Re: Liberal tolerance
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
> > The problem is that I still know that an axiom is an unprovable
> > assumption that forms the basis of formal system, so I'd really
> > prefer it if you called them assumptions, or something similar.
>
> I've got no problems with that word, bit I'm not sure that these
> assumptions are so much "unprovable" as "unproven." That is, in many
> cases, axioms can be proven, but may be assumed to be unproblematic,
> or having to prove the assumption would too much off topic. I might
> add that often an axiom is not proven so much as "justified." There
> are many reasons to accept a starting assumption beyond whether it can
> be proven. That we are capable of rational thought may be a starting
> assumption of our discourse, but more than something that needs to be
> proven, we accept it simply as a necessary condition for discourse,
> even if one of us ultimately decides the other is quite irrational ;-)
>
If an axiom is proven then it isn't an axiom but a theorem (as in 'The
Hunting of the Snark').
>
> I believe it is good scientific practice to make any unconventional
> axioms explicit, and hopefully to offer some justification for
> employing them
>
All assumptions ought to be stated, where known, yes.
--
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the
Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness. -- J.S.Mill Chapter II, Utilitarianism
* TagZilla 0.057 * http://tagzilla.mozdev.org
Peter H.M. Brooks
> > > 2. An established principle in some art or science, which, though
> > > not necessarily truth, is universally received; as, the axioms of
> > > political economy.
> > A poor definition, but I understand it and accept your usage of it.
>
> Because you are inclined to tar me with the brush of relativism, I
> note that this definition is not MY (perverse) usage of the word
> axiom, but a standard definition that I have chosen to use. That's
> quite something else. And what's wrong with the definition? I can't
> very well justify my use of it without knowing the basis of your
> objection to it.
>
It is a more general definition than the one that I generally use. Of
the three definitions of axiom from the OED, I usually mean definition 3
when talking about them:
1. A proposition that commends itself to genreal acceptance; a
well-established or universally-conceded principle; a maxim, rule, law
2. Logic: A proposition (whether true or false)
3. Logic and Mathematics. 'A self-evident proposition, requiring no
formal demonstration to prove its truth, but received and assented to as
soon as mentioned'
Even that isn't ideal. To me an axiom is as in definition 2, but
something used as an unproved basis from which an axiom system is built.
>
> Incidentally, entirely contrary to what I suspect to be your own
> position, I'd argue (not here, you will be glad to know) that all
> statements that have truth value are necessarily both subjective and
> objective. It may mystify you how I manage to reconcile the apparent
> contradiction, but it is what I try to do
>
There is nothing mystifying about it - you simply don't define
'subjective' and 'objective' in a standard or sensible manner and it's easy.
Statements are, actually, neither subjective nor objective, they are
strings of symbols. Statements are the easy bit, it is when you want to
ascribe some meaning to them that you end up with the difficulties - the
logical positivists had it that a statement was either nonsense,
tautological or empirically verifiable. There is a great appeal to this
simple classification, but it has some serious problems, not least that
it, itself, taken as a statement is either nonsense or none of these.
--
Whatever forces a certain number of students to any college or
university, independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers,
tends more or less to diminish the necessity of that merit or
reputation.-- AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS. by Adam Smith
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
> > Marxism is not scientific as it doesn't accept the falisifability
> > rule. Statements can be accepted that are simply religious dogma, no
> > means to prove them false are accepted.
>
> Another example of a starting assumption that we really need to
> question. Popper's falsification criterion for scientific statements
> is often been roundly criticized, and is not really honoured in
> practice in many scientific situations.
>
That there are criticisms (round or otherwise) of something does not
mean that it is false - just as a lack of them does not mean that it is
true. If you have a particular objection to the criterion then state it
and we can discuss it, a vague appeal to people who might have
criticised it doesn't cut the mustard.
That it is not honoured in all scientific theorising is one reason why
it was stated in the first place! To show that statements that cannot be
falsified are useless in science. They can be useful in thinking about
science, in producing new theories, for example, but, once the theory is
ready it needs to be falsifiable, otherwise it is of no value.
Marxism is not scientific for many other reasons as well - it does not
use valid methods, does not take cognizance of recent findings and has
not produced a coherent corpus of knowledge, to mention a few more.
>
> Furthermore, the idea implies a positivist approach to explanation in
> which the test of truth is prediction, that the particular instance
> becomes intelligible as a manifestation of a general law. As I
> suggested before, many of the objects of scientific study,
> particularly the "evolutionary sciences", work the other way
> around. The end of explanation is the particular instance, and no
> situation is ever quite the same. So there's no simple test. For
> example, planetary studies tend to focus on the way general forces
> converge to produce a unique outcome, and validation requires
> retrodiction.
>
That isn't quite true. Of course we always only have the past to draw
information from - what has happened, not what will happen. There are
some things where we can't perform experiments as we would on a
laboratory bench, cosmology is one and research into human beings
another one for practical the other for ethical reasons. This doesn't
mean that we can't test things through prediction. When a railway worker
had a bold fly through his head, but survived, the changes to his
behaviour provided strong evidence for what bits of his brain that were
no longer there did - since then many other similar happenstances have
enabled a pretty good map of the brain (a predictive map) to be
produced. Now PET scans show what happens as people think so we have an
even better tool.
Biology (what you call 'evolutionary science') also has methods that
enable predictive truth to be established. Darwin's finches, were able
to show evolutionary divergence over a relatively short period of time -
now, of course, we can establish exactly what the divergence involved
genetically as well.
Peter H.M. Brooks
> > Yes, well, no, fine. Science is atheistic,
>
> News to me. I thought science was agnostic. That is, do scientists use
> their expertise to disprove the existence of the supernatural? Once in
> a while that is done, but it seems to me as a special branch of study
> in itself. I'm an atheist myself, and I wouldn't presume to disprove
> the existence of the supernatural, in part because my proofs would be
> naturalistic and therefore irrelevant. I do try to justify my
> atheism, though, but largely just to my own satisfaction.
>
The distinction between 'agnosticism' and 'atheism' is specious. Science
is a-theistic - it involves no theism. This doesn't mean that it wastes
its time trying to disprove fairy stories!
There is no point trying to disprove things that cannot be proved or
disproved. It is true that there might be a traceable origin to the myth
of unicorns (rhinos, one-horned deer, fly agaric hallucinations) but
there is no point at all in trying to prove that they don't exist.
>
> > >>Your attempt to claim some sort of relativistic stance on axioms
> > >>fails
> > > I'm not sure what you are saying here.
>
> I'm getting the feeling that you have a view of science that requires
> axioms to be subject to objective proof, if not in practice, at least
> in principle, and that a body of scientific knowledge is nothing more
> than an accumulation of empirical data, to which logic is applied, to
> arrive at universal laws. Correct me if I'm wrong here.
>
Proof is the province of logic and mathematics, not science. It is also
found in jurisprudence, but that is a different form of proof. Science,
and scientists, do not 'prove' anything - they use experiment to
demonstrate to closer and closer approximations that something is
generally the case.
A body of scientific knowledge is the accumulation of empirical data,
that is true, but the data isn't acquired randomly, but in the attempt
to establish if certain things are true of the world. Universal laws or
general explanations of things are very nice to have and models of the
universe provide pretty good approximations of reality in many areas -
theoretical science does try to improve these models, then practical
scientists test them empirically.
--
All persons are deemed to have a _right_ to equality of treatment,
except when some recognised social expediency requires the reverse. And
hence all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered
expedient, assume the character not of simple inexpediency, but of
injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how
they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful that they themselves
perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken notion of
expediency, the correction of which would make that which they approve
seem quite as monstrous as what they have at last learnt to condemn. The
entire history of social improvement has been a series of transitions,
by which one custom or institution after another, from being a supposed
primary necessity of social existence, has passed into the rank of an
universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny. So it has been with the
distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and
plebeians; and so it will be, and in part already is, with the
aristocracies of colour, race, and sex. -- J.S.Mill Chapter V.
Utilitarianism
Peter H.M. Brooks
> > No, consensus is not a current paradigm, nor ever was. It is. from a
> > social point of view, how things actually happen, but what is
> > accepted by science is the well conducted study that survives both
> > peer review and is repeatable.
>
> I don't see where we disagree. The "consensus" is the consensus of a
> scholarly peer group. Or are you trying to distinguish the body of
> truth in a science from the scientists who give rise to that
> understanding and seek to perpetuate it? If you assume the presence of
> such a divide, that begs for explanation. More specifically, what do
> you see to be the mechanism by which scientific knowledge is
> transmitted and how one theory manages to displace another? Big
> subject, but I don't think you are making your starting assumptions
> here entirely explicit or clear
>
You mentioned Kuhn's book on the nature of scientific revolutions. It is
true that older brains learn new things less well than younger ones -
people with older brains tend to be in positions of power relative to
those with younger ones. So, naturally, older ideas hold sway longer
than they should - sometimes. The system also prevents appealling but
false ideas being too quickly taken to supersede the old. It is a matter
of the balance between these two trends.
To say in science that anything is the case (by which you mean the
overwhelming probability is that it is the case) you must quote
evidence. If you quote one study that shows X, then you have a case, but
a weak one, even if it is a peer-reviewed study. If you show two or more
independent studies show X, then, if they show it with a high degree of
certainty (that is the sample sizes are large, the methods sound and so
forth) then you have a strong case. In the long run whatever the
'consensus' might be is secondary to what is established to be the case
by experiment.
--
Whatever forces a certain number of students to any college or
university, independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers,
tends more or less to diminish the necessity of that merit or
reputation.-- AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS. by Adam Smith
Peter H.M. Brooks
> > > As an atheist, I don't happen be very impressed by theological
> > > studies, but I sure find it handy to have books on theology so I
> > > know what the opposition is thinking ;-)
> > Why not make 'value judgements'? If something has no value then it
> > is stupid not to judge it so.
>
> Au contraire, my friend. It strikes me that a lot of theology is very
> sophisticated, even wise, given its axiom set. What I meant by my
> statement above is that I don't see theology as being significant
> beyond its own purview and for believers. But given these constraints,
> I can certainly be impressed, and I don't think the constraints are
> entirely crippling. Some people go to church because they don't feel
> good about themselves or about the world. I've had some contact with
> the rule of religious counseling in drug rehabilitation and AIDS
> support, and my impression is that while no panacea, it seems to be a
> useful tool to help some people out. So the sense of the supernatural
> (a simple theology) is of value for them, but not for me.
>
Just like chess theory, I agree that theology can be interesting, even
amusing.
Is 'the sense of the supernatural' a simple theology? I'd see it is
prima facie evidence of schizophrenia or a drug induced simulacrum of it.
Peter H.M. Brooks
> > >>There are many excellent articles pointing out why sociology is a
> > >>crock of shit (to be kind to it), I can post some references if
> > >>you wish.
> > In this I am not being the least bit bold. I'm just stating where
> > things are as they stand at the moment - as I've said, only a little
> > reading of even popular books will give you an understanding of how
> > things are.
>
> I was not asking you to do a lot of work. I was not asking for popular
> books, but a couple citations of well-recognized works in social
> science that show that sociology as a whole is nothing other than what
> you claim it is (as opposed to particular schools of sociology). I'm
> aware of critiques of the various branches of sociology, but never
> stumbled on the suggestion in the scientific literature that a study
> per se of contemporary society is invalid.
>
Here is an example that illuminates the general problem. Clearly there
is nothing wrong with a study of contemporary society - armed with the
scientific method, a sound theoretical basis and the scepticism that is
vital to good science, excellent results can be produced:
The following passage gives an interesting and succinct summary of the
current scientific view of social 'scientists' and their bizarrely
old-fashioned and false misunderstanding of reality. Sadly, as the book
also points out, this misunderstanding has lead to considerable human
misery and the drafting of some daft legislation. Let us hope that, as a
breed, social 'scientists' will soon go the way of the Dodo.
"Despite Murdock's strong advice, many social science explanations
including explanations of rape, continue to attribute proximate
causation to abstract and metaphysical group entities.
The second premise of the social science theory of rape - that rape is
not sexually motivated - also contains a metaphysical assumption. The
claim that sexual arousal, interest, and/or motivation is absent during
sexual acts implies an extreme form of the classic dualistic assumption
that human brains (or minds) are separate entities from bodies - a
notion long ago tossed on the intellectual trash heap. For example,
Sanday (1990, p10) states that during a rape 'the sexual acts not
concerned with sexual gratification but with the deployment of the penis
as a concrete symbol of masculine social power.' And Benke (1982, p.16)
asserts that, for males, not only does rape have nothing to do with sex;
'sex itself often has little to do with sex.' This implies that the
bodies of human males may go through all the physiological processes of
sex (arousal, erection, even ejaculation) without their brains' going
through corresponding sexual physiological processes (such as dopamine
reward). Since certain physiological processes in the brain can be shown
to accompany certain physiological processes in the rest of the body,
the alleged lack of sexual motivation in the brain during sexual acts
must refer to the state of an unidentifiable human mind distinct from
the brain."
'A Natural History of Rape, Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion' by
Randy Thornhill and Craig T. Palmer P,147)
>
> I'm not sure, but it seems almost as if you discount nearly all social
> sciences, accept anthropology only partly, and elevate evolutionary
> biology as the answer to everything. If so, it seems to me this
> position is associated with several problems. For one thing, it
> dismisses out of hand the views of anyone who does not already happen
> to agree with you, and makes constructive dialog impossible. Or am I
> being unjust here
>
Constructive dialogue is perfectly possible. If somebody discussing the
matter says 'sociologists agree that X', then they can expect me to
conclude that either ~X is the case or, at best that X is not-proven.
If, on the other hand, somebody says that a sociologyst studied the
phenomenon Y, and produced a paper that I can read that came to
conclusion X, then that is great, I'm perfectly happy to read the study
with an open mind, I'll expect to find false assumptions, shoddy methods
and illogical conclusions, but, if these are not there, then I am happy
to accept that there is some evidence for conclusion X.
That is not dismissing out of hand. It is simply being appropriately
sceptical.
Peter H.M. Brooks
> > There are not many evolutionary theories, this is a creationist
> > myth. All biologists accept the principle of evolution,
>
> I think you misunderstand me. I meant by "evolutionary sciences" a
> broad classification of sciences, which have no necessary connection
> with biological evolution. My own rule of thumb (I don't know if this
> distinction is conventional) is that the study of positively entropic
> processes represent the positivist sciences (where functionalism holds
> sway), while the study of negatively entropic processes represent the
> evolutionary sciences. Cosmology is treated as an evolutionary science
> (although the cosmos as a whole has increasing entropy) because what
> is of interest to us manifests decreasing entropy. Biological
> evolution is, of course, seen as an evolutionary science, but it is
> just one of many. History, geology, and meteorology are examples of
> others
>
This is a rather strange classification to me. I suspect that you might
find more people happy to agree if you didn't use the term
'evolutionary' here, it is confusing.
As I see it, you're saying that the hard sciences fit together because
they can do experiments, though you exclude cosmology as you see
cosmological experiments as somehow different (I'm not sure why - if you
believe that gravity lensing of light is a phenomenon, then you can
easily set up an experiment where you look at stars behind a massive
galaxy and see if you can find it, for example).
I think your are making a distinction between observation and inference
from observation and active experiment. I'm not sure that this is really
a sensible boundary. Yes, you do set up an experiment on the lab bench,
but even with the best methods and equipment in the world, what you do
afterwards is observation and inference. So you may have a bit more
scope to test the edges, but your methods are fundamentally the same.
--
All persons are deemed to have a _right_ to equality of treatment,
except when some recognised social expediency requires the reverse. And
hence all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered
expedient, assume the character not of simple inexpediency, but of
injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how
they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful that they themselves
perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken notion of
expediency, the correction of which would make that which they approve
seem quite as monstrous as what they have at last learnt to condemn. The
entire history of social improvement has been a series of transitions,
by which one custom or institution after another, from being a supposed
primary necessity of social existence, has passed into the rank of an
universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny. So it has been with the
distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and
plebeians; and so it will be, and in part already is, with the
aristocracies of colour, race, and sex. -- J.S.Mill Chapter V.
Utilitarianism
Peter H.M. Brooks
> > I don't need to be persuasive. You need to examine the field. The
> > research is sound, well monitored and based on a consistent
> > theory. None of this applies to sociological 'research'. The journal
> > you quoted is, to me, highly suspect, I will look it up, but for any
> > journal to print such evident crap places it in the highly suspect
> > category.
>
> I did not cite a journal, but a book. How do you decide the contents
> of a book are "c**p"? None of us are experts in more than one or two
> fields, and we therefore must rely on some means to judge what is
> sound and what is not. Standard, peer-reviewed, scholarly or
> semi-scholarly books, that are up to date, and don't obviously entail
> axiom sets with which we disagree, seem likely to convey the current
> state of a science. You seem to feel this is all wrong. OK, then how
> do you know a book, a scholar, a paradigm, or a scholarly consensus in
> an area in which you lack expertise should be dismissed? It seems to
> be this is a very simple and elementary question. Scholars constantly
> rely on peer reviews of research findings even in their own narrow
> speciality.
>
Just to give an example, of how I do it. I have read a few sociological
pieces (papers and books) that talk about 'Rape Myths'. The whole list
of what these myths might be is seldom given (it appears assumed) and
evidence for them being widely believed but untrue is never given.
So I traced back all the references to a paper produced in the late
'60s. It was a paper that adduced no evidence, included no research but
simply, and baldly, outlined a set of statements that it claimed were
the case. So, based on this opinion of one person, based only on his
prejudices, whole legions of papers have been produced as if this were
true! To me it is shocking - every one of the papers ought to be revoked
and removed from the literature as they all repeat an ancient lie.
Alternatively somebody could research the matter scientifically and find
out what the beliefs about rape actually are, then establish whether
they are true (which the book I quoted earlier did - finding that the
so-called 'rape myths' were actually facts about rape that were all
true). It was simply that a politically motivated sociologist wanted the
world to be different so claimed that it was - that is not science, that
is propaganda.
--
When we have got to the end of this chapter (but not before) we must
all turn back to the two blank chapters, on the account of which my
honour has lain bleeding this half hour--I stop it, by pulling off one
of my yellow slippers and throwing it with all my violence to the
opposite side of my room, with a declaration at the heel of it-- -
Tristam Shandy Chapter 4.LXXXIV.Laurence Sterne
Peter H.M. Brooks
> > I had a discussion with a number of practising sociologists on the
> > net a while back. YOu can look it up on google if you wish. The
> > sociologists themselves agreed that they were in a mess, they had no
> > underlying theory, no rigour in their research and no coherent body
> > of knowledge.
>
> Yes, but that hardly distinguishes them. I suspect economists are even
> in worse shape. And of course, historians never agree with one
> another, etc. But I suspect all this confusion obscures that sociology
> often provides useful short-range explanation and tools for social
> action, and despite the contending schools, on the whole we probably
> understand social dynamics better today than a century or two
> ago. Even scholars who turn out to be very wrong in their way
> contribute to the progress of knowledge because they offer a target of
> attack
>
Part of the problem is just that! Politicians take half-baked ideas from
sociologists, often based on evidence free myths invented by
sociologists, and do change social policy. This means that often the
worst possible course of action is taken - and it shows, consider the
mess that the UK is in now with its social engineering turned horribly
wrong, anybody with a clear view of humanity would have predicted it (as
they did - vide even 'A Clockwork Orange'). It is just because sociology
provides such apparently plausible nonsense that it is such a danger.
--
All persons are deemed to have a _right_ to equality of treatment,
except when some recognised social expediency requires the reverse. And
hence all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered
expedient, assume the character not of simple inexpediency, but of
injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how
they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful that they themselves
perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken notion of
expediency, the correction of which would make that which they approve
seem quite as monstrous as what they have at last learnt to condemn. The
entire history of social improvement has been a series of transitions,
by which one custom or institution after another, from being a supposed
primary necessity of social existence, has passed into the rank of an
universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny. So it has been with the
distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and
plebeians; and so it will be, and in part already is, with the
aristocracies of colour, race, and sex. -- J.S.Mill Chapter V.
Utilitarianism
Peter H.M. Brooks
> > OK. What approach are you unclear about? The scientific approach,
> > the sociobiological findings, or something else? Tell me what you
> > need to learn and I'll give you the references.
>
> Great. Just cite a couple of scholarly (although accessible for the
> amateur), evaluations of Dawkins and/or the sociobiology field from
> someone outside the field. I don't want to learn sociobiology, for
> which I lack the talent or time or inclination, but I do need to
> understand the field in a scientific context, its current state, its
> contribution to other sciences, an evaluation of its method or
> foundations, etc
>
I mentioned E.O.Wilson's "Sociobiology", it is accessible, well written
and clear.
For a more up to date review, I have read excellent reports of Dawkins'
latest book. I'm looking forward to getting a copy myself once it is out
in paperback, if the library doesn't have one before then - it is "The
Ancestor's Tale".
A good source generally is the site http://www.hbes.com/ you'll find
pointers to debates, recent research and many other sources there - well
worth a browse.
--
Whatever forces a certain number of students to any college or
university, independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers,
tends more or less to diminish the necessity of that merit or
reputation.-- AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS. by Adam Smith
Peter H.M. Brooks
> > I've explained, culture is part of biology.
>
> No, you haven't "explained" anything. You've merely asserted that as
> an unquestionable fact. And when I mention poetry, which I assume you
> would agree is part of culture, it was to ask you how biology explains
> such a thing. On the surface this suggestion appears to be nonsense,
> and so naturally I invited you to explain your position so that it is
> not laughed off
>
I understand your question now. With some emergent properties you do
have to go through a few steps to get to seeing the mechanism.
You also have to be familiar with the distinction between proximate
behaviour (why you think you are doing something) and ultimate behaviour
(why you actually do something).
A simple example should make it clear. Somebody meets an attractive
person of the opposite sex and starts to chat him up. The proximate
reasons would be that it 'feels good', it would be nice to get to know
the person, maybe that it would be nice to sleep with the person. The
ultimate reason is an impulse that leads to the propagation of the
species - the 'getting to know' somebody is a process of establishing
where in the social hierarchy the person is for the purposes of either
mate selection or a one-night stand (the criteria are different).
It is important to keep the distinction in mind for it certainly does
appear silly to say that offering somebody a drink is part of human
sperm competition - from a proximate point of view. From an ultimate
point of view it is, of course, the case.
Similarly with poetry. Proximately reading poetry is pleasant (or
unpleasant) when it works because it provides escapist emotion, sense of
place or an aesthetic delight. Writing poetry also has proximate, well
understood aetiology. The ultimate reasons are concerned with social
class, or rather status, as is most work and most aesthetics because
social status is a guide to mate selection.
Again, until you are clear with the differences it sounds silly to say
that you might right poetry to increase your chances of having a
high-status mate, and that is indeed not why you do it, proximately, but
is the underlying, or ultimate reason why people do things.
--
When we have got to the end of this chapter (but not before) we must
all turn back to the two blank chapters, on the account of which my
honour has lain bleeding this half hour--I stop it, by pulling off one
of my yellow slippers and throwing it with all my violence to the
opposite side of my room, with a declaration at the heel of it-- -
Tristam Shandy Chapter 4.LXXXIV.Laurence Sterne
Peter H.M. Brooks
> > love good food and so forth. I think you must explain what
> > differences you think there are. I don't see them.
>
> Yes, you and your ancestors might share those traits. But I suspect
> there's more to human mating than just a sex drive, for each person
> will prefer one person of the opposite sex over another. I don't know
> that my ancestors loved peace, for my father and grandfather supported
> World War I and II, although my great-grandfather probably loved peace
> because he had a military career (my experience of professional
> soldiers is that they like peace more seriously than civilians). I
> enjoy good food, but my grandfather and great-grandfather didn't have
> the choices that I do, and their idea of good food was undoubtedly
> quite different, something familiar, nourishing and tasty, and they
> would not know what to make of my gourmet palette. My point here is to
> suggest that each of your general categories hides considerable
> variety and complexity, and so we need to find a dividing line to
> distinguish trivial differences from substantial similarities. I don't
> think this can be done scientifically, which is why I objected before
> to empiricism
>
You are right - there is also the urge to get the highest status mate
possible and one with a different histocompatibility.
I think you need to explain what you are meaning by 'empiricism' - it
doesn't make sense to me in your final sentence so you must be using the
word to mean something different.
--
"Me!--not at all," replied Mr. Knightley, rather displeased; "I do not
want to think ill of him. I should be as ready to acknowledge his
merits as any other man; but I hear of none, except what are merely
personal; that he is well-grown and good-looking, with smooth, plausible
manners." -- Emma, Jane Austen
Peter H.M. Brooks
> > After the big bang there are only quantum fluctiations in
> > space. Before the big bang nobody knows what there might have been -
> > all statements aobut it are conjecture and unprovable.
>
> Sure, it is speculative, but that wasn't my point, which was basically
> to define a thermodynamic engine. The point about a possible Higgs
> field constraining these fluctuations after the Big Bang is perhaps
> important to me because it helps validate the universality of the
> process, and whether the supposition it was the Higgs field rather
> than some other kind of field is not important
>
What do you mean by 'validate the universality of the process'? What
process? How can its 'universality' be 'validated' or otherwise? If this
means something then why do you think it important?
--
It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher pleasures,
occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the
lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the
intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of
character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it
to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two
bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental.-- J.S.Mill
chapter II, Utilitarianism
Peter H.M. Brooks
> The other objection that I have mentioned before is that culture is
> undoubtedly an emergent process (creative, generating novelties,
> developing out of what went before), and therefore in principle cannot
> be simply explained as nothing more than the sum of input factors
> unless somehow a poem is written into our genes. Until ca. World War
> II, it was broadly felt in Anglo-American philosophical circles that a
> whole can be no more than the sum of its parts. This issue has been
> put to rest by the sciences, where there are often behaviors or
> features that are not evident in the parts taken in isolation, appear
> when the parts are brought into a relation. It would be helpful to
> know if you distance yourself from radical (reductionist) empiricism
> of the late 19th century, and if so, what position in scientific
> philosophy do you prefer to it?
>
Well this isn't quite so. Emergent properties aren't mysterious in the
sense that they cannot be described by refrerence to the level below,
just that that is an inappropriate, clumsy and unilluminating way to
describe them. Once we can see (or project) a useful pattern into events
at a higher level we feel we understand them better - that doesn't mean
that the pattern is part of the configuration, only that we feel it
helpful to think that it is. Emergent properties are what we decide them
to be, not features of the thing itself.
Reductionism and empiricism are different things. The purpose of science
is to describe things at the appropriate level for the matter at hand -
Netownian physics is perfect for describing billiard balls, less good
for designing cathode ray tubes.
It is also important not to take too literally stories you read about
quantum mechanics - there is quite a lot of hey-wowism involved in what,
when all is said and done, is the solution to Dirac's tensors or
Schroedinger's wave equation that are shown experimentally to be the
case. Trying to build a macroscopic, intuitive world view is not
straightforward if you take these as your starting point - which is why
the appropriate level of reduction is what is required.
--
All persons are deemed to have a _right_ to equality of treatment,
except when some recognised social expediency requires the reverse. And
hence all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered
expedient, assume the character not of simple inexpediency, but of
injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how
they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful that they themselves
perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken notion of
expediency, the correction of which would make that which they approve
seem quite as monstrous as what they have at last learnt to condemn. The
entire history of social improvement has been a series of transitions,
by which one custom or institution after another, from being a supposed
primary necessity of social existence, has passed into the rank of an
universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny. So it has been with the
distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and
plebeians; and so it will be, and in part already is, with the
aristocracies of colour, race, and sex. -- J.S.Mill Chapter V.
Peter H.M. Brooks
> > >>>So there is a creative sub-process, the appearance of novelty, an
> > >>>emergent process, driven by dissipation (the so-called
> > >>>"thermodynamic engine", and constrained by the past (by existing
> > >>>structures). These novel structures, representing a present, in
> > >>>turn _necessarily_ constrain further dissipation to create new
> > >>>novel structures which define the probability distribution of
> > >>>possible futures.
> > >>What?? This is just hey-wowism, it doesn't mean anything.
>
> Let me try again, more simply. Any dissipation (positively entropic
> process) dissipates through some medium (matter or field). Cosmic
> expansion might seem the exception, but there are constraints present
> there as well, so perhaps not. The characteristics of this medium
> limit the possibilities for the dissipation (constrain the probability
> distribution of possible outcomes), or else the medium would not have
> structure at all. The probability distribution of the end state is
> narrower than the initial state. This is said to have lower entropy
> for that reason. It is the emergence of a less probable structure,
> which in turn must (I believe) constrain further dissipation,
> etc. Voila, a thermodynamic engine.
>
I'm not sure this makes much sense. By 'dissipation' do you mean
something like what happens when a fart expands to fill a room?
What do you mean by the 'probability distribution' of a state? Are you
trying to say that, in the example above, the state of the fart half an
hour later has a 'narrower probability distribution' than that of the
fart when first released? If so, what do you mean by that? If you are
talking about a bell curve as your 'probability distribution' what do
you mean by it being 'narrower' afterwards? What do you see on the x and
Y axes of your distribution?
It makes no sense to me to say that a 'less probable structure' emerges
and that somehow a 'less probable structure' constrains things. What are
you trying to say?
>
> I apologize for this crude description of a thermodynamic engine, and
> so let me give an example. Suppose we have a supersaturated solution
> of copper sulphate. The molecules in this supersaturated solution MUST
> as a whole seek to bond because their bonded state has higher entropy
> (energy state in this case) than their free state in a supersaturated
> solution.
>
Wait a minute. What do you mean by 'the molecules ..must', 'as a whole'?
Each molecule is affected by forces, no doubt about that, and it will
move according to them. What do you mean by 'as a whole' in this context?
You are talking as if entropy is a force. It isn't.
Things don't move because of entropy. Things move to more chaotic states
because of all possible states a more chaotic state is more probable -
if you have a crystal then there are fewer possible states so something
(heating, hitting it with a hammer) is required to change it to a more
chaotic state.
>
> However, the characteristics of the copper-sulphate
> molecules dictate that there are only so many ways the molecules can
> bond. These ways are what are called "packing rules" (jargon, again,
> I'm afraid). So there will be molecules forming bonds according to a
> certain probability distribution, where different bonds are
> represented in differing amounts. Chances are that the most probable
> bond will come to prevail over other kinds of bonds, but not
> necessarily (if you were actually growing copper sulphate crystals,
> you would perhaps intervene to nurture the kind bond you prefer). Once
> a particular bond prevails, it tends to encourage other molecules to
> bond in the same way. This is what is called a crystal "lattice
> structure." This process goes on as long as the entropy of the
> solution is more positively entropic than the lattice structure, but
> of course, the saturation of the solution decreases as the bonds form
> until a point is reached where the entropy of the solution is the same
> as the entropy of the crystal, and then there's a slight movement of
> molecules in and out, but on the whole, the crystal has grown as much
> as it can.
>
Molecules don't form bonds according to a probability distribution! The
form bonds because of the way forces act on each particular molecule
according to its orientation. Observing this we can describe the
different bonds as you say as 'packing rules' and, observing this we can
draw a graph of the probability distribution - but these are our
observations of patterns, our model, they are not what makes things
happen in the first place!
Your anthropomorphic view of crystals being encouraged to do things
because other crystals felt the good vibrations is nice and '60s. It is
just a fairy story though, a nice one for chemistry lessons so that
people pass their exams.
What happens is that more the surface area available for bonding
increases so the probability that a bond will be made increases - we see
this happen and it looks as if the seed crystal has 'encouraged' the
bonding, it hasn't, the bonding is simply proportional to the surface
area of crystal exposed.
>
> The dissipation of the crystal's environment--the decreasing
> saturation of the surrounding solution, is the thermodynamic engine
> that forces an improbable state (the regular crystal) to emerge. The
> drive for the crystallization process is dissipation, but the
> particulars involved in copper-sulphate molecules and then the lattice
> structure define the particulars. The unity and interdependence of
> these opposite processes is what I call a contradiction, and there you
> have the basics of dialectical materialism.
>
The crystal is not an 'improbable state'!!! It is 100% probable because
there you see it in front of you, a crystal. If you seed a
supersaturated solution you'll end up with a crystal every time - you
don't get much more probable than that.
You really seem to have misunderstood entropy rather badly.
I can believe that that sort of muddled thinking, misunderstood snippets
from distant chemistry lessons could be exactly what led to the woolly
mess that is 'dialectical materialism' - thesis, antithesis, synthesis,
what simplistic bosh!
>
> I'm curious whether I expressed this process clearly enough, and if
> so, whether you agree or disagree that it is a valid (although crude)
> analysis of crystallization, and if invalid, on what grounds you
> object. I assume neither of us are expert at cosmology, and so this
> reduces things to simple physics, for which you do have some
> expertise.
>
It is invalid because it misunderstands entropy and the stories, or
models, that we use to describe processes.
It is a common problem that analogies, metaphors and stories are
provided as pedagogic aids - but, instead of being discarded once the
real matter is understood, they end up being believed as literally true.
--
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the
Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness. -- J.S.Mill Chapter II, Utilitarianism
Peter H.M. Brooks
- it appears on google, but even google chokes on trying to reply to it.
So I've split my reply into a few sections under this new heading.
> > Haines Brown wrote:
> > >>I'm not sure what you mean by 'A-E stratification'.
> > > Yes, perhaps it should be "A-E type stratification." But that gets no
> > > hits on Goggle, so I'm still in the dark.
> > As I recall, it was a discussion about social class that is divided
> > between groups labelled A to E, with A1,A2..E3,E4 based on income,
> > education and occupation
>
> This would be a minor point, but it is worth pausing over because it
> does illustrate something. The definition for social class you
> describe here is clearly an example of empiricism. I don't say more
> about it other than note that empiricism has often been subject to
> severe criticism and that there's at least one other entirely
> different approach to defining social class. Since you dismiss
> sociology, which tends to be empiricist, out of hand; perhaps you
> would find an alternative more appealing?
>
Social class is a phenomenon that we all recognise pretty easily -
naturally, for it exists to serve our interests in mate selection, just
as simpler hierarchical stratification serves in other ape societies.
In trying to quantify this a theoretical basis needs to exist and
empirical research carried out to see if disprovable aspects of this
theory are supported by the evidence or not. This is simply the standard
scientific method - quite what 'sever criticism' you refer to of this
'empiricism' isn't clear, maybe you can elaborate.
In the case of social class, the theory holds that it is hierarchical
and that individuals don't belong to more than one social class - two
theoretical points that could be disproved by experiment. For example,
if experiment showed A > B > C but then C > A we would have a
contradiction of it being an hierarchy (I'm using the symbol ">" loosely).
--
A young lady who faints, must be recovered; questions must be
answered, and surprizes be explained. Such events are very interesting,
but the suspense of them cannot last long. A few minutes made Emma
acquainted with the whole. - Emma, Jane Austen
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
> > That's nice for you. I happen to love poetry too, but your
> > anthropocentrism means that you think it important because it is
> > human, not because it has any intrinsic merit.
>
> Yes, you are right. I do value poetry because it is human, and you are
> right that I do happen to be a human. I'm writing this reply under gnu
> emacs, and it has a feature named "Emacs Psychiatrist," with which I
> can carry on an extensive conversation that has the appearance of
> making sense. But it is just trash, because my perspective is human,
> and the "psychiatrist" is only aping the behavior of a human. I don't
> have the good fortune of escaping my existence to adopt that of
> something else, even another person. I especially can't adopt a
> hypothetical olympian position that has no material existence
> whatsoever.
>
The first program that did this was called 'Eliza', I believe, it is
interesting to see just how much people project onto the simple questions!
>
> This, of course, brings up the question of objectivity. As I mentioned
> before, I accept the importance of objectivity, but not "pure"
> objectivity. I believe it is generally agreed that a fact is also an
> effect of its observation. I'm not recommending we step into this bog,
> but it would be useful at least to know whether you maintain there are
> purely objective facts that are uncontaminated by the research project
> that defines them, and what position in the philosophy of science you
> embrace
>
There are purely objective facts in logic and mathematics - they are
tautologies, but they can be proved.
The rest are more or less subjective.
However, a number of well known and agreed facts are sufficiently
probable for it not to be worth questioning them unless you are a first
year philosophy student. The universe exists, we are not victims of some
Pascal's daemon or brain in a vat experiment, the speed of light in a
vacuum is a constant, Newton's laws of gravitation and the kinematic
equations apply sufficiently well for them to be useful in engineering,
all living things have arrived at their current state through the
process of evolution, evolution works through two mechanisms, selection
and sexual selection. And so forth.
--
It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher pleasures,
occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the
lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the
intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of
character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it
to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two
bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental.-- J.S.Mill
chapter II, Utilitarianism
Haines Brown
> Even that isn't ideal. To me an axiom is as in definition 2, but
> something used as an unproved basis from which an axiom system is
> built.
Then we don't seem to disagree as long as you admit the legitimacy of
the three definitions you offer. You here only say that you _prefer_
to use one of those definitions. Others (such as a mathematician) may
prefer to use another.
> > Incidentally, entirely contrary to what I suspect to be your own
> > position, I'd argue (not here, you will be glad to know) that all
> > statements that have truth value are necessarily both subjective
> > and objective. It may mystify you how I manage to reconcile the
> > apparent contradiction, but it is what I try to do
> >
> There is nothing mystifying about it - you simply don't define
> 'subjective' and 'objective' in a standard or sensible manner and
> it's easy.
You are probably right here. I did not venture to define the terms,
but used them as I understand historians generally mean
them. Historians usually use the term "subjective" to suggest that the
personal bias of the researcher colors statements of fact. "Objective"
statements therefore are independent of such coloration. My point was
that it is impossible in the sciences to make such statements.
> Statements are, actually, neither subjective nor objective, they are
> strings of symbols. Statements are the easy bit, it is when you want
> to ascribe some meaning to them that you end up with the
> difficulties - the logical positivists had it that a statement was
> either nonsense, tautological or empirically verifiable. There is a
> great appeal to this simple classification, but it has some serious
> problems, not least that it, itself, taken as a statement is either
> nonsense or none of these.
Understood, but maybe here we can flesh out an area of
disagreement. There are some complicated elements here (meaning) and a
briar patch (relevance of logical positivism). It would be useful to
start with an example of a simple statement of fact and then see to
how meaning or logical positivism is necessarily involved.
To that end, perhaps we can use an example. Suppose someone were to
list the factors that led to World War II. Everyone would agree that
some factors were minor, and some were major. By distinguishing the
more important factors, I assume that the resulting explanation of the
origins of the war becomes more objectively accurate. Is there
anything wrong with the use of the word "objective" here? Is not the
relative importance of factors in part a result of my understanding of
how history works rather than simply a matter of evaluating the
information I have concerning the war?
There are various criteria for the validity of scientific theories
that do not rely on empirical tests (see, for example, Lakatos and
Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge). For example, a
simple theory is "better" than a complex one. A more comprehensive
theory is preferable to a narrow one. A theory with the least number
of "auxiliary hypotheses" to account for exceptions or anomalies is
preferable. Some explanations are "elegant;" some theories are
heuristic. One of my favorites, although quaint, is that some theories
have good Gestalt.
My aim here is not so much to insist upon a position, but to encourage
you to define your own so that I can pin down where I might disagree.
--
Haines Brown
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > Another example of a starting assumption that we really need to
> > question. Popper's falsification criterion for scientific statements
> > is often been roundly criticized, and is not really honoured in
> > practice in many scientific situations.
> >
> That there are criticisms (round or otherwise) of something does not
> mean that it is false - just as a lack of them does not mean that it is
> true. If you have a particular objection to the criterion then state it
> and we can discuss it, a vague appeal to people who might have
> criticised it doesn't cut the mustard.
You are right, but I was not saying that falsificationism is false,
but that there is a widespread criticism of falsificationism. That is,
I have no reason to assume it to be valid or not to question it.
> once the theory is ready it needs to be falsifiable, otherwise it is
> of no value.
The Big Bang came up, for which there are a range of theories, as you
point out. Falsificationism is not about practical tests of a theory,
whether we can test these theories empirically, but about the formal
nature of theories. There are no empirical tests for these theories in
the near future, and so does that invalidate them all? There seems to
me a difference between saying that a falsifiable theory is preferable
over one that is not, and imposing a logical criteria in advance of
theory formation. I already mentioned that I'm rather inclined to the
position of scientific realism on this issue.
> Marxism is not scientific for many other reasons as well - it does not
> use valid methods, does not take cognizance of recent findings and has
> not produced a coherent corpus of knowledge, to mention a few more.
I've no idea what you mean by "valid methods," and that seems to me to
be an issue here yet resolved. If by "Marxism" you mean Marx's own
corpus, then, of course you are right, but if you mean that no
Marxists keep up with what's going on, then that would be hard to
prove, and on the surface seems unlikely. I'm a Marxist, and I've
tried to keep up as best I can, but I'm not taken with
sociobiology. If sociobiology is the only valid approach to social
science, then I suppose it means I've not kept up. But that seems a
weak argument, and in any case, it is my personal fault, not the
result of my happening to be a Marxist. Further, were I to define what
makes me a Marxist, you might not like that definition, and that gets
us into another circular argument. Since there's all kinds of
Marxists, who often disagree with one another, it is hard to make a
blank statement about Marxism without specifying just what you mean.
As for Marxism not producing a coherent corpus of knowledge, you may
be right, as I just suggested (maybe that's to its credit
;-)). Marxism is in part a method, and this method has resulted in
some understandings in all fields of knowledge, and much of that
understanding has been absorbed into "mainstream" science. For
example, World Systems Theory was cooked up by people who were
self-described Marxists, but no one thinks of that theory today as a
Marxist theory. It can't be dismissed, for it is perhaps the dominant
paradigm today in world history study. I happen to have objections to
it, but it does seem to represent a fairly coherent body of
knowledge. On the other hand, can one say that macroeconomics offers a
coherent body of knowledge? Or, your favorite, sociology? That a
science generates completing theories, exposes areas of our ignorance,
seems a virtue to me seems a virtue, and I naturally wonder if you
would dismiss such sciences as not being sciences at all.
Your objection to Marxism seems a red herring, for the issue seems to
have died a long time ago. It seems to me that today the concern is
not Marxism vs. non-Marxist approaches, but approaches that are
scientifically valid, whether containing Marxist elements or not. No
one today need apologize for being Marxist, but are held to account
solely for what they achieve in science.
> That isn't quite true. Of course we always only have the past to
> draw information from - what has happened, not what will
> happen. There are some things where we can't perform experiments as
> we would on a laboratory bench, cosmology is one and research into
> human beings another one for practical the other for ethical
> reasons. This doesn't mean that we can't test things through
> prediction.
You've lost me here. You point out (correctly) that there some things
we can't do empirical experiments with, such as events that took place
in the past. But my point was that in evolutionary sciences, you can't
make predictions (which presumes the object of study is subject to
universal laws that persist in time), but you make retrodictions (try
to reconstruct the events that probably resulted in a specific
outcome). To put the issue in very simple terms: is the state of any
system in any point in time simply the manifestation of universal
laws? To put this in another way, the positivist ideology of the
laboratory rested upon the "discovery" of universal laws, but these
laws were in part the effect of laboratory closure, of creating an
artificial world. In the "real world," things don't entirely respect
universal laws (as any student doing a physics experiment will
testify). These laws are "universal," not in that they fully explain
what happens in this world, but because they are a factor in all times
and places.
> Biology (what you call 'evolutionary science') also has methods that
> enable predictive truth to be established. Darwin's finches, were
> able to show evolutionary divergence over a relatively short period
> of time - now, of course, we can establish exactly what the
> divergence involved genetically as well.
The term "evolutionary science" is not my invention, but a
conventional attempt to distinguish scientific objects that have
increasing entropy and decreasing entropy, and therefore imply
different scientific approaches. Could you have predicted the specific
divergence of Darwin's finches? Of course not, and so your meaning is
not clear here. Through genetic studies we can only retrodict the
appearance of a particular kind of finch.
I get the feeling I'm getting close to perhaps one of your basic
assumptions here, and so let me ask this: Are outcomes in any process
studied by the sciences unequivocally determined by their initial
state? This is a very simple straightforward question, and your
response to it might help greatly to clear away the fog.
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>Even that isn't ideal. To me an axiom is as in definition 2, but
>>something used as an unproved basis from which an axiom system is
>>built.
>
>
> Then we don't seem to disagree as long as you admit the legitimacy of
> the three definitions you offer. You here only say that you _prefer_
> to use one of those definitions. Others (such as a mathematician) may
> prefer to use another.
>
actually mean when using the term.
>
>
>>>Incidentally, entirely contrary to what I suspect to be your own
>>>position, I'd argue (not here, you will be glad to know) that all
>>>statements that have truth value are necessarily both subjective
>>>and objective. It may mystify you how I manage to reconcile the
>>>apparent contradiction, but it is what I try to do
>>>
>>
>>There is nothing mystifying about it - you simply don't define
>>'subjective' and 'objective' in a standard or sensible manner and
>>it's easy.
>
>
> You are probably right here. I did not venture to define the terms,
> but used them as I understand historians generally mean
> them. Historians usually use the term "subjective" to suggest that the
> personal bias of the researcher colors statements of fact. "Objective"
> statements therefore are independent of such coloration. My point was
> that it is impossible in the sciences to make such statements.
>
>
>
>>Statements are, actually, neither subjective nor objective, they are
>>strings of symbols. Statements are the easy bit, it is when you want
>>to ascribe some meaning to them that you end up with the
>>difficulties - the logical positivists had it that a statement was
>>either nonsense, tautological or empirically verifiable. There is a
>>great appeal to this simple classification, but it has some serious
>>problems, not least that it, itself, taken as a statement is either
>>nonsense or none of these.
>
>
> Understood, but maybe here we can flesh out an area of
> disagreement. There are some complicated elements here (meaning) and a
> briar patch (relevance of logical positivism). It would be useful to
> start with an example of a simple statement of fact and then see to
> how meaning or logical positivism is necessarily involved.
>
Axiom 2: There is, within this universe of discourse, a set of all sets.
Theorem 1: A = the set of all sets ( the universal set) is an element of A.
Proof:
If A is an element of A then A is not the universe because it is
contained by another set.
If A is not an element of A then there is a set (A) that is not an
element of A, so A is not the universe.
Consequence. Axiom 1 in false. There is no Universe.
>
> To that end, perhaps we can use an example. Suppose someone were to
> list the factors that led to World War II. Everyone would agree that
> some factors were minor, and some were major. By distinguishing the
> more important factors, I assume that the resulting explanation of the
> origins of the war becomes more objectively accurate. Is there
> anything wrong with the use of the word "objective" here? Is not the
> relative importance of factors in part a result of my understanding of
> how history works rather than simply a matter of evaluating the
> information I have concerning the war?
>
Why would they agree that some factors are minor and some major? Where
does that come from?
If Minor factor W was that somebody had a hangover and said something
intemperate at a cruical time then, if ~W then WWII would not have
occured or, if it had, it would have occurred in a quite different way.
Making minor factor W a major factor.
If Major factor M was that people were unemployed then, if a minor
player had changed the popular view so that 'unemployed' became 'ready
for fun' then major factor M might not have lead to WWII. Making major
factor M a minor factor.
How can you possibly judge such things unless crudely?
>
> There are various criteria for the validity of scientific theories
> that do not rely on empirical tests (see, for example, Lakatos and
> Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge). For example, a
> simple theory is "better" than a complex one. A more comprehensive
> theory is preferable to a narrow one. A theory with the least number
> of "auxiliary hypotheses" to account for exceptions or anomalies is
> preferable. Some explanations are "elegant;" some theories are
> heuristic. One of my favorites, although quaint, is that some theories
> have good Gestalt.
>
These aren't criteria for validity! Far from it. These are indeed
criteria for preferring one theory to another, but validity only comes
from testing against what is the case.
Famously the solution to the four-colour problem in mathematics is a
computer proof whose print-out is several feet high. This is inelegant,
complex and lacks any Gestalt. However, if it is correct then that is
the end of it, it is the solution.
>
> My aim here is not so much to insist upon a position, but to encourage
> you to define your own so that I can pin down where I might disagree.
>
I am not seeking to give any particular position - I have only responded
to posts because I'm concerned about errors.
--
When we have got to the end of this chapter (but not before) we must
all turn back to the two blank chapters, on the account of which my
honour has lain bleeding this half hour--I stop it, by pulling off one
of my yellow slippers and throwing it with all my violence to the
opposite side of my room, with a declaration at the heel of it-- -
Tristam Shandy Chapter 4.LXXXIV.Laurence Sterne
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > > OK. What approach are you unclear about? The scientific approach,
> > > the sociobiological findings, or something else? Tell me what you
> > > need to learn and I'll give you the references.
> >
> > Great. Just cite a couple of scholarly (although accessible for the
> > amateur), evaluations of Dawkins and/or the sociobiology field from
> > someone outside the field. I don't want to learn sociobiology, for
> > which I lack the talent or time or inclination, but I do need to
> > understand the field in a scientific context, its current state, its
> > contribution to other sciences, an evaluation of its method or
> > foundations, etc
> >
> I mentioned E.O.Wilson's "Sociobiology", it is accessible, well written
> and clear.
>
> For a more up to date review, I have read excellent reports of Dawkins'
> latest book. I'm looking forward to getting a copy myself once it is out
> in paperback, if the library doesn't have one before then - it is "The
> Ancestor's Tale".
>
> A good source generally is the site http://www.hbes.com/ you'll find
> pointers to debates, recent research and many other sources there - well
> worth a browse.
Curious. I asked for an outside opinion, and you seem to list
insiders. I was asking for citations of such works as the following,
which I pick off my shelf and find in their indices a discussion of
sociobiology. I did not want to impose books I happen to find
agreeable, and so asked you to provide them, but you seem hesitant to
do so.
Sattler, Rolf.
Bio-philosophy (Berlin, 1886)
Allen, Garland.
Life Sciences in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 1978)
Ruse, Michael.
Philosophy of Biology Today (Albany 1988).
Dyke, C.
The Evolutionary Dynamics of Complex Systems (New York, 1988).
Plotkin, H. C., ed.
The Role of Behavior in Evolution (Cambridge, 1988).
Oyama, Susan.
The Ontogeny of Information (Cambridge, 1985).
Nitecki, Matthew H., ed.
Evolutionary Progress (Chicago, 1988).
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>Haines Brown wrote:
>
>
>>>Another example of a starting assumption that we really need to
>>>question. Popper's falsification criterion for scientific statements
>>>is often been roundly criticized, and is not really honoured in
>>>practice in many scientific situations.
>>>
>>
>>That there are criticisms (round or otherwise) of something does not
>>mean that it is false - just as a lack of them does not mean that it is
>>true. If you have a particular objection to the criterion then state it
>>and we can discuss it, a vague appeal to people who might have
>>criticised it doesn't cut the mustard.
>
>
> You are right, but I was not saying that falsificationism is false,
> but that there is a widespread criticism of falsificationism. That is,
> I have no reason to assume it to be valid or not to question it.
>
>
>
>>once the theory is ready it needs to be falsifiable, otherwise it is
>>of no value.
>
>
> The Big Bang came up, for which there are a range of theories, as you
> point out. Falsificationism is not about practical tests of a theory,
> whether we can test these theories empirically, but about the formal
> nature of theories. There are no empirical tests for these theories in
> the near future, and so does that invalidate them all? There seems to
> me a difference between saying that a falsifiable theory is preferable
> over one that is not, and imposing a logical criteria in advance of
> theory formation. I already mentioned that I'm rather inclined to the
> position of scientific realism on this issue.
>
speculation from scientific theory. If you speculate X, then find and
dandy for you. If you produce a theory X that can be falsified then we
can to and investigate if it is, or is not the case. That is a
fundamental difference, not a logical one.
>
>
>>Marxism is not scientific for many other reasons as well - it does not
>>use valid methods, does not take cognizance of recent findings and has
>>not produced a coherent corpus of knowledge, to mention a few more.
>
>
> I've no idea what you mean by "valid methods," and that seems to me to
> be an issue here yet resolved. If by "Marxism" you mean Marx's own
> corpus, then, of course you are right, but if you mean that no
> Marxists keep up with what's going on, then that would be hard to
> prove, and on the surface seems unlikely. I'm a Marxist, and I've
> tried to keep up as best I can, but I'm not taken with
> sociobiology. If sociobiology is the only valid approach to social
> science, then I suppose it means I've not kept up. But that seems a
> weak argument, and in any case, it is my personal fault, not the
> result of my happening to be a Marxist. Further, were I to define what
> makes me a Marxist, you might not like that definition, and that gets
> us into another circular argument. Since there's all kinds of
> Marxists, who often disagree with one another, it is hard to make a
> blank statement about Marxism without specifying just what you mean.
>
present evidence (apart from you feeling happy to be a Marxist) for
these lacunae being addressed then do so.
>
>
>>That isn't quite true. Of course we always only have the past to
>>draw information from - what has happened, not what will
>>happen. There are some things where we can't perform experiments as
>>we would on a laboratory bench, cosmology is one and research into
>>human beings another one for practical the other for ethical
>>reasons. This doesn't mean that we can't test things through
>>prediction.
>
>
> You've lost me here. You point out (correctly) that there some things
> we can't do empirical experiments with, such as events that took place
> in the past. But my point was that in evolutionary sciences, you can't
> make predictions (which presumes the object of study is subject to
> universal laws that persist in time), but you make retrodictions (try
> to reconstruct the events that probably resulted in a specific
> outcome). To put the issue in very simple terms: is the state of any
> system in any point in time simply the manifestation of universal
> laws? To put this in another way, the positivist ideology of the
> laboratory rested upon the "discovery" of universal laws, but these
> laws were in part the effect of laboratory closure, of creating an
> artificial world. In the "real world," things don't entirely respect
> universal laws (as any student doing a physics experiment will
> testify). These laws are "universal," not in that they fully explain
> what happens in this world, but because they are a factor in all times
> and places.
>
produce models - laws, equations, theories, formulations, ideas,
superstitions - that try to make sense of the way it works.
To try to say that the world works by universal 'laws' is to presuppose
what science is working to find out - it is to put the cart before the
horse.
This is a standard Marxist problem. Marxist believe, as an article of
faith, that there are historical processes, this is unproven and
probably unprovable, it is just a theory - but one that, as an article
of faith, can't be disputed with Marxists, any more than any other
theological or metaphysical theory can be.
>
>
>>Biology (what you call 'evolutionary science') also has methods that
>>enable predictive truth to be established. Darwin's finches, were
>>able to show evolutionary divergence over a relatively short period
>>of time - now, of course, we can establish exactly what the
>>divergence involved genetically as well.
>
>
> The term "evolutionary science" is not my invention, but a
> conventional attempt to distinguish scientific objects that have
> increasing entropy and decreasing entropy, and therefore imply
> different scientific approaches. Could you have predicted the specific
> divergence of Darwin's finches? Of course not, and so your meaning is
> not clear here. Through genetic studies we can only retrodict the
> appearance of a particular kind of finch.
>
> I get the feeling I'm getting close to perhaps one of your basic
> assumptions here, and so let me ask this: Are outcomes in any process
> studied by the sciences unequivocally determined by their initial
> state? This is a very simple straightforward question, and your
> response to it might help greatly to clear away the fog.
>
No. Not for the reasons you think, but because we don't live in, nor can
we easily (or ever maybe) construct closed systems to establish if this
is, or is not, the case.
I answer no because you say 'unequivocally'. Equivocation is necessary
to establish exactly what you mean by 'initial state'. Explain what you
mean and I can give you a more precise answer.
--
Now the chapter I was obliged to tear out, was the description of this
cavalcade, in which Corporal Trim and Obadiah, upon two coach-horses
a-breast, led the way as slow as a patrole--whilst my uncle Toby, in his
laced regimentals and tye-wig, kept his rank with my father, in deep
roads and dissertations alternately upon the advantage of learning and
arms, as each could get the start.- Tristam Shandy Chapter 2.LX Laurence
Sterne
Haines Brown
> Again, until you are clear with the differences it sounds silly to
> say that you might right poetry to increase your chances of having a
> high-status mate, and that is indeed not why you do it, proximately,
> but is the underlying, or ultimate reason why people do things.
No, I understand the argument. My objection is that it is
reductionist. I assume you understand my point and are aware of the
dangers of reductionist argumentation, although you undoubtedly feel
escape the charge. The issue arises with your justification for
the words "underlying" or "ultimate."
Let me take a little example. There's an old adage here: for want of a
nail the shoe was lost, for want of a shoe the horse was lost, for
want of a horse the general was lost, for want of a general, the
battle was lost (excuse my inaccurate paraphrase).
We have a causal chain here in which the nail was a contributory
factor to the loss of the battle. A reductionist argument would be
that it was the principle, or sole cause of the loss of the
battle. That flies in the face of common sense, and so what is wrong
with the argument?
1. We know that there are many factors, and so the issue is reducing
it to just this one. In the social sciences, reductionist arguments
are always felt to be undesirable, although at the same time some
simplification is necessary. So the objection to reductionism is
usually to a reduction to just one factor.
2. You could not have predicted the battle would be lost simply from
knowing the nail was insecure, but you can retrodict from the
outcome to determine that the nail's loss was one factor, although
perhaps an insignificant one.
3. We need to employ some criterion by which to distinguish important
factors from lesser factors. For example, the loss of a nail is
accidental, but we prefer explanations in human affairs that
emphasize human decision making (neg-entropic) or general forces at
work (postively entropic).
--
Haines Brown
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > My point here is to suggest that each of your general categories
> > hides considerable variety and complexity, and so we need to find
> > a dividing line to distinguish trivial differences from
> > substantial similarities. I don't think this can be done
> > scientifically, which is why I objected before to empiricism
> I think you need to explain what you are meaning by 'empiricism' -
> it doesn't make sense to me in your final sentence so you must be
> using the word to mean something different.
Fair enough. Empiricism suggests that all theory or statements of fact
derive from experience. In the case of social class, which is the
present context, sociologists often define them in terms of shared
characteristics, such as income. People with income below a certain
level are the poor; above a certain income are the rich; everyone else
is middle class.
While such classifications have practical use in specific situations,
they are criticized as being "scientifically inoperative." That is,
one can't create a theory of social dynamics with them.
There are a number of reasons why. In part it is because you are
defining social groups in terms of traits that are embedded in the
individual, when in fact people are social beings.
As I suggested when mentioning class defined as a relation of
production, people can be classified in terms of their relation to
what is outside.
For example (not of social class), in an election, people might vote
for a nationalist party. There is no simple empirical measurement of
the person that might predict such behavior as a manifestation of
innate qualities. A person might vote nationalist because of feelings
of personal insecurity, but another insecure person might not. How
many people feel insecure, the reasons for that insecurity, and how
they behave as a result, involve a range of extrasomatic factors.
I don't want to be controversial here, but I suspect the term "middle
class" is largely political propaganda. The dividing line between the
three empirical classes mentioned are entirely arbitrary. You can
shift them at will to substantiate various explanations. While income
can be determined from empirical observations, the classifications
themselves can't. They are subjective. A social theory that relies on
such a category as "middle class" therefore becomes suspect.
--
Haines Brown
Haines Brown
> Well this isn't quite so. Emergent properties aren't mysterious in
> the sense that they cannot be described by refrerence to the level
> below, just that that is an inappropriate, clumsy and unilluminating
> way to describe them.
Aha! Sorry to be answering your series of messages one by one, but I
think this statement impinges on an important point that remains
unclear here.
You seem to agree that an emergent level cannot be unequivocally
predicted from knowledge of the level from which it emerged. That's
what is meant by emergence: the appearance of new behaviors or
properties that could not have been unequivocally (mechanically)
predicted.
> Once we can see (or project) a useful pattern into events at a
> higher level we feel we understand them better - that doesn't mean
> that the pattern is part of the configuration, only that we feel it
> helpful to think that it is. Emergent properties are what we decide
> them to be, not features of the thing itself.
I'm not clear about what you mean here. Are you saying that the
emergent properties or behaviors are merely subjective (effects of our
need to understand), and not objective (real properties of the
emergent level)?
Oak trees appear to bear acorns. However, that can't be observed in
the oak seed, and so it is only a useful convention, and oak trees
don't _really_ bear acorns. Surely you don't argue this, and so where
do I misunderstand?
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
> Curious. I asked for an outside opinion, and you seem to list
> insiders.
>
matched, slugging out some point of order. It is a scientific matter,
where you have those who are correct, supported by evidence and those
who are simply wrong and opinionated. I've given you references to those
you can rely upon to have matters supported by evidence. There is no
point at all in giving you references to those who have no evidence!
'Insiders' and 'outsiders' suggests a political set of groupings.
Science doesn't work that way. You have to examine the evidence, based
on peer-reviewed, repeatable studies, not sift through competing
opinions to find those that suit you stance!
Welcome to the world of science! I hope you'll learn a lot and enjoy it.
--
Now the chapter I was obliged to tear out, was the description of this
cavalcade, in which Corporal Trim and Obadiah, upon two coach-horses
a-breast, led the way as slow as a patrole--whilst my uncle Toby, in his
laced regimentals and tye-wig, kept his rank with my father, in deep
roads and dissertations alternately upon the advantage of learning and
arms, as each could get the start.- Tristam Shandy Chapter 2.LX Laurence
Sterne
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>Again, until you are clear with the differences it sounds silly to
>>say that you might right poetry to increase your chances of having a
>>high-status mate, and that is indeed not why you do it, proximately,
>>but is the underlying, or ultimate reason why people do things.
>
>
> No, I understand the argument. My objection is that it is
> reductionist. I assume you understand my point and are aware of the
> dangers of reductionist argumentation, although you undoubtedly feel
> escape the charge. The issue arises with your justification for
> the words "underlying" or "ultimate."
>
political view. It is not, it is the scientific approach to problems
that has proved itself to work by the cars, computers, electric lights,
drugs and other artefacts (the wheel, for example) that you use in your
everyday life. To argue that it is just a position is ridiculous.
--
"Perhaps I intended you to say so, but I meant self-command. You had,
somehow or other, broken bounds yesterday, and run away from your own
management; but to-day you are got back again--and as I cannot be always
with you, it is best to believe your temper under your own command
rather than mine." -- Emma, Jane Austen
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>Haines Brown wrote:
>
>
>>>My point here is to suggest that each of your general categories
>>>hides considerable variety and complexity, and so we need to find
>>>a dividing line to distinguish trivial differences from
>>>substantial similarities. I don't think this can be done
>>>scientifically, which is why I objected before to empiricism
>
>
>>I think you need to explain what you are meaning by 'empiricism' -
>>it doesn't make sense to me in your final sentence so you must be
>>using the word to mean something different.
>
>
> Fair enough. Empiricism suggests that all theory or statements of fact
> derive from experience.
>
have nothing else, so nothing else can be the case.
What does it mean in any sensible context?
>
In the case of social class, which is the
> present context, sociologists often define them in terms of shared
> characteristics, such as income. People with income below a certain
> level are the poor; above a certain income are the rich; everyone else
> is middle class.
>
That is clearly nonsense! Poor means somebody who cannot survive,
somebody who starves, has no home, no medical support etc. The pretence
that anybody in the UK is 'poor' is simply that, posturing pretence.
--
"Me!--not at all," replied Mr. Knightley, rather displeased; "I do not
want to think ill of him. I should be as ready to acknowledge his
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > Let me try again, more simply. Any dissipation (positively entropic
> > process) dissipates through some medium (matter or field). Cosmic
> > expansion might seem the exception, but there are constraints present
> > there as well, so perhaps not. The characteristics of this medium
> > limit the possibilities for the dissipation (constrain the probability
> > distribution of possible outcomes), or else the medium would not have
> > structure at all. The probability distribution of the end state is
> > narrower than the initial state. This is said to have lower entropy
> > for that reason. It is the emergence of a less probable structure,
> > which in turn must (I believe) constrain further dissipation,
> > etc. Voila, a thermodynamic engine.
> I'm not sure this makes much sense. By 'dissipation' do you mean
> something like what happens when a fart expands to fill a room?
Yes. This seems a simple and unambivalent example of a system moving
toward greater entropy. The expansion of a gas to fill a container is
actually the textbook example. The term "dissipation" is
conventionally used to refer to systems with increasing entropy.
> What do you mean by the 'probability distribution' of a state?
A process having multiple possible outcomes, some being more likely
than others. My use of the phrase narrowing of the range of these
outcomes does not necessarily imply a bell curve. I offered the
example of copper-sulphate crystal formation that should have made
this clear.
> Are you trying to say that, in the example above, the state of the
> fart half an hour later has a 'narrower probability distribution'
> than that of the fart when first released?
No, the expansion of a gas to fill its container is a dissipative
system. My reference to probability distribution was to emergent
systems.
> It makes no sense to me to say that a 'less probable structure' emerges
> and that somehow a 'less probable structure' constrains things. What are
> you trying to say?
You may be confusing two different things. One is that the structure
through which dissipation takes place necessarily constrains the
probability distribution of possible outcomes. My crystal example was
meant to make this clear, where the lattice structure dictates which
of the possible crystal forms will actually develop. I suggested,
secondly, that the existence of structures constrain
dissipation. Again, in the crystal example, the relatively lower
energy state represented by bonded molecules only ensures that bonding
will occur, and it is the specific molecular properties, the packing
rules, that determine the probability distribution of possible crystal
types. My characterizing these structures as "improbable," although
accurate, may have confused you.
> > I apologize for this crude description of a thermodynamic engine, and
> > so let me give an example. Suppose we have a supersaturated solution
> > of copper sulphate. The molecules in this supersaturated solution MUST
> > as a whole seek to bond because their bonded state has higher entropy
> > (energy state in this case) than their free state in a supersaturated
> > solution.
> >
> Wait a minute. What do you mean by 'the molecules ..must', 'as a whole'?
> Each molecule is affected by forces, no doubt about that, and it will
> move according to them. What do you mean by 'as a whole' in this context?
Two things here, "must" and "as a whole." Must is simply the Second
Law of Thermodynamics. "As a whole" because the Second Law is a
probabilistic law, specifying the behavior of the system as a whole,
not each of its constituents in itself. So the phrase is present just for
the sake of accuracy. A particular molecule at a particular time may
not be "trying" to bond, but the molecules as a whole must surely do
so. This is an example of a system behavior that may not apply to its
parts.
> You are talking as if entropy is a force. It isn't.
>
> Things don't move because of entropy. Things move to more chaotic states
> because of all possible states a more chaotic state is more probable -
> if you have a crystal then there are fewer possible states so something
> (heating, hitting it with a hammer) is required to change it to a more
> chaotic state.
You are right. Entropy is not a force, but the description of a system
state. I spoke of the Second Law of Thermodynamics as a force that
moves a system toward a more probable state, toward higher
entropy. While a chaotic state is more probable, the fact is that a
crystal, a less chaotic state, did appear. I.e., the crystal is
improbable, which was my point. Smashing the crystal is not probable
(requires considerable energy in the form of hammering). So what is
your point?
> Molecules don't form bonds according to a probability distribution!
> The form bonds because of the way forces act on each particular
> molecule according to its orientation. Observing this we can
> describe the different bonds as you say as 'packing rules' and,
> observing this we can draw a graph of the probability distribution -
> but these are our observations of patterns, our model, they are not
> what makes things happen in the first place!
Again, a basic point is getting obscured here. If I observe crystals
forming and find that 90% of the time they take one form, and 10% take
another, I make the statement that this crystal formed the first way
90% of the time. So far, so good. This indeed is our observation of a
pattern (not a "model", but that's another issue we discussed
before). Who suggested our observations cause things to behave in
accordance with our observations? Rather, a common sense view is that
our little rule of thumb corresponds to reality. Maybe not, but you
have to explain why not.
> Your anthropomorphic view of crystals being encouraged to do things
> because other crystals felt the good vibrations is nice and '60s. It
> is just a fairy story though, a nice one for chemistry lessons so
> that people pass their exams.
>
> What happens is that more the surface area available for bonding
> increases so the probability that a bond will be made increases - we
> see this happen and it looks as if the seed crystal has 'encouraged'
> the bonding, it hasn't, the bonding is simply proportional to the
> surface area of crystal exposed.
Exactly. The word "encouraged" is yours, although I don't find it
objectionable in informal discourse. If I say that parking on the
hillside encouraged my car to roll, it is not a scientific statement,
but understood properly, is perfectly useful. I said nothing about
"good vibrations" either, and the Second Law of Thermodynamics is not
fashionable nonsense. Further, there's no obvious justification for
your use of the term "anthropomorphic" here, an I've no idea what you
mean to imply by it.
On the other hand, the engine that drives the process is obviously not
simply the surface area of the exposed surface area. It is the drive
to bond combined with the different possible kinds of surface areas
that are exposed to this bonding. I suspect that lurking in this
verbal fog is an assumption that empirical qualities are causal
agents. Certainly those qualities qualify causal relations, but in
themselves lack potency.
> The crystal is not an 'improbable state'!!! It is 100% probable because
> there you see it in front of you, a crystal. If you seed a
> supersaturated solution you'll end up with a crystal every time - you
> don't get much more probable than that.
Not the point. A measure of probability is always a relation. The
crystal is improbable in relation to the initial supersaturated
solution. You are correct that crystal formation can be predicted, but
that's not the point. You predict it because you've experienced
supersaturated solutions.
I suggest André Guinier, The Structure of Matter (London, 1984),
particularly the section, "Can a crystal structure be predicted or
explained?", pp. 86-101.
> You really seem to have misunderstood entropy rather badly.
>
> I can believe that that sort of muddled thinking, misunderstood
> snippets from distant chemistry lessons could be exactly what led to
> the woolly mess that is 'dialectical materialism' - thesis,
> antithesis, synthesis, what simplistic bosh!
Well, you don't specify where I've gone wrong. And I said nothing
about "thesis, antithesis, synthesis." Where did you pick up that
nonsense? Certainly not from anything I've said.
> It is invalid because it misunderstands entropy and the stories, or
> models, that we use to describe processes.
You have not raised specific objections to my comments about entropy
except where I've pointed out you've either misunderstood me or
injected something I did not say. What is it precisely I don't
understand? I described in abstract terms what is usually meant by a
"thermodynamic engine." What did you find wrong with that? I gave an
example of crystal formation, and you either didn't disagree with what
I said or put words into my mouth, and the only substantial difference
was whether the crystal formation was predictable And as for "stories"
and "models", I've already said I found your notion of models very
odd. And just who is "we?" You and your fellow bioevolutionists ;-)?
> It is a common problem that analogies, metaphors and stories are
> provided as pedagogic aids - but, instead of being discarded once
> the real matter is understood, they end up being believed as
> literally true.
I get the feeling you are have a position on the relation of
scientific explanation and the reality we seek to explain, but do not
come right out and say it. Let me ask, then, are scientific theories
just myths? If I could get a straight answer to that question, I've
have some ground on which to stand, for if everything we say is
fiction, stories, analogies, lacking in much truth value, that makes
discourse difficult.
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>Well this isn't quite so. Emergent properties aren't mysterious in
>>the sense that they cannot be described by refrerence to the level
>>below, just that that is an inappropriate, clumsy and unilluminating
>>way to describe them.
>
>
> Aha! Sorry to be answering your series of messages one by one, but I
> think this statement impinges on an important point that remains
> unclear here.
>
> You seem to agree that an emergent level cannot be unequivocally
> predicted from knowledge of the level from which it emerged. That's
> what is meant by emergence: the appearance of new behaviors or
> properties that could not have been unequivocally (mechanically)
> predicted.
>
particular level - not magic.
Ice and water have properties that are different and both emerge from
the properties of H2O. Neither is mysterious, both emerge as a result of
the essential properties of the molecule, H2O, and the environment in
which it finds itself. Both are patterns that we impose upon H2O in our
interpretation, or modelling, of the substance.
>
>
>>Once we can see (or project) a useful pattern into events at a
>>higher level we feel we understand them better - that doesn't mean
>>that the pattern is part of the configuration, only that we feel it
>>helpful to think that it is. Emergent properties are what we decide
>>them to be, not features of the thing itself.
>
>
> I'm not clear about what you mean here. Are you saying that the
> emergent properties or behaviors are merely subjective (effects of our
> need to understand), and not objective (real properties of the
> emergent level)?
>
Yes.
--
Now the chapter I was obliged to tear out, was the description of this
cavalcade, in which Corporal Trim and Obadiah, upon two coach-horses
a-breast, led the way as slow as a patrole--whilst my uncle Toby, in his
laced regimentals and tye-wig, kept his rank with my father, in deep
roads and dissertations alternately upon the advantage of learning and
arms, as each could get the start.- Tristam Shandy Chapter 2.LX Laurence
Sterne
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > This, of course, brings up the question of objectivity. As I
> > mentioned before, I accept the importance of objectivity, but not
> > "pure" objectivity. I believe it is generally agreed that a fact
> > is also an effect of its observation. I'm not recommending we step
> > into this bog, but it would be useful at least to know whether you
> > maintain there are purely objective facts that are uncontaminated
> > by the research project that defines them, and what position in
> > the philosophy of science you embrace
> There are purely objective facts in logic and mathematics - they are
> tautologies, but they can be proved.
>
> The rest are more or less subjective.
Here you bring up the question I raised in my previous note, but it
remains a bit ambivalent. That is, you accept purely objective "facts"
in logic and math, but my question was about scientific research,
obviously, and so am I to conclude you think of scientific facts as
subjective? And if so, how do you define "more or less?" Is the "less"
here a subtle reference to objectivity?
The ontological status of the fact is a very simple question with a
variety of difficult answers, which people have debated endlessly. It
should therefore be possible for you to state what your position is in
relation to all that debate without difficulty. True, I've not defined
my own position exactly, either, but then the discussion is not about
my outlook on things, but on your unequivocal defense of sociobiology
as almost the sole explanation of almost anything. Or at least you
have allowed that impression to arise.
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
emergent properties that I produced a little while back:
"
I am trying to clarify the range of meanings which the term "emergent
property" may bear. I am offering a preliminary definition, which may
well be
incorrect.
A property P is said to be an "emergent property" of x iff:-
A composite entity C is commonly said to have P; and
C can in some sense be said to be comprised of elements (x, y, z...)
There is no apparent commitment to the proposition that all constituent
elements of C must share any one property.
It is obvious that this definition will need to be tightened up
considerably. Just how it is to be tightened up will be interesting,
though I think it is a vast topic.
According to the above definition, we could have C == water, and x, y,
z... being arbitrary water molecules. According to the definition, since
water is wet,
wetness is an emergent property of x (a water molecule).
In a more complicated instance, glider-ness may be a property of C
where C == an instantiation of a Life game. Here, x might be a computer
display
unit, a computer memory, a machine state, or a machine state
description schema, or perhaps many other things. We might include the
retina of the
observer and the observer's pattern-recognition system (which I have
suggested before).
My problem with the definition of course is that we can argue about
which of the many (possibly varied) components of C is x - or is P (as
the definition
implies) equally a property of all components, including y, z...?
As a perhaps over-complex example of the kind of concrete ambiguity
that we face when using the term "emergent property", it may strike some
as
reasonable to talk about consciousness as an emergent property of a
machine/brain-state, but not of a neuron or a flip-flop. However, there
have
been those who have claimed that a (reduced) form of consciousness does
inhere in neurons - and for that matter, the molecules and atoms of
which brain-stuff is composed.
It would be useful to analyze the concept of "emergent property"
because in the slipshod fashion in which I have defined it, it is not
very difficult to make
metaphysical hay with it. So, can we sharpen it up? And if we can,
where does it get us?
"
Second Post by me
"
I agree with the formalization - I understand the concern regarding
'gives rise to'. I didn't intend any implication of cause by it, though,
clearly it appears
to be there. Probably the better 'is an emergent property of' is
better.
As to the propositions:
1: I am happy with this.
2: This makes sense too.
3: I agree.
Since I am constrained by this method of reply, I should mention that I
have considered the contradiction. The one arising from the
consideration of
egg boxes [cartons might be better] and egg crates [or egg carton
crates].
The contradiction holds using your notation:
x is "an egg"
- defined as the egg and shell to avoid double yolker questions -
defined as a hen's egg to avoid parasitic egg questions
P is "the number of eggs in it"
C1 is "the egg box, or carton"
C2 is "the egg crate or carton crate"
i) x !==> P {eggs never have eggs in them}
- which provides support for proposition 3
ii) C1 ==> P (egg cartons have a number of eggs in them} - which
provides support for proposition 2
iii) C2 ==> P {egg crates have a number of eggs in them}
{this may be better stated as C2 ==> p, see below, because a property
that emerged at the level below can't re-emerge at this level.}
but
iv) C2 !==> P {egg crates do not have a number of eggs in them} -
because they contain only egg cartons
One obvious way of dealing with this is to say - "obviously the egg
crates contain eggs, they are just wrapped in cartons". So (iv) is false
and (iii) carries
the day.
Though this is helpful in resolving this example, I don't think that it
is wise to take the easy way out. There may well be another better
chosen example
where (iv) is certainly true {consider one answer to the group mind
question}.
I don't think that we need to see (iii) and (iv) as necessarily a
contradiction. I would be happy to say that in the case of C2, it both
has the property P,
and it does not have it - at the same time. It may be useful (to the
wholesaler) to consider that it does not have it, and for him to sell
the crates in units
of cartons. At the same time, it is useful for the retailer to sell the
crates, and think of them, in units of eggs, which his customers will
consider the
proper unit.
In topology, it is quite possible to have sets that are both open and
closed (clopen is the coinage for this). This is a useful property and
does not
interfere with the fact that most sets are either open or closed, but
not both - the empty set is [if I remember correctly, which I may well
not] neither open
nor closed.
So, I would propose that we discuss:
The operation 'is contained in' <<.
(exists A) (exists B) {((all x)(x << A) -> (x << B)) -> (A << B)}
Proposition 4:
If (exists C) (exists D) {(P(C) && C << D) -> p(D)}
If C has an emergent property and is contained in D, then D has the
same emergent property.
My view is that this is not true.
This can't, by the way, be derived from definition II. Though
consideration of this suggests that definition II should be re-stated
as:
(C ==> P) <==> (P(C) & (all X)[C<X> -> !(X ==> p)]}
In other words, it is important that the components of C do not have
the property p, not that they don't have the emergent property P.
Though, of course:
(all C){!p(C) -> !P(C)}
and, again of course, trivially:
(all C){P(C) -> p(C)}
The main difficulty that this gives rise to is how to distinguish where
P arises. If we encounter a much nested entity {I don't mean ants},
then, we may
suppose that at level Ci we detect an emergent property P. However, we
may later find tha this is only a property p that emerged as the
property P at a
level Ci-n below it.
I don't think that this difficulty in any way means that there is a
problem with the definition. Quite the contrary. I think that part of
the strength of this
definition is that it points to the important question of exactly at
what level particular properties emerge. We could imagine a complex
system S, with
multiple properties Pi which emerge at different layers. We may then
find that (all Pi)(pi(S)) so that the properties that emerge at lower
levels are
preserved in the overall system. Or, in another system T, we may find
that the properties Pi don't exist at all at the top level (all
Pi)(!pi(T)). Both seem
intuitively fine to me, quite often there would be a mix of both in a
complex system with some properties hidden at lower levels and not
visible higher
up.
I could see that, for such a system, on could construct a matrix
showing exactly where (at which layer of complexity or sub-system)
certain properties
emerge, and then where they are masked or hidden by higher layers of
complexity (rather that they cease to apply as properties).
Again this fits of the common sense observation that billiard balls
exhibit a spin that is a property of quite a different order to the spin
that the electrons
that they contain exhibits.
"
--
When we have got to the end of this chapter (but not before) we must
all turn back to the two blank chapters, on the account of which my
honour has lain bleeding this half hour--I stop it, by pulling off one
of my yellow slippers and throwing it with all my violence to the
opposite side of my room, with a declaration at the heel of it-- -
Tristam Shandy Chapter 4.LXXXIV.Laurence Sterne
Haines Brown
> >>Statements are, actually, neither subjective nor objective, they
> >>are strings of symbols. Statements are the easy bit, it is when
> >>you want to ascribe some meaning to them that you end up with the
> >>difficulties - the logical positivists had it that a statement was
> >>either nonsense, tautological or empirically verifiable. There is
> >>a great appeal to this simple classification, but it has some
> >>serious problems, not least that it, itself, taken as a statement
> >>is either nonsense or none of these.
Why do you drag logical positivism into a simple question of whether
we can ever make statements about the world that are entirely free of
our social existence? The context of the discussion was our social
existence, not experience per se. Further, if, as is often argued (in
the social sciences you so cavalierly dismiss), our social existence
affects our mental categories and our logic, then how is one to decide
whether to make mental life or the world primary? Science can't answer
that, nor can logical positivism.
One might be left with merely an existential or moral choice, or
perhaps the alternatives are artificial in the first place. But
instead of addressing the question of whether we can escape a social
conditioning of our statements of fact, you apparently just assume we
can't and offer the following:
> Axiom 1: There exists a universe of discourse.
> Axiom 2: There is, within this universe of discourse, a set of all sets.
> Theorem 1: A = the set of all sets ( the universal set) is an element of A.
> Proof:
> If A is an element of A then A is not the universe because it is
> contained by another set.
> If A is not an element of A then there is a set (A) that is not an
> element of A, so A is not the universe.
>
> Consequence. Axiom 1 in false. There is no Universe.
You must admit that this must strike most people as bizarre, even
lunatic. Perhaps you meant it as a joke, but it actually has some
use. Axiom 1 offers an arbitrary statement of fact about a concept
that is undefined; axiom 2 is an arbitrary presumption of sets within
that universe. The consequence is not that there's no universe, but
that the term "universe" as used in axiom 1 was nonsense to begin
with, and perhaps "sets" in axiom 2 as well. This syllogism just shows
that we get into trouble when we try impose logical categories on the
real world of experience.
Is your implication that these rules, presumably a manifestation of
the structure of the human brain, or more likely, the modern
Euro-American capitalist brain, are the condition of knowledge in that
they are prior to experience? If so, what justifies such a position?
Not all logical positivists would agree with your apparent presumption
that the truth value of a statement is independent of experience, but
that's an academic question, for logical positivism died out in the
1930s, except for logical empiricism in the U.S. The point of logical
empiricism was to sharpen our scientific discourse, not to muddy it or
to substitute it for experience. While your example does show that
"universe" is a suspect concept, that seems irrelevant to the initial
question regarding objectivity in scientific statements.
My own inclination when the issue of objectivity comes up is to think
of it in terms of the sociology of consciousness, but I can't pursue
that line with you because you have already dismissed in advance all
sociology as worthless, along with all the other social sciences
except sociobiology. Although you might make the same charge of me,
for dismissing logical positivism with a guffaw, I take comfort in the
fact that my realism at least keeps me in touch with the rest of
humanity.
Just as the reduction of meaning to mental categories tends to cut one
off from much of the world, if the only discourse that you will accept
is that of sociobiology, that seems to exclude the overwhelming
majority of the human race from a meaningful discourse as well. Why
does this not fall under the definition of a cult?
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>>>Statements are, actually, neither subjective nor objective, they
>>>>are strings of symbols. Statements are the easy bit, it is when
>>>>you want to ascribe some meaning to them that you end up with the
>>>>difficulties - the logical positivists had it that a statement was
>>>>either nonsense, tautological or empirically verifiable. There is
>>>>a great appeal to this simple classification, but it has some
>>>>serious problems, not least that it, itself, taken as a statement
>>>>is either nonsense or none of these.
>
>
> Why do you drag logical positivism into a simple question of whether
> we can ever make statements about the world that are entirely free of
> our social existence?
>
>
The context of the discussion was our social
> existence, not experience per se. Further, if, as is often argued (in
> the social sciences you so cavalierly dismiss), our social existence
> affects our mental categories and our logic, then how is one to decide
> whether to make mental life or the world primary? Science can't answer
> that, nor can logical positivism.
>
of the same coin.
>
> One might be left with merely an existential or moral choice, or
> perhaps the alternatives are artificial in the first place. But
> instead of addressing the question of whether we can escape a social
> conditioning of our statements of fact, you apparently just assume we
> can't and offer the following:
>
environment - it doesn't add anything, it is simply a political statement.
>
>
>>Axiom 1: There exists a universe of discourse.
>>Axiom 2: There is, within this universe of discourse, a set of all sets.
>>Theorem 1: A = the set of all sets ( the universal set) is an element of A.
>>Proof:
>>If A is an element of A then A is not the universe because it is
>>contained by another set.
>>If A is not an element of A then there is a set (A) that is not an
>>element of A, so A is not the universe.
>>
>>Consequence. Axiom 1 in false. There is no Universe.
>
>
> You must admit that this must strike most people as bizarre, even
> lunatic. Perhaps you meant it as a joke, but it actually has some
> use. Axiom 1 offers an arbitrary statement of fact about a concept
> that is undefined; axiom 2 is an arbitrary presumption of sets within
> that universe. The consequence is not that there's no universe, but
> that the term "universe" as used in axiom 1 was nonsense to begin
> with, and perhaps "sets" in axiom 2 as well. This syllogism just shows
> that we get into trouble when we try impose logical categories on the
> real world of experience.
>
demonstrating what an axiom means. I'm pointing out the problem with
using the term 'axiom' loosely.
>
> Is your implication that these rules, presumably a manifestation of
> the structure of the human brain, or more likely, the modern
> Euro-American capitalist brain, are the condition of knowledge in that
> they are prior to experience? If so, what justifies such a position?
>
suggesting is 'prior to experience' and how is it so?
>
> Not all logical positivists would agree with your apparent presumption
> that the truth value of a statement is independent of experience, but
> that's an academic question, for logical positivism died out in the
> 1930s, except for logical empiricism in the U.S. The point of logical
> empiricism was to sharpen our scientific discourse, not to muddy it or
> to substitute it for experience. While your example does show that
> "universe" is a suspect concept, that seems irrelevant to the initial
> question regarding objectivity in scientific statements.
>
is perfectly normal English.
>
> My own inclination when the issue of objectivity comes up is to think
> of it in terms of the sociology of consciousness, but I can't pursue
> that line with you because you have already dismissed in advance all
> sociology as worthless, along with all the other social sciences
> except sociobiology. Although you might make the same charge of me,
> for dismissing logical positivism with a guffaw, I take comfort in the
> fact that my realism at least keeps me in touch with the rest of
> humanity.
>
consciousness'? It appears a meaningless phrase to me - why not
elaborate on it so that it makes some sort of sense.
What 'realism' are you claiming for yourself?
>
> Just as the reduction of meaning to mental categories tends to cut one
> off from much of the world, if the only discourse that you will accept
> is that of sociobiology, that seems to exclude the overwhelming
> majority of the human race from a meaningful discourse as well. Why
> does this not fall under the definition of a cult?
>
If you have an alternative theory of meaning, please elucidate.
Sociobiology doesn't provide 'discourse', it is simply a scientific
discipline with results.
What do you mean by 'meaningful discourse' - things that fit your
prejudices?
--
Whatever forces a certain number of students to any college or
university, independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers,
tends more or less to diminish the necessity of that merit or
reputation.-- AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS. by Adam Smith
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> > Curious. I asked for an outside opinion, and you seem to list
> > insiders.
> >
> You miss the point. It isn't a political debate with two sides,
> equally matched, slugging out some point of order. It is a
> scientific matter, where you have those who are correct, supported
> by evidence and those who are simply wrong and opinionated. I've
> given you references to those you can rely upon to have matters
> supported by evidence. There is no point at all in giving you
> references to those who have no evidence!
>
> 'Insiders' and 'outsiders' suggests a political set of
> groupings. Science doesn't work that way. You have to examine the
> evidence, based on peer-reviewed, repeatable studies, not sift
> through competing opinions to find those that suit you stance!
Very interesting reply. You not only presume that scientific issues
are un-political and a-moral, but that there are no representatives of
differing schools of thought in a particular field arguing pro and con
over a particular theory, with both sides using proper scientific
methods. Do I understand you correctly?
Do I also understand you to insist that there's no competent scholarly
opinion outside the domain of sociobiology? Those within that domain
rely on evidence, while those outside it are just opinionated and
simply ignore the evidence?
Yes, I suppose the capitalist (I'm aware that my use of the word in
this context is provocative, but if my estimation above is correct,
your position is clearly ideological) ideal is that of the isolated
scholar pursuing pure science in his (sic) laboratory, seeking
knowledge for its own sake, etc., etc., etc.
Let me suggest to the contrary:
1. The scholar has a social location, and arguably that necessarily
affects a range of intellectual issues. a) Does the dominant
paradigm represent a secure home, or is there a inner need to
challenge it to make a name for oneself or because it seems
virtuous to be a non-conformist? b) Is the scholarly literature
to which one is primarily exposed written in Chinese or German?
In my own field, until fairly recently, that made an enormous
difference in defining what is a problem and how to go about
resolving it, and there was a certain lack of intelligibility
between Chinese and European scholars as a result. c) How we see
reality, is a function of culture and social location.
For example, it has been demonstrated that ancient Egyptians did
not see parallel lines the way we do today. Also, the
conventional view is that the breakthrough to a more modern
scientific outlook in the European Renaissance depended on the
adoption of Platonic mysticism that in effect liberated
consciousness from seeing things in terms of just their
particulars, but as related to one another as aspects of an
abstract (metaphysical) greater whole.
2. Can people dis-embody themselves, jump out of their skins, divide
their mind into insular compartments? Of course not. The old view
was that we must try to do that as best we can, although we might
never entirely reaching the goal. But in the last half century it
has become apparent that there's far more bias in scientific
work than is usually admitted, and it is probably better to admit
the inevitability of that bias so that we might be able to strive
for a bias that is least distorting rather than pretend we can
escape that bias.
Need I drag out what is known to everyone, and that is how the
source of funding for medical research in the U.S. affects the
outcome of most research? A recent article (December 2) in The
New England Journal of Medicine represents a typical example.
3. One's training tends to shape how we see things. Teachers
encouraged us to enter a field in the first place and shape our
outlook subsequently. This affects not only our field of study,
but the axiom set we will bring to research. All sciences employ
axiom sets, and axiom sets as a whole are socially determined.
The science we pursue addresses deep psychological needs. When I
was a student in c. 1954, someone on the faculty had just written
a book on the reasons why young people choose a scientific career
(unfortunately, I have forgotten the author and title, but it
turned to be a major work). A pre-publication draft in fascicle
form circulated among us students, and we read it avidly. It
affected me profoundly and others as well. We became aware that
the field we choose had facets that address our personal needs,
and how we address that field must reflect those needs as well.
4. All sciences, to varying degrees, have some moral and political
implications. We ignore these at our peril, not only at our moral
and political peril, but because we become insensitive to how
they affect our work. Theory is a crucially constructive element
in any science, and is always present, but there's no simple
minded way to locate a barrier to separate social values and
culture and scientific theory, which is a cultural product.
For example, many scientists fudge the results of their
research. In some cases (such as recently the U.S. FDA) it is
just a matter of dishonesty. But in most cases, is expresses a
need to have results conform to a particular outcome, which to
varying degrees enables us to disregard certain
outcomes. Einstein is notorious for disregarding results when his
experiments didn't reveal what he wanted, and so he wisely ended
confining himself to theoretical physics ;-). There's a range of
behaviors between these two extremes that all involve a
subservience of empiria to theory. Again, the Lukatos and
Musgrave book I cited before spends a lot of time discussing what
we do about anomalies so that we don't have to pretend they don't
exist.
5. Science is a social activity carried out by social beings. To
claim that its method, its objectives, and its conclusions have
nothing to do with human beings or society, boggles the
imagination. Those who suggest there can be a surgical separation
between our living selves and our intellectual selves, or between
our intellectual life and the world in which we live, are
asserting what flies in the face of common sense and experience,
and the burden of proof falls on their shoulders. The argument
that the surgery is possible or necessary has failed so
completely, that few would still argue the position today.
6. Although for convenience we distinguish the sciences, both social
and natural, and while we sense there are distinct levels of
science, the fact is that all the sciences are interconnected and
interdependent to some extent. The ideology of scientific pursuit
in complete isolation from the world implies isolation of one
science from the others as well, and this is clearly not the case.
I am fully aware that children are taught in elementary school that
the pursuit of science (natural science at least), is value free, and
that any influences arising from our personal or social or political
existence necessarily distort the results, compromising the value of
our scientific work. This, like much else the state crams down the
throats of helpless children, is highly ideological. It is nothing but
propaganda.
It is an expression of late nineteenth century positivism, the
ideology of the laboratory, the presumption that isolation yields
truth. Clearly, the opposite is true: only engagement can yield
truth. That is, to know the world, you must engage the world.
The notion that truth about the world is gained by separation from the
world, is a very naive view probably held by very few scientists
today. Buddhist monks might feel otherwise, but they are in pursuit of
religious insight, not knowledge of the world. Certainly we don't want
our biases to undercut the truth value of our conclusions, but to
pretend the problem is solved by sweeping them under the carpet is
naive. It simply flies in the face of common sense and of everyone's
experience. To embrace the world is to embrace distortion, but at the
same time it also makes possible a reduction of that distortion.
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>Haines Brown wrote:
>>
>>>"Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>>> Curious. I asked for an outside opinion, and you seem to list
>>>insiders.
>>
>> >
>>You miss the point. It isn't a political debate with two sides,
>>equally matched, slugging out some point of order. It is a
>>scientific matter, where you have those who are correct, supported
>>by evidence and those who are simply wrong and opinionated. I've
>>given you references to those you can rely upon to have matters
>>supported by evidence. There is no point at all in giving you
>>references to those who have no evidence!
>>
>>'Insiders' and 'outsiders' suggests a political set of
>>groupings. Science doesn't work that way. You have to examine the
>>evidence, based on peer-reviewed, repeatable studies, not sift
>>through competing opinions to find those that suit you stance!
>
>
> Very interesting reply. You not only presume that scientific issues
> are un-political and a-moral, but that there are no representatives of
> differing schools of thought in a particular field arguing pro and con
> over a particular theory, with both sides using proper scientific
> methods. Do I understand you correctly?
>
In my previous replies I asked a number of questions. I haven't seen any
answers. Do you proceed by declamation and the mass destruction of straw
men only or can you answer questions?
--
A young lady who faints, must be recovered; questions must be
answered, and surprizes be explained. Such events are very interesting,
but the suspense of them cannot last long. A few minutes made Emma
acquainted with the whole. - Emma, Jane Austen
Haines Brown
I'm not sure this exchange is worth belaboring, but since you include
a reference to myself, I suppose I must.
You mention three "lacunae."
1. Marxism fails to use scientific methods. Not a "lacuna" of course,
but rather an issue of questionable methodology. If you feel the
methodology of Marxism is flawed, then I'd be glad to address your
criticisms of its method, but until I know what you believe to be
its method, what can I say, for your objection may be gratuitous.
I'm not sure that Marxism has a "method." Marxists these days seem
to employ methods similar to non-Marxists in their fields, and so
it would be useful to have you specify in which way they do not.
If I were to guess, perhaps you feel all theories must be subject
to predictive empirical tests. I had questioned such a view on the
basis of standard science, not in terms of Marxism. If my
estimation of your position is correct, then Marxism is not
involved here. Its inclusion may be a red herring.
2. Marxism does not take cognizance of recent findings. The first
problem is that you anthropomorphize a body of knowledge,
distinguishing it from its practitioners. So the issue immediately
bifurcates:
a) How can I address your objection until you specify just how this
very complex, perhaps even contradictory, body of knowledge
structurally excludes what's going on in science? The case would be
challenging to argue, for what defines Marxism is a contentious
issue, but you are certainly welcome to give it a try. But until
you do so, I have nothing with which to disagree.
b) Or perhaps you mean rather that all Marxists are indifferent to
what is going on in science. This seems impossible to prove in
principle. Haldane was a noted Marxist scientist. Did he ignore
what was going on in the field of biology at the time? No one
seriously suggests that. I have already cited at least one
contemporary Marxist author who has criticized sociobiology, and so
at least one Marxist has taken it into account. You seem to
conflate taking something into account and agreeing with it, which
are two quite different things. I try to take religion into
account, but don't agree with its findings.
I get the feeling that for you, perhaps sociobiology is the only
respectable science, for all the other sciences you have mentioned
you have either entirely dismissed (sociology) or largely dismissed
(cosmology, anthropology). Is it not possible to give Dawkins a
sympathetic reading and yet still disagree with him? Correct me if
I'm wrong, but you seem to assert that Marxism does not take into
account the recent findings of sociobiology. I don't happen to be
aware of any Marxist sociobiologists, but it flies in the face of
common sense to suggest that no contemporary Marxists has given
Dawkins a serious reading.
3. Marxists have not produced a coherent corpus of knowledge. That is
perhaps true, but hardly represents a "lacuna." Further, I don't
know that "coherence" is necessarily a virtue in any science, which
is presumably exploratory, tentative, and evolving. I've already
listed other sciences, such as economics, which manifest quite
different paradigms, and not all of them are in
contention. Coherence might be what we strive for, but we all fall
short of it.
Marxism is not a specific theory, but a range of theories that
naturally arise from a working-class perspective. In fact it is the
_only_ outlook that is specific to the modern working class. One
should assume that some theories proposed by the working class
(pour soi) are more developed, more mature, more coherent than
others. Also, we need to take into account, these days
particularly, that Marxists may generate theories that are not
clearly related to any class position, although other theories may
make that connection explicit.
More specifically, I'm a Marxist, but that does not mean I agree
with the findings of all Marxists--far from it. I also find that I
agree with many points raised by non-Marxists. Do I offer a
coherent theory? I wish I could say so, but I'm just a student, an
explorer, one never absolutely sure of my conclusions, and my views
undoubtedly enjoy greater coherence in some areas than in others. I
hope that most investigators can say the same for themselves.
> > But my point was that in evolutionary sciences, you can't make
> > predictions (which presumes the object of study is subject to
> > universal laws that persist in time), but you make retrodictions
> > (try to reconstruct the events that probably resulted in a
> > specific outcome).
> > ...
> > In the "real world," things don't entirely respect universal laws
> > (as any student doing a physics experiment will testify). These
> > laws are "universal," not in that they fully explain what happens
> > in this world, but because they are a factor in all times and
> > places.
> Not true. Things happen because the world works in a particular
> way. We produce models - laws, equations, theories, formulations,
> ideas, superstitions - that try to make sense of the way it works.
Hard to follow this. Is there causality? Of course. Are all outcomes
unequivocally determined by the prior state of the system? Of course
not. So your "a particular way" begs the question. Clarification is
needed. We use models, theory, etc. to make sense of our world, but
that's an epistemological point, not an ontological one. You are
confusing the two.
> To try to say that the world works by universal 'laws' is to
> presuppose what science is working to find out - it is to put the
> cart before the horse.
Again, you confuse epistemology and ontology.
> This is a standard Marxist problem. Marxist believe, as an article
> of faith, that there are historical processes, this is unproven and
> probably unprovable, it is just a theory - but one that, as an
> article of faith, can't be disputed with Marxists, any more than any
> other theological or metaphysical theory can be.
You deny there are processes in history? Well, what is history if not
a process? Perhaps you have a private definition of the word "process"
here. The standard meaning refers to a sequence of related states, and
that presumption is the condition for making any sense of history
whatsoever. Unless you deny the possibility of historiography (it is
not evolutionary biology, and so perhaps you do), process is at its
very core.
Also, I wonder what you mean by "theory." Science aims to generate
theories which strive to be truthful representations of reality. In
science, a theory is not an article of faith, for scientific theories
have a range of criteria by which we judge their relative truthfulness
as representations of the world. A theory is just our effort to
explain a process.
I suspect you have a criterion of truthfulness based solely on
empirical prediction, but I have already addressed the limitations of
that presumption, which you choose to ignore. This issue has nothing
to do with Marxism, but the legitimacy of any evolutionary science
that relies on retrodiction rather than prediction.
> > Are outcomes in any process studied by the sciences unequivocally
> > determined by their initial state? This is a very simple
> > straightforward question, and your response to it might help
> > greatly to clear away the fog.
> No. Not for the reasons you think, but because we don't live in, nor
> can we easily (or ever maybe) construct closed systems to establish if
> this is, or is not, the case.
Yes, some philosophers hold to this position, but not all. It was a
classic debate: Are uncertainties merely an artifact of our ignorance?
It seems to me that quantum mechanics, for example, put that issue to
rest, but some might objected that this refers only to a
micro-level. An historian might insist that human history is the story
of human creative actions, but a reductionist might insist that humans
are not really creative, and their actions are entirely pre-determined
by hidden forces. But that view is not held by historians (including
Marxist historians). Or do you dismiss historiography out of hand as
well?
It is my impression that the view that uncertainty is not an objective
fact (Einstein: God does not play dice) is a quaint view of pre-World
War II, and not seriously held today by the overwhelming majority of
scientists. A good book on this subject you might consider is Wesley
Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World
(Princeton, 1984).
> I answer no because you say 'unequivocally'. Equivocation is
> necessary to establish exactly what you mean by 'initial
> state'. Explain what you mean and I can give you a more precise
> answer.
My point was not this complicated, or I don't understand your
objection. An initial state is a description of a system at the
beginning of a process under study. An outcome, or final state is a
description of the system at some later point in the process. I don't
think I have to equivocate in offering these definitions.
My point about "unequivocally" has nothing to do with my definitions,
but whether a complete description of the initial state allows us to
predict completely the final state of the system. The issue here is
whether causality is always necessarily mechanical (the final state
can be exhaustively described simply from knowledge of the initial
state) or whether in some cases there can be the emergence of
properties that are not entirely predicated by our description of the
initial state.
All this addresses closed systems. With open systems, there are
naturally contingencies that mean the outcome of the process is not
entirely what we would expect from knowledge of the initial
state. However, this raises the philosophical point that when we bring
in contingencies, we are only opening the system wider, and so the
question remains. The system, the initial state that we wish to
describe exhaustively, must now include what will become an outside
contingency.
So we are back to where we started. In principle, the initial state of
the system must take into account the entire universe. And then, armed
with this knowledge, can we predict outcomes unequivocally? In theory,
having complete knowledge of the Big Bang, would be able to predict a
poem of Dryden? My point is that the issue of open or closed does not
address the issue of probabilistic causality. Since we can never have
absolute or complete knowledge of the initial state, we can never know
if the outcome is unequivocally determined.
I suspect your answer to this conundrum is that outcomes are indeed
predetermined, but that remains only an assumption, for there can be
no experiment that demonstrates this to be a fact. We need other
grounds on which to justify our position. My own is to adopt a realist
philosophy of science, but that's an existential choice, which I find
attractive on moral grounds as well as others. But the issue is that
you have not offered any justification for your apparent adoption of
the opposite position.
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> I'm not sure this exchange is worth belaboring, but since you include
> a reference to myself, I suppose I must.
>
in a detailed response to your points. You haven't managed to answer one
of them. I would like to think that this isn't because you are actually
quite incapable of it, so I look forward to you posting an answer to at
least some of my questions some day.
You did post a long refutation of a straw-man. I pointed out that that
was what it was and why - you haven't even managed to answer that.
I am not keen on ad hominem points, but, really, Haines, if you post
long rambling answers and then refuse (or incapable) of answering any of
the points questioned in response then I have to conclude that you have
nothing of substance to offer.
You have a choice of (I counted them) eighteen posts replying to your
rambles, most of them contained questions that you needed to answer.
Why not, in the interests of your own integrity and, maybe, in the
interests of your education, try to answer some of them.
Constructing new straw men and destroying them might give you a
delightful feeling of control (the Marxists entire rationale after all),
but it must leave you feeling just that tiny bit dishonest.
Maybe dishonesty doesn't worry you. Let's see - if you post some answers
to the questions that I posed in response to your long posting then we
might know.
Long rambles might have worked for Marxists in the past and made others
simply give up in boredom, but it won't work for me.
--
A young lady who faints, must be recovered; questions must be
answered, and surprizes be explained. Such events are very interesting,
but the suspense of them cannot last long. A few minutes made Emma
acquainted with the whole. - Emma, Jane Austen
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> You have a choice of (I counted them) eighteen posts replying to your
> rambles, most of them contained questions that you needed to answer.
I hope you will be forbearing. I have a life, and being deluged with
eighteen of your postings, I can only respond to one at a time, a day
at a time. This note is an exception, for it is OT, and I'll
momentarily take a look at your next post in the order I received
them.
> Why not, in the interests of your own integrity and, maybe, in the
> interests of your education, try to answer some of them.
This not ad hominem? I don't reply to your eighteen posts all at once
because I lack integrity? I don't answer because I'm not aware of my
need for an education at your knee? ;-)
> Constructing new straw men and destroying them might give you a
> delightful feeling of control (the Marxists entire rationale after
> all), but it must leave you feeling just that tiny bit dishonest.
This not ad hominem? I am motivated by a lust for power? All Marxists,
including myself are so motivated? I am dishonest?
> Maybe dishonesty doesn't worry you. Let's see - if you post some
> answers to the questions that I posed in response to your long
> posting then we might know.
Not ad homenem? Dishonesty does not worry me?
> Long rambles might have worked for Marxists in the past and made
> others simply give up in boredom, but it won't work for me.
OK, my posts are long and rambling. One reason is that I write them
primarily for myself. I know very well that no one out there has the
patience to listen in on our interminable dialog, so I'm not worried
about boring them. I don't bore you, for you quickly respond. I'd like
to think you benefit a little here and there, but who knows? I, for
one, do benefit a little, much like doing some calisthenics first
thing in the morning ;-)
As long as your posts say something new, and as long as your remarks
are not too ad hominem or in bad taste, I enjoy the little exercise. I
assume you do, too, for else you wouldn't bother. After all, here you
have an opportunity to debate a Marxist (however non-scholarly), and
given your comments, I get the impression that's not an ordinary
occurrence for you. I may not agree with many of your points, but I
find them interesting, nevertheless.
--
Haines Brown
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> >
> >>Again, until you are clear with the differences it sounds silly to
> >>say that you might right poetry to increase your chances of having
> >>a high-status mate, and that is indeed not why you do it,
> >>proximately, but is the underlying, or ultimate reason why people
> >>do things.
> > No, I understand the argument. My objection is that it is
> > reductionist. I assume you understand my point and are aware of
> > the dangers of reductionist argumentation, although you
> > undoubtedly feel escape the charge. The issue arises with your
> > justification for the words "underlying" or "ultimate."
> Not at all. You seek to claim that 'reductionist' is some sort of
> political view. It is not, it is the scientific approach to problems
> that has proved itself to work by the cars, computers, electric
> lights, drugs and other artefacts (the wheel, for example) that you
> use in your everyday life. To argue that it is just a position is
> ridiculous.
Interesting point, and worth looking at a bit more closely. I didn't
say or imply that reductionism is a political view, although it _can_
serve ideological ends. However, what I'd like to consider here is
your statement that reductionism "is _the_ scientific approach"
(emphasis added).
It is true that we always reduce the factors involved when studying a
problem, for we have to make a judgement about what is relevant or
meaningful and what is not. If I want to understand an auto accident,
the empty beer bottle on the floor might well be relevant, but the
color of upholstery is not. So I reduce the problem to manageable
terms by disregarding the upholstery color.
This introduces a subjective element, for I have made a judgement
about the relative importance of various factors. Hopefully I can
justify that subjective intervention, but the fact remains that any
weighing of the relative importance of data represents an intervention
based on criteria lying outside the event itself.
However, when the word "reductionism" is used, particularly in the
social sciences, it implies rather more than this. Let me quote from a
standard handbook:
Reduction is seldom an uncontentious activity, and to list some of
the many varieties of reductionism (which may be contrasted with
HOLISM) is to list a series of controversies: whether (as in
PHENOMENALISM) material objects are reducible to SENSE-DATA; whether
mental events are processes are reducible to physiological,
physical,or chemical events and processes in human brains (...);
whether SOCIAL STRUCTURES and social processes are reducible to
relationships between and actions of individuals (see METHODOLOGICAL
INDIVIDUALISM); whether (as denied by VITALISM) biological organisms
are reducible to physical systems; whether (as in LOGICAL
POSITIVISM) philosophy is reducible to ANALYSIS; ...
The reductionist sometimes justifies his activisty as a principle of
economy in EXPLANATION, a principle that has obviously paid off in
science; the anti-reductionist argues the existence of irreducible
or EMERGENT PROPERTIES.
And so it goes. I suspect you can find references to both of us in
here. I don't consider myself well-informed about sociobiology, but I
did object in principle to what I took to be its reductionist agenda
(my references to poetry, etc.) That is, I was looking critically at
what I took to its reductionist axiom.
You don't shy away from the term reductionism, insisting that what is
a practical methodology in daily life is valid also in science. If so,
I would beg to disagree. As I mentioned above, this economy in
explanation introduces a subjective factor, but if it can be
justified, it seems to be productive.
But this does not address what is described above as the "contentious"
nature of reductionism. The upper case words are references to other
sections in this work, and illustrate just how complex the issue is.
The source I quote does go on to suggest that often the contention is
more over the use of words than an issue of substance, and so I need
to have a more explicit statement of your reductionist axiom if I
expect to go beyond merely insisting that reductionism is
contentious. That is, in which specific respect (beyond mere utility)
would you define a reductionism?
It may be our disagreement is only verbal, but I can't come to that
conclusion until you state your reductionist axiom in specific terms.
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>Haines Brown wrote:
>>
>>>"Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>You have a choice of (I counted them) eighteen posts replying to your
>>rambles, most of them contained questions that you needed to answer.
>
>
> I hope you will be forbearing. I have a life, and being deluged with
> eighteen of your postings,
>
If you answered honestly then it would have taken you no longer than to
answer the post if I have put it in one long screed.
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> This note is an exception, for it is OT, and I'll
> momentarily take a look at your next post in the order I received
> them.
>
things for you to understand, entropy not least, and that'll take more
than a moment.
>
>
>>Why not, in the interests of your own integrity and, maybe, in the
>>interests of your education, try to answer some of them.
>
>
> This not ad hominem? I don't reply to your eighteen posts all at once
> because I lack integrity? I don't answer because I'm not aware of my
> need for an education at your knee? ;-)
>
recognised it yet.
>
>>Constructing new straw men and destroying them might give you a
>>delightful feeling of control (the Marxists entire rationale after
>>all), but it must leave you feeling just that tiny bit dishonest.
>
>
> This not ad hominem? I am motivated by a lust for power? All Marxists,
> including myself are so motivated? I am dishonest?
>
person, it is your choice, but, if you choose to be a Marxist the rest
goes along with it.
>
>
>>Maybe dishonesty doesn't worry you. Let's see - if you post some
>>answers to the questions that I posed in response to your long
>>posting then we might know.
>
>
> Not ad homenem? Dishonesty does not worry me?
>
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
> This introduces a subjective element, for I have made a judgement
> about the relative importance of various factors. Hopefully I can
> justify that subjective intervention, but the fact remains that any
> weighing of the relative importance of data represents an intervention
> based on criteria lying outside the event itself.
>
event itself is only approachable through subjective analysis. If you
wish to claim that there is such a thing as 'objectivity' then you
probably need to explain what you think it means and how you measure it.
>
> However, when the word "reductionism" is used, particularly in the
> social sciences, it implies rather more than this. Let me quote from a
> standard handbook:
>
>
> economy in EXPLANATION, a principle that has obviously paid off in
> science; the anti-reductionist argues the existence of irreducible
> or EMERGENT PROPERTIES.
>
elsewhere) are not necessarily irreducible at all. So the final phrase
should read 'argues the existence of irreducible emergent properties' -
the 'or' makes a nonsense of it.
>
>
> You don't shy away from the term reductionism, insisting that what is
> a practical methodology in daily life is valid also in science. If so,
> I would beg to disagree. As I mentioned above, this economy in
> explanation introduces a subjective factor, but if it can be
> justified, it seems to be productive.
>
always there, reduction doesn't add any extra.
>
> But this does not address what is described above as the "contentious"
> nature of reductionism. The upper case words are references to other
> sections in this work, and illustrate just how complex the issue is.
> The source I quote does go on to suggest that often the contention is
> more over the use of words than an issue of substance, and so I need
> to have a more explicit statement of your reductionist axiom if I
> expect to go beyond merely insisting that reductionism is
> contentious. That is, in which specific respect (beyond mere utility)
> would you define a reductionism?
>
reduction is one of the many tools of thought that one uses.
What, by the way, is 'mere' about utility?
>
> It may be our disagreement is only verbal, but I can't come to that
> conclusion until you state your reductionist axiom in specific terms.
>
There isn't a reductionist 'axiom', certainly not one that I have to state.
--
"You will not ask me what is the point of envy.--You are determined, I
see, to have no curiosity.--You are wise--but _I_ cannot be wise. Emma,
I must tell you what you will not ask, though I may wish it unsaid the
next moment." -- Emma, Jane Austen
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > You seem to agree that an emergent level cannot be unequivocally
> > predicted from knowledge of the level from which it emerged. That's
> > what is meant by emergence: the appearance of new behaviors or
> > properties that could not have been unequivocally (mechanically)
> > predicted.
> No, it isn't. Emergence simply describes behaviour that arises at a
> particular level - not magic.
I'm having trouble understanding you here. Agreed that emergence
describes behavior and properties arising at a particular level. But
to what does "No, it isn't" refer to? Are you suggesting my definition
is not satisfactory? I made a statement about a possible relationship
of levels, and you sort of define levels. It seems to me we are
talking about different, but possibly compatible, things.
> Ice and water have properties that are different and both emerge
> from the properties of H2O. Neither is mysterious, both emerge as a
> result of the essential properties of the molecule, H2O, and the
> environment in which it finds itself. Both are patterns that we
> impose upon H2O in our interpretation, or modelling, of the
> substance.
> >>Once we can see (or project) a useful pattern into events at a
> >>higher level we feel we understand them better - that doesn't mean
> >>that the pattern is part of the configuration, only that we feel
> >>it helpful to think that it is. Emergent properties are what we
> >>decide them to be, not features of the thing itself.
Let me see if I've got this right. You appear to be saying that the
solidification of ice could have been predicted from the properties of
water molecules. But it is conventional to refer to ice as a "phase"
of water, not as a level. What we need is a definition here of "level"
and "emergence."
There are situations where one level can be predicted from a parent
level, but because of its distinctive behavior becomes a separate
object of study. OK, but I didn't use the word "level" without
qualification, but said "emergent level." But to speak of an emergent
level is to suggest that it couldn't have been predicted from its
parent. I believe this is where we disagree. You appear to suggest all
levels are of the former sort, while I'm suggesting there is something
different about levels that are emergent.
One notion of emergence is that the property of a complex whole can't
be explained in terms of the properties of the parts. For example, the
mind is an emergent property of the brain. I take it that you suggest
that the mind can be reduced to properties of the brain. If I
characterize your position correctly, then the issue comes down to the
classic issue of parts and wholes.
> > I'm not clear about what you mean here. Are you saying that the
> > emergent properties or behaviors are merely subjective (effects of
> > our need to understand), and not objective (real properties of the
> > emergent level)?
> Yes.
But this seems yet another issue. An epistemological issue, not the
ontological issue discussed above. Are you saying the properties and
behaviors of things are nothing more than our mental constructions
that have no relation to reality? Do you embrace phenomenology?
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>Haines Brown wrote:
>
>
>>>You seem to agree that an emergent level cannot be unequivocally
>>>predicted from knowledge of the level from which it emerged. That's
>>>what is meant by emergence: the appearance of new behaviors or
>>>properties that could not have been unequivocally (mechanically)
>>>predicted.
>
>
>>No, it isn't. Emergence simply describes behaviour that arises at a
>>particular level - not magic.
>
>
> I'm having trouble understanding you here. Agreed that emergence
> describes behavior and properties arising at a particular level. But
> to what does "No, it isn't" refer to? Are you suggesting my definition
> is not satisfactory? I made a statement about a possible relationship
> of levels, and you sort of define levels. It seems to me we are
> talking about different, but possibly compatible, things.
>
that's not true. It isn't clear what you mean by 'mechanically' in the
above - unless you are trying to qualify the 'unequivocally'.
>
>
>>Ice and water have properties that are different and both emerge
>>from the properties of H2O. Neither is mysterious, both emerge as a
>>result of the essential properties of the molecule, H2O, and the
>>environment in which it finds itself. Both are patterns that we
>>impose upon H2O in our interpretation, or modelling, of the
>>substance.
>
>
>>>>Once we can see (or project) a useful pattern into events at a
>>>>higher level we feel we understand them better - that doesn't mean
>>>>that the pattern is part of the configuration, only that we feel
>>>>it helpful to think that it is. Emergent properties are what we
>>>>decide them to be, not features of the thing itself.
>
>
> Let me see if I've got this right. You appear to be saying that the
> solidification of ice could have been predicted from the properties of
> water molecules. But it is conventional to refer to ice as a "phase"
> of water, not as a level. What we need is a definition here of "level"
> and "emergence."
>
accompanying changes of property are emergent properties of water. This
is fair enough, they do emerge as a result of the structure of h2o, and
could, clearly, in principle, be predicted. They still are emergent, though.
>
> There are situations where one level can be predicted from a parent
> level, but because of its distinctive behavior becomes a separate
> object of study. OK, but I didn't use the word "level" without
> qualification, but said "emergent level." But to speak of an emergent
> level is to suggest that it couldn't have been predicted from its
> parent. I believe this is where we disagree. You appear to suggest all
> levels are of the former sort, while I'm suggesting there is something
> different about levels that are emergent.
>
find more usefully studied at a particular level. In principle they can
be reduced to the level below, but it isn't usually that helpful.
>
> One notion of emergence is that the property of a complex whole can't
> be explained in terms of the properties of the parts. For example, the
> mind is an emergent property of the brain. I take it that you suggest
> that the mind can be reduced to properties of the brain. If I
> characterize your position correctly, then the issue comes down to the
> classic issue of parts and wholes.
>
emergent property of the brain. That is why Chalmers, as I mentioned,
describes it as something that supervienes over the brain and may,
itself, be a physical property of the universe like magnetism.
What 'classic issue' of 'parts and wholes' do you mean to refer to?
>
>
>>>I'm not clear about what you mean here. Are you saying that the
>>>emergent properties or behaviors are merely subjective (effects of
>>>our need to understand), and not objective (real properties of the
>>>emergent level)?
>
>
>>Yes.
>
>
> But this seems yet another issue. An epistemological issue, not the
> ontological issue discussed above. Are you saying the properties and
> behaviors of things are nothing more than our mental constructions
> that have no relation to reality? Do you embrace phenomenology?
>
I don't know why you're always keen on simplistic interpretations.
You make claims for the difference between 'objective' and 'subjective'.
So you need to support these claims.
I have made no claim that the real world is 'nothing more' than mental
constructions - that is another straw man.
What defense do you have for things being 'objective'?
I am prefectly happy with there being an external reality and us having
some contact with it, subjective though our experience is. I worry about
peculiar claims you've made that suddenly, when you use a standard
tool like reduction, you think it all becomes more subjective - this
clearly is a nonsense unless you have some sort of explanation of what
you think objectivity might be.
--
Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every writer,
from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, meant by
it, not something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure
itself, together with exemption from pain; and instead of opposing the
useful to the agreeable or the ornamental, have always declared that the
useful means these, among other things. -- J.S.Mill Chapter II,
Utilitarianism
Peter H.M. Brooks
> >>> > fact derive from experience.
>
>
> >> Trivially this is true - we only have our experience of the world,
> >> we have nothing else, so nothing else can be the case.
> >>
> >> What does it mean in any sensible context?
>
>
> you seek a more formal definition, I suppose. Then you say the
> definition needs a "sensible context." Not sure what you mean here. Do
> you mean an example of the definition's application?
>
No. I'm not looking for a more formal definition. To claim that
empiricism is simply that is to say nothing of interest - there is no
point in having a word for something that is all-embracing, we already
have 'everything'.
>
> Let me start with your first request.
>
> Empiricism in general seems to imply two different things: a) All
> concepts arise from experience; b) the truth of all statements is
> justified by experience. The first is, I suppose, ontological
> (explains the relation of concepts and experience), and the latter,
> epistemological (how do we know our statements about the world are
> true?)
>
> I am inclined to make a further distinction between empiricism as a
> general policy and as an absolute statement of principle. That is,
> there's a difference between saying we should try generally to put our
> feet to the fire of experience, and saying that all our concepts must
> arise entirely from experience. The latter has the problem that it
> excludes logical concepts from being a priori, and most people would
> be unwilling to do that, insisting that mathematics and logical
> relations are not derived from experience, but are somehow
> metaphysical. I'm not inclined to make formal constructs and analytic
> propositions metaphysical or a priori, which is where I differ
> probably from most people.
>
The latter doesn't exclude logic, nor mathematics. Though they arise
from our experience of the world they are internally consistent (we
don't need to bother with godel's findings in this context) and don't
require a world to be verified. There is no test against reality for 2 +
2 = 4.
>
> So what do I think to be the status of our concepts if they don't
> simply reflect experience, and are not metaphysical either? Without
> elaborating the argument I'd suggest that our concepts, formal
> relations, and analytic tools, are emergent properties of the brain
> that arise from experience, but don't reduce to it.
>
What is that supposed to mean? If that were the case then these things
could not be reproduced elsewhere - we know that they can be, on a
computer, so they are not irreducible by any means. How exactly the
brain gives rise to consciousness is another question - bats can use
their brains to triangulate, as can many other creatures, and computers,
so, as one example, triangulation is a calculation that requires no
mumbo jumbo to explain.
>
> If you are a reductionist, you will not care for this position, but so
> far you have not been explicit about your alternative. Perhaps you
> would suggest that a statement such as 1+1=2 is metaphysical (real,
> but not derived from experience). Perhaps it is a function of our
> brains (we must think that way, but the world we think about may not
> be that way). Or perhaps this statement is unreal (it has no real
> relation to the world or to the brain, but for some mysterious reason
> we find it works for us in useful ways).
>
The creation of the symbols and rules of manipulation used in logic is a
result of human thought processes. The logic that they describe has thus
been 'created' by human brains, it does, however, stand independent of
them as can be shown by my above argument.
>
> The definition I offered above is from a standard handbook, and is not
> intended to be partisan. If you reject this conventional meaning of
> the word, then I've got no idea how to approach the issue.
>
> As for an example of empiricism, let me introduce that in connection
> with the following exchange.
>
>
> >>> > In the case of social class, which is the present context,
> >>> > sociologists often define them in terms of shared characteristics,
> >>> > such as income. People with income below a certain level are the
> >>> > poor; above a certain income are the rich; everyone else is middle
> >>> > class.
>
>
> >> That is clearly nonsense! Poor means somebody who cannot survive,
> >> somebody who starves, has no home, no medical support etc. The
> >> pretence that anybody in the UK is 'poor' is simply that, posturing
> >> pretence.
>
>
> term "poor" refers to people having income below a certain
> level. Perhaps I should have made that clearer, but it seems to have
> been clear enough. Some poor people may be homeless, etc., but most
> are not. Some people who are not poor (have income over a certain
> level) have insufficient medical care (self employment and many jobs
> these days don't come with medical insurance, and that means not
> getting sufficient care, and sometimes in practice, not getting care
> at all). I hope you can go along with this convention for the sake of
> discussion, although it may not be the current usage in South Africa.
>
It is a poor usage, if you excuse the pun, for poverty is something that
exists in most of the world in the genuine sense of deprivation that
seriously hinders the ability to live. To use the same word to describe
relative affluence simply removes an important word from the vocabulary.
Politically it also suggests that people who are in a state of relative
affluence require the same level of intervention as those who are
genuinely poor - something that is to the real detriment of poor people
and to be rejected on humanitarian grounds rather than linguistic ones.
>
> My example of an empiricist definition of class was one in which the
> different classes (conventionally here called the poor, the middle
> class, and the rich), are categorized in terms of some empirical
> quality shared by the members of that class. Here that empirical
> quality is usually income, although sometimes here there may also be
> an vague empirical quality name "lifestyle." But for purposes of
> social planning, social legislation, etc., it seems simply on peoples'
> relative income. To bring up the question of whether or not the "poor"
> can survive rather than the term "poor" being an example of an
> empirical classification is a red herring.
>
Class is not usually defined so simplistically. Occupation is not vague
and describes the level of education and the groups of people with whom
members of a particular class are likely to associate. A school teacher
and a waitress might have similar incomes, but they are most certainly
not of the same social class - generally, at any rate, an individual
school teacher might supplement her income by working as a waitress, but
this does not affect the essential point.
>
> My point was that dividing people into groups based solely on shared
> empirical qualities, such as income, works only for short-range
> problems (such as social legislation or marketing), but not for long
> range problems, such as are engaged by social science (what makes
> society tick?). That is why categories based simply on empirical
> distinctions are usually dismissed as "scientifically inoperable." But
> since you reject sociology altogether, you apparently reject the
> notion of class as well, and with it any long-range explanation, which
> leaves me wondering if you are following any of this at all.
>
No. That does not follow at all. Many animals have hierarchical systems
- the term 'pecking order' comes from the behaviour of chickens and
social insects mirror caste systems in humans. So class is simply a
description of a standard biological function as it pertains to humans.
>
> How did all this come up in the first place? I had suggested that
> empirical categories force us to distinguish between accidental
> differences and essential differences, which introduces an element of
> subjectivism. While that view can certainly be challenged, for some
> reason you evade doing it and instead go off on some other issues,
> challenging me to redefine the term empiricism, a request for a
> "sensible context," a term which I found meaningless, and whether by
> definition the poor can survive. In the process, the original question
> was pushed out of sight, but I think it remains a valid one.
>
You keep claiming that this or that that you disapprove of 'introduces
an element of subjectivism' (or similar words), however you haven't
answered any of my questions relating to how you understand what
'objectivism' is, how you measure it, how you are able to tell (apart
from your prejudice) that X or Y are subjective or objective. Your
silence on this matter suggests to me that you have only the woolliest
notion of what these words mean.
--
When we have got to the end of this chapter (but not before) we must
all turn back to the two blank chapters, on the account of which my
honour has lain bleeding this half hour--I stop it, by pulling off one
of my yellow slippers and throwing it with all my violence to the
opposite side of my room, with a declaration at the heel of it-- -
Tristam Shandy Chapter 4.LXXXIV.Laurence Sterne
Haines Brown
properties.
"Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> It may help this discussion if I post a definition, and discussion,
> of emergent properties that I produced a little while back:
>
> I am trying to clarify the range of meanings which the term
> "emergent property" may bear. I am offering a preliminary
> definition, which may well be incorrect.
>
> A property P is said to be an "emergent property" of x iff:-
>
> A composite entity C is commonly said to have P; and
>
> C can in some sense be said to be comprised of elements (x, y, z...)
>
> There is no apparent commitment to the proposition that all
> constituent elements of C must share any one property.
I don't want to be obtuse about this, particularly because you are
about to revise the definition, but very often our conclusions simply
manifest starting assumptions, and so they must be considered
carefully. I'll engage the starting statements not as representing
your own view, but as the target of your critical evaluation.
What the above seems to boil down to is that x has a property that is
said to be emergent because it arises from its being a part of a
larger system that has that property.
If this is an accurate representation of these initial statements,
then it raises in my mind the following points:
1. While there is certainly something called systemic causality,
this set of statements is not my understanding of it, for the
system effect can be understood as a result of the relation of
parts as well as the empirical qualities of those parts. For
example, in the earlier European Middle Ages, the word "poverty"
did not refer to a lack of money (an empirical quality), but to
not having a (causal) relation with a lord or protector. Any
analysis of complexity must include the causal relation of its
parts, not just the qualities of those parts.
2 I'm also not willing to presume that systemic causality is the
same as emergence, although emergence may be one kind of systemic
causality. I was using the term in the way it is used in
thermodynamics, in which what "emerges" is not simply properties,
but a state that is improbable in relation to some prior
state. This can be referred to as entropy, which certainly can't
be reduced to a discussion of properties, but to a relation of
properties. Concentration has higher entropy than dispersal
because those states are compared, not because of the
concentrated or dispersed states in themselves. So the word
"emergence" remains contested and may not capture something we
seek to understand about the world.
3. The set of statements presumes a static situation in that C and x
have definable qualities. If, rather, we are talking about a
process, then we can't define those qualities in any unambivalent
way. How do you measure the height of the rising tide? You can
only do so at various arbitrary points in time, which imposes a
distortion of reality. Even an infinite number of such
measurements (integral calculus) represents only an
approximation, a distortion in principle. A movie gives us the
psychological impression of movement, but in fact is a series of
static images.
4. No one that I know suggests that the effect of one thing upon
another simply transfers a property of one to the other. The
effect of one thing upon another is a function of the properties
of each element and their causal relation, but hardly reduces to
those qualities. If I light a firecracker, the properties of my
match are not being transferred to the explosion. Perhaps I
misunderstand the above statements. I must be misunderstanding
the implications of the statements above.
5. An observation of qualities is a function of the interaction of
my mind's properties and a sense impression, and the sense
impression is a function of the relation of the features of my
sensory organs and an aspect of the world, and therefore not the
objective world. My mind is not a tabula rasa, but grasps the
world in the only way it can, in terms of its own capacities, my
experiences, and my culture. My sense organs don't exactly
reproduce the world, but translate certain features of the world
experience into nerve impulses. Further, I'm only experiencing a
small part of the world, and not only is that part out of
context, but is a function of my observational capacities. We
can't talk about the qualities of things as if they were an
autonomous Ding an sich, but as a complex process that gives rise
to novel conceptions that only approximate the world.
> It is obvious that this definition will need to be tightened up
> considerably. Just how it is to be tightened up will be interesting,
> though I think it is a vast topic.
Yes and yes.
> According to the above definition, we could have C == water, and x,
> y, z... being arbitrary water molecules. According to the
> definition, since water is wet, wetness is an emergent property of x
> (a water molecule).
Yes, agreed, this is silly.
> My problem with the definition of course is that we can argue about
> which of the many (possibly varied) components of C is x - or is P
> (as the definition implies) equally a property of all components,
> including y, z...?
You loose me. P is not an element of C, but is a property. Also, P is
a property of x and C, but who said anything about y and z?
> As a perhaps over-complex example of the kind of concrete ambiguity
> that we face when using the term "emergent property", it may strike
> some as reasonable to talk about consciousness as an emergent
> property of a machine/brain-state, but not of a neuron or a
> flip-flop. However, there have been those who have claimed that a
> (reduced) form of consciousness does inhere in neurons - and for
> that matter, the molecules and atoms of which brain-stuff is
> composed.
The suggestion seems gratuitous. It only seems a speculation by a
hypothetical person. That person may have a point, but how can we
begin to evaluate it based on this?
> It would be useful to analyze the concept of "emergent property"
> because in the slipshod fashion in which I have defined it, it is
> not very difficult to make metaphysical hay with it. So, can we
> sharpen it up? And if we can, where does it get us?
OK, so everything so far remains in an unsatisfactory state, and we
begin now to come to grips with the meaning of emergence.
> I agree with the formalization - I understand the concern regarding
> 'gives rise to'. I didn't intend any implication of cause by it,
> though, clearly it appears to be there. Probably the better 'is an
> emergent property of' is better.
What formalization? The statements quoted at the beginning of your
post? After expressing your reservations about them, you here agree
with them? Who is concerned about "gives rise to," and why the
concern? Are not all properties caused? You seem to be discussing
statements, people and views here that were not included in your first
part, so I'm at a loss.
> As to the propositions:
>
> 1: I am happy with this.
> 2: This makes sense too.
> 3: I agree.
So you support the three statements (logical propositions, perhaps,
but so far not statements about our world). If so, see my comments
concerning them.
You here take an aside to consider logical contradictions. This is
indeed a thicket. I don't see much profit in engaging it (I'm not
Kant), but I do use word "contradiction" to refer to processes that
are opposite with respect to entropy and mutually destructive (the
reduced entropy of one subsystem is purchased by increasing the
entropy of another subsystem, its environment). But my notion of
contradiction in the real world has absolutely nothing to do with
logical contradictions in our mental world, and so I'll simply say
that I don't understand them as anything more than manifestations of
our mental life.
> In topology, it is quite possible to have sets that are both open
> and closed (clopen is the coinage for this). This is a useful
> property and does not interfere with the fact that most sets are
> either open or closed, but not both - the empty set is [if I
> remember correctly, which I may well not] neither open nor closed.
Again, is this not also a problem having to do with our conceptions
and mental capacities, our categories of thought, and nothing to do
with the real world?
You draw some conclusions about how our mind works:
> In other words, it is important that the components of C do not have
> the property p, not that they don't have the emergent property P.
> Though, of course:
>
> (all C){!p(C) -> !P(C)}
>
> and, again of course, trivially:
>
> (all C){P(C) -> p(C)}
But for some strange reason you want to impose this on the world, on
real systems, not mental systems:
> I could see that, for such a system, on could construct a matrix
> showing exactly where (at which layer of complexity or sub-system)
> certain properties emerge, and then where they are masked or hidden
> by higher layers of complexity (rather that they cease to apply as
> properties).
>
> Again this fits of the common sense observation that billiard balls
> exhibit a spin that is a property of quite a different order to the
> spin that the electrons that they contain exhibits.
I'm still in the dark. You shift from a convoluted discussion of
logical categories, which don't much have to do with even our mental
life, to a comment about the real world, which leads to obscure
statements about that world as if electron "spin" had any connection
with billiard balls spinning.
You expended much effort, but it seems to come down to the logical
categories employed by one person's mind, the mind of a particular
person having a particular social location at a particular time. There
are alternative logics (such as my references to process and
contradiction above), and so I see no reason why these categorical
presuppositions are compelling. Unless there is reason to believe the
world actually behaves that way, a dubious proposition, I don't see
the relevance.
Apparently, for you emergence is a conceptual category, and for me it
is a material process. Our disagreement may simply be that you are
talking about one thing and I another. But I can't help noting that
the origin of this dialog was a discussion of the real world, and so
perhaps I can be excused for assuming you continued to make statements
about it. It turns out this assumption may be incorrect.
Two questions come to mind after all this:
a) Why are the logical categories you employ compelling? No one I
know uses them. They are certainly not universal in terms of world
culture. They are not embraced by all philosophers or all
scientists, and so what makes them attractive? What justifies them?
b) Why do we start with mental life and then seek to make the world
conform to it, rather than start with our real experiences (such as
the rising tide) and adapt our mental life to these experiences as
best we can?
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
>
> Apparently, for you emergence is a conceptual category, and for me it
> is a material process. Our disagreement may simply be that you are
> talking about one thing and I another. But I can't help noting that
> the origin of this dialog was a discussion of the real world, and so
> perhaps I can be excused for assuming you continued to make statements
> about it. It turns out this assumption may be incorrect.
>
clarify what you mean by 'objective' and why you think that certain
things are not 'objective' and how you tell the difference - and then
why the difference matters.
We can only model material processes, we have no direct access to them,
these models include what you call 'conceptual categories'. Emergent
properties are simply what we choose to see, I mentioned a fork in
chess, this is something that is clear to somebody who knows the rules
of chess but has no meaning to somebody who doesn't. This is common with
emergent properties.
>
> Two questions come to mind after all this:
>
> a) Why are the logical categories you employ compelling? No one I
> know uses them. They are certainly not universal in terms of world
> culture. They are not embraced by all philosophers or all
> scientists, and so what makes them attractive? What justifies them?
>
Popularity is no measure of truth! In fact the popularity of an idea is
often inversely proportional to its truth.
I find them compelling because the satisfy the general usage of emergent
properties and are simple enough to work with. Since emergent properties
are simply constructions that we find handy they don't have any
particular value per se, one might be useful to hang an idea on, another
quite useless.
>
> b) Why do we start with mental life and then seek to make the world
> conform to it, rather than start with our real experiences (such as
> the rising tide) and adapt our mental life to these experiences as
> best we can?
>
I'm not quite sure what you mean by 'real experiences' here. What we see
and conventionally agree to be a rising tide could in fact be a falling
earth, the two would provide the same experience. The former model works
better in many ways and the other leads to some conceptual difficulties,
but they are both just models of the world.
--
All persons are deemed to have a _right_ to equality of treatment,
except when some recognised social expediency requires the reverse. And
hence all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered
expedient, assume the character not of simple inexpediency, but of
injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how
they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful that they themselves
perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken notion of
expediency, the correction of which would make that which they approve
seem quite as monstrous as what they have at last learnt to condemn. The
entire history of social improvement has been a series of transitions,
by which one custom or institution after another, from being a supposed
primary necessity of social existence, has passed into the rank of an
universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny. So it has been with the
distinctions of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and
plebeians; and so it will be, and in part already is, with the
aristocracies of colour, race, and sex. -- J.S.Mill Chapter V.
Utilitarianism
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> >>>>Statements are, actually, neither subjective nor objective, they
> >>>>are strings of symbols. Statements are the easy bit, it is when
> >>>>you want to ascribe some meaning to them that you end up with
> >>>>the difficulties - the logical positivists had it that a
> >>>>statement was either nonsense, tautological or empirically
> >>>>verifiable. There is a great appeal to this simple
> >>>>classification, but it has some serious problems, not least that
> >>>>it, itself, taken as a statement is either nonsense or none of
> >>>>these.
> > Why do you drag logical positivism into a simple question of
> > whether we can ever make statements about the world that are
> > entirely free of our social existence?
> No dragging, it is relevant to answering the question.
So, why evade the question? Just why is it relevant? I know you
_believe_ it to be relevant, but that does not make it so.
In terms of my own take on this, I believe knowledge emerges from the
interaction of the mind and our experiences as the result of actions
in the world. So I do find to be relevant a discussion of the nature
of mind. However, one can't reduce knowledge to its contributing
factors, to either the experience or to the nature of mind
(categorical imperatives), although both undoubtedly constrain the
possibilities for knowledge of the world. That is, I think we need to
start with an explicit theory for the relation of mind and world,
rather than naively try to make the world conform to mental
structures.
Second, what is the status of logical positivism? Is it a description
of the structure of mental life? I seriously doubt it, for not many
people (if any) really think that way. Is it an attempt to grasp the
logic underlying mental life? Perhaps, and as such it may help sharpen
our thinking, but to what extent is it meaningful? Is it meaningful
solely in terms of European culture? Solely in terms of some academic
fashion, now passé? Solely in terms of social class?
> > The context of the discussion was our social existence, not
> > experience per se. Further, if, as is often argued (in the social
> > sciences you so cavalierly dismiss), our social existence affects
> > our mental categories and our logic, then how is one to decide
> > whether to make mental life or the world primary? Science can't
> > answer that, nor can logical positivism.
> That is a false choice. Mental life and the world are simply two sides
> of the same coin.
The question was rhetorical here, and I do agree it is not an either
or choice. On the other hand, your coin analogy confounds me. The
sides of a coin are aspects or its properties or subjective
perspectives, and so how they are related is not specified. In other
words, just what is the coin itself? Knowledge of the world? Are you
therefore suggesting that knowledge is simply a combination of worldly
properties and mental properties? That would be silly. And how can one
have two different subjective perspectives on knowledge? That makes no
sense, and so the coin analogy breaks down here as well.
I don't want to appear to be picky here, but use this little issue to
suggest once again that we can't proceed without a theory for the
relation of mind and world. This issue has been so much debated that
we certainly can't embrace a naive view on the assumption that the
question is a simple one.
> > One might be left with merely an existential or moral choice, or
> > perhaps the alternatives are artificial in the first place. But
> > instead of addressing the question of whether we can escape a social
> > conditioning of our statements of fact, you apparently just assume we
> > can't and offer the following:
> >
> 'Social conditioning' is simply a negative way of describing part of
> our environment - it doesn't add anything, it is simply a political
> statement.
Something was lost here. You assert that I just assume the social
conditioning of knowledge without attempting to justify it. Then,
instead of presenting my position on the issue, you quote
yourself. That is, to the best of my recollection, "'Social
conditioning' is simply..." is you speaking, not me.
I did assume that our knowledge is socially conditioned, and it is
true I did not seek to justify that assumption. Since you challenge me
to produce such a justification, I suppose I should try to outline it
now. I don't elaborate this outline because this seems a bit OT.
1. Most of our scientific knowledge is part of socially transmitted
culture. We pick it up in school, through our reading, etc. While
few people contribute significantly to the fund of scientific
knowledge, and the bulk of it is socially transmitted and therefore
subject to social conditioning. I believe it is still the consensus
among cultural anthropologists that culture is transformed as it is
socially transmitted, and this transformation is socially
conditioned.
2. The more fundamental issue is the extent to which the creation of
new knowledge, not just its transmission, is socially
conditioned. The first thing to note is that almost always, the
creation of new knowledge is a social enterprise. One is a member
of a scientific community, such as being aware of similar research
projects elsewhere, or as a collaborator in a research project,
such as in a laboratory or an institution. So probably most new
knowledge is achieved by social means.
3. Even if we were to presume the unlikely existence of the lonely
investigator, society still creates the instruments of research and
probably the axiom set with which investigation starts. Both shape
the outcome of a research project. Society defines what is a
meaningful question (how many angels might dance on the head of a
pin is not a meaningful question because the social climate today
says so), and it legitimates the results, such as through
publication in peer reviewed journals.
4. The result of research remains a private fantasy until it enters
the realm of culture. It is a waste of time, merely a hobby, until
others become aware of the findings, but then they must judge those
findings as being meaningful and valid. So the contribution of
research to knowledge is socially conditioned by a culling of
research results and making them part of culture, and specifically,
part of scientific knowledge.
5. So far I have addressed the easy questions, which would be tedious
to belabor. However, the classic formulation of the question is
more difficult to resolve: To what extent is scientific knowledge
itself value free, or free of ideological implications"
a) Scientific knowledge evolves, and so that knowledge at any one
point in time is necessarily imperfect. For example, simple
mechanics, which might at one time have seemed unassailable, now
appears to be valid only under certain conditions, as the special
theory of relatively makes clear. So no scientific knowledge can be
presumed to be sacrosanct and free of social coloration as a matter
of principle. The case has to be argued in terms of a particular
scientific finding in a particular time and circumstance, and
social influence can't be dismissed a priori.
b) I use the word "ideology" here cautiously, using it to mean
ideas that have a functional relation with a person's social
class. Nothing here about misrepresentation, and the distortion
comes only from ideology being "one sided," rather than simply
false. I assume that if an idea has such an ideological function,
it is not value free.
c) So, to what extent does scientific knowledge have such a
function? Well there are sciences, such as economics, that
obviously do have such a function, but some sciences, such as
quantum mechanics, seem to lack it. That is, the content of these
"objective" sciences appears to be largely meaningful or valid
across culture and class lines. However, even if this be granted,
it does not make these sciences non-ideological, which has to with
their function, not necessarily their content.
d) We should note that most science (although some perhaps to a
very small extent) contributes to the power or prestige of the
state. Arguably, the state is tied to class relations, for a
standard definition of state is that it is an institution that
serves to perpetuate society despite its social contradictions
(classes). If this be granted, much scientific knowledge has a
function in terms of classes.
e) It seems impossible to separate knowledge from language. It
seems to be the consensus of linguists that language evolves, and
is not reducible to some underling constants (Chomsky's
essentialism). So if language evolves, so too would scientific
knowledge. Since language is a social product, it implies that
scientific knowledge is socially conditioned.
Let me end by emphasizing that I have not felt the need to explore
this question, and so my response here is off the top of my head and
undoubtedly has weaknesses. It is also just an outline meant to
characterize the kind of response I'd offer, and not a developed
argument.
At points worth reading is Hilary and Steven Rose, eds, Ideology of/in
the natural sciences (Cambridge 1980).
> >>Axiom 1: There exists a universe of discourse.
> >>Axiom 2: There is, within this universe of discourse, a set of all
> >>sets.
> >>Theorem 1: A = the set of all sets ( the universal set) is an
> >>element of A.
> >>Proof:
> >>If A is an element of A then A is not the universe because it is
> >>contained by another set.
> >>If A is not an element of A then there is a set (A) that is not an
> >>element of A, so A is not the universe.
> >>
> >>Consequence. Axiom 1 in false. There is no Universe.
> > You must admit that this must strike most people as bizarre, even
> > lunatic. Perhaps you meant it as a joke, but it actually has some
> > use. Axiom 1 offers an arbitrary statement of fact about a concept
> > that is undefined; axiom 2 is an arbitrary presumption of sets
> > within that universe. The consequence is not that there's no
> > universe, but that the term "universe" as used in axiom 1 was
> > nonsense to begin with, and perhaps "sets" in axiom 2 as
> > well. This syllogism just shows that we get into trouble when we
> > try impose logical categories on the real world of experience.
> It is not a joke, nor is it bizarre, it is simply mathematics -
> demonstrating what an axiom means. I'm pointing out the problem with
> using the term 'axiom' loosely.
It's not the math I learned in school. I don't recall anything like
this from calculus or from boolean algebra, etc. Perhaps you mean
instead that it represents a mathematical formalism applied to
language. I'm sure most people would find it bizarre, but I suppose
you do not. In any case, I've no idea what is being demonstrated
here. Do you mean rather that it is an example rather than a
demonstration? Are you getting at the danger of using the term "axiom"
loosely, or the danger of loose axioms? So I still don't follow.
> > Not all logical positivists would agree with your apparent
> > presumption that the truth value of a statement is independent of
> > experience, but that's an academic question, for logical
> > positivism died out in the 1930s, except for logical empiricism in
> > the U.S. The point of logical empiricism was to sharpen our
> > scientific discourse, not to muddy it or to substitute it for
> > experience. While your example does show that "universe" is a
> > suspect concept, that seems irrelevant to the initial question
> > regarding objectivity in scientific statements.
> "Universe" as equivalent to "Universe of discourse" or "Universal
> set" is perfectly normal English.
Well, my English then is also limited. I'm not sure what "universe of
discourse" means, and "universal set" sounds like a hypothetical
construct that has no relation to reality. I suggested the concept
"universe" is challenging, and for some odd reason (I suspect not
based on exploring a dictionary), you choose to "define" the word
simply by equating it with two phrases, which are not only left
undefined, but which contain the word to be defined!
> > My own inclination when the issue of objectivity comes up is to
> > think of it in terms of the sociology of consciousness, but I
> > can't pursue that line with you because you have already dismissed
> > in advance all sociology as worthless, along with all the other
> > social sciences except sociobiology. Although you might make the
> > same charge of me, for dismissing logical positivism with a
> > guffaw, I take comfort in the fact that my realism at least keeps
> > me in touch with the rest of humanity.
> Why not explain just what you intend to mean by 'the sociology of
> consciousness'? It appears a meaningless phrase to me - why not
> elaborate on it so that it makes some sort of sense.
Unless you refuse to admit the identify of sociology of consciousness
and the sociology of knowledge (the more conventional term), I'm not
sure what you are getting at. It is a generally accepted known
subdivision of sociology, usually felt to have been started by Karl
Mannheim. You may dismiss the findings of sociology out of hand, but
that does not obviate its having various subdivisions. Most of the
scientific work has been carried out in terms of specific aspects of
the sociology of knowledge, such as the sociology of ideology,
religion and art, rather than the sociology of consciousness per se.
> What 'realism' are you claiming for yourself?
Realism as in the well-established realist school in the philosophy of
science. See, for example, Rom Harré, The Philosophies of Science
(Oxford, 1984). A couple important works that exemplify the school:
Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (London 1986)
and Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure
of the World (Princeton, 1984).
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
I think you'll be a little embarrassed.
Peter H.M. Brooks
Yes, well, fine, how nice.
I'm quite aware of the quotes. None of them answer the question.
What 'realism' are you claiming for yourself?
I know that it is a common failing of people who have fallen for one or
other religion, to quote their prophets - or those who agree with those
prophet
This hagiography is quite sweet and it does indeed remove any need for
though from the sheep (sorry, believers).
If you think that you actually have anything to say then say it. Quoting
other people who have been wrong (or maybe even from time to time right
- it is as difficult always to be wrong as it is always to be right). I
qualify that last parent his by saying that, if you are right, then you
can defend yourself, not by hiding behind quotes, but by actually saying
in simple language, just what you mean.
Try it.
--
"Me!--not at all," replied Mr. Knightley, rather displeased; "I do not
want to think ill of him. I should be as ready to acknowledge his
merits as any other man; but I hear of none, except what are merely
personal; that he is well-grown and good-looking, with smooth, plausible
manners." -- Emma, Jane Austen
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>Haines Brown wrote:
>>
>>>"Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
> I don't want to appear to be picky here, but use this little issue to
> suggest once again that we can't proceed without a theory for the
> relation of mind and world. This issue has been so much debated that
> we certainly can't embrace a naive view on the assumption that the
> question is a simple one.
>
How exactly does the level of debate influence our understanding of the
matter?
You claim some understanding, but now you appear to be retreating from
it. Are you being honest?
It's OK, actually a good thing, to change your mind when you've been
shown to be wrong, but it is a very good thing, an excellent thing, in
fact, to admit to your change of view, your new understanding.
--
It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher pleasures,
occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the
lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the
intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of
character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it
to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two
bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental.-- J.S.Mill
chapter II, Utilitarianism
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>Haines Brown wrote:
>>
>
> 4. The result of research remains a private fantasy until it enters
> the realm of culture. It is a waste of time, merely a hobby, until
> others become aware of the findings, but then they must judge those
> findings as being meaningful and valid. So the contribution of
> research to knowledge is socially conditioned by a culling of
> research results and making them part of culture, and specifically,
> part of scientific knowledge.
>
Yes, it is true that researh can turn up a load of arse.
It is also true, but unlikely, that a peer review can accept that this
is valid research.
It is also true that a journal can accept this load of arse and the peer
review that has accepted it.
Other people can attempt to replicate the experiment. It is true that
they can also get it wrong and publish a load of arse that a peer review
can accept.
This cycle can, in principle, carry on indefinately. If the reviewers
were estate agents of civil servants, then indeed we would expect it to
do so.
However, those who review such research are not estate agents, they are
clever people, able in their field, that the journal has asked to help
validate the research. Whilst the scenario I paint above is perfectly
possible, and, in fact, has been established to be the case in some
deplorable instances of corruption and incompetence, that is not the point.
Yes, all human endeavour can be compromised by the corrupt, the stupid,
the venal and the earnest, the fact of the matter is that this is
unusual. So unusual that I, in the above, mention almost all the cases
known in the past half century..
Corruption will continue, the natural and normal state of mind of a
scientist is sceptical. This cast of mind is justified not just from the
point of view of the cases I meintion above, but also to prevent
bullshit being seen as fact.
The untoutoured, innocent and, frankly, stupid mind can't grok how
different the above is from the claims of the quacks, the snake-oil
salesmen - now known (with far too much respect for such low life) as
homeopaths.
--
A young lady who faints, must be recovered; questions must be
answered, and surprizes be explained. Such events are very interesting,
but the suspense of them cannot last long. A few minutes made Emma
acquainted with the whole. - Emma, Jane Austen
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
> So, why evade the question? Just why is it relevant? I know you
> _believe_ it to be relevant, but that does not make it so.
>
You claim that you know the difference between subjectivity and
objectivity. You know the difference so well that you can declare that
reductionism (actually the process of reduction, of reducing one level
of description to the level below) fails to be objective.
You fail constantly to provide any support for your view, you don't
define what you mean by 'subjective' or 'objective. and you fail to
describe how you are so good at telling that any form of reductionism
(that you clearly feel you understand) is so wickedly 'subjective'.
I don't mean to persecute you, Haines, I know that you've been fed this
horseshit by other people - it is well known horseshit so it clearly
isn't your invention. I do think it important to challenge it, however,
because other simple souls might also be subverted by it. It does, after
all, appear to offer a simple solution to the way the world works and
there are tons of people just aching to have a simple solution to
everything.
--
"Me!--not at all," replied Mr. Knightley, rather displeased; "I do not
want to think ill of him. I should be as ready to acknowledge his
merits as any other man; but I hear of none, except what are merely
personal; that he is well-grown and good-looking, with smooth, plausible
manners." -- Emma, Jane Austen
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>>"Universe" as equivalent to "Universe of discourse" or "Universal
>>set" is perfectly normal English.
>
>
> Well, my English then is also limited. I'm not sure what "universe of
> discourse" means, and "universal set" sounds like a hypothetical
> construct that has no relation to reality. I suggested the concept
> "universe" is challenging, and for some odd reason (I suspect not
> based on exploring a dictionary), you choose to "define" the word
> simply by equating it with two phrases, which are not only left
> undefined, but which contain the word to be defined!
>
problem that we have in this discussion is that you claim some
understanding of physics and mathematics to make your points - at the
same time you demonstrate your ignorance of both these fields quite
painfully.
If wanted to avoid being a laughing stock then, at least, I'd try to
restrict my points to things that I have, at least, a little
understanding of.
--
A young lady who faints, must be recovered; questions must be
answered, and surprizes be explained. Such events are very interesting,
but the suspense of them cannot last long. A few minutes made Emma
acquainted with the whole. - Emma, Jane Austen
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
> Let me end by emphasizing that I have not felt the need to explore
> this question, and so my response here is off the top of my head and
> undoubtedly has weaknesses. It is also just an outline meant to
> characterize the kind of response I'd offer, and not a developed
> argument.
>
oddness of most of your claims
I'd recommend that you do a little work, read some books, if you can, do
a first year course in philosophy, or, again, if you can manage it, a
course in mathematics. Then re-enter the discussion.
If you wish to continue with the 'paint by numbers' approach, the there
are some excellent books to help you get a grasp of the matters involved.
Read Hofstarter's 'Godel, Escher, Bach' it includes an excellent
tutorial in basic mathematics and is, despite that, a delightful read.
If you have that under your belt then write again, I've got more good
books that you'll find useful.
--
"Me!--not at all," replied Mr. Knightley, rather displeased; "I do not
want to think ill of him. I should be as ready to acknowledge his
merits as any other man; but I hear of none, except what are merely
personal; that he is well-grown and good-looking, with smooth, plausible
manners." -- Emma, Jane Austen
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> a) Scientific knowledge evolves, and so that knowledge at any one
> point in time is necessarily imperfect. For example, simple
> mechanics, which might at one time have seemed unassailable, now
> appears to be valid only under certain conditions, as the special
> theory of relatively makes clear. So no scientific knowledge can be
> presumed to be sacrosanct and free of social coloration as a matter
> of principle. The case has to be argued in terms of a particular
> scientific finding in a particular time and circumstance, and
> social influence can't be dismissed a priori.
>
essential way in which science is conducted.
The 'uncertainty' is exploited by snake-oil salemen of every hue,
homoeopaths, naturopaths.... the sad list continues of people exploiting
the gullibility of the proles.
The point to understand is that aeroplanes fly as a result of physics,
when you turn your light on in the morning, it is as a result of
physics. So, of you are sceptical, a good thing to be, incidentally,
then to be sceptical of the scientific method itself is to brand
yourself as a fool, a space-cadet, a looney tunes, fuckwit,
It is just that level of fuckwittery you appear to be supporting in your
paragraph above.
I do understand your problem, if you worship at the grave of brother
Marx, then you have to sign up to supporting all this, and more,
fuckwittery.
This is why people who are not fuckwits are not marxists. I do agree
that there are indeed many fuckwits who are not marxists for other
reasons - don't let that put you off, ask your shrink how he can help
you to be more sensible.
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > Let me start with your first request.
> >
> > Empiricism in general seems to imply two different things: a) All
> > concepts arise from experience; b) the truth of all statements is
> > justified by experience. The first is, I suppose, ontological
> > (explains the relation of concepts and experience), and the latter,
> > epistemological (how do we know our statements about the world are
> > true?)
> >
> > I am inclined to make a further distinction between empiricism as a
> > general policy and as an absolute statement of principle. That is,
> > there's a difference between saying we should try generally to put our
> > feet to the fire of experience, and saying that all our concepts must
> > arise entirely from experience. The latter has the problem that it
> > excludes logical concepts from being a priori, and most people would
> > be unwilling to do that, insisting that mathematics and logical
> > relations are not derived from experience, but are somehow
> > metaphysical. I'm not inclined to make formal constructs and analytic
> > propositions metaphysical or a priori, which is where I differ
> > probably from most people.
> >
> The latter doesn't exclude logic, nor mathematics. Though they arise
> from our experience of the world they are internally consistent (we
> don't need to bother with godel's findings in this context) and don't
> require a world to be verified. There is no test against reality for 2
> + 2 = 4.
I have trouble figuring out where you stand on things. You had
previously implied you were a logical positivist, but shied away from
saying so explicitly. And now you make the assertion that logic and
math arises from our experience, which I had assume, perhaps wrongly,
was the opposite of logical positivism. Perhaps you will enlighten me
here.
Why the demand for consistency? Is that a priori or based on
experience? How do you justify it? If logic and math are based on
experienced, but don't require verification, I'm uncertain what you
mean by "based."
I can think of two ways one might say they are based on
experience. One is to say that they seem to work well enough in some
situations we encounter in daily life. Of course, there are the
conventional objections to operationalism to note, and of course most
situations in daily life fall out of its range. The second way is to
suggest that our experience of static, isolated, objects in a world
scale above quantum mechanics and below that of the cosmos supports a
logical covering law. While this is certainly useful, there's no
obvious reason for it to be universal. For example, in the traditional
view (now being challenged) information falling into a black hole
simply disappears. In this case 1+1≠2.
Is not the issue whether 1+1=2 represents a categorical imperative,
prior to experience and universal? If it is simply based on
experience, then much escapes its embrace. You seem to maintain two
opposite positions.
> > So what do I think to be the status of our concepts if they don't
> > simply reflect experience, and are not metaphysical either? Without
> > elaborating the argument I'd suggest that our concepts, formal
> > relations, and analytic tools, are emergent properties of the brain
> > that arise from experience, but don't reduce to it.
> What is that supposed to mean?
How simply do you want me to put that? Oh, I forget, you had denied
the existence of emergent properties, apparently reducing all
properties to be necessary consequences of a system's prior
state. However, you may recall that at one point I did define the
term, and so you should have applied my definition to the above
statement to grasp its meaning. The meaning is transparent, although
you are free to challenge it.
Emergence by a standard definition refers to appearance of system
properties or behaviors that could not have been predicted from the
system's prior state. It would certainly clear the air if you would
simply deny the reality of such phenomena, and then justify why you
choose to disagree with the consensus view, which is to accept the
reality of emergent phenomena.
Historians, for example, base themselves on the reality of emergence,
for they see history as the result in part of human creativity. No
historian would suggest that historical outcomes can be predictable by
studying their antecedents. I discussed the issue of retrodiction
already.
> If that were the case then these things could not be reproduced
> elsewhere - we know that they can be, on a computer, so they are not
> irreducible by any means. How exactly the brain gives rise to
> consciousness is another question - bats can use their brains to
> triangulate, as can many other creatures, and computers, so, as one
> example, triangulation is a calculation that requires no mumbo jumbo
> to explain.
What I guess you are saying is that emergent properties (given a
standard definition of the term) simply do not exist. Since you choose
to disagree with the consensus, how would you justify your position?
> > If you are a reductionist, you will not care for this position, but so
> > far you have not been explicit about your alternative. Perhaps you
> > would suggest that a statement such as 1+1=2 is metaphysical (real,
> > but not derived from experience). Perhaps it is a function of our
> > brains (we must think that way, but the world we think about may not
> > be that way). Or perhaps this statement is unreal (it has no real
> > relation to the world or to the brain, but for some mysterious reason
> > we find it works for us in useful ways).
> >
> The creation of the symbols and rules of manipulation used in logic
> is a result of human thought processes. The logic that they describe
> has thus been 'created' by human brains, it does, however, stand
> independent of them as can be shown by my above argument.
There is no above argument. Humans brains create logic, but then you
suggest logic is separable from the brain. I have trouble
understanding this. It is a product of the brain that acquires a life
of its own? Where is that life? Since in our culture? I don't think
that is what you are getting at. So where, then, does this logic
reside? If you say in the reality we experience, why is this a
position not the opposite of logical positivism. Or is there some kind
of invisible meta-reality?
> > The definition I offered above is from a standard handbook, and is not
> > intended to be partisan. If you reject this conventional meaning of
> > the word, then I've got no idea how to approach the issue.
> >
> > As for an example of empiricism, let me introduce that in connection
> > with the following exchange.
The exchange that follows has nothing to do with empiricism, but the
meaning of the word "poor."
> > My example of an empiricist definition of class was one in which the
> > different classes (conventionally here called the poor, the middle
> > class, and the rich), are categorized in terms of some empirical
> > quality shared by the members of that class. Here that empirical
> > quality is usually income, although sometimes here there may also be
> > an vague empirical quality name "lifestyle." But for purposes of
> > social planning, social legislation, etc., it seems simply on peoples'
> > relative income. To bring up the question of whether or not the "poor"
> > can survive rather than the term "poor" being an example of an
> > empirical classification is a red herring.
> Class is not usually defined so simplistically.
Perhaps true, but not the point. I was trying to illustrate an
empiricist definition of class. I was not defending the sophistication
of that example, nor do I in principle accept the empiricist
definition of class. You are evading the point that not all
definitions of class are necessarily empiricist.
> > My point was that dividing people into groups based solely on shared
> > empirical qualities, such as income, works only for short-range
> > problems (such as social legislation or marketing), but not for long
> > range problems, such as are engaged by social science (what makes
> > society tick?). That is why categories based simply on empirical
> > distinctions are usually dismissed as "scientifically inoperable." But
> > since you reject sociology altogether, you apparently reject the
> > notion of class as well, and with it any long-range explanation, which
> > leaves me wondering if you are following any of this at all.
> >
> No. That does not follow at all. Many animals have hierarchical
> systems - the term 'pecking order' comes from the behaviour of
> chickens and social insects mirror caste systems in humans. So class
> is simply a description of a standard biological function as it
> pertains to humans.
So you would have it. You see why I suggested it was scientifically
inoperable? In other words, social relations come down to pecking
order. That is ridiculous, of course.
> > How did all this come up in the first place? I had suggested that
> > empirical categories force us to distinguish between accidental
> > differences and essential differences, which introduces an
> > element of subjectivism. While that view can certainly be
> > challenged, for some reason you evade doing it and instead go off
> > on some other issues, challenging me to redefine the term
> > empiricism, a request for a "sensible context," a term which I
> > found meaningless, and whether by definition the poor can
> > survive. In the process, the original question was pushed out of
> > sight, but I think it remains a valid one.
> >
> You keep claiming that this or that that you disapprove of 'introduces
> an element of subjectivism' (or similar words), however you haven't
> answered any of my questions relating to how you understand what
> 'objectivism' is, how you measure it, how you are able to tell (apart
> from your prejudice) that X or Y are subjective or objective.
You are not following me very closely. I was making a statement about
empiricism, that it entails a subjective element. That is not
objectionable in the realm for which it is appropriate (daily life,
for example). On the contrary, I suggested that all statements of fact
do entail a subjective element.
I don't recall your asking me to define objective (I don't think I
used the word "objectivism"), but I suppose it refers to the would
independent of human consciousness, things exterior to the mind, an
object of thought. For example, in education theory, an objective test
is one in which questions have only one right answer and the
examiner's own interpretation is excluded. Now don't let us get off on
a side track here, for all I'm doing is offering a conventional
meaning, since you apparently don't know what "objective" means.
> Your silence on this matter suggests to me that you have only the
> woolliest notion of what these words mean.
I've drawn definitions from standard sources because it was soon
apparent to me that you were using them in your own peculiar way. Not
just in this message, but frequently before I have gone to the trouble
of looking the word up in some standard reference because I wanted to
avoid any ambiguity.
Strange, you can't seem to enter a discussion without insulting the
other person. Do you always feel compelled to do that?
--
Haines Brown
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> > This introduces a subjective element, for I have made a judgement
> > about the relative importance of various factors. Hopefully I can
> > justify that subjective intervention, but the fact remains that
> > any weighing of the relative importance of data represents an
> > intervention based on criteria lying outside the event itself.
> Just wondering what happened introduces a 'subjective' element. The
> event itself is only approachable through subjective analysis. If
> you wish to claim that there is such a thing as 'objectivity' then
> you probably need to explain what you think it means and how you
> measure it.
You evade my point about the selection of relevant data representing a
subjective intervention by tossing in the red herring of
objectivity. The issue is not objectivity or objectivism, but whether
a selection of data is intrinsically subjective.
The broad context here seems to amount to two issues: a) can any
investigation be entirely free of a subjective component? b) is a pure
objectivity possible or even desirable? I gather we agree that a
subjective element is inevitably present, and therefore pure
objectivity is a myth.
This position is certainly not that of late 19th century positivism,
which would have assumed that, to the extent there is a subjective
element in our explanations, they fall short of truth. That position
is probably not much held these days, but the challenge it represents
remains: how do we reconcile the presence of a subjective element with
our goal of truth?
There seems a post-modern position that "truth" is a word that simply
aims to legitimate our discourse, and the aim is to dominate that
discourse, not to seek truth. You reject that position, and I fully
agree with you. It has often been described as fascist, and today it
seems to characterize the domestic and foreign policy of George Bush
(seriously, he has been seen as a post-modernist several times that
I've encountered).
It seems to me that the issue of the relation of subjectivity and
truth value has to be addressed in a more satisfactory way than
offered by the post-modernists. I'd be interested in your position. As
for my own, I have a (not "the") Marxist view that the principle
subjective element arises from the investigator's social location, and
so the corrective is to adopt the position of a universal class, which
is the working class. A more universal social location makes possible
a closer approximation of truth in our findings. True, this makes more
sense in the social sciences, and is less persuasive in the natural
sciences, and so perhaps one adopts the kind of existential view
developed in Lakatos and Musgrave (cited before). But this gets
complicated.
Now, please, I know very well you disagree with my take on the issue,
but I don't bring it up as a point of debate, but to be illustrate one
kind of response and to be open about my own. I certainly would
appreciate a critical evaluation of my position, but it would be OT
here, and so let's put it aside.
The issue here is reductionism, not subjectivism, although, based on
the extended quote in my prior message, the subjectivity involved in
reductionism is in fact controversial. So to understand your
reductionism, I need to know your take on how your reductionist agenda
reconciles the inevitable subjectivity with the truth value of
conclusions, if that is indeed your goal. If we recognize the presence
of a subjective element, it seems to me we must manage it somehow,
such as specifying the its effect on the truth value of our
conclusions. It would unwise to sweep that under the carpet.
> > However, when the word "reductionism" is used, particularly in the
> > social sciences, it implies rather more than this. Let me quote
> > from a standard handbook:
> > The reductionist sometimes justifies his activisty as a
> > principle of economy in EXPLANATION, a principle that has
> > obviously paid off in science; the anti-reductionist argues the
> > existence of irreducible or EMERGENT PROPERTIES.
> The last bit is in error - emergent properties (as I've pointed out
> elsewhere) are not necessarily irreducible at all. So the final
> phrase should read 'argues the existence of irreducible emergent
> properties'
I hope you understand by this time that you are denying the reality of
emergent properties or behaviors in the conventional sense, and that
you need to be aware of conventional meanings when you are reading
conventional material such as quoted above. That is, the sentence you
criticize is not "in error" so much as it presumes something you
believe to be false. The statement is not issue, but its premise. I
trust you grasp this.
The issue is, how do you justify your position that all complex
phenomena are reducible to an expression of the qualities of its
constituents or that all outcomes are unequivocally predictable from a
knowledge of a system's prior state?
I would find it challenging to demonstrate that these two statements
amount to the same thing, but intuitively I believe they are. The
difference is that one clearly has a time dimension, while the other
may have only an implicit time dimension, depending on whether we see
it in ontological or epistemological terms. If the latter, then I
definitely see the two statements as equivalent. Incidentally, this is
a philosophical speculation that is an aside, so don't pay any
attention to it.
> the 'or' makes a nonsense of it.
Yes, of course, for you define "emergent" in your own way in which
emergent properties can be reduced to a prior state of the system. But
I hope you understand this is only because of your private definition
or understanding of "emergence." Clearly, the author above assumes
that reduction and emergence are opposite. This, I insist, is the
general and standard view, for the quote comes from perhaps the best
known and most respected handbook of modern thought. That does not
make it always right, of course, but when you deny an aspect of
reality that is generally presumed to be real (novel properties), then
there's a burden on you to justify your position. So how do you
justify your reductionist agenda?
> > You don't shy away from the term reductionism, insisting that what
> > is a practical methodology in daily life is valid also in
> > science. If so, I would beg to disagree. As I mentioned above,
> > this economy in explanation introduces a subjective factor, but if
> > it can be justified, it seems to be productive.
> It doesn't. The subjective 'element' (if you wish to call it that)
> is always there, reduction doesn't add any extra.
But the conventional view seems to be that it does in fact add its own
subjective element. If reductionism entails making a choice among the
relevant factors that serve to explain a particular outcome, then that
choice, however wise and necessary it may be, represents a subjective
element that seems to arise solely from the reduction itself. As you
insist, the alternative can't be a mythical objectivism, but that does
not take us off the hook of justifying our subjective interventions
and evaluating the extent to which they compromise the truth value of
our conclusions.
> 'A reduction' - not 'a reductionism'. I wouldn't 'define' a
> reduction, reduction is one of the many tools of thought that one
> uses.
Well, I suppose not. In the chemistry lab, for example. However, you
do seem to be a reductionist as the term is conventionally
understood. However, you now say you only employ a reduction
method. So, again, you need to take a stand on the basic issue: Can
the characteristics or behavior of a complex whole be always
unequivocally predicted from knowledge of its parts or its past? I
believe that if you answer "yes," you are a reductionist in the
conventional meaning of the term.
It makes me uncomfortable to hear that a method of investigation or
tool of thought, such as your "reduction" (which on the surface
appears to be a reductionism until you explain why not) can't be
defined. If so, that certainly insulates your position from any
outside criticism. I get the feeling that you may embrace sociobiology
as almost a cult, in that everyone inside has a monopoly on absolute
truth, and everyone outside is lost, and no meaningful communication
can take place between the saved and the lost. Instead of showing why
the conventional notion of emergence is false, you simply use the word
in your own way, so that no outsider appears to make any sense at all!
I have illustrated a very clear example of this unfortunate position.
> There isn't a reductionist 'axiom', certainly not one that I have to
> state.
Perhaps you are right, that your reductionism is not "axiomatic," but
it is clearly a presupposition that has enormous consequences as
everyone else realizes. Here you seem to be saying that you don't have
to make your old fashioned reductionist agenda explicit nor defend
it. Is that because it's god's truth, and anyone who does not grasp
its truth and beauty immediately is a hopeless case with whom there is
no meaningful dialog?
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
> You evade my point
>
This, Haines, is one of your more positive statements. I'm delighted to
learn that (unlike most pinkos) you actually understand that people can
evade points.
Let me not be too positive, though.
I am still waiting for an answer to my questions (posed a number of
times). Let me post them again, simply, in order so that you can really
understand what 'evading the point' means, let me remind you of one of
my simpler questions:
"
>>
> Who made any such suggestion??
>
> You made the suggestion that politics is an epiphenomenon. To suggest that the only alternative is to believe the above is just silly - the above is a strawman, there might be one or two politicians barmy enough to believe that (I'd be happy to believe that there are quite a number), but that does not mean it is a position that any sensible person would take seriously.
"
You have not managed to answer a single question that I've put to you,
not one. Why not try to break the habit of a lifetime and answer just
the one I pose above?
After that you could always work on answering the others, but I don'
want to strain you too much.
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> You say that an emergent level 'cannot be unequivocally
> predicted...', that's not true. It isn't clear what you mean by
> 'mechanically' in the above - unless you are trying to qualify the
> 'unequivocally'.
This point we've been around and around, and it should be clear to you
by this time that you are employing the word "emergence" in an
unconventional manner, in fact in a manner the opposite to what is
generally understood by it. It naturally took me a while to realize
this, and I still don't understand your motive.
We are speaking here, not of whether emergence exists, but the meaning
of the word "emergence," and, according to the standard source I've
cited before, an emergent effect by definition _can't_ be entirely
predicted in terms of its cause. There are properties or behaviors
that are novel, at best predictable only to a degree in successive
states of a system. This is the conventional meaning of the word, and
whether the phenomenon to which it refers is real, is another
matter. You appear to be a reductionist who denies the reality of
emergence in the ordinary sense, and that position is entirely
legitimate. However, to employ the word with a meaning that is the
exact opposite of its conventional usage causes confusion and does not
further meaningful dialog.
The term "mechanical" applied to causality seems a conventional way to
specify a causal mechanism for which the effect is entirely and
unequivocally determined by the cause. That is, an end state can be
entirely predicted from knowledge of some prior state. Actually, the
logic is that outcomes could have been predicted by _any_ prior state,
for each prior state is the unequivocal effect of its prior state. So,
with total knowledge of the earth in 10 million B.C., you would be
able in principle to predict the second line of Grey's Elegy in a
Country Graveyard. Where do I misunderstand you?
The phrase "mechanical causation" apparently remains in use with an
unequivocal definition, but it must be distinguished from the phrase
"mechanism of causality." For example, R. Harré, The Philosophies of
Science (Oxford, 1984):
The discovery of the mechanisms by which causes produce or generate
their effects is a central part of scientific investigation. ... But
a word of caution is needed here as to the meaning of
'mechanism'. In ordinary English this word has two distinct
meanings. Sometimes it means mechanical contrivance, a device that
operates with rigid connections. Sometimes it means something much
more general, namely any kind of connection through which causes are
effective. [This latter is the] sense that the word is used in
science generally. ... Not all mechanisms are mechanical.
In terms of this quotation, am I correct to assume that for you, all
causal mechanisms in science are mechanical, have "rigid connections"
that allow complete and accurate predictions in principle; despite
Harré's last sentence, do you believe all causal mechanisms of concern
to science mechanical?
Since I have pulled Harré off the shelf, let me look at "emergence."
Many groups or aggregates have properties that are not properties
of the individuals of which they are a collection. Such properties
are called `emergent' properties. ... Emergent properties are
particularly prominent in biological sciences, but they are
commonplace elsewhere too.
He goes on to discuss two sources of emergent properties. One is that
many emergent properties are to be explained by the characteristics of
the structure of the whole, the relation of its parts, not the
properties of the parts themselves. Another source for emergence is
what he calls "the fact of the ensemble." In other words different
levels of a given reality obey different rules that cannot be
explained as the effect of some other level. Am I correct to assume
that you disagree with Harré again?
> >>Ice and water have properties that are different and both emerge
> >>from the properties of H2O. Neither is mysterious, both emerge as
> >>a result of the essential properties of the molecule, H2O, and the
> >>environment in which it finds itself. Both are patterns that we
> >>impose upon H2O in our interpretation, or modelling, of the
> >>substance.
You also say:
> Emergent is just a label that we find convenient for phenomena that
> we find more usefully studied at a particular level. In principle
> they can be reduced to the level below, but it isn't usually that
> helpful.
So, you insist that the properties of the whole could in principle
have been predicted from knowledge of the properties of its parts? Or
do I misunderstand? It seems you suggest that the properties of a
higher level (ice), is implied by the lower level (H2O), and so the
higher level ceased being a distinct level:
A. R. Lacey, A Dictionary of Philosophy (New York, 1976), under
Causation, in discussing Hume: ... if the occurrence of the cause
_entailed_ that of the effect, they would be one thing and not two.
You evidently disagree with Harré. That's your right of course, but
when you disagree with what is authoritative, you not only need to
make that difference very explicit, so as not to sew the seeds of
confusion, but you also need to offer some justification for your
choice, lest it be dismissed out of hand. I have seen neither.
And finally, are you saying that the characteristics of ice, such as
being solid, have no basis in reality, but are patterns we impose on
reality? That "solidity" is only an interpretation or model, not how
our mind represents a real state? It makes no sense to me to speak of
solidity as an "interpretation" (an explanation), or a model (a mental
analog) rather than a description of a state. Your misuse of words
makes your position opaque. Is there an objective reality out there
that we refer to as the property "solid" and that constrains how we
represent that property in thought? It seems you do not think there
is, but your use of words does not allow me to be certain, and I'm not
at all clear just why you make the assumption. You seem to deny that
the content of our consciousness is in any way constrained by the
world. Is the conventional discussion of objective reality and an
effort to grasp it in thought mere empty rhetoric?
I suggested:
> > One notion of emergence is that the property of a complex whole
> > can't be explained in terms of the properties of the parts. For
> > example, the mind is an emergent property of the brain. I take it
> > that you suggest that the mind can be reduced to properties of the
> > brain. If I characterize your position correctly, then the issue
> > comes down to the classic issue of parts and wholes.
and you respond:
> Consciousness (or the 'mind' if you prefer that) is not simply an
> emergent property of the brain. That is why Chalmers, as I
> mentioned, describes it as something that supervienes over the brain
> and may, itself, be a physical property of the universe like
> magnetism.
I do see that I was not quite precise. To avoid misunderstanding, I
should have said: "... can't be explained entirely in terms of the
properties... ."
You don't address the point I raised about mind being an emergent
behavior of the brain. You respond that it is more than that, is "not
simply" an emergent property of the brain. Are you using your private
definition of "emergence" here? If so, how then can that be reconciled
with your "more than that?" I suppose it can be if "more than that"
refers to our fantasies. But then I wonder if our fantasies and
mistaken judgements could also be unequivocally predicted by a study
of our brain cells. It does not seem very likely to me, but so you
insist. How can one initial state give unequivocal rise to two
contradictory outcomes if we assume an unequivocal causality?
> > Are you saying the properties and behaviors of things are nothing
> > more than our mental constructions that have no relation to
> > reality? Do you embrace phenomenology?
> I don't know why you're always keen on simplistic interpretations.
I asked a very simple question, and in response get an ad hominem
remark. You can't seem to enter a discussion without them. I'd be glad
to entertain the suggestion that the world is necessarily unknown,
that our scientific endeavor mere hubris, but you don't appear to
adopt that position, which is why I ventured to ask a simple question,
confident I would get a simple answer.
> You make claims for the difference between 'objective' and
> 'subjective'. So you need to support these claims.
I'll define again how I use these terms: What is objective is
independent of mind; what is subjective is what is a function of
mind. I'm not making any claims here, but merely defining my terms. If
you feel I'm misunderstanding the words, then I stand ready to be
corrected. If, on the other hand, you feel the conventional meanings
have objectionable ontological implications, then it is up to you to
show why, for then it is you who make a claim against convention.
> What defense do you have for things being 'objective'?
By objective, I was saying that things exist independent of mind. A
hypothetical planet circling a star yet discovered, for example. If I
encounter that star, measure carefully its motion, then I may be able
to infer the existence of the planet, perhaps even its orbit and
mass. The object enters my thought, and therefore acquires a
subjective aspect, but the object remains. I tend to think of the
properties of the object as constraining, but not as mechanically
determining the content of my thought. If your notion of causality is
mechanistic, then of course the term "constraining" will have no
meaning to you in this context.
But in answer to your question, how can I justify my assumption of
there being a world that is independent of my thought? I can't. It is
an existential and moral choice. I must admit that everything might be
only an illusion, but accepting that as true would make my life very
difficult. But I am simply adopting the viewpoint of most other
people, and if you are suggesting that indeed, there is no objective
reality, that all knowledge is entirely illusory, then I suspect you
are the one that has to justify such an extraordinary position. Note
that I am not assuming that because there's a subjective element in
all knowledge, that all knowledge is fantasy. I assume that our
knowledge approximates reality to varying degrees, or is a model if
you like, while fantasy does not (in any obvious sense).
> I am prefectly happy with there being an external reality and us
> having some contact with it, subjective though our experience is. I
> worry about peculiar claims you've made that suddenly, when you use
> a standard tool like reduction, you think it all becomes more
> subjective - this clearly is a nonsense unless you have some sort of
> explanation of what you think objectivity might be.
I'm confused here. Your first sentence seems to take the opposite
position from that you took before. I suspect I'd agree with you here
that there is an objective reality and our experience of it introduces
a subjective aspect, since we grasp the world in the only way we can,
in terms of our mind's own capacities and limitations (a paraphrase of
Marx, incidentally).
I'm also confused by this. After all my effect to define emergence and
to criticize reductionism, you accuse me of using a reduction. Your
point is too subtle for me to grasp. Also, I've always thought of
reductionism as a philosophy, not a "tool." I've already demonstrated
that it is a contentious philosophy and not, as you suggest, in any
way "standard."
I'm unclear what you are stating to be my position, and so let me
state it again. I objected to radical empiricism because it entails
the creation of categories that are not only subjective, but usually
arbitrary. I do not believe I implied reductionism introduces an
undesirable subjectivism, but rather that it denies the reality of
what we experience.
Let me make sure I've got your position right. If I understand you,
the behavior and properties of an organism can be entirely and
unequivocally explained in principle from a knowledge of its
constituent molecules such as genes. Likewise, the properties and
behavior of genes can be fully understood and predicted from a
knowledge of the molecules that constitute the gene. These molecules,
in turn can be fully explained and predicted on the basis of the
standard atomic particles, quarks etc. In other words, I could
unequivocally predict the behavior of Napoleon at Waterloo if I had
perfect knowledge of all the quarks in the universe. This flies the
face of common sense and surely does not represent your position. So
where does my example go wrong?
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
> The term "mechanical" applied to causality seems a conventional way to
> specify a causal mechanism for which the effect is entirely and
> unequivocally determined by the cause. That is, an end state can be
> entirely predicted from knowledge of some prior state. Actually, the
> logic is that outcomes could have been predicted by _any_ prior state,
> for each prior state is the unequivocal effect of its prior state. So,
> with total knowledge of the earth in 10 million B.C., you would be
> able in principle to predict the second line of Grey's Elegy in a
> Country Graveyard. Where do I misunderstand you?
>
course, is that some things appear not to be, in principle, predictable
in this way. The question is whether this appearance is a manifestation
of an actual state of the world, or a manifestation of our perception of
the world. We've discussed a few things, the behaviour of water, for
example, appears, at first examination, not to flow from the behaviour
of the molecule H2O - this is our minds imposing a view on reality and
giving it the name an 'emergent property'. Clearly this is simply a
matter of perception and almost certainly not a matter of the stuff
itself, how could H2O behave in a different way than the physics of its
molecular structure dictate? Consequently with matters where it is
considerably less clear - and the only one that is unequivocally such a
matter is consciousness - the term 'emergent property' is simply of no
use. This is why the notion of supervenience is an important one to
consider.
>
> Many groups or aggregates have properties that are not properties
> of the individuals of which they are a collection. Such properties
> are called `emergent' properties. ... Emergent properties are
> particularly prominent in biological sciences, but they are
> commonplace elsewhere too.
>
state of affairs - practically it is useful to chose an appropriate
level of description to analyse something, but actually it is just our
imposition of an idea and is generally not an artefact of the world.
>
> He goes on to discuss two sources of emergent properties. One is that
> many emergent properties are to be explained by the characteristics of
> the structure of the whole, the relation of its parts, not the
> properties of the parts themselves. Another source for emergence is
> what he calls "the fact of the ensemble." In other words different
> levels of a given reality obey different rules that cannot be
> explained as the effect of some other level. Am I correct to assume
> that you disagree with Harré again?
>
>
>
> So, you insist that the properties of the whole could in principle
> have been predicted from knowledge of the properties of its parts? Or
> do I misunderstand? It seems you suggest that the properties of a
> higher level (ice), is implied by the lower level (H2O), and so the
> higher level ceased being a distinct level:
>
>
> And finally, are you saying that the characteristics of ice, such as
> being solid, have no basis in reality, but are patterns we impose on
> reality? That "solidity" is only an interpretation or model, not how
> our mind represents a real state? It makes no sense to me to speak of
> solidity as an "interpretation" (an explanation), or a model (a mental
> analog) rather than a description of a state. Your misuse of words
> makes your position opaque. Is there an objective reality out there
> that we refer to as the property "solid" and that constrains how we
> represent that property in thought? It seems you do not think there
> is, but your use of words does not allow me to be certain, and I'm not
> at all clear just why you make the assumption. You seem to deny that
> the content of our consciousness is in any way constrained by the
> world. Is the conventional discussion of objective reality and an
> effort to grasp it in thought mere empty rhetoric?
>
establish from you!
You have appeared, throughout, to rely on a distinction between
'subjective' and 'objective' - and further you claim that reductionism
somehow crosses a border between the two.
Repeated questioning of you has not led to any answer to clear this up.
Asking me the question about 'external reality' is not a substitute for
you supporting your claim - your claim then would be, as you say, 'empty
rhetoric'.
I have asked you to clear this up repeatedly - you now come around in a
circle and try to get me to clear up your confusion!!
See if you can answer the above, you've seen it asked by me often
enough. If you don't understand the question I can try to make it clearer.
--
Now the chapter I was obliged to tear out, was the description of this
cavalcade, in which Corporal Trim and Obadiah, upon two coach-horses
a-breast, led the way as slow as a patrole--whilst my uncle Toby, in his
laced regimentals and tye-wig, kept his rank with my father, in deep
roads and dissertations alternately upon the advantage of learning and
arms, as each could get the start.- Tristam Shandy Chapter 2.LX Laurence
Sterne
Peter H.M. Brooks
What do you mean by something 'denying the reality' of 'what we
experience? 'what we experience' is surely our subjective view, in what
sense are you seeking to say that it is 'real'?
How does reductionism in any way deny anything? It is a process, not a
political statement. If you reduce level Y to level X, you explain the
mechanism whereby X causes Y (leaving aside questions of causality for
the moment, treating the use of the word here as a simple English
usage). If you explanation is inadequate fine, more work may need to be
done.
If, on the other hand, you wish to make the claim that, in principle,
particular Y's, or a particular Y, cannot be reduced to any X, then you
need to point out why it is impossible.
The problem is that your claim, of course, has to deal with all time,
all technology and so forth - for the claim is vast enough to say that
nobody ever anywhere with any tools will be able to provide a causal
explanation. To make such an extreme and special claim you need some
evidence at least.
>
> Let me make sure I've got your position right. If I understand you,
> the behavior and properties of an organism can be entirely and
> unequivocally explained in principle from a knowledge of its
> constituent molecules such as genes. Likewise, the properties and
> behavior of genes can be fully understood and predicted from a
> knowledge of the molecules that constitute the gene. These molecules,
> in turn can be fully explained and predicted on the basis of the
> standard atomic particles, quarks etc. In other words, I could
> unequivocally predict the behavior of Napoleon at Waterloo if I had
> perfect knowledge of all the quarks in the universe. This flies the
> face of common sense and surely does not represent your position. So
> where does my example go wrong?
>
What 'common sense' [a tricky notion at best] does this fly in the face of?
It is not quite what I've been saying. I've been looking for something a
little more substantial than a claim that 'it is not common sense' to
justify your claim that it is impossible.
Your example leaves out the one important point of the nature of
consciousness. If consciousness is a physical property, like magnetism,
then, yes, if you also knew the state of the consciousness that
supervened over Napoleon's brain (and that of the other protagonists as
well, presumably) then, yes, there would be nothing left out and it
would be predictable, in principle. Of course, practically it is likely
to be impossible given that he is now long dead, but, in principle, yes
there is nothing wrong with the idea.
I look forward to learning more about this magical 'common sense'
defence of your position.
--
"Me!--not at all," replied Mr. Knightley, rather displeased; "I do not
want to think ill of him. I should be as ready to acknowledge his
merits as any other man; but I hear of none, except what are merely
personal; that he is well-grown and good-looking, with smooth, plausible
manners." -- Emma, Jane Austen
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > Apparently, for you emergence is a conceptual category, and for me
> > it is a material process. Our disagreement may simply be that you
> > are talking about one thing and I another. But I can't help noting
> > that the origin of this dialog was a discussion of the real world,
> > and so perhaps I can be excused for assuming you continued to make
> > statements about it. It turns out this assumption may be
> > incorrect.
> I'm not certain that it was about the real world - you have yet to
> clarify what you mean by 'objective' and why you think that certain
> things are not 'objective' and how you tell the difference - and
> then why the difference matters.
We have debated the meaning of "emergence" already, perhaps
subsequently to your point here. So I'll put that aside.
Whether our discussion of sociobiology and reductionism was about the
real world or only about our statements seems to be the issue in
contention here. A complication is that, at least superficially,
sociobiology seems to be about processes that take place independently
of mind, and reductionism is surely a mental operation.
Let me state my own position very simply and then ask that you specify
at least the first point with which you disagree and why you disagree
with it.
1. My position is expressed here verbally, and to the extent possible,
my words will have conventional meanings. So let me take for
granted the general assumption, which forms the basis of
conventional definitions, that there are things that happen in the
world that are independent of humans, such as events of 10 million
years ago, or independently of mind, such as catching a cold. It
seems that the term "world" is used to refer to events outside the
mind (of course, our mental events can form part of someone else's
world), whether or not we become aware of them. An "objective"
statement, then, is a statement that has truth value in relation to
that part of the world of which we are aware.
It is irrelevant here if these meanings are based on false
assumptions. Perhaps the mind does not exist, perhaps we cannot
make truthful statements about the world, perhaps the rules of
logic are only fantasty. The issue here, however, is just what are
the conventional meanings. If you disagree with one of these
meanings, our difference can be simply resolved by referring to a
standard dictionary. If we are compelled to adopt a non-standard
definitions, we must make that choice very explicit, we must define
the term carefully, and we should offer some justify our deviation.
2. I suggest there exists a world independent of thought. Why do I
assume that? It is difficult to prove, for everything might indeed
be just an illusion, including any proof or justification I might
offer for the existence of the world. However, I have several
personal reasons to assume that the world does in fact exist
independently of my thought. I've mentioned before that one of them
has to do with my social class, but there are other and more
personal reasons as well that I need not elaborate here. These
reasons all have to do with my relations with other people who form
part of my world, and without whom I'd feel very isolated and
hopeless.
If you don't accept the conventional assumption that the world
exists outside the mind, but prefer some unconventional axiom, it
seems to me that you are obliged to make that axiom explicit and to
justify your choice. An axiom that is unconventional requires
justification if it is to serve as the basis of meaningful
dialog. One does not debate axioms, for otherwise they would not be
axiomatic by definition, but they can be justified and they do shed
useful light on the arguments that arise from them.
3. All observational events, by which I mean the effect of an
observational act, entail an objective and a subjective inputs.
The observational event is influenced both by the world (which is
axiomatic here) observed and also influenced by the mind and
instruments of the observer (my mental capacities and its
limitations, my presumptions, my culture, my social
location). These determinations of the observational event that
arise from the world are generally called objective, and those that
do not arise from the world represent in principle the "subjective"
aspect of an observational event, although in practice it usually
refers only to the effect of mind upon the observational
event. This position, which presumes the reality of an objective
world outside the mind, and that the truth value of our statements
about the world are the result of their being constrained by
empirical data, and of the presence of a subjective aspect of our
statements about that world, I believe to be entirely conventional.
Less controversial than the origin of the observational event is
the nature of the event itself.
4. One might be inclined to see the observational event as purely
mental on one hand or as purely objective on the other. If the
result of observation is purely a product of the imagination, then
there is no reason to assume the mind is at all rational (thus
ending any meaningful discussion), and there follow serious moral
and political consequences (which it seems you identify correctly
with post-Modernism). If the observational event were purely
objective (such as in a naive reflection theory), while having the
advantage of being a popular assumption, does not stand up under
scientific scrutiny.
Most people would insist that observational statements must have a
bit of both: It is obvious that observational statements have a
subjective factor because humans do the observing, and they
observe with human instrumentation, and the result is expressed in
human terms. The issue then becomes, how do we understand this
mixed observational statement? The common view in the social
sciences (natural scientists are less naive) is that observational
statements can be subsequently analyzed (reduced) to an objective
component and a subjective component. The objective statement is
simply a sum of its contributory factors. It follows that this
analysis or reduction allows us to remove or compensate for the
subjective element, so that the resulting statement becomes more
purely objective.
I have made clear, however, that I do not accept this analytical
position and assume rather that observational statements are
irreducible (emergent) phenomena that combine objective and
subjective inputs into an indissoluble whole (obviously, I'm using
"emergent" here in the conventional sense opposite to analysis or
reduction) that cannot be analyzed into constituent parts. In this
case, the aim is not to neutralize the subjective component, but to
ensure that it is as capable of true value as possible, which I
take to mean that it be socially universal.
What is there to recommend either a reductionist or
non-reductionist position? It seems to me that a common sense view
is that some things can be reduced (as in chemistry) and some can't
(such as life), and so it's not a question of being absolute about
the issue, but of finding reasons to prefer one or the other as
more appropriate to specific situations and also for reasons that
arise from outside the event under discussion. If, on the contrary,
one were to assume that all phenomena are reducable (atomism) or no
phenomena at all are reducable (I don't know who might hold this
position, but perhaps in connection with some religious view), it
represents assumptions that beg justification. One reason I don't
start with an atomistic agenda is that it seems clearly associated
with classical political economy and therefore a different social
class than the one with which I associate.
5. So far all this may be quite conventional, but at this point,
because of my own interests and certain ambiguities present in my
own field (it is presumptuous for me to say I have a "field," and
it has not much intruded in this dialog), I also find it necessary
to explain how the non-reductionist emergence of the observational
statement might take place. I start with the fact of the brain's
being an enormous dissipater of energy (it represents a third of
our entire energy budget, I suppose). If that cranial dissipation
is constrained by experience of the world, it drives a relatively
large thermodynamic engine, the outcome of which is the emergence
of observational events. I suspect my elaboration is not
controversial in principle, but I'm not seen it discussed.
6. Another aspect of this question where I tread on an uncertain is my
conviction that the issue of atomism vs. a non-reductionist
approach depends much on whether we see things in static terms or
as processes. Argument here would be off topic, but I will mention
that a) I assume everything in this cosmos without exception is a
process. b) A process can not be fully described in static terms,
and so cannot be reduced, even if we are able to predict its
outcome at some arbitrary point in time in the future. c) Some
(emergent) processes do not support entirely predictable outcomes
by definition, in which case we are limited to retrodiction, which
is is to make true statements about the past of the process under
study rather than about its outcomes in the future.
6. The observational event is an event in the mind that is stimulated
by and influenced by what lies outside the mind. The objective
world constrains the brain's dissipation so that it can create an
object of thought. These observational events are manipulated by
the mind to arrive at mental representations and explanations of
events in the objective world. While these explanations reside in
the mind and are influenced by the nature and content of our mind,
they are also constrained by the world and therefore have truth
value, whether they happen to be true or not.
7. The observational event and our explanation of a worldly event are
both mental events, but I feel nevertheless they have a determinant
relation with the world as suggested above. So our task then is to
justify our explanations as being in some way true to the
world. The historical context for this issue is a) Ernst Mach's
empiriocriticism (yes, the same Mach who invented the speed of
sound barrier and anticipated Einstein's special theory of
relativity), which suggested that science is about observational
events rather than about the world outside the mind, and b( Lenin's
extended critique of Mach. The result of this was a bifurcation
between what eventually became known as phenomenalism on one hand,
and Marxist realism on the other. It could be said that Mach,
rather than Compte, marks the origin of positivism.
8. The former (empiriocritical) branch has moved in several
directions, none of which have had much influenced on the practice
of science. Springing from empiriocricism was logical positivism,
which proposed rigid local criteria for observational
statements. Popper's verification criteria also contributed little
to science (a bit more to social science, however), and Carnap's
physicalism, which strikes most scientists as silly. Bridgeman's
operationalism is another offshoot. In short, the phenomenalist
path has led nowhere from the perspective of scientific
practice. It is a kind of scholasticism of the 20th century, the
sigh of a dying civilization.
9. The fate of the naturalist alternative is quite different. Due to
several circumstances, there was not much development of Lenin's
defense of realism, which admittedly was not very strong. However,
it has tended to be the implicit assumption of scientific
practice. Since the Second World War it has revived as a
self-conscious philosophy of science, arguing that the world is
real and a priori to our mental life and that our observational
statements refer to real things, not just to mental events. To
quote R. Harré again:
For most of scientific knowledge realists are surely right to
see the extension of our knowledge as alternately an extension
of our knowledge of what things and materials there are, and
an extension of our knowledge of their natures.
It is the consensus among intellectual historians (of Europe), I
believe, that positivism acquired hegemony because of the Second
Industrial Revolution, and that it successfully blocked challenges
in the course of the 20th century (because of the dominance of the
bourgeois order?), and that from, say, the 1970s, we have entered
new uncharted territory in which realism and positivism will have
contributed, but with an unpredictable outcome that will reduce to
neither. So my adherence to realism remains tentative, and I must
be open minded bout new currents of thought.
10. Most scientists shy away from these issues as mere distractions,
or if they do take an interest, they adopt one position or the
other based on factors lying outside science. I suggest the choice
is often ideological, but I don't assume that this alone
invalidates the choice.
> We can only model material processes, we have no direct access to
> them, these models include what you call 'conceptual
> categories'.
Yes. Seems compatible with the points above.
> Emergent properties are simply what we choose to see, I mentioned a
> fork in chess, this is something that is clear to somebody who knows
> the rules of chess but has no meaning to somebody who doesn't. This
> is common with emergent properties.
This is not the standard definition of emergent properties, as I have
demonstrated before. So I have to look upon this paragraph as your
alternative definition. You seem to imply here that our experiences of
the world have no influence on observational events. I don't want to
go off on this until you either confirm this is your position or
explain why it is not your position.
> > Two questions come to mind after all this: a) Why are the
> > logical categories you employ compelling? No one I know uses
> > them. They are certainly not universal in terms of world
> > culture. They are not embraced by all philosophers or all
> > scientists, and so what makes them attractive? What justifies
> > them?
> Popularity is no measure of truth! In fact the popularity of an idea
> is often inversely proportional to its truth.
A gratuitous statement. If I have sufficient justification, then my
conclusion about some matter may turn out to be unpopular, although
true. If I lack justification, then my unpopular conclusion is just
childish willfulness. Obviously popular opinion is often right and it
is often wrong, but I see no reason to reject it without some
justification. I do not agree with the inference of your second
sentence that the more unpopular my ideas, the more truthful they must
be, and I hope you don't feel that way either.
> > b) Why do we start with mental life and then seek to make the
> > world conform to it, rather than start with our real experiences
> > (such as the rising tide) and adapt our mental life to these
> > experiences as best we can?
> I'm not quite sure what you mean by 'real experiences' here. What we
> see and conventionally agree to be a rising tide could in fact be a
> falling earth, the two would provide the same experience. The former
> model works better in many ways and the other leads to some
> conceptual difficulties, but they are both just models of the world.
A valid enough point, for indeed my observation of the rising tide
might have an alternative explanation, such as an approaching tsunami
while the tide should actually be going out. But if I were to suggest
that the rising tide was due to the machinations of little green men
from Mars, you would naturally be sceptical. The difference here has
nothing to do with the logic of our alternative statements, but with
common sense (popular opinion) and with received scientific knowledge
that we presume represents an approximate truth of the world. You
"know" very well there are no little green men from Mars changing the
ocean level, and because you believe it true of the world, you assume
it to be as true today as yesterday, as true in New York as in
Johannesberg, and as true for me as it is for you. If truth were
entirely subjective, these conditions would be meaningless, and you
have no reason to reject the presence of the little green men, and
therefore to reject anything else either. Constructive thought comes
to a screeching halt. The logical positivists offer a good example of
empty ratiocination.
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
not invalidate meaning.
There is no screeching halt.
We can accept the subjectivity of our experience and still accept the
reality of the world.
It is indeed more difficult to do this that to postulate some silly
objectivity that does not exist.
--
intian by force we should try to do without.' - Quenten Crisp 'Resient
Alien'
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>>> Two questions come to mind after all this: a) Why are the
>>> logical categories you employ compelling? No one I know uses
>>> them. They are certainly not universal in terms of world
>>> culture. They are not embraced by all philosophers or all
>>> scientists, and so what makes them attractive? What justifies
>>> them?
>
>
>>Popularity is no measure of truth! In fact the popularity of an idea
>>is often inversely proportional to its truth.
>
>
> A gratuitous statement. If I have sufficient justification, then my
> conclusion about some matter may turn out to be unpopular, although
> true. If I lack justification, then my unpopular conclusion is just
> childish willfulness. Obviously popular opinion is often right and it
> is often wrong, but I see no reason to reject it without some
> justification. I do not agree with the inference of your second
> sentence that the more unpopular my ideas, the more truthful they must
> be, and I hope you don't feel that way either.
>
--
intian by force we should try to do without.' - Quenten Crisp 'Resient
Alien'
* TagZilla 0.057 * http://tagzilla.mozdev.org
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
> 6. Another aspect of this question where I tread on an uncertain is my
> conviction that the issue of atomism vs. a non-reductionist
> approach depends much on whether we see things in static terms or
> as processes. Argument here would be off topic, but I will mention
> that a) I assume everything in this cosmos without exception is a
> process. b) A process can not be fully described in static terms,
> and so cannot be reduced, even if we are able to predict its
> outcome at some arbitrary point in time in the future. c) Some
> (emergent) processes do not support entirely predictable outcomes
> by definition, in which case we are limited to retrodiction, which
> is is to make true statements about the past of the process under
> study rather than about its outcomes in the future.
>
not, just how you arrive at an assumption that 'everything is a
process'.. Just what do you mean by this and how do you come to think
this a reasonable assumption?
Please let me know. This is curious and needing and explanation.
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>Haines Brown wrote:
>
>
> 5. So far all this may be quite conventional, but at this point,
> because of my own interests and certain ambiguities present in my
> own field (it is presumptuous for me to say I have a "field," and
> it has not much intruded in this dialog), I also find it necessary
> to explain how the non-reductionist emergence of the observational
> statement might take place. I start with the fact of the brain's
> being an enormous dissipater of energy (it represents a third of
> our entire energy budget, I suppose). If that cranial dissipation
> is constrained by experience of the world, it drives a relatively
> large thermodynamic engine, the outcome of which is the emergence
> of observational events. I suspect my elaboration is not
> controversial in principle, but I'm not seen it discussed.
>
suggest, that this is a novel thought.
That doesn't matter. What matters is if you have any evidence,
whatsoever, to suggest that what you claim is true.
Do you>
Peter H.M. Brooks
>
> 4. One might be inclined to see the observational event as purely
> mental on one hand or as purely objective on the other. If the
> result of observation is purely a product of the imagination, then
> there is no reason to assume the mind is at all rational (thus
> ending any meaningful discussion), and there follow serious moral
> and political consequences (which it seems you identify correctly
> with post-Modernism). If the observational event were purely
> objective (such as in a naive reflection theory), while having the
> advantage of being a popular assumption, does not stand up under
> scientific scrutiny.
>
Well, no. That is not the dichotomy.
You don't explain what you mean by 'purely objective', so what you claim
makes no sense.
Try to explain what you mean and we have a discussion.
Peter H.M. Brooks
Well, it is very nice that you assume all this.
Probably it makes you feel very comfortable.
What you have to do is justify your comfortable assumptions.
It is certainly true that much of what people think is irrational - you
confirm this yourself.
The question is whether you understand what is necessary for something
to be rational.
You try to claim that all your prejudices are 'commons sense'. A common
and naive position. Do try to be a little more rational and explain what
other support for these positions you claim.
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>Haines Brown wrote:
>
>
>>>Apparently, for you emergence is a conceptual category, and for me
>>>it is a material process. Our disagreement may simply be that you
>>>are talking about one thing and I another. But I can't help noting
>>>that the origin of this dialog was a discussion of the real world,
>>>and so perhaps I can be excused for assuming you continued to make
>>>statements about it. It turns out this assumption may be
>>>incorrect.
>
>
>>I'm not certain that it was about the real world - you have yet to
>>clarify what you mean by 'objective' and why you think that certain
>>things are not 'objective' and how you tell the difference - and
>>then why the difference matters.
>
>
> We have debated the meaning of "emergence" already, perhaps
> subsequently to your point here. So I'll put that aside.
>
> Whether our discussion of sociobiology and reductionism was about the
> real world or only about our statements seems to be the issue in
> contention here. A complication is that, at least superficially,
> sociobiology seems to be about processes that take place independently
> of mind, and reductionism is surely a mental operation.
>
my objection to your claims. (aka a straw-man)
You claim that reductionism transgresses an objective view of the world.
You fail (even in this most recent long posting) to explain what you see
is possible as an objective view.
I've asked you many times to justify your claim that reductionism
somehow transgresses in being a 'subjective' approach relative to what
you claim to be an 'objective' approach. You fail continually to give a
simple straightforward explanation of what you think this difference is.
Consequently all your claims fail entirely.
Just try it. Give a twenty line definition of what you think
'objectivity', or an 'objective' approach might be. So we can understand
why you think that reductionism transgresses you idea. It ought to be
easy if you understand it.
It is just that simple.
If you can define your idea of 'objectivity' so that it make sense, then
all the rest will follow.
I have lost count of how many times I've asked you to do this.
--
"You will not ask me what is the point of envy.--You are determined, I
see, to have no curiosity.--You are wise--but _I_ cannot be wise. Emma,
I must tell you what you will not ask, though I may wish it unsaid the
next moment." -- Emma, Jane Austen
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> >>What 'realism' are you claiming for yourself?
> > Realism as in the well-established realist school in the
> > philosophy of science. See, for example, Rom Harré, The
> > Philosophies of Science (Oxford, 1984). A couple important works
> > that exemplify the school: Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and
> > Human Emancipation (London 1986) and Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific
> > Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton,
> > 1984).
> Yes, well, fine, how nice.
I said my views were like those of the philosophy of science known as
scientific realism. Your question implies there are several kinds of
realism. I toss in a couple of titles whose realism I find
congenial. How else am I supposed to identify to which branch (which
you suppose exist) of realism I ascribe? I gave a simple answer to a
simple question, for you did not ask me for an exposition of my
realist position. I suggest you look up a definition of "trolling."
I doubt you are thinking of Platonic realism, for the context here is
modern science. The only realism today of relevance is perceptual
realism (sometimes called epistemological realism).
So what else can I do? Quote from a standard definition and say,
that's where I stand? Simply give a summation of my views? I'll try a
bit of both (again). Of course, in principle my own viewpoint on
science is irrelevant to the thread, but you are forcing me to beat
this red herring to death, which of course is associated with
trolling.
So let me go back once again to Harré (I've a limited library and have
to make do with what I've got). He discusses various philosophies of
science, and realism is the fourth. He assumes it to have the
following characteristics:
1. Our words point to hypothetical entities, some of which can be
real and can be demonstrated to be real.
2. While phenomenalists see science as consisting exclusively of
general laws of phenomena, realists see scientific knowledge as
knowledge of the existence and nature of things, from which
empirical laws flow.
This strikes me as a bit austere, so I turn to Lacey's dictionary of
philosophy. He suggests that any view can be considered realist that
emphasizes the existence or role of some kind of thing or object,
rather than emphasize words (nominalism), ideas (idealism,
conceptualism), or logical constructions (phenomenalism).
But this definition by negation remains rather vague, so from another
standard source:
(Perceptual) realism defends one of the most common elementary
convictions of common sense against the consequence of the argument
from illusion that only private sense-data or appearance are
directly perceived, doing so usually on the ground that since
sense-experiences occur independently of the perceiver's will they
must be attributed to a cause external to him.
My only quibble here is that this grossly simplifies the issue of the
relation of sense data and the object perceived. While I agree the
perception is caused by the existence of an independent object, it's
specific content is only a function of the outside object, not a
reflecton of it, and is is also a function of the act of perception.
So let me add another standard source to put a little more flesh on
the bones:
Three main positions characterize the history of philosophical
reflection upon the sciences. For empiricism, the natural order is
what is given in experience; for idealism, it is what we make or
construct; for realism it is recognized as a presupposition of our
causal investigations of nature, but our knowledge of it is socially
produced with the cognitive resources at our disposal, on the
grounds of the effect of those investigations. For realism, it is
the nature of the world that determines its cognitive possibilities
for us; it is humankind that is the contingent phenomena in nature
and human knowledge, which is, on a cosmic scale, accidental.
I believe these generally reflect points I've already made, that the
existence of things is presumed prior to our cognition of them, that
theory represents our effort to represent the nature of things in
thought, that our cognitive ability is a social product, and that it
develops through our being engaged in an investigation of that outside
reality.
Notice that there little reference in these brief characterizations of
the existence of different kinds of realism that might compel me to
identify with one or the other so that my self-identification with
realism might become clear. So if your reference to "what realism?"
implies which kind of realism, it would appear to be nothing but a red
herring. If you are up to defining various kinds of realism, I'll try
to tell you with which I feel comfortable. But until then, your point
is gratuitous.
Also note that realism is probably closest to common sense, for most
people assume there's a reality out there, that it is intelligible,
and our ability to grasp it depends on our prior experience of having
done so and is socially conditioned (although perhaps in the popular
view in some countries only negatively in terms of personal biases or
corruption). While common sense is often wrong, it has its advantages
too, and I need not apologize for any position that happens to be in
accord with common sense. Otherwise, I would be arrogant.
Finally, my citing standard texts, not all realist in persuasion, is a
perfectly legitimate way to define the realist philosophy without
having to do it here myself, for which I lack the time and ability,
and you presumably lack the patience. But the main thing is that it is
off topic, a red herring. Because you admit you are ignorant of the
topic, I cited authoritative works representing the field, I have
quoted brief characterizations from standard works, and I have briefly
offered my own sense of its basic thrust. What else can I do on a
topic that is clearly off thread?
I've been forced to hit all the bases and go on at length, when my
prior characterization should have entirely sufficed for the purpose of
the discussion, which, you might note, has been forced by your request
to get way from the initial topic of sociobiology and reductionism. My
personal views on other matters are irrelevant to the thread unless
you are seeking weapons for an ad hominem attack.
> I know that it is a common failing of people who have fallen for one
> or other religion, to quote their prophets - or those who agree with
> those prophet
Yes, apparently you can't engage in any discussion without abusing
others with such ad hominem remarks. Few of your messages have been
able to resist that weakness. What is there about my preference for
scientific realism that resembles a commitment to religion? Your
comment is just being nasty and offers no useful content, such as
would have resulted from your specifying and justifying the analogy.
For example, any scientific theory or method has certain axioms, which
do resemble religion in that they are taken for granted as being
true. However, as I have said before on this subject (which you have
forgotten or choose to ignore):
1. Axioms that are accepted as being true by the scientific
community can be taken for granted, and need not be justified and
may need not even be explicit.
2. Nevertheless, all axioms are held to be tentative in principle
and subject to challenge. Often, scientific advance arises from
such a challenge to conventional axioms.
3. Scientific knowledge is felt to be a partial knowledge, an
imperfect knowledge, that is provisional, contingent and only
approximates the truth. This applies to our axioms as well. If
our axioms serve us well (the definition of such utility is
variable, of course), we tend to stay with them. Otherwise, we
are happy to toss them out and try others.
4. In religion, on the other hand, it appears there are certain
fundamental beliefs that are taken for granted as being
unequivocally true, absolute and universal. Faith precedes
reason, or at least reason should be compatible with or fortify
the articles of faith.
5. Progress in religious knowledge is marked by an increase of truth
in relation to our ignorance; progress in scientific knowledge is
marked by the increase of ignorance in relation to known truths,
for every new discovery in science exposes enormous new realms
of ignorance.
You see, you have gotten me again to rise to your bait. I hope this
makes the difference between science and religion clear. If you
disagree, I suggest you let this red herring just swim away.
People naturally disagree, but that fact is useless until they specify
exactly where they disagree, explore the reasons for the disagreement
or seek to justify their positions.
Are you suggesting that reductionism is free of axioms? On the
other hand, are you suggesting that because my own axioms differ from
yours, I am incapable of subjecting anything to reasoned criticism?
All this seems gratuitous. If you are a reductionist (and have not
come right out and said so), have you tried at all to define or
justify that position? I don't think so. I do feel that I've hinted
occasionally why I prefer my realist position, such as what I see to
be its moral and social implications, to say nothing of the fact that
it's closer to common sense, but my position should remain irrelevant
here.
The issue here is not the strengths or weaknesses of my own feeble
attempts to think rationally about the world, but whether you are a
sociobiologist (I don't think you have even explicitly said you are),
whether sociobiology entails a reductionism in the conventional
meaning of that word, and, again, whether you support a reductionist
method in science. I assume you are capable of defining and justifying
your position, but you have not done it yet, and instead have only
raised red herrings and made nasty personal comments.
> This hagiography is quite sweet and it does indeed remove any need
> for though from the sheep (sorry, believers).
Again you misuse a word. "Hagiography" means the study or writing of
saints' lives. That effort can be a very rational and
worthwhile. Hagiography represent a major source for European Medieval
history. You seem to be accusing me of not examining my axioms
critically, which is quite a different thing than hagiography and, of
course, completely off topic.
> If you think that you actually have anything to say then say
> it. Quoting other people who have been wrong (or maybe even from
> time to time right - it is as difficult always to be wrong as it is
> always to be right). I qualify that last parent his by saying that,
> if you are right, then you can defend yourself, not by hiding behind
> quotes, but by actually saying in simple language, just what you
> mean.
You asked to which kind of realism I ascribed, and so naturally I had
to use some standard definitions, and it is safer to quote them than
to paraphrase them. I hope now that I've be a bit more explicit about
my position, you are satisfied and we can get back on thread.
Other people can indeed be wrong, but is that not another red herring?
I assume I'm probably more often wrong than the authorities, and since
I don't happen to an authority, I must cautiously rely on them. If I
were to suggest that my position is necessarily entirely correct, and
therefore I need not trouble myself with any differing views, would I
not stand accused of arrogance and ignorance?
I've avoided being personal, but I can't help wonder at this point if
you are indeed a sociobiologist (that is useful if I am to evaluate
your view of the relation, if any, between sociobiology and
reductionism) or even active in any field of science (which would save
me the effort of defining elementary concepts), except perhaps as a
student. If I knew you were a student or an amateur (as I am to an
extent), I might have greater forbearance.
Given the unwillingness to engage in debate, your aim increasingly
seems to be merely to troll. I've not minded having risen to the bait,
for, as I said before, it is an opportunity for self-clarification,
and I know very well by this time that no one else (with a modicum of
sanity) is following the thread.
So to block the opportunity for trolling, let me suggest these ground
rules:
1. I suggested sociobiology was contested. You doubted it, but I
produced a standard book that said it was. That it is contested
does not mean it is false, but that there is serious opposition to
it. My citation proves that to be the case. End of issue.
2. You asked what I objected to in sociobiology. I admitted I was not
particularly knowledgeable, but assumed it was reductionist. You
did not deny that characterization and even implied you are a
reductionist. But this leaves things up in the air in a very
unsatisfactory way. I suggest you explicitly state whether
sociobiology is reductionist, and explicitly define what you
believe reductionism to be. Otherwise, there is only hot air.
3. So the thread could boil down to the pros and cons of reductionism,
once the above conditions are met. That strikes me as a useful
direction to take, but from this point on let me impose some
conditions:
a) The avoidance, to the extent possible, of all side issues,
including my personal outlook. These I'll dismiss as just red
herrings aimed at throwing up a fog, or an effort to troll in order
to cause discomfort or to waste the time of others for its own sake.
b) I will assume all words and ideas, theories, etc. have
conventional meanings as defined in standard works, unless you make
explicit a private meaning, and then define and justifify it. Short
of that, I will consider private usages as only obscurantism.
c) I have presumed a connection between sociobiology and
reductionism, and awaited your confirmation or denial. It seems to
me that this must be the first order of business. There's no point
in talking about reductionism until after you have admitted it is a
basis of sociobiology and until after that method has been
satisfactorily defined. I intend to be cautious about leaping ahead
without being first satisfied the obvious starting points and
issues in contention are resolved.
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>Haines Brown wrote:
>>
>>>"Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>
> I said my views were like those of the philosophy of science known as
> scientific realism. Your question implies there are several kinds of
> realism. I toss in a couple of titles whose realism I find
> congenial. How else am I supposed to identify to which branch (which
> you suppose exist) of realism I ascribe? I gave a simple answer to a
> simple question, for you did not ask me for an exposition of my
> realist position. I suggest you look up a definition of "trolling."
>
suggests that you have no view yourself of what it means.
>
> I doubt you are thinking of Platonic realism, for the context here is
> modern science. The only realism today of relevance is perceptual
> realism (sometimes called epistemological realism).
>
suggesting that you have views on the matter!
Platonic realism is a pertinent discussion in mathematics as a good many
practising mathematicians do believe that they discover rather than
invent things.
>
> So what else can I do? Quote from a standard definition and say,
> that's where I stand? Simply give a summation of my views? I'll try a
> bit of both (again). Of course, in principle my own viewpoint on
> science is irrelevant to the thread, but you are forcing me to beat
> this red herring to death, which of course is associated with
> trolling.
>
Accusing your interloquitor of 'trolling' rather suggests that you've
lost the plot, the argument or both.
A summation of your view as it was relevant would have been useful - you
have yet to give a useful explanation of what you see as 'subjective'
and 'objective' and why you see reductionism somehow transgressing on a
boundary between them. I agree that you appeared to be making a bizarre
claim at the time, but failing to answer requests for clarification
suggest that you now know you were wrong - a confession and acceptance
of reductionism might be in order.
>
> So let me go back once again to Harré (I've a limited library and have
> to make do with what I've got). He discusses various philosophies of
> science, and realism is the fourth. He assumes it to have the
> following characteristics:
>
> 1. Our words point to hypothetical entities, some of which can be
> real and can be demonstrated to be real.
>
> 2. While phenomenalists see science as consisting exclusively of
> general laws of phenomena, realists see scientific knowledge as
> knowledge of the existence and nature of things, from which
> empirical laws flow.
>
> This strikes me as a bit austere, so I turn to Lacey's dictionary of
> philosophy.
>
I have no problem with the above - if that is what you believe. You need
to explain how you see reductionism exists in such a view and why you
see it as wrong.
>
> My only quibble here is that this grossly simplifies the issue of the
> relation of sense data and the object perceived. While I agree the
> perception is caused by the existence of an independent object, it's
> specific content is only a function of the outside object, not a
> reflecton of it, and is is also a function of the act of perception.
>
Thats a sensible and well understood view - it doesn't help in
clarifying your objection to reduction though.
>
> Notice that there little reference in these brief characterizations of
> the existence of different kinds of realism that might compel me to
> identify with one or the other so that my self-identification with
> realism might become clear. So if your reference to "what realism?"
> implies which kind of realism, it would appear to be nothing but a red
> herring. If you are up to defining various kinds of realism, I'll try
> to tell you with which I feel comfortable. But until then, your point
> is gratuitous.
>
No, it isn't. You have answered the question relating to views of, or
descriptions of 'realism'.
>
> Also note that realism is probably closest to common sense, for most
> people assume there's a reality out there, that it is intelligible,
> and our ability to grasp it depends on our prior experience of having
> done so and is socially conditioned (although perhaps in the popular
> view in some countries only negatively in terms of personal biases or
> corruption). While common sense is often wrong, it has its advantages
> too, and I need not apologize for any position that happens to be in
> accord with common sense. Otherwise, I would be arrogant.
>
Quite - you are now saying sensible things.
>
> I've been forced to hit all the bases and go on at length, when my
> prior characterization should have entirely sufficed for the purpose of
> the discussion, which, you might note, has been forced by your request
> to get way from the initial topic of sociobiology and reductionism. My
> personal views on other matters are irrelevant to the thread unless
> you are seeking weapons for an ad hominem attack.
>
I haven't made any such request! On the contrary, I have continued,
repeatedly, to ask you to clarify what you claim as an objection to
reductionism based on what it somehow does between subjectivity and
objectivity. I doubt I could have made this request much clearer.
>
>
> Are you suggesting that reductionism is free of axioms? On the
> other hand, are you suggesting that because my own axioms differ from
> yours, I am incapable of subjecting anything to reasoned criticism?
>
No. I repeatedly ask you to clarify your objection to reduction - you
have said that it makes the objective somehow subjective but you appear
unable to clarify what you mean by that. Asking about reductionism and
axioms doesn't help the matter at all - you made the claim, you need to
defend it, firstly by describing what it actually is.
>
> All this seems gratuitous. If you are a reductionist (and have not
> come right out and said so), have you tried at all to define or
> justify that position? I don't think so. I do feel that I've hinted
> occasionally why I prefer my realist position, such as what I see to
> be its moral and social implications, to say nothing of the fact that
> it's closer to common sense, but my position should remain irrelevant
> here.
>
You now contrast reductionism and realism. What makes you think that a
realist (of any particular stripe you care for) cannot be a
reductionist? How do you see the positions as contradictory?
>
> The issue here is not the strengths or weaknesses of my own feeble
> attempts to think rationally about the world, but whether you are a
> sociobiologist (I don't think you have even explicitly said you are),
> whether sociobiology entails a reductionism in the conventional
> meaning of that word, and, again, whether you support a reductionist
> method in science. I assume you are capable of defining and justifying
> your position, but you have not done it yet, and instead have only
> raised red herrings and made nasty personal comments.
>
You are the person who attacked reductinism with your claim about it not
being realistic because of its making 'subjectivity objective' - you
have not explained this claim. I have been asking you questions to try
to get you to add some meat to this claim, as I repeat above.
Why can't you just try to justify your claim? I haven't made any
particular claims, as you say, I see no need to. You have made what
seems to me a bizarre claim, I'd like you, if you can, to give at least
some rationalisation for it.
>
> Given the unwillingness to engage in debate, your aim increasingly
> seems to be merely to troll. I've not minded having risen to the bait,
> for, as I said before, it is an opportunity for self-clarification,
> and I know very well by this time that no one else (with a modicum of
> sanity) is following the thread.
>
Why do you have this unwillingness to debate? I ask a clear question
about your claim and repeat it many times - you appear not to understand
it or to be able to answer it. Instead you raise all sorts of
side-issues and claim that it is me who raised red herrings!
>
>
> 2. You asked what I objected to in sociobiology. I admitted I was not
> particularly knowledgeable, but assumed it was reductionist. You
> did not deny that characterization and even implied you are a
> reductionist. But this leaves things up in the air in a very
> unsatisfactory way. I suggest you explicitly state whether
> sociobiology is reductionist, and explicitly define what you
> believe reductionism to be. Otherwise, there is only hot air.
>
I know that you have created lots of hot air. No denying it. In the
above you try to claim that if X is reductionist then it is a knock down
argument against it - but, though you state it again, then you fail to
provide any justification for it whatsoever.
--
Secretly I have always held the opinion that it would be less depressing
to be alcoholic than to be anonymous- Quinten Crisp, Resident Alien
Peter H.M. Brooks
for this!!!
Yes, brilliant - please, if you can, produce your objection to
reductionism. In particular explain what you intended to mean when you
claimed that it made the objective subjective.
This, as I have repeated again and again, is what is missing.
You have made a claim. Now you must defend it.
That is all really.
--
Secretly I have always held the opinion that it would be less depressing
to be alcoholic than to be anonymous- Quinten Crisp, Resident Alien
Peter H.M. Brooks
> 1. Of or pertaining to a subject
> 2. Especially, pertaining to, or derived from one's own
> consciousness, in distinction from external observation;
> relating to the mind, or intellectual world, in distinction
> from the outward or material...
>
> Objective
> 1. Of or pertaining to an object
> 2. ... having the nature or position of, an object, outward;
> external, extrinsic; ... whatever is exterior to the mind
>
Let's hope your definitions match your claim, at least to some extent!
>
> I accept these very simple standard definitions, on this basis
> obviously can distinguish their meanings. To suggest otherwise is
> silly.
>
Let's see if you can support your claim.
>
> I believe I did not say reductionism fails to be objective, but that
> it introduces an undesirable subjective component. This may appear to
> amount to the same thing, but it is not. The first statement presumes
> the existence of pure objectivity. The second statement merely
> suggests reductionism has a subjective component, and as I'll
> demonstrate momentarily, I'm not saying the subjective component is
> necessarily bad, but that the kind of subjectivity involved in
> reductionism is in fact bad. While it is possible I spoke carelessly
> before or forgotten what I said, it seems more likely you are here
> simply misrepresenting me.
>
Ah, at last, an attempt to answer my questions! Thank you, Haines, how
nice to see a rational attempt at a response to the matter at hand at last.
I notice your retreat from what you said. Fair enough, you were wrong,
but lets look at your revised position:
Now you say not that 'reductionism implies subjectivism' (a bizarre
claim as I pointed out - well done for dropping it!), but now that it
introduces the 'wrong kind of subjectivism' - a nice skipping exercise.
Lets now see how you defend this change of your view:
> Normally, explanation of an event is carried out in terms of prior
> events. By "event" I mean empirical change within a relatively limited
> time and place. This is a common convention, and so I do not have to
> defend it unless you suggest it is in fact not conventional. I assume
> that change is caused by one or more other changes, usually prior in
> time, rather than by conditions (factors defined entirely in empirical
> terms). This is perhaps not a very conventional point, but seems
> intuitively obvious. So I'll elaborate or defend it only if you put
> forward a contrary case (that I will insist must honour the elementary
> laws of physics).
>
Ah, so you don't understand the difference between an open and a closed
system - fair enough, you haven't a scientific training.
You are wrong in claiming that an 'event' is only to be read as a local
matter - this is not a standard convention at all. It is a misreading of
the subtle (but important) difference between open and closed systems -
your initial claim was bizarre, but your misunderstanding of this
explains a little of it - good.
You have a naive conception of 'causality'. To be expected, after all,
if you know nothing of science, or the philosophy of science, this is
natural. Why, knowing so little, did you try to embark on an attack of
reductionism?
I like your reliance on 'intuitively obvious' points. Part of the
exercise of science is to reject such naivety. Many 'intuitively
obvious' points (like much of 'common sense') is proven to be wrong.
I really think that you could do with reading a primer on physics,
mathematics or just on logic. Your fatuous claim to have an objection to
reductionism is revealed for just what it is - a political bit of
post-modernistic nonsense uttered by somebody who understood science,
the scientific method and the matters of causality, objectivity and
subjectivity not a jot.
Come back for a discussion, Haines, when you have learned a little of
the world.
--
When people ask me what I've got against pictures, I can only reply,
'What have you got against the well'- Quinten Crisp, Resident Alien
Peter H.M. Brooks
> Now, how about reductionism. Despite my requests, you have not defined
> it nor offered any specific examples, so I may have to shoot at a
> straw man. I have to define that straw man in terms of convention, but
> I understand you may not care for that definition, and perhaps with
> some justice. Until then, I can only work with a conventional notion
> of the method.
>
> I argued above that any meaningful explanation of a process, of cause
> and effect, requires a reduction of the initial situation to
> manageable terms, and this may actually contribute to the truth value
> of our assessments. However, I understand that reductionism involves
> more than just this, but also tried to represent causes as being a)
> relatively simple and a b) more empirically accessible, and favouring
> c) mono-causal explanation rather than the ambivalence of multiple
> causes, and as a result of these taken together, a d) preference for
> mechanistic causation (unequivocal and highly predictable
> outcomes). (A.R. Lacy, op.cit., pg. 182, Hilary & Stephen Rose,
> op.cit., passim).
>
> I won't go further with this at this point because I have no reason to
> know if I have fairly represented your idea of the reductionist method
> and whether you, and more generally sociobiology, ascribe to it. My
> aim here has been the modest one of specifying some conventional
> characterizations of reductionism (with biologism as the
> example). Only after you have agreed that I have been accurate is
> there any point in my explaining why these four characteristics tend
> to reduce the truth value of our statements. I'd be spinning my wheels
> if instead you disavow one or more of these four characterizations.
>
Yes, Haines - you demonstrate your lack of understanding (and pompous
blather with it) in the above very well.
Yes, you do not understand reductionism.
You nevertheless attempted to pretend to an authoritative objection to it.
Don't do it again.
Go and read a little about it. Not just sociobiology (that might open
your horizons, or just have you clamp into your thoughtless shell), but
a bit about the scientific method. You claimed to have read 'The Nature
of Scientific Revolutions', if you actually have read it (which I
doubt), then read it again with attention and learn a little about the
scientific method. There are other books, but, if your mind is as closed
as the above, and your evasion of debate of your claim, suggest then,
maybe, you should just stick to what you know and chat to people about
programming or suchlike.
I don't mean to be upsetting, nor insulting, however, Haines, I have
spent quite a bit of my time asking you to answer some simple questions
in relation to your claim. To your credit (and I mean that), you have
had the honesty to come up with an answer. Sadly it exposes your
misunderstandings rather painfully. Don't go on making a fool of
yourself, either give up making claims about things you don't
understand, or learn about them. The only other alternative is that you
understand that people ignore your postings because they are mainly
bullshit.
You do have an element of plausibility about you. You tend to dress
things up in meaningless verbiage (a Marxist failing). Try to give that
up, and, as you have done (mainly, to be kind), in this posting, say
what you mean. Then, if you have it wrong (as you so clearly have here)
then the matter is over. If you are partially right then a discussion
can ensue.
I'm afraid that, sadly, I must no declare this discussion at an end. You
do not have anything to say that would interest me. I confess to being
wrong in my first analysis in thinking that you might have something to
say behind the verbiage.
If you go away for a few weeks and read up on the subjects you have
claimed to have knowledge of - and you do have a sharp enough brain to
manage that, I have no doubt. Then I will be only to happy to help you
with the matters you are still unclear about.
I leave you with one golden rule. If you understand something then you
can explain it in simple enough language for your grandmother to get the
gist. If you find you have to dress it up in pseudo-intellectual blather
to confuse the point then realise that you haven't understood it.
Make simplicity your aim. Then you may even acquire wisdom.
Even if you don't like me (and few of us like our nemesis much) don't
ignore my advice - I shan't check that you've followed it, I have more
interesting things to do, it will be only you that are the loser for
ignoring it.
--
Secretly I have always held the opinion that it would be less depressing
to be alcoholic than to be anonymous- Quieten Crisp, Resident Alien
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> > Let me end by emphasizing that I have not felt the need to explore
> > this question, and so my response here is off the top of my head
> > and undoubtedly has weaknesses. It is also just an outline meant
> > to characterize the kind of response I'd offer, and not a
> > developed argument.
> I'm happy that you make that confession. It does rather explain the
> oddness of most of your claims
>
> I'd recommend that you do a little work, read some books, if you
> can, do a first year course in philosophy, or, again, if you can
> manage it, a course in mathematics. Then re-enter the discussion.
>
> If you wish to continue with the 'paint by numbers' approach, the
> there are some excellent books to help you get a grasp of the
> matters involved.
>
> Read Hofstarter's 'Godel, Escher, Bach' it includes an excellent
> tutorial in basic mathematics and is, despite that, a delightful
> read.
>
> If you have that under your belt then write again, I've got more
> good books that you'll find useful.
My, my my! Do you feel better now? Do you always engage in dialog by
belittling the other person, telling them to go away and try learn
something before they again venture to engage your brilliant mind?
I read Gödel, Escher, Bach years ago, and indeed it was entertaining,
but don't know that it was particularly constructive. However, you
might try reading it yourself, for it develops a notion of emergence
that is similar to my own, and contrary to the one you insist upon
using. Also, you might learn how to spell the author's name.
I am a student in life, and am always keenly aware of my ignorance,
and I try to be aware of my sad blunders. I feel no shame admitting
this, and it does seem a necessary precondition for constructive
dialog. As any teacher will tell you, they learn much from their
students. If I thought I knew it all, and represented myself as
casting pearls before the swine, it would only mean my mind was
closed, and I would be incapable of any further learning. Such a
stance would betray the very principle of a scientific quest to
advance knowledge.
The topic is supposed to be whether sociobiology is reductionst, and
whether reduction is scientific. You seem to have affirmed the first,
but have not tried to engage me on the question of reductionism. If
you find it possible to define reductionism, which you imply you
advocate, I would be glad to explore my initial suspicion that it is
inherently racist. But I can't do that until we have agreed on what
reductionism entails. You have neither defined it nor yet addressed my
own effort to define it.
--
Haines Brown
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > a) Scientific knowledge evolves, and so that knowledge at any one
> > point in time is necessarily imperfect. For example, simple
> > mechanics, which might at one time have seemed unassailable, now
> > appears to be valid only under certain conditions, as the special
> > theory of relatively makes clear. So no scientific knowledge can be
> > presumed to be sacrosanct and free of social coloration as a matter
> > of principle. The case has to be argued in terms of a particular
> > scientific finding in a particular time and circumstance, and
> > social influence can't be dismissed a priori.
> It is just that level of fuckwittery you appear to be supporting in
> your paragraph above.
>
> I do understand your problem, if you worship at the grave of brother
> Marx, then you have to sign up to supporting all this, and more,
> fuckwittery.
>
> This is why people who are not fuckwits are not marxists. I do agree
> that there are indeed many fuckwits who are not marxists for other
> reasons - don't let that put you off, ask your shrink how he can
> help you to be more sensible.
Brilliant! Is this the only level of discussion of which you are
capable? The issue is reductionism. You refuse to define it, although
you apparently associate with that method, and you so far ignore my
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> > You evade my point
> >
> This, Haines, is one of your more positive statements. I'm delighted
> to learn that (unlike most pinkos) you actually understand that people
> can evade points.
>
> Let me not be too positive, though.
>
> I am still waiting for an answer to my questions (posed a number of
> times). Let me post them again, simply, in order so that you can
> really understand what 'evading the point' means, let me remind you of
> one of my simpler questions:
> > Who made any such suggestion?? You made the suggestion that
> > politics is an epiphenomenon. To suggest that the only alternative
> > is to believe the above is just silly - the above is a strawman,
> > there might be one or two politicians barmy enough to believe that
> > (I'd be happy to believe that there are quite a number), but that
> > does not mean it is a position that any sensible person would take
> > seriously.
Your have raised a number of red herrings, which I ignore because I am
doing my best to get back on topic, which if you recall was
reductionism. Actually, I might be guilty of that myself if I said
politics is epiphenomenal, but since you don't quote me, but merely
ascribe to me that view, it is hard to say.
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>
> I am a student in life, and am always keenly aware of my ignorance,
> and I try to be aware of my sad blunders.
>
to the article in which you finally (after me asking almost daily for
you to give an answer) tried to answer the question as to why you
claimed reductionism was wrong because of how it influenced objectivity
and subjectivity.
I've pointed out your error and what you need to do to recover from it.
Your sentence above suggests that I'll hear how well you've done in a
few months.
I closed the conversation in that posting - nothing useful can come out
of continuing it until you've learned rather a lot.
--
That which we can only maintain by force we should try to do without -
Quinten Crisp, Resident Alien
Peter H.M. Brooks
are racist.
Follow my advice and read up on the subject, then come back when you are
equipped for debate.
The conversation is closed.
--
Secretly I have always held the opinion that it would be less depressing
to be alcoholic than to be anonymous- Quinten Crisp, Resident Alien
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > The term "mechanical" applied to causality seems a conventional
> > way to specify a causal mechanism for which the effect is entirely
> > and unequivocally determined by the cause. That is, an end state
> > can be entirely predicted from knowledge of some prior
> > state. Actually, the logic is that outcomes could have been
> > predicted by _any_ prior state, for each prior state is the
> > unequivocal effect of its prior state. So, with total knowledge of
> > the earth in 10 million B.C., you would be able in principle to
> > predict the second line of Grey's Elegy in a Country
> > Graveyard. Where do I misunderstand you?
> Yes, that is true. In principle, that would be the case.
I try to define mechanical causality, and you say, "that is true." So
I'll assume you agree with that definition in principle.
> The issue, of course, is that some things appear not to be, in
> principle, predictable in this way.
In principle? Why do you say that? Surely you mean some things are not
predictable in practice? Otherwise you have conceded the point. I'm
the one who is arguing that in principle there are novelties that
cannot be unequivocally predicted.
> The question is whether this appearance is a manifestation of an
> actual state of the world, or a manifestation of our perception of
> the world.
The question seems fair enough, but perhaps a little too
simple. Besides the possibility that novelty is intrinsic in some
processes, it might also be either either an effect of our mode of
understanding or an effect of our ignorance. Almost by definition, if
we are ignorant about a process, we will fail to predict its
outcome. I hope you address the ambivalence here.
> We've discussed a few things, the behaviour of water, for example,
> appears, at first examination, not to flow from the behaviour of the
> molecule H2O - this is our minds imposing a view on reality and
> giving it the name an 'emergent property'.
You have not proven anything here. We call novelties emergent
(sometimes), but that evades the question of whether that is an
objective property of some processes (which you apparently deny) or if
it is only a mental construction required to address our ignorance or
required for understanding.
I might note a logical peculiarity here that you might later try to
resolve. How can there be a view imposed by the mind if everything is
mechanically determined by the past? That is, if we reduce everything
to mechanical causality, then my "view" is merely a reflection of the
object under study, and so can't be "imposed." Even if the mind can
only distort the world perceived, is that distortion not a novelty?
> Clearly this is simply a matter of perception and almost
> certainly not a matter of the stuff itself, how could H2O behave in a
> different way than the physics of its molecular structure dictate?
You have not proven anything, but merely assert it.
Water flows, ice does not. Both behaviors must, as you say, be
compatible with the constituent molecules. So obviously the
constituent molecules allow a variety of behaviors (ice, water, water
vapor). Which behavior is manifested depends on external
determinations (ambient temperature). Could you have predicted the
ambient temperature from a study of the water before it became frozen?
Of course not.
However, you could have offered a hypothetical, such as: If the
ambient temperature cools the water below 0 degrees, then... But
hypotheticals are just that, hypothetical. If you are speaking of
specific realities, then you could not have predicted the outcome of
the particular process by a study of its initial state, unless this
initial state includes all outside determinations, and in principle,
knowledge of the entire universe. But then mechanical causation looses
any meaning.
The second problem here is that you try to prove that all emergent
phenomenon can be reduced to the mechanical effect of some prior state
by selecting the example of water. Need I point out that an example
does not prove a universal statement that all processes are
unequivocally determined? Further, it is your example, so naturally is
an example that will support your case. That is, ice has higher
entropy than water, and so it necessarily predictable.
I expressed my unhappiness with this example before when I said you
were only talking about the phases of water. Obviously you can pick an
example of unequivocal determination, but the issue is whether that
way of seeing things can be applied to _all_ phenomena. Technically,
you can't _prove_ that, but I'm willing to consider some justificaton
for it. You should be able to provide plausible reductionist
explanations for any examples that I consider emergent. I've mentioned
a few, one being a poem. Superficially, a poem does seem to be an
emergent pheonomenon, and so your task is to offer a reductionist
explanation of that poem that does not greatly reduce its significance
and meaning for us.
In short, you merely assert that the outcome of all processes can be
unequivocally predicted by their prior state, and then offer a
predictable process as an example. There's attempt at proof or
justification yet.
> Consequently with matters where it is considerably less clear - and
> the only one that is unequivocally such a matter is consciousness -
> the term 'emergent property' is simply of no use. This is why the
> notion of supervenience is an important one to consider.
I have trouble following you here. Are you saying that, for example, a
poem clearly manifests novelty or uniqueness? But why is use of the
term emergence (such as the poem slowly emerged in the mind of its
author), of no "use." Use for what? Are you saying that the words and
significance of the poem could have been unequivocally predicted by
any prior state? That flies in the face of common sense, and so begs
for some justification.
Now you toss in "supervenience" without using it to elluminate a
reality, but only to suggest that it is a useful term to describe as
reality that you have not proven or justified. In my crude
understanding, this merely suggests that our conceptions of the world
are functions of that world, which I don't deny, but I remain
mystified until you elaborate. A novelty, something that seems to be
an emergent property, will affect our consciousness if we are
conscious of it. A hypothetical novelty we are unaware of does not
significantly affect our consciousness. Our consciousness may be a
function of what we perceive, such as observing the rising tide, but
it may not be a function of anything outside us, such as pure fantasy,
dreams, false opinions, etc. If I were to say the moon consists of
green cheese, I've transferred a notion to your consciousness, but it
is a false representation of reality. All this sounds tautological.
At this point you only seem to assert, without proof or justification,
that while consciousness seems to be an emergent phenomenon, it isn't
really. Why isn't it?
> > He goes on to discuss two sources of emergent properties. One is
> > that many emergent properties are to be explained by the
> > characteristics of the structure of the whole, the relation of its
> > parts, not the properties of the parts themselves. Another source
> > for emergence is what he calls "the fact of the ensemble." In
> > other words different levels of a given reality obey different
> > rules that cannot be explained as the effect of some other
> > level. Am I correct to assume that you disagree with Harré again?
> Yes, as I say above.
On what grounds do you come to such an extraordinary conclusion? You
have not yet offered a shred of argumentation, but merely one example
of a predictable process from which infer for some inexplicable reason
that it must be true of all processes.
> You have appeared, throughout, to rely on a distinction between
> 'subjective' and 'objective' - and further you claim that reductionism
> somehow crosses a border between the two.
I assume those words are useful in their conventional meanings, which
I have trouble to provide. Your reference to supervenience suggests
that you are embracing some unconventional notion about the realm of
consciousness and the world beyond us, perhaps even conflating
them. True, I assume there is a world independent of consciousness. If
you disagree with this very conventional common sense notion, which
you have every right to do, at the very least you need to explain it
and offer some justification. Neither of which have you done.
To use objective and subjective to refer to what lies outside
consciousness and to what is a product of consciousness is not
problematic. You seem to want to say something about the relation of
those realities, but get hung up on the conventional words used to
reference them. But what is it you want to say? To object to the words
without defining the reality is to put the cart before the horse and
it causes confusion because you have secret meanings for words that
you don't explain or justify. If you demonstrate that the reality of a
world independent of consciousness is false, or the notion of
conscious life is false, or that the two are really indistinguishable,
then _you_ might want to avoid the terms. However, I have not yet
accepted those points, and so the words remain for entirely valid and
useful.
> Repeated questioning of you has not led to any answer to clear this
> up.
I keep asking questions because you have not yet said much, and I find
it very difficult to draw you out. I _must_ pin you down if I am to
know how to address your positions. You appear to feel that your
positions, particularly on reductionism, are intuitively obvious and
not in need of definition, explanation or justification. Could that be
true? I hope not.
> Asking me the question about 'external reality' is not a substitute
> for you supporting your claim - your claim then would be, as you
> say, 'empty rhetoric'.
>
> I have asked you to clear this up repeatedly - you now come around
> in a circle and try to get me to clear up your confusion!!
>
> See if you can answer the above, you've seen it asked by me often
> enough. If you don't understand the question I can try to make it
> clearer.
The issue is not my positions, but reductionism, which I take to be
your position. I'm not just asking for greater clarity, I'm asking for
you to define your position and then attempt to justify it. The issue
here is not my own views until I venture to criticize your definition
of reductionism, yet forthcoming. You have not defined reductionism
and you have not objected yet to my characterization of its
features.
--
Haines Brown
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > I'm unclear what you are stating to be my position, and so let me
> > state it again. I objected to radical empiricism because it
> > entails the creation of categories that are not only subjective,
> > but usually arbitrary. I do not believe I implied reductionism
> > introduces an undesirable subjectivism, but rather that it denies
> > the reality of what we experience.
> This is a different claim from the one you made before.
>
> What do you mean by something 'denying the reality' of 'what we
> experience? 'what we experience' is surely our subjective view, in
> what sense are you seeking to say that it is 'real'?
Yes, you are right to object. I should at least have put this more
cautiously. Certainly "what we experience" has a subjective component,
although I'd argue it is also constrained by the "real world" out
there, which I suspect you might deny. The statement arose from my own
assumption that our conceptual categories should follow our experience
of the world, even though that experience is in part subjective. That
is, I admit that you can't experience the world entirely "in the raw"
(Ranke's "wie es eigentlich gewesen" ;-)), but we often impose on
experience a priori categories that are nothing but mental constructs
that seem to contradict what we think we know about the world. I would
accuse logical positivism of this.
Let me give a little illustration. We watch the rising tide and "know"
that it is rising. Nevertheless, we find it difficult to represent
such a process in thought. I can tell you its rising, and you know
what I mean, but if "rising tide" becomes a subject of scientific
discourse, the intuitive sense of what is going on is
inappropriate. So wouldn't it make sense to develop a conceptual tool
for handling processes in thought, for we "know" that such things are
real and important, perhaps even a characteristic of all things. How
can we do this? Well, we could make the causal relation of things a
priori to their empirical specifics, so that things are understood
essentially as processes, and empirical change ceases being merely
accidental. This decision can be justified, I believe, in specific
tangible ways. It implies that anything we choose to represent as a
process in this way, is inherently in motion, and the reasons are
quite naturalistic (vs. Bergson's vitalism). it also implies that
causality involving such processes becomes probabilistic, etc.
Now, I won't get sidetracked on issues you undoubtedly see here, for
the thread is about reductionism, not about my own perverse outlook. I
merely wanted to illustrate what I meant by giving experience greater
weight than a priori mental categories. If I were to describe the
rising tide in static terms, I would in the process deny an important
part of its reality that I know to be true. This is the kind of thing
I meant in the paragraph above. Our experiences are real, obviously,
although they have a subjective aspect. Almost everyone assumes that
we have some rough idea what makes nature tick, and so it seems
incumbent upon someone who suggests that we live in a world of
illusion to justify that proposition. If our knowledge of the world is
not constrained by the real world out there, does that knowledge
thereby acquire truth value? Oh, perhaps you deny there is a world out
there, and since I'm part of a world outside you, I don't exist.
> How does reductionism in any way deny anything? It is a process, not
> a political statement. If you reduce level Y to level X, you explain
> the mechanism whereby X causes Y (leaving aside questions of
> causality for the moment, treating the use of the word here as a
> simple English usage). If you explanation is inadequate fine, more
> work may need to be done.
Sorry, I don't follow this. I believe I was suggesting that the
criteria involved in discounting some causal factors in favor of just
a few, probably only one factor, entails a subjective judgement of the
relative significance of those factors. This seems an elementary
point. Perhaps it does hold up, but you have not explained what you
mean by reductionism, and so I have to rely on my understanding of it,
which you might not accept for yourself. My objection seems simple
enough, but you may define reductionism in your own way such that it
escapes the charge.
I don't understand your point that reductionism is a "process." I
suppose by it you mean it is a method of investigation. But how does
politics get in here? If I see an ideological implication in crude
reductionism, that's not quite the same as politics. By "ideology," I
mean ideas that tend to support contradictory social relations, ideas
which are therefore one-sided. That's not your definition, of course,
but there's no necessary politics in my definition. Since the thread
here is reductionism, and you hint that you are a reductionist, it
would be useful for you to explain why it is a process and perhaps why
it can't be ideological.
I understand your explanation that reductionism amounts to mechanical
causality. However, I believe your use of the term "level" here tends
to impose unwarranted assumptions on causality. Your "level Y" is the
outcome of the process, and "level X" is some initial state--that much
I understand.
1. One reason for my concern about the word "level" is that when we
speak of causality, we are speaking of processes, and the
starting point and end point are assumed to be arbitrary unless
there is specific reason not to do so. The word "level" might
imply qualities or behaviors that persist in time, rather than a
measurement we make at some arbitrary point in a fluid process.
2. The term "level" also seems to imply that the outcome is in some
way a coherent whole, a system, a reality having its own
properties or rules of behavior. However, causality can be local,
only a minor aspect of a larger system and does not seem to imply
any regular behavior.
3. Speaking of Level X and Level Y implies there's a difference
between the two, but if Level Y is unequivocally determined by
Level X, then by definition don't they have the same properties
and behaviors? The word "level" here might entail a logical
contradiction.
More generally, I think you need to justify your linking the concepts
causality and level, for the latter seems to impose certain
conditionalities (coherence, persistence) that are not implied by the
word causality. "Causality" implies change; "level" implies
persistence. The words seem opposite, or at least you need to explain
what you mean.
Finally, your statement presumes mechanical causality, that any
situation can be entirely and unequivocally predicted by any prior
situation. I just don't think this is realistic. My example was the
choice of words in the second line of Grey's Elegie. If everything is
the predictable outcome of all prior states ("all" because any prior
state is itself an effect of some prior state), then you are implying
that the choice of words can be predicted from the Big Bang. On the
surface, that appears to be nonsense, and so you need to explain
yourself. Common sense seems to imply there are novelties, that humans
are creative, etc., and if you think that merely an illusion, you
certainly must offer some justification for what flies in the face of
common sense and most scientific convention.
We obviously do very poorly predicting things in practice, and so your
unequivocal prediction remains a hypothetical. What justifies your
assuming that all processes have unequivocal outcomes? Not only do you
need to define what you mean by reductionism, but you also need to
justify it.
> If, on the other hand, you wish to make the claim that, in
> principle, particular Y's, or a particular Y, cannot be reduced to
> any X, then you need to point out why it is impossible.
No, it is you who are making the assertion (I assume it to be, all
causality is mechanical determinant), and so it is up to you to prove
it. Also, we expect positive statements to be provable, not negative
statements.
> The problem is that your claim, of course, has to deal with all time,
> all technology and so forth - for the claim is vast enough to say that
> nobody ever anywhere with any tools will be able to provide a causal
> explanation. To make such an extreme and special claim you need some
> evidence at least.
I don't know what claim you are talking about, but it is irrelevant
because the issue is not my own views, but reductionism, which seems
to be your view. So far, because you seem incapable of defining it,
I've had to resort to standard views of what reductionism means, but
you have said you have little regard for standard science, and so I'm
not sure my remarks are pointed at the right target.
> > Let me make sure I've got your position right. If I understand you,
> > the behavior and properties of an organism can be entirely and
> > unequivocally explained in principle from a knowledge of its
> > constituent molecules such as genes. Likewise, the properties and
> > behavior of genes can be fully understood and predicted from a
> > knowledge of the molecules that constitute the gene. These molecules,
> > in turn can be fully explained and predicted on the basis of the
> > standard atomic particles, quarks etc. In other words, I could
> > unequivocally predict the behavior of Napoleon at Waterloo if I had
> > perfect knowledge of all the quarks in the universe. This flies the
> > face of common sense and surely does not represent your position. So
> > where does my example go wrong?
> > What 'common sense' [a tricky notion at best] does this fly in the
> > face of?
Yes, "common sense" is tricky. On the face of it, your acceptance of
my ridiculous example would strike normal people as just that. How
could I demonstrate that? I suppose if I asked the man on the street
or a group of scientists, if quantum mechanics allows one to predict
the outcome of Waterloo, they would all find that an insane
suggestion. I suspect you would agree, but nevertheless dismiss that
assessment.
Again, it is you who says it can be done, and so it is up to you to
show that it is so. An example would help, but more importantly, we
need your explanation of the causal mechanism that would produce such
an outcome: why is causality always unequivocal.
> It is not quite what I've been saying. I've been looking for
> something a little more substantial than a claim that 'it is not
> common sense' to justify your claim that it is impossible.
My statement was based on common sense, and you may be right to expect
more. However, it is you who make the assertion, and so it is up to
you to justify it. So far, you have not tried to justify reductionism
at all.
> Your example leaves out the one important point of the nature of
> consciousness. If consciousness is a physical property, like
> magnetism, then, yes, if you also knew the state of the
> consciousness that supervened over Napoleon's brain (and that of the
> other protagonists as well, presumably) then, yes, there would be
> nothing left out and it would be predictable, in principle.
Why? What do you mean by "physical property"? Why is consciousness
like magnetism? Magnetism can be a force, but is consciousness? Not
that I know of. You presume, but don't justify the reduction of
consciousness to atomic particles.
Another thing that confuses me is your reference to
supervention. While that is a can of worms, it is conventionally
understood to be a non-reductionist physicalism. Off hand, that sounds
the opposite of your reductionism. You leave out meanings, logic and
justifications, and then wonder why you can't be understood. I
certainly don't want to get involved in supervention, and am just
trying to get you to define your reductionism and to offer some
justification for it.
> I look forward to learning more about this magical 'common sense'
> defence of your position.
Sorry, I won't be forthcoming, for the thread has to do with
reductionism, which you don't seem to be able to define, and I know
better by this time to assume you mean it in any conventional
sense. To go off on "common sense" would be another red herring
intended to hide your failure to offer a definition and justification
for reductionism. All I ask for is that the focus of the threat be
maintained. If you are able to do that, then I can raise meaningful
objections, and then you can find reasons to dismiss my
objections. The thread has nothing to do with my own views.
--
Haines Brown
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> Nonsense. Truth is entirely subjective - from one viewpoint. This
> does not invalidate meaning.
Remarkable! a) How do you justify such a statement? b) Is the
implication that statements about the world have no truth value? c)
Who said subjectivism invalidates meaning? d) What does this have to
do with reductionism, the topic of this dialog?
> We can accept the subjectivity of our experience and still accept
> the reality of the world.
>
> It is indeed more difficult to do this that to postulate some silly
> objectivity that does not exist.
You still refuse to reconcile your reductionism, your subjectivism,
your mechanical determinism, and I'm beginning to fear the reason is
that you have not thought through your position. At least there's not
the slightest evidence of that so far. I've suggested that
sociobiology is in danger of racism, that reductionism is not
scientific, and that mechanical determinism flies in the face of
common sense. But such comments I've had to apply to standard
understandings of those terms, but as you yourself insist, you do not
employ standard views or definitions, so my comments have been
pointless.
If you are incapable of defining and defending your position, which
you call reductionism and is not reductionism, but something you
refuse to define or justify, how can that be the beginning of
meaningful discussion of reductionism? Who knows, you may have a very
respectable position, but for some reason can't communicate (it).
--
Haines Brown
Haines Brown
No I won't rise to the bait of your troll, for it is obviously yet
another red herring. The issue here is not my views, but
reductionism. You represented yourself as a reductionist, but clearly
you are not.
So far have evaded the starting point of this dialog, which at this
point would seem to be a) What do you mean by saying you are a
reductionist, and how do you justify that position, or b) How does
your own view require a redefinition of the reductionist method so
that it becomes reputable?
--
Haines Brown
Haines Brown
And what does this have to do with reductionism?
--
Haines Brown
Haines Brown
No, the topic of discussion is not my views, but reductionism, and you
have yet to engage it.
--
Haines Brown
Haines Brown
All red herrings, for your comments are about my views, and the thread
is about her reductionism, which you refuse either to define or justify.
--
Haines Brown
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> You claim that reductionism transgresses an objective view of the
> world. You fail (even in this most recent long posting) to explain
> what you see is possible as an objective view.
>
> I've asked you many times to justify your claim that reductionism
> somehow transgresses in being a 'subjective' approach relative to what
> you claim to be an 'objective' approach. You fail continually to give
> a simple straightforward explanation of what you think this difference
> is.
I'm replying to this note because at least the word "reductionism"
appears!
Your first sentence is a red herring: it is not an accurate
representation of my remarks. You choose to ignore what I've said
several times about constraint and probabilistic causality, and
suggest simply that my position is thats of objectivism, which clearly
it not.
But what does this misrepresentation of my views have to do with the
topic of the thread, which is reductionism? It is you, not I, who
identified himself with that method.
> I have lost count of how many times I've asked you to do this.
Don't assume that because you throw out a red herring, I'll rise to
the bait. The topic of this thread is not my views, but yours, which
up to now you refuse to define or justify.
--
Haines Brown
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> > "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
> Yes, brilliant - please, if you can, produce your objection to
> reductionism. In particular explain what you intended to mean when
> you claimed that it made the objective subjective.
>
> This, as I have repeated again and again, is what is missing.
>
> You have made a claim. Now you must defend it.
>
> That is all really.
I did produce objections to reductionism, but it turns out you don't
accept its standard definition. Until you define it in your own way
and justify it, my criticisms obviously can't hit the mark because
there simply is no mark.
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>Haines Brown wrote:
>>
>>>"Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
>
>>You claim that reductionism transgresses an objective view of the
>>world. You fail (even in this most recent long posting) to explain
>>what you see is possible as an objective view.
>>
>>I've asked you many times to justify your claim that reductionism
>>somehow transgresses in being a 'subjective' approach relative to what
>>you claim to be an 'objective' approach. You fail continually to give
>>a simple straightforward explanation of what you think this difference
>>is.
>
>
>
>
>
> Don't assume that because you throw out a red herring, I'll rise to
> the bait. The topic of this thread is not my views, but yours, which
> up to now you refuse to define or justify.
>
improves your credibility, it does not.
I have repeatedly asked you to justify your claim (that I state above).
You have failed to do it. You have also made utterly mad claims such as
'reductionism is racist'.
Like most Marxists, you are a dishonest debater. You evade questions you
can't answer and now are claiming that you didn't.
I am not impressed by frauds and liars. I do not debate with them.
As I've said, this discussion is closed. I only reply to this posting
because you are claiming untruthful things about me.
--
Politics are not an instrument for effecting social change; they are
the art of making the inevitable appear to be a matter of wise human
choice. -Quentin Crisp, 'Resident Alien'
Peter H.M. Brooks
claim that it fell down in making the objective subjective - as stupid
thing to say that you failed to justify. Now that you have been shown to
have said something stupid, based on your misunderstanding you wish to
pretend that it had something to do with me.
You are a dishonest fraud.
I have no debate with you.
--
It is an unalterable law that people who claim to care about the human
race are utterly indifferent to the sufferings of individuals - Quinten
Peter H.M. Brooks
you to defend it. You failed to.
Now you broadcast a set of untruthful posts pretending that the
situation was different.
When you have learned something about the subject and ceased to be
dishonest - if this ever happens. Then it would be worth while somebody
helping you overcome your deep ignorance. Until then there is no point
in any discussion.
--
That which we can only maintain by force we should try to do without -
Haines Brown
> Haines Brown wrote:
> Follow my advice and read up on the subject, then come back when you
> are equipped for debate.
>
> The conversation is closed.
I'm amused to see that this is your final comment. You identify with
reductionism, but deny you accept the standard notion of it. And then
you refuse to define and justify your own version. When I ask you to
do that, you say I'm too ignorant to engage in conversation.
The implications of this are obvious.
The most brilliant minds are often those who can best communicate with
children. Let me offer a little anecdote. When I started college, I
did not have the free election of courses that is common these days,
but a more or less prescribed schedule that immediately reflected
one's choice of major. They needed someone to teach introductory
physics, and instead of using a graduate assistant or junior faculty
member, they chose instead one of the most brilliant senior faculty,
Hans Müller. He could communicate rather demanding ideas in a
beautifully clear and amusing manner.
--
Haines Brown
Peter H.M. Brooks
> "Peter H.M. Brooks" <pe...@new.co.za> writes:
>
> The most brilliant minds are often those who can best communicate with
> children. Let me offer a little anecdote.
>
muddled waffle you produce show that you need to work very hard to
improve your communication skills.
You also need to work on your honesty.
It was you who claimed that reductionism was wrong because of it making
the objective subjective. It was you who failed to defend this
ridiculous claim. To try to pretend otherwise is simple dishonesty.
--
"You will not ask me what is the point of envy.--You are determined, I
see, to have no curiosity.--You are wise--but _I_ cannot be wise. Emma,
I must tell you what you will not ask, though I may wish it unsaid the
next moment." -- Emma, Jane Austen