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Re: Mixmaster implicated in bomb threats

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Anonymous Remailer (austria)

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Apr 20, 2012, 7:16:44 PM4/20/12
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God knows we could use the Frog remailer.

Does anybody know how to get in touch with the operator. If he were
asked nicely, he might return.

Kulin

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Apr 20, 2012, 10:19:05 PM4/20/12
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Nomen Nescio

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Apr 20, 2012, 11:04:00 PM4/20/12
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In article <DK09IJUQ4102...@reece.net.au>
Kulin <rema...@reece.net.au> wrote:
>
> In article <53a3b53b10c1ad4e...@remailer.privacy.at>
> "Anonymous Remailer (austria)" <mixm...@remailer.privacy.at> wrote:
> >
> >
> > God knows we could use the Frog remailer.
> >
> > Does anybody know how to get in touch with the operator. If he were
> > asked nicely, he might return.
>
> Frog was the most corrupt and untrustworthy remailer ever.
>
> http://www.cotse.net/users/bluejay

So says the biggest asshole ever to post here, fucking bluegay.









Anonymous

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Apr 23, 2012, 4:31:18 PM4/23/12
to
In article <216f2993ba13638d...@dizum.com>
Nomen Nescio <nob...@dizum.com> wrote:
>
> > The FBI seized the server that the cripto remailer was running on.
> >
> > https://help.riseup.net/en/seizure-2012-april
>
> I seriously doubt that the FBI agents who did this actually thought it
> would accomplish anything for their investigation. More likely they
> have been trying to shut down remailers for a long time, and this just
> gave them an excuse to do so. Law enforcement types generally take a
> negative view of any privacy enhancing technology, regardless of how
> many positive uses that technology sees. They want us to rely on
> courts and law enforcement to protect privacy.
>
> Of course, there are other possibilities. Maybe the FBI agents really
> are that inept; I would not be terribly surprised if this were the
> case. Maybe the FBI already controls all the other remailers, and
> just needed a way to get cripto out of the picture. These seem pretty
> unlikely to me, though; this is a situation where I think it is safe
> to blame malice rather than stupidity.


FBI=PIG

un2037

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Apr 24, 2012, 12:53:47 AM4/24/12
to
In article
<f091959f2993e56c...@remailer.paranoici.org>
Anonymous <nob...@remailer.paranoici.org> wrote:
>
> In article <216f2993ba13638d...@dizum.com>
> Nomen Nescio <nob...@dizum.com> wrote:
> >
> > > The FBI seized the server that the cripto remailer was running on.
> > >
> > > https://help.riseup.net/en/seizure-2012-april

> > Of course, there are other possibilities. Maybe the FBI agents really
> > are that inept; I would not be terribly surprised if this were the
> > case.

They're trained by Microsoft!

>
> FBI=PIG

FBI = fumbling, bumbling, idiots.



[Anon] Anon User

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Apr 26, 2012, 2:28:53 AM4/26/12
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This is a Type III anonymous message, sent to you by the Mixminion
server at mixminion.hamburg.ccc.de. If you do not want to receive
anonymous messages, please contact cpu...@hamburg.ccc.de. For more
information about anonymity, see http://mixminion.net/.

In <30341c714b239ff3...@remailer.paranoici.org>
Anonymous <nob...@remailer.paranoici.org> wrote:
>http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/breaking/s_791037.html
>
>This
may serve as a test of law enforcement's ability to monitor and
>defeat anonymous remailers. If the sender of these messages
is
>caught without giving themselves up, we will have reason to
believe
>that US law enforcement agencies are capable of breaking the
security
>of anonymous remailers. Unfortunately, it is likely that the
court
>will seal the records of the case, making it difficult for us to
know
>what evidence the police actually used.
>
>


Correction. Mixmaster was not "implicated" in anything. Some
idiot USING mixmaster is the problem

go fuck yourself

Anonymous

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Apr 18, 2012, 5:06:31 PM4/18/12
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Nomen Nescio

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Apr 18, 2012, 10:49:42 PM4/18/12
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In article <30341c714b239ff3...@remailer.paranoici.org>
Another NSA mole-idiot trying to dissuade everyone from using remailers.

This group has been flooded with shit like this for months.




Bubba

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Apr 18, 2012, 11:45:37 PM4/18/12
to
I would assume that any serious "clear and present" danger against the
status quo would not be communicated by any obvious means at all. If
anything, dangerous actions would merely happen by complete surprise,
hence "authorities" could only react in the gruesome wake thereof.

Doers do. They don't talk about it first, and if they're smart they'll
never talk about it at all. That's how you know that all of talk radio
is rubbish, because all they ever do is talk. The fix is in. The rich
keep getting richer and the poor keep getting poorer. That's all it
ever was. Everything else is garbage. Governments, religions, money,
all of it is evil and there never was any good in any of it. With any
luck, the Mayan calendar will prove its worth and the end of the world
will actually happen before the end of this year. When all rich people
are dead, then everyone else in the world will be dead, too. Small
price to pay.

But remailers are really good for communicating in the realm of common
knowledge and so forth. Without remailers, I would not have replied to
your reply to the imbecilic OP, nor would (s)he have instigated this
and other odious Usenet threads which you aptly described as "shit."

--
Bub


Anonymous Remailer (austria)

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Apr 19, 2012, 12:52:50 AM4/19/12
to

In article <9JZF6JU74101...@reece.net.au>
I'm thinking you had too many bad pills when your brain was not yet fully
formed. Also, given your reference to the Mayan, (swell as they were when
they weren't eating their captives), we are now destined to hear from
mister fundamentalist again: "There is only ONE true God, one true
religion...etc., ad naseum. Thanks for that, Buba.

Nomen Nescio

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Apr 19, 2012, 1:04:18 AM4/19/12
to
In article <9JZF6JU74101...@reece.net.au>
Bubba <Bub@ba> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 19 Apr 2012, Nomen Nescio <nob...@dizum.com> wrote:

> With any
> luck, the Mayan calendar will prove its worth and the end of the world
> will actually happen before the end of this year.

Yes, and I hope it includes just your silly ass. zzzzz

Anonymous Remailer (austria)

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Apr 19, 2012, 2:18:34 AM4/19/12
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And in January 2013 I'm going to be one of many that takes time out to
laugh my ass off at all you 'Mayan calendar end of the world in Dec 2012'
bullshit people.

Bubba

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Apr 19, 2012, 11:46:03 AM4/19/12
to
Glass parking lot.

--
Bub
































Nomen Nescio

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Apr 19, 2012, 3:52:15 PM4/19/12
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Anonymous

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Apr 19, 2012, 6:56:01 PM4/19/12
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Frank Merlott

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Apr 19, 2012, 7:56:36 PM4/19/12
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Anonymous email tool has pros, cons

The computer program someone is using to send emails threatening the University
of Pittsburgh's campus grew out of another campus across the country nearly 20
years ago.

Pitt and federal investigators would not say whether any threats on Wednesday
used the Mixmaster program, which allows users to bounce encrypted emails
through servers so they become untraceable. The FBI last week subpoenaed
records from at least one Mixmaster server host in its investigation of more
than 100 bomb threats targeting Pitt since Feb. 13.

"I think it's unfortunate he picked the tool that I built," said Lance
Cottrell, 43, a San Diego computer company executive who wrote Mixmaster. "It
does a lot of good and enables a lot of important things. I guess I don't feel
a sense of responsibility, but certainly a sense of sadness."

The university evacuated eight buildings yesterday, including Sennott Square,
where Taylor Praskach, 21, was taking her last undergraduate course, a computer
class. Finals start next week.

"I think it's a shame someone has chosen to use it in that way, to displace
students. But with any technology, there are tools, and it depends on how
people choose to use them," said Praskach of Oakland.

Cottrell wrote the program while working on his doctoral dissertation in
astrophysics at the University of California, San Diego, as the Internet began
making its way into people's homes in the early 1990s. Cottrell's research team
shared equipment with other researchers, so he learned to encrypt data to
protect their work from theft. At the same time, debates about privacy on the
Internet left many people worrying about an Orwellian future.

Longer article on:
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/s_791933.html

Anonymous Remailer (austria)

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Apr 19, 2012, 9:24:22 PM4/19/12
to

In article <9r51p7p8d6l8bppjo...@news.stray.cat.edu>
Anonymous wrote:
>
> The FBI seized the server that the cripto remailer was running on.
>
> https://help.riseup.net/en/seizure-2012-april

I'm assuming cripto was the exit remailer. If that's true, how does
the FBI think grabbing the cripto remailer will help them? Their
experts must know that they will get nothing in regards to the
original posts from cripto.

I guess it's just a tactic to frighten remailer ops and users.

I do think the site with the story is full of shit. When threats are
made, the authorities have to do something. Of course, European
anarchists think otherwise.

Anonymous

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Apr 19, 2012, 10:30:50 PM4/19/12
to
On Fri, 20 Apr 2012 03:24:22 +0200 (CEST), "Anonymous Remailer
(austria)" <mixm...@remailer.privacy.at> wrote:

>
>In article <9r51p7p8d6l8bppjo...@news.stray.cat.edu>
>Anonymous wrote:
>>
>> The FBI seized the server that the cripto remailer was running on.
>>
>> https://help.riseup.net/en/seizure-2012-april
>
>I'm assuming cripto was the exit remailer.

Well, sure. Something told them where to go to get the machine. Even
if the remailer itself does no logging, the MTA that forwards the
message to the destination probably does.

>If that's true, how does
>the FBI think grabbing the cripto remailer will help them? Their
>experts must know that they will get nothing in regards to the
>original posts from cripto.

I'm convinced that the FBI knew that the seizure would likely yield
nothing that could be used to identify the original source of the
messages, or even give them a first step in that direction. But you
can't expect them to use that as justification not to make the
seizure.

Can you imagine what would happen if the FBI held a news conference
where they admitted that they knew in advance that a seizure would
yield nothing, so they didn't make a seizure.................and then
off in the distance a huge explosion could be heard coming from the
area that was previously threatened?

They have to be able to say they tried. And if everything was set up
properly, the remop could cooperate fully and betray nothing.

As far as having the equipment seized, if it was not single purposed
and others were inconvenienced, then the remop might want to keep that
in mind if he decides to bring another remailer up.

Nomen Nescio

unread,
Apr 20, 2012, 3:30:10 AM4/20/12
to
> The FBI seized the server that the cripto remailer was running on.
>
> https://help.riseup.net/en/seizure-2012-april

I seriously doubt that the FBI agents who did this actually thought it
would accomplish anything for their investigation. More likely they
have been trying to shut down remailers for a long time, and this just
gave them an excuse to do so. Law enforcement types generally take a
negative view of any privacy enhancing technology, regardless of how
many positive uses that technology sees. They want us to rely on
courts and law enforcement to protect privacy.

Of course, there are other possibilities. Maybe the FBI agents really
are that inept; I would not be terribly surprised if this were the

Zax

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Apr 20, 2012, 11:40:38 AM4/20/12
to
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On Fri, 20 Apr 2012 09:30:10 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio wrote in
Message-Id: <216f2993ba13638d...@dizum.com>:

> I seriously doubt that the FBI agents who did this actually thought it
> would accomplish anything for their investigation. More likely they
> have been trying to shut down remailers for a long time, and this just
> gave them an excuse to do so. Law enforcement types generally take a
> negative view of any privacy enhancing technology, regardless of how
> many positive uses that technology sees. They want us to rely on
> courts and law enforcement to protect privacy.

I'm inclined to agree with you. Mixmaster has been around for so long
that the FBI should be well versed in how it works. If all the
bomb-threat messages exited through Crypto then it may have been a
deliberate attack on the remailer itself. Even the FBI, with good
knowledge of Mixmaster, would have to investigate it. If messages came
from various exit remailers then the only obvious reason for taking down
that server is to send a clear message. "Run a remailer in the US at
your own risk".

The other problem it presents (at least to me) is the collateral damage
of having a server shut down because it runs Mixmaster. I'd prefer to
be in a position of running every service on a separate server but
clearly that's expensive and impractical.

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--
pub 1024D/8ED57743 2003-07-08 Bananasplit Operator
Key fingerprint = 796F 67E0 E890 A0BB BDAE EBB4 94A6 7A09 8ED5 7743
uid Admin <admin.mixmin.net>

joee...@mixnym.net

unread,
Apr 20, 2012, 1:06:31 PM4/20/12
to
Zax <ad...@mixmin.net> wrote:
> If all the
> bomb-threat messages exited through Crypto then it may have been a
> deliberate attack on the remailer itself. Even the FBI, with good
> knowledge of Mixmaster, would have to investigate it.

Allow exit messages to go out only via a nym, so that
the From address is that of the nym's customer. It would allow the
nym
operator easily to turn the guy off and generally discourage bomb
threats
and the like.

Anonymous Remailer (austria)

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Apr 20, 2012, 1:08:20 PM4/20/12
to

In article <slrnjp30rm...@news.mixmin.net>
Zax <ad...@mixmin.net> wrote:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA512
>
> On Fri, 20 Apr 2012 09:30:10 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio wrote in
> Message-Id: <216f2993ba13638d...@dizum.com>:
>
> > I seriously doubt that the FBI agents who did this actually thought it
> > would accomplish anything for their investigation. More likely they
> > have been trying to shut down remailers for a long time, and this just
> > gave them an excuse to do so. Law enforcement types generally take a
> > negative view of any privacy enhancing technology, regardless of how
> > many positive uses that technology sees. They want us to rely on
> > courts and law enforcement to protect privacy.
>
> I'm inclined to agree with you. Mixmaster has been around for so long
> that the FBI should be well versed in how it works. If all the
> bomb-threat messages exited through Crypto then it may have been a
> deliberate attack on the remailer itself. Even the FBI, with good
> knowledge of Mixmaster, would have to investigate it. If messages came
> from various exit remailers then the only obvious reason for taking down
> that server is to send a clear message. "Run a remailer in the US at
> your own risk".
>
> The other problem it presents (at least to me) is the collateral damage
> of having a server shut down because it runs Mixmaster. I'd prefer to
> be in a position of running every service on a separate server but
> clearly that's expensive and impractical.

So I am wondering what all was siezed. Did the warrant order the seizure
of all computers on the premises, or did they have to determine which one
of them was running the server in question and then sieze only that one?

Zax

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Apr 20, 2012, 2:26:04 PM4/20/12
to
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On Fri, 20 Apr 2012 19:08:20 +0200 (CEST), Anonymous Remailer (austria) wrote in
Message-Id: <56ecc889f53241a2...@remailer.privacy.at>:

> So I am wondering what all was siezed. Did the warrant order the seizure
> of all computers on the premises, or did they have to determine which one
> of them was running the server in question and then sieze only that one?

- From what I've read, the computer in question was located in a colo.
They identified and seized the one computer but of course, that took out
everything located on that server, not just the remailer.

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=06g0

Nomen Nescio

unread,
Apr 20, 2012, 3:50:43 PM4/20/12
to
On Fri, 20 Apr 2012, Zax <ad...@mixmin.net> wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>Hash: SHA512
>
>On Fri, 20 Apr 2012 19:08:20 +0200 (CEST), Anonymous Remailer (austria)
>wrote in
>Message-Id: <56ecc889f53241a2...@remailer.privacy.at>:
>
>> So I am wondering what all was siezed. Did the warrant order the seizure
>> of all computers on the premises, or did they have to determine which one
>> of them was running the server in question and then sieze only that one?
>
>- From what I've read, the computer in question was located in a colo.
>They identified and seized the one computer but of course, that took out
>everything located on that server, not just the remailer.
>

I don't suppose we can expect to hear anything from Cripto Admin anytime
soon can we?

Kulin

unread,
Apr 20, 2012, 4:49:11 PM4/20/12
to
Typical Rooster nonsense.


Nomen Nescio

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Apr 20, 2012, 6:37:27 PM4/20/12
to
> > So I am wondering what all was siezed. Did the warrant order the seizure
> > of all computers on the premises, or did they have to determine which one
> > of them was running the server in question and then sieze only that one?

> - From what I've read, the computer in question was located in a colo.
> They identified and seized the one computer but of course, that took out
> everything located on that server, not just the remailer.

Yes, that is what the FBI does here. They have absolutely no
regard for disrupting/destroying businesses in these types of
investigations. They made a raid recently on a server company in
Dallas, taking every server thet the company was running, not just
the one that held the company they were investigating. They hurt
and destroyed many innocent businesses doing this Dallas raid. The
FBI are truely a total bunch of bastards.

As the companies that were innocent, they most fled to offshore
servers. I think I read that the server company they raided has
moved everything to Mexico and Canada.

Sieg Heil to our saviors, the FBI.

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