Universalism and Particularism
Mark A. Foster
paragraphs from various posts I
have made on the subject of realism
and nominalism. Perhaps they may be
of interest to someone.
I am also a realist, a social
realist, as are most sociologists.
Societies and groups are, to me,
not merely abstractions but
emergent realities sui generis. My
reading of Marx is that society and
social structure are the
evolutionary and revolutionary
products of the reflexive relations
between history (challenge) and
social action (response). The
particular species of social
realism to which I subscribe is a
variant of Roy Bhaskar's
dialectical critical realism, a
compromise between realism and
idealism.
On a spiritual level, I consider
the universal (spirit) to be animus
of the particular (individual
souls). I suppose that this
perspective, combined with my
passion for Wilber's approach to
holarchy, makes me a realist, as
well. (Incidentally, his newest
book, _One Taste: The Journals of
Ken Wilber_, provides added
insights into Wilber's thinking
behind holons and other subjects.)
However, in my view, realism cannot
be assumed from what I call
"prophetic ecology," the various
contexts, including linguistic,
which are utilized by the Messenger
in translating Logos into logos.
When you write, "I interpret this
[realism in the Baha'i texts] to
mean that God considers this line
of thought as the preferred avenue
of human evolution for the next
thousand years," I think you
conflate context with meaning.
My reading of the Baha'i teachings
would place them closer to
(Bhaskarian and Wilberian) critical
realism (toward the center on a
realism-idealism scale, i.e.,
rejecting ontological relativism
while affirming epistemic
relativism) and closer to spiritual
realism (on a realism-nominalism
scale).
Although I am a social realist (on
a social realism- social
nominalism/methodological
individualism scale) and a
Bhaskarian "transformationalist"
(on a Durkheimian collectivism-
Weberian voluntarism scale), I
would not want to argue that my
perspective is supported by the
Baha'i texts.
The social nominalist position
argues that society and structure
are simply convenient terms to
describe observed similarities in
behavior patterns of individuals.
Extreme social realism leads to
Durkheimian reification. Extreme
nominalism reduces sociology to
studies of individual actors.
(George Homans is a good example.)
Although I appreciate Durkheim's
perspective, a more workable (and
"middle range," hopefully use
Merton's criteria) theory of social
realism, in my view, is to regard
social structures, groups, and
societies as ongoing emergent
products (syntheses) of a dialectic
between history and social action.
That is, it seems to me, the
essence of Marxian (critical)
realism.
Despite its radicalism, I would
place Marx's sociology or, as he
referred to it, "scientific
socialism" (not to be confused with
an externalized socialism or a
"communism") about midway between
Weberian voluntarism (what Parsons
called Weber's "social action
theory") and Durkheimian
collectivism (reification).
If collectivities meet the criteria
for being societies (and are not
merely aggregates), I would agree
that they are "real." The
difference is that social
structures incorporate a higher
level of awareness than does, say,
the structure of an ant colony or a
bee hive. Societies, IMO, develop
through a process of *conscious*
evolution, which would include an
interaction between false and class
consciousness.
For what's worth, my impression is
that the various statements made by
the Guardian could be read as
assuming either social realism or
social conceptualism. However, I
would rather leave that subject to
the magisterium of (social)
science.
Therefore, my responses to the
realism-nominalism question may, in
this respect and in some others,
not be much different from yours.
However, I would not want to use
the presence of the language of
Neoplatonism, irfaniyyih,
Sadriyyih, Ishraqiyyih, and
Akbariyyih in the Baha'i texts as
evidence.
Generally most forms of realism are
someone else's nominalism.
Conversely, most social nominalists
would balk at the notion of
reducing the individual to a
collection of organs and tissues.
Wilber resolves this problem by
developing a global model of
critical realism. By postulating
that holarchic layers of the same
reality are seen through different
critical perspectives (as he
pointed out in one of his first
books, _Spectrum of
Consciousness_), he avoids
reductionism altogether.
In my view, the ultimate universal
is spirit. The Most Great Spirit
(God) manifests as the Holy Spirit
which, in turn, generates a
succession of lower spiritual
degrees. Consequently, as I see it,
there is no *accomplishment* of
unity between particulars. Rather,
there is an outward realization of
the pre-existing Unity of God
expressed in the diversity of
existence.
In addition, I think you may be
engaging in reification. Although I
believe that social structures are
real and not merely sums of actors,
I regard those structures as the
ongoing products of human action.
In that sense, the substructures of
societies and groups are not
identical to material structures,
like that of biological organisms
or chemical compounds. To say that
societies are potentials
contradicts, IMO, the second part
of your sentence, viz., where you
say that they are the "result[s] of
historical processes." Societies
are emergent realities. They are
not natural phenomena.
I know that the term "challenge and
response" came from _A Study in
History_. However, I *do* believe
that all challenges are material.
(That is to say, they are
manifested spirituality.) The
prophetic challenge, in my view,
comes from the names and attributes
of God revealed in nature. The
human response is witnessed in our
relations to those natural
perfections (not purely the
relations of production, as Marx
argued).
You wrote, "Responses to false
challenges result in false
consciousness according to Marx." I
would rather say that false
consciousness, like Karl Mannheim's
ideology (which he contrasted with
utopia, or class consciousness),
emerges out of a failure to
respond. It is the path of *no*
resistance.
To illustrate the relation between
vehicle and meaning, _The Dawn-
Breakers_ might be regarded as as
Baha'i mythology. That volume,
irrespective of its historical
accuracy, is almost like our
gospel, "The Gospel According to
Nabil." ;-) We can also see within
it certain parallels to the life,
suffering, and Crucifixion of
Christ, correspondences pointed out
by the Guardian.
I have sometimes speculated that
the primary reason Shoghi Effendi
selected that particular book was
because of its numerous
similarities in construction and
content to the Gospels of the New
Testament. It seems to me that if
the Guardian was particularly
concerned about its factual
historical accuracy, he himself
would not have contradicted it in
_God Passes By_ (though it has been
a while since I have looked into
it).
The hermeneutic error of Christian
fundamentalism, IMO, is to reduce
scripture to history and observable
fact. Thus, the Resurrection of
Christ, the edenic account, and the
story of Jonah in the belly of the
whale are interpreted as actual
historical events, as if they had
been reported to us by a
journalist.
While _The Dawn-Breakers_ is not
scripture (though it may be more
authentic than any of the four
Gospels), I think we commit a
comparable error, confusing vehicle
with meaning, if we assume the
reason the Guardian translated the
first part of Nabil's Narrative was
to promote its value as literal
history.
Sociology founder Auguste Comte
resolved the dilemma between
rationalism and empiricism by
attempting to eliminate metaphysics
altogether. A better solution, IMO,
is to recognize the differences
between the "real" and the
"empirical." All to often, their
distinctions are blurred (or even
denied).
The primary distinction between
biological and sociocultural
evolution is that while, in the
former, teleology is not dependent
on human response, the latter is
dialectical. Sociocultural
evolution is dependent on a dynamic
encounter between the continuing
challenges of history, guided by
Theophany, and praxis (response).
IMO, structure itself is, by
definition, emergent. If a
structure (holon or universal)
performs differently than its
particulars would when viewed in
the context of another structure, I
think one may assume that the
difference (alternative hypothesis)
is attributable to the structure,
i.e., the whole and not the parts.
On a micro level, one can observe
this same phenomenon in Erving
Goffman's frame analysis (or his
earlier dramaturgy). Human behavior
changes as it responds to different
roles (structural or expected
behaviors).
Mark A. Foster
ow...@sociologist.com
RBCF Mark (on AOL only)