Art of War #1 of 5
Shy David www.xenu.net
Lionel Giles translation of Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR
Standard OSA reading material. The commentary in [braces] is by
the translator. "Chia Lin says that an army without spies is
like a man with ears or eyes."
[Large intro has been cut. See http://holysmoke.org/artofwar.htm]
I. LAYING PLANS
[Ts`ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the
title of this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in
the temple selected by the general for his temporary use, or as
we should say, in his tent. See. ss. 26.]
1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the
State.
2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or
to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no
account be neglected.
3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors,
to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking
to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The
Commander; (5) Method and discipline.
[It appears from what follows that Sun Tzu means by "Moral Law"
a principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its
moral aspect. One might be tempted to render it by "morale,"
were it not considered as an attribute of the ruler in ss. 13.]
5, 6. The MORAL LAW causes the people to be in complete accord
with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of
their lives, undismayed by any danger.
[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "Without constant practice,
the officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for
battle; without constant practice, the general will be wavering
and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."]
7. HEAVEN signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and
seasons.
[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two
words here. Meng Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, waxing
and waning" of Heaven. Wang Hsi, however, may be right in
saying that what is meant is "the general economy of Heaven,"
including the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds,
and other phenomena.]
8. EARTH comprises distances, great and small; danger and
security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life
and death.
9. The COMMANDER stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely,
benevolence, courage and strictness.
[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or
benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-
control, or "proper feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good
faith. Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before "humanity
or benevolence," and the two military virtues of "courage" and
"strictness" substituted for "uprightness of mind" and "self-
respect, self-control, or 'proper feeling.'"]
10. By METHOD AND DISCIPLINE are to be understood the
marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the
graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of
roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of
military expenditure.
11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he
who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will
fail.
12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine
the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a
comparison, in this wise: --
13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral
law?
[I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. ss. 5.]
(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?
(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
[See ss. 7,8]
(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
[Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts`ao Ts`ao (A.D.
155-220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in
accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to
standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having
allowed him horse to shy into a field of corn! However, in lieu
of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of
justice by cutting off his hair. Ts`ao Ts`ao's own comment on
the present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay
down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed
the offender must be put to death."]
(5) Which army is stronger?
[Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch`en puts it,
freely rendered, "ESPIRIT DE CORPS and 'big battalions.'"]
(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?
[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "Without constant practice,
the officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for
battle; without constant practice, the general will be wavering
and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."]
(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward
and punishment?
[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit
will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?]
14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast
victory or defeat.
15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it,
will conquer: --let such a one be retained in command! The
general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will
suffer defeat: --let such a one be dismissed!
[The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu's treatise
was composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu,
king of the Wu State.]
16. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also
of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
17. According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify
one's plans.
[Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the
"bookish theoric." He cautions us here not to pin our faith to
abstract principles; "for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the
main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the
benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of
the enemy in attempting to secure a favorable position in
actual warfare." On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord
Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of
Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations
were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might
suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to
frame new plans in a critical moment. The Duke listened quietly
and then said: "Who will attack the first tomorrow -- I or
Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge. "Well,"
continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his
projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you
expect me to tell you what mine are?" [1] ]
18. All warfare is based on deception.
[The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted
by every soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington,
great in so many military qualities, was especially
distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with which he
concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe."]
19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using
our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must
make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must
make him believe we are near.
20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and
crush him.
[All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in
disorder, crush him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun
Tzu is still illustrating the uses of deception in war.]
21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he
is in superior strength, evade him.
22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate
him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.
[Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays
with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning
weakness and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.]
23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.
[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch`en has the
note: "while we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire
himself out." The YU LAN has "Lure him on and tire him out."]
If his forces are united, separate them.
[Less plausible is the interpretation favored by most of the
commentators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put
division between them."]
24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not
expected.
25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be
divulged beforehand.
26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations
in his temple ere the battle is fought.
[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a
temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was about
to take the field, in order that he might there elaborate his
plan of campaign.]
The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations
beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few
calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It
is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely
to win or lose.
---------------------------------------
II. WAGING WAR
[Ts`ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first
count the cost," which prepares us for the discovery that the
subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the
title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.]
1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in
the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots,
and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers,
[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to
Chang Yu, used for the attack; the "heavy chariots" were
heavier, and designed for purposes of defense. Li Ch`uan, it is
true, says that the latter were light, but this seems hardly
probable. It is interesting to note the analogies between early
Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case,
the war- chariot was the important factor, forming as it did
the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of
foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are
informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen,
and each heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army
would be divided up into a thousand battalions, each consisting
of two chariots and a hundred men.]
with provisions enough to carry them a thousand LI,
[2.78 modern LI go to a mile. The length may have varied
slightly since Sun Tzu's time.]
the expenditure at home and at the front, including
entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint,
and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a
thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising
an army of 100,000 men.
2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in
coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will
be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your
strength.
3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the
State will not be equal to the strain.
4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your
strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains
will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no
man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that
must ensue.
5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,
cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.
[This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by
any of the commentators. Ts`ao Kung, Li Ch`uan, Meng Shih, Tu
Yu, Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en have notes to the effect that a
general, though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer
through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: "Haste may be
stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and
treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they
bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty
by remarking: "Lengthy operations mean an army growing old,
wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and distress among
the people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of
such calamities." Chang Yu says: "So long as victory can be
attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness."
Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by
implication, about ill-considered haste being better than
ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something
much more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be
injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but foolish -- if
only because it means impoverishment to the nation. In
considering the point raised here by Sun Tzu, the classic
example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind.
That general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome
against that of Hannibals's isolated army, because it seemed to
him that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long
campaign in a strange country. But it is quite a moot question
whether his tactics would have proved successful in the long
run. Their reversal it is true, led to Cannae; but this only
establishes a negative presumption in their favor.]
6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from
prolonged warfare.
7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils
of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of
carrying it on.
[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous
effects of a long war can realize the supreme importance of
rapidity in bringing it to a close. Only two commentators seem
to favor this interpretation, but it fits well into the logic
of the context, whereas the rendering, "He who does not know
the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is distinctly
pointless.]
8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither
are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.
[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in
waiting for reinforcements, nor will he return his army back
for fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy's frontier without
delay. This may seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with
all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon
Bonaparte, the value of time -- that is, being a little ahead
of your opponent -- has counted for more than either numerical
superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to
commissariat.]
9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the
enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.
[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally
means "things to be used", and is meant in the widest sense. It
includes all the impedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.]
10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be
maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to
maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be
impoverished.
[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with
the next, though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement,
moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some
corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to Chinese
commentators that an emendation may be necessary for the sense,
and we get no help from them there. The Chinese words Sun Tzu
used to indicate the cause of the people's impoverishment
clearly have reference to some system by which the husbandmen
sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why
should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except
because the State or Government is too poor to do so?]
11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices
to go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to be
drained away.
[Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left its
own territory. Ts`ao Kung understands it of an army that has
already crossed the frontier.]
12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be
afflicted by heavy exactions.
13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength,
the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths
of their income will be dissipated;
[Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted not
of 3/10, but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be
extracted from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: "The
PEOPLE being regarded as the essential part of the State, and
FOOD as the people's heaven, is it not right that those in
authority should value and be careful of both?"]
while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,
breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,
protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount
to four-tenths of its total revenue.
15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the
enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to
twenty of one's own, and likewise a single PICUL of his
provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store.
[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of
transporting one cartload to the front. A PICUL is a unit of
measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).]
16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to
anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy,
they must have their rewards.
[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the
soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you
capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so
that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his
own account."]
17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots
have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first.
Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and
the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The
captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's
own strength.
19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy
campaigns.
[As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled with."
Sun Tzu here reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is
intended to enforce."]
20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the
arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends
whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.
---------------------------------------
III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM
1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of
all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter
and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to
recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a
regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.
[The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa,
consisted nominally of 12500 men; according to Ts`ao Kung, the
equivalent of a regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a
detachment consists from any number between 100 and 500, and
the equivalent of a company contains from 5 to 100 men. For the
last two, however, Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and
5 respectively.]
2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not
supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the
enemy's resistance without fighting.
[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of
the old Chinese general. Moltke's greatest triumph, the
capitulation of the huge French army at Sedan, was won
practically without bloodshed.]
3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's
plans;
[Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full
force of the Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of
defense, whereby one might be content to foil the enemy's
stratagems one after another, but an active policy of counter-
attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: "When the
enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate
him by delivering our own attack first."]
the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces;
[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun
Tzu, in speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the
numerous states or principalities into which the China of his
day was split up.]
the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field;
[When he is already at full strength.]
and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly
be avoided.
[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted
upon it in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength
before Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than
probable that they would have been masters of the situation
before the British were ready seriously to oppose them.]
The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various
implements of war, will take up three whole months;
[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated
as "mantlets", described. Ts`ao Kung simply defines them as
"large shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li
Ch`uan, who says they were to protect the heads of those who
were assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems to
suggest a sort of Roman TESTUDO, ready made. Tu Mu says they
were wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks, but this is
denied by Ch`en Hao. See supra II. 14. The name is also applied
to turrets on city walls. Of the "movable shelters" we get a
fairly clear description from several commentators. They were
wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from
within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to
convey parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of
filling up the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they
are now called "wooden donkeys."]
and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take
three months more.
[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the
level of the enemy's walls in order to discover the weak points
in the defense, and also to destroy the fortified turrets
mentioned in the preceding note.]
5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch
his men to the assault like swarming ants,
[This vivid simile of Ts`ao Kung is taken from the spectacle of
an army of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the
general, losing patience at the long delay, may make a
premature attempt to storm the place before his engines of war
are ready.]
with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the
town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of
a siege.
[We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before
Port Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to
record.]
6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops
without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying
siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy
operations in the field.
[Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but
does no harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang,
who after having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed
"Father and mother of the people."]
7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the
Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be
complete.
[Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the latter
part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different
meaning: "And thus, the weapon not being blunted by use, its
keenness remains perfect."]
This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's
one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him;
[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.]
if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight,
indeed, it appears to violate a fundamental principle of war.
Ts'ao Kung, however, gives a clue to Sun Tzu's meaning: "Being
two to the enemy's one, we may use one part of our army in the
regular way, and the other for some special diversion." Chang
Yu thus further elucidates the point: "If our force is twice as
numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up into two
divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon
his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be
crushed from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be
crushed in front." This is what is meant by saying that 'one
part may be used in the regular way, and the other for some
special diversion.' Tu Mu does not understand that dividing
one's army is simply an irregular, just as concentrating it is
the regular, strategical method, and he is too hasty in calling
this a mistake."]
9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;
[Li Ch`uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following
paraphrase: "If attackers and attacked are equally matched in
strength, only the able general will fight."]
if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;
[The meaning, "we can WATCH the enemy," is certainly a great
improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be
no very good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us
that the saying only applies if the other factors are equal; a
small difference in numbers is often more than counterbalanced
by superior energy and discipline.]
if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small
force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.
11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark
is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the
bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.
[As Li Ch`uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if
the general's ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not
thoroughly versed in his profession), his army will lack
strength."]
12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune
upon his army:--
13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being
ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called
hobbling the army.
[Li Ch`uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the
legs of a thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One
would naturally think of "the ruler" in this passage as being
at home, and trying to direct the movements of his army from a
distance. But the commentators understand just the reverse, and
quote the saying of T`ai Kung: "A kingdom should not be
governed from without, and army should not be directed from
within." Of course it is true that, during an engagement, or
when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be
in the thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart.
Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a
whole, and give wrong orders.]
14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he
administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which
obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's
minds.
[Ts`ao Kung's note is, freely translated: "The military sphere
and the civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can't handle an
army in kid gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice
are the principles on which to govern a state, but not an army;
opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are military
rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of an
army"--to that of a State, understood.]
15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without
discrimination,
[That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right
place.]
through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to
circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
[I follow Mei Yao-ch`en here. The other commentators refer not
to the ruler, as in SS. 13, 14, but to the officers he employs.
Thus Tu Yu says: "If a general is ignorant of the principle of
adaptability, he must not be entrusted with a position of
authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The skillful employer of men will
employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, and the
stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing his
merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action, the
covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man
has no fear of death."]
16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is
sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply
bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for
victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not
to fight.
[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the
offensive; if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the
defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is
right to take the offensive or the defensive.]
(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and
inferior forces.
[This is not merely the general's ability to estimate numbers
correctly, as Li Ch`uan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds
the saying more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it
is possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and vice
versa. The secret lies in an eye for locality, and in not
letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzu says: 'With a
superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one,
make for difficult ground.'"]
(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit
throughout all its ranks.
(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy
unprepared.
(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered
with by the sovereign.
[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "It is the sovereign's
function to give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it
is the function of the general." It is needless to dilate on
the military disasters which have been caused by undue
interference with operations in the field on the part of the
home government. Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his
extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered by
central authority.]
18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself,
you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know
yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will
also suffer a defeat.
[Li Ch`uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch`in, who in
383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor.
When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the
services of such men as Hsieh An and Huan Ch`ung, he boastfully
replied: "I have the population of eight provinces at my back,
infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, they
could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their
whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?"
Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously routed at
the Fei River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.]
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in
every battle.
[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the
offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the
defensive." He adds: "Attack is the secret of defense; defense
is the planning of an attack." It would be hard to find a
better epitome of the root-principle of war.]
---------------------------------------
IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS
[Ts`ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the
title of this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the
part of the two armies with a view to discovering each other's
condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the dispositions of an
army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your
dispositions, and your condition will remain secret, which
leads to victory,; show your dispositions, and your condition
will become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks
that the good general can "secure success by modifying his
tactics to meet those of the enemy."]
1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves
beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an
opportunity of defeating the enemy.
2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands,
but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the
enemy himself.
[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy's part.]
3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against
defeat,
[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition of
his troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting
precautions."]
but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
4. Hence the saying: One may KNOW how to conquer without being
able to DO it.
5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability
to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
[I retain the sense found in a similar passage in ss. 1-3, in
spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. The
meaning they give, "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive,"
is plausible enough.]
6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength;
attacking, a superabundance of strength.
7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most
secret recesses of the earth;
[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor
indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the
enemy may not know his whereabouts."]
he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost
heights of heaven.
[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like
a thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This
is the opinion of most of the commentators.]
Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on
the other, a victory that is complete.
8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common
herd is not the acme of excellence.
[As Ts`ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before
it has germinated," to foresee the event before the action has
begun. Li Ch`uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when
about to attack the vastly superior army of Chao, which was
strongly entrenched in the city of Ch`eng-an, said to his
officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and
shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took his words
seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had
already worked out in his mind the details of a clever
stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the
city and inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."]
9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and
conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"
[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to
move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy's intentions and balk
his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without
shedding a drop of blood." Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for
things that
"the world's coarse thumb And finger fail to plumb."]
10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;
["Autumn" hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is
finest in autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is
a very common one in Chinese writers.]
to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the
noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
[Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and
quick hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250
stone; Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see
objects no bigger than a mustard seed; and Shih K`uang, a blind
musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.]
11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not
only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
[The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in
easy conquering." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "He who only sees the
obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below
the surface of things, wins with ease."]
12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom
nor credit for courage.
[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are
gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the
world as large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation
for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there
has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage."]
13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.
[Ch`en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises
no futile attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained
by Chang Yu: "One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength,
clever though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also
liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look
into the future and discern conditions that are not yet
manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably
win."]
Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of
victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already
defeated.
14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position
which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for
defeating the enemy.
[A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. "Position"
need not be confined to the actual ground occupied by the
troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations which
a wise general will make to increase the safety of his army.]
15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks
battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is
destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for
victory.
[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay
plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to
battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute
strength alone, victory will no longer be assured."]
16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and
strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his
power to control success.
17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly,
Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly,
Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of
quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity;
Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing
of chances.
[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in
the Chinese. The first seems to be surveying and measurement of
the ground, which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy's
strength, and to make calculations based on the data thus
obtained; we are thus led to a general weighing-up, or
comparison of the enemy's chances with our own; if the latter
turn the scale, then victory ensues. The chief difficulty lies
in third term, which in the Chinese some commentators take as a
calculation of NUMBERS, thereby making it nearly synonymous
with the second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought
of as a consideration of the enemy's general position or
condition, while the third term is the estimate of his
numerical strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu says: "The
question of relative strength having been settled, we can bring
the varied resources of cunning into play." Ho Shih seconds
this interpretation, but weakens it. However, it points to the
third term as being a calculation of numbers.]
19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's
weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
[Literally, "a victorious army is like an I (20 oz.) weighed
against a SHU (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a SHU weighed
against an I." The point is simply the enormous advantage which
a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one
demoralized by defeat." Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2.
ix. 2, makes the I to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu
Hsi's statement that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch`uan of
the T`ang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.]
20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of
pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.
---------------------------------------
V. ENERGY
1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same
principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question
of dividing up their numbers.
[That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc.,
with subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us
of Han Hsin's famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once
said to him: "How large an army do you think I could lead?"
"Not more than 100,000 men, your Majesty." "And you?" asked the
Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more the better."]
2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise
different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a
question of instituting signs and signals.
3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of
the enemy's attack and remain unshaken - this is effected by
maneuvers direct and indirect.
[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzu's
treatise, the discussion of the CHENG and the CH`I." As it is
by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these two
terms, or to render them consistently by good English
equivalents; it may be as well to tabulate some of the
commentators' remarks on the subject before proceeding further.
Li Ch`uan: "Facing the enemy is CHENG, making lateral diversion
is CH`I. Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy, your troops
should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure
victory abnormal maneuvers must be employed." Mei Yao-ch`en:
"CH`I is active, CHENG is passive; passivity means waiting for
an opportunity, activity beings the victory itself." Ho Shih:
"We must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack
as one that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus CHENG
may also be CH`I, and CH`I may also be CHENG." He instances the
famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly
against Lin- chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a
large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly
disconcerting his opponent. [Ch`ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we
are told, the march on Lin-chin was CHENG, and the surprise
maneuver was CH`I." Chang Yu gives the following summary of
opinions on the words: "Military writers do not agree with
regard to the meaning of CH`I and CHENG. Wei Liao Tzu [4th
cent. B.C.] says: 'Direct warfare favors frontal attacks,
indirect warfare attacks from the rear.' Ts`ao Kung says:
'Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation;
appearing on the enemy's rear is an indirect maneuver.' Li
Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: 'In war, to march
straight ahead is CHENG; turning movements, on the other hand,
are CH`I.' These writers simply regard CHENG as CHENG, and CH`I
as CH`I; they do not note that the two are mutually
interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides of a
circle [see infra, ss. 11]. A comment on the T`ang Emperor T`ai
Tsung goes to the root of the matter: 'A CH`I maneuver may be
CHENG, if we make the enemy look upon it as CHENG; then our
real attack will be CH`I, and vice versa. The whole secret lies
in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real
intent.'" To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack
or other operation is CHENG, on which the enemy has had his
attention fixed; whereas that is CH`I," which takes him by
surprise or comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy
perceives a movement which is meant to be CH`I," it immediately
becomes CHENG."]
4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed
against an egg - this is effected by the science of weak points
and strong.
5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining
battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure
victory.
[Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by
pounding the enemy's flanks or falling on his rear." A
brilliant example of "indirect tactics" which decided the
fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts' night march round the
Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. [1]
---
"There is madmen in the world and there are terror." --- George W. Bush
"My hands ARE fucking up!" --- Bob Minton, Great Clearwater Street Chase
"I want to dance." --- Lisa McPherson, 18 Nov 95 http://holysmoke.org/lm/lm.htm
mimus
>Project Gutenberg Etext
>Lionel Giles translation of Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR
>
>Standard OSA reading material. The commentary in [braces] is by
>the translator. "Chia Lin says that an army without spies is
>like a man with ears or eyes."
>
>[Large intro has been cut. See http://holysmoke.org/artofwar.htm]
<snip>
Old hat (bwahahaha), the two most innovative principles of which are
(1) attack where the enemy ain't and (2) make them attack you.
I saw
many people
reduced to
incoherent babbling,
stripping off clothes,
crawling around on the ground,
banging heads, limbs and other body parts
against furniture and walls,
barking,
losing all sense of one's identity
and intense and persistent suicidal ideation.
--Declaration of Andre Tabayoyon
I'm an OT.--Lisa McPherson
If you imagine 40-50 Scientologists
posting on the Internet every few days,
we'll just run the SP's right off the system.
It will be quite simple, actually.
--Elaine Siegel, OSA INT (1996)
Case 5/BTLA/SP2
Chris Owen
<tinmi...@hotmail.com> writes
>>Lionel Giles translation of Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR
>>
>>Standard OSA reading material. The commentary in [braces] is by
>>the translator. "Chia Lin says that an army without spies is
>>like a man with ears or eyes."
>>
>>[Large intro has been cut. See http://holysmoke.org/artofwar.htm]
>
>
>Old hat (bwahahaha), the two most innovative principles of which are
>(1) attack where the enemy ain't and (2) make them attack you.
Old hat? It's still standard reading (and taken *very* seriously) at
military academies.
--
| Chris Owen - chr...@OISPAMNOlutefisk.demon.co.uk |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| THE TRUTH ABOUT L. RON HUBBARD AND THE UNITED STATES NAVY |
| http://www.ronthewarhero.org |
Mistmagoo55
From: Chris Owen
Give it up, Chris. Nobody here cares about your stupid Art of War BS. IT ain't
a war,
and if it were, you've got a combo of certified mental cases, loons, and giant
red necks to be your big army.
Forget it. Have a cream soda. You will feel better.
Mike O'Connor
mistm...@aol.com (Mistmagoo55) wrote:
Scientology calls it a war.
++++++++++++ SACRED CULT SCRIPTURE +++++++++++++
Our war has been forced to become "To take over absolutely the field of
mental healing on this planet in all forms.
That was not the original purpose. The original purpose was to clear
Earth. The battles suffered developed the data that we had an enemy who
would have to be gotten out of the way and this meant that we were at
war...
[...]
By showing him to be brutal, venal and plotting we get him discarded.
Our direct assault will come when they start to arrest his principals
and troops for crimes (already begun).
Our total victory will come when we run his organisations, perform his
functions and obtain his financing and appropriations.
-- L. Ron Hubbard
"The WAR", 2 Dec 69
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Scientology scripture instructs parishioners in The Art of War. I
believe Mr. Hubbard may have said the concept of a "dead agent" came
from The Art of War:
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
During war, enemy agents infiltrate the opposing side, planting highly
convincing, yet false and damaging information. If the true nature of
the agent's activities are discovered, the agent is killed by those
he/she deceived. So a dead agent is highly skilled, disinformation
planting spy that has been discovered (and killed) by the enemy.
-- Sun Tzu
The Art of War
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
--
SCIENTOLOGY IS SECRETLY A UFO CULT
ASK THEM ABOUT XENU
Mike O'Connor <mi...@leptonicsystems.com>
<http://www.leptonicsystems.com>
mimus
>In article <395050fa...@news.zoomnet.net>, mimus
><tinmi...@hotmail.com> writes
>>shy_...@nospam.org (Shy David www.xenu.net) posted:
>>
>>>Project Gutenberg Etext
>>>Lionel Giles translation of Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR
>>>
>>>Standard OSA reading material. The commentary in [braces] is by
>>>the translator. "Chia Lin says that an army without spies is
>>>like a man with ears or eyes."
>>>
>>>[Large intro has been cut. See http://holysmoke.org/artofwar.htm]
>>
>><snip>
>>
>>Old hat (bwahahaha), the two most innovative principles of which are
>>(1) attack where the enemy ain't and (2) make them attack you.
>
>Old hat? It's still standard reading (and taken *very* seriously) at
>military academies.
They should be ashamed--the few grand principles involved could be
summarized much more clearly and simply.
As for "old hat", it's old, and "hat", well, that was sortofa clam
joke . . . .
>--
> | Chris Owen - chr...@OISPAMNOlutefisk.demon.co.uk |
> |---------------------------------------------------------------|
> | THE TRUTH ABOUT L. RON HUBBARD AND THE UNITED STATES NAVY |
> | http://www.ronthewarhero.org |
I saw
many people
reduced to
incoherent babbling,
stripping off clothes,
crawling around on the ground,
banging heads, limbs and other body parts
against furniture and walls,
barking,
losing all sense of one's identity
and intense and persistent suicidal ideation.
--Declaration of Andre Tabayoyon
I'm an OT.--Lisa McPherson
If you imagine 40-50 Scientologists
posting on the Internet every few days,
we'll just run the SP's right off the system.
It will be quite simple, actually.
--Elaine Siegel, OSA INT (1996)
Case 5/BTLA/SP1
Podkayne1
<chr...@lutefisk.OISPAMNOdemon.co.uk> wrote:
> >Old hat (bwahahaha), the two most innovative principles of which are
> >(1) attack where the enemy ain't and (2) make them attack you.
>
> Old hat? It's still standard reading (and taken *very* seriously) at
> military academies.
I was going to ask what "old hat" means in British, looked it up in
American first. Odd. I've never thought it meant "old fashioned,
trite". I thought that it meant knowledge you've used as long & often
as your favorite old hat.
--
John Travolta thinks Scientology is wonderful.
But then, he thinks the "Battlefield Earth" movie is wonderful too.
Think about it.
"You have angered the hedgehog, and now you must pay!"
Chris Owen
Podkayne1 <podk...@aol.com> writes
>In article <JyE4MIA8...@lutefisk.demon.co.uk>, Chris Owen
><chr...@lutefisk.OISPAMNOdemon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> >Old hat (bwahahaha), the two most innovative principles of which are
>> >(1) attack where the enemy ain't and (2) make them attack you.
>>
>> Old hat? It's still standard reading (and taken *very* seriously) at
>> military academies.
>
>I was going to ask what "old hat" means in British, looked it up in
>American first. Odd. I've never thought it meant "old fashioned,
>trite". I thought that it meant knowledge you've used as long & often
>as your favorite old hat.
Two peoples separated by a common language, and all that... and it's
pronounced *zed*, btw ;-)
Dave Bird
tefisk.OISPAMNOdemon.co.uk> writes:
>>>Project Gutenberg Etext
>>>Lionel Giles translation of Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR
>>>
>>>Standard OSA reading material. The commentary in [braces] is by
>>>the translator. "Chia Lin says that an army without spies is
>>>like a man with ears or eyes."
>>
>>(1) attack where the enemy ain't and (2) make them attack you.
>
>Old hat? It's still standard reading (and taken *very* seriously) at
>military academies.
Many of the basics of fighting with infantry and armour/cavalry
haven't changed that much over time.
-- . : : ,; . : ' ___.
uno, due, tre, FUEGO! .:. .:. .:': :' .:':' :. . : (") #oH|
' :' : :' : .::. H_ ~~~|
< > __ ,;;,. \\::// R_) |
'-|"""(") {__}::===== ....'''' ' ' ' ___..\||/....L\. ...|
____||--|_'--/__\___ '' .--''':::::::::::::::::::::
\ / /////////////S.Coronado/////
;'^';-._.-;'^';-._.-;'^';-._.-;'^';-._;'^';-._.-;'^';-._.-;'^';-._.-;'^
LRon Hubbard is shelled by goats in hell. www.xemu.demon.co.uk/clam/
mimus
>In article <podkayne1-73AF3...@nntp.lightlink.com>,
>Podkayne1 <podk...@aol.com> writes
>>In article <JyE4MIA8...@lutefisk.demon.co.uk>, Chris Owen
>><chr...@lutefisk.OISPAMNOdemon.co.uk> wrote:
>>
>>> >Old hat (bwahahaha), the two most innovative principles of which are
>>> >(1) attack where the enemy ain't and (2) make them attack you.
>>>
>>> Old hat? It's still standard reading (and taken *very* seriously) at
>>> military academies.
>>
>>I was going to ask what "old hat" means in British, looked it up in
>>American first. Odd. I've never thought it meant "old fashioned,
>>trite". I thought that it meant knowledge you've used as long & often
>>as your favorite old hat.
>
>Two peoples separated by a common language, and all that... and it's
>pronounced *zed*, btw ;-)
You mean "zee"?
>--
> | Chris Owen - chr...@OISPAMNOlutefisk.demon.co.uk |
> |---------------------------------------------------------------|
> | THE TRUTH ABOUT L. RON HUBBARD AND THE UNITED STATES NAVY |
> | http://www.ronthewarhero.org |
>
--
Dave Bird
Hash: SHA1
In article<JyE4MIA8...@lutefisk.demon.co.uk>, Chris Owen writes:
>In article <395050fa...@news.zoomnet.net>, mimus writes:
>:shy_...@nospam.org (Shy David www.xenu.net) posted:
>:|
>:|Project Gutenberg Etext
>:|Lionel Giles translation of Sun Tzu's ART OF WAR
>:
>:Old hat (bwahahaha), the two most innovative principles of which are
>:(1) attack where the enemy ain't and (2) make them attack you.
>
>Old hat? It's still standard reading (and taken *very* seriously) at
>military academies.
Earlier I wrote this was because "tactics" had hardly changed
over time. Whoops: I meant "strategy". The STRATEGY of turning
round a bad situation by retreat-and-consolidate to over-stretch
the enemy's supply lines would be familiar to Sun Tzu.
The TACTICS at the battle of El Alamein would not be; chiefly
because tanks, combining cavalry and artillery, with close
infantry support moving at speed behind them changed all the
tactical rules of the battlefield.
- -- . : : ,; . : ' ___.
uno, due, tre, FUEGO! .:. .:. .:': :' .:':' :. . : (") #oH|
' :' : :' : .::. H_ ~~~|
< > __ ,;;,. \\::// R_) |
'-|"""(") {__}::===== ....'''' ' ' ' ___..\||/....L\. ...|
____||--|_'--/__\___ '' .--''':::::::::::::::::::::
\ / /////////////S.Coronado/////
;'^';-._.-;'^';-._.-;'^';-._.-;'^';-._;'^';-._.-;'^';-._.-;'^';-._.-;'^
LRon Hubbard is shelled by goats in hell. www.xemu.demon.co.uk/clam/
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