything but an aggressive intention.
The second point which was against it was the fact that training
continued on an entirely peacetime basis. I myself-I was a divisional
commander in peacetime-remained with my division at the training camp
in Lusatia, far away, therefore, from that part of the country where my
division would have to be drawn up.
Besides, we knew of Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons, in
which he assured the Poles of Britain's assistance, and since Hitler on
every occasion during the time I was in the High Command of the Army
repeated the statement that he would never enter into a war on two
fronts, one could not possibly think that, in view of that promise, he
would indulge in such an adventurous policy.
On the other hand, however, we had the most reliable information-which
was confirmed by subsequent facts-that the Poles were proposing to
concentrate their troops in Poznania for an offensive towards Berlin.
We completely failed to, understand this gesture in view of the entire
situation, but in fact that was the way the Poles drew up their troops
at a later stage. The eventuality of war might well be envisaged,
therefore, and it was most likely, since the Poles could look to
Britain for assistance; and if the political negotiations should teach
a crisis, the Poles might on their part be reckless enough to attack,
since they were already forming-up offensively, and then, of course, a
war would have been inevitable.
Considering all these signs, one could hardly assume that Hitler would,
so to speak, pick a quarrel with Poland to unleash an aggressive war
against her. The conference at Obersalzberg, for instance, on 22
August, did not give me the impression either that war was bound to
come, an impression that was neither mine nor that of
Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Von Rundstedt until the night from 31
August to I September, since an order to march in had been withdrawn on
the 25th.
<end quote>
So we know what Hitler said at that conference. We know the phony
speech quoted by the British in 1939, and still quoted fifteen years
later by hateful and hate-filled German bashers, is nothing but war
propaganda.
But we have to ask: why is it that 1940's anti-German propaganda is
still being spouted today? What kind of sick individuals would
continue to demonize a people half-a-century with the same lies without
let up? What is it that compels these holohucksters to keep right on
spewing their hateful filth long after a war is over?
War time propaganda that doesn't stop--that's the holocaust. The same
people who would keep repeating the lies dreamed up in the World II war
rooms are the same people who keep repeating the lies of the holocaust.
Well, here's some news for you people: the war is over. It's time for
the lies to stop. The claims that the Germans faked the Gleiwitz
incident is a lie; the claims that the Germans murdered millions of
innocent noncombatants is a lie; the claims of gas chambers, diesel
exhaust gas chambers, gassing vans, vacuum chambers, steam chambers,
shrinking heads, soap making, flaying, lethal injections, and all those
other World War II stories are lies; the holocaust is a lie.
phil...@aol.com
> phil...@aol.com wrote:
Yet another desperate lie from the German hating Morghus.
Evidence for the speech comes from German documents.
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/11-26-45.htm
In this presentation of condemning documents, concerning the initiation
of war in September 1939, I must bring to the attention of the Tribunal
a group of documents concerning an address by Hitler to his chief
military commanders, at Obersalzberg on
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26 Nov. 45
22 August 1939, just one week prior to the launching of the attack on
Poland.
We have three of these documents, related and constituting a single
group. The first one I do not intend to offer as evidence. The other
two I shall offer.
The reason for that is this: The first of the three documents came into
our possession through the medium of an American newspaperman and
purported to be original minutes of this meeting at Obersalzberg,
transmitted to this American newspaperman by some other person; and we
had no proof of the actual delivery to the intermediary by the person
who took the notes. That document, therefore, merely served to alert
our Prosecution to see if it could find something better. Fortunately,
we did get the other two documents, which indicate that Hitler on that
day made two speeches, perhaps one in the morning, one in the
afternoon, as indicated by the original minutes, which we captured. By
comparison of those two documents with the first document, we concluded
that the first document was a slightly garbled merger of the two
speeches.
On 22 August 1939 Hitler had called together at Obersalzberg the three
Supreme Commanders of the three branches of the Armed Forces, as well
as the commanding generals bearing the title Commanders -in- Chief
(Oberbefehlshaber) .
I have indicated how, upon discovering this first document, the
Prosecution set out to find better evidence of what happened on this
day. In this the Prosecution succeeded. In the files of the DOW at
Flensburg, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Chief of the High Command of
the Armed Forces), there were uncovered two speeches delivered by
Hitler at Obersalzberg, on 22 August 1939. These are Documents Numbers
798-PS and 1014-PS, in our series of documents.
In order to keep serial numbers consecutive, if the Tribunal please, we
have had the first document, which I do not intend to offer, marked for
identification Exhibit USA-28. Accordingly, I offer the second
document, 798-PS, in evidence as Exhibit USA-29, and the third
document, 1014-PS, as Exhibit USA-30.
These are again, especially the first one, rather lengthy speeches, and
I shall not necessarily read the entire speech.
Reading from 798-PS, which is Exhibit USA-29, the Führer speaks to the
Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939: "I have called you together..."
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything to show where the speech took place?
MR. ALDERMAN: Obersalzberg.
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26 Nov. 45
THE PRESIDENT: How do you show that?
MR. ALDERMAN: You mean on the document?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: I am afraid the indication "Obersalzberg" came from the
first document which I have not offered in evidence. I have no doubt
that the defendants will admit that Obersalzberg was the place of this
speech.
The place is not very significant; it is the time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN [Reading]: "I have called you together to give you a
picture of the political situation, in order that you may have insight
into the individual element on which I base my decision to act, and in
order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we will discuss
military details.
"It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or
later. I had already made this decision in the spring."-I interpolate,
I think he is there referring to the May document, which I have already
read, L-79. -"But I thought I would first turn against the West in a
few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence
cannot be fixed. One cannot close one's eyes even before a threatening
situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with
Poland, in order to fight first against the West, but this plan, which
was agreeable to me, could not be executed, since the essential points
have changed.
"It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case of a
conflict with the West.
"Poland wants access to the sea.
"The further development became obvious after the occupation of the
Memel region, and it became clear to me that under the circumstances a
conflict with Poland could arise at an inopportune moment.
"I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two personal
constitutions"-I suppose he means "personalities"; that probably is an
inapt translation-"my own personality, and that of Mussolini.
Essentially, it depends on me, my existence, because of my political
ability."
I interpolate to comment on the tremendous significance of the fact of
a war, which engulfed almost the whole world, depending upon one man's
personality.
"Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the
confidence of the whole German people as I do.
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26 Nov. 45
There will probably never again be a man in the future with more
authority than I have. My existence is, therefore, a factor of great
value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.
"The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is also decisive.
If something happens to him, Italy's loyalty to the Alliance will no
longer be certain. The basic attitude of the Italian Court is against
the Duce. Above all, the Court sees in the expansion of the empire a
burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.
"The third factor favorable for us is Franco. We can ask only
benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco's
personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness of the
present system in Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain
does not as yet have a Fascist Party of our internal unity.
"On the other side, a negative picture, as far as decisive
personalities are concerned: There is no outstanding personality in
England or France."-I interpolate: I think Adolf Hitler must have
overlooked one in England, perhaps many.-
"For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to lose-we can
only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our restrictions,
that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm
this. We have no other choice; we must act. Our opponents risk much and
can gain only a little. England's stake in a war is unimaginably great.
Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities, no
masters, no men of action."
I interpolate again. Perhaps that last sentence explains what he meant
by no personalities-no masters having the authority that he had over
his nation.
"Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable for
us; in the Mediterranean rivalry between Italy, France, and England; in
the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan
world.
"The English empire did not emerge from the last war strengthened. From
a maritime point of view, nothing was achieved; conflict between
England and Ireland, the South African Union became more independent,
concessions had to be made to India, England is in great danger,
unhealthy industries. A British statesman can look into the future only
with concern.
288
26 Nov. 45
"France's position has also deteriorated, particularly in the
Mediterranean.
"Further favorable factors for us are these:
"Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans.
Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal
situation.
"Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and vulnerable.
She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal's death Turkey
has been ruled by small minds, unsteady weak men.
"All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in 2 or 3
years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better
now.
"The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically,
but militarily it was questionable, since it was achieved through a
bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military,
if at all possible, not by general settlement, but by solving
individual tasks.
"The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy
hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My propositions to
Poland, the Danzig corridor, were disturbed by England's intervention.
Poland changed her tune towards us. The initiative cannot be avowed to
pass to the others. This moment is more favorable than in 2 to 3 years.
An attempt on my life or Mussolini's would change the situation to our
disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another with
cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change
our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again in
the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing prestige. Now
the probability is still great that the West will not interfere. We
must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept
a risk as much as a military leader. We are facing the alternative to
strike or be destroyed with certainty sooner or later."-We skip two
paragraphs.-
"Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution...."
A long discussion follows which I think it is unnecessary to read, and
then towards the end, four paragraphs from the bottom, I resume:
"We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with
grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc. It is a big aim, which demands
great efforts. I am only afraid that at the
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26 Nov. 45
last minute some 'Schweinehund' will make a proposal for
mediation."-And then the last paragraph of one sentence- "Goering
answers with thanks to the Führer and the assurance that the Armed
Forces will do their duty."
I believe I have already offered Exhibit 30, which is a shorter note
entitled: "Second Speech of the Führer on 22 August 1939." Reading
then from United States Exhibit 30, headed "Second Speech by the
Führer on 22 August 1939:
"It may also turn out differently regarding England and France. One
cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade barrier, not on
blockade, and with severance of relations. Most iron determination on
our side. Retreat before nothing. Everybody shall have to make a point
of it, that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western
Powers. A struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long
as she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors,
greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by
getting used to the heaviest strain. A long period of peace would not
do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect everything. Manly
bearing. It is not machines that fight each other, but men. We have the
better quality of men. Mental factors are decisive. The opposite camp
has weaker people. In 1918 the Nation fell down because the mental
pre-requisites were not sufficient. Frederick the Great secured final
success only through his mental power.
"Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is the elimination of
living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war should
break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary
objective. Quick decision because of the season.
"I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, never mind
whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked, later
on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not
the Right is what matters, but Victory.
==========================
Additional confirmation that Hitler intended to create a pretext to
attack comes from General Haldar's personal diary.
http://www.currentconcerns.ch/archive/20011102.php
Extract from the diary of General Halder
22 August 1939
Meeting with the Führer (Obersalzberg, 12 a.m.)
Present were army group leaders and army commanders of the German army,
navy and air force.
The Führer demands of the military leaders:
Unyielding resoluteness: counter-moves by England-France will ensue. We
must hold out. W-deployment will be utilized. 'Iron, unshakable
firmness of all those in charge!'
Aim: Poland's annihilation-extermination of its vital force. It is
not a question of advancing towards any particular line or drawing new
borders, but about destroying the enemy, for which new ways need to be
constantly devised.
Trigger: means immaterial. The victor is never asked the question
whether his reasons were justified. It does not matter whether we have
the law on our side, the only thing that matters is victory.
Execution: tough and ruthless. Harden yourselves against all
considerations of compassion! Swift: faith in the German soldier even
if scruples emerge. Most important is the wedge from the SE to the
Vistula, the wedge from N to the Narev and the Vistula. Adapt swiftly
to new situations. Swiftly apply new means to new situations.
Drawing new borders: new territory of the Reich? Forefront protectorate
territory. Military operations are not to take into account future
borders.
Source: Walther Hofer, Die Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges -
Eine Studie über die internationalen Beziehungen im Sommer 1939,
S.-Fischer-Verlag 1964. (How World War II Was Unleashed - A Study of
International Relations in the Summer of 1939)
=============
So there is clear evidence that Hitler made known to attendees at his
August 22, 1939 Obersalzberg speech that he intended to create an
excuse for attacking Poland, and this fact supports the affidavit of
Naujocks, who helped carry out the Gleiwitz attack, as well as memoirs
of Schellenberg, which I post again.
(quote)
Mehlhorn's voice grew more excited as he told me that Heydrich had
asked him to come to his office and, surprisingly, had confided to him
one of Hitler's secret orders. Before 1 September, if possible, an
absolutely irreproachable cause for war had got to be created, one that
would stand in history as a complete justification and would brand
Poland in the eyes of the world as the aggressor against Germany. It
had therefore been planned to dress troops in Polish uniforms and
attack the Gleiwitz radio transmitter. Hitler had assigned Heydrich
and Admiral Canaris, Chief of Army Intelligence, to carry out this
operation. [.].
(end quote)
Walter Schellenberg, German Foreign Intelligence Service. Schellenberg
Memoirs, The (The Labyrinth) edited by Louis Hagen. Deutsch, 1956;
Harper
1957.
The War, 1939-1945
Flower & Reeves
Da Capo Press, 1997
===============
None of this evidence is challenged by the testimony our German hater
posted, and as usual he has been caught trying to clumsily pervert the
historical record.
--
Philip Mathews