The notion of truth proposed by essentialistic realism, interpretation and first thoughts about a contra position.

[Gene Douglas]

J.G.H. wrote in message <7kjkuh$sdh$3...@news.worldonline.nl>...
:Hello,
:
:I need to write a paper and give a lecture about a position against the
:conception of truth as given by essentialistic realism. I started
explaining
:essentialistic realism and the corresponding notion of truth. You'll find
:this below. It's not very detailed, but I don't need to do that. Before I
:give my lecture, a fellow student has presented the pro position.
:
:I'd like some comments on my interpretation of essentialistic realism and
:the corresponding notion of truth. Also if anyone can give me directions
for
:constructing my contra position I'd like to hear that too. Finally, all
:other comments, including comments on my English, are very welcome. You're
:help is greatly appreciated.
:
:>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
:Essentialistic realism
:Central to most notions of realism are the following propositions:
:1. The reality outside of us exists.
:2. About this reality we can gather real knowledge.
:
:Essentialistic realism is introduced by Kripke and Putnam and should be
seen
:in close relation to their theory of causal reference. Essentialistic
:realism poses that natural kinds exists and that science is working to
:reveal their essence. The causal reference theory is constructed out of
:three components.
: (I'll use a reconstruction of the causal reference theory as proposed by
:Visser in a Dutch article. For references contact me by email).
:(i) Meanings are object-involving. (Meanings have an intrinsic bonding
with
:objects)
:(ii) The obtaining-mechanism uses real series of events, like "causal
: chains", that connect the using of a name by an individual with the
:original act of name-giving.
:(iii) The act of obtaining of the meaning isn't part of the meaning
itself.
:
:Straight on to the corresponding conception of truth. The notion of truth
:proposed here is an redone version of the traditional adequatio rei et
:intellectus. First of all, certain properties, like roundness, will be
:attributed to the objects itself, and so become external. (Traditional
these
:properties were located in the head of the individual.) Secondly, after
:these properties are located externally, there will be two ways to grasp
the
:conception of truth, namely through the object itself, or through the
:description of the essence of the object. The subject - predicate form is
no
:longer suitable and will be replaced by a new form: situation / type. This
:new model rests on two conventions. First, the descriptive convention (the
:possibility to speak a language correctly). Secondly, the demonstrative
:convention (what you can see happening and about what you are talking).
:
:Conclusion: The adequatio rei et intellectus is now between the
proposition
:and the situation, and the proposition includes both a structural
:abstraction (type) and the realia (situation).
:
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:
:Till now I've presented the pro position. I need to defend a contra
:position. What I'm planning to do is to attack the rather metaphysical
:notion of "natural kinds". I will argue the natural kinds exists, indeed,
as
:many as you like, and that will make this notion at least problematic.
From
:there I'll try to defend an anti-realism and an anti-realistic notion of
:truth. I'm not sure what a anti-realistic notion of truth looks like.
:
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