>In lieu of dealing with what I said you clip it and indulge your
>perennial ad hominem filth.
There you go with your "perennial ad hominem filth" shtik, which, as
we all know, is your stale euphemism for "presenting facts in
opposition to Watsonian bs".
> Here again is what you clipped so that the
>readers may see and I may comment again:
And "readers" may yawn again.
>Ben-Gurion actually *carried out* the eviction of the
> Arabs from Palestine commencing in late 1947, ten
> years after the disputed letter was written.
The letter is not in dispute, except by adherent of Israeli communist
leader Pappe.
> He was the civilian commander in chief of that
>operation and well prior to 1947-48 he had been
> deeply involved in the preparation for it. This is
>amply demonstrated in Dr. Pappe's "The Ethnic
>Cleansing of Palestine"
Pappe demonstrates nothing, amply or otherwise, other than the
aversion to facts you share.
You claim that BG was "civilian commander in chief" of some
"operation"? What "operation"? When?
What Ben was "deeply involved with" and "well prior to 1947-48" was
NOT ridding western Palestine of Arabs.
Now read carefully -- and pay attention, for a change:
"Ben-Gurion, who saw in Zionism the only solution for the problem
confronting the Jewish people and the sole chance for their rescue,
was utterly convinced that if Zionism was not realized at once, the
Jewish people were doomed. This explains why, more than all his
colleagues in the labor movement and the Zionist leadership, he was
driven by an enduring sense that the ground was burning beneath the
feet of the Jews of Europe. Therefore, in his view, time was of the
essence...From 1933 on, Ben-Gurion was guided in his judgments and
actions by his sense of the burning ground, along with his drive to
establish the authority without which rescue of the Jews in Europe
would be impossible."
Shabtai Teveth, David Ben-Gurion: The Burning Ground, pp xiv-xv
---------------------------------------------------------------
"He rejected Jabotinsky's teaching that the Jews would get Palestine
only by force of arms. In 1916, implicitly acknowledging the conflict,
he had written to himself, "It is possible to come to terms with the
Arabs. this is a matter of strategy for the Yishuv." But after the
revolution in Russia he began asserting that there was no conflict of
interest between Zionism and the Arabs, since labor Zionism's vocation
was to expedite the socialist revolution in the East. With the
establishment of socialism in the region the conflict would disappear
as if it had never been, since it had been created arbitrarily by the
exploitative, feudal Arab effendis and clerics, who sought only to
benefit themselves, fearing progress and the social and national
liberation it would bring.
"A Jewish socialist republic could be established in Palestine that
would live in peace and harmony with its neighbors, the Arab socialist
republics."
"The Zionists, including Ben-Gurion, claimed that the Disturbances of
1919 and the early 1920s – which constituted Arab protest in blood and
fire against the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate, and Jewish
immigration to Palestine – were no more than the work of vandals and
mobs incited by the effendis and clerics, who feared Zionism as a
liberating social movement that threatened their class privileges, and
had the encouragement and assistance of British officials, who were
also enemies of Zionism.
"After the riots of Av 1929, Ben-Gurion...acknowledged the existence
of the Arab national movement and, as he had not been formerly, was
ready to meet with its spokesmen, the representatives of the same
effendis and clerics whom he had once dismissed. He sought to convince
them that there was no conflict of interest and that the two nations,
Jewish and Arab, could live together in peace and harmony in the
framework of a plan he had created to establish a Federal Palestine; a
federation between a Jewish Palestine and its Arab neighbors, in which
the Arabs of Palestine, even if they became the minority in the Jewish
state, would not be a minority in the framework of the federation. In
this manner the Arab "fragment" living in Palestine would not be
oppressed since its national aspirations would be expressed within the
framework."
Teveth, pp 457-458
---------------------------------------------------------------
"Joseph Aharonovitch, one of Ben-Gurion's staunchest supporters in the
HEC, wrote in Davar [May 3, 1933], under the headline Neither Shall
You Follow Their Example, that "the use of force, other than in self-
defense, is an abomination to our movement; it jeopardizes our work in
Palestine and all the hopes of Zionism. Only he who has finished with
Zionism, or a madman, can choose such a path."
Teveth, p 461
---------------------------------------------------------------
"Unlike other JAE officials who dealt with the Arab question, Ben-
Gurion rejected political contacts with Arabs who favored Zionism for
financial gain and openly espoused contacts with Arab nationalists,
more precisely the heads of the pan-Arab movement. Since 1929 the star
of the mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, had been rising in
the Arab community. The Jews held him responsible for the massacres
and atrocities against Jews in the 1929 Disturbances. By 1933 it was
clear that if anyone could claim to speak on behalf of Palestine's
Arabs it was he, and Ben-Gurion focused on this man."
"Ben-Gurion approached Musa Alami, son of a wealthy and respected
family and holder of a law degree from Cambridge. Until the end of
1933 Alami had been Wauchope's personal secretary, and from early 1934
he was assistant attorney general for the Mandatory government. Ben-
Gurion said he was in search of an "Arab nationalist who cannot be
bought with money or favors, but is not a hater of Israel." In Alami
he found such an Arab."
"Ben-Gurion chose Alami not only because of [his]family connections,
but also because he regarded Alami – mistakenly, it turned out – as
"an Arab politician who does not appear as such in public because he
holds government office, but who is the man behind Arab policy in
Palestine." And Ben-Gurion intended to open his talks with the Arabs
quietly.
"On March 20, 1934, Alami and Ben-Gurion met in Moshe Sharett's
apartment in Jerusalem. Opening his remarks with the accepted Zionist
claim that "we bring a blessing to the Arabs of Palestine, and they
have no good cause to oppose us," Ben-Gurion received a shattering
surprise. Musa Alami retorted, "I would prefer that the country remain
impoverished and barren for another hundred years, until we ourselves
are able to develop it on our own." Dauntless opponents had always
found favor with Ben-Gurion, and he was pleased at this reply. "I felt
that as an Arab patriot he was entitled to say what he said," wrote
Ben-Gurion in his memoirs. It is likely that he also expressed the
same sentiment directly to Alami at their first meeting, and a certain
chemistry developed between them. The first talk, like the ones that
followed, was frank and straightforward."
Teveth, pp 460-461
---------------------------------------------------------------
"On June 15, while Musa Alami was still involved with the murder
trial, Ben-Gurion had met with the Lebanese Muslim leader Riyadh al-
Sulh, and on July 18 with the leader of the pan-Arab Istiqal party in
Palestine...At the end of July Ben-Gurion was invited to Government
House in Jerusalem...Before dinner Ben-Gurion told him [Wauchope]
about his plan and the positive response it had received from the
Arabs...to his great surprise Wauchope asked him to continue his talks
with the Arabs.
"He did. On August 14 he went to see Alami at his home in Sharafat,
and visited him again on August 27, and 31. Alami and Hadi told Ben-
Gurion things he had never heard before. He got a firsthand account of
Arab fears and growing Arab pessimism. Although "a few are getting
rich" from the development Zionism brought about in Palestine, Hadi
told him, "the people are being dispossessed."*
These talks, Ben-Gurion believed, taught him to see Zionism and its
enterprise "through Arab eyes" and to empathize with the Arabs. Ben-
Gurion would later tell his JAE and Mapai colleagues that they saw
only the terrible distress of the Jewish people, with the sword of
Nazism dangling over their heads, but that he perceived the Arabs'
distress as well and could sense their fear of growing Jewish strength
in Palestine. He explained further that this fear was rooted in the
prejudice that Jews ruled the world, having unlimited financial means
at their disposal an omnipotent control over public opinion, the
press, Parliament, and the British government. He said he understood
how "the Arab fear" fueled the Arab national movement and its acts of
protest and terror.
"From these talks the irreducible conflict of interest of Zionism and
the Arab national movement emerged very clearly, for the only solution
perceived by his interlocutors for their problems was an end to Jewish
immigration and land sales.* "Our final goal, Ben-Gurion told Hadi and
Alami, "is the independence of the Jewish people in Palestine , on
both sides of the Jordan River, not as a minority, but as a community
numbering millions," whereas "the goal of the Arab nation is
independence, unity, and revival for all the Arab peoples in their
lands." The main question he posed in these talks was whether these
two objectives could be reconciled, and he believed they could. In
exchange for Arab recognition of the Jewish right to return to
Palestine, Ben-Gurion promised, speaking for the Jewish people, to
recognize "the right of the Arabs to remain on their land, while the
Yishuv is allowed to grow through the development of Palestine." The
Jews would use their "political influence, financial means, and moral
support to bring about the independence and unity of the Arab people,"
namely, an Arab federation."
"At the August 14 meeting Alami brought up the mufti, who was "the
decisive force" in Palestine, promising to pass on to him the content
of their talks and suggesting that Ben-Gurion meet with Haj Amin
himself – secretly, of course...Meanwhile the connection continued
through Alami, who kept his word and, in describing the Federal
Palestine plan to the mufti, also raised Ben-Gurion's question. Was it
possible to come to an understanding whereby the Arabs would agree to
the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine in exchange for
Jewish consent to this federation?
Teveth, pp 464-467
See further:
S. Teveth, Ben-Gurion and the Palestine Arabs: From Peace to War
D. Ben-Gurion, My Talks with Arab Leaders
---------------------------------------------------------------
"In March 1936 he had told Judah-Lieb Magnes, "The difference between
you and me is that you are ready to sacrifice immigration for peace,
while I am not, though peace is dear to me. And even if I were
prepared to make a concession, the Jews of Poland and Germany would
not be, because they have no other choice. For them immigration comes
before peace."
Teveth, Burning Ground, p 539
---------------------------------------------------------------
"Ben-Gurion maintained that, whatever the Zionist policy, the Arabs
would always be the Jews' neighbors in Palestine. In November 1935 he
had told Menahem Ussishkin, "We should not, and cannot, drive the
Arabs out by force." He regarded dialogue as essential, and Sharett
defended the talks with Antonius to Wauchope in the same vein."
Teveth, Burning Ground, p 539-40
---------------------------------------------------------------
"Ben-Gurion, more than any of his colleagues in the party and the JAE,
understood the Arabs' feelings and was ready to acknowledge their
rights. He took satisfaction in the fact that his meetings with with
Abd al-Hadi, Alami, Arslan, Antonius, and others had taught him to
empathize with the Arab point of view. He pointed out this advantage
more than once to his JAE and Mapai colleagues. His "Arab eyes"
enabled him to feel "the Arabs' fear" of a Jewish buildup and to
understand that this fear lay at the root of the Disturbances. "It
really is difficult," he wrote the Jewish Agency in June, "for someone
who has never talked with the Arabs to imagine the magnitude of their
fear."10
"Furthermore, he acknowledged the existence of an Arab national
movement, and in November 1936 accounted for its origins in a letter
to Ussishkin. "We ourselves, by our very presence and progress here,
have nurtured the Arab nationalist movement." Such a movement would
have arisen anyway, but Zionism had had a catalytic effect. In the
same letter he presaged the conflict's future. "In these Disturbances
we have already seen a mighty manifestation of a pan-Arab movement and
military alignment...of the Arabs of neighboring countries for the
Palestinian Arabs' war against the Jews."
"Reviewing all of his statements at the time, one can see that the
signs of recognition of a Palestinian people were clear. In 1930 Ben-
Gurion had declared, "We wholeheartedly support the right of self-
determination for all peoples...and that undeniably includes the Arab
people in Palestine." He reiterated this view in February 1937 before
the Histadrut council:
"The right which the Arabs in Palestine have is theirs as inhabitants
of the country...because they live here, and not because they are
Arabs...Arabs who do not live here have no rights in Palestine...The
Arab inhabitants of Palestine should enjoy all civic and political
rights, not only as individuals, but as a national group, just like
the Jews."
"[H]e found himself at odds with his Mapai colleagues, who took him to
task in both party forums and the press, in a controversy that lasted
from May 1936 to February 1937...The controversy was based on
differing evaluations of the Arab national movement. Katznelson still
regarded Arab violence as the work of "instigators" -- clerics and
effendis — and ...denied the existence of an Arab national movement
that was the standard-bearer for the rights of Palestine's Arabs. "Can
this be described as nationalism? Let's not believe it for a moment!"
To his mind, the hostility and terror stemmed from other sources
entirely—the malaise of the educated sons of the effendis, Arab
savagery, and Muslim xenophobia. "The factor of importance, which
characterizes the Arab movement in the East, is the desert origin,
this deep link with the desert which has not yet been severed." This,
not "the Arabs' fear," constituted "the true content" of the Arab
movement. Reprovingly, almost raising his voice, he asked, "Where is
the SOCIAL AND PROGESSIVE CONTENT we saw in the liberation movements
of Poland and of the Czechs, in the protracted struggle against
European rule in India, and among all those who seek to liberate their
culture? Not a trace." Katznelson rejected Ben-Gurion's premise that
the Arabs were fighting dispossession from the land of their fathers,
as well as Ben-Gurion's view of Sheik Izz al-Din al-Qassam as an "Arab
Trumpeldor." "In all these terrorist manifestations," wrote
Katznelson, "one might find evidence of personal dedication to
religious fanaticism and xenophobia, but we cannot discern anything
else."12
"By 1929 Ben-Gurion had found that a movement's political capacity is
determined and measured by its ability to mobilize the masses. This
was the ground on which he recognized the Arab national movement;
Katznelson, on the other hand, judged a movement according to its
"content." The Arab movement's "corrupt leadership," said Katznelson,
disqualified it as a national movement. "Such is the Arab movement,
and I say all the groping and sifting in the world is unlikely to
change our attitude to its character." Tabenkin, Beilinson, and Kaplan
also denied that the Disturbances constituted "war" and "rebellion."
As far as they were concerned, these were nothing more than dastardly
acts of murder, robbery, looting, and destruction, for which the sole
accountability rested on the government. Naturally enough, then, they
could not accept the British factor as the most vital of Zionism's
interests. "I think this idea is far-fetched," said Tabenkin.
"Ben-Gurion responded, "There are comrades among us who see only one
enemy, the government. In their opinion, there is no uprising or
revolt by the Arabs...I have a hard time understanding the astonishing
blindness of people like Beilinson, Tabenkin, Kaplan, and others." He
could not fathom, he said, their denial of such an obvious fact. In
August 1936 he sent the party Central Committee a special letter on
this matter. "I cannot ignore the harsh fact that there is indeed an
Arab uprising in Palestine...The Arabs fight with arms and strikes,
terror and sabotage, mayhem and destruction of property...What more
must they do to make their acts merit the name of rebellion and
uprising?" But the more he pounded away at his colleagues the more
stubbornly and infuriatingly they held to their views. "Were I an
Arab," he wrote Sharett in June 1937, "an Arab politically, nationally
minded...I would rebel even more vigorously, bitterly, and desperately
against the immigration that will one day turn Palestine and all its
Arab residents over to Jewish rule."13
"If Ben-Gurion was astonished by his colleagues' blindness, were they
not also entitled to an equal measure of astonishment at Ben-Gurion's
vision? And might they not take him for an opportunist? This
possibility weighed heavily on Ben-Gurion, and he felt the need to
demonstrate his ideological integrity. At the height of the
controversy he confided to his diary [26 June 1937], as if for his own
eyes only,
"In my opinion, there is no greater danger to political (and
not only political) thought than inertia, devotion to an existing
structure of outmoded thought. The world is never static, and
certainly history is not. Powers and factors and constellations renew
themselves from time to time, obliterating or fundamentally altering
that which existed before. Other ways must be sought to obtain the
objective."
"Ben-Gurion then went to great lengths to distance himself from
outmoded thought. In June 1936 he had taken the rare step of
confessing to an error, telling Mapai that his approach to the Arab
question in the early years of Achdut ha-Avodah had been mistaken. To
the Histadrut council in February 1937 he again admitted "a mistake I
made thirteen years ago."14 If he did this hoping his associates would
follow suit, he was disappointed. The disagreement deepened; at its
center was the unspoken question of whether a Palestinian people truly
existed. By remaining "blind," his colleagues were spared major
ideological contradictions and could continue to regard socialist
Zionism as a wholly just doctrine, for it there was no Arab national
movement there could not be a Palestinian people..
"Ben-Gurion, who could no longer claim, as he had previously, that the
Arabs of Palestine were but a "fragment" of the great Arab nation and
that therefore there was no conflict of interest between them and
Zionism, found himself upholding a flawed doctrine. However, because
he could not admit publicly that Zionism was not a movement of
absolute justice, he stopped short of declaring that the Arabs of
Palestine were a "Palestinian people." ...Moreover, the Arabs of
Palestine had not yet declared themselves a "Palestinian nation," and
Ben-Gurion, at the forefront of Zionism, was certainly not the man to
do so for them."
Teveth, pp 542-544
---------------------------------------------------------------
"November 1938 was a decisive time in Ben-Gurion's life. The future
Ben-Gurion envisaged was more terrifying than any of his colleagues
could imagine. He differed from other Zionist leaders both in his
foresight of political developments and in his adherence to the dream
of a Jewish state that would be the salvation of European Jewry. The
temporary peace achieved in Munich had not clouded his vision for an
instant. He had no doubt that Hitler would move inexorably toward war
and the destruction of the Jewish people and that Britain would betray
the Jews just as it had Czechoslovakia. Ben-Gurion saw through Malcolm
MacDonald's Zionist-sympathizer posturings whose purpose was "merely
to cover up the betrayal." "At this time," he wrote the Jerusalem JAE,
"we cannot rule out the possibility that they will abandon us."
"The Woodhead Report and its accompanying statement made it clear that
the Peel Commission had merely postponed the change of course for two
years. The report's significance was frighteningly clear: the harsh
restrictions on immigration and land sales were tantamount to
abolishing the Mandate and handing Palestine over to Arab rule, just
as the Czechs had been turned over to the Nazis. As the sands of the
hourglass measured out the last days of European Jewry, Zionism was
simultaneously reaching the end of its rope. Realizing this, Ben-
Gurion felt pressed to find an immediate answer to two questions: if
the state was not to be, how could Zionism save European Jews from
Hitler? And how could Zionism deliver the Jews of Palestine from the
Arabs? Ben-Gurion was alone in considering these two questions a
single problem."
Teveth, p 654
---------------------------------------------------------------
"In August 1933 Ben-Gurion bought a copy of Mein Kampf and after
reading it announced to the Histadrut Council, in January 1934, that
"Hitler's rule endangers the entire Jewish people...Who knows, perhaps
just four or five years—if not less—stand between us and that terrible
day." That January he and Sharett confronted Sir Arthur Wauchope with
the threat of destruction hovering over the Jews of Germany and
Poland. In April 1935 he asked the Zionist Executive, "Is there a man
today so blind he does not see the catastrophe of the Jews?" That year
he forewarned the Zionist Congress of "the greatest perils in store
for the existence of the Jewish people all over the world...the days
of the Inquisition...and the Crusades...are back." In November, he
told the JAE, "From the fearful situation of the masses one gets the
feeling that even the little it is possible to do at the moment will
not be possible a short time from now. We must work as fast as we can
to save the maximum." And in December 1935 he said, "Destruction is
lying in wait for our people in all the lands of its dispersion. A war
of ruination has been declared against the captives of the Nazis."
"In a letter to Kaplan in March 1936, Ben-Gurion spoke of "the
destruction in store for the Jews of Germany and Poland and the other
countries of eastern Europe," and several days later prophesied to
Mapai's Central Committee that "the situation of Polish Jewry will be
worse than that of German Jewry." In October 1936 he warned the
Zionist Actions Committee, "There are forces in Europe that seek to
blot out the memory of Judaism." At the Mapai convention in Rehovot in
1938 he spoke of "a war of extinction against the Jewish people,"
saying that Germany had "engraved upon its flag the obliteration of
the Jewish people." In November he wrote Malcolm MacDonald that
"millions of our people are facing annihilation." He did not keep his
forebodings secret from the public at large; at a meeting of
representatives from throughout the Yishuv in December 1938 he
announced that one of Hitler's goals was "the absolute eradication and
physical destruction of the Jewish people, not just in Germany but all
over the world." The approach of the world war strengthened his belief
in his prediction, and in June 1939 Ben-Gurion told the Zionist
Executive, "This war could bring down catastrophe upon us...in this we
can trust Hitler...If there is a war...he will carry this out. First
of all he will wipe out the Jews of Europe."
Teveth, pp 848-849
---------------------------------------------------------------
"Did he ask himself, when confronted with information on the
systematic physical extermination of the Jews, whether history was
playing a cruel joke on him, testing the courage of his convictions?
He might well have answered yes, for the terms "destruction,"
"extermination," "ruin," "catastrophe," and "extinction" had had an
entirely different meaning before the Holocaust, the putting to death
of six million Jews, was recognized for what it was and named. When
Ben-Gurion spoke in January 1933 of the "annihilation" facing German
Jewry, he meant terrible living conditions imposed on them by Hitler.
In April 1935 he defined "ruin" as "economic and cultural
impoverishment, the weakening of a people as a whole, political
devastation, the eradication of civil rights." Even at the Congress in
the summer of 1937, he said that "physical destruction and material
impoverishment endanger the existence of the Jewish populations of
many countries." And when he wrote to Miriam from Beaver Lake in April
1942 that Hitler aimed "to annihilate" the Jews, he was thinking of
political and economic ruin, not genocide. Until late 1942, when he
used the terms "obliteration" and "devastation," Ben-Gurion, like his
colleagues, visualized large-scale pogroms, not the Final Solution."
Teveth, pp 850-851
"Although a distinction was made after the Holocaust between the
massive death caused by premeditated starvation, deprivation, disease,
and large-scale killings and the massive death by industrial
implements that took place after the Wannsee Conference in January
1942, this distinction concerned only the Germans. From a Jewish,
Zionist point of view it mattered little whether the six million died
by typhus and shooting or by gas and crematoriums. Had he realized
sooner that an industrial, systematic genocide was taking place, he
would have understood that time was of the essence and might have
reacted differently. But, as must be repeated forever, such
annihilation was far beyond his grasp and that of his generation..He
foresaw destruction, but not the Holocaust, and this imperfect
forecast predetermined his actions. He worked out his plans in
accordance with his conception of the world at that time, its faults
and its surprises; the world of evil spawned by Hitler was unthinkable
to him in the literal sense of the word. He believed that the Jewish
people had been cast into an abyss of darkness, but that the beacon of
Zionism would direct them up into the light. He did not understand
that there would be no exit, no salvation, no hope of escape from
Hitler's inferno."
Teveth, pp 851-852
---------------------------------------------------------------
"In April 1936 he had told Wauchope, "Were there a possibility of
transferring Polish Jewry to America or Argentina we would have done
so, regardless of our Zionist ideology. But the whole world is closed
to us. Had we not room in Palestine, our people would have no choice
but suicide."
"The Evian Conference of 1938 and the Bermuda Conference of April 1943—
the free world's two farcical attempts, at the initiative of the
United States, to find a refuge for the Jews—proved Ben Gurion right.
Not one country opened its gates to Hitler's victims."
Teveth, p 855
---------------------------------------------------------------
"Ben-Gurion supported the proposed partition state, he said, not
because he viewed it as the fulfillment of the Zionist goal -- "Within
this area there is no possibility of solving the Jewish question" --
but because he thought sovereignty could decisively help achieve both
short-term and long-term objectives. His sense of the burning ground
made him view the saving of Jews from the destruction awaiting them in
Europe as the primary, immediate objective. "For this reason the
decisive factor," which he was unwilling to forego, even in return for
a truncated state, was "the area and limits of authority...Will they
serve to bring in one and a half million Jews within the next fifteen
years?...I see time as the fatal, decisive, and crucial element. I see
the writing on the wall burning in letters of blood and fire all over
Palestine."
Teveth, p 612
---------------------------------------------------------------
The frontiers envisaged by the Peel scheme should also be regarded as
a stage, for "no borders are eternal...and by the time we complete the
settlement...of our state a lot of water will have flowed under the
bridge." First, it would be possible to expand peacefully. "We shall
break through these frontiers, and not necessarily by the sword." How?
"We will bring into our state hundreds of thousands of Jews," "a
million and a half," "more than two million," he said at different
times. Then, "after we become numerous and strong," it would be
possible to discuss settlement of the Negev desert, "making it worth
the Arabs' while." Failing this, the state could be enlarged by other
means. Two months after the Congress, in a letter to his son, he
specified what these would be."
p 616
---------------------------------------------------------------
*NB: Both Alami and Hadi were prominent opponents to land sales to
Jews. Nevertheless:
Musa al-Alami sold lands to the JNF on which Kibbutz Tirat-Zevi was
founded in 1936, plus 1,600 dunams near Migdal, 1,700 dunams in
Hirbiya, 6,000 dunams in the southern Judean plain, and other lands
jointly owned with the Husaynis.
Awni Abd al-Hadi sold 2,000 dunams in the Jezre'el, the lands of the
village of Qumia, and a parcel of 6,000 dunams in Kafer-Zar'in to the
JNF. Both Hadi and his brother assisted the JNF in assembling large
tracts of land for purchase, while their father sold lands on which
moshava Karkur and Kefar-Pinnes were founded.]
Both were lawyers, of course.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Something to keep in mind:
"There is no greater danger to political (and not only political)
thought than inertia, devotion to an existing structure of outmoded
thought. The world is never static, and certainly history is not.
Powers and factors and constellations renew themselves from time to
time, obliterating or fundamentally altering that which existed
before."
Ben-Gurion, 26 June 1937
>What we see in this article is an attempt
>to discredit the entire book and Pappe too
Pappe does a fine enough job discrediting himself, and needs no help.
>This ambiguous picking of a single nit about a
>scribbled-upon sentence in a personal letter of
>October 5, 1937 is ridiculous. It's the sort of
>thing which is Camera's stock in trade.
It would not be "ambiguous picking of a single nit" or "ridiculous" if
corrections were made to someone who, while claiming to be an
historian, had written: "In June 1940, Churchill declared in the
Commons, 'We shall fight with the Wehrmacht on the beaches, we shall
fight with the Wehrmacht on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the
fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never
fail our Nazi allies".
If you weren't so ignorant of the subjects you try, and fail, to
address, you would know that Pappe's deliberate falsification of BG's
1937 letter is neither "ambiguous picking of a single nit" nor
"ridiculous".
>In the past you've said you read Dr. Ilan Pappe's "The Ethnic
>Cleansing of Palestine". I won't ask you to acknowledge it again,
Do so, and you'll get the list of Pappeal errors I previously posted.
>it is impossible for you to honestly claim that what I say
> immediately above about the book and Ben-Gurion
>is "bullshit".
It is indeed highly possible for me to state -- honestly -- that what
you posted above, and about Pappe's crappe, and your mutual crappe
about Ben Gurion, is bullshit, and of the purest ray serene, too.
>It is absolutely true and can be easily verified
> by anyone open-minded enough to read it.
>The idea that people will do so as the result of reading me here brings up unbidden
It brings up "unbidden" the thought that you have a ridiculously high
opinion of yourself.
>the filthy bile of your being, sharavi,
Va te y chingala tu madre sucia, pendejo.
>but you can gain nothing from that because all
>of those looking over our shoulders, hundreds
>every week, personally*want to know the truth
>of the matter* no matter which side they inhabit.
>That's human nature.
That's MOTSS. It's human nature to tell stories, a trait carried to
the extreme by "palestinians" and communist leaders like Pappe.
>Everyone wants to know the truth
You have amply demonstrated that, like your communist idol Pappe, you
don't give a damn for "truth".
>even if, as with
>you, the intent is to suppress it at all costs for ethno-
>political reasons.
Bah.
>Even you, an unemployed former secretary or
>paralegal, with ridiculous intellectual pretentions
>WANT TO KNOW even if the truth is your most
>dire enemy.
You wish. Truth isn't my enemy – it's yours, and you prove it with
your continuous posting of lies, propaganda insults, defamations, and
pure unadulterated crap. And FYI, I was a litigation paralegal in a
multinational oil corporation's West Coast legal division HQ, then
ditto in a major PNW law firm, one in which, I might add, an
associate's lowest AV rating was still higher than yours --
particularly in the matter of ethics.
N'awr, mynd i eistedd ar'no a theolli fel r'alter kacker dwp tiyn.