Trinity and William Lane Craig
ghali
A continuation of my argument with Denis on Soc.religion.islam, quite a
while ago if anyone wants to follow this up.....
> From the start I have asserted the doctrine as
> pushing the Godhead as a set
> of three persons (again, like Craig's Cerberus
> analogy).
Then we are not strictly following Craig. Craig thinks that God is the
one substance in the trinity (taking into account the athanasian
creed). But if you take God to be a set then we are in disasters! A set
is not an entity in the way we usually think about things! The set of
divine beings include the Hindu Gods, yet they are not one! I would
hope you stick with substance. Don't make it that easy for me!
> Maybe, but then I don't know what a bundle theorist
> is, and I don't know
> what tropes are, so maybe not!
A bundle theorist believes that there is no need for substance. A
lumping together of properties is all we need. Tropes where introduced
to avoid the problems with the Leibnez's law. If two entities have
exactly the same properties then they are one and the same thing. This
would be difficult if you thought space and time to be relative. Tropes
are particulars that are never identical. I have a red jumper and a red
car. Both the colour red in the jumper and the car have similarities,
but they are not truly identical. This is a very rough idea!
See this link
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tropes/
> >What about the views of
> >relative identity, those of David Wiggins etc etc
> etc.
>
> After reading about this, I would answer "no" here
> with confidence (i.e. I
> do not affirm that at all). If I'm not mistaken,
> both Craig and Thomas
> Morris have been highly critical of that route.
Ok then we will exclude relative identity. I think in the end we are
left with substance
Ghali
Denis Giron
Ghali (ghal...@yahoo.co.uk) wrote in message
<1119724506.8...@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>...
>
> > From the start I have asserted the doctrine as
> > pushing the Godhead as a set
> > of three persons (again, like Craig's Cerberus
> > analogy).
>
> Then we are not strictly following Craig. Craig thinks
> that God is the one substance in the trinity (taking
> into account the athanasian creed).
Why is it that the objects within a set cannot be of the same substance
(even in whatever sense of "substance" Craig refers to)?
> But if you take God to be a set then we are in
> disasters! A set is not an entity in the way we
> usually think about things!
I would say a set is not necessarily a single entity. But could not a
cat be considered a set of different parts and yet simultaneously a
single entity as well? Or are we using two different notions of set?
> Ok then we will exclude relative identity. I think in
> the end we are left with substance
Maybe.
ghali
substance
(even in whatever sense of "substance" Craig refers to)? "
I think we are talking about different notions of a set. I am thinking
of a naive set theory. A set is defined as a well defined collection of
objects or more particularly elements. Obviously the elements in the
set share a common characteristic. But if God is only and I mean only
defined as a collection of elements then that alone does not provide
unity. A cat is on this definition not a set. After all a cat is not an
abstract mathematical entity.
In Mathematics we have a an empty set, assign properties to it i.e.
divinity and then include all members that have this property.
Hindu Gods have the properties of being divine ( on a polytheistic
view) and therefore are included in the set. Their inclusion does not
make them one.
Denis in other words you must show me how your example unites them
literally into one while the second does not. At least the
understanding of set in your example and mines but have some
difference. What is it?
Therefore their must be something additional to the notion of set that
must be added
I guess we fall back on substance again!
Don't forget the problem that Howard Snyder notes in footnote 18
Argument: the conjunction of
(1) God is absolutely identical with the three Persons
and
(2) The Trinity "as a whole" is absolutely identical with God,
which is the First Tenet, entails by the transitivity of absolute
identity that
(3) The Trinity "as a whole" is absolutely identical with the three
Persons.
But recall the composition claim:
(4) The three Persons compose the Trinity "as a whole."
Using the term "the ps" as a plural variable which collectively
refers to the ps and not to any
object which has the ps as its parts or members,
(5) Necessarily, for any ps and for any thing x, if the ps compose x,
then x is not absolutely
identical with the ps.
The denial of 3 follows from 4 and 5.
I think their maybe a way out of this. I wait and see.
Denis Giron
ghali wrote:
> A set is defined as a well defined collection of
> objects or more particularly elements. Obviously
> the elements in the set share a common characteristic.
> But if God is only and I mean only
> defined as a collection of elements then that alone
> does not provide unity. A cat is on this definition not
> a set. After all a cat is not an
> abstract mathematical entity.
Well, God too, I would imagine for a theist, is not an abstract
mathematical entity. I still don't understand why a cat cannot also be
thought of as a set of its respective parts.
> Denis in other words you must show me how your example
> unites them literally into one while the second does not.
The assertion was that a single deity was comprised of three persons
(or three centers of consciousness or self-awareness), and again this
is where Craig's three-headed dog analogy comes in. The question was
simply is there anything logically incoherent about a single
being/entity being comprised of three persons. I think the answer is
no. This issue of what unites them is something I don't understand.
Being that the issue is with regard to logical coherence, how would you
respond to "I dunno"? In other words, what stops me here from simply
asserting that there is one being comprised of three persons and
leaving at that without explaining how the three persons are united
(i.e. if the discussion is about logical coherence). [I suppose,
however cheap, this might be analogous to asserting the existence of a
team in a three-legged race comprised of two men, without explaining by
what is used to connect the two men at the legs.]
With regard to the difference between a mutlipersonal deity, and a
simple collection of deities, again note that according to Craig's
doctrine none of the persons is by themself a God. It is simply the
assertion that a single deity is comprised of three persons. Perhaps
I'm still missing the point of your question?
> At least the
> understanding of set in your example and mines but have some
> difference. What is it?
This is precisely what I'm wondering. Maybe you could explain further?
> Don't forget the problem that Howard Snyder
> notes in footnote 18
>
> Argument: the conjunction of
> (1) God is absolutely identical with the three Persons
> and
> (2) The Trinity "as a whole" is absolutely identical with
> God, which is the First Tenet, entails by the transitivity
> of absolute identity that
> (3) The Trinity "as a whole" is absolutely identical with
> the three Persons.
> But recall the composition claim:
> (4) The three Persons compose the Trinity "as a whole."
> Using the term "the ps" as a plural variable which collectively
> refers to the ps and not to any
> object which has the ps as its parts or members,
> (5) Necessarily, for any ps and for any thing x, if the ps compose x,
> then x is not absolutely
> identical with the ps.
>
> The denial of 3 follows from 4 and 5.
Maybe you can explain this to me? The gist of (5) is that an object
cannot be identical with the collection of its parts? Is that right? If
so, could you explain why this is? Why is it, as Snyder claims, that a
thing cannot be identical with a collection of things? Is a cat not
identical to the the collective two halves of the same cat? In other
words, why does one accept (5) above?
ghali
> Well, God too, I would imagine for a theist, is not an abstract
> mathematical entity. I still don't understand why a cat cannot also be
> thought of as a set of its respective parts.
Muslims don't think Allah is a set Denis. I don't see the point here.
Sets just bring things together into a group.
> This issue of what unites them is something I don't understand.
> Being that the issue is with regard to logical coherence, how would you
> respond to "I dunno"?
Because by definition the notion of a set does not unite things into
single entities. If I have a set of mice, I am only saying by
DEFINITION that the mice are in a certain group. This is a category
mistake. It is like saying all bachelors are married. By definition
again bachelors are not married. Also by definition in the naive set
theory their is not idea of uniting things into one entity. That is
something outside the definition of a set. You can claim what you want
but I do need to understand what you say! What is your definition of a
set?
>. Perhaps I'm still missing the point of your question?
I think you are.
> This is precisely what I'm wondering. Maybe you could explain further?
Exactly I can't
> Maybe you can explain this to me? The gist of (5) is that an object
> cannot be identical with the collection of its parts? Is that right?
>From the idea of composition if the skeleton is part of the cat then by
definition again the cat is more than the skeleton. Take it from their.
Ghali
Denis Giron
> > Well, God too, I would imagine for a theist, is not
> > an abstract mathematical entity. I still don't
> > understand why a cat cannot also be
> > thought of as a set of its respective parts.
>
> Muslims don't think Allah is a set Denis.
Which is what I was arguing above: Theists don't believe God is merely
an abstract mathematical entity, and from there you instantiate in a
very specific kind of theist (i.e. Muslim).
If you mean Muslims don't believe God is comprised of three persons, I
would agree. But I'm not discussing what Muslims believe specifically;
rather I'm attempting to discuss whether Craig's doctrine is logically
coherent. Now again, what I don't understand is *why* a cat cannot also
be thought of as a set of its respective parts.
> Sets just bring things together into a group.
Again, the question is why an object cannot be considered to be a set
of its respective parts.
> > This issue of what unites them is something I don't understand.
> > Being that the issue is with regard to logical coherence,
> > how would you respond to "I dunno"?
>
> Because by definition the notion of a set does not unite things
> into single entities.
Wait, are you saying that a set cannot have those things united, or a
set necessarily does not have its members united? If it is the latter,
let me note that I am not claiming they are united simply because they
are a set.
> If I have a set of mice, I am only saying by
> DEFINITION that the mice are in a certain group.
Let's use Craig's Cerberus analogy. Why is it that this beast cannot be
also considered a set of three distinct centers of doggy consciousness?
Now I'm not saying that if you have a set of three centers of doggy
consciousness, then you have a Cerberus. But I am saying that I still
don't see why the Cerberus cannot be considered, in some sense, to be a
set of its respective parts (parts which, in this case, include centers
of consciousness).
> This is a category mistake. It is like saying
> all bachelors are married.
Why is it a category mistake? If a set is a certain group, why can't a
cat be considered a set of its parts? Is not the cat, in some sense, a
grouping together of its various parts? Now, again, I'm not stating
that simply grouping together cat parts gives one a cat, but a cat can
be a group of cat parts (organized in a very specific way).
> By definition again bachelors are not married. Also by
> definition in the naive set theory their is not idea
> of uniting things into one entity.
Okay, so, again, are you stating that necessarily, the members of a set
CANNOT be united? Or that the members of a set are not necessarily
united just because they're in the same set?
> > Perhaps I'm still missing the point of your question?
>
> I think you are.
Agreed. Hopefully your forthcoming posts will clear this up for me.
> > Maybe you can explain this to me? The gist of (5) is
> > that an object cannot be identical with the collection
> > of its parts? Is that right?
>
> From the idea of composition if the skeleton is part of the
> cat then by definition again the cat is more than the skeleton.
Right, a given part of an object is not identical to the whole, but I
was asking why the collection of parts in toto cannot be identical to
the whole. For example, I mentioned the two halves of a cat in my last
post. I'm not saying the cat is identical to the front half or the back
half alone, but rather that the cat is identical to the two halves
combined.
ghali
> Again, the question is why an object cannot be considered to be a set
> of its respective parts.
Ok, Denis let us have a set, the set of the properties of a cat called
Felix. So what does this set do. It bunches them together so that we
can draw ven diagrams etc etc. But nowhere in the definition of the set
does it make the properties unite in one being. Sets have NOTHING to do
with that. This then begs the question. God by definition in the
athanasian creed UNITES the persons. If God is only and I mean ONLY a
set then he does NOT unite them into ONE BEING, He unites them in a
group that shares the same properties but that is it. So it does not
help!
> > Because by definition the notion of a set does not unite things
> > into single entities.
>
> Wait, are you saying that a set cannot have those things united, or a
> set necessarily does not have its members united? If it is the latter,
> let me note that I am not claiming they are united simply because they
> are a set.
Yes the latter! They are then united because God say is a
substance...and so on. You have to use another notion
> Let's use Craig's Cerberus analogy. Why is it that this beast cannot be
> also considered a set of three distinct centers of doggy consciousness?
Well the analogy fails in a bad way as you should know if you had read
Synders article. But let us go along with this. They are united because
there is a BODY. A set is not a BODY. So again you are confusing the
two issues here. Craig uses this to help us understand the notion of
SUBSTANCE! You also agree that things are not united because of the
notion of set ALONE
> Why is it a category mistake? If a set is a certain group, why can't a
> cat be considered a set of its parts? Is not the cat, in some sense, a
> grouping together of its various parts? Now, again, I'm not stating
> that simply grouping together cat parts gives one a cat, but a cat can
> be a group of cat parts (organized in a very specific way).
Simply put. Put the properties of Felix the cat in a set. Mix them
together on paper with Ven diagrams and you do not get Felix the cat.
You get alot of circles on some paper!
Compare this with the notion of substance. Put properties in an
exisiting substance. No doubt these properties define the substance and
you do get Felix the cat.
Another important thing. Sets are defined prior to membership. So God
would then be on your analogy the set of the Divine persons Jesus, The
Father and the Holy spirit. These three persons are then in one set.
Ok again the analogy that I have repeated over and over again. Let us
call a set "Hindu God". This set would be then the set of divine
persons like Krishna. It follows that all the Hindu personalities are
then in one set. Are they then united because of this notion ALONE! No!
So What is the difference between the first notion of set and the
second that allows one to unite in ONE BEING in the first and not the
second. Therefore we are looking for an ADDITIONAL fact. What is it?
It would have to be the set of the persons who are united in one being.
But if that is the case . Then it would not help if being meant set.
It then would be equivalent to saying that to differentiate it has to
be the set of persons who are united in one being or the equivalent
statement the set of persons who are united in one set! A tautology if
I ever saw one!
> Okay, so, again, are you stating that necessarily, the members of a set
> CANNOT be united? Or that the members of a set are not necessarily
> united just because they're in the same set?
I am saying the second. Members of the set maybe united. But that has
nothing to do with the notion of a set. But you still have not defined
a set. What is a set according to you Denis?
>
> Agreed. Hopefully your forthcoming posts will clear this up for me.
>
Define a set and I think things will be more clear
Ghali
Denis Giron
ghali wrote:
> > Again, the question is why an object cannot be considered
> > to be a set of its respective parts.
>
> Ok, Denis let us have a set, the set of the properties of
> a cat called Felix. So what does this set do. It bunches
> them together so that we can draw ven diagrams etc etc.
> But nowhere in the definition of the set does it make the
> properties unite in one being.
Right, so if you're saying that just because something is a set does
not mean the members of the set are united, I would *AGREE*. I am not
claiming the persons are united simply because they are part of the
same set. Nonetheless, they are part of the same set, and all the
members of the set combined is identical to God.
> > > Because by definition the notion of a set does
> > > not unite things into single entities.
> >
> > Wait, are you saying that a set cannot have those
> > things united, or a set necessarily does not have
> > its members united? If it is the latter, let me note
> > that I am not claiming they are united simply because
> > they are a set.
>
> Yes the latter!
Funny, I have become further confused due to you affirming an option
which contained a typo from me. Base on the following exchange...
> > Okay, so, again, are you stating that necessarily, the
> > members of a set CANNOT be united? Or that the members
> > of a set are not necessarily united just because they're
> > in the same set?
>
> I am saying the second. Members of the set maybe united.
...that in the question above, you (correctly) interpreted 'a set
necessarily does not have its members united' as 'a set does not
necessarily have its members united' (i.e. while I typed the former, I
*MEANT* the latter; the former was accidental).
So this brings me back to my post to June 25 (where I offered the
possible response of "I dunno"). The claim is that the members of this
set are united. What unites them? I dunno (i.e. I don't know). However,
by virtue of the fact that we both agree that the members of a set may
be united, it is safe to say that we both agree that there is nothing
logically incoherent about claiming that the members of this particular
set are united.
> But you still have not defined
> a set. What is a set according
> to you Denis?
A collection or group of things/objects (and those things/objects would
be called members of that set). Assuming this definition is not
problematic, there is nothing in it that specifically denies that the
members of a set are united.
> > Let's use Craig's Cerberus analogy. Why is it that this
> > beast cannot be also considered a set of three distinct
> > centers of doggy consciousness?
>
> Well the analogy fails in a bad way as you should know if
> you had read Synders article.
I read it, and could not precisely wrap my mind around it, so let me
presuppose that what you write below properly represents
Howard-Snyder's objection.
> They are united because there is a BODY. A set is not
> a BODY. So again you are confusing the
> two issues here.
I am not claiming they are united because they are a set. I was simply
noting that Cerberus could also be considered a set of three distinct
centers of doggy consciousness. Furthermore, I like the analogy because
it presents a logically coherent notion of a single being with three
centers of consciousness, in which none of the centers of consciousness
are identical to the being as a whole.
> > Why is it a category mistake? If a set is a certain
> > group, why can't a cat be considered a set of its
> > parts? Is not the cat, in some sense, a grouping
> > together of its various parts? Now, again, I'm not
> > stating that simply grouping together cat parts
> > gives one a cat, but a cat can be a group of cat
> > parts (organized in a very specific way).
>
> Simply put. Put the properties of Felix the cat in a
> set. Mix them together on paper with Ven diagrams and
> you do not get Felix the cat. You get alot of circles
> on some paper!
I have no idea what you're saying here. Assuming a set can be defined
as a collection of parts or objects, it would seem it is possible to
define a cat as a set in some sense. As far as I can see, the only way
out is to deny the antecedent (i.e. my assumption). Is my definition of
set wrong?
> Compare this with the notion of substance.
I've deliberately avoided the notion of substance (mainly because I
unwittingly/accidentally employed it rather differently from the way it
is used in an Aristotelian sense when I posted to the SRI thread with
Dr. Saifullaah). Now, you have asked me on more than one occasion to
give my definition of "substance," while I'm trying to avoid that since
I'm not fully informed on the way it was used by medieval or ancient
philosophers. If you're going to try to get me to settle on the notion
of substance, maybe you should define what you mean by substance, and
I'll tell you whether I agree or not.
> Ok again the analogy that I have repeated over and over
> again. Let us call a set "Hindu God". This set would be
> then the set of divine persons like Krishna. It follows
> that all the Hindu personalities are then in one set.
> Are they then united because of this notion ALONE! No!
I agree, and never stated otherwise.
> So What is the difference between the first notion of
> set and the second that allows one to unite in ONE BEING
> in the first and not the second.
The difference is the assertion that the persons in the set are united.
The simple assertion.
Now, I'd like to return to the argument of the 18th footnote:
[------ BEGIN ARGUMENT ------]
the conjunction of
(1) God is absolutely identical with the three Persons
and
(2) The Trinity "as a whole" is absolutely identical with God, which is
the First Tenet, entails by the transitivity of absolute identity that
(3) The Trinity "as a whole" is absolutely identical with the three
Persons.
But recall the composition claim:
(4) The three Persons compose the Trinity "as a whole." Using the term
"the ps" as a plural variable which collectively refers to the ps and
not to any
object which has the ps as its parts or members,
(5) Necessarily, for any ps and for any thing x, if the ps compose x,
then x is not absolutely identical with the ps.
The denial of 3 follows from 4 and 5.
[------ END ARGUMENT ------]
I think it is plainly obvious that an object can be identical with a
collection of its parts. In one sense, an object can be numerically
identical with the composite of its parts. Being that you called this
argument to witness, I must concede that I still do not understand the
fifth proposition (i.e. I do not see why it is true).
1MAN4ALL
Denis Giron wrote:
> I am not claiming they are united because they are a set. I was simply
> noting that Cerberus could also be considered a set of three distinct
> centers of doggy consciousness. Furthermore, I like the analogy because
> it presents a logically coherent notion of a single being with three
> centers of consciousness, in which none of the centers of consciousness
> are identical to the being as a whole.
I know that I still owe you a response on the same discussion in
another thread, but out of curiosity let me ask you one question:
Knowing that the Father is the same as God as per the Old and the New
Testaments, ignoring the other debate whether Jesus can be God by
predication, and not using the word "Godhead" as it is not used in the
Bible, how would you diagram Trinity using Set Theory *only*? If you
can draw that up and put it on your web site, that would be very
helpful for all of us.
Denis Giron
1MAN4ALL wrote:
>
> > I am not claiming they are united because they are a
> > set. I was simply noting that Cerberus could also be
> > considered a set of three distinct centers of doggy
> > consciousness. Furthermore, I like the analogy because
> > it presents a logically coherent notion of a single
> > being with three centers of consciousness, in which
> > none of the centers of consciousness are identical to
> > the being as a whole.
>
> Knowing that the Father is the same as God as per the
> Old and the New Testaments,
Really quickly, this might be open to interpretation. Regardless, if
the Bible does affirm that the Father is identical to the Godhead,
proposition 7 (and possibly 4) would become scripturally inconsistent.
> ignoring the other debate whether Jesus can be God
> by predication, and not using the word "Godhead" as
> it is not used in the Bible, how would you diagram
> Trinity using Set Theory *only*? If you can draw that
> up and put it on your web site, that would be very
> helpful for all of us.
I'd have to think about this, but off the top of my head, a preliminary
rendering might be something like the following:
1. G = {f, s, h}
2. ~(G = f)
3. ~(G = s)
4. ~(G = h)
The first proposition states that G is identical to the set that
composites f, s and h, and the other three propositions note that none
of the members of this set are, by themself, identical to G.
But again, I'd have to think about this further (and look into a book
on Set Theory). But of course, if you simply want a rendering into
formal logic (with a slight nod to set theory, as I wouldn't know off
the top of my head how to represent predication without making recourse
to formal logic in general), I would recommend the end of the following
post from June 5th in the 'Christianity vs. Islam' thread...
http://groups-beta.google.com/group/alt.religion.islam/msg/cf7963d7b9ac81ea
...which put forth the following propositions:
(1) ~(Ey) [(Gy) & ~(y = ixGx)]
(2) (y) (Gy) --> (y = ixGx)
(3) (y) (y = ixGx) --> (Gy)
(4) (y) (Gy) <--> (y = ixGx)
(5) (y) (G'y) --> (y.P.ixGx)
(6) G'j & G'f & G'h
The terms used are explained in the post linked to above. This has a
*slight* nod to set theory by virtue of the fact that the 5th and 6th
propositions combine to present the persons as being proper parts of a
single entity (thus being members of a common set).
You'll have to elaborate with regard to what exactly it is you're
looking for, and in the mean time I'll pull Quine's 'Set Theory and its
Logic' off my shelf at home to flip through it with the hopes of coming
up with some ideas.
1MAN4ALL
Denis Giron wrote:
> 1MAN4ALL wrote:
> >
> > > I am not claiming they are united because they are a
> > > set. I was simply noting that Cerberus could also be
> > > considered a set of three distinct centers of doggy
> > > consciousness. Furthermore, I like the analogy because
> > > it presents a logically coherent notion of a single
> > > being with three centers of consciousness, in which
> > > none of the centers of consciousness are identical to
> > > the being as a whole.
> >
> > Knowing that the Father is the same as God as per the
> > Old and the New Testaments,
>
> Really quickly, this might be open to interpretation. Regardless, if
> the Bible does affirm that the Father is identical to the Godhead,
> proposition 7 (and possibly 4) would become scripturally inconsistent.
As I stated earlier, let's ignore the word "Godhead" as the Bible does
not even mention the word.
> But again, I'd have to think about this further (and look into a book
> on Set Theory). But of course, if you simply want a rendering into
> formal logic
No, no. That's another debate. Let's try to draw it up in a diagram. It
shouldn't take you more than ten minutes to figure out once you find
the book. I think that would truly clarify this discussion.
Denis Giron
1MAN4ALL wrote:
>
> > But again, I'd have to think about this further (and
> > look into a book on Set Theory). But of course, if you
> > simply want a rendering into formal logic
>
> No, no. That's another debate.
Is it? It seems to me that it is going to necessarily overlap with
formal logic if I am expected to explain predication. [and Set Theory
is not something mutually exclusive from formal logic as far as I can
see]
> Let's try to draw it up in a diagram.
If it is just about diagrams, consider the following image:
http://oopi.us/pictures/trinity-diagram-attempt.jpg
It represents God, but of course notions of predication are not
explained in such. But then I don't know what you mean by a diagram
using only set theory. Could you give me an example of a diagram using
only set theory employed to describe anything (so I can understand if
you mean an image or a translation into formal language employing the
terminology of set theory, or something else).
> It shouldn't take you more than ten minutes to figure
> out once you find the book. I think that would truly
> clarify this discussion.
Well, I'm leaving for home now, and will report back tomorrow after
flipping through Quine's work. In the mean time, provide me with an
example of what you mean when you speak of a 'diagram using set theory
only'. Use such to describe or diagram anything, just so I understand
what you mean. Also, give your thoughts on the 'preliminary rendering'
in my previous post (you just snipped it without explaining if it was
along the lines of what you're looking for), and inform me with regard
to what it is you are looking for (i.e. do you expect it to also
discuss predication? or do you want it only to explain the notion of
the persons being part of a set? something else?).
Denis Giron
1MAN4ALL wrote:
>
> > Regardless, if the Bible does affirm that the Father
> > is identical to the Godhead, proposition 7 (and
> > possibly 4) would become scripturally inconsistent.
>
> As I stated earlier, let's ignore the word "Godhead" as
> the Bible does not even mention the word.
As an aside, this is as ridiculous as saying that thr word "tawHeed"
does not appear in the Qur'an. The Western Christian Bible, in its
present form, does not contain the word "Godhead," but a concept along
those lines is put forth in the text. For example, there is no doubt
that the text states that there is only one God. Then, in John 1:1 we
have God, and then the Logos (i.e. Jesus), who is not identical to God,
but God in a sense of predication. The implication, as far as I can
see, is of a multipersonal Godhead.
Denis Giron
Denis Giron wrote:
> 1MAN4ALL wrote:
> >
> > > But again, I'd have to think about this further (and
> > > look into a book on Set Theory). But of course, if you
> > > simply want a rendering into formal logic
> >
> > No, no. That's another debate.
>
> Is it? It seems to me that it is going to necessarily
> overlap with formal logic if I am expected to explain
> predication. [and Set Theory is not something mutually
> exclusive from formal logic as far as I can see]
[NOTE: I just submitted this reply about 20 minutes ago, but it has yet
to appear on Google, so I assume it has been lost in the void, hence
the reason I am reposting it. Apologies to anyone who receives this
reply twice.]
Okay, I looked through Quine, and what follows here is a rather
long-winded way of saying that I was justified when I tried to simply
render the doctrine into formal logic. To back up this position, I will
be quoting from two works:
(1) Willard Van Orman Quine, "Set Theory and its Logic," (Harvard Univ.
Press, 1963)
(2) Alfred North Whitehead & Bertrand Russell, "Principia Mathematica,"
Paperback Edition to *56, (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1962)
I quote the latter mainly because it is called to witness by the former
[and, as an interesting side note, on the back cover of my edition of
Principia Mathematica there is a blurb from Quine which reads "This is
the book that has meant the most to me."]. In both sources there are
symbols which I am not certain can be represented over usenet (and even
if I did find a way to get them across on Google, this does not
guarantee that people employing other types of newsreaders will be able
to see them). Therefore, I have rendered the quotes in the form of
images, which will be linked to.
To begin, I felt that 1Man4All's attempt at bifurcating between
notation in set theory and notation in formal logic was bogus, as I
thought I recalled the two having considerable overlap (i.e. set theory
is a branch of mathematics and/or a branch of logic, and I'll leave for
others to decide whether logic is a branch of mathematics or vice
versa). As it turns out, my feeling was correct, as the very first
paragraph of the opening chapter in Quine's work on set theory (p. 9)
starts as follows:
http://lubienski.com/gifs/quinesettheory-9.gif
So in other words, all the standard connectives (exempli gratia:
negation, conditional, biconditional, conjunction and disjunction) of
basic formal logic, as well as the existential and universal
quantifiers, are employed in set theoretical notation, therefore I am
justified in employing them.
Then there is the issues of identity and predication (and by
predication here I specifically mean it in the sense employed by Craig,
i.e. with regard to description or attributes). Quine notes (p.12) that
identity can simply be represented with an equal sign:
http://lubienski.com/gifs/quinesettheory-12.gif
With regard to the schema on the last line of that passage, I would
rewrite it as:
((x = y) & Fx) --> Fy
In other words, if x is identical to y, and x is the object of some
predicative function F, then it follows that y also bears that
predicative function. This takes us back to my original example of a
rendering into formal logic of the gist of the first chapter of the
gospel of John:
(1) l = j
(2) Gl
(3) Gj
...or...
(1) The Logos is identical to Jesus.
(2) The Logos is God in a sense of predication.
(3) Therefore, Jesus is God in a sense of predication.
Now, as should be obvious from the representation 'Fx', predication (or
predicative functions of any stripe) can be represented in this
fashion. To drive this point home, however, let me note that Quine (pp.
15-16) wrote the following:
http://lubienski.com/gifs/quinesettheory-15-16.gif
[NOTE: portions in red brackets and dots represent text ommitted for
the sake of brevity.]
In other words, within set theory, one can employ Fx to state that the
variable x is part of some class of members who serve as the object of
the predicatiove function F. With regard to specifically the law of
concretion that Quine mentions in the passage linked to above, he
called to witness *20.03 in the Principia Mathematica. So I'd note the
following from the Principia (p. 188) which presents *20.03 within the
context of *20.02:
http://lubienski.com/gifs/principia-188.gif
That passage employs symbols that may not be recognizable (such as the
Greek letter phi followed by an exclamation point and then a variable),
so let me first call to witness Principia Mathematica p. 162 to explain
such a construction:
http://lubienski.com/gifs/principia-162.gif
So that construction (Greek letter phi - exclamation point - variable)
represents a predicative function. Returning back to p. 188 of the work
(linked to above), definition *20.02 states that if x is a member of
the class of things that bear the predicative function represented by
the Greek letter phi, then x itself bears that predicative function.
The text goes on to explain (via denition *20.03) that a class is such
that there is some predicative function which certain objects bear
(exempli gratia: the class of men is comprised of members who bear the
predicative function of being men).
So, I can employ the construction G'x to represent that x is a member
of the class of things which are "God" in a sense of predication (i.e.
divine or in possession of some of the attributes of deity) and proper
parts of the Godhead. The similar looking construction Gx (the
difference might be vocalized G-prime-of-x and G-of-x, respectively)
will state something different, namely that x is a deity. I will use
the constants f, j, h, and ixGx to represent the Father, Jesus, the
Holy Ghost and the Godhead, respectively (with regard to ixGx, this is
taken from Brian Leftow's employment of Russell's definite description
operator, but if anyone objects, they can simply replace ixGx with g).
Some other definitions (already covered in the "Christianity vs. Islam"
thread):
x --> y will represent "if x, then y"
~ will represent negation (e.g. ~x means not-x)
= will be used to represent identity
& will be used as the conjunctive connective
x <--> y will represent the biconditional (i.e. both if x then y as
well as if y then x)
x.P.y will represent the relation function such that x is a proper part
of y
{x,y,z} will represent the set/class containing x, y and z
x.U.y will represent x and y being united within the Godhead in some
way
(x) will represent the universal quantifier (i.e. for all x)
(Ex) will represent the existential quantifier (i.e. for some x, or
there is at least one x such that)
With that, the doctrine can be re-written as follows:
1. (x)(Gx <--> (x = ixGx))
2. ~(Ex)(Gx & ~(x = ixGx))
3. (x)(G'x --> x.P.ixGx)
4. (x)(y)((x.P.ixGx & y.P.ixGx) --> x.U.y)
5. G'f
6. G'j
7. G'h
8. ~Gf
9. ~Gj
10. ~Gh
11. (~(f = j) & ~(f = h)) & ~(j = h)
12. {f,j,h} = ixGx
ELUCIDATION: The first proposition notes that anything which is
identical to the Godhead is a deity, and the second proposition notes
that there does not exist any being which is a deity and not identical
to the Godhead. In other words, the first two propositions are
statements of Monotheism (there is only one deity, and that is the
Godhead). The third proposition notes that any being which is God in a
sense of predication (i.e. divine or in the possession of some of the
attributes of deity) is a proper part of the Godhead (and it logically
follows by denying th consequent that those beings which are not proper
parts of the Godhead are not "God" in a sense of predication). The
fourth proposition states that any two (or more) beings who are proper
parts of the Godhead are united within the Godhead. I make no attempt
to explain *how* they are united; rather I am simply asserting that
they are united in some way. The fifth, sixth and seventh propositions
note that the Father, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit are each God in a
sense of predication. The eighth, ninth, and tenth propositions
specifically deny that any of these persons are deities by themselves,
nor is any of them (by virtue of the first proposition) identical to
the Godhead. The eleventh proposition notes that none of the three
persons are identical to one another. The twelfth proposition notes
that the Godhead is identical to the combined set of the three persons
in toto. Note however that this is for these constants specifically -
no hard and fast rule was stated where an object is necessarily
identical to the collection of its member parts. The point is that an
object *can* be identical with the collection of its proper parts in
toto, and in this case it is. This doctrine is logically coherent (i.e.
there is nothing self contradictory about it).
ghali
> Right, so if you're saying that just because something is a set does
> not mean the members of the set are united, I would *AGREE*.
Excellent, we will take it from here. We agree that the notion of a set
does not unite things into one being! That is all I wanted. If God then
is ONLY a set then by definition God does not unite persons or whatever
into one entity. You need another idea! That is what I am looking for.
Unfortunately you are repeating yourself now, and it seems we are going
along different tangents. I think you still have not got the crux of
the matter
> by virtue of the fact that we both agree that the members of a set may
> be united, it is safe to say that we both agree that there is nothing
> logically incoherent about claiming that the members of this particular
> set are united.
No their is nothing logically incoherent about properties or members
being united. That would require though a different understanding. Like
I said the properties of the cat Felix can be objects of a set and they
are united in Felix. My problem is a SEMANTIC one though. You are stuck
in coherence and forgeting I am tackling this in a "wittgenstein" like
way.
I know who Felix is. He is a cat! More crucially in my argument. What
does God MEAN in the Trinity? Think along those lines Denis. If God
MEANS ONLY a set then this leads to a paradox. All that can be said of
God essentially is necessary. God is essentially ONLY a set but yet it
is a CONTINGENT fact that a set may have members that are united in one
being. But God NECESSARLY UNITES the three persons BY DEFINITION. A
paradox. Your argument from possiblity to coherence has shot itself in
the foot!
> A collection or group of things/objects (and those things/objects would
> be called members of that set).
Then on this definition God is ONLY a COLLECTION of the persons. Don't
you see the problem now?
> I read it, and could not precisely wrap my mind around it, so let me
> presuppose that what you write below properly represents
> Howard-Snyder's objection.
Let us leave Howard Snyder aside for now. Not that I am not happy to
discuss him. I always admitted thought, that some of his arguments may
not be full proof.
>
> I've deliberately avoided the notion of substance (mainly because I
> unwittingly/accidentally employed it rather differently from the way it
> is used in an Aristotelian sense when I posted to the SRI thread with
> Dr. Saifullaah). Now, you have asked me on more than one occasion to
> give my definition of "substance," while I'm trying to avoid that since
> I'm not fully informed on the way it was used by medieval or ancient
> philosophers. If you're going to try to get me to settle on the notion
> of substance, maybe you should define what you mean by substance, and
> I'll tell you whether I agree or not.
OK If God is not a set! Then what does it mean to be God in the
trinity? A set and....? A set or ? A set ?
>
> The difference is the assertion that the persons in the set are united.
> The simple assertion.
Ahh but it is more complex then that Denis! For they are united in one
God, who according to you falls into the I know not what ( Is that how
Locke talked about substance? another issue! I know). The only
definition I am assuming you are putting forward goes like this
God is the collection of the persons in the trinity who are united
How? God Knows!
We agreed on your model that Jesus, the Father and the Holy Spirit are
predicates or properties. But what are they properties of? So your
sentence is missing something
God is the collection of the persons in the trinity who are predicated
of ?????
Fill the gap!
Another thing. Saying something is united still leaves things very
vague.
A team is united, The properties of Felix are united, but yet both have
a different sense. I assume yours is the second
Then your sentence should run as follows
The properties of the cat Felix are united IN Felix
The properties of the persons in the trinity are united IN ???
Again we fall back on the substance or set. We agreed the second leads
to a tautology, I can repeat that argument if you want!
You could modify it further
God is the set of the persons in the trinity who are united as one
But again another problem. We have one team, one person, one country
and so on.... Still in the realms of possible polytheism
The only way out would be to say that they are united in one BEING
So substance pops up again!
Ghali
Denis Giron
ghali wrote:
> > Right, so if you're saying that just because something
> > is a set does not mean the members of the set are united,
> > I would AGREE*.
>
> Excellent, we will take it from here. We agree that the
> notion of a set does not unite things into one being!
Right, but we also agree that it is *POSSIBLE* for the members of a set
to be united, and this is something to keep in mind.
> If God then is ONLY a set then by definition God does
> not unite persons or whatever into one entity.
So then define God as a set of persons which are united, and then some.
See my post from earlier today (in response to 1Man4All's request that
I employ set theoretical notation to explain the doctrine):
http://groups-beta.google.com/group/alt.religion.islam/msg/cb3f2d525360d539
It seems the collection of the 12 proposition towards the end of the
post is a good explanation of the doctrine (though I look forward to
any comments from you), and it explains this particular concept of God.
What is God according to this doctrine? A multipersonal being (Thomas
Jefferson's three-headed monster if you will). A being comprised of
three centers of consciousness which are united some how, some way.
Your thoughts?
> > by virtue of the fact that we both agree that the
> > members of a set may be united, it is safe to say
> > that we both agree that there is nothing logically
> > incoherent about claiming that the members of this
> > particular set are united.
>
> No their is nothing logically incoherent about properties
> or members being united.
So then the notion put forth is not logically incoherent, and that was
precisely what I was arguing.
> You are stuck in coherence and forgeting I am tackling
> this in a "wittgenstein" like way.
But logical coherence (and to a much lesser degree, scriptural
consistency) was all I wanted to argue. The claim from the jump was
that this version of the doctrine of the Trinity is logically coherent.
> God is essentially ONLY a set but yet it
> is a CONTINGENT fact that a set may have members
> that are united in one being. But God NECESSARLY
> UNITES the three persons BY DEFINITION. A paradox.
I don't recall claiming that God is *ONLY* a set, nor for that matter
do I recall claiming that God necessarily unites the Persons (with
regard to the latter, you claimed this is creedally affirmed, and while
the relevant doctrine does not necessarily have to be consistent with
the various credal proclamations [e.g. Craig himself consciously
contradicts certain credal proclamations], I guess I can side with the
latter).
So, to repeat myself (as you rightly accused me of doing): what is God?
A multipersonal being, a collection of three divine Persons which are
united some how. How are they united? I dunno.
> God is the collection of the persons in the trinity who
> are united
>
> How? God Knows!
So far so good akhi! :)
> We agreed on your model that Jesus, the Father and
> the Holy Spirit are predicates or properties. But
> what are they properties of?
I don't understand what you mean by properties. Could you elaborate?
What I said was that these three persons are 'God in a sense of
predication' and by that it was meant that each person are divine, or
possess certain attributes of divinity. The claim was not that the
persons are predicates, but rather that they bear certain predicates.
> God is the collection of the persons in the trinity
> who are predicated of ?????
Who, as per the post linked to above, bear the predicate G' (G-prime),
which represents being divine in some sense, being in possession of
some of the attributes of deity, and being a proper part of the
Godhead.
> Another thing. Saying something is united still leaves
> things very vague.
I agree 100%. Saying "I dunno" is the epitome of vagueness!
> A team is united, The properties of Felix are united, but
> yet both have a different sense. I assume yours is the second
>
> Then your sentence should run as follows
>
> The properties of the cat Felix are united IN Felix
>
> The properties of the persons in the trinity are united IN ???
United in the Godhead, perhaps?
> Again we fall back on the substance or set.
And again, I'm woefully shaky on the notion of substance, so I need you
to explain what you mean by that if I am going to be able to determine
whether I mean something like that.
> We agreed the second leads to a tautology, I can
> repeat that argument if you want!
Please do, as I'm at a loss with regard to what you mean (though being
that my main issue was logical coherence, I'd probably be just fine
with the accusation that the doctrine is tautological).
> The only way out would be to say that they are united
> in one BEING
>
> So substance pops up again!
Maybe! But before I can be certain, you need to educate me on the
proper sense of substance.
Denis Giron
Denis Giron wrote:
> 1MAN4ALL wrote:
> >
> > > But again, I'd have to think about this further (and
> > > look into a book on Set Theory). But of course, if you
> > > simply want a rendering into formal logic
> >
> > No, no. That's another debate.
>
> Is it? It seems to me that it is going to necessarily
> overlap with formal logic if I am expected to explain
> predication. [and Set Theory is not something mutually
> exclusive from formal logic as far as I can see]
Okay, I looked through Quine, and what follows here is a rather
http://lubienski.com/gifs/quinesettheory-9.gif
quantifiers, can be employed in set theoretical notation, therefore I
http://lubienski.com/gifs/quinesettheory-12.gif
...or...
http://lubienski.com/gifs/quinesettheory-15-16.gif
[Portions in red brackets and dots represent text ommitted for the sake
of brevity.]
In other words, within set theory, one can employ Fx to state that the
variable x is part of some class of members who serve as the object of
the predicatiove function F. With regard to specifically the law of
concretion that Quine mentions in the passage linked to above, he
called to witness *20.03 in the Principia Mathematica (which is within
the section on the general theory of classes). So I'd note the
following from the Principia (p. 188) which presents *20.03 within the
context of *20.02:
http://lubienski.com/gifs/principia-188.gif
That passage employs symbols that may not be recognizable (such as the
Greek letter phi followed by an exclamation point and then a variable),
so let me first call to witness Principia Mathematica p. 162 to explain
such a construction:
http://lubienski.com/gifs/principia-162.gif
So that construction (Greek letter phi - exclamation point - variable)
represents a predicative function. Returning back to p. 188 of the work
(linked to above), definition *20.02 states that if x is a member of
the class of things that bear the predicative function represented by
the Greek letter phi, then x itself bears that predicative function.
The text goes on to explain (via denition *20.03) that a class is such
that there is some predicative function which certain objects bear
(exempli gratia: the class of men is comprised of members who bear the
predicative function of being men).
So, I can employ the construction G'x to represent that x is a member
of the class of things which are "God" in a sense of predication (i.e.
divine or in possession of some of the attributes of deity) and proper
parts of the Godhead. The similar looking construction Gx (the
difference might be vocalized G-prime-of-x and G-of-x, respectively)
will state something different, namely that x is a deity. I will use
the constants f, j, h, and ixGx to represent the Father, Jesus, the
Holy Spirit and the Godhead, respectively (with regard to ixGx, this is
ghali
> Right, but we also agree that it is *POSSIBLE* for the members of a set
> to be united, and this is something to keep in mind.
That had already been answered if you think God is only a set. You
don't now so let us see if you are any clearer
> http://groups-beta.google.com/group/alt.religion.islam/msg/cb3f2d525360d539
The above link put your words into logical symbols. Just another
language that added nothing to the argument. Sorry!
>
> But logical coherence (and to a much lesser degree, scriptural
> consistency) was all I wanted to argue. The claim from the jump was
> that this version of the doctrine of the Trinity is logically coherent.
You can have as much logical coherence as you want. Afterall logic is
formal. But if your languags is only formal and your symbols MEAN
NOTHING, then what is the point?
> I don't recall claiming that God is *ONLY* a set,
Then what else is he? I don't know does not help! LOL!
>nor for that matter
> do I recall claiming that God necessarily unites the Persons
So the Christian God is not necessarily ONE BEING? He does not
necessarly Unite the persons? This is not a Christian God. This a God
of Denis's new religion!
> How are they united? I dunno.
The question is not how but what or who is God? That you did not answer
clearly
> > God is the collection of the persons in the trinity who
> > are united
> >
> > How? God Knows!
>
> So far so good akhi! :)
A contradiction here. God is ONLY the collection of the persons and yet
he is not a set? The rest of the information on God is not known!
Therefore we cannot say whether God is the uniting them as one team or
one being. A problem for Christians if they are on the fence with this
point.
> > We agreed on your model that Jesus, the Father and
> > the Holy Spirit are predicates or properties. But
> > what are they properties of?
>
> I don't understand what you mean by properties. Could you elaborate?
Proper parts, predicates, properties, Lets call the whole think off.
Whatever you want. They all are part of something. That thing is what
we want to know about. Note their is the thing and the properties
etc....
> and being a proper part of the
> Godhead.
So here we have it Jesus is a proper part of the Godhead. Well again
that does not help! I ask you what God means and you tell me he is the
Godhead. LOL!
> > Another thing. Saying something is united still leaves
> > things very vague.
>
> I agree 100%. Saying "I dunno" is the epitome of vagueness!
But this vagueness is VERY IMPORTANT! Because I can be united as a team
or as one being. The difference between polytheism and monotheism. If
you want to still say I don't know , then I think that is enough for me
to show the whole thing is a nonsensc. After all, all chrisitans
believe in ONE God!
> > A team is united, The properties of Felix are united, but
> > yet both have a different sense. I assume yours is the second
> >
> > Then your sentence should run as follows
> >
> > The properties of the cat Felix are united IN Felix
> >
> > The properties of the persons in the trinity are united IN ???
>
> United in the Godhead, perhaps?
God or Godhead? What is that? Again a being? a set? and so on.... Note
the question again is a WHAT and not a HOW!
.
>
> > We agreed the second leads to a tautology, I can
> > repeat that argument if you want!
>
> Please do, as I'm at a loss with regard to what you mean (though being
> that my main issue was logical coherence, I'd probably be just fine
> with the accusation that the doctrine is tautological).
If god is the collection of the persons in the trinity and God is a
set. Then you are just repeating yourself. It maybe logically coherent
but it adds nothing to the conversation. After all parrots are good at
repeating themselves. They do not add weight to an argument.
Simply again Who or What is God? He is a set. And what is that? A
collection!
We know that! But the collection could be as a team or as a .....
Remember Godhead does not rescue from polythesim
Ghali
Denis Giron
ghali wrote:
>
> > http://groups-beta.google.com/group/alt.religion.islam/msg/cb3f2d525360d539
>
> The above link put your words into logical symbols.
It is more than that. Those symbols are defined in a very specific way,
and the 12 propositions in toto form a very specific conception of God.
> You can have as much logical coherence as you want.
That's all I wanted.
> > I don't recall claiming that God is *ONLY* a set,
>
> Then what else is he? I don't know does not help! LOL!
Laugh all you want, but you snipped the answer. What is God? A
multipersonal being. An entity comprised of three centers of
consciousness which are united, and each of which possess some of the
attributes of deity. That is God according to this doctrine.
> > How are they united? I dunno.
>
> The question is not how but what or who is God? That you
> did not answer clearly
Work from what I just gave above.
> > > God is the collection of the persons in the trinity who
> > > are united
> > >
> > > How? God Knows!
> >
> > So far so good akhi! :)
>
> A contradiction here. God is ONLY the collection of the
> persons and yet he is not a set?
Where did I claim God is ONLY a collection of the persons? That
statement in itself does not include the point about them being united.
Second, I did not state that God is not a set. In fact I said God is a
set the way a cat is a set, i.e. a collection of its respective proper
parts.
> Therefore we cannot say whether God is the uniting them
> as one team or one being.
One being, the way Cerberus is one being.
> > and being a proper part of the
> > Godhead.
>
> So here we have it Jesus is a proper part of the Godhead.
> Well again that does not help! I ask you what God means
> and you tell me he is the Godhead. LOL!
No, I said that God, according to this doctrine, is a multipersonal
being, a single being comprised of three divine persons who are united.
> I can be united as a team or as one being. The difference
> between polytheism and monotheism.
No, the difference between polytheism and monotheism is the difference
between the number of gods that are claimed to exist within the given
type of theism. In this conception of God there is only one god, that
being the Godhead. None of the persons are gods by themself.
> Simply again Who or What is God?
A single multipersonal being, comprised of three persons, each of which
possess some of the attributes of deity, but none of which are deities
by themselves.
> Remember Godhead does not rescue from polythesim
No, the acknowledgement that there is only one God does.
Denis Giron
H2O/water analogies. Consider the following (admittedly cheap) image:
http://lubienski.com/pictures/H2O-trinity-analogy.jpg
Imagine further that there the body of water represented there is all
the water that exists. We shall call the body of water in toto "THE
WATER". There is only one "THE WATER".
Now you have harped on about substance, but not given a definition of
what *you* mean by substance. So I will introduce a notion of
"substance" for this analogy, but I think this notion is rather
different from what Aristotle meant when he said "substance". By
substance I mean a material of a specific kind, a sort of constitution,
the "stuff" of which something is primarily made (e.g. you're in my
kitchen and you ask "what's that strange substance in the sink?" to
which I reply "water you fool!"). Again, I don't have a grip on the
medieval or ancient notion of substance, and you have not educated me
in this regard, so this notion of substance with which I will proceed
is almost certainly different.
On the right hand side of the image is a cheap drawing of the water
raised in three parts. Beneath it is the same image, with aline drawn
to divide the three parts, but not physically divide them, rather to
divide them conceptually (i.e. to make it easier to distinguish them).
"THE WATER" is a single body comprised of these three parts. These
three parts in toto combine to form "THE WATER". None of the three
parts are by themself identical to "THE WATER". All three parts are H2O
in a sense of predication. The common substance permeating between all
three parts (and "THE WATER" as a whole) is water or liquid which is
H2O in a sense of predication.
The reason I like this analogy is because it hints at one notion of
substance as well as a notion of unity. God is like this body, only
instead of being made up of water or liquid which is H2O in a sense of
predication, it is made up of a different "substance", i.e. a divine
substance, the magic god-stuff, a divine essence if you will. This
divine essence might be thought of having three distinct portions.
Think of the raised humps in the image as each possessing some sort of
consciousness or self-awareness. None of these centers of consciousness
are gods by themselves, but the divine substance/essence/stuff in toto
(which is comprised of these three centers of self awareness) *IS* God
(in a sense of identity). God is identical to the divine
substance/essence/stuff in toto (which is comprised of these three
centers of self awareness). Think of it moving or acting with a common
will, or as one body (that is if God moves or acts).
If this is too amorphous for you (even though it is deliberately so),
then feel free to anthropomorphize it by imaginging a three-headed
monster - a single being with three centers of consciousness within it.
Does this help?
Denis Giron
in the Bible, in Colossians 2:9. Thayer's Lexicon notes that "Godhead"
is a possible translation of this word, and translations that render it
as such include the KJV, ASV, Darby, Young's Literal, and the NKJV.
friend
>
>
> friend wrote:
>> The collection of two halves of a cat will never result
>> in any sort of identical cat before it has been cut in
>> half.
> Who said anything about *CUTTING* the cat?
None, nor did you rule out that possibility either!
Now, if you identify the cat as that being composed of its
several parts organized and united in some way, then your
assertion implies that conversely the separated various parts of
a cat, organized and combined in the same way yield the very
same cat.
In other words, if a cat is defined as identical to the whole,
then the reverse should be true, that is, the combination of all
parts (either separated or not) results in the same cat. Since
my example shows that's not the case, hence, my objection to
your assertion came to mind [I quote you]:
\begin\quote
["Right, a given part of an object is not identical to the
whole, but I
was asking why the collection of parts in toto cannot be
identical to
the whole. For example, I mentioned the two halves of a cat in
my last
post. I'm not saying the cat is identical to the front half or
the back
half alone, but rather that the cat is identical to the two
halves
combined.]
\end\quote
> One can discern two halves
> without separating them. For example, but your hand on your
> waist and
> lower torso, and you might be able to discern the part of your
> body
> below your hand, and the part of your body above your hand
> (which we
> might refer to as your upper and lower halves). In no way are
> either of
> these parts, by themself, identical to you, yet I believe the
> two parts
> combined are identical to you.
>> Subsequently, collecting two halves of a cat
>> yields rather a cadaver with other peculiarities
>> (of the body as a collection of its various parts
>> as well as those peculiarities of each single part)
>> than the former which made of it a living being.
> This ties in with Ghali's mistaken assumption that I am saying
> that
> combining two things unites them. I'm not claiming that if you
> take two
> halves of a bisected cat and put them next to each other, then
> you have
> a living, fully functioning cat. I am saying that a living cat
> can be
> considered a set of its two (or more!) parts, and that it can
> be
> considered identical to all those parts in toto.
Right, but what is if you dismember it and then join all parts
together?
>> Thusly, the whole analogy doesn't hold at all und is
>> as obscure as the whole "trio + 1" thing.
> I'm not impressed with this trio+1 (or quadrinity) objection.
> Consider
> the Cerberus analogy. Does the analogy of a single beast
> comprised of
> three centers of doggy consciousness affirm the existence of
> four
> centers of doggy consciousness? Certainly not. Or, if a
> triangle is
> identical to its three sides COMBINED, does that mean we have
> four
> things (i.e. the three sides and the triangle)? I'm not so
> certain.
No, you certainly have 9 things of which a triangle consists,
that is, 3 (inner)angles, 3 (outer)angles and 3 sides!
Denis Giron
friend wrote:
>
> >> The collection of two halves of a cat will never
> >> result in any sort of identical cat before it has
> >> been cut in half.
>
> > Who said anything about *CUTTING* the cat?
>
> None, nor did you rule out that possibility either!
I'm glad you brought up the issue of possibility, as we need to clarify
where our modal operators go. More below...
> Now, if you identify the cat as that being
> composed of its several parts organized and
> united in some way, then your assertion
> implies that conversely the separated various
> parts of a cat, organized and combined in the
> same way yield the very same cat.
What I stated was that an object (including a cat) *CAN* be considered
identical to the collection of its parts in toto. That does not imply
that necessarily a collection of those parts will be identical to the
cat. Though it does imply that the collection of those parts *CAN* be
identical to a cat.
> In other words, if a cat is defined as identical
> to the whole, then the reverse should be true,
> that is, the combination of all parts (either
> separated or not) results in the same cat.
Your interpolation of the clause that it does not matter if they are
separated or not is the problem here. If we have a bunch of chopped up
cat parts in a basket, that is not identical to the living cat. But an
instance of a collection of parts that are not identical to the whole
does not negate the statement that an object *CAN* (i.e. under certain
circumstances) be identical with the collection of its parts in toto.
> [I quote you]:
>
> \begin\quote
>
> ["Right, a given part of an object is not
> identical to the whole, but I was asking why
> the collection of parts in toto cannot be
> identical to the whole.
See the word 'cannot' in there? The question is with regard to what
grounds one would argue that an object is necessarily never identical
to the collection of its parts. If we agree that such is not the case,
and agree it is possible, under certain circumstances, for an object to
be identical to the collection of its parts in toto, then we admit that
there is nothing logically incoherent about a claim that this object is
identical to the collection of its parts.
> >> Subsequently, collecting two halves of a cat
> >> yields rather a cadaver with other peculiarities
> >> (of the body as a collection of its various parts
> >> as well as those peculiarities of each single part)
> >> than the former which made of it a living being.
>
> > This ties in with Ghali's mistaken assumption that
> > I am saying that combining two things unites them.
> > I'm not claiming that if you take two halves of a
> > bisected cat and put them next to each other, then
> > you have a living, fully functioning cat. I am
> > saying that a living cat can be considered a set of
> > its two (or more!) parts, and that it can be
> > considered identical to all those parts in toto.
>
> Right, but what is if you dismember it and then join
> all parts together?
Under certain circumstances the collection of parts would not be
identical to the whole. That does not negate the claim that an object
*CAN* be considered identical to the collection of its parts in toto.
ghali
> It is more than that. Those symbols are defined in a very specific way,
> and the 12 propositions in toto form a very specific conception of God.
Look I am sorry again. I looked even closer at these propositions.
Nothing new!. Tell me what you added?? Even worse, you contradicted
yourself. You tell me that God is not ONLY the set of the three
persons, you then in your 12th proposition say
{f,j,h} = ixGx
i.e.e Godhead is IDENTICAL to the set of the three persons! What are
you on Denis and can I have some. It must be some good stuff!
Ironically alot on Quine! Ever heard of the sparse theory of being?
LOL! This just gets better
> > > I don't recall claiming that God is *ONLY* a set,
Need I say more!
> What is God? A
> multipersonal being. An entity comprised of three centers of
> consciousness which are united, and each of which possess some of the
> attributes of deity. That is God according to this doctrine.
>
> > > How are they united? I dunno.
And you snipped my answers to this. United in what sense? As a team or
as a being? But notice the term multipersonal being. Ok, fine
substance again!
> > The question is not how but what or who is God? That you
> > did not answer clearly
>
> Work from what I just gave above.
I did in the previous post!
>
> Where did I claim God is ONLY a collection of the persons?
In proposition 12!
> Second, I did not state that God is not a set. In fact I said God is a
> set the way a cat is a set, i.e. a collection of its respective proper
> parts.
A cat is not a set. A cat is a being with proper parts. The set of the
proper parts of Felix the cat is a set. Their is a difference. The
analogy does not help
> > Therefore we cannot say whether God is the uniting them
> > as one team or one being.
>
> One being, the way Cerberus is one being.
You are begging the question. What does being mean for Cereberus then?
> > So here we have it Jesus is a proper part of the Godhead.
> > Well again that does not help! I ask you what God means
> > and you tell me he is the Godhead. LOL!
>
> No, I said that God, according to this doctrine, is a multipersonal
> being, a single being comprised of three divine persons who are united.
First he is a set then he is a being. You cannot have both. The set of
the proper parts of felix the cat is NOT IDENTICAL to Felix the cat!
> > I can be united as a team or as one being. The difference
> > between polytheism and monotheism.
>
> No, the difference between polytheism and monotheism is the difference
> between the number of gods that are claimed to exist within the given
> type of theism. In this conception of God there is only one god, that
> being the Godhead. None of the persons are gods by themself.
OK we are now seeing this word being being repeated alot. So what we
really have is being then. What is being to you again?
> > Simply again Who or What is God?
>
> A single multipersonal being, comprised of three persons, each of which
> possess some of the attributes of deity, but none of which are deities
> by themselves.
See above
> > Remember Godhead does not rescue from polythesim
>
> No, the acknowledgement that there is only one God does.
If we know what it means to be God in the trinity!
ghali
"Imagine further that there the body of water represented there is all
the water that exists. We shall call the body of water in toto "THE
WATER". There is only one "THE WATER".""
This was answered a long time ago in the soc.religion.islam group. I
will paste it again
"Suppose, however, that the H2O present there represents the entirety
of all H2O in the universe. Suppose further that we give the body of
H2O as a whole a single name ("water" or whatever). There is nothing
logically incoherent about this structure as a whole being comprised
of different, and distinct, parts, and that all the parts (as well as
the whole) are made up of the same "stuff" (H2O in this instance)"
Denis I took this into account. Then on this account we fall into
version one of the cat analogy. Jesus is Divine and God is Divine,
would mean exactly the same thing. As ice, steam and water have all
the same molecule. But what is even worse and you still did not answer
this, is that this same analogy could be used for POLYTHEISM. This
only shows that different things can share similar properties. The set
you are talking about is not an entity ( as the "whole" mass water is
no SPECIFIC OBJECT) but a set of different things that share the
molecule H2O, or on the Hindu version the set of Gods that share
divine properties
This analogy is disasterous Denis!
Now you have harped on about substance, but not given a definition of
what *you* mean by substance.
Actually it depends on your view of substance. I am increasingly
thinking that substance theory has something to say for it, more in the
primary less explicit sense that their are fundamental building blocks
in nature etc. On Aristotle's understanding "substance" is the subject
of properties ( primary substance anyway). Properties enhere in it as
opposed to the other way around. Substances do not change a and even
are eternal which would be apt with God. Substances in themselves do
not act or move, and have no spatial or temporal extension. Only with
their properties they do act etc.. William Lane Craig holds roughly
onto the second. The Athanasian creed also says their is only ONE
substance and that is God. Properties do not float on substance theory.
"So I will introduce a notion of
"substance" for this analogy, but I think this notion is rather
different from what Aristotle meant when he said "substance".
Well then we have a problem with your defence of Craig, and the
Athanasian creed. Nothing wrong in itself, but you did claim that
Craigs concept of trinity was the coherent one. Why jump into new
concepts, if Craig is enough?
"By substance I mean a material of a specific kind, a sort of
constitution,
the "stuff" of which something is primarily made "
I have a problem here. This would be a bit vague again. On this account
you have generalised to much. Notice the more general you get the less
we really know. Because on this account we would have many competing
theories for the primary stuff.
I will quote from the Stanford encylopedia
""The first is the more generic. The philosophical term 'substance'
corresponds to the Greek ousia, which means 'being', transmitted
via the Latin substantia, which means 'something that stands under or
grounds things'. According to the generic sense, therefore, the
substances in a given philosophical system are those things which,
according to that system, are the foundational or fundamental entities
of reality. Thus, for an atomist, atoms are the substances, for they
are the basic things from which everything is constructed. In David
Hume's system, impressions and ideas are the substances, for the same
reason. In a slightly different way, Forms are Plato's substances, for
everything derives its existence from Forms. In this sense of
'substance' any realist philosophical system acknowledges the
existence of substances. Probably the only theories which do not would
be those forms of logical positivism or pragmatism which treat ontology
as a matter of convention. According to such theories, there are no
real facts about what is ontologically basic, and so nothing is
objectively substance.""
Funny this would exclude Quine. But Ok, you think that God is the basic
buliding block or stuff that the persons are made of.
What is that stuff, now Denis? Notice this is not a how question! With
Cerebrus it would be quarks, I don't know? After all he is material.
Could that analogy then really apply?
If God is ONLY substance then he falls into the " I know not what.." (
I am not sure about the phrase but you know what I mean) So by
definition God would be meaningless
Your statement would be equivalent to saying That the three persons are
united in ???
who knows?
At least Craig on his version had something to say about substance. But
then you would have to go by his view. I don't mind though. Howard
Snyder also had similar problems with it as well. On this definition
the world is divided into substance and predicate. The substance unites
the properties as they do not float and therefore gives identity. On
Aristotles view the PERSON is one of the prime examples of substance.
Not on Craig's view of course. One of the more modern philosphers
would be Strawson
Ghali
es this help?
1MAN4ALL
Denis Giron wrote:
> On a quick side note, the word Theotes (rather than theos) appears once
> in the Bible, in Colossians 2:9. Thayer's Lexicon notes that "Godhead"
> is a possible translation of this word, and translations that render it
> as such include the KJV, ASV, Darby, Young's Literal, and the NKJV.
It is noteworthy that none of the four Gospels uses this term. But
let's look at the verse itself. Here Paul says very emphatically that
"For in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily" (KJV). Some
other translations have used the word "Deity" instead of Godhead.
Regardless, the meaning of Godhead/Deity in Colossians 2:9 is totally
different than what you have been insisting on. In your/Craig's
argument, "Godhead" is the 'set', the members of which are the Father
(F), Son (S) and the Holy Ghost (H). In other words GH (Godhead)= {F,
S, H}. And Godhead would not be complete without any of the three. What
Paul is suggesting is the opposite. He is saying that *ALL* of the
"FULLNESS" of Godhead got into Jesus. That can be expressed as GH={J},
while Jesus was still alive. If we try to reconcile your statement with
Paul's, it would mean that Godhead (GH) which already included Jesus
(J) came to dwell in Jesus (J) [an impossibility] and the Father (F)
and the Holy Ghost (H) were all within Jesus in bodily form. But that
renders many Biblical statements meaningless. For example, how could
Jesus say that the Father is greater than I? Wasn't the Father inside
of him when the Godhead dwelled within him? Or why did he say that he
would send the Holy Ghost, while the Holy Ghost was right inside of him
as part of the Godhead? No matter how you look at it, your argument
fails. I would strongly suggest that you give up this line of
reasoning, as it is all contradictory and nonsensical.
1MAN4ALL
Denis Giron wrote:
> 1MAN4ALL wrote:
> >
> > > But again, I'd have to think about this further (and
> > > look into a book on Set Theory). But of course, if you
> > > simply want a rendering into formal logic
> >
> > No, no. That's another debate.
>
> Is it? It seems to me that it is going to necessarily overlap with
> formal logic if I am expected to explain predication. [and Set Theory
> is not something mutually exclusive from formal logic as far as I can
> see]
>
> > Let's try to draw it up in a diagram.
>
> If it is just about diagrams, consider the following image:
>
> http://oopi.us/pictures/trinity-diagram-attempt.jpg
>
> It represents God, but of course notions of predication are not
> explained in such. But then I don't know what you mean by a diagram
> using only set theory. Could you give me an example of a diagram using
> only set theory employed to describe anything (so I can understand if
> you mean an image or a translation into formal language employing the
> terminology of set theory, or something else).
To answer my one post, you have submitted 6 responses in utter
desperation. So let me just focus on this one point.
Few points:
1. There are some/many [depending on one's point of view] parallels
between set theory and logic, but one is not a substitute for the
other.
2. You are correct that in set theory or in any diagram "notions of
predication are not explained" and for good reason. Predication, by
itself, is meaningless and cannot be diagrammed.
3. In your diagram above, the circle is God (G) which is made up of
Father, Son and the Holy Ghost i.e. G={F,S,HG}.
If that is true, it creates all kinds of theological problems, and
renders Christianity into a mishmash of contradictory doctrines, some
of which people have already pointed out in this newsgroup and
elsewhere.
I think you are wasting your time explaining Trinity. Even most
Christians that I know have either stopped believing in it or given up
trying to explain it. No matter what explanation you come up with, it
would contradict some other passage in the Bible. If all that you have
left are seven propositions that don't contradict each other, you have
no argument to make!
friend
1MAN4ALL schrieb:
Trinity, as always stated, is nothing tham a man made dying cult with
absolutly no rational edvidence.
The new semantic game asseting that, for instance, "God is Jesus" in
the sense of predication as as absurd as the whole christian
theological construct. Such an assertion itself is self-contradictory,
if you just take into account that God shares some divine attributes
with the Son while just ignoring the remaining (allegedly) son's human
attributes. Both kinds of attributes cannot coexist in the same body,
i.e. Jesus allegedly the eternal being (logos) and his mortal one.
This alone suffices to blow the "predication" thing with the wind.
:-)
1MAN4ALL
Especially when you consider what Paul said, "For in him dwelleth all
the fulness of the Godhead bodily" (KJV).
The Trinitarian God is like a rubber balloon. You fill it with helium,
it's God the Father. Fill it with water, you'll get Jesus. And if
you blow it yourself, you'll get the Holy Ghost.
Denis Giron
Independence Day weekend...
ghali wrote:
>
> Denis I took this into account. Then on this account we
> fall into version one of the cat analogy. Jesus is Divine
> and God is Divine, would mean exactly the same thing.
The analogy simply means that the Godhead as a whole, as well as the
persons that serve as proper parts of the Godhead, are all comprised of
the same "stuff". But the Godhead is defined as the structure AS A
WHOLE.
> But what is even worse and you still did not answer
> this, is that this same analogy could be used for
> POLYTHEISM.
Fine, but polytheism hinges on the assertion that there is more than
one deity, while this doctrine holds that there is only one deity, and
that is the structure as a whole (i.e. that whole thing represented in
the image).
> The set you are talking about is not an entity ( as
> the "whole" mass water is no SPECIFIC OBJECT)
Hold on here, please explain why a specific whole mass of water is not
a specific object. For example, if a drop of water is falling through
the air, and I refer to it as "that drop," am I not referring to an
object?
> but a set of different things that share the
> molecule H2O,
The point is that the structure as a whole, represents the Godhead.
> This analogy is disasterous Denis!
You've given me no reason to believe so, Ghali!
> On Aristotle's understanding "substance" is the subject
> of properties ( primary substance anyway). Properties
> enhere in it as opposed to the other way around.
I don't understand what this means. I'm not trying to be abusive
either. I seriously don't know what this means. Could you elaborate?
> Substances do not change a and even are eternal which
> would be apt with God. Substances in themselves do
> not act or move, and have no spatial or temporal
> extension. Only with their properties they do act etc..
I still don't understand. You're telling me what substances don't do,
but you haven't defined substance as far as I can see. And what is the
property of a substance? How do we know when we have a substance and
when we have a property of a substance?
That's not what I said. The analogy offered the Deity as being the
object/structure as a whole, and being comprised of the three parts.
The Deity, as well as the parts, are made up of the same building
blocks.
> What is that stuff, now Denis? Notice this is not a how
> question!
But it is a ridiculous question! What is the single, unitary, monadic
deity of Islam made up of? What is his stuff? Nothing, or something? I
imagine this is a question that cannot be answered. So why require that
other conceptions of God answer it?
> Your statement would be equivalent to saying That the
> three persons are united in ???
>
> who knows?
United within the Godhead, but what exactly the Godhead is made up of
is unknown. So what?
> At least Craig on his version had something to say
> about substance. But then you would have to go by
> his view. I don't mind though. Howard Snyder also
> had similar problems with it as well. On this definition
> the world is divided into substance and predicate.
> The substance unites the properties as they do not
> float and therefore gives identity. On
> Aristotles view the PERSON is one of the prime
> examples of substance. Not on Craig's view of course.
> One of the more modern philosphers
> would be Strawson
Previously you gave me the impression that Craig's conception of
substance is in line with Aristotle's, and now you are explicitly
saying the opposite. As I have already admitted, I am ignorant of
Craig's notion of substance (hence the very real possibility that I
diverged from what he meant by it). Could you elaborate on the above,
and explain how Craig defines substance?
Denis Giron
ghali wrote:
>
> Even worse, you contradicted yourself. You tell me that
> God is not ONLY the set of the three
> persons, you then in your 12th proposition say
>
> {f,j,h} = ixGx
>
> i.e.e Godhead is IDENTICAL to the set of the three
> persons!
We alreayd agreed that it is POSSIBLE for an object to be identical to
the collection of its three parts in toto. That does not mean that the
object is simply a set of the parts. For example, a cat *CAN* be
identical to the collection of its parts in toto, but that does not
mean any collection of the respective parts gives you a cat. So while a
cat *CAN* be identical to the collection of its parts, that does not
mean it is *ONLY* a set of the parts.
> What are you on Denis and can I have some.
One of us would be in trouble with the law if I tried to mail marijuana
off to the UK.
> Ironically alot on Quine! Ever heard of the sparse
> theory of being?
Quite simply, no. Care to tell me about it?
> United in what sense? As a team or as a being?
United within a being.
> A cat is not a set.
We're covering old ground here. If a set can be defined as a collection
of members, then a cat can be considered a set, in some sense, of its
respective parts. Kind of like the way my tool set is not merely some
abstract notion that exists only in my mind; rather I really do have a
box with tools in it.
> > > Therefore we cannot say whether God is the uniting them
> > > as one team or one being.
> >
> > One being, the way Cerberus is one being.
>
> You are begging the question. What does being mean for
> Cereberus then?
A being is an object (usually a living thing, but I suppose it could be
a non-living object as well). That is what being refers to when it is
used as a noun. Do you have a different definition for being?
> > No, I said that God, according to this doctrine,
> > is a multipersonal being, a single being comprised
> > of three divine persons who are united.
>
> First he is a set then he is a being. You cannot have both.
It is only the case that I cannot have both if, and only if, they are
contradictory. They are not contradictory, therefore I can have both.
Let me back up that last claim. A set can be defined as any collection
of parts. A being can be an object comprised of various parts.
Therefore a being can be a set (the way a cat can be a set!). No
contradiction.
> The set of the proper parts of felix the cat is NOT
> IDENTICAL to Felix the cat!
Is this necessarily the case, if so, why?
It seems to me that, admittedly under certain circumstances, an object
(such as a cat) *CAN* be (though not necessarily is) identical to the
collection of its parts in toto. Therefore, I conclude that your
statement immediately above is not some necessary truth. It is possible
to have an instance where the statement is not true (i.e. an instance
where an object is identical to the collection of its parts).
> OK we are now seeing this word being being repeated alot.
> So what we really have is being then. What is being to
> you again?
Remember that I'm using being as a noun. And I defined it above. This
is not a controversial definition. A being is an object (usually a
living organism, but not necessarily).
> > > Remember Godhead does not rescue from polythesim
> >
> > No, the acknowledgement that there is only one God does.
>
> If we know what it means to be God in the trinity!
A single BEING that happens to be comprised of three Persons, none of
which are deities by themself. A single Tripersonal being.
Denis Giron
1MAN4ALL wrote:
>
> To answer my one post, you have submitted 6 responses
> in utter desperation.
Oh come on. Only one post was repetitious, and that was because it
(originally) was not appearing in my newsreader, so I thought it was
lost (as is so often the case). Each post had a point.
> 1. There are some/many [depending on one's point
> of view] parallels between set theory and logic,
> but one is not a substitute for the other.
Nonetheless, my (repeated) post from June 29 backed up the terminology
employed, thus nothing in the 12 propositions was not part of set
theoretical terminology. You wanted me to explain it in set theory, and
I was not sure what you meant, so I expressed the doctrine in set
theoretical notation. I feel I met your request, though if you disagree
I am interested in an explanation of what exactly it is you were asking
for.
> 2. You are correct that in set theory or in any diagram
> "notions of predication are not explained" and for good
> reason.
Keep in mind that while it may be difficult to express predication in a
diagram, set theoretical notation DOES allow for such (I gave examples
of who to represent predicative functions).
> 3. In your diagram above, the circle is God (G) which
> is made up of Father, Son and the Holy Ghost i.e.
> G={F,S,HG}. If that is true, it creates all kinds of
> theological problems, and renders Christianity into a
> mishmash of contradictory doctrines, some of which people
> have already pointed out in this newsgroup and
> elsewhere.
Such as? Care to give an example? I have not seen one.
> I think you are wasting your time explaining Trinity.
What I am doing is explaining why a certain Trinitarian doctrine is
logically coherent. Even Ghali has agreed that it is logically
coherent, so all that is left between him and I is coming to an
understanding on a few vagueries of definition.
Denis Giron
friend wrote:
>
> Trinity, as always stated, is nothing tham a man made
> dying cult with absolutly no rational edvidence.
I certainly believe the doctrine of the Trinity is man made, but dying?
There may be more Trinitarian Christians than there are Muslims, and
there are certainly more Trinitarian Christians than there are Hindus.
These are vibrant faith communities, thus if the Trinitarian Christians
outnumber either of these groups, then the cohort is alive and well,
not dying.
> The new semantic game asseting that, for instance, "God
> is Jesus" in the sense of predication as as absurd as the
> whole christian theological construct. Such an assertion
> itself is self-contradictory, if you just take into account
> that God shares some divine attributes with the Son while
> just ignoring the remaining (allegedly) son's human
> attributes.
So this would mean that God is not identical to Jesus. This is
precisely affirmed by the doctrine being discussed. So way to raise a
straw man!
> Both kinds of attributes cannot coexist in the same
> body, i.e. Jesus allegedly the eternal being (logos)
> and his mortal one.
But a single being can possess two natures, a divine one, and a human
one. Furthermore, an imortal being can suffer death if we simply define
death as somatic termination.
Denis Giron
1MAN4ALL wrote:
>
> It is noteworthy that none of the four Gospels uses
> this term.
I agree, but that is irrelevant. I have already admitted that I don't
think any of the gospel writers were Trinitarians. That does not hurt
my argument one bit (and if you think it does hurt my argument, you
have no idea what my argument is).
> But let's look at the verse itself. Here Paul says very
> emphatically that "For in him dwelleth all the fulness of
> the Godhead bodily" (KJV). Some other translations have
> used the word "Deity" instead of Godhead. Regardless, the
> meaning of Godhead/Deity in Colossians 2:9 is totally
> different than what you have been insisting on. In
> your/Craig's argument, "Godhead" is the 'set', the members
> of which are the Father (F), Son (S) and the Holy Ghost (H).
> In other words GH (Godhead)= {F, S, H}. And Godhead would
> not be complete without any of the three. What Paul is
> suggesting is the opposite. He is saying that *ALL* of the
> "FULLNESS" of Godhead got into Jesus. That can be expressed
> as GH={J}, while Jesus was still alive. If we try to reconcile
> your statement with Paul's, it would mean that Godhead (GH)
> which already included Jesus (J) came to dwell in Jesus (J)
> [an impossibility] and the Father (F) and the Holy Ghost (H)
> were all within Jesus in bodily form.
I agree there is an exegetical problem here. Orthodox Christians (i.e.
Eastern Orthodox Christians) I have discussed social trinitarian
doctrine with have explicitly denied/rejected the doctrine because they
interpret the verse as stating that Jesus *is* somehow identical to the
Godhead (and then they inform me with some indignant hand-waving that
God is not limited by Western Logic). I have not discussed this verse
with serious propoents of this doctrine (such as Craig, Moreland,
Morris, et cetera), so I don't know how they interpret it. Of course, I
think other interpretations are possible. The key word in the Greek is
paleroma, which is more of a passive participle of sorts (i.e. a thing
which has been filled [Thayer's Lexicon notes that it can refer, for
example, to a ship which has been filled with supplies]). Therefore,
the Greek construction 'paleroma tes theotetos' can refer to some
paleroma of the Godhead, and that could be anything (i.e. an object
filled with the divine essence/substance/stuff). Therefore it does not
have to be the Godhead in toto, but something that is merely filled
entirely with his essence/substance/stuff. Thus, if his 'stuff' was
water (for an example), a collection of water might be a paleroma of
His (i.e. an object which is filled with it). Therefore, Jesus is, in
some sort of bodily form (whether it be his earth body or his heavenly
form) made up of (or entirely filled with) the divine
essence/stuff/substance of the Godhead. The Vulgate seems to have this
understanding, as it reads 'quia in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo
divinitatis corporaliter' (who in him resides completely the wholeness
of divinity bodily) - i.e. an image of Jesus being an embodiment of
divine stuff (of course divinitatis can mean a myriad things).
Anmyway, my point is that this verse is open to interpretation.
Furthermore, my original point was that it is not necessarily the case
that Godhead is not found anywhere in the Christian Bible. Colossians
2:9 employs a word meaning Godhead, and it seems it is referring to
Jesus being filled with something of this Godhead/Deity. Worthy of
note, Paul used this round about way of saying whatever he was saying,
rather than just stating that Jesus is the Godhead (therefore I imagine
he was trying to say something other than Jesus is the Godhead, and
vice versa, hence the reason I doubt he intended this to be taken as
idenitifying Jesus with the Godhead/deity).
1MAN4ALL
Denis Giron wrote:
> 1MAN4ALL wrote:
> >
> > It is noteworthy that none of the four Gospels uses
> > this term.
> I agree, but that is irrelevant. I have already admitted that I don't
> think any of the gospel writers were Trinitarians. That does not hurt
> my argument one bit (and if you think it does hurt my argument, you
> have no idea what my argument is).
I am not sure if anybody but you truly knows what your argument is!
LOL.
If the Gospel writers didn't believe in Trinity; St. Paul, the
co-founder of Christianity, didn't believe in it; even Jesus Christ
made no mention of it, then who the hell are you reinventing
Christianity! It seems that you are promoting a new religion,
"Craigtianity", which started as a defense of traditional
Christianity but is now limited to your seven meaningless propositions!
Well, why don't we wait until you do. I am dying to know what they
think of your seven propositions vis-a-vis this verse.
> Of course, I
> think other interpretations are possible. The key word in the Greek is
> paleroma, which is more of a passive participle of sorts (i.e. a thing
> which has been filled [Thayer's Lexicon notes that it can refer, for
> example, to a ship which has been filled with supplies]). Therefore,
> the Greek construction 'paleroma tes theotetos' can refer to some
> paleroma of the Godhead, and that could be anything (i.e. an object
> filled with the divine essence/substance/stuff). Therefore it does not
> have to be the Godhead in toto, but something that is merely filled
> entirely with his essence/substance/stuff. Thus, if his 'stuff' was
> water (for an example), a collection of water might be a paleroma of
> His (i.e. an object which is filled with it). Therefore, Jesus is, in
> some sort of bodily form (whether it be his earth body or his heavenly
> form) made up of (or entirely filled with) the divine
> essence/stuff/substance of the Godhead. The Vulgate seems to have this
> understanding, as it reads 'quia in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo
> divinitatis corporaliter' (who in him resides completely the wholeness
> of divinity bodily) - i.e. an image of Jesus being an embodiment of
> divine stuff (of course divinitatis can mean a myriad things).
Once again you are playing semantic games. The "essence" of God 'is'
God.
> Anmyway, my point is that this verse is open to interpretation.
> Furthermore, my original point was that it is not necessarily the case
> that Godhead is not found anywhere in the Christian Bible. Colossians
> 2:9 employs a word meaning Godhead, and it seems it is referring to
> Jesus being filled with something of this Godhead/Deity.
Yeah, but as I pointed out earlier, your concept of "Godhead" is vastly
different than what Colossians 2.9 suggests. The two cannot be
reconciled!
> Worthy of
> note, Paul used this round about way of saying whatever he was saying,
> rather than just stating that Jesus is the Godhead (therefore I imagine
> he was trying to say something other than Jesus is the Godhead, and
> vice versa, hence the reason I doubt he intended this to be taken as
> idenitifying Jesus with the Godhead/deity).
I know you are trying to wiggle your way out of it but the fact remains
that most Christian theologians interpret this verse to mean that Jesus
was Godhead/God in flesh.
ghali
>
> We alreayd agreed that it is POSSIBLE for an object to be identical to
> the collection of its three parts in toto. That does not mean that the
> object is simply a set of the parts. For example, a cat *CAN* be
> identical to the collection of its parts in toto, but that does not
> mean any collection of the respective parts gives you a cat. So while a
> cat *CAN* be identical to the collection of its parts, that does not
> mean it is *ONLY* a set of the parts.
Then this violates one of the principles of identity ( this one is
controvertial, but I generally agree with it) i.e.
The identity of Indiscernibles. This says that if a and b have all
their properties in common, then they are one and the same
or in logic
(x)(y)(F) ((F(x)=F(y))) this leads to x=y
Strictly speaking the = sign is actually three dashes for identity. I
could not find a the logical sign on the computer for "this leads to"
ot "then". I am using Frege's logical signs here.
Now according to you The cat is the collection of ALL its proper parts
yet it is not identical to the collection. This either means that BEING
is NOT a proper part which would lead to the substance, proper part
distinction ( therefore this whole talk of sets is a waste of time, or
at most superflous) or it is and again it violates the the principle
above and hence your proposition 12 is false!. It is actually false on
both counts! On the first count being is a proper part, then we are
talking about the set of proper parts. One of the basic assumptions in
set theory as result of Russell's paradox says that a set cannot be a
member of itself, (this is ad hoc but I would like to see you solve the
paradox). Ok so the set is not a proper part and God is the set on
proposition 12. Therefore God is not being or substance ( on Aristotle
or the athanasian creed) Disaster! What do you say about God ,if God
does not exist or is not a being?
Another problem, the notion of existence. Is existence a proper part
Denis? . If it is then again on the the problem of set theory God does
not exist!, and if it isn't then sets exist ONLY and Jesus, the Father
and the Holy spirit DO NOT EXIST IN BEING! They only EXIST IN THE SET.
(because being cannot exist, or a set cannot be a member of itself)
Remember that your way out of polytheism was to say that the
multipersonal entity EXIST IN ONE BEING! Now this is false and
therefore polytheism is on the rise again Why?
The divine Avatars only exist as a collection or a set
The Persons now only exist as a collection or a set. BEING DOES NOT
UNITE THEM!
Finally Identity is a NECESSARY LAW and not one of possibility. Your
philosophy is all new to me Denis! LOL! I thought relative identity was
something that you did not believe in
> One of us would be in trouble with the law if I tried to mail marijuana
> off to the UK.
I am sure it is much stronger than that!
> Quite simply, no. Care to tell me about it?
OK, according to Quine existence is not a volcabulary in his logic, or
on Frege's sense existence is a quantifier. So when we say something
exists, we are actually saying their is one entity with the described
properites (F). OK which things then exist? Well Quine would say that
our language is a kind of theory which aims to bring order to our
experience. We quantify over objects according to our experience.
Existence or being in the end is "theory relative" or more radically
"truth" is as well. Quine holds onto "ontological relativity". Things
only exist in the context of a theory. This is a very sparse theory of
being! Is existence or being a relative according to you?
> United within a being.
See above!
> We're covering old ground here. If a set can be defined as a collection
> of members, then a cat can be considered a set, in some sense, of its
> respective parts. Kind of like the way my tool set is not merely some
> abstract notion that exists only in my mind; rather I really do have a
> box with tools in it.
The box of tools is not a good analogy. The only thing you can say
about sets are that they are a collection. On the other hand the box
has joints a colour etc. This gets worse. In the box the tools do not
exist IN IT and therefore DO NOT DESCRIBE IT. While according to you
the proper parts describe the set. So if the set of the persons is on
par with the tools in the box,then well you complete the analogy! I
love your analogies Denis!
> A being is an object (usually a living thing, but I suppose it could be
> a non-living object as well). That is what being refers to when it is
> used as a noun. Do you have a different definition for being?
I would say that Allah is the creator that exists. He is also all
powerful all knowing. It is enough to describe Allah by his properties.
I don't mind the substance theory as well, Then Allah is the entity
that is described by the unique proper parts, when asked what is the
entity, we mention the proper parts. . Even on the notion of
"experience" things then exist because they interact with the world. We
then only know things exist as an "inductive" answer. Allah would also
exist on this sense because he is the only answer for this complex
world we live in.
> It is only the case that I cannot have both if, and only if, they are
> contradictory. They are not contradictory, therefore I can have both.
See above.
> A single BEING that happens to be comprised of three Persons, none of
> which are deities by themself. A single Tripersonal being.
OK back to substance and proper parts. So why all this diversion into
set theory. We shall take it from here in our next thread.
Ghali
ghali
> The analogy simply means that the Godhead as a whole, as well as the
> persons that serve as proper parts of the Godhead, are all comprised of
> the same "stuff". But the Godhead is defined as the structure AS A
> WHOLE
Look Denis, maybe this is a simpler way to explain things. Jesus is
Divine and God is Divine have two different senses. One is a proper
part and one is an issue of identity. Ice is water and Steam is water.
Both have the same understanding. Water in both cases is the same
predicate! That is why it falls into Version 1 of Howard Snyders
example, which I clearly agree is a problem.
> Hold on here, please explain why a specific whole mass of water is not
> a specific object. For example, if a drop of water is falling through
> the air, and I refer to it as "that drop," am I not referring to an
> object?
Water on the whole is no specific object because it only exists ( their
more detail here) in one of three forms here. Water never exists as H2O
but as water, ice or steam! Therefore there is no whole mass called
water. Only a whole mass of the molecule but on this account we have
only one predicate.
>
> The point is that the structure as a whole, represents the Godhead.
The structure as a whole represents one molecule!
> > This analogy is disasterous Denis!
>
> You've given me no reason to believe so, Ghali!
Plenty I think! I could use this very same analogy to explain similar
properties shared by DIFFERENT entities. This analogy does not
differentiate between polytheism and monontheism
Think of a discussion between a polytheist and say a skeptic
How can different entities all share the same property of divinity?
He replies think of ice water and steam
Ok..
Well they are different objects yet they all share similar properties
Such as
Well they all are made of the molecule H2O
Similarly the Divine avatars are all separate beings but yet they share
the SAME property of divinity.
> Previously you gave me the impression that Craig's conception of
> substance is in line with Aristotle's, and now you are explicitly
> saying the opposite. As I have already admitted, I am ignorant of
> Craig's notion of substance (hence the very real possibility that I
> diverged from what he meant by it). Could you elaborate on the above,
> and explain how Craig defines substance?
Well Howard Snyder devotes a whole section to this very topic and
accurately puts forward Craigs view ( in fact a number of conditions
that Craig puts forward) on substance. I really do not understand how I
said opposite things. Please clarify
Ghali
Denis Giron
ghali wrote:
> > The analogy simply means that the Godhead as a whole,
> > as well as the persons that serve as proper parts of
> > the Godhead, are all comprised of the same "stuff".
> > But the Godhead is defined as the structure AS A
> > WHOLE
>
> Look Denis, maybe this is a simpler way to explain things.
> Jesus is Divine and God is Divine have two different senses.
Right, especially according to the predicates employed in my 12
propositions.
> One is a proper part and one is an issue of identity. Ice is
> water and Steam is water. Both have the same understanding.
> Water in both cases is the same predicate! That is why it
> falls into Version 1 of Howard Snyders example, which I
> clearly agree is a problem.
The point of the image was to show a single object which is comprised
of three entities, with the entities each being made up of the same
'stuff' as the object of which they are a part. So the Persons are all
made of the same divine magical 'stuff' but are united within a single
entity, being or object. The Godhead bears the predicate 'G' in the 12
propositions, making it a deity, identical to the Godhead, a
tripersonal being. The persons bear the predicate G' which simply means
being made up of some of the same magical stuff the Godhead is made up
of, being a proper part of the Godhead, and even bearing some of the
Godhead's attributes.
> > Hold on here, please explain why a specific whole mass of
> > water is not a specific object. For example, if a drop of
> > water is falling through the air, and I refer to it as
> > "that drop," am I not referring to an object?
>
> Water on the whole is no specific object because it only
> exists ( their more detail here) in one of three forms here.
I find it ironic that you would say this after asking me what *I'm*
smoking. You missed the point about a drop perhaps? A drop of water can
be considered an object, therefore a certain mass of water can be a
specific object.
> > The point is that the structure as a whole, represents
> > the Godhead.
>
> The structure as a whole represents one molecule!
You're focusing too hard on water. The point was to elucidate one
entity being comprised of three smaller entities, yet all three
entities being made up of the same 'stuff' that the larger entity as a
whole is made up of. Obviously I am not claiming that the Godhead and
the persons are all made up of H2O and only H2O. As I noted when I
first put forth the image, the different persons have centers of
consciousness, for example, making them somewhat different from mere
water.
> Think of a discussion between a polytheist and say
> a skeptic
>
> How can different entities all share the same property
> of divinity?
>
> He replies think of ice water and steam
>
> Ok..
>
> Well they are different objects yet they all share similar
> properties
>
> Such as
>
> Well they all are made of the molecule H2O
>
> Similarly the Divine avatars are all separate beings but
> yet they share the SAME property of divinity.
So what? If this doctrine holds that each avatar is a deity by
themself, then it espouses polytheism. However, if it argues that there
is only one deity, that is monotheism. On the model I presented, the
entire object as a whole is a deity, and none of its parts are deities.
Therefore, monotheism. Your only response has been the ridiculous claim
that a collection of water (e.g. a drop!) is not a single object.
To use an analogy you yourself alluded to back when the discussion was
in SRI, think of God's intellect. God's intellect is divine, and a
proper part of God, yet not identical to God (rather it is something
God possesses). So there is nothing incoherent about stating that a
proper part of God is divine yet not a separate God, even if we can't
describe in detail the magic pixie dust that is divinity.
Denis Giron
ghali wrote:
> >
> > We alreayd agreed that it is POSSIBLE for an object
> > to be identical to the collection of its three parts
> > in toto. That does not mean that the object is simply
> > a set of the parts. For example, a cat *CAN* be
> > identical to the collection of its parts in toto,
> > but that does not mean any collection of the respective
> > parts gives you a cat. So while a cat *CAN* be identical
> > to the collection of its parts, that does not
> > mean it is *ONLY* a set of the parts.
>
> Then this violates one of the principles of identity ( this
> one is controvertial, but I generally agree with it) i.e.
>
> The identity of Indiscernibles. This says that if a and b
> have all their properties in common, then they are one and
> the same
>
> or in logic
>
> (x)(y)(F) ((F(x)=F(y))) this leads to x=y
Okay, let me set another analogy. Are you familiar with legos (the
plastic building blocks enjoyed by children)? Suppose you have three
legos, a blue one, a white one, and a red one. When one stacks them on
top of each other (fully connected), with the blue on the bottom, the
white in the middle, and the red on top, we get what can be considered
an object. That object, that stack of legos, we'll call the 'trilegi'.
Now, the trilegi *CAN* be identical to the collection of its three
parts under certain circumstances (i.e. when they are stacked in the
precise way just described), but that does not mean the trilegi is
*ONLY* a simple set of its three parts (i.e. if I just throw the three
legos on the table, you don't have a trilegi).
Therefore, there is no contradiction in stating, on the one hand, that
an object *CAN* be identical to the collection of its parts in toto
(and is such in this or that instance or circumstance), and stating, on
the other hand, that that object is not *ONLY* a set of its collective
parts. Focus on the trilegi-legos analogy to understand why this is
true.
> Now according to you The cat is the collection of ALL
> its proper parts yet it is not identical to the collection.
Perhaps I should have employed modal operators? I.e. diamonds and
squares?
A cat *CAN* be considered identical to a collection of its parts in
toto, under certain circumstances. On no such grounds can you deny
this. And in no way does this mean a living cat is identical to any
collection of cat parts. At best, you can only accuse me of vagueness
in my 12th proposition, as it did not explain how the set was organized
(or if it needed to be organized in a certain way in order for the
proposition to be true).
> This either means that BEING is NOT a proper part
How are you using being? Previously you asked me to define being, and I
did. Are you now using it in a different sense? If so, you have to give
your definition. I used being as a noun, such as this being or that
being, a reference to this thing or object or that thing or object
(which can be, often is, though not necessarily is, a living
organism/being).
In the sense I am using being, I have no idea what you mean above. The
three persons are united within a single being, and that being is
comrpised of the three persons. It is not necessarily false to say that
the being is identical to the collection of the three parts.
> Another problem, the notion of existence. Is existence
> a proper part Denis?
What does this mean? What does it mean to affirm or deny that existence
happens to be a proper part?
> Remember that your way out of polytheism was to say
> that the multipersonal entity EXIST IN ONE BEING!
*AND* to say that this one being was a deity, and none of its parts by
themselves were deities. Analogously, a feline is one cat, and none of
its parts which are feline in a sense of predication are felines by
themself.
> The Persons now only exist as a collection or a set.
> BEING DOES NOT UNITE THEM!
In what sense are you using the word being? It seems clearly different
from my own. I said that they are united in *A* being, i.e. I used
being as a noun, referring to an object (like the body of Cerberus or a
cat if you will).
> Finally Identity is a NECESSARY LAW and not one of
> possibility.
Bullfeathers.
Let G stand for Ghali.
Let D stand for Denis.
Let <> represent the possible modal operator.
I assert that:
<> G = D
It is possible that Ghali and Denis are identical. There may even be
worlds within logical space where this is true. It is not actually true
in our world, but I see no reason to deny its possiblity. It is also
possible that an object I designated the trilegi is identical to the
collection of its parts (i.e. they are identical under certain
circumstances, e.g. when they are united and stacked in a certain way).
Or have I misunderstood you? What do you mean when you say that
identity cannot be a law of possibility? Keep the trilegi-legos analogy
above in mind as you answer.
> > Quite simply, no. Care to tell me about it?
>
> OK, according to Quine existence is not a volcabulary
> in his logic, or on Frege's sense existence is a quantifier.
> So when we say something exists, we are actually saying
> their is one entity with the described properites (F).
> OK which things then exist? Well Quine would say that
> our language is a kind of theory which aims to bring order
> to our experience. We quantify over objects according to
> our experience. Existence or being in the end is "theory
> relative" or more radically "truth" is as well. Quine holds
> onto "ontological relativity". Things only exist in the
> context of a theory. This is a very sparse theory of
> being! Is existence or being a relative according to you?
I would agree that it is problematic to employ existence as a predicate
(as we all learn in intro-level philosophy courses), but I do not know
what it means to state that things only exist within the context of
some theory. What does that mean? That certain things don't actually
exist exclusive of our respective theories? Something else?
> > We're covering old ground here. If a set can be defined
> > as a collection of members, then a cat can be considered
> > a set, in some sense, of its respective parts. Kind of
> > like the way my tool set is not merely some abstract
> > notion that exists only in my mind; rather I really do
> > have a box with tools in it.
>
> The box of tools is not a good analogy. The only thing you
> can say about sets are that they are a collection. On the
> other hand the box has joints a colour etc. This gets worse.
If I can say that a set is a collection, I can say that this collection
of tools is a set of tools *IN SOME SENSE*. But I am not saying that it
is *ONLY* or *MERELY* a set. Understand the difference?
> > A being is an object (usually a living thing, but I
> > suppose it could be a non-living object as well).
> > That is what being refers to when it is used as a
> > noun. Do you have a different definition for being?
>
> I would say that Allah is the creator that exists. He is
> also all powerful all knowing. It is enough to describe
> Allah by his properties.
If it is enough to describe Allah by his properties, then an Arab
trinitarian might say that Allaah has the property of being
tripersonal, of being comrpised of three persons which are united
within Allaah. Presto! We're done.
> I don't mind the substance theory as well, Then Allah is
> the entity that is described by the unique proper parts,
> when asked what is the entity, we mention the proper parts.
> Even on the notion of "experience" things then exist
> because they interact with the world.
How odd. Does this mean that if a thing does not interact with our
world, it does not exist? What is our world then? Does your deity exist
within our world? Is He part of it? If not, is it possible to exist
outside our world and not interact with it?
> > A single BEING that happens to be comprised of three
> > Persons, none of which are deities by themself. A
> > single Tripersonal being.
>
> OK back to substance and proper parts.
No, not yet back to substance, as I'm still in the dark with regard to
what you mean by substance. I need to clearly understand what you mean
by substance if I am going to disagree or agree with your notion of
substance.
Denis Giron
1MAN4ALL wrote:
>
> > I don't think any of the gospel writers were
> > Trinitarians. That does not hurt my argument
> > one bit (and if you think it does hurt my argument,
> > you have no idea what my argument is).
>
> I am not sure if anybody but you truly knows what your
> argument is!
The argument primarily is that the version of the doctrine of the
Trinity I have put forth is logically coherent. On a secondary level, I
have also claimed it is not contradicted by the Western Christian Bible
in its present form. Simple.
> If the Gospel writers didn't believe in Trinity; St. Paul,
> the co-founder of Christianity, didn't believe in it; even
> Jesus Christ made no mention of it, then who the hell are
> you reinventing Christianity!
Obviously, Christians will assume the Bible is uniform in message (and
that assumption forces one to conclude that the Bible implies a
multipersonal conception of God), just as Muslims assume the Islamic
corpora is uniform in message. To use an analogy I have employed
before, I personally don't believe certain NT writers thought Jesus was
born of a virgin. That does not change the fact that the doctrine of
Jesus' virgin birth is logically coherent, and that it is not
contradicted by the Western Christian Bible in its present form (in
fact the Bible implies it, regardless of whether Mark or Paul believed
it).
> > I have not discussed this verse with serious propoents
> > of this doctrine (such as Craig, Moreland, Morris, et
> > cetera), so I don't know how they interpret it.
>
> Well, why don't we wait until you do.
I think Craig, and others mentioned in this thread (such as Thomas
Morris, assuming he is still alive), are very busy men, so if I am ever
to discuss this with them at all (and there is no reason to believe I
ever will!), or see it in one of their texts, there is no reason to
believe it will happen any time soon.
> Once again you are playing semantic games.
So that's it? Semantic games? What I have shown is that it is at least
possible to interpret the relevant verse as not affirming the
identification of the Godhead with Jesus, therefore this verse does not
contradict the doctrine I have pushed.
As a rule of logic, X contradicts Y if, and only if, it is *IMPOSSIBLE*
for both to be true.
I have shown that the verse from Colossians can be interpreted in such
a way that it does not conflict with the doctrine I have pushed,
therefore they do not contradict.
> Yeah, but as I pointed out earlier, your concept of
> "Godhead" is vastly different than what Colossians 2.9
> suggests. The two cannot be reconciled!
Nonsense. I see no reason to believe that the author of Colossians
thought Jesus was identical to the Godhead (in fact, elsewhere the
author writes as if he believes they are not identical). But Colossians
2:9 (and 1:9) have some sort of Pleroma, some sort of filled thing from
God, dwells within Jesus. This seems to me to at least be open to the
possibility that the pleroma is some sort of divine stuff, substance or
essence... Jesus is filled with divinity. Jesus is divine.
> I know you are trying to wiggle your way out of it but
> the fact remains that most Christian theologians interpret
> this verse to mean that Jesus was Godhead/God in flesh.
Really? Have you done a survey of Christian theologians? Of the last
few Christian theologians I have read, such as Craig, Morris, Moreland,
et cetera, all of them denied that "Jesus is God" is an identity
statement. Morris, a Catholic theologian, even affirms that it is a
predication in line with Classical Christology (which is in line with
John 1:1). I could add Raymond Brown in here, and others as well. So it
seems you're just speculating.
ghali
> The point of the image was to show a single object which is comprised
> of three entities, with the entities each being made up of the same
> 'stuff' as the object of which they are a part. So the Persons are all
> made of the same divine magical 'stuff' but are united within a single
> entity, being or object. The Godhead bears the predicate 'G' in the 12
> propositions, making it a deity, identical to the Godhead, a
> tripersonal being. The persons bear the predicate G' which simply means
> being made up of some of the same magical stuff the Godhead is made up
> of, being a proper part of the Godhead, and even bearing some of the
> Godhead's attributes.
This is getting repetitive now Denis. I know that! But how does the
water analogy explain the two senses of divinity. IT DOES NOT! It only
shows that many objects can share common properties. How can you
extrapolate further from this analogy? Remember Occams razor as well!
> I find it ironic that you would say this after asking me what *I'm*
> smoking. You missed the point about a drop perhaps? A drop of water can
> be considered an object, therefore a certain mass of water can be a
> specific object.
I can't see the irony here. Maybe it is my sense of humour? But this
logic is very poor! A certain mass can be ice water or steam, but
aren't we talking about the Godhead as a whole with three persons, or
on this analogy water as a WHOLE with the three "persons" ice, steam
and water?
A drop surely is not the three "persons" at one time. It is generally
only ice, steam or water. But this certain mass? Water or the whole
mass water is really a red herring. We are not concerned about how much
water there is but about how this analogy clarifies the two senses of
divinity. Whether there is a certain mass of H20 with ice, steam or
water does not matter to me. It should not matter to you either. I
found this objection very strange.
So my objection still stands, this certain mass water is NO SPECIFIC
OBJECT. Or if you want to be clearer no specific MODE. If it was, then
it would defeat the whole purpose of bringing this analogy up!
>
> You're focusing too hard on water. The point was to elucidate one
> entity being comprised of three smaller entities, yet all three
> entities being made up of the same 'stuff'
Ok then Jesus is Divine would mean that Jesus is made up of "H20"
God is Divine would mean that God is made up of "H20"
So BOTH HAVE THE SAME SENSE OF DIVINE!!! Isn't this plainly obvious?
The above analogy does not show how the first is a proper part and the
second is a statement of identity.
>
> So what? If this doctrine holds that each avatar is a deity by
> themself, then it espouses polytheism. However, if it argues that there
> is only one deity, that is monotheism.
So you without realising it have shown that this model can explain both
and therefore none! It is like using the identical model to describe a
square and a circle and then say I can understand how they are
differentiated FROM THIS MODEL ALONE, or in our case THIS ANALOGY
ALONE.
>On the model I presented, the
> entire object as a whole is a deity, and none of its parts are deities.
> Therefore, monotheism. Your only response has been the ridiculous claim
> that a collection of water (e.g. a drop!) is not a single object.
The ridiculous claim was your strawman. I am right in saying the whole
mass of H20 in the universe is no specific object. It not one of any of
the specific modes ice water or steam.
> To use an analogy you yourself alluded to back when the discussion was
> in SRI, think of God's intellect. God's intellect is divine, and a
> proper part of God, yet not identical to God (rather it is something
> God possesses).
So Jesus on this analogy is an attribute like omniscience or
omnipotence? I dont think that is the case. What we have here are three
FULLY divine persons who are one divine being. Or as you will see how
this will lead to later on, three substances that are actually one!
There is the problem. The issue of the attributes of God are a
different thing. Let me make this clearer. On the traditional
chrisitian view all three persons have INDEPENDENT WILLS, yet are one
being, but it would be strange to say that the thickness of my eyebrow
has a will or an attribute of a being has an independent will.
Ghali
ghali
> Okay, let me set another analogy. Are you familiar with legos (the
> plastic building blocks enjoyed by children)? Suppose you have three
> legos, a blue one, a white one, and a red one. When one stacks them on
> top of each other (fully connected), with the blue on the bottom, the
> white in the middle, and the red on top, we get what can be considered
> an object. That object, that stack of legos, we'll call the 'trilegi'.
> Now, the trilegi *CAN* be identical to the collection of its three
> parts under certain circumstances (i.e. when they are stacked in the
> precise way just described), but that does not mean the trilegi is
> *ONLY* a simple set of its three parts (i.e. if I just throw the three
> legos on the table, you don't have a trilegi).
Like I said before Denis, love the analogies. This is really shows some
basic errors in philosophy Denis. Which modules did you take?
This shows that the trilegi is NECESSARLIY identical with the three
blocks arranged in a particular SPATIAL order. The blocks thrown on the
floor ARE NOT identical with the trilegi or even the unique set
trilegi. This only shows that DIFFERENT sets have common members. Even
on this account I am not so sure. For sure the two sets together do not
form a "bag" on the Bag theory of sets.
> Therefore, there is no contradiction in stating, on the one hand, that
> an object *CAN* be identical to the collection of its parts in toto
> (and is such in this or that instance or circumstance), and stating, on
> the other hand, that that object is not *ONLY* a set of its collective
> parts. Focus on the trilegi-legos analogy to understand why this is
> true.
Yes there can as shown above. I cannot say that trilegi is both
identical and not identical with its unique set
> Perhaps I should have employed modal operators? I.e. diamonds and
> squares?
I don't see how that would clarify it. I think your set is also vague
and needs to be clarified
> How are you using being? Previously you asked me to define being, and I
> did. Are you now using it in a different sense? If so, you have to give
> your definition. I used being as a noun, such as this being or that
> being,
Like I said before I am not committed to the bundle theory or substance
theory at the moment. It seems at the moment at least that they are
both coherent ways to describe reality. But on the traditional sense,
being is that which is the bearer of proper parts. I don't understand
this use of the word noun. Noun in the sense of Saul Kripke? Noun in
the sense that Ghali refers to the collection of his unique proper
parts? I thought that being referred, according to you at least to that
fairy like stuff that glues the persons together. If that isn't the
case then I think we have progressed in the discussion in the sense
that there is more to say.
.
>
> What does this mean? What does it mean to affirm or deny that existence
> happens to be a proper part?
A being exists. Being has the property of existing or the proper part
if you want. Come on Denis! This is basic again!
>
> > Finally Identity is a NECESSARY LAW and not one of
> > possibility.
>
> Bullfeathers.
Sheep's testicles!!
>
> It is possible that Ghali and Denis are identical. There may even be
> worlds within logical space where this is true. It is not actually true
> in our world, but I see no reason to deny its possiblity. It is also
> possible that an object I designated the trilegi is identical to the
> collection of its parts (i.e. they are identical under certain
> circumstances, e.g. when they are united and stacked in a certain way).
>
So there is a possible world (Possible in the sense used by Alvin
Plantinga in Nature and Necessity) were the following laws do not apply
(i) Identity is symmetrical. If a=b then b=a
(ii) Identity is reflexive. Everything is identical with itself
(iii) Identity is transitive. If a=b and b=c then a=c
(iv) Leibniz's law. If a is the same as b then everything that can be
said of a can be said of b
(v) And finally the inverse which is controversial. If a and b have
all the properties in common then a is the same as b
You would be very hard pressed to find ANY possible world were we would
could identify anything if the first four laws could be violated. This
is basic stuff again Denis! Which zany philosophy textbook are you
reading? Which author says that the first four laws noted can actually
have diamonds in front of them?
> I would agree that it is problematic to employ existence as a predicate
> (as we all learn in intro-level philosophy courses), but I do not know
> what it means to state that things only exist within the context of
> some theory. What does that mean? That certain things don't actually
> exist exclusive of our respective theories? Something else?
Like I said Quine is radical here. All things described are relative to
a theory relative to our relative experience. No model holds a
privileged frame for existence or truth . Think of Minkowskian space
time. Is it an entity that exists? On the strong version of the general
theory of relativity it is. Now use this radically across all objects!
> If I can say that a set is a collection, I can say that this collection
> of tools is a set of tools *IN SOME SENSE*. But I am not saying that it
> is *ONLY* or *MERELY* a set. Understand the difference?
Well you used the identity sign in proposition 12. In logic this would
be a necessary issue. Maybe you have a new logic that places the law of
identity under the hammer of squares and diamonds! I will love to see
this! This would be a great PHD thesis!
> How odd. Does this mean that if a thing does not interact with our
> world, it does not exist? What is our world then? Does your deity exist
> within our world? Is He part of it? If not, is it possible to exist
> outside our world and not interact with it?
First I am not committed as the snipped text suggested, but yes what is
the problem. We infer the existence of a creator because there is a
universe. This is an inductive fact. So if the universe did not exist
and therefore our minds and language did not exist, Statements like
"God exists" would be meaningless.
But the absence of evidence only shows that a thing does not actually
exist but possibly exists. I do not jump into absolute negation unless
there is a contradiction.
> No, not yet back to substance, as I'm still in the dark with regard to
> what you mean by substance.
I gave you the references before. Like I said I am not committed at the
moment, so I can only give the different schools. There are still in my
eyes competing views that are coherent.
In the end I just think you are in the dark full stop!
Ghali
ghali
> Okay, let me set another analogy. Are you familiar with legos (the
> plastic building blocks enjoyed by children)? Suppose you have three
> legos, a blue one, a white one, and a red one. When one stacks them on
> top of each other (fully connected), with the blue on the bottom, the
> white in the middle, and the red on top, we get what can be considered
> an object. That object, that stack of legos, we'll call the 'trilegi'.
> Now, the trilegi *CAN* be identical to the collection of its three
> parts under certain circumstances (i.e. when they are stacked in the
> precise way just described), but that does not mean the trilegi is
> *ONLY* a simple set of its three parts (i.e. if I just throw the three
> legos on the table, you don't have a trilegi).
Like I said before Denis, love the analogies. This is really shows some
basic errors in philosophy Denis. Which modules did you take?
This shows that the trilegi is NECESSARLIY identical with the three
blocks arranged in a particular SPATIAL order. The blocks thrown on the
floor ARE NOT identical with the trilegi or even the unique set
trilegi. This only shows that DIFFERENT sets have common members. Even
on this account I am not so sure. For sure the two sets together do not
form a "bag" on the Bag theory of sets.
> Therefore, there is no contradiction in stating, on the one hand, that
> an object *CAN* be identical to the collection of its parts in toto
> (and is such in this or that instance or circumstance), and stating, on
> the other hand, that that object is not *ONLY* a set of its collective
> parts. Focus on the trilegi-legos analogy to understand why this is
> true.
Yes there can as shown above. I cannot say that trilegi is both
identical and not identical with its unique set
> Perhaps I should have employed modal operators? I.e. diamonds and
> squares?
I don't see how that would clarify it. I think your set is also vague
and needs to be clarified
> How are you using being? Previously you asked me to define being, and I
> did. Are you now using it in a different sense? If so, you have to give
> your definition. I used being as a noun, such as this being or that
> being,
Like I said before I am not committed to the bundle theory or substance
theory at the moment. It seems at the moment at least that they are
both coherent ways to describe reality. But on the traditional sense,
being is that which is the bearer of proper parts. I don't understand
this use of the word noun. Noun in the sense of Saul Kripke? Noun in
the sense that Ghali refers to the collection of his unique proper
parts? I thought that being referred, according to you at least to that
fairy like stuff that glues the persons together. If that isn't the
case then I think we have progressed in the discussion in the sense
that there is more to say.
.
>
> What does this mean? What does it mean to affirm or deny that existence
> happens to be a proper part?
A being exists. Being has the property of existing or the proper part
if you want. Come on Denis! This is basic again!
>
> > Finally Identity is a NECESSARY LAW and not one of
> > possibility.
>
> Bullfeathers.
Sheep's testicles!!
>
> It is possible that Ghali and Denis are identical. There may even be
> worlds within logical space where this is true. It is not actually true
> in our world, but I see no reason to deny its possiblity. It is also
> possible that an object I designated the trilegi is identical to the
> collection of its parts (i.e. they are identical under certain
> circumstances, e.g. when they are united and stacked in a certain way).
>
So there is a possible world (Possible in the sense used by Alvin
Plantinga in Nature and Necessity) were the following laws do not apply
(i) Identity is symmetrical. If a=b then b=a
(ii) Identity is reflexive. Everything is identical with itself
(iii) Identity is transitive. If a=b and b=c then a=c
(iv) Leibniz's law. If a is the same as b then everything that can be
said of a can be said of b
(v) And finally the inverse which is controversial. If a and b have
all the properties in common then a is the same as b
You would be very hard pressed to find ANY possible world were we would
could identify anything if the first four laws could be violated. This
is basic stuff again Denis! Which zany philosophy textbook are you
reading? Which author says that the first four laws noted can actually
have diamonds in front of them?
> I would agree that it is problematic to employ existence as a predicate
> (as we all learn in intro-level philosophy courses), but I do not know
> what it means to state that things only exist within the context of
> some theory. What does that mean? That certain things don't actually
> exist exclusive of our respective theories? Something else?
Like I said Quine is radical here. All things described are relative to
a theory relative to our relative experience. No model holds a
privileged frame for existence or truth . Think of Minkowskian space
time. Is it an entity that exists? On the strong version of the general
theory of relativity it is. Now use this radically across all objects!
> If I can say that a set is a collection, I can say that this collection
> of tools is a set of tools *IN SOME SENSE*. But I am not saying that it
> is *ONLY* or *MERELY* a set. Understand the difference?
Well you used the identity sign in proposition 12. In logic this would
be a necessary issue. Maybe you have a new logic that places the law of
identity under the hammer of squares and diamonds! I will love to see
this! This would be a great PHD thesis!
> How odd. Does this mean that if a thing does not interact with our
> world, it does not exist? What is our world then? Does your deity exist
> within our world? Is He part of it? If not, is it possible to exist
> outside our world and not interact with it?
First I am not committed as the snipped text suggested, but yes what is
the problem. We infer the existence of a creator because there is a
universe. This is an inductive fact. So if the universe did not exist
and therefore our minds and language did not exist, Statements like
"God exists" would be meaningless.
But the absence of evidence only shows that a thing does not actually
exist but possibly exists. I do not jump into absolute negation unless
there is a contradiction.
> No, not yet back to substance, as I'm still in the dark with regard to
> what you mean by substance.
I gave you the references before. Like I said I am not committed at the
ghali
> Okay, let me set another analogy. Are you familiar with legos (the
> plastic building blocks enjoyed by children)? Suppose you have three
> legos, a blue one, a white one, and a red one. When one stacks them on
> top of each other (fully connected), with the blue on the bottom, the
> white in the middle, and the red on top, we get what can be considered
> an object. That object, that stack of legos, we'll call the 'trilegi'.
> Now, the trilegi *CAN* be identical to the collection of its three
> parts under certain circumstances (i.e. when they are stacked in the
> precise way just described), but that does not mean the trilegi is
> *ONLY* a simple set of its three parts (i.e. if I just throw the three
> legos on the table, you don't have a trilegi).
Like I said before Denis, love the analogies. This is really shows some
basic errors in philosophy Denis. Which modules did you take?
This shows that the trilegi is NECESSARLIY identical with the three
blocks arranged in a particular SPATIAL order. The blocks thrown on the
floor ARE NOT identical with the trilegi or even the unique set
trilegi. This only shows that DIFFERENT sets have common members. Even
on this account I am not so sure. For sure the two sets together do not
form a "bag" on the Bag theory of sets.
> Therefore, there is no contradiction in stating, on the one hand, that
> an object *CAN* be identical to the collection of its parts in toto
> (and is such in this or that instance or circumstance), and stating, on
> the other hand, that that object is not *ONLY* a set of its collective
> parts. Focus on the trilegi-legos analogy to understand why this is
> true.
Yes there can as shown above. I cannot say that trilegi is both
identical and not identical with its unique set
> Perhaps I should have employed modal operators? I.e. diamonds and
> squares?
I don't see how that would clarify it. I think your set is also vague
and needs to be clarified
> How are you using being? Previously you asked me to define being, and I
> did. Are you now using it in a different sense? If so, you have to give
> your definition. I used being as a noun, such as this being or that
> being,
Like I said before I am not committed to the bundle theory or substance
theory at the moment. It seems at the moment at least that they are
both coherent ways to describe reality. But on the traditional sense,
being is that which is the bearer of proper parts. I don't understand
this use of the word noun. Noun in the sense of Saul Kripke? Noun in
the sense that Ghali refers to the collection of his unique proper
parts? I thought that being referred, according to you at least to that
fairy like stuff that glues the persons together. If that isn't the
case then I think we have progressed in the discussion in the sense
that there is more to say.
.
>
> What does this mean? What does it mean to affirm or deny that existence
> happens to be a proper part?
A being exists. Being has the property of existing or the proper part
if you want. Come on Denis! This is basic again!
>
> > Finally Identity is a NECESSARY LAW and not one of
> > possibility.
>
> Bullfeathers.
Sheep's testicles!!
>
> It is possible that Ghali and Denis are identical. There may even be
> worlds within logical space where this is true. It is not actually true
> in our world, but I see no reason to deny its possiblity. It is also
> possible that an object I designated the trilegi is identical to the
> collection of its parts (i.e. they are identical under certain
> circumstances, e.g. when they are united and stacked in a certain way).
>
So there is a possible world (Possible in the sense used by Alvin
Plantinga in Nature and Necessity) were the following laws do not apply
(i) Identity is symmetrical. If a=b then b=a
(ii) Identity is reflexive. Everything is identical with itself
(iii) Identity is transitive. If a=b and b=c then a=c
(iv) Leibniz's law. If a is the same as b then everything that can be
said of a can be said of b
(v) And finally the inverse which is controversial. If a and b have
all the properties in common then a is the same as b
You would be very hard pressed to find ANY possible world were we would
could identify anything if the first four laws could be violated. This
is basic stuff again Denis! Which zany philosophy textbook are you
reading? Which author says that the first four laws noted can actually
have diamonds in front of them?
> I would agree that it is problematic to employ existence as a predicate
> (as we all learn in intro-level philosophy courses), but I do not know
> what it means to state that things only exist within the context of
> some theory. What does that mean? That certain things don't actually
> exist exclusive of our respective theories? Something else?
Like I said Quine is radical here. All things described are relative to
a theory relative to our relative experience. No model holds a
privileged frame for existence or truth . Think of Minkowskian space
time. Is it an entity that exists? On the strong version of the general
theory of relativity it is. Now use this radically across all objects!
> If I can say that a set is a collection, I can say that this collection
> of tools is a set of tools *IN SOME SENSE*. But I am not saying that it
> is *ONLY* or *MERELY* a set. Understand the difference?
Well you used the identity sign in proposition 12. In logic this would
be a necessary issue. Maybe you have a new logic that places the law of
identity under the hammer of squares and diamonds! I will love to see
this! This would be a great PHD thesis!
> How odd. Does this mean that if a thing does not interact with our
> world, it does not exist? What is our world then? Does your deity exist
> within our world? Is He part of it? If not, is it possible to exist
> outside our world and not interact with it?
First I am not committed as the snipped text suggested, but yes what is
the problem. We infer the existence of a creator because there is a
universe. This is an inductive fact. So if the universe did not exist
and therefore our minds and language did not exist, Statements like
"God exists" would be meaningless.
But the absence of evidence only shows that a thing does not actually
exist but possibly exists. I do not jump into absolute negation unless
there is a contradiction.
> No, not yet back to substance, as I'm still in the dark with regard to
> what you mean by substance.
I gave you the references before. Like I said I am not committed at the
AnonMoos
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Denis Giron
Ghali <ghal...@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
> > Okay, let me set another analogy. Are you familiar with
> > legos (the plastic building blocks enjoyed by children)?
> > Suppose you have three legos, a blue one, a white one,
> > and a red one. When one stacks them on top of each other
> > (fully connected), with the blue on the bottom, the
> > white in the middle, and the red on top, we get what can
> > be considered an object. That object, that stack of legos,
> > we'll call the 'trilegi'. Now, the trilegi *CAN* be
> > identical to the collection of its three parts under
> > certain circumstances (i.e. when they are stacked in the
> > precise way just described), but that does not mean the
> > trilegi is *ONLY* a simple set of its three parts (i.e.
> > if I just throw the three legos on the table, you don't
> > have a trilegi).
>
> Like I said before Denis, love the analogies. This is
> really shows some basic errors in philosophy Denis. Which
> modules did you take?
>
> This shows that the trilegi is NECESSARLIY identical with
> the three blocks arranged in a particular SPATIAL order.
> The blocks thrown on the floor ARE NOT identical with the
> trilegi or even the unique set trilegi.
Which was precisely my point! Therefore, the trilegi *CAN* be identical
to the collection of its parts under certain circumstances (e.g. when
those parts are organized in a certain way). Admittinh such is not
contradicted by also noting that the trilegi is always or necessarily
identical to a collection of its parts (as there are circumstances when
a given collection is not identical, such as the example you gave: the
legos just thrown on the floor). That was my point! This is the reason
I have argued that stating that an object *CAN* be identical to its
parts is not the same as stating that the object in question is merely
a collection of its parts.
> > How are you using being? Previously you asked me to define
> > being, and I did. Are you now using it in a different sense?
> > If so, you have to give your definition. I used being as a
> > noun, such as this being or that being,
>
> Like I said before I am not committed to the bundle theory or
> substance theory at the moment. It seems at the moment at least
> that they are both coherent ways to describe reality. But on
> the traditional sense, being is that which is the bearer of
> proper parts.
By this you mean a being would be a thing which has proper parts,
right? Well then, if this is correct, then the deity of the Trinity has
proper parts, and is thus a being.
> I don't understand this use of the word noun. Noun in the sense
> of Saul Kripke? Noun in the sense that Ghali refers to the
> collection of his unique proper parts?
Noun in the sense of the way it is used in the English language! In the
sentence 'the cat jumped over the table', both 'cat' and 'table' are
nouns. Hence the reason I used defininte and indefinite articles before
the word 'being', such as 'a being', 'this being', or 'the being'. When
you asked me to define being, on July fifth I responded as follows:
> A being is an object (usually a living thing, but I suppose it
> could be a non-living object as well).
Is that clear?
> I thought that being referred, according to you at least to
> that fairy like stuff that glues the persons together.
No, that magical fairy-dust stuff was the substance or 'stuff' that was
common to the three persons, and permeated the being that is the
Godhead.
> > > Finally Identity is a NECESSARY LAW and not one of
> > > possibility.
> >
> > Bullfeathers.
>
> Sheep's testicles!!
Well, now you're just being vulgar. ;p
> > It is possible that Ghali and Denis are identical. There may
> > even be worlds within logical space where this is true. It
> > is not actually true in our world, but I see no reason to
> > deny its possiblity. It is also possible that an object I
> > designated the trilegi is identical to the collection of its
> > parts (i.e. they are identical under certain circumstances,
> > e.g. when they are united and stacked in a certain way).
>
> So there is a possible world (Possible in the sense used by
> Alvin Plantinga in Nature and Necessity) were the following
> laws do not apply
>
> (i) Identity is symmetrical. If a=b then b=a
> (ii) Identity is reflexive. Everything is identical with itself
> (iii) Identity is transitive. If a=b and b=c then a=c
> (iv) Leibniz's law. If a is the same as b then everything that
> can be said of a can be said of b
> (v) And finally the inverse which is controversial. If a and
> b have all the properties in common then a is the same as b
What kind of a straw man is this? I never stated that I think there is
some world where these rules aren't true. I stated that it is possible
that Ghali is identical to Denis. Now, if this possibility were
actually the case, then the rules above would apply to that instance.
However, if it is not actually the case, they do not apply. In other
words, note that (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) employ CONDITIONAL
propositions. If Ghali and Denis are not identical, then the
antecedents of those conditionals are not satisfied.
So I was not calling for any of these laws to be violated. I was simply
noting that stating that an object *CAN* be identical to a collection
of its parts does not imply that the relevant object is merely a
collection of its parts.
> Well you used the identity sign in proposition 12.
And as I noted previously, at best you could accuse me of being vague
(i.e. vagueness) in that I did not state the circumstances under which
it would be true, or charge that I need to be explicit with my modal
operators.
> Maybe you have a new logic that places the law of
> identity under the hammer of squares and diamonds!
What don't you get about modal logic? Try this:
(1) (P=Q) --> (Q=P)
(2) ((P=Q) & (Q=R)) --> (P=R)
(3) <>(P=Q)
(4) <>(Q=R)
(5) <>(Q=P)
(6) <>(P=R)
The fifth proposition follows naturally from the first and third, while
the sixth proposition follows naturally from the second, third and
fourth.
Now, with regard to the charge of vagueness (back on July 7th I
admitted that my 12th propositions can rightfully be subjected to this
charge), let me clarify. Suppose there is a set (i.e. a collection of
parts) which bears some specific organization 'O'. We can designate it
as follows:
O[a,b,c]
In contrast, the following...
{a,b,c}
...will simply represent the collection of parts (without a specific
organization necessarily implied).
So, consider the following:
(1) O[a,b,c] --> (X = {a,b,c})
(2) <>(O[a,b,c])
(3) <>(X = {a,b,c})
The first proposition notes that if the collection of parts (a,b,c)
bears some specific organization, then that collection/set is identical
to X. The second proposition notes that the antecedent of the first is
possible, thus the conclusion (3) naturally follows: the consequent of
(1) is also possible. In no was does the positive assertion of (3)
imply that the consequent of (1) by itself (i.e. without the qualifying
antecedent) is actually true. So, in the 12 propositions I presented
for 1Man4All, the 12th was problematic in that I was vague - I did not
say under what conditions it was true, when in fact there was only a
very specific condition under which I would it admit it was true (i.e.
when the persons are united and/or organized in some such specific
way). Hence the crime of vagueness.
> > No, not yet back to substance, as I'm still in the dark
> > with regard to what you mean by substance.
>
> I gave you the references before. Like I said I am not
> committed at the moment, so I can only give the different
> schools.
What kind of a joke is this? You want to argue that we must get into
the issue of substance, yet you won't say what you mean by substance,
because you're not committed to a specific notion of substance. Well
then, if you're not committed to a specific meaning for or notion of
substance, how do you know that we necessarily need to discuss
substance?
But I say 'fudge it! - let's discuss substance!'. Unfortunately, I have
yet to consult Craig's 'Philosophical Foundations for a Christian
Worldview', thus I can't yet be 100% certain what he means by
substance. Nonetheless, for the time being I will assume
Howard-Snyder's representation of Craig's position (via the relevatant
quotes and citations) is accurate. Craig feels that the Godhead as a
whole is an individual substance but the Persons are not individual
substances (cf. Howard-Snyder, p. 393-395 - and here 'individual
substance' seems to be used in the 'primary' sense of substance used by
Aristotle in Categories, 2A11f). I must admit I find this odd. The
first question I would have is if a non-living object can be an
individual substance (i.e. can a cat's paw be an individual substance,
e.g. the unique thing which is the front left paw of the specific cat
named Fat Freddy which lives in an apartment on sixth street in
Manhattan). If the answer is yes, then we have a very easy analogy of
one individual substance being a proper part within another individual
substance. However, even if non-living things cannot be individual
substances [and yes I am aware of the quote from 'Philosophical
Foundations' which makes specific reference to 'living organisms' - cf.
Howard-Snyder, p. 393], I don't see what the problem would be with
stating that the Persons are individual substances yet united within a
single universal substance (i.e. the Godhead). Of course, the problem
here is that Craig denies that the Persons are not individual
substances, and I agree this seems problematic. But I don't see why one
couldn't ultimately shed such a position (and no, I'm not worried about
whether this contradicts the Athanasian Creed).
Regardless, to answer your questions about substance, if an individual
substance is a single unique thing, then I don't see the problem in
stating that the Persons are united within a very specific universal
substance. That's one notion of substance.
If we use another notion of substance (the colloquial sense I employed
in my water analogy), where it refers to the 'stuff' of which something
is made, I still don't see the problem with stating that the Persons
are united within a specific substance.
Yet a third notion of substance is given in the official Catechism of
the Catholic Church, where it is defined as having the same meaning as
essence [by the way, don't think this reference to the Catechism means
I believe the doctrine of the Trinity found therein is compatible with
the doctrine I have put forth here - on the contrary, if I understood
the English translation of the Catechism correctly, it asserts that
each Person is identical to the Godhead, yet not identical to one
another, which both contradicts the doctrine I have adopted from Craig
and contradicts logic]. Anyway, if we define substance as 'essence' I
think the Catechism meant 'essence' in the sense Thomas V. Morris used
it: 'a set of properties or underlying traits individually necessary
and jointly sufficient for membership in the kind' [cf. Morris, The
Logic of God Incarnate, (Cornell, 1986), p. 22]. This is a rather
different notion of substance, and here I would state that the Godhead
possesses one substance different from the substances possessed by each
individual Person.
For a forth notion of substance, keeping Aristotle's notion of
secondary substance in mind, I would state that the Godhead bears one
secondary substance (represented by the predicate G, which signifies a
deity), while each person bears a different secondary substance
(represented by the predicate G-prime, which represents being a proper
part of the Godhead, and being made of the same primordial divine
'stuff').
I would also note that the doctrine I have put forth (alternatively
expressed in seven and then twelve propositions) did not need to make
any specific recourse to any of these specific notions of substance, so
I don't see why substance was such an important issue (in fact it seems
like a red herring in a discussion about whether the seven or twelve
point doctrines were logically coherent or biblically consistent). Most
of these ideas could have been expressed with notions of identity or
predication.
Finally, I don't see what the problem is here. You yourself said that
it is enough to define God by his properties. Where is the problem,
then, in stating that God has the property of being tri-personal (i.e.
comprised of three persons), and being done with it? What have I
missed? What is it that you're looking for? Where's the problem? If I'm
not mistaken, you said you're not arguing against the claim that the
doctrine is logically coherent, but you want a clearer definition of
what God is according to this doctrine. Well, where is the problem in
stating that God is a tripersonal being?
Denis Giron
It doesn't! The only point of the water analogy was help you understand
how it is possible for three things to be united within one object. In
the 12 propositions representing the doctrine, the different senses of
divinity were given. The being as a whole, and not any of the persons,
bears the predicate G, which means it is a tripersonal being, a deity,
and identical to the Godhead. The persons bore a different predicate,
G' (i.e. G-prime), which means they are proper parts of the Godhead, in
possession of some its attributes, and made up of the same substance or
magig pixy dust stuff which the Deity is made up of.
In the following I will re-instantiate text which you snipped for the
sake of context:
> > > > Hold on here, please explain why a specific whole mass of
> > > > water is not a specific object. For example, if a drop of
> > > > water is falling through the air, and I refer to it as
> > > > "that drop," am I not referring to an object?
>
> > > Water on the whole is no specific object because it only
> > > exists ( their more detail here) in one of three forms here.
>
> > I find it ironic that you would say this after asking me what
> > *I'm* smoking. You missed the point about a drop perhaps? A drop
> > of water can be considered an object, therefore a certain mass of
> > water can be a specific object.
>
> I can't see the irony here. Maybe it is my sense of humour? But
> this logic is very poor! A certain mass can be ice water or steam,
> but aren't we talking about the Godhead as a whole with three
> persons, or on this analogy water as a WHOLE with the three
> "persons" ice, steam and water?
What was at issue here was my analogy claiming that the mass of water
as a whole represents the Godhead, while the portions of that mass
represent the Persons which are united within it. You made the dubious
claim that water is no specific object. That seemed like an objection
to my request that the mass of water in the analogy be considered a
single object. It seemed like you were objecting on the grounds that a
mass of water cannot be a single object. So I noted that (if this was
your objection) you were wrong: on the contrary, a mass of water can be
considered a specific object.
Forget steam and ice for a moment. The issue was of a single mass, and
parts of that mass being united within that mass, and being of the same
substance or stuff as that mass, though not being identical to the
mass. The analogy was meant to answer your queries about what the
Persons are united in (i.e. they are united within a single object or
being, the Godhead).
> A drop surely is not the three "persons" at one time.
Right, but we can conceptually divinethe drop into three parts, and
note that the parts are united within the drop, made up of the same
'stuff' as the drop, and not identical to the drop! That was the point
of the analogy.
> We are not concerned about how much water there is but
> about how this analogy clarifies the two senses of
> divinity.
It wasn't meant to do so! I brought the analogy in when you were asking
what the persons are united in. It explains the notion of things united
within a single thing. Instead of water, we could imagine a mass of
divine pixie dust, and the three parts each have their own center of
consciousness. The mass as a whole is God.
> So my objection still stands, this certain mass water is NO
> SPECIFIC OBJECT.
How does this ridiculous objection still stand? A mass of water can
absolutely be a specific object (i.e. a drop falling through the air is
a finite mass of water, and is a specific object, which we refer to as
'that drop' or 'the drop', et cetera).
> Or if you want to be clearer no specific MODE.
I don't know what you mean. Care to elaborate?
> Ok then Jesus is Divine would mean that Jesus is made
> up of "H20"
>
> God is Divine would mean that God is made up of "H20"
Along these lines, a part of the drop bears the predicate H2O just as
the drop as a whole bears the predicate H2O, but that does not mean
that bearing the predicate H2O makes one identical to the drop! The
analogy comes in because the argument is that there is only one drop,
just as there is only one God. The Godhead or Deity has the very
specific property of bearing predicate G, which is being comprised of
the three parts, each of which possess a center of consciousness. so
the differing senses of divinity might come in with the predicates G
and G-prime. The Persons do not bear the predicate G by themselves, and
it is bearing this predicate which makes one identical to the Godhead,
i.e. a deity.
> > So what? If this doctrine holds that each avatar is a
> > deity by themself, then it espouses polytheism. However,
> > if it argues that there is only one deity, that is
> > monotheism.
>
> So you without realising it have shown that this model can
> explain both and therefore none!
The analogy explained monotheism vis a vis polytheism in that it was
noted that the parts are not gods by themselves, while the mass as a
whole is the only thing that bears the prediate of being as god or
deity. Hence there is only one god, thus Monotheism.
> On the traditional chrisitian view all three persons have
> INDEPENDENT WILLS, yet are one being, but it would be strange
> to say that the thickness of my eyebrow has a will or an
> attribute of a being has an independent will.
Why discuss the thickness of your eyebrow? Let us discuss the eyebrow
itself (i.e. the persons are proper parts, and thus actual things, not
mere attributes or predicates). It would be odd to say your eyebrow has
an independent will only because we don't think of having such.
Nonetheless, if it were such a case that your eyebrow was conscious,
and had an independent will, it would still be a proper part of a
single being (i.e. Ghali!).
ghali
> Which was precisely my point! Therefore, the trilegi *CAN* be identical
> to the collection of its parts under certain circumstances (e.g. when
> those parts are organized in a certain way).
Sorry about the delayed reply. Anyway, I am really confused here.
Identity needs a COMPLETE description of an entity if we are to be
sure. So the "proper parts" would also INCLUDE SPATIAL ORIENTATION.
What this shows then is that some sets can have common properties.
These lego blocks can also be built up to make a "tower". Now both the
set Tower and Trilegi have common lego blocks but they are NOT
IDENTICAL sets.
On this analogy then God who is the set of three persons is an
INCOMPLETE SET OF PROPER PARTS. Obviously this will shoot you in the
foot.
There is only one set of trilegi with ALL its proper parts. There is no
"can" involved here.
I don't know why you brought this up. It adds nothing to the
discussion.
> By this you mean a being would be a thing which has proper parts,
> right? Well then, if this is correct, then the deity of the Trinity has
> proper parts, and is thus a being.
Then that is substance. So we have rules. Being or substance is the
bearer of properties, but obviously is not a property itself and so on.
Look there are only two ways. Either this bearer IS ONLY its proper
parts, or this bearer is another thing that holds onto proper parts
i.e. substance.
The set issue did not work! as noted from your analogy
> > A being is an object (usually a living thing, but I suppose it
> > could be a non-living object as well).
>
> Is that clear?
Ha Ha, so now being is an object. What is an object then? I can
guarrantee you that either you fall back into bundle theory to describe
an object or again into substance theory. We then will have a circular
argument.
> No, that magical fairy-dust stuff was the substance or 'stuff' that was
> common to the three persons, and permeated the being that is the
> Godhead.
Ok then God is the collection of the three persons joined by some
"glue" which is not God. God knows what this glue is? So now your set
would be
God is the collection of the three persons united by glue
Lets forget the really anthropromorphic issues here ( God being
spatially extended etc. ). On this account then, remembering Russell's
paradox, A set being a member of itself etc, God would not be a proper
part. God then would not exist or have substance or anything. This is
not the Chrisitian view. Remember it is the christian view we are
discussing here.
We have the obvious issue of asking what this glue is?
You would say that it is the stuff that unites them!
I know that. But again I can be united as a team, or as one being!
So really then the glue is another way of saying it is the attribute
that united the proper parts into ONE ENTITY. Substance again.
It is important that I know what the glue is here? William lane Craig
thought it was important. That is why he introduced the notion of
substance. If you are not going to introduce substance then you need to
say more.
> Well, now you're just being vulgar. ;p
Ok then your really full of magical fairy like sugar!
> What kind of a straw man is this? I never stated that I think there is
> some world where these rules aren't true. I stated that it is possible
> that Ghali is identical to Denis.
It is very important here Denis. One of the central problems with the
trinity was its apparent violation of the FORMAL laws of identity. It
is a platitude that I could have another name on another universe.
Relative identity violates the FORMAL laws though. So did your
proposition 12? You said that God is IDENTICAL to the three persons. It
then follows that HE CANNOT be otherwise. You put this as a possibily
and yet somehow, maybe your full of that magical fairy like sugar
again, it did not violate the FORMAL laws. This is no strawman.
> I was simply
> noting that stating that an object *CAN* be identical to a collection
> of its parts does not imply that the relevant object is merely a
> collection of its parts.
I am saying that this is a contradiction!
> > Maybe you have a new logic that places the law of
> > identity under the hammer of squares and diamonds!
>
> What don't you get about modal logic? Try this:
>
> (1) (P=Q) --> (Q=P)
> (2) ((P=Q) & (Q=R)) --> (P=R)
> (3) <>(P=Q)
> (4) <>(Q=R)
> (5) <>(Q=P)
> (6) <>(P=R)
And! What does this show? It is not sugar your on! Class A drugs more
like it!
> Now, with regard to the charge of vagueness (back on July 7th I
> admitted that my 12th propositions can rightfully be subjected to this
> charge), let me clarify. Suppose there is a set (i.e. a collection of
> parts) which bears some specific organization 'O'. We can designate it
> as follows:
>
> O[a,b,c]
>
> In contrast, the following...
>
> {a,b,c}
>
> ...will simply represent the collection of parts (without a specific
> organization necessarily implied).
Really what is the difference between the o(a,b,c) and (a,b,c). If O is
(a,b,c) then this an empty statement. How about this then p(o(a,b,c)
q(p(o(a,b,c) You can see how this stupid!
> So, consider the following:
>
> (1) O[a,b,c] --> (X = {a,b,c})
> (2) <>(O[a,b,c])
> (3) <>(X = {a,b,c})
This only shows that O could be say (a,b,c,d). So what!
How does this show that
A-IF God is ONLY the collection OF ALL HIS PROPER parts then he is
identical to his proper parts,
Is a contingent statement? It doesn't
>
> What kind of a joke is this?
Whatever! You can laugh we all do. Adds nothing to the argument if you
think something is a joke!
>You want to argue that we must get into
> the issue of substance, yet you won't say what you mean by substance,
> because you're not committed to a specific notion of substance.
And.. what is the big deal. I am not defending a concept of trinity,
you are! I can question and need not be committed in this circmstance.
I am just trying to help you find a possible way out with ANY of the
schools noted.
I will answer the rest of this post and the other one on another
occasion
Still nice talking Denis
Ghali
Denis Giron
<1123419451.0...@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>
>
> > Which was precisely my point! Therefore, the trilegi *CAN*
> > be identical to the collection of its parts under certain
> > circumstances (e.g. when those parts are organized in a
> > certain way).
>
> Sorry about the delayed reply. Anyway, I am really confused
> here. Identity needs a COMPLETE description of an entity if
> we are to be sure. So the "proper parts" would also INCLUDE
> SPATIAL ORIENTATION. What this shows then is that some sets
> can have common properties. These lego blocks can also be
> built up to make a "tower". Now both the set Tower and Trilegi
> have common lego blocks but they are NOT IDENTICAL sets.
I agree 100%. Nonetheless, the point stands that the trilegi can be
identical to the set/collection of legos *IF* those legos are organized
in some such specific way. If they are organized in a different way,
then it is not identical to the trilegi. This demonstrates precisely
what I have been saying: saying that a set/collection can be identical
to an object under some such conditions is not the same as saying the
set/collection is necessarily or always identical to that object (or
thing).
> On this analogy then God who is the set of three persons is
> an INCOMPLETE SET OF PROPER PARTS.
Based on what? The analogy shows that it is *POSSIBLE* for a set or
collection to be identical to a thing, thus it is *POSSIBLE* for the
Persons combined to be identical to the Godhead.
> There is only one set of trilegi with ALL its proper parts.
> There is no "can" involved here.
You need to see your own tower analogy above. If the legos are
organized in one way, they will be identical to the trilegi, but if
they are organized in a different way, they will not be identical to
the trilegi. Thus stating that the set/collection of legos is identical
to the trilegi is a contingent statement, in that the identity is
present based on a very specific organization. It *CAN* be identical to
the trilegi under certain conditions, but it is also possible, under
different conditions, that it will not be identical to the trilegi.
> I don't know why you brought this up. It adds nothing to the
> discussion.
I brought it up to refute your claim that I am contradicting myself
when I state that a thing can be identical to the collection of its
parts in toto, but asserting this does not mean any mere collection of
those parts will be identical to that thing. The analogy shows that I
have not violated any principle of identity.
> > By this you mean a being would be a thing which has proper
> > parts, right? Well then, if this is correct, then the deity
> > of the Trinity has proper parts, and is thus a being.
>
> Then that is substance.
And I got into substance in my previous post. I look forward to your
comments on that.
> > Look there are only two ways. Either this bearer IS ONLY its
> > proper parts, or this bearer is another thing that holds onto
> > proper parts i.e. substance.
>
> The set issue did not work! as noted from your analogy
The set issue works just fine, asper the trilegi analogy. It is
possible for a thing to be identical to the collection of its parts,
therefore there is nothing incoherent about stating that the Godhead is
identical to the collection of the Persons in toto.
> > > A being is an object (usually a living thing, but I suppose
> > > it could be a non-living object as well).
>
> > Is that clear?
>
> Ha Ha, so now being is an object.
Or a thing. I don't see the problem. Is the God of Islam not an object
or thing? Is it no thing?
> > No, that magical fairy-dust stuff was the substance or 'stuff'
> > that was common to the three persons, and permeated the being
> > that is the Godhead.
>
> Ok then God is the collection of the three persons joined by some
> "glue" which is not God.
They don't have to be joined by glue. For example, it is possible for a
group/collection of things to be organized and connected without any
extra stuff (e.g. the trilegi and the legos which serve as proper parts
are all made up of the same stuff, in this case plastic).
> God is the collection of the three persons united by glue
No, God is identical to the three persons combined. There is no need to
import any notion of glue.
> Lets forget the really anthropromorphic issues here ( God being
> spatially extended etc. ).
No, actually, let's not forget that. Do you believe God has no spatial
extension? Does He exist no where? If there is no spacial extension,
then it would seem we move outside the realm of reasoning, and there
would be no grounds on which to question the possibility of a three
persons united within a single Godhead. If not, explain how a being
such as the Islamic deity, which has no spatial extension (as I assume
you believe) is possible, while this version of the Trinitarian deity,
which is a single being comprised of three centers of self-awareness,
and is also devoid of spatial extension, is not possible? Or is it
simply a mystery how a being exists without spacial extension? I'd like
for youto explain this...
> On this account then, remembering Russell's paradox, A set being
> a member of itself etc, God would not be a proper part.
Keep the trilegi analogy in mind. Is the trilegi an example of a set
being a member of itself? If not, what are you stating here? Where did
you get this notion from?
> We have the obvious issue of asking what this glue is?
I never said anything about glue. That was your straw man. You asked if
the magical stuffwas glue, and I said no, yet here we are...
> You would say that it is the stuff that unites them!
No more than is glue employed to unite the parts of the trilegi.
> I know that. But again I can be united as a team, or as one being!
This was answered already: they are united within a single being: the
Godhead.
> If you are not going to introduce substance then you need to
> say more.
This is like a bad joke. Go see my post from July 20th, Message-ID:
<1121873785.9...@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com> as in the last
seven paragraphs I attempted to introduce substance, and this is the
very same post you were responding to! This is a gross straw man, where
I attempt to discuss substance, you snip those parts, and then accuse
me of avoiding the issue of substance?
> > What kind of a straw man is this? I never stated that I think
> > there is some world where these rules aren't true. I stated
> > that it is possible that Ghali is identical to Denis.
>
> It is very important here Denis. One of the central problems with
> the trinity was its apparent violation of the FORMAL laws of
> identity.
Versions of the Trinity that violate rules of identity are the ones
that state the Father is identical to God, the Son is identical to God,
but the Father is not identical to the Son. The version I have been
pushing states something quite different: the Father is NOT identical
to God, the Son is NOT identical to God, and the Father is not
identical to the Son.
> It is a platitude that I could have another name on another
> universe.
Again, the statement that Ghali is identical to Denis is contingent in
that it might be true (though in reality it is false).
> Relative identity violates the FORMAL laws though.
I never said anything about relative identity.
> So did your proposition 12? You said that God is IDENTICAL
> to the three persons. It then follows that HE CANNOT be
> otherwise.
I stand by that claim. My only point was that stating that X is
identical to the collection of its parts is not the same as stating
that it is identical to any collection of its parts. This is where the
trilegi comes in. The trilegi is identical to the collection of its
parts under some very specific conditions. So yes, the Godhead is
identical to the collection of the Persons.
> > I was simply noting that stating that an object *CAN* be
> > identical to a collection of its parts does not imply that
> > the relevant object is merely a collection of its parts.
>
> I am saying that this is a contradiction!
Then with all due respect, Ghali, you don't know what a contradiction
is. Here are two propositions:
(1) An object can be identical to the collection of its parts.
(2) It is not the case that the object is merely a collection of its
parts.
You claim (1) contradicts (2), but two propositions contradict if, and
only if, it is impossible for both to be true. Let's bring in the
trilegi. The trilegi can be identical to the collection of it parts
(i.e. when they are organized/stacked in a very specific way you have a
trilegi). So (1) is true. Also note that if you merely collected those
parts in a pile, you would not have a trilegi, thus a mere collection
of those parts does not necessarily produce a trilegi. Thus (2) is
true. Being that it is possible for (1) and (2) to be true, these
propositions do not contradict each other.
> > > Maybe you have a new logic that places the law of
> > > identity under the hammer of squares and diamonds!
>
> > What don't you get about modal logic? Try this:
>
> > (1) (P=Q) --> (Q=P)
> > (2) ((P=Q) & (Q=R)) --> (P=R)
> > (3) <>(P=Q)
> > (4) <>(Q=R)
> > (5) <>(Q=P)
> > (6) <>(P=R)
>
> And! What does this show? It is not sugar your on! Class A drugs
> more like it!
Really, this is surprisingly pathetic Ghali. The point of the above is
to show that talking about things possibly being identical does not
violate the laws of identity. There it is above, right in front of you,
and rather than offering a rebuttal, or admitting that I'm right, you
resort to irrelevant abuse (I don't mind relevant abuse, but irrelevant
abuse in place of any response of substance reaches a childish level
that is beneath the quality of posts you usually produce).
> > Now, with regard to the charge of vagueness (back on July 7th
> > I admitted that my 12th propositions can rightfully be
> > subjected to this charge), let me clarify. Suppose there is
> > a set (i.e. a collection of parts) which bears some specific
> > organization 'O'. We can designate it as follows:
> >
> > O[a,b,c]
> >
> > In contrast, the following...
> >
> > {a,b,c}
> >
> > ...will simply represent the collection of parts (without
> > a specific organization necessarily implied).
>
> Really what is the difference between the o(a,b,c) and (a,b,c).
> If O is (a,b,c) then this an empty statement.
There is nothing empty about it. O[a,b,c], designates some very
specific organization of the parts. It is not merely any collection of
the parts (e.g. like legos simply grouped together on a table); rather
it represents a very specific organization (e.g. the specific
organization of legos present in the trilegi).
> How about this then p(o(a,b,c)
>
> q(p(o(a,b,c) You can see how this stupid!
Are you going to explain what q & p signifies in the above? Or are you
just adding letters for the fun of it?
Again, O[a,b,c] is to be contrasted with {a,b,c}, as the latter is
simply any set/collection ogf the parts, while the former represents
those parts organized in a very specific way.
> > So, consider the following:
> >
> > (1) O[a,b,c] --> (X = {a,b,c})
> > (2) <>(O[a,b,c])
> > (3) <>(X = {a,b,c})
>
> This only shows that O could be say (a,b,c,d). So what!
So what? So it demonstrates a small point I have been trying to blugeon
you with for quite some time now: stating that a thing is identical to
the collection of its parts does not mean that thing is merely a
collection of its parts, as we *could* require that it only be
identical under a very specific organization (e.g. the lego analogy, or
the cat analogy, where a cat can be identical to its parts in toto, but
you do not have a living cat simpyl by throwing cat parts into a
bucket).
> How does this show that
>
> A-IF God is ONLY the collection OF ALL HIS PROPER parts then
> he is identical to his proper parts,
>
> Is a contingent statement? It doesn't
You're putting the cart before the horse. Did I ever use that precise
statement? What I said was that stating that God is identical to the
collection of His parts does not imply that he is merely a collection
of his parts. In the syllogism immediately above, we see that it is
possible for a thing to be identical to its parts, but under a very
specific condition. So to use the trilegi example, indeed if a trilegi
is in existence, then that trilegi is identical to the collection of
its parts organized in a very specific way. However, if you simply
threw those parts together in any organization, you might not get a
trilegi. So the point is that stating that X is identical to its parts
does not mean X is merely a collection of those parts. Simple.
But to make this clear, my argument has been: stating that X is
identical to the collection of its parts (and not anything extra) does
not mean X is merely a collection of those parts. Therefore, stating
that God is identical to the collection of Persons is not the same as
stating that God is merely a collection of those Persons.
> > You want to argue that we must get into the issue of
> > substance, yet you won't say what you mean by substance,
> > because you're not committed to a specific notion of
> > substance.
>
> And.. what is the big deal. I am not defending a concept of
> trinity, you are!
Right, but I never said anything about substance, rather you
continually tried to introduce this, constantly asserting that the
model I provided violated some rule about substance. I even attempted
to discuss substance, and you snipped what I wrote, and then accused me
of not wanting to discuss substance. It seems like game. You're the one
telling me that I am violating some rule about substance, but if that
is your claim, shouldn'tyou take a position and explain how this is so?
Where's the problem? Being that you're the one that wants to discuss
substance specifically, it seems incumbent on you to offer something
concrete.
Finally, when you do look at and respond to the different notions of
substance I introduced, at your request, please keep the Cerberus
analogy in focus (as I plan to make recourse to it, so explain if it is
one substance, three, four, et cetera, and where the problems are
conceptually).
abu_abdul...@yahoo.com
defense of trinity? i will paste the debate here for all to see.
Quote:
ME: They are all equal on absolute levels so that all of those proper
nouns are completely and effortlessly interchangeable.
YOU: All of the nouns are not equal. The Creator is not The Redeemer,
etc. READ WHAT I HAVE WRITTEN ABOVE.
For fuck's sake. What you wrote above was incorrect; wrong; fallacious;
bad; poorly conceived; fatally flawed; etc., etc., etc. That's the
point!
If you state that God is the Redeemer, then you are defining God, not
just defining one of God's roles. To do that, you would have to declare
that God is a Redeemer. The best around, perhaps, but still, just a
Redeemer.
God is alleged to be the ultimate being, so when you make declarative
statements, you are axiomatically making declarative statements about
God's ultimate status, unless you properly qualify them.
Therefore, claiming that "God is the Redeemer" is to ipso facto claim
and confer an absolute, ultimate status as the Redeemer. In other
words, you are axiomatically declaring that God can not be less than or
anything other than the Redeemer. That's what it means when you state
"God is Redeemer" (or "God is the Redeemer"). You are defining the
ultimate state of Godhood (as rw alluded to) as "Redeemer."
If you wish to qualify your declarative properly, then do so by
claiming that God is a Redeemer, which is, axiomatically, less than an
absolute or ultimate status. Roles are less than the person, not the
ultimate defining characteristic of the person.
A person can be the best redeemer around and can therefore wear the
badge of "the Redeemer," for example, but the person is not equivalent
to or defined entirely by the role that he or she performs; the role is
necessarily less than the person performing the role.
You don't say that an actor playing Hamlet on stage actually is Hamlet,
unless you're either clinically insane, or you are speaking in
absolutes, but thinking in abstractions; fuzzy abstractions at that,
which do not have the same impact of the words you so poorly chose to
express what you were thinking.
Quote:
MORE: You cannot work backward logically from one person and apply its
role another of the persons.
What the hell are you talking about? You have defined God in three
ultimate ways, which is a logical impossibility and therefore amounts
to nothing more than a tautology.
God is the Redeemer. God is the Creator. God is the Sustainer.
Therefore, the Redeemer is the Creator is the Sustainer.
Here, let me be painfully pedantic so you actually see how you're
wrong: The Redeemer is The Creator is The Sustainer. These are not
roles; these are definitions of ultimate states.
For them to be merely roles, you would have to state that God is a
redeemer and a creator and a sustainer as various roles among many that
God has and therefore, when he is redeeming, he is not creating and
when he is sustaining, he is not redeeming, etc., etc., which is
precisely what you are doing. You are saying nothing more than God has
a whole bunch of different roles he performs, but that does not mean
God is three different beings as God is one being!
I am a writer and a friend and a son and a lover, but I'm not four
separate beings as I am one. Not only would that be an unnecessary
qualification, it completely destroys the meaning of any of those
terms. If God is ultimate and everything, then everything is ultimate
and those terms have no meaning.
Quote:
MORE: That is because there are no words in the English language for
the "be's", or "is's" we mean in the case of God.
Bullshit. Either these are absolutes or they are not; either they are
ultimate conditions, or merely conditional attributes. If you'd stop
flip-flopping and equivocating every time this is pointed out to you,
you'd concede the argument for the tripe that it is, but since that
would mean the foundations of your beliefs would collapse, you refuse
to.
Plain and simple.
Quote:
MORE: In fact the three persons exist in completely different ways.
So you keep claiming without admitting that it is logically impossible,
probably because you are typing in absolutes, but thinking in
abstractions. It's nice work if you can get it, but hardly logically
consistent.
Quote:
MORE: Therefore, if you want to get technical, it should really be
articulated something like this:
1. God is[1] The Creator.
2. God is[2] The Redeemer.
3. God is[3] The Sustainer.
In other words, one being with three different jobs and not three
persons existing in completely different ways!
Fuckin' hell!
You rendering all of these words utterly meaningless with this
gibberish. Happy now?
Quote:
MORE: Now, The Creator is[1], and The Sustainer is[2].
Wrong no matter how you torture the language and equivocate disparate
meanings. God does both of those jobs, but it is logically impossible
for God to instantiate both of those ultimate states.
Do you know what the word "ultimate" means? It means there can be no
other state above and no state below and nothing else to either side;
it is ultimate, supreme, the whole goddamned shooting match. If one is
the ultimate anything, then that's it; that's all she wrote and there
can be nothing else that exceeds it.
So if you are claiming that God is The Redeemer and you are making "The
Redeemer" an ultimate state, then God cannot be anything other than
"The Redeemer." At no point can God be anything less than or greater
than or other than "The Redeemer" for all eternity. Got that? It is
therefore the sole (pardon the pun) defining quality, because it is
ultimate.
Same is therefore true for The Creator and The Sustainer. By claiming
these to be ultimate states, you are claiming that God cannot be
anything other than or less than or greater than...etc., but that's
logically impossible if each of these states are uniquely ultimate
conditions, and not merely conditionally unique (i.e., God could be the
ultimate Redeemer, as in, God's the best redeemer there ever was or
could be, but God cannot be The Redeemer and have that be God's
ultimate defining state of existence and also be The Sustainer as God's
ultimate defining state of existence, which is why you are trying to
slip past us all.
That's why words have definitions; so that their meanings can be
properly communicated and not twisted around so painfully in order to
avoid dealing with the obvious.
So which is it? Are you claiming that God has various jobs and as the
boss in charge of those jobs, there is no one higher than he (in which
case, no trinity) or are you still clinging to this fallacy that an
ultimate being is actually three distinct and unique ultimate beings
co-existing somehow within one unique and distinct ultimate being,
because that is logically impossible and therefore must be
icontrivertably false in all possible worlds and under all possible
conditions.
There can be only ONE ultimate being, or no ultimate beings. Read the
definition of "Ultimate" before you answer anything further, because
this Semantics 101 course is so pointlessly time consuming that the
mind boggles. Words have meanings for reasons. You should look into
them.
It is logically impossible for there to be three distinct, unique
ultimate beings co-existing somehow within one distinct, unique
ultimate being; there can only be one being that is ultimate, or else
the word has no meaning.
Quote:
MORE: These are three different ways of existing, just as the I am my
mind, and I am my body, but my body is not my mind.
"I am my mind" expresses one way of "existing," to use your terminology
and "I am my body" expresses one way of "existing," but the phrase "my
body is not my mind" isn't an expression of a way of existing, it is a
definition of terms; of what you meant when you used the word "body"
and the word "mind" in your first two ways of expressing your
existence.
You didn't present three ways of existing, you presented two different
ways of expressing one's existence (singular) and then defined the
terms you used in relationship to the two different ways of expressing
your singular existence (the "I" part).
Whether your express your existence in terms of your body or in terms
of your mind, you are still only expressing a singular existence
described in different ways. You are not, however, expressing two
distinct and unique beings somehow co-existing in one being.
It is meaningless to say, "I am my mind" and mean that you are nothing
but Mind as you also say, "I am my body" and mean that you are nothing
but Body.
Quote:
ME: So, you've got a choice. You can either properly format 1-3
accordingly:
1. God is the Creator.
2. God is the Redeemer.
3. God is the Sustainer.
Or reformat 4-6 to be consistent:
4. Creator is not Redeemer.
5. Redeemer is not Sustainer.
6. Sustainer is not Creator.
Either way, your choice, but you can't format it the way you have it
now because it's not logically consistent (deliberatly so, I would
hasten to add).
YOU: I still have no idea what your point in that part was.
Quelle surprise!
You had orginally formatted (or at least the one I was responding to)
thus:
Quote:
1. God is Creator
2. God is Redeemer
3. God is Sustainer
4. The Creator is not the Redeemer
5. The Redeemer is not the Sustainer
6. The Creator is not the Sustainer
7. There is only one God.
So, to be logically consistent, you need to either format it thus:
Quote:
1. God is the Creator
2. God is the Redeemer
3. God is the Sustainer
4. The Creator is not the Redeemer
5. The Redeemer is not the Sustainer
6. The Creator is not the Sustainer
7. There is only one God.
In which case 4, 5, and 6 are all false, due to the definitions of 1,
2, and 3. If God is the Redeemer, then wherever the words "the
Redeemer" are found, you can substitute the word "God," and therefore,
5 becomes "God is not the Sustainer."
See?
Actually, from 1, 2, and 3 you would get the following:
Quote:
4. God is not God.
5. God is not God.
6. God is not God.
But back to explaining to you what I was pointing out about being
logically consistent with your formatting:
Quote:
1. God is Creator
2. God is Redeemer
3. God is Sustainer
4. Creator is not Redeemer
5. Redeemer is not Sustainer
6. Creator is not Sustainer
7. There is only one God.
See? Consistency in formatting is essential, otherwise you would be
engaging in deliberate fraud.
Quote:
ME: This means, by the way, that "4" would now clearly be a
contradiction no matter what.
YOU: No, you can't just slap "be" on God in the same way you can on
other things in this world. He exists in a way that completely
transcends our existence.
So you continue to claim. Petulantly. As if that will add some sort of
substance to support your assertion.
Fortunately for us, your petulance is irrelevant and the word
"ultimate" proves the obvious fallacy of your claim and demonstrates
the fatally flawed and poorly conceived theology to be nothing more
than a mythology fit only for the easily manipulated minds of children.
----------
MORE: in which case Koyaanisqatsi is utterly, absolutely wrong to draw
from the statement, "God is the Redeemer", the conclusion that "God can
not be ... anything other than the Redeemer".
False. You have claimed (erroneously) that the phrase "God is the
Redeemer" can be restated as "God is the ONLY Redeemer," which was
never the argument, other than to be guilty of the same equivocation
that kierk engaged in. MY argument (from the very beginning of this
stupidity) was in response to kierks fallacious syllogism:
1. God is Redeemer.
2. God is Sustainer...etc.
Specifically in that he began his first three premises (if that's what
they are) by declaring absolutes. Then in the fourth through sixth
premises (if that's what they are) he fallaciously qualifies these
absolutes by declaring "The Redeemer is not the Sustainer."
Thus, his syllogism was not being logically consistent with his own
terms. By stating that "God is Redeemer" you are, indeed, engaging in a
semantics obfuscation as was my charge against kierk, for that means
you are defining God as Redeemer (and Sustainer and Creator). Thus,
they are interchangeable. God is Redeemer. God is Creator. God is
Sustainer.
That means you can plug "God" in for any of those others, such that
"Redeemer is not Sustainer" becomes "God is not God.
Or, you can change one through three, so that the syllogism is again
logically consistent and you get "God is the Redeemer" and, later, "The
Redeemer is not the Sustainer," but you run into the exact same problem
of substitution and you get "God is not God."
What kierk (and you, presumably) was trying to do was slip one by us
(semantically) in the first place. I was correcting his logical
inconsistency first and foremost.
Then I went on from there, but I digress from my hunt for substantive
counter-argument to what I've posted...
Quote:
MORE: Accordingly, it is clear and obvious that God can be the Redeemer
and the Sustainer.
Ok, then let's once again use the law of substitution and plug those
into kierk's syllogism. God is the Redeemer and the Sustainer. The
Redeemer is not the Sustainer, however, according to kierk. Why?
Because this element of the syllogism relies on equivocation of terms,
but the law of substitution betrays the fallacy of so doing.
If premise four (or whatever it was) is: The Redeemer is not the
Sustainer, and you have just declared that God is the Redeemer and the
Sustainer, then premise four is contradicted. The Redeemer is the
Sustainer (is God); they are interchangeable terms of art and once
again the syllogism fails. Logical consistency; the hobgoblin of
critical minds.
But back to the hunt...
Quote:
MORE: So what is there about Jesus as "fully man" (to use
Koyaanisqatsi's preferred rendition) that is supposed to be problematic
for Trinitarians?
Logical consistency, of course. Again I will ask you, what does it mean
to say someone is "fully man" and "not fully man?" How is that in any
way logically consistent, let alone logically possible unless you do as
you accuse me of and play deliberately obfuscatorial (works for me)
games of semantics?
If Jesus were not "fully man," then he must have been "partially man,"
yes? Which would, in turn mean "partially God," at the very least and
that, in turn, would necessarily mean that God offered himself as a
sacrifice to himself in order to save us from himself, a patently
ludicrous and self-evidently unnecessary course of events, unless as I
mentioned before, this God character were clinically insane.
But, again, I digress from my ongoing hunt from you for a direct,
substantive counter-argument to what I've written. My guess is that I
won't ever get anything remotely like a direct, substantive
counter-argument from you to what I've actually written, but hope
springs eternal so back to the hunt....
Quote:
MORE: The problem probably lies
Ooohh. None too hopeful there...
Quote:
MORE: with the (likely very limited) manner
More irrelevant characterization, I fear...
Quote:
MORE: in which Koyaanisqatsi understands whatever might be the
notion(s) associated with the term "fully".
Yes, it's such a tricky word, "fully." Hmmm. What could I have possibly
meant when I asked you what it means to be "fully man?" It certainly
looks to me like it's a claim of absolute status, you know, from the
definition of the word "fully," but let's see whether or not you offer
any kind of substantive deconstruction, shall we?
Quote:
MORE: If Koyaanisqatsi intends for "fully man" to convey "*only* man",
I did not, so we can safely rule this pointless strawman out with all
the others and see if you actually may have a substantive
counter-argument in there somewhere....
Quote:
MORE: then this would clearly explain why it would be logically
impossible for an Incarnation of the Divine to occur in the man Jesus
(or any human, for that matter). However, Jesus as "*only* man" is not
the claim put forth in the notion of the Incarnation.
Ok, then, again I will ask you, what does it mean to say that Jesus is
"fully man?" We now know it doesn't mean "only man," so what does it
mean? Partially man? God and man? That's the claim, right?
Ok, let's deconstruct. Jesus was God and man (at least partially so;
oh, no wait, "fully" so, right?) Was Jesus also "fully God," then, too?
I suppose that must be the case, but I wouldn't want to tread on your
toes, so, again I will let you present a cogent, logically consistent
argument in which a being is both "fully God" as it is also "fully Man"
or whatever words you wish to use to that effect. Just please make sure
to address the problem this necessarily entails of a being therefore
sacrificing himself to himself in order to save us all from himself,
because that's the logical conclusion that follows from a being that is
"fully God" and "fully man." Fully God (redundant) trumps "fully man,"
yes?
So we are again, ultimately faced with a being who sacrificed himself
to himself in order to save us all from himself. Or shall we qualify it
even further and say that we have a being that sacrificed part of
himself to himself in order to save us all from himself (his "wrath" I
think is the proper, biblical term, just to pin it down even further).
What does it mean to claim that a being sacrificed part of himself to
himself in order to save us all from himself? Or are we back to "him"
(I should qualify, since we don't know if "he" has a penis or not)
sacrificing "fully" himself to himself in order to save us all from
himself?
Or none of that nonsense, because it appears as if you're trying to eat
your cake and have it, too. Or are you now going to once again claim
that another unrefuted argument from another thread already refutes all
of this, due to the fact that it remains (according to you) unrefuted?
There was almost some substance there, but still nothing that directly
addresses any of my arguments, so the hunt continues...
Quote:
MORE: The "Definition of the Union of the Divine and Human Natures in
the Person of Christ", Council of Chalcedon, 451 A.D., Act V (as
reprinted in The Book of Common Prayer of the Episcopal Church USA),
describes Jesus as "... at once complete in Godhead and complete in
manhood, truly God and truly man ...."
Good for them to so define it. It still doesn't address any of my
arguments, but why should there be anything substantive to any of this
now? The hunt continues...
Quote:
MORE: The word "fully" is not used here,
Ahhh! Well, then, I guess that's settled. So "truly God" and "truly
man" means what, then? Did God sacrifice himself to himself or not?
Sorry, did "truly God" sacrifice his "truly man"....part? Aspect?
Attribute? What?
Quote:
MORE: but it is easy to see how someone might think - as Koyaanisqatsi
apparently does - in terms of "fully" rather than in terms of
"complete" and "truly".
Yes, well, since I'm such a stickler for arguing "largely semantics"
it's a good thing we've got you here to clarify what those semantics
are. So "complete" God sacrificed "truly" God to himself? And this
would serve a redemptive purpose how?
Quote:
MORE: If, however, Koyaanisqatsi is using "fully" in the sense of
"only" above described, then he is using "fully" in a manner that does
not correspond to the Chalcedonian statement which employs the
conjunction "and" - thereby eliminating the possible sense of Jesus as
*only* man.
Great. Still no substantive counter-argument (or, for that matter,
coherent counter-argument) so the hunt continues...
Truly God sacrificed Truly God to himself. Or is it, Complete God
sacrificed Complete God to himself? Or is it Truly God sacrificed a
part of himself that was Truly Man to himself? I'll leave out the
eunuch jokes in order to hopefully get a direct, coherent
deconstruction from you.
Here, let's narrow it down. What part of God did God sacrifice to
himself and how is that in any way a redemptive act?
Quote:
MORE: In order for Koyaanisqatsi to demonstrate the logical
impossibility of the Incarnation,
Strawman...again. My argument was that claiming something is "fully"
and "not fully" is logically impossible, but, again, why let anything
substantive slow you down? And, yes, I've left off the "at the same
time" aspect of it, because I don't want you to keep using the word
"semantics" as if that somehow indicts the question, so now I'll once
again accomodate your semantics shuffling and use your terms; how is it
logically possible to be "truly God" and "not truly God?" Or "complete
God" and "not complete God?"
And, more importantly, how can something be "truly God" and "truly
man," when "truly God" trumps "truly man" and what does that mean in
terms of a redemptive sacrifice of one's own self, even if that self is
just a lesser part? I cut off my arm as a sacrifice to myself in order
to save you from my wrath? Is that the thrust here? Because I require a
sacrifice in order to save you (a blood sacrifice, no less) and that
sacrifice has to be "pure" in order for it to work in my mind, I
therefore cut off my own arm (a "pure" arm) in order to satisfy my own
requirments, therefore making the requirement larger than myself?
Is this the logic of the Creeds you keep claiming are unrefuted in
other threads?
The hunt continues...
Quote:
MORE: he would first have to ensure that what he targets is the claim -
as actually presented by those with whom he disagrees.
Bullshit. The claim is identical to what I've repeatedly deconstructed.
You are you the one obfuscating that fact with all of this semantics
bullshit, but even granting your semantics shuffling, we're still left
with an illogical scenario in which a being sacrifices himself to
himself in order to save us from himself.
The hunt continues...
Quote:
MORE: He has not done this;
Nor do I need to, even though, I just did, using your own terms.
Complete God sacrifices that part of himself that is Complete Man (or
Truly Man, or whatever other spin you want to put on it) to himself in
order to save us from himself; a self-evidently irrelevant process that
must therefore mean that the act of sacrifice is so necessary that not
even God himself can avoid its mandate.
Is that what your arguing?
Quote:
MORE: therefore, this discussion is already sufficient as a refutation
Strawmen and equivocation (semantics shuffling) that result in the same
question being asked is "sufficient refutation" eh?
Still looking for the substance...
Quote:
MORE: Nevertheless, I will delve - albeit only very briefly - farther
into some of the avenues opened up by having refuted Koyaanisqatsi.
You just keep singing that note, little clubber. It speaks volumes.
Quote:
MORE: With regards to epistemic matters, even if it is logically
possible for Jesus to have been Divine and human, is there - in any
ultimately coherent sense of the word "know" - any way for us to know
that the Incarnation in Jesus was actual?
Or logically consistent? Even better. Oh, but you've already "refuted"
that, right? Through strawmen and equivocation of terms. Great. Gotcha.
The hunt continues...
Quote:
MORE: If it is not possible to know that the Incarnation actually
occurred, then is Christianity *necessarily* irrational - or false?
Yes.
Quote:
MORE: The answer will be, "No",
What a shock.
Quote:
MORE: for reasons related to the nature of objectiveness
Which are? Still hunting...
Quote:
MORE: (which is generally presumed by Christianity, as well as other
philosophies), a discussion of which would, in turn, bring in the
matter/nature of semantics.
Ahh, back to your favorite spin. Still no substance, though...
Quote:
MORE: The matter of semantics would also relate to the notion - touched
upon by Koyaanisqatsi - of Jesus as some kind of sacrifice for the
redemption of sins. In a discussion of semantics, it would be shown
that the idea of Jesus-as-sacrifice is not necessary - in the logical
sense - to Christianity, and, still, such a way of speaking would be
rationally acceptable.
Boy, you sure do like to explain without actually showing anything
substantive, don't you little clubber?
So, the hunt, as always, still continues....
But I guess it's a damn good thing you think you've refuted my
arguments, because now you can just keep saying, "That's already been
refuted" over and over and over again as if it actually were true, when
in fact, nothing of my arguments have even been addressed by you in any
direct sense. Hell in any indirect sense, for that matter.
Just keep singing that note, though, and maybe nobody else will notice
that the only thing you've done is claim that "truly God" or "complete
God" is somehow substantively different than saying "fully God." But
then, you've still got that nagging little problem of the logical
impossibility of "truly God" and "not truly God." Or "complete God" and
"not complete God."
Not to mention, but I'll take a page from your book and rely on
repetition to get through, how "truly God" can sacrifice "not truly
God" (or "truly God") and all that.
It'll be fun to watch you spin those semantics though, while you accuse
others of the crimes you are evidently most guilty.
rest of the debate can be seen over here
-http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=89277&page=7&pp=25
what is your response to this debate?
Denis Giron
abu_abdul...@yahoo.com wrote:
> what is your opinion on koyaniskatis's response to Michael
> S pearls defense of trinity? i will paste the debate here
> for all to see.
With all due respect, assuming Koyaanisqatsi's understanding of Mr.
Pearl's argument is correct, his objections are to something quite
different from what I have been arguing. For example:
> 1. God is Creator
> 2. God is Redeemer
> 3. God is Sustainer
> 4. The Creator is not the Redeemer
> 5. The Redeemer is not the Sustainer
> 6. The Creator is not the Sustainer
> 7. There is only one God.
Koyaanisqatsi, apparently understands the first six propositions to all
be identity statements. If they are, then I would agree that they are
logically inconsistent. I, on the other hand, have been pushing a
doctrine that argues:
(1) Jesus is God.
(2) The Father is God.
(3) The Holy Spirit is God.
(4) Jesus is not the Father.
(5) Jesus is not the Holy Spirit.
(6) The Father is not the Holy Spirit.
(7) There is only one God.
The reason these seven propositions are consistent is because the first
three are intended to be predications, while the third fourth and fifth
are identity statements. In other words, in the first three
propositions, the assertion is that each person is divine, in
possession of some of the attrributes of deity, and/or a proper part of
the Godhead. None of the three persons are identical to the Godhead,
nor are any of them a god by themself. This doctrine I believe to be
logically coherent (though I do not consider it to be true - I do not
believe it reflects reality).
> rest of the debate can be seen over here
> -http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?t=89277&page=7&pp=25
>
> what is your response to this debate?
I'll need more time to look over the debate in toto, but from what I
have seen thus far, Koyaanisqatsi was critiquing a doctrine that was
different from the one I was endorsing as logically consistent.