Islam and the Theology of Power - Khaled Abou El Fadl, UCLA School of Law
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Islam and the Theology of Power
"Supremacist puritanism in contemporary Islam is dismissive of all
moral norms or ethical values."
By Khaled Abou El Fadl, UCLA School of Law.
Since the early 1980s, commentators have argued that Islam is
suffering a crisis of identity, as the crumbling of Islamic
civilization in the modern age has left Muslims with a profound sense
of alienation and injury. Challenges confronting Muslim nations --
failures of development projects, entrenched authoritarian regimes and
the inability to respond effectively to Israeli belligerence -- have
induced deep-seated frustration and anger that, in turn, contributed
to the rise of fundamentalist movements, or as most commentators have
preferred to say, political Islam. But most commentators have been
caught off guard by the ferocity of the acts of mass murder recently
committed in New York and Washington. The basic cruelty and moral
depravity of these attacks came as a shock not only to non-Muslims,
but to Muslims as well.
The extreme political violence we call terrorism is not a simple
aberration unrelated to the political dynamics of a society.
Generally, terrorism is the quintessential crime of those who feel
powerless seeking to undermine the perceived power of a targeted
group. Like many crimes of power, terrorism is also a hate crime, for
it relies on a polarized rhetoric of belligerence toward a particular
group that is demonized to the point of being denied any moral worth.
To recruit and communicate effectively, this rhetoric of belligerence
needs to tap into and exploit an already radicalized discourse with
the expectation of resonating with the social and political
frustrations of a people. If acts of terrorism find little resonance
within a society, such acts and their ideological defenders are
marginalized. But if these acts do find a degree of resonance,
terrorism becomes incrementally more acute and severe, and its
ideological justifications become progressively more radical.
Asking Why
To what extent are the September 11 attacks in the US symptomatic of
more pervasive ideological undercurrents in the Muslim world today?
Obviously, not all social or political frustrations lead to the use of
violence. While national liberation movements often resort to
violence, the recent attacks are set apart from such movements. The
perpetrators did not seem to be acting on behalf of an ethnic group or
nation. They presented no specific territorial claims or political
agenda, and were not keen to claim responsibility for their acts. One
can speculate that the perpetrators' list of grievances included
persistent Israeli abuses of Palestinians, near-daily bombings of Iraq
and the presence of American troops in the Gulf, but the fact remains
that the attacks were not followed by a list of demands or even a set
of articulated goals. The attacks exhibit a profound sense of
frustration and extreme despair, rather than a struggle to achieve
clear-cut objectives.
Some commentators have viewed the underpinnings of the recent attacks
as part of a "clash of civilizations" between Western values and
Islamic culture. According to these commentators, the issue is not
religious fundamentalism or political Islam, but an essential conflict
between competing visions of morality and ethics. From this
perspective, it is hardly surprising that the terrorists do not
present concrete demands, do not have specific territorial objectives
and do not rush to take responsibility. The September 11 attacks aimed
to strike at the symbols of Western civilization, and to challenge its
perceived hegemony, in the hope of empowering and reinvigorating
Islamic civilization.
The "clash of civilizations" approach assumes, in deeply prejudiced
fashion, that puritanism and terrorism are somehow authentic
expressions of the predominant values of the Islamic tradition, and
hence is a dangerous interpretation of the present moment. But the
common responses to this interpretation, focusing on either the crisis
of identity or acute social frustration in the Muslim world, do not
adequately explain the theological positions adopted by radical
Islamist groups, or how extreme violence can be legitimated in the
modern age. Further, none of these perspectives engage the classical
tradition in Islamic thought regarding the employment of political
violence, and how contemporary Muslims reconstruct the classical
tradition. How might the classical or contemporary doctrines of
Islamic theology contribute to the use of terrorism by modern Islamic
movements?
Classical Islamic Law and Political Violence
By the eleventh century, Muslim jurists had developed a sophisticated
discourse on the proper limits on the conduct of warfare, political
violence and terrorism. The Qur'an exhorted Muslims in general terms
to perform jihad by waging war against their enemies. The Qur'anic
prescriptions simply call upon Muslims to fight in the way of God,
establish justice and refrain from exceeding the limits of justice in
fighting their enemies. Muslim jurists, reflecting their historical
circumstances and context, tended to divide the world into three
conceptual categories: the abode of Islam, the abode of war and the
abode of peace or non-belligerence. These were not clear or precise
categories, but generally they connoted territories belonging to
Muslims, territories belonging to enemies and territories considered
neutral or non-hostile for one reason or another. But Muslim jurists
could not agree on exactly how to define the abode of Muslims versus
the abode of others, especially when sectarian divisions within Islam
were involved, and when dealing with conquered Muslim territories or
territories where sizable Muslim minorities resided.(1) Furthermore,
Muslim jurists disagreed on the legal cause for fighting non-Muslims.
Some contended that non-Muslims are to be fought because they are
infidels, while the majority argued that non-Muslims should be fought
only if they pose a danger to Muslims. The majority of early jurists
argued that a treaty of non-aggression between Muslims and non-Muslims
ought to be limited to a ten-year term. Nonetheless, after the tenth
century an increasing number of jurists argued that such treaties
could be renewed indefinitely, or be of permanent or indefinite
duration.(2)
Importantly, Muslim jurists did not focus on the idea of just cause
for war. Other than emphasizing that if Muslim territory is attacked,
Muslims must fight back, the jurists seemed to relegate the decision
to make war or peace to political authorities. There is a considerable
body of legal writing prohibiting Muslim rulers from violating
treaties, indulging in treachery or attacking an enemy without first
giving notice, but the literature on the conditions that warrant a
jihad is sparse. It is not that the classical jurists believed that
war is always justified or appropriate; rather, they seemed to assume
that the decision to wage war is fundamentally political. However, the
methods of war were the subject of a substantial jurisprudential
discourse.
Building upon the proscriptions of the Prophet Muhammad, Muslim
jurists insisted that there are legal restrictions upon the conduct of
war. In general, Muslim armies may not kill women, children, seniors,
hermits, pacifists, peasants or slaves unless they are combatants.
Vegetation and property may not be destroyed, water holes may not be
poisoned, and flame-throwers may not be used unless out of necessity,
and even then only to a limited extent. Torture, mutilation and murder
of hostages were forbidden under all circumstances. Importantly, the
classical jurists reached these determinations not simply as a matter
of textual interpretation, but as moral or ethical assertions. The
classical jurists spoke from the vantage point of a moral
civilization, in other words, from a perspective that betrayed a
strong sense of confidence in the normative message of Islam. In
contrast to their pragmatism regarding whether a war should be waged,
the classical jurists accepted the necessity of moral constraints upon
the way war is conducted.
An Offense Against God and Society
Muslim jurists exhibited a remarkable tolerance toward the idea of
political rebellion. Because of historical circumstances in the first
three centuries of Islam, Muslim jurists, in principle, prohibited
rebellions even against unjust rulers. At the same time, they refused
to give the government unfettered discretion against rebels. The
classical jurists argued that the law of God prohibited the execution
of rebels or needless destruction or confiscation of their property.
Rebels should not be tortured or even imprisoned if they take an oath
promising to abandon their rebellion. Most importantly, according to
the majority point of view, rebellion, for a plausible cause, is not a
sin or moral infraction, but merely a political wrong because of the
chaos and civil strife that result. This approach effectively made
political rebellion a civil, and not a religious, infraction.
The classical juristic approach to terrorism was quite different.
Since the very first century of Islam, Muslims suffered from extremist
theologies that not only rejected the political institutions of the
Islamic empire, but also refused to concede legitimacy to the juristic
class. Although not organized in a church or a single institutional
structure, the juristic class in Islam had clear and distinctive
insignia of investiture. They attended particular colleges, received
training in a particular methodology of juristic inquiry, and
developed a specialized technical language, the mastery of which
became the gateway to inclusion.
Significantly, the juristic class engaged as a rule in discussion and
debate. On each point of law, there are ten different opinions and a
considerable amount of debate among the various legal schools of
thought. Various puritan theological movements in Islamic history
resolutely rejected this juristic tradition, which reveled in
indeterminacy. The hallmark of these puritan movements was an
intolerant theology displaying extreme hostility not only to
non-Muslims but also to Muslims who belonged to different schools of
thought or even remained neutral. These movements considered opponents
and indifferent Muslims to have exited the fold of Islam, and
therefore legitimate targets of violence. These groups' preferred
methods of violence were stealth attacks and the dissemination of
terror in the general population.
Muslim jurists reacted sharply to these groups, considering them
enemies of humankind. They were designated as muharibs (literally,
those who fight society). A muharib was defined as someone who attacks
defenseless victims by stealth, and spreads terror in society. They
were not to be given quarter or refuge by anyone or at any place. In
fact, Muslim jurists argued that any Muslim or non-Muslim territory
sheltering such a group is hostile territory that may be attacked by
the mainstream Islamic forces. Although the classical jurists agreed
on the definition of a muharib, they disagreed about which types of
criminal acts should be considered crimes of terror. Many jurists
classified rape, armed robbery, assassinations, arson and murder by
poisoning as crimes of terror and argued that such crimes must be
punished vigorously regardless of the motivations of the criminal.
Most importantly, these doctrines were asserted as religious
imperatives. Regardless of the desired goals or ideological
justifications, the terrorizing of the defenseless was recognized as a
moral wrong and an offense against society and God.
Demise of the Classical Tradition
It is often stated that terrorism is the weapon of the weak. Notably,
classical juristic discourse was developed when Islamic civilization
was supreme, and this supremacy was reflected in the benevolent
attitude of the juristic class. Pre-modern Muslim juristic discourses
navigated a course between principled thinking and real-life pragmatic
concerns and demands. Ultimately, these jurists spoke with a sense of
urgency, but not desperation. Power and political supremacy were not
their sole pursuits.
Much has changed in the modern age. Islamic civilization has crumbled,
and the traditional institutions that once sustained the juristic
discourse have all but vanished. The moral foundations that once
mapped out Islamic law and theology have disintegrated, leaving an
unsettling vacuum. More to the point, the juristic discourses on
tolerance towards rebellion and hostility to the use of terror are no
longer part of the normative categories of contemporary Muslims.
Contemporary Muslim discourses either give lip service to the
classical doctrines without a sense of commitment or ignore and
neglect them all together.
There are many factors that contributed to this modern reality. Among
the pertinent factors is the undeniably traumatic experience of
colonialism, which dismantled the traditional institutions of civil
society. The emergence of highly centralized, despotic and often
corrupt governments, and the nationalization of the institutions of
religious learning undermined the mediating role of jurists in Muslim
societies. Nearly all charitable religious endowments became
state-controlled entities, and Muslim jurists in most Muslim nations
became salaried state employees, effectively transforming them into
what may be called "court priests." The establishment of the state of
Israel, the expulsion of the Palestinians and the persistent military
conflicts in which Arab states suffered heavy losses all contributed
to a widespread siege mentality and a highly polarized and belligerent
political discourse. Perhaps most importantly, Western cultural
symbols, modes of production and social values aggressively penetrated
the Muslim world, seriously challenging inherited values and
practices, and adding to a profound sense of alienation.
Two developments became particularly relevant to the withering away of
Islamic jurisprudence. Most Muslim nations experienced the wholesale
borrowing of civil law concepts. Instead of the dialectical and
indeterminate methodology of traditional Islamic jurisprudence, Muslim
nations opted for more centralized and often code-based systems of
law. Even Muslim modernists who attempted to reform Islamic
jurisprudence were heavily influenced by the civil law system, and
sought to resist the fluidity of Islamic law and increase its unitary
and centralized character. Not only were the concepts of law heavily
influenced by the European legal tradition, the ideologies of
resistance employed by Muslims were laden with Third World notions of
national liberation and self-determination. For instance, modern
nationalistic thought exercised a greater influence on the resistance
ideologies of Muslim and Arab national liberation movements than
anything in the Islamic tradition. The Islamic tradition was
reconstructed to fit Third World nationalistic ideologies of
anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism rather than the other way
around.
While national liberation movements -- such as the Palestinian or
Algerian resistance -- resorted to guerrilla or non-conventional
warfare, modern day terrorism of the variety promoted by Osama bin
Laden is rooted in a different ideological paradigm. There is little
doubt that organizations such as the Jihad, al-Qaeda, Hizb al-Tahrir
and Jama'at al-Muslimin were influenced by national liberation and
anti-colonialist ideologies, but they have anchored themselves in a
theology that can be described as puritan, supremacist and thoroughly
opportunistic. This theology is the byproduct of the emergence and
eventual dominance of Wahhabism, Salafism and apologetic discourses in
modern Islam.
Contemporary Puritan Islam
The foundations of Wahhabi theology were put in place by the
eighteenth-century evangelist Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab in the
Arabian Peninsula. With a puritanical zeal, 'Abd al-Wahhab sought to
rid Islam of corruptions that he believed had crept into the religion.
Wahhabism resisted the indeterminacy of the modern age by escaping to
a strict literalism in which the text became the sole source of
legitimacy. In this context, Wahhabism exhibited extreme hostility to
intellectualism, mysticism and any sectarian divisions within Islam.
The Wahhabi creed also considered any form of moral thought that was
not entirely dependent on the text as a form of self-idolatry, and
treated humanistic fields of knowledge, especially philosophy, as "the
sciences of the devil." According to the Wahhabi creed, it was
imperative to return to a presumed pristine, simple and
straightforward Islam, which could be entirely reclaimed by literal
implementation of the commands of the Prophet, and by strict adherence
to correct ritual practice. Importantly, Wahhabism rejected any
attempt to interpret the divine law from a historical, contextual
perspective, and treated the vast majority of Islamic history as a
corruption of the true and authentic Islam. The classical
jurisprudential tradition was considered at best to be mere sophistry.
Wahhabism became very intolerant of the long-established Islamic
practice of considering a variety of schools of thought to be equally
orthodox. Orthodoxy was narrowly defined, and 'Abd al-Wahhab himself
was fond of creating long lists of beliefs and acts which he
considered hypocritical, the adoption or commission of which
immediately rendered a Muslim an unbeliever.
In the late eighteenth century, the Al Sa'ud family united with the
Wahhabi movement and rebelled against Ottoman rule in Arabia. Egyptian
forces quashed this rebellion in 1818. Nevertheless, Wahhabi ideology
was resuscitated in the early twentieth century under the leadership
of 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud who allied himself with the tribes of Najd,
in the beginnings of what would become Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi
rebellions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were very bloody
because the Wahhabis indiscriminately slaughtered and terrorized
Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Mainstream jurists writing at the time,
such as the Hanafi Ibn 'Abidin and the Maliki al-Sawi, described the
Wahhabis as a fanatic fringe group.(3)
Wahhabism Ascendant
Nevertheless, Wahhabism survived and, in fact, thrived in contemporary
Islam for several reasons. By treating Muslim Ottoman rule as a
foreign occupying power, Wahhabism set a powerful precedent for
notions of Arab self-determination and autonomy. In advocating a
return to the pristine and pure origins of Islam, Wahhabism rejected
the cumulative weight of historical baggage. This idea was intuitively
liberating for Muslim reformers since it meant the rebirth of ijtihad,
or the return to de novo examination and determination of legal issues
unencumbered by the accretions of precedents and inherited doctrines.
Most importantly, the discovery and exploitation of oil provided Saudi
Arabia with high liquidity. Especially after 1975, with the sharp rise
in oil prices, Saudi Arabia aggressively promoted Wahhabi thought
around the Muslim world. Even a cursory examination of predominant
ideas and practices reveals the widespread influence of Wahhabi
thought on the Muslim world today.
But Wahhabism did not spread in the modern Muslim world under its own
banner. Even the term "Wahhabism" is considered derogatory by its
adherents, since Wahhabis prefer to see themselves as the
representatives of Islamic orthodoxy. To them, Wahhabism is not a
school of thought within Islam, but is Islam. The fact that Wahhabism
rejected a label gave it a diffuse quality, making many of its
doctrines and methodologies eminently transferable. Wahhabi thought
exercised its greatest influence not under its own label, but under
the rubric of Salafism. In their literature, Wahhabi clerics have
consistently described themselves as Salafis, and not Wahhabis.
Beset with Contradictions
Salafism is a creed founded in the late nineteenth century by Muslim
reformers such as Muhammad 'Abduh, al-Afghani and Rashid Rida.
Salafism appealed to a very basic concept in Islam: Muslims ought to
follow the precedent of the Prophet and his companions (al-salaf
al-salih). Methodologically, Salafism was nearly identical to
Wahhabism except that Wahhabism is far less tolerant of diversity and
differences of opinion. The founders of Salafism maintained that on
all issues Muslims ought to return to the Qur'an and the sunna
(precedent) of the Prophet. In doing so, Muslims ought to reinterpret
the original sources in light of modern needs and demands, without
being slavishly bound to the interpretations of earlier Muslim
generations.
As originally conceived, Salafism was not necessarily
anti-intellectual, but like Wahhabism, it did tend to be uninterested
in history. By emphasizing a presumed golden age in Islam, the
adherents of Salafism idealized the time of the Prophet and his
companions, and ignored or demonized the balance of Islamic history.
By rejecting juristic precedents and undervaluing tradition, Salafism
adopted a form of egalitarianism that deconstructed any notions of
established authority within Islam. Effectively, anyone was considered
qualified to return to the original sources and speak for the divine
will. By liberating Muslims from the tradition of the jurists,
Salafism contributed to a real vacuum of authority in contemporary
Islam. Importantly, Salafism was founded by Muslim nationalists who
were eager to read the values of modernism into the original sources
of Islam. Hence, Salafism was not necessarily anti-Western. In fact,
its founders strove to project contemporary institutions such as
democracy, constitutions or socialism into the foundational texts, and
to justify the modern nation-state within Islam.
The liberal age of Salafism came to an end in the 1960s. After 1975,
Wahhabism was able to rid itself of its extreme intolerance, and
proceeded to coopt Salafism until the two became practically
indistinguishable. Both theologies imagined a golden age within Islam,
entailing a belief in a historical utopia that can be reproduced in
contemporary Islam. Both remained uninterested in critical historical
inquiry and responded to the challenge of modernity by escaping to the
secure haven of the text. Both advocated a form of egalitarianism and
anti-elitism to the point that they came to consider intellectualism
and rational moral insight to be inaccessible and, thus, corruptions
of the purity of the Islamic message. Wahhabism and Salafism were
beset with contradictions that made them simultaneously idealistic and
pragmatic and infested both creeds (especially in the 1980s and 1990s)
with a kind of supremacist thinking that prevails until today.
Between Apologetics and Supremacy
The predominant intellectual response to the challenge of modernity in
Islam has been apologetics. Apologetics consisted of an effort by a
large number of commentators to defend the Islamic system of beliefs
from the onslaught of Orientalism, Westernization and modernity by
simultaneously emphasizing the compatibility and supremacy of Islam.
Apologists responded to the intellectual challenges coming from the
West by adopting pietistic fictions about the Islamic traditions. Such
fictions eschewed any critical evaluation of Islamic doctrines, and
celebrated the presumed perfection of Islam. A common apologist
argument was that any meritorious or worthwhile modern institution was
first invented by Muslims. According to the apologists, Islam
liberated women, created a democracy, endorsed pluralism, protected
human rights and guaranteed social security long before these
institutions ever existed in the West. These concepts were not
asserted out of critical understanding or ideological commitment, but
primarily as a means of resisting Western hegemony and affirming
self-worth. The main effect of apologetics, however, was to contribute
to a sense of intellectual self-sufficiency that often descended into
moral arrogance. To the extent that apologetics were habit-forming, it
produced a culture that eschewed self-critical and introspective
insight, and embraced the projection of blame and a fantasy-like level
of confidence.
In many ways, the apologetic response was fundamentally centered on
power. Its main purpose was not to integrate particular values within
Islamic culture, but to empower Islam against its civilizational
rival. Muslim apologetics tended to be opportunistic and rather
unprincipled, and, in fact, they lent support to the tendency among
many intellectuals and activists to give precedence to the logic of
pragmatism over any other competing demands. Invoking the logic of
necessity or public interest to justify courses of action, at the
expense of moral imperatives, became common practice. Effectively,
apologists got into the habit of paying homage to the presumed
superiority of the Islamic tradition, but marginalized this idealistic
image in everyday life.
Post-1970s Salafism adopted many of the premises of the apologetic
discourse, but it also took these premises to their logical extreme.
Instead of simple apologetics, Salafism responded to feelings of
powerlessness and defeat with uncompromising and arrogant symbolic
displays of power, not only against non-Muslims, but also against
Muslim women. Fundamentally, Salafism, which by the 1970s had become a
virulent puritan theology, further anchored itself in the confident
security of texts. Nonetheless, contrary to the assertions of its
proponents, Salafism did not necessarily pursue objective or balanced
interpretations of Islamic texts, but primarily projected its own
frustrations and aspirations upon the text. Its proponents no longer
concerned themselves with coopting or claiming Western institutions as
their own, but defined Islam as the exact antithesis of the West,
under the guise of reclaiming the true and real Islam. Whatever the
West was perceived to be, Islam was understood to be the exact
opposite.
Alienation from Tradition
Of course, neither Wahhabism nor Salafism is represented by some
formal institution. They are theological orientations and not
structured schools of thought. Nevertheless, the lapsing and bonding
of the theologies of Wahhabism and Salafism produced a contemporary
orientation that is anchored in profound feelings of defeat,
frustration and alienation, not only from modern institutions of
power, but also from the Islamic heritage and tradition. The outcome
of the apologist, Wahhabi and Salafi legacies is a supremacist
puritanism that compensates for feelings of defeat, disempowerment and
alienation with a distinct sense of self-righteous arrogance vis-à-vis
the nondescript "other" -- whether the other is the West,
non-believers in general or even Muslims of a different sect and
Muslim women. In this sense, it is accurate to describe this
widespread modern trend as supremacist, for it sees the world from the
perspective of stations of merit and extreme polarization.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, several commentators posed
the question of whether Islam somehow encourages violence and
terrorism. Some commentators argued that the Islamic concept of jihad
or the notion of the dar al-harb (the abode of war) is to blame for
the contemporary violence. These arguments are anachronistic and
Orientalist. They project Western categories and historical
experiences upon a situation that is very particular and fairly
complex. One can easily locate an ethical discourse within the Islamic
tradition that is uncompromisingly hostile to acts of terrorism. One
can also locate a discourse that is tolerant toward the other, and
mindful of the dignity and worth of all human beings. But one must
also come to terms with the fact that supremacist puritanism in
contemporary Islam is dismissive of all moral norms or ethical values,
regardless of the identity of their origins or foundations. The prime
and nearly singular concern is power and its symbols. Somehow, all
other values are made subservient.
Khaled Abou El Fadl is Omar and Azmeralda Alfi Distinguished
Fellow in Islamic Law at the UCLA School of Law.
ENDNOTES
(1) Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The
Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the
Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries," Journal of Islamic Law and Society
22/1 (1994).
(2) Khaled Abou El Fadl, "The Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry into
Classical Sources," The Muslim World 89 (1999).
(3) Muhammad Amin Ibn 'Abidin, Hashiyat Radd al-Muhtar, vol. VI
(Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi, 1966), p. 413; Ahmad al-Sawi, Hashiyat
al-Sawi 'ala Tafsir al-Jalalayn, vol. III (Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-Turath
al-Arabi, n.d.), pp. 307-308. See also Ahmad Dallal, "The Origins and
Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750-1850," Journal of the
American Oriental Society 113/3 (1993).
Copyright © Middle East Report 221, Winter 2001