Paul de Man
SSHazle
Greetings!
I am new to this group, obviously, but I have a favor to ask:
Having been given two weeks to read Allegories of Meaning, in addition to my
regular courseload, and write a paper, I have no time to read Derrida, B&I,
etc., but I feel that the reading itself is not sufficient. A perfunctory
reading of a few journal articles only gave me a little depth on "the problem
of Paul de Man". In other words, I know the basics, but I would like some
extra depth. If anyone has some readily available info, could you please
e-mail or post? It would be greatly appreciated. Thank you.
Scott
Robert Sterner
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"The problem of Paul deMan," which was perhaps not a problem, is far too
difficult to address in such an abbreviated form. A book has been
published about it (Responses: On Paul deMan's Wartime Journalism) which
deals with the intricacies of the affair. Suffice it to say, deMan wrote
what have been construed as anti-Semitic articles for a paper which
frequently acted as a mouth-piece for the Nazi cause. This lead many of
the opponents of "deconstruction" to see deMan as the perfect--or
imperfect--symbol of the plight of deconstruction: what is the political
agenda attached, implicitly or explicitly, to the deconstructive reading?;
is not deconstruction inherently anti-humanist; should the academy not do
away with deconstruction in toto because of the perceived failings of its
chief American "spokesperson", etc...
Interestingly, Derrida and J. Hillis Miller wrote essays for the
"Responses" book, where they tool opponents of deconstruction to task. In
the Miller essay, one of his colleagues at UC Irvine becomes the focus of
his ire: how can he rely upon failed accounts of what deMan has written
(all his wartime work had not been made public at that point) and turn to
Frank Lentrecchia, for Christ's sake, to provide the scorching indictment
of the deManian system of reading? Or, for Derrida--I am only partly
remembering, which is perhaps the appropriate method of encountering
Derrida--it becomes an issue of the "War of Paul deMan." Derrida attempts
to show that the wars of signification in deMan's works merely represents
the guerre vrai in deMan's life, that the problem of signification
demonstrates the impossibility f the signification performing what it is
intended to do, etc. Thus, the larger war is actually the war within deMan
himself, the war of "truth" and "untruth" about his past, the war of
veiling and unveiling, etc. In short, the same old Derridian bullshit.
But the fact that Derrida valorizes deMan's scholarship (and the fact that
his vilifiers cannot, precisely because his writings have not been
published, do for deMan what he thought should be done to any text, i.e.,
"read closely") and stands up for deMan "as a Jew" is extremely important.
We should note that the same thing happened only last year to Gertrude
Stein. In an essay published by (now-deceased) graduate Wanda Van Duesen,
Stein is uncovered, vis-a-vis a speech she made during WW2, to be--an
anti-Semite. She was also, for Van Deusen, a protector of the patriarchy
who "effaced" her lesbian identity, etc. In short, she accomplished in one
short speech the triumpherate of damnation in contemporary American
academe! (I am afraid I will be accused of the same with this post...)
However, I think, a close reading of the speech will reveal a Gertrude who
is aware,, to a fault, of the mythological status of any form of hegemony.
That is of little solace to her detractors.
I am afraid I may not have cleared these issues well, if at all. I'm sure
others will be able to amend my failures.
Robert
SSHazle <ssh...@aol.com> wrote in article
<19971020041...@ladder02.news.aol.com>...
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<html><head></head><BODY bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF"><p><font size=3D2 =
color=3D"#000000" face=3D"Arial">"The problem of Paul deMan," =
which was perhaps not a problem, is far too difficult to address in such =
an abbreviated form. A book has been published about it =
(Responses: On Paul deMan's Wartime Journalism) which deals with the =
intricacies of the affair. Suffice it to say, deMan wrote what =
have been construed as anti-Semitic articles for a paper which =
frequently acted as a mouth-piece for the Nazi cause. This lead =
many of the opponents of "deconstruction" to see deMan as the =
perfect--or imperfect--symbol of the plight of deconstruction: =
what is the political agenda attached, implicitly or explicitly, =
to the deconstructive reading?; is not deconstruction inherently =
anti-humanist; should the academy not do away with deconstruction =
in toto because of the perceived failings of its chief American =
"spokesperson", etc...<br>Interestingly, Derrida and J. Hillis =
Miller wrote essays for the "Responses" book, where they tool =
opponents of deconstruction to task. In the Miller essay, one of =
his colleagues at UC Irvine becomes the focus of his ire: how can he =
rely upon failed accounts of what deMan has written (all his wartime =
work had not been made public at that point) and turn to Frank =
Lentrecchia, for Christ's sake, to provide the scorching indictment of =
the deManian system of reading? Or, for Derrida--I am only partly =
remembering, which is perhaps the appropriate method of encountering =
Derrida--it becomes an issue of the "War of Paul deMan." =
Derrida attempts to show that the wars of signification in deMan's works =
merely represents the guerre vrai in deMan's life, that the problem of =
signification demonstrates the impossibility f the signification =
performing what it is intended to do, etc. Thus, the larger war is =
actually the war within deMan himself, the war of "truth" and =
"untruth" about his past, the war of veiling and unveiling, =
etc. In short, the same old Derridian bullshit. But the fact =
that Derrida valorizes deMan's scholarship (and the fact that his =
vilifiers cannot, precisely because his writings have not been =
published, do for deMan what he thought should be done to any text, =
i.e., "read closely") and stands up for deMan "as a =
Jew" is extremely important. <br>We should note that the same thing =
happened only last year to Gertrude Stein. In an essay published =
by (now-deceased) graduate Wanda Van Duesen, Stein is uncovered, =
vis-a-vis a speech she made during WW2, to be--an anti-Semite. She =
was also, for Van Deusen, a protector of the patriarchy who =
"effaced" her lesbian identity, etc. In short, she =
accomplished in one short speech the triumpherate of damnation in =
contemporary American academe! (I am afraid I will be accused of =
the same with this post...) However, I think, a close reading of =
the speech will reveal a Gertrude who is aware,, to a fault, of the =
mythological status of any form of hegemony. That is of little =
solace to her detractors. <br><br>I am afraid I may not have =
cleared these issues well, if at all. I'm sure others will be able =
to amend my failures.<br><br>Robert<br><br><br><br>SSHazle <<font =
color=3D"#0000FF"><u>ssh...@aol.com</u><font color=3D"#000000">> =
wrote in article <<font =
color=3D"#0000FF"><u>19971020041...@ladder02.news.aol.com</u><fo=
nt color=3D"#000000">>...<br>> Greetings!<br>> <br>> I am =
new to this group, obviously, but I have a favor to ask:<br>> =
<br>> Having been given two weeks to read Allegories of Meaning, in =
addition to my<br>> regular courseload, and write a paper, I =
have no time to read Derrida, B&I,<br>> etc., but I feel =
that the reading itself is not sufficient. A perfunctory<br>> =
reading of a few journal articles only gave me a little depth on =
"the problem<br>> of Paul de Man". In other =
words, I know the basics, but I would like some<br>> extra =
depth. If anyone has some readily available info, could you =
please<br>> e-mail or post? It would be greatly =
appreciated. Thank you.<br>> <br>> Scott <br>> </p>
</font></font></font></font></font></body></html>
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Puss in Boots
Sayan:
[...]
> Now given de Man's past (his one-time Nazi associations), one could possibly
> argue that a stance which denies the unchallengeable validity of empirical
> _facts_ would appeal to him, and perhaps this was why he was unconsciously
> drawn to taking this stance (because empirical facts are de-emphasized and
> so, for example, a past Nazi association becomes less damning).
Poor reasoning. "Empirical facts" are never damning. Damnation
is an act of interpretation (except when God performs it -- in that
instance, it's also an "empirical fact"). So if de Man's unconscious
_was_, as you suggest, trying to make his past "less damning," it
would've turned him into a strict, "just the facts, ma'am" positivist.
The "empirical _facts_" here are that during WWII, de Man wrote a
number of articles for the Belgian newspaper _Le Soir_ -- to damn him
would require, at a minimum, interpreting what he said. (If you're
going to made ad hominem arguments, at least try to do a better job.)
-- Moggin
Frieda Fieldmouse
In article <moggin-ya02408000...@news.mindspring.com>,
mog...@mindspring.com (Puss in Boots) wrote:
> Sayan:
>
> [...]
>
> > Now given de Man's past (his one-time Nazi associations), one could
possibly
> > argue that a stance which denies the unchallengeable validity of empirical
> > _facts_ would appeal to him, and perhaps this was why he was unconsciously
> > drawn to taking this stance (because empirical facts are de-emphasized and
> > so, for example, a past Nazi association becomes less damning).
>
> Poor reasoning. "Empirical facts" are never damning. Damnation
> is an act of interpretation (except when God performs it -- in that
> instance, it's also an "empirical fact"). So if de Man's unconscious
> _was_, as you suggest, trying to make his past "less damning," it
> would've turned him into a strict, "just the facts, ma'am" positivist.
How idiotic. If you're trying to cover up your past, one good way to do
it is obfuscation and evasion. A bad way to do it is to admit the facts,
something that de Man, smart guy that he was, never did during his
lifetime.
> The "empirical _facts_" here are that during WWII, de Man wrote a
> number of articles for the Belgian newspaper _Le Soir_ -- to damn him
> would require, at a minimum, interpreting what he said. (If you're
> going to made ad hominem arguments, at least try to do a better job.)
This has got to be the only time I've wished I owned a copy of the
so-called Wartime "Journalism" (I refuse to give any money to the
shameless fucks who edited it). But perhaps Moggin would like to
enlighten us with an interpretation of the line regarding how, if memory
serves, it wouldn't be such a bad thing if all the jews in Europe were
sent to an island somewhere. I'm sure you can supply the exact quote.
It's in "The Jews in Modern Literature."
--Frieda
Paul Ilechko
Puss in Boots wrote:
> Poor reasoning. "Empirical facts" are never damning. Damnation
You accuse someone of poor reasoning, and than talk about "God" in the
same paragraph .. isn't that just a little bit inconsistent ?
Paul.
Puss in Boots
Sayan:
[...]
> Now given de Man's past (his one-time Nazi associations), one could
> possibly argue that a stance which denies the unchallengeable validity of
> empirical _facts_ would appeal to him, and perhaps this was why he was
> unconsciously drawn to taking this stance (because empirical facts are
> de-emphasized and so, for example, a past Nazi association becomes less
> damning).
Moggin:
>> Poor reasoning. "Empirical facts" are never damning. Damnation
>> is an act of interpretation (except when God performs it -- in that
>> instance, it's also an "empirical fact"). So if de Man's unconscious
>> _was_, as you suggest, trying to make his past "less damning," it
>> would've turned him into a strict, "just the facts, ma'am" positivist.
WH...@squeak.squeak.ie (Frieda Fieldmouse):
> How idiotic. If you're trying to cover up your past, one good way to do
> it is obfuscation and evasion. A bad way to do it is to admit the facts,
> something that de Man, smart guy that he was, never did during his
> lifetime.
Sayan forwarded the argument that in _Allegories of Reading_, de
Man "was unconsciously drawn" to "a stance which denies the
unchallengeable validity of empirical _facts_," because by that means
"a past Nazi association becomes less damning." But as I replied,
empirical facts aren't damning. With the exception I gave, damnation
is an act of interpretation. So if de Man's object _was_ to reduce
his damnation, then he should've quoted Joe Friday. "Just the facts"
never damned anyone.
Moggin:
> > The "empirical _facts_" here are that during WWII, de Man wrote a
> > number of articles for the Belgian newspaper _Le Soir_ -- to damn him
> > would require, at a minimum, interpreting what he said. (If you're
> > going to made ad hominem arguments, at least try to do a better job.)
Frieda:
> This has got to be the only time I've wished I owned a copy of the
> so-called Wartime "Journalism" (I refuse to give any money to the
> shameless fucks who edited it).
Do you you think they shouldn't have have published the material?
Wouldn't you be complaining about "obfuscation and evasion" if they
_hadn't_? Instead, those "shameless fucks" got the stuff out into the
open.
> But perhaps Moggin would like to
> enlighten us with an interpretation of the line regarding how, if memory
> serves, it wouldn't be such a bad thing if all the jews in Europe were
> sent to an island somewhere. I'm sure you can supply the exact quote.
> It's in "The Jews in Modern Literature."
Madagascar, I think. And you make my point. "Empirical _facts_"
aren't damning -- no matter how much you emphasize "_facts_,"
damnation requires an interpretation. And that's where de Man _does_
put his emphasis -- on reading and interpreting. So the argument
that he was unconsciously attempting to escape damnation doesn't work.
"Whether he _is_ damned is, of course, another question, and we are
not prevented from praying for his repose."
-- Moggin
Puss in Boots
Sayan:
[...]
> Now given de Man's past (his one-time Nazi associations), one could
> possibly argue that a stance which denies the unchallengeable validity of
> empirical _facts_ would appeal to him, and perhaps this was why he was
> unconsciously drawn to taking this stance (because empirical facts are
> de-emphasized and so, for example, a past Nazi association becomes less
> damning).
Moggin:
>
> Poor reasoning. "Empirical facts" are never damning. Damnation
> is an act of interpretation (except when God performs it -- in that
> instance, it's also an "empirical fact"). So if de Man's unconscious
> _was_, as you suggest, trying to make his past "less damning," it
> would've turned him into a strict, "just the facts, ma'am" positivist.
> The "empirical _facts_" here are that during WWII, de Man wrote a
> number of articles for the Belgian newspaper _Le Soir_ -- to damn him
> would require, at a minimum, interpreting what he said. (If you're
> going to made ad hominem arguments, at least try to do a better job.)
Freida:
> How idiotic. If you're trying to cover up your past, one good way to do
> it is obfuscation and evasion. A bad way to do it is to admit the facts,
> something that de Man, smart guy that he was, never did during his
> lifetime.
SSHazle:
> Idiotic? On the contrary. The point Moggin was trying to make (forgive me,
> Moggin, if I misrepresent you here) is that de Man could very easily have
> translated his indiscretion into a case of "it was merely theory-- that's
> what I do. Don't confuse that with reality. I never put it into effect or
> acted under the inspiration of those ideas. It was theory only." That's
> precisely what "Mein Kampf" was until Hitler put it into effect. The real
> threat would have been what the articles could have meant _had_ they ever
> been put into practice; deriving the action from the thought is the act of
> interpretation Moggin spoke of. ...
No, I was trying to say something else. Sayan is offering an ad
hominem argument -- that should be obvious. What's more, the
argument doesn't add up. Sayan reasons that de Man was unconsciously
trying to make an episode of his past "less damning" by
downplaying the importance of empirical facts -- but facts don't hold
the power of damnation. You can't get an ought-not from an is any
more than you can get an ought. So if Sayan was right, then de Man's
unconscious should have made "Just the facts, ma'am" his motto,
while de Man's work focused on reading and interpretation: the items
necessary to make his damnation even possible.
-- Moggin
Andy Lowry
On 20 Oct 1997, sayan bhattacharyya wrote:
> Now given de Man's past (his one-time Nazi associations), one could possibly
> argue that a stance which denies the unchallengeable validity of empirical
> _facts_ would appeal to him, and perhaps this was why he was unconsciously
> drawn to taking this stance (because empirical facts are de-emphasized and
> so, for example, a past Nazi association becomes less damning).
The special benefit of this approach is that it gives up the rather
difficult task of understanding de Man's writings in favor of the easier
task, reading them into his life.
Not that this would actually be much easier if you really tried reading
his life (& not, say, accepting helpful summaries from David Lehmann et
al.).
The sheer egotism of suggesting that de Man was _unconsciously_ led to his
theories as an escape from guilt is pretty darn amazing. You honestly
think he never thought about connections himself? Such suggestions tell
all too much about the person making them.
As for the original poster, I have found de Man to be his own best
expositor. "Allegories" is a damn tough book; I would look at the title
essay of "The Resistance to Theory," the one after it ("The Return to
Philology"), the essay in the same book on Jauss; then perhaps to the 1st
essay in "Blindness & Insight" as well as the long essay in that book on
Derrida. Also some of the essays in "Romanticism and Contemporary
Criticism" are good insights; I like the one on "The Double Aspect of
Symbolism" and the one on Barthes, which is especially good for getting a
sense of where de Man's coming from; it complements "Resistance to
Theory."
Perhaps after looking at these 6 or 7 essays, "Allegories" will seem less
fierce, and you'll also be in a much better position to read about de Man;
without knowing his work pretty well, it's hard to distinguish the pearls
from the swill.
-- Andy Lowry
Frieda Fieldmouse
In article <344BF8...@research.att.com>, Ron Hardin
<r...@research.att.com> wrote:
> sayan bhattacharyya wrote:
> > In "Allegories of Reading" de Man seems to be saying that the signifiers
> > in language do not get their meaning from some kind of grounding in
external
> > material reality but only from other signifiers in language. It is possible
> > to construe this as somehow minimizing the importance of external reality
> > -- or universal, empirical _facts_ -- which is why this stance is considered
> > as one variant of deconstruction, which also discounts the existence of
> > universal empirical facts.
>
> Here's Derrida. In what way is he minimizing the importance of external
> reality in this passage:
[Long, irrelevant passage about Derrida's mom snipped]
I'm sure if I had access to them I could also cite some of Derrida's
laundry lists in which the issue also does not arise and adduce them as
evidence to bolster your case too. Actually, come to think of it, laundry
lists would probably make a better case (indeed, maybe even a KNOCKDOWN
CASE!) than your longwinded excerpt.
Frieda
Puss in Boots
Frieda Fieldmouse:
> Not to put too fine a point on it, but if I were living in Belgium at that
> time, my body would *already* be on the line, since I happen to be
> Jewish. Where would you be, Frau Weineck?
Oh, I love it! An argument-from-I'm-Jewish. I can't wait
'til Mikhail offers his customary argument-from-I-have-dead-
relatives. By-the-by, I'd think that de Man's body was "on the
line," and not just hypothetically, when he used his apartment
to shelter Jews.
> What I find most amazing about all of this is that, rather than admitting
> that Paul De Man was probably a fairly despicable character who wrote some
> unforgiveable things, you all are determined to make sure that he is seen
> to have accumulated *every virtue*, merely because you happen to like his
> writings.
Nobody here has so much as hinted that de Man "accumulated
*every virtue*." You're just making shit up. By now it's
become clear that's your standard procedure. (I don't think my
point was unclear: "His past makes an easier target than his
work -- but on examination, they both have their complexities.")
It's not enough for you that you think he wrote some
> interesting or right on texts. He has to be defended against challenges
> on *whatever* grounds they may be based.
Yet another falsehood.
> Céline was a fairly rotten fucker who wrote stuff that even De Man
> wouldn't sign off on, but that doesn't mean that he wasn't a good writer.
> If someone says he was a shitty writer, I'll defend him on that score. If
> they say he was an anti-semitic scumbag, I'm forced to agree. That's
> called being intellectually honest, to use an expression that is
> especially out of date.
Speaking of hypocrisy...
-- Moggin
Ron Hardin
Frieda Fieldmouse wrote:
> > Here's Derrida. In what way is he minimizing the importance of external
> > reality in this passage:
>
> [Long, irrelevant passage about Derrida's mom snipped]
>
> I'm sure if I had access to them I could also cite some of Derrida's
> laundry lists in which the issue also does not arise and adduce them as
> evidence to bolster your case too. Actually, come to think of it, laundry
> lists would probably make a better case (indeed, maybe even a KNOCKDOWN
> CASE!) than your longwinded excerpt.
Well, that's the trouble then; it wasn't irrelevant. It was about what
was happening exactly, and in the interest of accuracy he had to undermine
the reference of a name, his self-identity, and the authority of knowing -
because that's what was happening, with no metaphor at all to it.
--
Ron Hardin
r...@research.att.com
On the internet, nobody knows you're a jerk.
Mikhail Zeleny
Context deconstructed by my predecessors is reconstructed below.
Puss in Boots <mog...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>Frieda Fieldmouse <WH...@squeak.squeak.ie> wrote:
>>Silke-Maria Weineck <wein...@mail1.sas.upenn.edu> wrote:
>>>Frieda Fieldmouse <WH...@squeak.squeak.ie> wrote:
>>>>Puss in Boots <mog...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>>>>Andy Lowry <a...@Ra.MsState.Edu> wrote:
>>>>>sayan bhattacharyya <bhat...@skynet.eecs.umich.edu> wrote:
>>>>>>SSHazle <ssh...@aol.com> wrote:
SSH:
>>>>>>>Greetings!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>I am new to this group, obviously, but I have a favor to ask:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Having been given two weeks to read Allegories of Meaning, in
>>>>>>>addition to my regular courseload, and write a paper, I have no
>>>>>>>time to read Derrida, B&I, etc., but I feel that the reading
>>>>>>>itself is not sufficient. A perfunctory reading of a few journal
>>>>>>>articles only gave me a little depth on "the problem of Paul de
>>>>>>>Man". In other words, I know the basics, but I would like some
>>>>>>>extra depth. If anyone has some readily available info, could
>>>>>>>you please e-mail or post? It would be greatly appreciated.
>>>>>>>Thank you.
One way to deal with de Man's rhetoric is to question his grasp of the
fundamental rhetorical practices. A definitive critique of his shoddy
scholarship is presented at the end of Brian Vickers' book in defense
of rhetoric. In view of Vickers' evidence, it would be ludicrous to
take the titular claim of the book you have been assigned more
seriously than lÈger de Man.
SB:
>>>>>>You haven't said what exactly is going to be a topic of your
>>>>>>paper. However, here is an interesting idea that I've heard
>>>>>>people speculate on -- maybe you can toy with this.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>In "Allegories of Reading" de Man seems to be saying that the
>>>>>>signifiers in language do not get their meaning from some kind
>>>>>>of grounding in external material reality but only from other
>>>>>>signifiers in language. It is possible to construe this as
>>>>>>somehow minimizing the importance of external reality -- or
>>>>>>universal, empirical _facts_ -- which is why this stance is
>>>>>>considered as one variant of deconstruction, which also
>>>>>>discounts the existence of universal empirical facts.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Now given de Man's past (his one-time Nazi associations), one
>>>>>>could possibly argue that a stance which denies the
>>>>>>unchallengeable validity of empirical _facts_ would appeal to
>>>>>>him, and perhaps this was why he was unconsciously drawn to
>>>>>>taking this stance (because empirical facts are de-emphasized
>>>>>>and so, for example, a past Nazi association becomes less
>>>>>>damning).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>I know this sounds far-fetched, but this is something to think
>>>>>>about. I should warn you that I am not really an expert on
>>>>>>these things (and I don't even play one on tv). But perhaps
>>>>>>Silke Weineck or Moggin can help you more.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>-Sayan.
AL:
>>>>>The special benefit of this approach is that it gives up the rather
>>>>>difficult task of understanding de Man's writings in favor of the
>>>>>easier task, reading them into his life.
>>>>>
>>>>>Not that this would actually be much easier if you really tried
>>>>>reading his life (& not, say, accepting helpful summaries from
>>>>>David Lehmann et al.).
Is there a critical advantage to dirempting de Man's bile from the
cirrhotic liver that secreted it? Are you seriously proposing that
his interpretive methodology that posits the notion that all reading
is irremediably enmired in an aporematic interpretive conundrum as its
main tenet -- for surely one cannot rightly deem it a consequence for
want of identifiable premisses leading by logically valid argument to
the stated conclusion -- is in no way underwritten by, or otherwise
logically connected to, its author's youthful literary indiscretions
that just happened to escape postwar punishment duly meted out to
other Nazi collaborators?
>>>>>The sheer egotism of suggesting that de Man was _unconsciously_
>>>>>led to his theories as an escape from guilt is pretty darn amazing.
>>>>>You honestly think he never thought about connections himself?
>>>>>Such suggestions tell all too much about the person making them.
Maybe so. To me, they tell that the person making them was being
charitable in his interpretation of de Man's theoretic conceits by
ruling out the likelihood that they were concocted ad hoc, to excuse
his sordid past.
AL:
>>>>>As for the original poster, I have found de Man to be his own best
>>>>>expositor. "Allegories" is a damn tough book; I would look at the
>>>>>title essay of "The Resistance to Theory," the one after it ("The
>>>>>Return to Philology"), the essay in the same book on Jauss; then
>>>>>perhaps to the 1st essay in "Blindness & Insight" as well as the
>>>>>long essay in that book on Derrida. Also some of the essays in
>>>>>"Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism" are good insights; I like
>>>>>the one on "The Double Aspect of Symbolism" and the one on Barthes,
>>>>>which is especially good for getting a sense of where de Man's
>>>>>coming from; it complements "Resistance to Theory."
>>>>>
>>>>>Perhaps after looking at these 6 or 7 essays, "Allegories" will
>>>>>seem less fierce, and you'll also be in a much better position to
>>>>>read about de Man; without knowing his work pretty well, it's hard
>>>>>to distinguish the pearls from the swill.
>>>>>
>>>>>-- Andy Lowry
m:
>>>> Interesting that you would mention Lehmann. For anyone who isn't
>>>>familiar with the debate, Lehmann is one of de Man's most vicious
>>>>enemies: his _Signs of the Times_ is a book-length assault. Yet even
>>>>Lehmann, describing de Man's behavior during the war, writes, "He
>>>>continued to maintain good relations with writers who opposed the Nazis,
>>>>and his personal conduct toward Jewish acquaintances was evidently
>>>>blameless. De Man was capable of offering the shelter of his home for
>>>>several nights to a Jewish couple who found themselves on the streets
>>>>of Brussels -- accidentally locked out of the flat where they had been
>>>>staying -- after curfew" (_Signs of the Times_ 176).
>>>>
>>>> That's all Lehmann has to say; here are a few more of the details.
>>>>The couple were Esther and Nahum Sluszny. Esther dates the episode
>>>>back to 1942 or '43, and states, "I guarantee you that he [de Man] was
>>>>not anti-Semitic" -- a feeling shared by many of his friends and
>>>>acquaintances (_Responses_: On Paul de Man's Wartime Journalism_ 436).
>>>>
>>>> Lehmann also mentions de Man's relationship with Georges Goriely,
>>>>"a Jewish friend of de Man's during the war years" who belonged to
>>>>the resistance."
FF:
>>>>In short, some of his best friends were Jews.
SMW:
>>>It seems that way, doesn't it? It's interesting that you don't
>>>recognize the vital difference between "Some of my best friends
>>>rhetorical practice that has justly come to stand as a cipher for
>>>are Jews" -- a hypocritical non-engagement -- and the kind of
>>>lived friendship that provides shelter. Interesting, but hardly
>>>surprising, given your Erkenntnisinteresse. While you're already
>>>turning around touting the empirical and dismissing interpretation
>>>elsewhere, no doubt, you may ask yourself whether, as a Jew out on
>>>the streets of Belgium, you would rather run into a collaborationist
>>>writer who will take you in or into a banalsqueak like you who'd be
>>>must unlikely to put hir body on the line.
I sense the temperature rising. Interesting, but hardly surprising,
that Frau Weineck would impute nefarious "Erkenntnisinteresse" whilst
summarily degrading her interlocutrix to the status of "a banal
squeak". Interesting, but hardly surprising that an interpretive
hypothesis imputing self-serving cognitive interests to the titular
subject of this discussion on the basis of well-known evidence of
his war crimes, should meet with a closing of the hermeneutic ranks
and reciprocal deployment of rhetorical practice whose illegitimacy
of application to postmodern figureheads must be asseverated at all
costs.
Numerous Nazi officials covertly protected Jews from deportation and
extermination, which is decidedly more than Paul de Man is known to
have done. Are you really suggesting that this common practice of
making special dispensations for personal relations or acquaintances
in any way exculpates or even mitigates the war crimes of genocide
perpetrators and their accomplices?
FF:
>>Lessee, who would I rather run into "as a Jew out on the streets of
>>Belgium": a "banal squeak" (whatever that is supposed to mean) like myself
>>or Paul De Man? Tough call. The thought of running into someone like
>>myself could be scary. Depends on how much like myself they are.
>>
>>Not to put too fine a point on it, but if I were living in Belgium at that
>>time, my body would *already* be on the line, since I happen to be
>>Jewish. Where would you be, Frau Weineck?
m:
> Oh, I love it! An argument-from-I'm-Jewish. I can't wait
>'til Mikhail offers his customary argument-from-I-have-dead-
>relatives.
Your reference to arguments is obscure. Neither Frieda's remark nor
any personal information I have adduced at any time in this forum
functions as a premiss in any argument. In my own case, as above, a
personal perspective was gratuitously solicited by Silke Weineck and
supplied by her interlocutor, with no intended or discernible bearing
on the conclusion of the debate. While I cannot presume to speak for
anybody else, the relevance of my provenance is to point out whose ox
is being gored. If any elements of your performance to date bear on
the point of this discussion, rather than function as your trademark
smokescreen, kindly take the trouble to point out their connection to
the issue at hand.
m:
> By-the-by, I'd think that de Man's body was "on the
>line," and not just hypothetically, when he used his apartment
>to shelter Jews.
Your thoughts in this matter notwithstanding, the historical reality
is that sheltering Jews was not prosecuted as a crime in occupied
Belgium prior to their deportation, when the events in question must
have occurred, as witness the reference to curfew.
FF:
>>What I find most amazing about all of this is that, rather than admitting
>>that Paul De Man was probably a fairly despicable character who wrote some
>>unforgiveable things, you all are determined to make sure that he is seen
>>to have accumulated *every virtue*, merely because you happen to like his
>>writings.
m:
> Nobody here has so much as hinted that de Man "accumulated
>*every virtue*." You're just making shit up. By now it's
>become clear that's your standard procedure. (I don't think my
>point was unclear: "His past makes an easier target than his
>work -- but on examination, they both have their complexities.")
If that was your point, what bearing does it have on the legitimacy of
Sayan's interpretation of de Man's rhetoric? Whatever the complexity
of his past or his work, surely it cannot preempt a reading of the
former into the latter. At any rate, similar complexities can be
imputed with equal justification to Eichmann, who likewise "was not
anti-Semitic", and even Hitler, whose personal physician was a Jew.
Fortunately, in a parallel thread terminating in article
<moggin-ya02408000...@news.mindspring.com>, and
referring to <19971022014...@ladder02.news.aol.com>,
<WHAP-21109...@ts09-16.dublin.indigo.ie>,
<moggin-ya02408000...@news.mindspring.com>,
and <62gqo2$esn$1...@news.eecs.umich.edu>,
moggin elaborates his critique of Sayan thusly:
Puss in Boots <mog...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>SSHazle <ssh...@aol.com> wrote:
>>Frieda Fieldmouse <WH...@squeak.squeak.ie> wrote:
>>>Puss in Boots <mog...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>>>>sayan bhattacharyya <bhat...@skynet.eecs.umich.edu> wrote:
SB:
>>>>>Now given de Man's past (his one-time Nazi associations), one
>>>>>could possibly argue that a stance which denies the
>>>>>unchallengeable validity of empirical _facts_ would appeal to
>>>>>him, and perhaps this was why he was unconsciously drawn to
>>>>>taking this stance (because empirical facts are de-emphasized
>>>>>and so, for example, a past Nazi association becomes less
>>>>>damning).
m:
>>>> Poor reasoning. "Empirical facts" are never damning.
>>>>Damnation is an act of interpretation (except when God performs
>>>>it -- in that instance, it's also an "empirical fact"). So if
>>>>de Man's unconscious _was_, as you suggest, trying to make his
>>>>past "less damning," it would've turned him into a strict, "just
>>>>the facts, ma'am" positivist. The "empirical _facts_" here are
>>>>that during WWII, de Man wrote a number of articles for the
>>>>Belgian newspaper _Le Soir_ -- to damn him would require, at a
>>>>minimum, interpreting what he said. (If you're going to made
>>>>ad hominem arguments, at least try to do a better job.)
FF:
>>>How idiotic. If you're trying to cover up your past, one good
>>>way to do it is obfuscation and evasion. A bad way to do it is
>>>to admit the facts, something that de Man, smart guy that he was,
>>>never did during his lifetime.
SSH:
>>Idiotic? On the contrary. The point Moggin was trying to make
>>(forgive me, Moggin, if I misrepresent you here) is that de Man
>>could very easily have translated his indiscretion into a case of
>>"it was merely theory-- that's what I do. Don't confuse that with
>>reality. I never put it into effect or acted under the inspiration
>>of those ideas. It was theory only." That's precisely what "Mein
>>Kampf" was until Hitler put it into effect. The real threat would
>>have been what the articles could have meant _had_ they ever been
>>put into practice; deriving the action from the thought is the act
>>of interpretation Moggin spoke of. ...
m:
> No, I was trying to say something else. Sayan is offering an ad
>hominem argument -- that should be obvious. What's more, the
>argument doesn't add up. Sayan reasons that de Man was unconsciously
>trying to make an episode of his past "less damning" by
>downplaying the importance of empirical facts -- but facts don't hold
>the power of damnation. You can't get an ought-not from an is any
>more than you can get an ought. So if Sayan was right, then de Man's
>unconscious should have made "Just the facts, ma'am" his motto,
>while de Man's work focused on reading and interpretation: the items
>necessary to make his damnation even possible.
Nonsense. The _Le Soir_ screeds comprise an actus reus that would
have been sufficient to guarantee cozy state-secured confinement for
their author after the liberation of Belgium. No postwar court ever
concerned itself with the mens rea of a collaborationist hack, much
less the interpretation of his clarion call for ethnic purification
of Europe. For that matter, I heartily recommend deploying your
doctrine that "facts don't hold the power of damnation" next time
you have to defend yourself against a traffic ticket.
cordially, don't
mikhail zel...@math.ucla.edu a.k.a. m...@ptyx.com tread
writing from the disneyland of formal philosophy on
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes." me
-------------------==== Posted via Deja News ====-----------------------
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Post to Usenet
David P.
In article <Pine.SOL.3.96.971027...@Ra.MsState.Edu>, Andy
Lowry <a...@Ra.MsState.Edu> wrote:
> To suggest that this episode permeates his criticism is at best a curious
> biographical hypothesis. It could be THE governing cause of his work, and
> yet not matter a whit for whether or not he was right or wrong in his
> theories. Everyone on this group is smart enough to grasp this, yet
> nonsense continues.
AKA The Eternal Return of Hagiography as Criticism. It has an irresistible
allure, and it beats grappling with real texts...
David
Melissa Hardie
Andy Lowry:
>I happen to believe, on relatively scanty info, that de Man was a German
>sympathizer, and that if not an anti-Semite, he was at least callous
>enough about "Jews in general" to go along with Nazi anti-Semitism. These
>are grave ethical & moral failings, albeit in a period when a hell of a
>lot of "good people" shared just these failings. De Man was 21 when he
>began at Le Soir & 23 when he left, & quite the young hotshot, too. No
>doubt some major rationalizing was going on.
>
>To suggest that this episode permeates his criticism is at best a curious
>biographical hypothesis. It could be THE governing cause of his work, and
>yet not matter a whit for whether or not he was right or wrong in his
>theories. Everyone on this group is smart enough to grasp this, yet
>nonsense continues.
>
>(I've certainly not seen Moggin or Silke _defend_ de Man's Soirisms; at
>most, they've argued that these aren't as egregious as some critics would
>lead one to believe. I take it none of us would be happy to do what de
>Man did during the war. But the vindictive lack of human sympathy shown
>by some of his critics -- the inability to understand how good people can
>do evil things without becoming evil people -- alternately annoys and
>dejects me. Can such moral executioners appreciate literature, let alone
>discuss theories of it?)
Excellent summary of the problem, Andy. Surely no one with whom one would
care to debate these questions will defend the Soirisms per se. And as
I've read this thread, no one here has. On the other hand, I understand a
kind of total reading of de Man prompted by his career at Le Soir: whilst
I don't share it, I can understand those whose repugnance obliterates the
use they might have for de Man, particularly those who came to de Man
*after* the revelations. That's a response I can understand. But for
those, like me, who were totally mesmerised by de Man prior to the
disclosure -- as in my case, immediately, and traumatically closely before
the disclosure -- to deny the influence de Man had on our thinking would
be *analogous* to the repression of which de Man stands infinitely
accused: it erases *our* history too conveniently. What do these critics
propose that we do with that history? Should we forget it in a slather of
recrimination, or should we try to use it in a way that is appropriately
humble and appropriately attentive to the history it foregrounds? We
didn't know: what should we do, now we know?
For me, the debate over de Man is an insult to the witnessing of the
Holocaust when it devolves into a cartoon representation of the
Holocaust's complex tragedy. In particular, ad hominem references to
nationality ("Frau Weinecke") are the most contemptuous, IMHO. They trap
the thinking of resistance in the logic of oppression, until it vanishes,
to return as ressentiment. Let's try and think of de Man's culpability --
which should be accounted for as real, material, historical, and beyond
apologia -- in terms of its own historical complexity, not in terms of the
kinds of egregious misstatements, ad hominems, and carictatures that
constitued the *intellectualism* of the period, including de Man's own
writings. De Man's journalism warrants close scrutiny for any student of
his work. It is not the answer to the riddle: it is the riddle. To deny
the importance and brilliance of de Man's academic career is as futile as
to deny the shameful writings. They are both real, and need be dealt with
both. The vindictive deployment of de Man's journalism as a kind of
second-order ad hominem against deconstruction is the most repugnant,
becauses it uses the Holocaust *in service* of a debate whose terms are in
American academic life over the last thirty years: cheap and dirty indeed.
Melissa
*
New address: melissa...@english.usyd.edu.au
Puss in Boots
Mikhail Zeleny [re: _Allegories of Reading]:
> One way to deal with de Man's rhetoric is to question his grasp of the
> fundamental rhetorical practices. A definitive critique of his shoddy
> scholarship is presented at the end of Brian Vickers' book in defense
> of rhetoric. In view of Vickers' evidence, it would be ludicrous to
> take the titular claim of the book you have been assigned more
> seriously than lÈger de Man.
If Vickers' critique is definitive, then we can say definitively
that de Man's work stands up well to criticism. But you're giving
Vickers too much credit. He's a pedant who delivers some superficial
and largely ineffective commentary on de Man as the afterthought, I
mean, the afterword to a lengthy treatise on rhetoric. Vickers shows
that he doesn't care for de Man's approach to the subject, that he
differs with de Man's thinking, that he dislikes the politics he sees
in de Man's work, and, not least, that he's willing to criticize de
Man's spelling when he can't find anything better to do.
His basic complaint is that although "de Man may have thought of
himself as a friend to rhetoric," nonetheless he isn't friendly in
the right way -- in Vickers' view, de Man doesn't put enough emphasis
on "the whole social and political function of classical rhetoric,
its powers of persuasion" (_In Defense of Rhetoric_). Which means de
Man doesn't follow Vickers' program.
[...]
Andy Lowry:
> >>>>>The sheer egotism of suggesting that de Man was _unconsciously_
> >>>>>led to his theories as an escape from guilt is pretty darn amazing.
> >>>>>You honestly think he never thought about connections himself?
> >>>>>Such suggestions tell all too much about the person making them.
Zeleny:
> Maybe so. To me, they tell that the person making them was being
> charitable in his interpretation of de Man's theoretic conceits by
> ruling out the likelihood that they were concocted ad hoc, to excuse
> his sordid past.
Speaking of ad hoc concoctions...
Andy:
> The special benefit of this approach is that it gives up the rather
> difficult task of understanding de Man's writings in favor of the easier
> task, reading them into his life. Not that this would actually be much
> easier if you really tried reading his life (& not, say, accepting
> helpful summaries from David Lehmann et al.).
Moggin:
>>>>> Interesting that you would mention Lehmann. For anyone who isn't
>>>>>familiar with the debate, Lehmann is one of de Man's most vicious
>>>>>enemies: his _Signs of the Times_ is a book-length assault. Yet even
>>>>>Lehmann, describing de Man's behavior during the war, writes, "He
>>>>>continued to maintain good relations with writers who opposed the Nazis,
>>>>>and his personal conduct toward Jewish acquaintances was evidently
>>>>>blameless. De Man was capable of offering the shelter of his home for
>>>>>several nights to a Jewish couple who found themselves on the streets
>>>>>of Brussels -- accidentally locked out of the flat where they had been
>>>>>staying -- after curfew" (_Signs of the Times_ 176).
>>>>> That's all Lehmann has to say; here are a few more of the details.
>>>>>The couple were Esther and Nahum Sluszny. Esther dates the episode
>>>>>back to 1942 or '43, and states, "I guarantee you that he [de Man] was
>>>>>not anti-Semitic" -- a feeling shared by many of his friends and
>>>>>acquaintances (_Responses_: On Paul de Man's Wartime Journalism_ 436).
>>>>> Lehmann also mentions de Man's relationship with Georges Goriely,
>>>>>"a Jewish friend of de Man's during the war years" who belonged to
>>>>>the resistance. Lehmann quotes his description of de Man as an
>>>>>opportunist who wrote for _Le Soir_ out of a "lack of moral conscience
>>>>>rather than any ideological choice." According to Lehmann, Goriely
>>>>>"felt that he could speak freely about his 'clandestine
>>>>> activities' to de Man."
>>>>> Here are some more of Goriely's observations: "I insist on
>>>>>being fair with regard to his collaboration: he had no ideological
>>>>>sympathies with the _Ordre nouveau_. He knew about my life and my
>>>>>clandestine activities and I never had any hesitations [_inquiétudes_]
>>>>>about expressing my views to him, which, in addition, he never
>>>>>contested" (_Responses_ 436).
>>>>> It seems fair to conclude that someone who concerns herself with
>>>>>the "empirical _facts_" will find reading de Man's life no simple
>>>>>thing -- it doesn't lead inexorably to any, one conclusion, like, for
>>>>>instance, "de Man should be damned to hell." As you say, his past
>>>>>makes an easier target than his work -- but on examination, they both
>>>>>have their complexities.
Correction: Lehman spells his name with one n.
Zeleny:
> Numerous Nazi officials covertly protected Jews from deportation and
> extermination, which is decidedly more than Paul de Man is known to
> have done. Are you really suggesting that this common practice of
> making special dispensations for personal relations or acquaintances
> in any way exculpates or even mitigates the war crimes of genocide
> perpetrators and their accomplices?
I'm suggesting precisely what I said just above, after "It seems
fair to conclude..." -- that interpreting de Man's behavior during
the war is no simple thing. Anyone intent on bringing down a ringing
judgement will have to contend with certain complexities. For
example, that de Man sheltered Jews in his own apartment, and that he
was the confidant of an active member of the resistance. I'm also
saying that anybody reading his work of the 70's in light of his life
during the early 40's would want to rembember those details, along
with the articles that he wrote for _Le Soir_.
[...]
Frieda Fieldmouse:
> >>Not to put too fine a point on it, but if I were living in Belgium at
> >>that time, my body would *already* be on the line, since I happen to be
> >>Jewish. Where would you be, Frau Weineck?
Moggin:
> > Oh, I love it! An argument-from-I'm-Jewish. I can't wait
> >'til Mikhail offers his customary argument-from-I-have-dead-
> >relatives.
Zeleny:
> Your reference to arguments is obscure. Neither Frieda's remark nor
> any personal information I have adduced at any time in this forum
> functions as a premiss in any argument.
Frieda seemed to believe she was making a point against Silke --
I'm willing to agree she didn't manage it (whatever her thoughts may
have been).
> In my own case, as above, a
> personal perspective was gratuitously solicited by Silke Weineck and
> supplied by her interlocutor, with no intended or discernible bearing
> on the conclusion of the debate. While I cannot presume to speak for
> anybody else, the relevance of my provenance is to point out whose ox
> is being gored. ...
You don't require any invitation to cite your dead relatives --
you bring them up on a regular basis, with no solicitation, in
conversations on a wide variety of topics. To say you've earned your
own version of Godwin's Law would be exaggerating, of course, but
statements about your dead kin are a very familiar part of your posts.
(I was about to say that they're predictable, but it's not easy to
guess when the next one might pop up.)
Moggin:
>> By-the-by, I'd think that de Man's body was "on the
>> line," and not just hypothetically, when he used his apartment
>> to shelter Jews.
Zeleny:
>Your thoughts in this matter notwithstanding, the historical reality
>is that sheltering Jews was not prosecuted as a crime in occupied
>Belgium prior to their deportation, when the events in question must
>have occurred, as witness the reference to curfew.
That's not clear. The deportation of Jews from Belgium began in
the summer of 1942 (late July, to be specific). By the end of the
year, 15,000 Jews had been sent to Auschwitz -- as in France, Belgian
citizens were allowed exemptions, at first, while the focus was on
non-Belgian Jews. (See Arendt, or since you've got a thing about her,
try Judah Pilch, _The Jewish Catastrophe in Europe_.) Sluszny says
that she and her husband stayed in de Man's apartment sometime in '42
or '43.
Frieda Fieldmouse:
>>>What I find most amazing about all of this is that, rather than admitting
>>>that Paul De Man was probably a fairly despicable character who wrote some
>>>unforgiveable things, you all are determined to make sure that he is seen
>>>to have accumulated *every virtue*, merely because you happen to like his
>>>writings.
Moggin:
> > Nobody here has so much as hinted that de Man "accumulated
> >*every virtue*." You're just making shit up. By now it's
> >become plain that's your standard procedure. (I don't think my
> >point was unclear: "His past makes an easier target than his
> >work -- but on examination, they both have their complexities.")
Zeleny:
> If that was your point, what bearing does it have on the legitimacy of
> Sayan's interpretation of de Man's rhetoric? Whatever the complexity
> of his past or his work, surely it cannot preempt a reading of the
> former into the latter. ...
Yet if you're trying to read his work on the basis of his life,
then it's necessary to take into account the complexities of them
both -- and that's precisely what Sayan's interpretation fails to do.
Sayan:
> >>>>>Now given de Man's past (his one-time Nazi associations), one
> >>>>>could possibly argue that a stance which denies the
> >>>>>unchallengeable validity of empirical _facts_ would appeal to
> >>>>>him, and perhaps this was why he was unconsciously drawn to
> >>>>>taking this stance (because empirical facts are de-emphasized
> >>>>>and so, for example, a past Nazi association becomes less
> >>>>>damning).
Moggin:
> >>>> Poor reasoning. "Empirical facts" are never damning.
> >>>>Damnation is an act of interpretation (except when God performs
> >>>>it -- in that instance, it's also an "empirical fact"). So if
> >>>>de Man's unconscious _was_, as you suggest, trying to make his
> >>>>past "less damning," it would've turned him into a strict, "just
> >>>>the facts, ma'am" positivist. The "empirical _facts_" here are
> >>>>that during WWII, de Man wrote a number of articles for the
> >>>>Belgian newspaper _Le Soir_ -- to damn him would require, at a
> >>>>minimum, interpreting what he said. (If you're going to made
> >>>>ad hominem arguments, at least try to do a better job.)
Frieda Fieldmouse:
> >>>How idiotic. If you're trying to cover up your past, one good
> >>>way to do it is obfuscation and evasion. A bad way to do it is
> >>>to admit the facts, something that de Man, smart guy that he was,
> >>>never did during his lifetime.
Moggin:
> Sayan forwarded the argument that in _Allegories of Reading_, de
> Man "was unconsciously drawn" to "a stance which denies the
> unchallengeable validity of empirical _facts_," because by that means
> "a past Nazi association becomes less damning." But as I replied,
> empirical facts aren't damning. With the exception I gave, damnation
> is an act of interpretation. So if de Man's object _was_ to reduce
> his damnation, then he should've quoted Joe Friday. "Just the facts"
> never damned anyone.
SSHazle:
> >>Idiotic? On the contrary. The point Moggin was trying to make
> >>(forgive me, Moggin, if I misrepresent you here) is that de Man
> >>could very easily have translated his indiscretion into a case of
> >>"it was merely theory-- that's what I do. Don't confuse that with
> >>reality. I never put it into effect or acted under the inspiration
> >>of those ideas. It was theory only." That's precisely what "Mein
> >>Kampf" was until Hitler put it into effect. The real threat would
> >>have been what the articles could have meant _had_ they ever been
> >>put into practice; deriving the action from the thought is the act
> >>of interpretation Moggin spoke of. ...
Moggin:
> > No, I was trying to say something else. Sayan is offering an ad
> >hominem argument -- that should be obvious. What's more, the
> >argument doesn't add up. Sayan reasons that de Man was unconsciously
> >trying to make an episode of his past "less damning" by
> >downplaying the importance of empirical facts -- but facts don't hold
> >the power of damnation. You can't get an ought-not from an is any
> >more than you can get an ought. So if Sayan was right, then de Man's
> >unconscious should have made "Just the facts, ma'am" his motto,
> >while de Man's work focused on reading and interpretation: the items
> >necessary to make his damnation even possible.
Zeleny:
> Nonsense. The _Le Soir_ screeds comprise an actus reus that would
> have been sufficient to guarantee cozy state-secured confinement for
> their author after the liberation of Belgium.
Not unless they were read and interpreted, honeybear. Otherwise
you're left with the fact that de Man wrote some newspaper articles.
(Somebody with a powerful animosity toward journalists might've found
that grounds for conviction, I guess.)
> No postwar court ever
> concerned itself with the mens rea of a collaborationist hack, much
> less the interpretation of his clarion call for ethnic purification
> of Europe.
Ever hear of Nuremberg? (A postwar court which concerned itself
with that kinda thing.) Anyway, the accusations against de Man
are based on his articles in _Le Soir_ -- unless you put them forward
for interpretation, there isn't a case.
> For that matter, I heartily recommend deploying your
> doctrine that "facts don't hold the power of damnation" next time
> you have to defend yourself against a traffic ticket.
You make my point. Let's say you're driving on some, given road
at such-and-such a speed. For the sake of argument, I'll call that
the "fact." To make that into a conviction for speeding will require
an entire apparatus of regulation and interpretation. The fact, by
itself, doesn't give you a ticket or earn you a fine -- it sits there.
But if you supply a whole set of "speed limits," highway signs,
traffic laws, and so on, then driving at a certain speed on a certain
highway turns into "speeding" and inspires a fat-assed, jack-booted
state trooper to put down his donut, haul you over to the side of the
road, and give you a ticket.
Go to court and you'll find a dull-brained judge dressed up like
it was Halloween (these folks all like to wear costumes) ready to
convict you of going too damn fast. But if you could restrict him to
the _facts_, then you'd be home free -- there's no guilt in the
_facts_ about your driving. (Like I said, you can't get an ought-not
from an is any more than you can get an ought.) Making you guilty
requires turning the _facts_ into a _crime_. And _that's_ impossible
without an act of interpretation. The _fact_ that you were driving
at a given speed at a specific place is no crime until you read it in
a particular way -- it has to be interpreted as "breaking the law"
before it turns into something you can be convicted of.
-- Moggin
Puss in Boots
Andy Lowry:
> I happen to believe, on relatively scanty info, that de Man was a German
> sympathizer, and that if not an anti-Semite, he was at least callous
> enough about "Jews in general" to go along with Nazi anti-Semitism. These
> are grave ethical & moral failings, albeit in a period when a hell of a
> lot of "good people" shared just these failings. De Man was 21 when he
> began at Le Soir & 23 when he left, & quite the young hotshot, too. No
> doubt some major rationalizing was going on.
That seems about right -- de Man may have had German sympathies,
which isn't necessarily to say Nazi ones. Belgian politics of the
time were an unholy mess. His German leanings seem to have been tied
to his Belgian nationalism, which was directed against France. And
while he seems not to have been an anti-Semite, he was willing enough
to write an anti-Semitic article for _Le Soir_ (attacking "vulgar
anti-Semitism," but indulging in what must be the sophisticated kind).
[...]
> (I've certainly not seen Moggin or Silke _defend_ de Man's Soirisms; at
> most, they've argued that these aren't as egregious as some critics would
> lead one to believe. I take it none of us would be happy to do what de
> Man did during the war. But the vindictive lack of human sympathy shown
> by some of his critics -- the inability to understand how good people can
> do evil things without becoming evil people -- alternately annoys and
> dejects me. Can such moral executioners appreciate literature, let alone
> discuss theories of it?)
Actually, we haven't gotten around to discussing the articles --
typically enough, we've talked about everything _else_. But they've
come up a couple of times in the past, and I think the same thing now
as I did then: some of the things they say are indefensible. At
the same time, they contain some curious ambiguities. Maybe I should
mention a few basic points, for anyone unfamiliar with the story.
de Man wasn't a Nazi. He tried to flee the German invasion, but
wound up back in Belgium, where he managed to make a living by
writing literary journalism for _Le Soir_. And he wasn't a committed
anti-Semitic propagandist (unlike, say, Celine). Most of the focus
has been on one of his essays, "The Jews in Contemporary Literature."
For good reason, too: that's where he claims Jewish writers have
always been second-rate, and suggests a "Jewish colony" isolated from
Europe. But it's one article, not a body of work. It's also where
de Man names Kafka, Gide, Hemingway, and Lawrence as the
representative figures of modern literature: a Jew, a homosexual, an
anti-fascist, and a pornographer, as somebody has noted.
-- Moggin
Mikhail Zeleny
Zeleny:
>>One way to deal with de Man's rhetoric is to question his grasp of the
>>fundamental rhetorical practices. A definitive critique of his shoddy
>>scholarship is presented at the end of Brian Vickers' book in defense
>>of rhetoric. In view of Vickers' evidence, it would be ludicrous to
>>take the titular claim of the book you have been assigned more
>>seriously than léger de Man.
Moggin:
> If Vickers' critique is definitive, then we can say definitively
>that de Man's work stands up well to criticism. But you're giving
>Vickers too much credit. He's a pedant who delivers some superficial
>and largely ineffective commentary on de Man as the afterthought, I
>mean, the afterword to a lengthy treatise on rhetoric. Vickers shows
>that he doesn't care for de Man's approach to the subject, that he
>differs with de Man's thinking, that he dislikes the politics he sees
>in de Man's work, and, not least, that he's willing to criticize de
>Man's spelling when he can't find anything better to do.
Vickers suggests that a soi-disant rhetorical expert whgo cannot spell
Quintilian's name is full of shit in at least two ways. I concur. We
are talking basics here.
Moggin:
> His basic complaint is that although "de Man may have thought of
>himself as a friend to rhetoric," nonetheless he isn't friendly in
>the right way -- in Vickers' view, de Man doesn't put enough emphasis
>on "the whole social and political function of classical rhetoric,
>its powers of persuasion" (_In Defense of Rhetoric_). Which means de
>Man doesn't follow Vickers' program.
Funny how the allegedly interminable task of deconstructive
interpretation becomes trivial as soon as the allegation itself is
questioned. Vickers demonstrates factual and logical errors in de
Man's pronouncements on rhetoric. Deal with it.
>[...]
Andy Lowry:
>>>>>>>The sheer egotism of suggesting that de Man was _unconsciously_
>>>>>>>led to his theories as an escape from guilt is pretty darn amazing.
>>>>>>>You honestly think he never thought about connections himself?
>>>>>>>Such suggestions tell all too much about the person making them.
Zeleny:
>>Maybe so. To me, they tell that the person making them was being
>>charitable in his interpretation of de Man's theoretic conceits by
>>ruling out the likelihood that they were concocted ad hoc, to excuse
>>his sordid past.
> Speaking of ad hoc concoctions...
Tu quoque is neither original nor persuasive. How is my interpretive
hypothesis any worse than Andy's?
Andy:
>>The special benefit of this approach is that it gives up the rather
>>difficult task of understanding de Man's writings in favor of the easier
>>task, reading them into his life. Not that this would actually be much
>>easier if you really tried reading his life (& not, say, accepting
>>helpful summaries from David Lehmann et al.).
Moggin:
>>>>>> Interesting that you would mention Lehmann. For anyone who
>>>>>>isn't familiar with the debate, Lehmann is one of de Man's most
>>>>>>vicious enemies: his _Signs of the Times_ is a book-length
>>>>>>assault. Yet even Lehmann, describing de Man's behavior during
>>>>>>the war, writes, "He continued to maintain good relations with
>>>>>>writers who opposed the Nazis, and his personal conduct toward
>>>>>>Jewish acquaintances was evidently blameless. De Man was capable
>>>>>>of offering the shelter of his home for several nights to a Jewish
>>>>>>couple who found themselves on the streets of Brussels --
>>>>>> accidentally locked out of the flat where they had been staying --
>>>>>>after curfew" (_Signs of the Times_ 176).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's all Lehmann has to say; here are a few more of the
>>>>>>details. The couple were Esther and Nahum Sluszny. Esther dates
>>>>>>the episode back to 1942 or '43, and states, "I guarantee you that
>>>>>>he [de Man] wasnot anti-Semitic" -- a feeling shared by many of
>>>>>>his friends and acquaintances (_Responses_: On Paul de Man's
>>>>>>Wartime Journalism_ 436).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Lehmann also mentions de Man's relationship with Georges
>>>>>>Goriely, "a Jewish friend of de Man's during the war years" who
>>>>>>belonged to the resistance. Lehmann quotes his description of
>>>>>>de Man as an opportunist who wrote for _Le Soir_ out of a "lack
>>>>>>of moral conscience rather than any ideological choice."
>>>>>>According to Lehmann, Goriely "felt that he could speak freely
>>>>>>about his 'clandestine activities' to de Man."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here are some more of Goriely's observations: "I insist on
>>>>>>being fair with regard to his collaboration: he had no ideological
>>>>>>sympathies with the _Ordre nouveau_. He knew about my life and my
>>>>>>clandestine activities and I never had any hesitations
>>>>>>[_inquiétudes_] about expressing my views to him, which, in
>>>>>>addition, he never contested" (_Responses_ 436).
Bad translation: "inquiétudes" is properly rendered as "worries".
>>>>>> It seems fair to conclude that someone who concerns herself with
>>>>>>the "empirical _facts_" will find reading de Man's life no simple
>>>>>>thing -- it doesn't lead inexorably to any, one conclusion, like, for
>>>>>>instance, "de Man should be damned to hell." As you say, his past
>>>>>>makes an easier target than his work -- but on examination, they
>>>>>>both have their complexities.
> Correction: Lehman spells his name with one n.
Are you trying to compensate for de Man's never having corrected his
habitual misspelling "Quintillian"?
Zeleny:
>>Numerous Nazi officials covertly protected Jews from deportation and
>>extermination, which is decidedly more than Paul de Man is known to
>>have done. Are you really suggesting that this common practice of
>>making special dispensations for personal relations or acquaintances
>>in any way exculpates or even mitigates the war crimes of genocide
>>perpetrators and their accomplices?
Moggin:
> I'm suggesting precisely what I said just above, after "It seems
>fair to conclude..." -- that interpreting de Man's behavior during
>the war is no simple thing. Anyone intent on bringing down a ringing
>judgement will have to contend with certain complexities. For
>example, that de Man sheltered Jews in his own apartment, and that he
>was the confidant of an active member of the resistance. I'm also
>saying that anybody reading his work of the 70's in light of his life
>during the early 40's would want to rembember those details, along
>with the articles that he wrote for _Le Soir_.
Done and accounted for. The ensuing picture is one of a war criminal
that escaped justice by lying about his wartime activities. Deal with it.
>[...]
Frieda Fieldmouse:
>>>>Not to put too fine a point on it, but if I were living in Belgium at
>>>>that time, my body would *already* be on the line, since I happen to be
>>>>Jewish. Where would you be, Frau Weineck?
Moggin:
>>> Oh, I love it! An argument-from-I'm-Jewish. I can't wait
>>>'til Mikhail offers his customary argument-from-I-have-dead-
>>>relatives.
Zeleny:
>>Your reference to arguments is obscure. Neither Frieda's remark nor
>>any personal information I have adduced at any time in this forum
>>functions as a premiss in any argument.
Moggin:
> Frieda seemed to believe she was making a point against Silke --
>I'm willing to agree she didn't manage it (whatever her thoughts may
>have been).
Your expectations of proper responses to Weineck's personal attacks
are curiously inflated. Why would Silke's gratuitous imputation of
Erkenntnissinteresse and banal squeak merit any sort of point beyond
a verbal equivalent of a bitch-slap that she so richly deserves?
Zeleny:
>>In my own case, as above, a
>>personal perspective was gratuitously solicited by Silke Weineck and
>>supplied by her interlocutor, with no intended or discernible bearing
>>on the conclusion of the debate. While I cannot presume to speak for
>>anybody else, the relevance of my provenance is to point out whose ox
>>is being gored. ...
Moggin:
> You don't require any invitation to cite your dead relatives --
>you bring them up on a regular basis, with no solicitation, in
>conversations on a wide variety of topics. To say you've earned your
>own version of Godwin's Law would be exaggerating, of course, but
>statements about your dead kin are a very familiar part of your posts.
>(I was about to say that they're predictable, but it's not easy to
>guess when the next one might pop up.)
Note that your asseveration is belied by your behavior in the present
instance. What exactly is the point of accusing me of bringing up the
matter of my dead relatives by bringing it up yourself?
Moggin:
>>> By-the-by, I'd think that de Man's body was "on the
>>> line," and not just hypothetically, when he used his apartment
>>> to shelter Jews.
Zeleny:
>>Your thoughts in this matter notwithstanding, the historical reality
>>is that sheltering Jews was not prosecuted as a crime in occupied
>>Belgium prior to their deportation, when the events in question must
>>have occurred, as witness the reference to curfew.
Moggin:
> That's not clear. The deportation of Jews from Belgium began in
>the summer of 1942 (late July, to be specific). By the end of the
>year, 15,000 Jews had been sent to Auschwitz -- as in France, Belgian
>citizens were allowed exemptions, at first, while the focus was on
>non-Belgian Jews. (See Arendt, or since you've got a thing about her,
>try Judah Pilch, _The Jewish Catastrophe in Europe_.) Sluszny says
>that she and her husband stayed in de Man's apartment sometime in '42
>or '43.
Attend to your own evidence. The incident, as you reported it,
specifically names the missed curfew as the cause of the couple's
temporary homelessness.
Frieda Fieldmouse:
>>>>What I find most amazing about all of this is that, rather than
>>>>admitting that Paul De Man was probably a fairly despicable
>>>>character who wrote some unforgiveable things, you all are
>>>>determined to make sure that he is seen to have accumulated
>>>>*every virtue*, merely because you happen to like his writings.
Moggin:
>>> Nobody here has so much as hinted that de Man "accumulated
>>>*every virtue*." You're just making shit up. By now it's
>>>become plain that's your standard procedure. (I don't think my
>>>point was unclear: "His past makes an easier target than his
>>>work -- but on examination, they both have their complexities.")
Zeleny:
>>If that was your point, what bearing does it have on the legitimacy of
>>Sayan's interpretation of de Man's rhetoric? Whatever the complexity
>>of his past or his work, surely it cannot preempt a reading of the
>>former into the latter. ...
Moggin:
> Yet if you're trying to read his work on the basis of his life,
>then it's necessary to take into account the complexities of them
>both -- and that's precisely what Sayan's interpretation fails to do.
So you say. But the fact of the matter remains that de Man was a Nazi
collaborationist shill who went to a great deal of trouble to conceal
his war crimes. And that is all that Sayan's reading requires. The
circumstances you bring up in no way vitiate it. As Himmler noted,
every good Nazi has his own favorite Jew.
Moggin:
> Not unless they were read and interpreted, honeybear. Otherwise
>you're left with the fact that de Man wrote some newspaper articles.
>(Somebody with a powerful animosity toward journalists might've found
>that grounds for conviction, I guess.)
Kindly save your charming vocatives for your arsehole buddies.
Robert Brasillach was executed for the same sort of collaborationist
propaganda that de Man indulged in. The difference between them was
in degree, not in kind. The court judged actus reus, with mens rea
never questioned, and interpretation never made into an issue. Deal
with it.
Zeleny:
>>No postwar court ever
>>concerned itself with the mens rea of a collaborationist hack, much
>>less the interpretation of his clarion call for ethnic purification
>>of Europe.
Moggin:
> Ever hear of Nuremberg? (A postwar court which concerned itself
>with that kinda thing.) Anyway, the accusations against de Man
>are based on his articles in _Le Soir_ -- unless you put them forward
>for interpretation, there isn't a case.
First of all, Nuremberg was not the venue for judging collaborationist
hacks. Secondly, interpretation is still not on the judicial menu in
the relevant cases such as the one I cited above. There are legal
distinctions that could be plausibly grounded in interpretive issues.
A classic example is the distinction between murder and involuntary
manslaughter, which entirely rests upon mens rea, in the presence or
absence of malice aforethought that is the mental element for murder.
Given that mens rea must be imputed on the basis of verbal and factual
evidence, you could make a claim that the extent of judicial damnation
is subject to the vagaries of interpretation. But the brute fact of
judging a defendant innocent or guilty almost never is so dependent,
certainly not when he is charged with collaboration with Nazis.
Zeleny:
>>For that matter, I heartily recommend deploying your
>>doctrine that "facts don't hold the power of damnation" next time
>>you have to defend yourself against a traffic ticket.
Moggin:
> You make my point. Let's say you're driving on some, given road
>at such-and-such a speed. For the sake of argument, I'll call that
>the "fact." To make that into a conviction for speeding will require
>an entire apparatus of regulation and interpretation. The fact, by
>itself, doesn't give you a ticket or earn you a fine -- it sits there.
>But if you supply a whole set of "speed limits," highway signs,
>traffic laws, and so on, then driving at a certain speed on a certain
>highway turns into "speeding" and inspires a fat-assed, jack-booted
>state trooper to put down his donut, haul you over to the side of the
>road, and give you a ticket.
Legal regulation is a given fact. Granted that interpretation of the
regulation as it is expressed in the letter of the law is part of the
court's duties. But you are not talking about that. Your point could
stand only if the prosecution were required to perform hermeneutic
rites over the elements of the offense. And that is not a requirement
that obtains in real life. Deal with it.
Moggin:
> Go to court and you'll find a dull-brained judge dressed up like
>it was Halloween (these folks all like to wear costumes) ready to
>convict you of going too damn fast. But if you could restrict him to
>the _facts_, then you'd be home free -- there's no guilt in the
>_facts_ about your driving. (Like I said, you can't get an ought-not
>from an is any more than you can get an ought.) Making you guilty
>requires turning the _facts_ into a _crime_. And _that's_ impossible
>without an act of interpretation. The _fact_ that you were driving
>at a given speed at a specific place is no crime until you read it in
>a particular way -- it has to be interpreted as "breaking the law"
>before it turns into something you can be convicted of.
If you could restrict the judge to the facts whilst maintaining their
Humean distinction from the norms, you would merely make him into a
legal positivist. Curiously enough, not even the numerous legal
positivists flattening their spotted arses on traffic court perches
across this country feel compelled to engage in haruspicy before
handing down your sentence. The brute facts suffice.
cordially,
mikhail zel...@math.ucla.edu a.k.a. m...@ptyx.com
writing from the disneyland of formal philosophy
"Nous donnons la mort et savons la subir."
Mikhail Zeleny
> >I happen to believe, on relatively scanty info, that de Man was a German
> >sympathizer, and that if not an anti-Semite, he was at least callous
> >enough about "Jews in general" to go along with Nazi anti-Semitism. These
> >are grave ethical & moral failings, albeit in a period when a hell of a
> >lot of "good people" shared just these failings. De Man was 21 when he
> >began at Le Soir & 23 when he left, & quite the young hotshot, too. No
> >doubt some major rationalizing was going on.
> >
> >To suggest that this episode permeates his criticism is at best a curious
> >biographical hypothesis. It could be THE governing cause of his work, and
> >yet not matter a whit for whether or not he was right or wrong in his
> >theories. Everyone on this group is smart enough to grasp this, yet
> >nonsense continues.
> >
> >(I've certainly not seen Moggin or Silke _defend_ de Man's Soirisms; at
> >most, they've argued that these aren't as egregious as some critics would
> >lead one to believe. I take it none of us would be happy to do what de
> >Man did during the war. But the vindictive lack of human sympathy shown
> >by some of his critics -- the inability to understand how good people can
> >do evil things without becoming evil people -- alternately annoys and
> >dejects me. Can such moral executioners appreciate literature, let alone
> >discuss theories of it?)
> Excellent summary of the problem, Andy. Surely no one with whom one would
Any doctrine that has ethical implications is susceptible to ad
hominem refutation. In de Man's case, the ethical implications
of his doctrine purport to exempt any text from the burden of
definite meaning. Such exemption is all too convenient for the
author who spends most of his life hiding from very tangible
meanings of his own texts.
To deny the importance and brilliance of Trofim Lysenko's
academic career would be as futile as to deny the same to Paul
de Man's trajectory. Unlike Lysenko, your idol had the good
fortune to die before being toppled from his pedestal. You
ought to be thankful for such small mercies. Instead, you
draw a specious distinction between those who came to de Man
after the revelations about his repugnant war record, and
those, like yourself, who were totally mesmerised by de Man
prior to the disclosure, as if the value of his doctrine
depended on the gullibility of his audience. So you have
been duped and exposed as a mark. Time to get over it.
Incidentally, identifying Silke Weineck as a Teutonic matron
is no more contemptuous than identifying you as an antipodean
lesbian, though your presumption to the contrary is most telling.
Mikhail Zeleny
>Andy Lowry <a...@Ra.MsState.Edu> wrote:
>On Mon, 27 Oct 1997, Mikhail Zeleny wrote:
>>One way to deal with de Man's rhetoric is to question his grasp of the
>>fundamental rhetorical practices. A definitive critique of his shoddy
>>scholarship is presented at the end of Brian Vickers' book in defense
>>of rhetoric. In view of Vickers' evidence, it would be ludicrous to
>>take the titular claim of the book you have been assigned more
>>seriously than léger de Man.
>Vickers, eh? I'll have a look.
A good book, even if it rambles too much for my taste.
AL:
>>>>>>>The special benefit of this approach is that it gives up the rather
>>>>>>>difficult task of understanding de Man's writings in favor of the
>>>>>>>easier task, reading them into his life.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Not that this would actually be much easier if you really tried
>>>>>>>reading his life (& not, say, accepting helpful summaries from
>>>>>>>David Lehmann et al.).
MZ:
>>Is there a critical advantage to dirempting de Man's bile from the
>>cirrhotic liver that secreted it? Are you seriously proposing that
>>his interpretive methodology that posits the notion that all reading
>>is irremediably enmired in an aporematic interpretive conundrum as its
>>main tenet -- for surely one cannot rightly deem it a consequence for
>>want of identifiable premisses leading by logically valid argument to
>>the stated conclusion -- is in no way underwritten by, or otherwise
>>logically connected to, its author's youthful literary indiscretions
>>that just happened to escape postwar punishment duly meted out to
>>other Nazi collaborators?
AL:
>Aren't deconstructors supposed to have the monopoly on pretentious
>writing?
So sorry -- is there a sesquipedalean convolution licensing agency I
should be contacting?
AL:
>Anyway, no, I'm not seriously proposing any "is in no way" nonsense.
>I'm making the simple, even simplistic, point that you've gotta read &
>understand de Man's texts on their own; if you read them by way of his
>biography, then it will be little wonder that you find the biography
>permeating the texts. Are you truly pretending to be unfamiliar with
>the device of dismissing or trivializing an author via his life? I
>mean, "duh!"
I understand what you mean. But consider the ramifications of your
suggestion in the context of the original request for tertiary sources
for clarifying de Man's Allegories of Reading. To repeat a point I
made some time ago in a similar context, if the brunt of your counsel
is that de Man is his own best expositor, the status of his writings
is thereby relegated to a choice between hermetic poetry or random
gibberish, according to their prosodic value. For consider that any
meaningful and rational argument can be summarized along the lines
requested by Noam Chomsky and repeated by Mario Taboada, as proceeding
logically from explicitly stated premisses to precisely formulated
conclusions; and any scholarly critical contribution can be shown to
be grounded in matters of historical and textual record. Now, if you
want to extol the poetic merits of deManian prose, I will gladly agree
to disagree on the issues of aesthetic ineffables. Otherwise kindly
show evidence of its historical grounding and/or its logical acumen,
refuting Vickers, and going against all appearances to the contrary.
>>>>>>>The sheer egotism of suggesting that de Man was _unconsciously_
>>>>>>>led to his theories as an escape from guilt is pretty darn amazing.
>>>>>>>You honestly think he never thought about connections himself?
>>>>>>>Such suggestions tell all too much about the person making them.
>>Maybe so. To me, they tell that the person making them was being
>>charitable in his interpretation of de Man's theoretic conceits by
>>ruling out the likelihood that they were concocted ad hoc, to excuse
>>his sordid past.
>Yes, and what sordid past underlies Derrida's thought, or Andy
>Lowry's, or Mikhail Zeleny's? Too bad we don't know the whole story
>of Plato & the Thirty, or we could read his entire corpus as a veiled
>confession. At least, until we got bored.
It is a juridical platitude that there exist but five or seven
forensic argument types, two of which are "It is a slippery slope" and
"No, it is not." I make my stand on the latter principle, against
your invocation of the former. I see no reason to withhold judgment
pending the final reckoning of all worldly accounts. We know what we
know. If our current knowledge of de Man's private motivation is more
complete than it was prior to 1988, we can interpret his texts better
now than we could then.
The truth of the matter is, neither you nor anybody else has given a
good reason not to regard all literary corpora as hidden confessions.
To be sure, there is Proust's brilliant neurotic invective contre
Sainte-Beuve. So Sainte-Beuve was a philistine who had no taste for
his contemporaries. "But Proust admired the poetry of the Comtesse de
Noailles. Saperlipopette!" And aside from Joseph Delorme, without
whom we would have no Fleurs du Mal for the philistine to condescend
to, the old academician has to his credit _Port-Royal_, a work of
scholarship that has set the standard for study of its subject matter
for 150 years and counting. By this standard, Proust, for all his
excellence, is as much of a parvenu in literature as he was in polite
society. And do you think that a reticent, self-consciously Jewish,
would-be aristocratic pederast with his coy Albert/Albertine act might
have had private agenda to further by his attempted diremption of the
person from his writings, which lies at the poisoned wellspring of all
aitiophobic doctrines of New Criticism and deconstruction, even as it
dominates its degenerate epigoni?
>I happen to believe, on relatively scanty info, that de Man was a
>German sympathizer, and that if not an anti-Semite, he was at least
>callous enough about "Jews in general" to go along with Nazi
>anti-Semitism. These are grave ethical & moral failings, albeit in a
>period when a hell of a lot of "good people" shared just these
>failings. De Man was 21 when he began at Le Soir & 23 when he left, &
>quite the young hotshot, too. No doubt some major rationalizing was
>going on.
Funny, I thought that no person can be judged good until tried by
challenging circumstances. Whom exactly do you have in mind as
sharing "just these failings"?
>To suggest that this episode permeates his criticism is at best a
>curious biographical hypothesis. It could be THE governing cause of
>his work, and yet not matter a whit for whether or not he was right or
>wrong in his theories. Everyone on this group is smart enough to
>grasp this, yet nonsense continues.
The nonsense, as you imperiously deem it, continues because the
rightness or wrongness of deManian insistence on interminable
necessitarian deferral of interpretation is a moral issue, which ipso
facto very much depends on his rightness or wrongness in adumbrating
it. With your gracious permission, I shall abstain from classifying
his body of work as a theory, until and unless you demonstrate that it
follows from self-evident or empirically manifest premisses by
rationally validated means. Then again, I do not expect to be obliged
any sooner or better than Noam Chomsky or Mario Taboada.
>(I've certainly not seen Moggin or Silke _defend_ de Man's Soirisms;
>at most, they've argued that these aren't as egregious as some critics
>would lead one to believe. I take it none of us would be happy to do
>what de Man did during the war. But the vindictive lack of human
>sympathy shown by some of his critics -- the inability to understand
>how good people can do evil things without becoming evil people --
>alternately annoys and dejects me. Can such moral executioners
>appreciate literature, let alone discuss theories of it?)
I shamefacedly confess being unable to understand how good people can
do evil things without becoming evil peopl. Would you kindly take a
break from feeling annoyed and dejected to explain what there might be
to becoming an evil person, above and beyond doing evil things?
SSHazle
Frieda wrote:
> Just so
>you know, if he were really a French aristocrat called "de Man," his name
>would have to be alphabetized under "M" (just as Maupassant's was) and he
>would be referred to in writing as "Man," in the same way that Ferdinand
>de Saussure is referred to as "Saussure."
>
Dear Frieda (ye of the emotion-sans-intellect argument)
Just so _you_ know, correct style holds that after a lower-case "de", if the
following name is one syllable, the "de" is still used in reference purposes.
If the following name is of two or more syllables, the last moniker is used,
i.e. Saussure and Maupassant.
Scott
The only good is knowledge, and the only evil ignorance.--Diogenes
Melissa Hardie
Frida Fieldmouse wrote:
****Here we go again. Why, pray tell, is the fact that De Man wrote some
newspaper articles not also in need of interpretation?
If you would do us all the favour of citing the text from the Jews in
modern literature, then maybe I could go about "interpreting" it for you.
The fact of the matter--cold, hard, brutal--is that that declaration is
not in need of any interpretation whatever: it means exactly what it
says.
<reluctant snip>
Good God!
I have just read Frieda Fieldmouse's post. I am mostly a lurker in this
NG, so I do not know what the decorum is in these instances, here, but
what the heck. In the rather more bumptious NGs I am familiar with, we
know a tour de force when we read one.
Yes, to the above: agreed. And I hope it is clear in my earlier post that
I *do* think the journalism requires interpretation, and *also* that it is
very clear that it means what you say it means. It does say those
things. And the task of interpretation is not to mollify "De Man'" via
his famous readers, but to understand better what it means to have meant
to have said them. Perhaps, also, to deal with the question of shame
without exculpation *or* ressentiment.
Although she seems to impugn my position, Fieldmouse does it with such
sublime vituperation, and so intelligently, that I have to say -- I am in
awe. This is one of the best post I have read in ages, and I don't find
it at all unpersuasive. Which is not to say, of course, that I agree.
Who *are* you?
Racing off to Dejanews,
Puss in Boots
Moggin:
> > > > No, I was trying to say something else. Sayan is offering an ad
> > > >hominem argument -- that should be obvious. What's more, the
> > > >argument doesn't add up. Sayan reasons that de Man was unconsciously
> > > >trying to make an episode of his past "less damning" by
> > > >downplaying the importance of empirical facts -- but facts don't hold
> > > >the power of damnation. You can't get an ought-not from an is any
> > > >more than you can get an ought. So if Sayan was right, then de Man's
> > > >unconscious should have made "Just the facts, ma'am" his motto,
> > > >while de Man's work focused on reading and interpretation: the items
> > > >necessary to make his damnation even possible.
Zeleny:
> > > Nonsense. The _Le Soir_ screeds comprise an actus reus that would
> > > have been sufficient to guarantee cozy state-secured confinement for
> > > their author after the liberation of Belgium.
Moggin:
> > Not unless they were read and interpreted, honeybear. Otherwise
> > you're left with the fact that de Man wrote some newspaper articles.
> > (Somebody with a powerful animosity toward journalists might've found
> > that grounds for conviction, I guess.)
Frieda:
> Here we go again. Why, pray tell, is the fact that De Man wrote some
> newspaper articles not also in need of interpretation?
That's just it: without interpreting the articles, all you have
is the fact that he wrote them. That's not grounds for conviction.
Reading and interpretation are necessary to make them a basis for the
"cozy state-secured confinement for their author."
> If you would do us all the favour of citing the text from the Jews in
> modern literature, then maybe I could go about "interpreting" it for you.
> The fact of the matter--cold, hard, brutal--is that that declaration is
> not in need of any interpretation whatever: it means exactly what it
> says.
Perhaps it does -- but when you establish "what it says," you're
interpreting it. And when you establish what it means, and decide
that it's meaning coincides with "what it says," the same goes. Acts
of interpretation, every step of the way.
Now, you may be able to argue that your interpretation possesses
certain qualities, e.g., validity, necessity, self-evidence, truth,
accuracy, adequacy, or moral virtue. But even if it has every single
item on the list, it's no less an interpretation.
> ... If everything
> needs to be interpreted, then there's wiggle room in even the clearest
> declarative sentence, for example: "It would be a salutary thing if all
> the Jews were rounded up and sent to an island somewhere."
[...]
Since you mention it, that sentence, as you offer it here (i.e.,
not necessarily as de Man makes a similar remark) leaves a huge
amount of room for interpretation -- consider how different it would
sound coming from a Nazi and a Zionist, respectively.
-- Moggin
Frieda Fieldmouse
> Frieda:
>
> > Here we go again. Why, pray tell, is the fact that De Man wrote some
> > newspaper articles not also in need of interpretation?
Moggin:
> That's just it: without interpreting the articles, all you have
> is the fact that he wrote them.
I ask the question again: why is that "fact" exempt from the need for
interpretive labour? Doesn't your view dictate that I never have "the
fact" that he wrote them but only the interpretation that he did?
Do I interpret that a stone is not a loaf of bread or do I understand that
it is not?
> > If you would do us all the favour of citing the text from the Jews in
> > modern literature, then maybe I could go about "interpreting" it for you.
> > The fact of the matter--cold, hard, brutal--is that that declaration is
> > not in need of any interpretation whatever: it means exactly what it
> > says.
> Perhaps it does -- but when you establish "what it says," you're
> interpreting it. And when you establish what it means, and decide
> that it's meaning coincides with "what it says," the same goes. Acts
> of interpretation, every step of the way.
> Now, you may be able to argue that your interpretation possesses
> certain qualities, e.g., validity, necessity, self-evidence, truth,
> accuracy, adequacy, or moral virtue. But even if it has every single
> item on the list, it's no less an interpretation.
This is as succinct an expression of the "interpretive monism" that I
railed against in my previous post. Now I will show you why it is a false
view.
The view was that of Nietzsche ("there are no facts, only
interpretations") and more recent hermeneutic philosophers like Gadamer
and Ricoeur. It has been given a "radical" but nonsensical spin by the
likes of Derrida and De Man, who maintain that interpretation is not only
*necessary* it is also *impossible*. Refuting that view is, happily,
easily done by refuting the view that interpretation is necessary. In
fact (and to give them more credit) the tiresome paradoxes that De Man and
Derrida arrive at are merely relatively consistent consequences of their
interpretive monism (i.e., no understanding without interpretation)
because it is the case that anyone who believes that there is no
understanding without interpretation really believes that interpretation
is impossible. By saying that "interpretation is necessary" I am
referring to the view that there can be no understanding of the meaning of
a text or spoken utterance--whether a correct or incorrect
understanding--without a labour of interpretation. This view, which I
presume is your own, falls apart on further inspection.
Let's suppose that it is true that every Text A (for simplicity's sake
I'll refer to texts) requires that an interpretation B be provided in
order for understanding to take place. Text A cannot be understood
directly but must, rather, be interpreted as meaning B in order for
understanding to take place. On the other hand, Text B (the
interpretation) must be different from Text A itself. Now, since we are
not admitting the possibility of understanding without interpretation,
Text B (the interpretation) will entail a further labour of interpretation
in order to be understood. This leads to the production of a further
interpretation, C. We end up with the type of endless chain of
interpretations so dear to both hermeneuticists and deconstructors. So it
is that the claim that interpretation is necessary leads one to the view
that interpretation is ultimately impossible (since the chain is endless).
What's wrong with this picture? What is wrong with it is that the
*conditions* for interpretation to be possible at all preclude
interpretation being necessary in order for there to be understanding of
any meaning whatever. The problem is not so much that interpretation is
endless (A leading to B leading to C, ad infinitum) but rather that
interpretation in such a conception can never begin. If interpretation B
requires the production of C in order to be understood (i.e., if the
interpretation itself requires an interpretation, ad infinitum), then
intepretation is not in fact endless because it never gets off the ground
in the first place. If we cannot understand an interpretation (Text B)
without interpreting it (Text C), then Text B is never actually produced.
Our understanding of Text B turns out to have been in fact Text C and Text
B does not exist. Interpretation, on this model, never gets off the
ground.
A better view is then that, in order for interpretation to be possible,
some texts (I would say *most texts*) have to be understandable without
interpretation.
A similar argument can be found in Wittgenstein's _Philosophical Grammar_
(p. 47). Suppose someone gives us the order to square a series of numbers
and gives this order in the form of a table:
x | 1 | 2 | 3 |
-----------------
x2 | | | | (my apologies if the table doesn't look like much)
Wittgenstein writes: "It seems to us as if by understanding the order we
add something to it, something that fills the gap between command and
execution. So that if someone said 'You understand it, don't you, so it
is not incomplete' we could reply 'Yes, I understand it, but only because
I add something to it, namely the interpretation.' --But what makes you
give just _this_ interpretation? Is it the order? In that case it was
already unambiguous, since it demanded this interpretation. Or did you
attach the interpretation arbitrarily? In that case what you understood
was not the command, but only what you made of it. . . .
"But an interpretation is something that is given in signs. It is
_this_ interpretation as opposed to a different one (running
differently). So if one were to say 'Any sentence still stands in need of
an interpretation' that would mean: no sentence can be understood without
a rider.
"Of course sometimes I do _interpret_ signs, give signs an
interpretation; but that does not happen every time I understand a sign.
(If someone asks me 'What time is it?' there is no inner process of
laborious interpretation; I simply react to what I see and hear. If
someone whips out a knife at me, I do not say 'I interpret that as a
threat.'"
> > ... If everything
> > needs to be interpreted, then there's wiggle room in even the clearest
> > declarative sentence, for example: "It would be a salutary thing if all
> > the Jews were rounded up and sent to an island somewhere."
>
> Since you mention it, that sentence, as you offer it here (i.e.,
> not necessarily as de Man makes a similar remark) leaves a huge
> amount of room for interpretation -- consider how different it would
> sound coming from a Nazi and a Zionist, respectively.
So I understand it based on who said it. Nobody would deny that
background knowledge plays a role in understanding. That is still not
enough to make the sentence _need_ an interpretation in order to
understand it. Sure I *can* always interpret it, but that's different
from saying I can't understand it without doing so.
Frieda
Frieda Fieldmouse
In article <6382m3$kea$1...@netnews.upenn.edu>, wein...@mail1.sas.upenn.edu
(Silke-Maria Weineck) wrote:
> : > Frieda:
> : >
> : > > Here we go again. Why, pray tell, is the fact that De Man wrote some
> : > > newspaper articles not also in need of interpretation?
>
> : Moggin:
>
> : > That's just it: without interpreting the articles, all you have
> : > is the fact that he wrote them.
Frieda:
> : I ask the question again: why is that "fact" exempt from the need for
> : interpretive labour?
>
> Actually, it isn't.
Then I suggest you take it up with Moggin because, apparently, you
disagree on the matter.
> : Do I interpret that a stone is not a loaf of bread or do I understand that
> : it is not?
>
> I just baked a loaf yesterday; the answer to your question was by no means
> obvious, I'm afraid, even though it could be determined upon closer
> examination.
I asked a question about a stone, not about a loaf of bread. You avoided
it. Once again: faced with a stone, do I interpret that it is not a loaf
of bread or do I understand that it's not?
> : > Perhaps it does -- but when you establish "what it says," you're
> : > interpreting it. And when you establish what it means, and decide
> : > that it's meaning coincides with "what it says," the same goes. Acts
> : > of interpretation, every step of the way.
> : > Now, you may be able to argue that your interpretation possesses
> : > certain qualities, e.g., validity, necessity, self-evidence, truth,
> : > accuracy, adequacy, or moral virtue. But even if it has every single
> : > item on the list, it's no less an interpretation.
>
> : This is as succinct an expression of the "interpretive monism" that I
> : railed against in my previous post.
>
> Well, no, that's an accurate description of what you and moggin and other
> people including me have done when confronted with de Man's articles.
I'm, obviously, talking about the presuppositions underlying these
statements are accurately described as exemplifying "interpretive
monism." Another red herring from you (but I'm used to it by now).
> We've interpreted them, and, it seems, in rather similar fashions, even
> though there are passages we might interpret differently, as the
> mentioning of Kafka that has come up a few times.
I don't deny that some passages (particularly with a writer as obscure as
De Man in his later years) might require interpretation. I merely say
that the condition for that interpretation to be possible is that not
every text or utterance be in need of an interpretation.
> : Now I will show you why it is a false view.
>
> Hardly. We'll go through it.
Perhaps you'd like to read what I wrote before you come up with your
knee-jerk response.
> : The view was that of Nietzsche ("there are no facts, only
> : interpretations") and more recent hermeneutic philosophers like Gadamer
> : and Ricoeur. It has been given a "radical" but nonsensical spin by the
> : likes of Derrida and De Man, who maintain that interpretation is not only
> : *necessary* it is also *impossible*.
>
> Not that interpretation per se is impossible. Interpretation happens all
> the time. Please provide a quotation, so we can see which tenet you are
> talking about specifically.
You know full well that I can't provide a quotation since, I presume, you
are familiar with their work. Someone who thinks interpretation is
necessary and impossible (and both Derrida and De Man do) would never be
so dumb as just to nakedly declare it. To do so would be self-refuting.
It has to be *demonstrated*, which is what De Man and Derrida think
they're doing. In De Man's case, the demonstration consists in constantly
subverting the conclusions he seems to have just reached, with the
entirety of the demonstration supposed to hammer home the point (Warminski
calls this "the stutter"). It does nothing of the sort, although it does
raise the question of how it is De Man arrived at the animating conclusion
that language is defective as such (in Wittgenstein's terms, in need of a
rider). It cannot be something he observed and writing an incoherent or
self-subverting text hardly proves the matter. The answer, rather, has to
be sought in De Man himself and here I can understand why an
undemonstrable and unobservable doctrine like "language itself is
defective" would be most appealing to someone with De Man's past.
> : Let's suppose that it is true that every Text A (for simplicity's sake
> : I'll refer to texts) requires that an interpretation B be provided in
> : order for understanding to take place. Text A cannot be understood
> : directly
>
> What do you mean by "understanding directly"?
With no need for a labour of interpretation. This is merely restating the
premise in the previous sentence.
> but must, rather, be interpreted as meaning B in order for
> : understanding to take place. On the other hand, Text B (the
> : interpretation) must be different from Text A itself.
>
> as in, a paraphrase?
If you like, but not necessarily.
> Now, since we are
> : not admitting the possibility of understanding without interpretation,
> : Text B (the interpretation) will entail a further labour of interpretation
> : in order to be understood. This leads to the production of a further
> : interpretation, C. We end up with the type of endless chain of
> : interpretations so dear to both hermeneuticists and deconstructors. So it
> : is that the claim that interpretation is necessary leads one to the view
> : that interpretation is ultimately impossible (since the chain is endless).
>
> Not that interpretation is impossible -- interpretation, in your
> scenario, has already happened.
No, it hasn't. If you'd read the rest of my argument, you'd understand why.
> : What's wrong with this picture?
>
> Since your further elucidations rest on a misunderstanding (i.e. the
> substitution of "there is no interpretation" for "there is no final
> interpretation), all that follows rest on a false premise.
You pompous fool. The rest of my elucidations rest on no such
"misunderstanding." I even conceded that (and I quote): "The problem is
not so much that interpretation is endless (A leading to B leading to C,
ad infinitum) but rather that
interpretation in such a conception can never begin."
This leads me to entertain the possibility that you alone do just
interpret things however you please.
> : A better view is then that, in order for interpretation to be possible,
> : some texts (I would say *most texts*) have to be understandable without
> : interpretation.
>
> For instance?
Most well-formed sentences in the language in most contexts.
Me:
If everything
> : > > needs to be interpreted, then there's wiggle room in even the clearest
> : > > declarative sentence, for example: "It would be a salutary thing if all
> : > > the Jews were rounded up and sent to an island somewhere."
Moggin:
> : > Since you mention it, that sentence, as you offer it here (i.e.,
> : > not necessarily as de Man makes a similar remark) leaves a huge
> : > amount of room for interpretation -- consider how different it would
> : > sound coming from a Nazi and a Zionist, respectively.
>
> : So I understand it based on who said it. Nobody would deny that
> : background knowledge plays a role in understanding. That is still not
> : enough to make the sentence _need_ an interpretation in order to
> : understand it.
>
> But most certainly it does, since "background knowledge" is, as you say,
> part of understanding the passage as you do understand it -- knowing
> about Nazis, what and where Belgium is, what Jews are, what the position
> of the Jews is in Europe of the time, etc. etc. etc. They are all
> necessary for you to arrive at your conclusions, or for me to arrive at
> mine.
I don't deny any of that, as long as "understanding the passage" does not
*necessarily* imply passing through a prior act of interpretation. I also
have to know what all the words in the sentence mean and the other ways in
which they can be used. I interpret none of this, by the way. The
question is: does this background knowledge make of any understanding a
mere interpretation? I maintain that it does not for the reasons
contained in the argument you conveniently dismissed.
Furthermore, it is almost impossible to imagine that a Zionist would use
the verbs "to round up" and "send," which imply forcible removal and are
in no need of interpretation. Any putative Zionist who said it in this
way probably _is_ a Nazi.
> Try again. This is fun.
Try reading what I said the first time.
Frieda
Rick Hartman/Lani Ellington
I'm going to interrupt here very quickly, and then go back to lurking.
I should say up front that I have not read de Man, and so don't really
have much to say ragarding the heart of this debate. However, there is
one point that Moggin made regarding interpretation that, as I got it
anyway, seems as clear as day, yet seemingly continually gets mis-read.
Frieda Fieldmouse wrote:
>
> In article <6382m3$kea$1...@netnews.upenn.edu>, wein...@mail1.sas.upenn.edu
> (Silke-Maria Weineck) wrote:
>
> > : > Frieda:
> > : >
> > : > > Here we go again. Why, pray tell, is the fact that De Man wrote some
> > : > > newspaper articles not also in need of interpretation?
> >
> > : Moggin:
> >
> > : > That's just it: without interpreting the articles, all you have
> > : > is the fact that he wrote them.
>
> Frieda:
>
> > : I ask the question again: why is that "fact" exempt from the need for
> > : interpretive labour?
> >
> > Actually, it isn't.
Frieda:
> Then I suggest you take it up with Moggin because, apparently, you
> disagree on the matter.
As I see things, there's no disagreement here whatsoever between Silke
and Moggin. As far as I remember, Moggin hasn't said anything one way
or the other about whether or not the above mentioned fact, on its own,
is in need of interpretation. Rather, Moggin seems to have said
something about if you want to get judgement x from fact y _then_ such
an interpretation is needed.
Some time ago, somebody made the point that perhaps de Man's emphasis on
interpretation arose out of a desire to obscure his supposed guilt in
writing some articles for Le Soir. Moggin made the (I thought, anyways)
simple point that such a desire would have been better served by
down-playing the role of interpretation, because to get any kind of
moral judgement, interpretation is needed. That's how I saw Moggin's
point in any case (I could be wrong, of course.)
Frieda then responded to this general argument with "...Why, pray tell,
is the fact that De Man wrote some newspaper articles not also in need
of interpretation?," which actually makes Moggin's point. To get make
any kind of of judgement regarding that fact, there needs to be some
level of interpretation. Considering this, de Man's emphasis on
interpretation does not do a very good job of serving any type of desire
to obscure his supposed guilt.
Then Frieda answered with "...why is that "fact" exempt from the need
for interpretive labour?" But, as far as I can tell, Moggin never made
the claim that such a fact was exempt from the need for interpretave
labor. Instead, Moggin's point was that, for any sort of judgement to
be made regarding that fact, such an interpretive labor is _exactly_
what's needed. Again, de Man's emphasis on interpretation would subvert
any desire he had to obscure his supposed guilt.
Finally, if I remember correctly, Moggin did address the matter of
interpreting de Man's mork by way of biographical facts (such as he
wrote article so and so for magazine that and such). If I remember
correctly, Moggin had the gall to suggest that such a task is itself a
complex one, because those biographical facts are open to more than one
simple interpretation.
Sorry for interrupting, and especially for simply wasting space by
reiterating points that Moggin seems to have made already, and quite
clearly. I just got momentarily frustrated.
Rick
Melissa Hardie
smw wrote:
>Melissa Hardie (melissa...@english.usyd.edu.au) wrote:
>
>[...]
>: Excellent summary of the problem, Andy. Surely no one with whom one would
>: care to debate these questions will defend the Soirisms per se. And as
>: I've read this thread, no one here has. On the other hand, I understand a
>: kind of total reading of de Man prompted by his career at Le Soir: whilst
>: I don't share it, I can understand those whose repugnance obliterates the
>: use they might have for de Man, particularly those who came to de Man
>: *after* the revelations.
>
>So would I -- if it hadn't been so convenient, and if the people
>most vituperative hadn't played it in such a despicable fashion --
>we always knew decon was evil, and now we've found a way to ground
>our ignorant opinion in the most evil of evils. The joy that
>permeated what you call "the revelations" was a bit distasteful --
>certainly, less distasteful than de Man's two articles in question,
>but nonetheless.
Well yes, and I do have a rather different experience of that. Without
wishing to drift too far from the topic, deconstruction is located so
differently in this country that the whole thing had very little effect
academically -- except on those of us interested in de Man, of course. US
deconstruction is not nearly as influential as, well, in the US.
>A word on "relevations" -- I'm always a bit amazed at the rhetoric
>of secrecy, revelation, hidden shame -- we're dealing with a
>newspaper. The guy did what he did in the most public fashion
>imagineable. Ortwin certainly didn't have a hard time finding the
>articled -- they weren't hidden, nobody had tried to burn the
>archives or to remove the issues in question.
Hmm. The public record. The ability to "reveal" what is public is
certainly there, though -- see the reference to me as "antipodean lesbian"
later in this thread. Ob Book _The Epistemology of the Closet_. I agree
with you, with the proviso that the notion of "public" is historical.
<snip>
>I'd say, read his criticism and decide whether it's any good. Why
>should you be humble because de Man wrote two nasty articles at the age
>of 22? <snip>
>Now that we know what? That de Man, as a young man, worked for a
>collaborationist newspaper and wrote one long antisemitic article and
>another one that contains plenty of nasty remarks? What exact bearing
>does that have on your critical work? Do you see a connection or don't
>you? The case of Heidegger is much more interesting in this regard.
I have no problem with those who work with de Man doing so: I do. I don't
find the "young man"/"old man" argument persuasive. It seems to share with
the repudiation of de Man the premise of biographical *truth*. I see no
necessary philosophical connection between his criticism and his wartime
journalism, which is precisely the problematic, for me. Certainly noone
has demonstrated one to me, and I have read both, closely. That severence
however, I do not read as biographical, or locational (expatriated), but
puzzle over in other ways less pertinent to this debate. Given my own
interest in cultural difference and modernism, his journalism is quite
specifically within my own critical interests: perhaps if it weren't I
would feel differently.
Let's not even get to Heidegger!
>: For me, the debate over de Man is an insult to the witnessing of the
>: Holocaust when it devolves into a cartoon representation of the
>: Holocaust's complex tragedy.
>I take exception at calling the holocaust a tragedy in light of what the
>genre of tragedy represents.
Yes, it was inappropriate. You are right. Sorry.
>Well, even then I'd like some attention to due process, actually. In the
>interest of the standards of justice allegedly put forth here.
>
Well, I would read his writing in the same way as I would read anything
published, and I don't see any question of "justice" beyond that. I am
not sure what you mean. De Man's authorship is beyond dispute, isn't it?
I read him as any other author. He's not on trial.
>: writings. De Man's journalism warrants close scrutiny for any student of
>: his work.
>
>It does? Why?
OK, I think it does, because it exists, and because to fail to do so is a
position unfortunately preempted by de Man himself. But I suppose others
may call this differently, and fair enough. That is how I feel about it.
>: the importance and brilliance of de Man's academic career is as futile as
>: to deny the shameful writings. They are both real, and need be dealt with
>: both.
>
>But only together if there is indeed a connection, and I haven't seen a
>good case made for that.
<above> It is the failure of congruence that interest me, appals me -
whatever.
>
>The vindictive deployment of de Man's journalism as a kind of
>: second-order ad hominem against deconstruction is the most repugnant,
>: becauses it uses the Holocaust *in service* of a debate whose terms are in
>: American academic life over the last thirty years: cheap and dirty indeed.
>
>Yes.
Well, thanks for your comments.
Frieda Fieldmouse
In article <638ni4$jl1$1...@netnews.upenn.edu>, wein...@mail1.sas.upenn.edu
(Silke-Maria Weineck) wrote:
> Curiously, you seem to accuse me of mis-interpreting your statements.
It's hardly curious. But I wouldn't say you misinterpreted them. I'd say
you didn't understand them.
> a) please draw a clear distinction between "interpretation" and
> "directly understanding"
I've done so to the extent required by this discussion. This is a red herring.
> b) please cite where de Man and Derrida say that "interpretation is
> impossible"
I've explained why they would be idiots to ever say such a thing. That
doesn't mean it isn't a fundamental tenet of what they believe. Indeed,
it follows from their view that there is no understanding without
interpretation, as I've shown.
> c) please make your arguments relevant to the Soir articles
The relevance is this: there are statements in the Soir articles that,
like most statements in the language, require no interpretation in order
to be understood.
> d) please do so w/o interpreting
Huh? First, why is that a requirement? Second, I think I've done so.
Frieda
Mikhail Zeleny
Melissa Hardie <melissa...@english.usyd.edu.au> wrote:
>Zeleny:
><snip>
>>To deny the importance and brilliance of Trofim Lysenko's
>>academic career would be as futile as to deny the same to Paul
>>de Man's trajectory. Unlike Lysenko, your idol had the good
>>fortune to die before being toppled from his pedestal. You
>>ought to be thankful for such small mercies. Instead, you
>>draw a specious distinction between those who came to de Man
>>after the revelations about his repugnant war record, and
>>those, like yourself, who were totally mesmerised by de Man
>>prior to the disclosure, as if the value of his doctrine
>>depended on the gullibility of his audience. So you have
>>been duped and exposed as a mark. Time to get over it.
>>
>>Incidentally, identifying Silke Weineck as a Teutonic matron
>>is no more contemptuous than identifying you as an antipodean
>>lesbian, though your presumption to the contrary is most telling.
>Specious to whom? My comments pertained to a particular experience of de
>Man's *trajectory*, which depends on such a dinstinction. It did not
>suggest that his "doctrine" was different in either case, but that the
>gesture of total dismissal would be a repression cognate with that of de
>Man himself.
It's not specious "to whom", it's specious, period. You speak as if
the personal history of the recipient were a legitimate factor in
determining the moral, factual, or aesthetic value of the sender and
his message. Get a grip, Heisenberg: your sentimental experience in
no way modifies the nature of the object being experienced.
I dismiss Paul de Man's corpus no more and no less than I dismiss
_Mein Kampf_, valuing both as historically significant specimens of
misological polemic that deserve a prominent place in any scholarly
library in the humanities, under the rubric of the repudiation of
reason and the pathologies of rhetoric.
>Paul de Man is not my idol. I am not his dupe. You presume a lot.
I presumed nothing that was not inscribed in the purple prose to
which I was responding:
>>>Excellent summary of the problem, Andy. Surely no one with whom one would
>>>care to debate these questions will defend the Soirisms per se. And as
>>>I've read this thread, no one here has. On the other hand, I understand a
>>>kind of total reading of de Man prompted by his career at Le Soir: whilst
>>>I don't share it, I can understand those whose repugnance obliterates the
>>>use they might have for de Man, particularly those who came to de Man
>>>*after* the revelations. That's a response I can understand. But for
>>>those, like me, who were totally mesmerised by de Man prior to the
>>>disclosure -- as in my case, immediately, and traumatically closely before
>>>the disclosure -- to deny the influence de Man had on our thinking would
>>>be *analogous* to the repression of which de Man stands infinitely
>>>accused: it erases *our* history too conveniently. What do these critics
>>>propose that we do with that history? Should we forget it in a slather of
>>>recrimination, or should we try to use it in a way that is appropriately
>>>humble and appropriately attentive to the history it foregrounds? We
>>>didn't know: what should we do, now we know?
To use your own words, you were "totally mesmerized by de Man [...]
immediately, and traumatically closely before the disclosure" of his
repugnant wartime behavior. To paraphrase ever so slightly, you have
been duped by your idol and exposed as a mark by his fall. If you
have an alternative interpretation of your crestfallen claptrap, by
all means put it forth.
>I do not share your "interpretation" of the comment <Frau Weineck> where
>it came in this debate. I do find it telling that the identification of
>me you offer is "antipodean lesbian." I made no presumption about either
>identification's relation to the other, so there is nothing "telling"
>about me here at all. Do you want to know about my eye colour as well?
Frankly, I don't care whether or not you have eyes, much less what
their color might be. But if you should opt to bandy it around as
much as you gratuitously advertise your sexual preference, never mind
as strenuously as Silke broadcasts her marital status and her German
mannerisms, I might take it under advisement. Indeed, your being a
pink-eyed albino could go some way towards explaining your propensity
for wilfully seeing la vie en rose where any unbiased observer could
only see a pile of garbage.
cordially,
mikhail zel...@math.ucla.edu a.k.a m...@ptyx.com
writing from the disneyland of formal philosophy
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
-------------------==== Posted via Deja News ====-----------------------
Puss in Boots
Frieda:
>>:>> Here we go again. Why, pray tell, is the fact that De Man wrote some
>>:>> newspaper articles not also in need of interpretation?
Moggin:
>>:> That's just it: without interpreting the articles, all you have
>>:> is the fact that he wrote them.
Frieda:
>>: I ask the question again: why is that "fact" exempt from the need for
>>: interpretive labour?
Silke:
> > Actually, it isn't.
Frieda:
> Then I suggest you take it up with Moggin because, apparently, you
> disagree on the matter.
We do? Maybe you can show where -- I don't see. I've taken the
_fact_ as a given, but we can always look at it more closely.
Silke's mentioned some of the ways that the fact of de Man's articles
is already a product of interpretation. That's not to say he _didn't_
write them, but to observe that establishing his authorship as a
_fact_ results from a certain kind of process. Not to mention what's
going on when you determine the specific _kind_ of thing that he
authored. ("Newspaper articles.")
[...]
Frieda:
>>:Now, since we are
>>:not admitting the possibility of understanding without interpretation,
>>:Text B (the interpretation) will entail a further labour of interpretation
>>:in order to be understood. This leads to the production of a further
>>:interpretation, C. We end up with the type of endless chain of
>>:interpretations so dear to both hermeneuticists and deconstructors. So it
>>:is that the claim that interpretation is necessary leads one to the view
>>:that interpretation is ultimately impossible (since the chain is endless).
Silke:
>> Not that interpretation is impossible -- interpretation, in your
>> scenario, has already happened.
Frieda:
> No, it hasn't. If you'd read the rest of my argument, you'd understand why.
I just finished reading your entire argument, start to finish; it
looks as though Silke is right. Your scenario clearly contains two
(count 'em) interpretations -- the ones you labeled "B" and "C." It's
also got a chain containing indefinitely more. Interpretation _has_
occurred, and it won't stop. You do make a relevant assertion -- that
those interpretations don't exist. Unfortunately, you don't support
it, except with the statement that we don't understand them -- I don't
see anywhere you support that, either; but even taking it as given,
their non-existence wouldn't seem to follow.
Frieda:
> > : What's wrong with this picture?
Silke:
> > Since your further elucidations rest on a misunderstanding (i.e. the
> > substitution of "there is no interpretation" for "there is no final
> > interpretation), all that follows rest on a false premise.
Frieda:
> You pompous fool. The rest of my elucidations rest on no such
> "misunderstanding." I even conceded that (and I quote): "The problem is
> not so much that interpretation is endless (A leading to B leading to C,
> ad infinitum) but rather that interpretation in such a conception can
> ever begin."
Yet "A leading to B leading to C, ad infinitum" is what you just
described, problem or not. So it's obvious that even in your own
description, interpretation can and does begin. What it doesn't seem
to do is stop -- that's why you end up saying that "the chain is
endless." And if interpretation goes on endlessly, you must be wrong
to state, "interpretation in such a conception can never begin."
[...]
Frieda:
>>:>> If everything
>>:>> needs to be interpreted, then there's wiggle room in even the clearest
>>:>> declarative sentence, for example: "It would be a salutary thing if all
>>:>> the Jews were rounded up and sent to an island somewhere."
Moggin:
>>:> Since you mention it, that sentence, as you offer it here (i.e.,
>>:> not necessarily as de Man makes a similar remark) leaves a huge
>>:> amount of room for interpretation -- consider how different it would
>>:> sound coming from a Nazi and a Zionist, respectively.
Frieda:
>>: So I understand it based on who said it. Nobody would deny that
>>: background knowledge plays a role in understanding. That is still not
>>: enough to make the sentence _need_ an interpretation in order to
>>: understand it.
Silke:
> > But most certainly it does, since "background knowledge" is, as you say,
> > part of understanding the passage as you do understand it -- knowing
> > about Nazis, what and where Belgium is, what Jews are, what the position
> > of the Jews is in Europe of the time, etc. etc. etc. They are all
> > necessary for you to arrive at your conclusions, or for me to arrive at
> > mine.
Frieda:
> I don't deny any of that, as long as "understanding the passage" does not
> *necessarily* imply passing through a prior act of interpretation. I also
> have to know what all the words in the sentence mean and the other ways in
> which they can be used. I interpret none of this, by the way. The
> question is: does this background knowledge make of any understanding a
> mere interpretation? I maintain that it does not for the reasons
> contained in the argument you conveniently dismissed.
Your argument didn't contain any reasons to maintain that you're
not interpreting the statement (which wasn't quite so perfectly
clear). Ditto for your comments here. When you bring your knowledge
into play, you're using it to help you construct an interpretation.
> Furthermore, it is almost impossible to imagine that a Zionist would use
> the verbs "to round up" and "send," which imply forcible removal and are
> in no need of interpretation. Any putative Zionist who said it in this
> way probably _is_ a Nazi.
Identifying the implications of key terms and using them to help
determine the meaning of a statement isn't interpreting?
-- Moggin
Mikhail Zeleny
In article <moggin-ya02408000...@news.mindspring.com>
Puss in Boots <mog...@mindspring.com> wrote:
Zeleny:
>>Vickers suggests that a soi-disant rhetorical expert whgo cannot spell
>>Quintilian's name is full of shit in at least two ways. I concur. We
>>are talking basics here.
Moggin:
> We're talking spelling flames.
There is no point in discussing Vickers. Your mind is obviously made
up. Anyone not so notionally encumbered will know where to find the
book in question.
Zeleny:
>>Funny how the allegedly interminable task of deconstructive
>>interpretation becomes trivial as soon as the allegation itself is
>>questioned. Vickers demonstrates factual and logical errors in de
>>Man's pronouncements on rhetoric. Deal with it.
Moggin:
> See above.
Likewise.
>[...]
Andy Lowry:
>>>>>>>>>The sheer egotism of suggesting that de Man was _unconsciously_
>>>>>>>>>led to his theories as an escape from guilt is pretty darn amazing.
>>>>>>>>>You honestly think he never thought about connections himself?
>>>>>>>>>Such suggestions tell all too much about the person making them.
Zeleny:
>>>>Maybe so. To me, they tell that the person making them was being
>>>>charitable in his interpretation of de Man's theoretic conceits by
>>>>ruling out the likelihood that they were concocted ad hoc, to excuse
>>>>his sordid past.
Moggin:
>>> Speaking of ad hoc concoctions...
Zeleny:
>>Tu quoque is neither original nor persuasive. How is my interpretive
>>hypothesis any worse than Andy's?
Moggin:
> Tu quoque is beside the point, since you never established that
>de Man's work was "concocted ad hoc, to excuse his sordid past."
>That's a bit of ad hoc speculation; physician, heal thyself, y'know?
You are missing out on the burden of proof. I am arguing against
ruling out the likelihood that de Man's interpretive inevitability and
impossibility doctrines were concocted to excuse his collaborationist
screeds. As regards the likelihood, the evidence presented to date
will suffice: Le Soir articles are manifest, and so are the attempts
of deconstructionist acolytes to question their odious meaning or
otherwise exculpate their author from the moral responsibility for
promulgating Judeophobic propaganda in collusion with the Nazis.
Theoretically speaking, in addition to already mentioned Sainte-Beuve,
there are the principles of Taine most apposite to the present case:
"race, milieu, moment." In the beginning of his career Paul de Man
defined himself racially as a Flemish nationalist in opposition to the
Judaic "infection"; he integrated himself into the collaborationist
milieu; he paid his tribute to the Nazi ideology of the moment. His
ensuing literary corpus is a reflection on these choices. If you wish
to impugn the legitimacy of this reading with a rational argument, by
all means do so.
Zeleny:
>>>>Numerous Nazi officials covertly protected Jews from deportation and
>>>>extermination, which is decidedly more than Paul de Man is known to
>>>>have done. Are you really suggesting that this common practice of
>>>>making special dispensations for personal relations or acquaintances
>>>>in any way exculpates or even mitigates the war crimes of genocide
>>>>perpetrators and their accomplices?
Moggin:
>>> I'm suggesting precisely what I said just above, after "It seems
>>>fair to conclude..." -- that interpreting de Man's behavior during
>>>the war is no simple thing. Anyone intent on bringing down a ringing
>>>judgement will have to contend with certain complexities. For
>>>example, that de Man sheltered Jews in his own apartment, and that he
>>>was the confidant of an active member of the resistance. I'm also
>>>saying that anybody reading his work of the 70's in light of his life
>>>during the early 40's would want to rembember those details, along
>>>with the articles that he wrote for _Le Soir_.
Zeleny:
>>Done and accounted for. The ensuing picture is one of a war criminal
>>that escaped justice by lying about his wartime activities.
Moggin:
> You've just left out any details that don't fit into the picture
>you want to draw. The result is a portrait that's incomplete, at best.
By the standard of fitness you are promoting, Hitler's "sheltering" of
his Jewish physician does not "fit into the picture" of him as a
maniacal genocidal Judeophobe. In my trade, this is called a reductio
ad absurdum.
Nobody but a dedicated Nazi apologist gives a rat's arse for your
putatively nuanced presentation of a Nazi collaborator with a soft
spot for his Jewish friends. Deal with it.
Zeleny:
>>Deal with it.
Moggin:
> I am -- and not from the bottom of the deck.
Your sterling opinion of yourself is duly noted, and so is your
propensity for spurious imputation of metaphors.
>[...]
Frieda Fieldmouse:
>>>>>>Not to put too fine a point on it, but if I were living in Belgium at
>>>>>>that time, my body would *already* be on the line, since I happen to
>>>>>>be Jewish. Where would you be, Frau Weineck?
Moggin:
>>>>> Oh, I love it! An argument-from-I'm-Jewish. I can't wait
>>>>>'til Mikhail offers his customary argument-from-I-have-dead-
>>>>>relatives.
Zeleny:
>>>>Your reference to arguments is obscure. Neither Frieda's remark nor
>>>>any personal information I have adduced at any time in this forum
>>>>functions as a premiss in any argument.
Moggin:
>>> Frieda seemed to believe she was making a point against Silke --
>>>I'm willing to agree she didn't manage it (whatever her thoughts may
>>>have been).
Zeleny:
>>Your expectations of proper responses to Weineck's personal attacks
>>are curiously inflated. Why would Silke's gratuitous imputation of
>>Erkenntnissinteresse and banal squeak merit any sort of point beyond
>>a verbal equivalent of a bitch-slap that she so richly deserves?
Moggin:
> I have no expectations of Frieda -- I said that I was willing to
>agree she failed to make a point. And so I am.
The notion of Frieda standing in need of your validation must warm the
cockles of your heart, for surely your manifest self-humiliation in
broadcasting this conceit could not be compensated for by any other
means.
Zeleny:
>>>>In my own case, as above, a
>>>>personal perspective was gratuitously solicited by Silke Weineck and
>>>>supplied by her interlocutor, with no intended or discernible bearing
>>>>on the conclusion of the debate. While I cannot presume to speak for
>>>>anybody else, the relevance of my provenance is to point out whose ox
>>>>is being gored. ...
Moggin:
>>> You don't require any invitation to cite your dead relatives --
>>>you bring them up on a regular basis, with no solicitation, in
>>>conversations on a wide variety of topics. To say you've earned your
>>>own version of Godwin's Law would be exaggerating, of course, but
>>>statements about your dead kin are a very familiar part of your posts.
>>>(I was about to say that they're predictable, but it's not easy to
>>>guess when the next one might pop up.)
Zeleny:
>>Note that your asseveration is belied by your behavior in the present
>>instance. What exactly is the point of accusing me of bringing up the
>>matter of my dead relatives by bringing it up yourself?
Moggin:
> As somebody once said, "Tu quoque is neither original nor
>persuasive."
So the point is to excoriate ad hominem arguments by selfsame means?
How original.
Moggin:
>>>>> By-the-by, I'd think that de Man's body was "on the
>>>>> line," and not just hypothetically, when he used his apartment
>>>>> to shelter Jews.
Zeleny:
>>>>Your thoughts in this matter notwithstanding, the historical reality
>>>>is that sheltering Jews was not prosecuted as a crime in occupied
>>>>Belgium prior to their deportation, when the events in question must
>>>>have occurred, as witness the reference to curfew.
Moggin:
>>> That's not clear. The deportation of Jews from Belgium began in
>>>the summer of 1942 (late July, to be specific). By the end of the
>>>year, 15,000 Jews had been sent to Auschwitz -- as in France, Belgian
>>>citizens were allowed exemptions, at first, while the focus was on
>>>non-Belgian Jews. (See Arendt, or since you've got a thing about her,
>>>try Judah Pilch, _The Jewish Catastrophe in Europe_.) Sluszny says
>>>that she and her husband stayed in de Man's apartment sometime in '42
>>>or '43.
Zeleny:
>>Attend to your own evidence. The incident, as you reported it,
>>specifically names the missed curfew as the cause of the couple's
>>temporary homelessness.
Moggin:
> Yep -- it also dates the episode to the period of deportations.
>But the dates aren't precise, memory can err, etc., etc. So as
>things stand, we don't have perfect clarity; we can say that de Man
>sheltered a Jewish couple (Esther and Nahum Sluszny) in his
>apartment when they were caught out after curfew. Beyond that, the
>details become harder to pin down.
Right. And how is being able to say that supposed to attenuate his
portrait as a war criminal? Is his favor to Esther and Nahum Sluszny
supposed to have made things easier for the six million Jews not so
fortunate to have had their very own pet Nazi collaborator?
Frieda Fieldmouse:
>>>>>>What I find most amazing about all of this is that, rather than
>>>>>>admitting that Paul De Man was probably a fairly despicable
>>>>>>character who wrote some unforgiveable things, you all are
>>>>>>determined to make sure that he is seen to have accumulated
>>>>>>*every virtue*, merely because you happen to like his writings.
Moggin:
>>>>> Nobody here has so much as hinted that de Man "accumulated
>>>>>*every virtue*." You're just making shit up. By now it's
>>>>>become plain that's your standard procedure. (I don't think my
>>>>>point was unclear: "His past makes an easier target than his
>>>>>work -- but on examination, they both have their complexities.")
Zeleny:
>>>>If that was your point, what bearing does it have on the legitimacy of
>>>>Sayan's interpretation of de Man's rhetoric? Whatever the complexity
>>>>of his past or his work, surely it cannot preempt a reading of the
>>>>former into the latter. ...
Moggin:
>>> Yet if you're trying to read his work on the basis of his life,
>>>then it's necessary to take into account the complexities of them
>>>both -- and that's precisely what Sayan's interpretation fails to do.
Zeleny:
>>So you say. But the fact of the matter remains that de Man was a Nazi
>>collaborationist shill who went to a great deal of trouble to conceal
>>his war crimes. And that is all that Sayan's reading requires. The
>>circumstances you bring up in no way vitiate it. As Himmler noted,
>>every good Nazi has his own favorite Jew.
Moggin:
> Sayan's reading (or rather, as he reminds us, the reading Sayan
>forwarded -- not necessarily _his_) requires ignoring the other
>elements in de Man's personal history: the ones that add complexity
>to the picture, and make it into more than a caricature.
No more so than the received reading of Hitler requires ignoring his
famous concern for the humane treatment of lobsters. This sort of
added complexity I am content to neglect.
>[...]
Moggin:
>>>>> No, I was trying to say something else. Sayan is offering an ad
>>>>>hominem argument -- that should be obvious. What's more, the
>>>>>argument doesn't add up. Sayan reasons that de Man was unconsciously
>>>>>trying to make an episode of his past "less damning" by
>>>>>downplaying the importance of empirical facts -- but facts don't hold
>>>>>the power of damnation. You can't get an ought-not from an is any
>>>>>more than you can get an ought. So if Sayan was right, then de Man's
>>>>>unconscious should have made "Just the facts, ma'am" his motto,
>>>>>while de Man's work focused on reading and interpretation: the items
>>>>>necessary to make his damnation even possible.
Zeleny:
>>>>Nonsense. The _Le Soir_ screeds comprise an actus reus that would
>>>>have been sufficient to guarantee cozy state-secured confinement for
>>>>their author after the liberation of Belgium.
Moggin:
>>> Not unless they were read and interpreted, honeybear. Otherwise
>>>you're left with the fact that de Man wrote some newspaper articles.
>>>(Somebody with a powerful animosity toward journalists might've found
>>>that grounds for conviction, I guess.)
Zeleny:
>>Kindly save your charming vocatives for your arsehole buddies.
>>Robert Brasillach was executed for the same sort of collaborationist
>>propaganda that de Man indulged in. The difference between them was
>>in degree, not in kind. The court judged actus reus, with mens rea
>>never questioned, and interpretation never made into an issue. Deal
>>with it.
Moggin:
> Interpretation may not have been an issue, but it was certainly
>a _practice_. Without it, the court wouldn't have had anything to
>consider beyond the fact that Brasillach was a writer. But instead,
>it made a reading of Brasillach's work that allowed it to convict
>him. Result -- one dead Brasillach. (Incidentally, de Man reviewed
>B.'s _Notre Avant-Guerre_ in _Le Soir_. He panned it.)
Thus what you deem interpretation the world undertakes as a practice.
Consequently it cannot be identical to the interminably deferred
interpretive chimaera that de Man conjures in his deconstructionist
doctrines. Case closed.
Zeleny:
>>>>No postwar court ever
>>>>concerned itself with the mens rea of a collaborationist hack, much
>>>>less the interpretation of his clarion call for ethnic purification
>>>>of Europe.
Moggin:
>>> Ever hear of Nuremberg? (A postwar court which concerned itself
>>>with that kinda thing.) Anyway, the accusations against de Man
>>>are based on his articles in _Le Soir_ -- unless you put them forward
>>>for interpretation, there isn't a case.
Zeleny:
>>First of all, Nuremberg was not the venue for judging collaborationist
>>hacks.
Moggin:
> Of course not -- but it concerned itself with "clarion calls" for
>the "ethnic purification of Europe" on the part of some well known
>Nazis; so statements of that sort were a concern of the postwar courts.
Nuremberg was excused from this concern by Goebbels' suicide. At any
rate, concern with statements does not equal concern with their
"problematized" interpretation. There is nothing problematic about
understanding de Man or Brasillach.
Zeleny:
>>Secondly, interpretation is still not on the judicial menu in
>>the relevant cases such as the one I cited above. There are legal
>>distinctions that could be plausibly grounded in interpretive issues.
>>A classic example is the distinction between murder and involuntary
>>manslaughter, which entirely rests upon mens rea, in the presence or
>>absence of malice aforethought that is the mental element for murder.
>>Given that mens rea must be imputed on the basis of verbal and factual
>>evidence, you could make a claim that the extent of judicial damnation
>>is subject to the vagaries of interpretation. But the brute fact of
>>judging a defendant innocent or guilty almost never is so dependent,
>>certainly not when he is charged with collaboration with Nazis.
Moggin:
> One more time. While you might describe any given judgement as a
>"brute fact," no brute fact will lead directly to a conviction. To
>convict a person requires interpreting the facts of their behavior, no
>matter how brutal it may have been. So interpretation is _always_ a
>part of the judicial process (whether or not it's printed on the menu).
Your repeated asseveration of this doctrine against all evidence to
the contrary is duly noted. You must have gotten a great kick out of
stomping your foot in early life.
Zeleny:
>>>>For that matter, I heartily recommend deploying your
>>>>doctrine that "facts don't hold the power of damnation" next time
>>>>you have to defend yourself against a traffic ticket.
Moggin:
>>> You make my point. Let's say you're driving on some, given road
>>>at such-and-such a speed. For the sake of argument, I'll call that
>>>the "fact." To make that into a conviction for speeding will require
>>>an entire apparatus of regulation and interpretation. The fact, by
>>>itself, doesn't give you a ticket or earn you a fine -- it sits there.
>>>But if you supply a whole set of "speed limits," highway signs,
>>>traffic laws, and so on, then driving at a certain speed on a certain
>>>highway turns into "speeding" and inspires a fat-assed, jack-booted
>>>state trooper to put down his donut, haul you over to the side of the
>>>road, and give you a ticket.
>>>
>>> Go to court and you'll find a dull-brained judge dressed up like
>>>it was Halloween (these folks all like to wear costumes) ready to
>>>convict you of going too damn fast. But if you could restrict him to
>>>the _facts_, then you'd be home free -- there's no guilt in the
>>>_facts_ about your driving. (Like I said, you can't get an ought-not
>>>from an is any more than you can get an ought.) Making you guilty
>>>requires turning the _facts_ into a _crime_. And _that's_ impossible
>>>without an act of interpretation. The _fact_ that you were driving
>>>at a given speed at a specific place is no crime until you read it in
>>>a particular way -- it has to be interpreted as "breaking the law"
>>>before it turns into something you can be convicted of.
Zeleny:
>>Legal regulation is a given fact. Granted that interpretation of the
>>regulation as it is expressed in the letter of the law is part of the
>>court's duties. But you are not talking about that. Your point could
>>stand only if the prosecution were required to perform hermeneutic
>>rites over the elements of the offense. And that is not a requirement
>>that obtains in real life. Deal with it.
Moggin:
> The legal system _does_ perform what you might call "hermeneutic
>rites." That's what I was just describing. "Rites" might not be a
>good term, since they're usually absorbed into business-as-usual; but
>"hermeneutic" will fit.
If you say so. So take a concrete case of relevant judicial action,
that of Brasillach, and show the questionable hermeneutic elements of
his conviction. This is not an argument that can be settled merely by
identifying the established practice of passing legal judgment with
the allegedly problematic art of textual analysis. Your point, if you
have one, depends on there always existing a factual nuance that makes
all such judgment impossible, or at least indefinitely defers it. If
so, kindly support it with argument; if not, kindly spell out what you
have in mind.
Zeleny:
>>If you could restrict the judge to the facts whilst maintaining their
>>Humean distinction from the norms, you would merely make him into a
>>legal positivist. Curiously enough, not even the numerous legal
>>positivists flattening their spotted arses on traffic court perches
>>across this country feel compelled to engage in haruspicy before
>>handing down your sentence. The brute facts suffice.
Moggin:
> Of course they don't: that's what I just finished explaining to
>you. The mere fact that you were driving at such a speed on such a
>highway doesn't suffice to establish your "guilt" or "innocence." To
>make it into a _crime_ requires wheeling an entire system of
>interpretation into play. Which is just what happens, beginning with
>the moment when some cop decides that you can help him meet his
>monthly quota of tickets. It's what turns the _fact_ about the speed
>of your car into a _judgement_ that you were "speeding."
Your sleight of hand is in presupposing that the "wheeling" of an
entire system of interpretation into play is arbitrary. But the
letter of the law is always prior to the actus reus, and therefore
necessary relative to it. And so, in most cases, is the interpretive
precedent. Now, if you want to classify the practice of fitting the
actus reus to legal precedent as hermeneutics, you have to show some
relevant similarities between what takes place in the courtroom and
what transpires in a library. But even if I were to grant you this
much for the sake of the argument, this reclassification will get you
nowhere in refuting my point that the war crimes of Paul de Man differ
from the precedent set by Robert Brasillach only in degree, rather
than in kind. Which is what the de Man affair is all about.
Frieda Fieldmouse
[A bunch of blather that does not address the argument]
Moggin,
How very typical of you. Everything but the issue at hand.
This is the only reply you'll get.
Asshole.
Frieda
Ted Samsel
In rec.arts.books Frieda Fieldmouse <WH...@squeak.squeak.ie> wrote:
: In article <moggin-ya02408000...@news.mindspring.com>,
: mog...@mindspring.com (Puss in Boots) wrote:
: [A bunch of blather that does not address the argument]
: Moggin,
: How very typical of you. Everything but the issue at hand.
: This is the only reply you'll get.
: Asshole.
You go girl!!
--
Ted Samsel....tejas@infi.net (or tbsa...@richmond.infi.net)
"do the boogie woogie in the South American way"
Rhumba Boogie- Hank Snow (1955)
Ron Hardin
Frieda Fieldmouse wrote:
> Moggin,
>
> How very typical of you. Everything but the issue at hand.
>
> This is the only reply you'll get.
>
> Asshole.
>
Hey, that's what women say to me too.
paschal
On Thu, 30 Oct 1997, Ron Hardin wrote:
> Frieda Fieldmouse wrote:
> > Moggin,
> >
> > How very typical of you. Everything but the issue at hand.
> >
> > This is the only reply you'll get.
> >
> > Asshole.
>
> Hey, that's what women say to me too.
Well, Boink, Boink, Boinkity-BOINK!.
(They only say it when they're really mad. Usually it's a more ladylike,
refined, delicate, "JACKASS!")
-P.
Don Tuite
Frieda Fieldmouse' argument against the necessity of interpretation
seems based on the notion that *necessity* demands an infinite
regression of interpretations, which is a reductio ad absurdum in the
sense of Russell's (apocryphal?), "Turtles, young man! It's
turtles--all the way down!"
So I pondered whether "necessity" could mean different things to
different posters. But apart from the obvious potty-smirk, I don't see
how.
Don
mj devaney
Frieda Fieldmouse wrote:
Silke or moggin (I don't know which) wrote:
Since your further elucidations rest on a misunderstanding (i.e. the
substitution of "there is no interpretation" for "there is no final
interpretation), all that follows rest on a false premise.
Frieda:
You pompous fool. The rest of my elucidations rest on no such
"misunderstanding." I even conceded that (and I quote): "The problem is
not so much that interpretation is endless (A leading to B leading to C,
ad infinitum) but rather that interpretation in such a conception can
never begin."
This leads me to entertain the possibility that you alone do just
interpret things however you please.
Frieda:
A better view is then that, in order for interpretation to be possible,
some texts (I would say *most texts*) have to be understandable without
interpretation.
s and m :):
For instance?
Frieda:
Most well-formed sentences in the language in most contexts.
Frieda: J. J. Katz's _Metaphysics of Meaning_ provides ammunition for
your case in the form of his New Intensionalism (the old being Fregean
semantics).
(By the way, I've tried e-mailing you without success.)
--MJ Devaney
Frieda Fieldmouse
> Anyway, none of this has got anything to do with my point, above.
> When you read a text and establish "what is says," "what it means,"
> and the relationship between the two, you've performed interpretation.
> You may be able to argue that your interpretation has qualities such
> as validity, necessity, self-evidence, truth, accuracy, adequacy, and
> moral virtue, but it won't be any less an interpretation. _That's_
> the argument you promised to show false; but as yet, you haven't even
> addressed it.
Moggin,
_That_ is not an argument at all. It is a set of declarations. I have,
elsewhere, once again provided an argument against this position. Maybe
you'd like to come up with an argument in its favour this time, rather
than simply asserting that it is the case.
> I don't see anything here which would lead to that conclusion --
> in the model you've described (which, again, has got damn-all to do
> with the point you're supposedly rebutting), there's nothing to stand
> in the way of interpretation, or to keep it from getting off the
> ground. More the opposite -- interpretation _keeps_ taking off, time
> after time.
No. If the my understanding of Text B is really Text C (the
interpretation of B) and my understanding of C is D, then Text B never
really gets produced. Nor do the others since my understanding of each of
them is always the next one.
> > A better view is then that, in order for interpretation to be possible,
> > some texts (I would say *most texts*) have to be understandable without
> > interpretation.
>
> If you've arrived at an understanding of a text, then ipso facto,
> you _have_ interpreted it.
Do you have an argument for that position or do you just like to repeat
it? I suggest you look again at the passage from Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Grammar that I cited.
Your understanding constitutes an
> interpretation. Get it? When you say, "Here's what I understand the
> text to mean," you're explaining how you interpret it. You seem to
> have the wrong end of the stick -- I'm not saying that interpretation
> is necessary _in addition_ to "understanding." My point is that
> understanding _already_ involves interpretation; without interpreting
> a text, you wouldn't _have_ an understanding of it.
You've now said this about 50 times. You have, unfortunately, provided no
evidence for it. I have provided evidence that this cannot be the case.
Your turn to put up or shut up.
> Interpretation
> isn't necessarily a "labor" (to borrow your term) piled on top of the
> understanding you already have -- it's what your understanding has
> already done.
This is neither a fair characterisation of what I said, nor is it intelligent.
> > A similar argument can be found in Wittgenstein's _Philosophical Grammar_
> > (p. 47). Suppose someone gives us the order to square a series of numbers
> > and gives this order in the form of a table:
>
> > x | 1 | 2 | 3 |
> > -----------------
> > x2 | | | | (my apologies if the table doesn't look like much)
>
> > Wittgenstein writes: "It seems to us as if by understanding the order we
> > add something to it, something that fills the gap between command and
> > execution. So that if someone said 'You understand it, don't you, so it
> > is not incomplete' we could reply 'Yes, I understand it, but only because
> > I add something to it, namely the interpretation.' --But what makes you
> > give just _this_ interpretation? Is it the order? In that case it was
> > already unambiguous, since it demanded this interpretation. Or did you
> > attach the interpretation arbitrarily? In that case what you understood
> > was not the command, but only what you made of it. . . .
The preceding is the part of W's argument that you ought to think about.
> > "But an interpretation is something that is given in signs. It is
> > _this_ interpretation as opposed to a different one (running
> > differently). So if one were to say 'Any sentence still stands in need of
> > an interpretation' that would mean: no sentence can be understood without
> > a rider.
> > "Of course sometimes I do _interpret_ signs, give signs an
> > interpretation; but that does not happen every time I understand a sign.
> > (If someone asks me 'What time is it?' there is no inner process of
> > laborious interpretation; I simply react to what I see and hear. If
> > someone whips out a knife at me, I do not say 'I interpret that as a
> > threat.'"
>
> Even Homer nods. If someone pulls out a knife, you certainly do
> interpret that.
I do not *interpret* it as a threat. I understand that it is a threat.
The difference is between being and meaning. Pulling out a knife at
someone else *is* a threatening gesture; it is not something I'm free to
interpret or not interpret as threatening.
>You probably don't give an interpretation out loud,
> but that's irrelevant. You make it all the same. If you're standing
> in the kitchen and somebody pulls a chef's knife out of a drawer,
> then you'll probably read it in terms of cooking.
That case *is not* a threat. But it's not the one Wittgenstein is discussing.
> You might even ask,
> "Anything I can do to help?" But now imagine that you're standing in
> a dark alley when someone pulls a switchblade out of their pocket --
> you'll probably interpret _that_ as a threat of violence.
Not probably and it's not an interpretation: it is a threat of violence.
If I understand that, I will flee. If I merely interpret that it's a
threat of violence, I might just as well interpret that it's not and hang
around for a while (this is what W meant when he wrote "what makes you
give just _this_ interpretation?"). Do so would be an error. Why?
Because it *is* a threat of violence and I have misunderstood if I think
it's anything else.
Can one misinterpret, on your view?
> I'm saying that if you understand it, you _have_ interpreted it,
> ipso facto. Take the example here. You might happen to know that
> the speaker is a Nazi, and not a Zionist. That would be information
> you could use to interpret the statement. Or you could base your
> interpretation on a close reading. ("Rounded up" doesn't sound very
> friendly to me.) Either way, interpreting the statement is what
> produces your understanding. If you _didn't_ interpret it, then you
> wouldn't _have_ an understanding -- the statement would be
> meaningless to you.
Really? So you do believe that language is defective and that all
sentences are in need of a rider (their interpretation), without which
they are meaningless. I suggest you meditate long and hard on the
Wittgenstein passage. Then try providing me with an argument (rather than
a set of declarations) for why you think that all understanding has to be
the result of interpretation, especially after I've shown you (elsewhere)
the incoherencies to which that view leads.
Frieda
Frieda Fieldmouse
> Frieda:
>
> >>:Now, since we are
> >>:not admitting the possibility of understanding without interpretation,
> >>:Text B (the interpretation) will entail a further labour of interpretation
> >>:in order to be understood. This leads to the production of a further
> >>:interpretation, C. We end up with the type of endless chain of
> >>:interpretations so dear to both hermeneuticists and deconstructors. So it
> >>:is that the claim that interpretation is necessary leads one to the view
> >>:that interpretation is ultimately impossible (since the chain is endless).
>
> Silke:
>
> >> Not that interpretation is impossible -- interpretation, in your
> >> scenario, has already happened.
>
> Frieda:
>
> > No, it hasn't. If you'd read the rest of my argument, you'd understand why.
>
> I just finished reading your entire argument, start to finish; it
> looks as though Silke is right. Your scenario clearly contains two
> (count 'em) interpretations -- the ones you labeled "B" and "C." It's
> also got a chain containing indefinitely more. Interpretation _has_
> occurred, and it won't stop. You do make a relevant assertion -- that
> those interpretations don't exist. Unfortunately, you don't support
> it, except with the statement that we don't understand them -- I don't
> see anywhere you support that, either; but even taking it as given,
> their non-existence wouldn't seem to follow.
Let's start again. We are taking as given your view that there is no
understanding without a prior labour of interpretation. That means: in
order to understand anything, we have to interpret it and interpretation
is therefore ubiquitous, a necessary condition for the use of language
itself. This, as Wittgenstein points out, amounts to the view that
language is defective, that no sentence is complete without a rider
(Zusatz). A couple of other clarifications are in order. One is that, if
interpretation is to mean anything, it has to involve some kind of effort
on the part of the interpreter. This means that interpretation is a
process and it consequently takes some time (though perhaps not much). As
Wittgenstein put it: "To interpret is to think, to do something"
(Investigations, p. 213). Second, an interpretation of, say, an utterance
cannot merely be the repetition of the utterance itself. It must differ
from the utterance that is being interpreted. Third, if an interpretation
must differ from that of which it is the interpretation, then it must be
expressible in signs. In order to be *this particular interpretation*
rather than some other interpretation that it is not, the interpretation
must be capable of being enunciated. If you and I are looking at some
smoke signals and I say "What's your interpretation?", assuming you have
one you have to be able to tell me what it is. Now, on your view, any
interpretation of the smoke signals that you offered me would itself be in
need of interpretation. Smoke signals (Text A) give rise to your
interpretation (Text B) which in turn gives rise to my interpretation of
your interpretation (Text C), which may or may not rest unspoken. But we
can't just leave it at Text C. Because we've excluded as a matter of
principle that a text can be understood without interpretation, Text C
will itself be in need of interpretation by a Text D and so on ad
infinitum. This view would seem to imply that interpretation is endless.
I will now address the problems with this view (which I have not hitherto
done, having conceded strategically that such a thing is possible) before
proceeding to show why, on this view, what really happens is not that
interpretation never ends but rather it never begins.
Let's suppose, as we have been, that any act of interpreting implies an
endless chain of interpretations. You say (A), which I interpret as (B)
which requires further interpretation into (C) and so on, ad infinitum.
Since this chain is *endless*, and since interpretation takes time, one
would expect that the interpretation of any given utterance would last
forever. Since this is manifestly not the case (it doesn't take me
*forever* to understand what people say to me), the chain of
interpretations must stop at some point. Now, what does it mean for the
chain of interpretations to *stop*? If, as a matter of principle, there
can be no understanding without interpretation, the chain can *never*
stop. Conversely, if you accept the idea that, at some point, the chain
stops (for practical reasons, whatever), then you accept the idea that at
least one interpretation (let's say Text X, the one you stop on) is not in
need of further interpretation to be understood. You have then accepted
the idea that contradicts your entire hermeneutic philosophy. For if you
can stop on Text X, why can you not stop on Text A?
However, as I said before in my prior argument, what the view that there
is no understanding without interpretation really implies is not that
interpretation goes on forever or that it arbitrarily stops somewhere.
Rather, I believe that this view implies that interpretation never
starts. Here's why:
Text A produces Text B (the interpretation of A). But Text B cannot be
understood without interpretation. This means that our understanding of B
is actually Text C (the interpretation of B). And because C cannot be
understood without interpretation, our understanding of C is really Text D
(the interpretation of C). This would seem to go on endlessly. However,
because our understanding of B turns out to be C and our understanding of
C turns out to be D, what was *taken* to be Text B was in fact Text C (and
what was taken to be C was D which was really only E) and, therefore, Text
B does not exist, either implicitly or explicitly. Nor do Texts C to
infinity. Interpretation here never gets off the ground because every
interpretation is *always already* (I never thought *I'd* be using those
words) the next one.
These are perhaps just two ways of thinking about the same idea, but in
either case, the view that all understanding requires interpretation is a
false one.
As for your (you and Silke's) constant harping on what constitutes an
understanding as opposed to an interpretation, I note with interest that
Silke writes:
> > > Since your further elucidations rest on a misunderstanding (i.e. the
> > > substitution of "there is no interpretation" for "there is no final
> > > interpretation), all that follows rest on a false premise.
Since she accuses me of misunderstanding, I assume she already has some
idea of what it would be for me to understand. Otherwise the charge makes
no sense. So, if you're still obsessed with it, I suggest you ask her.
You also wrote:
> Frieda:
>
> > Do I interpret that a stone is not a loaf of bread or do I understand
> > that it is not?
>
> You may well do both; I'm not certain, since you've neglected to
> describe what it is that you're doing which might be viewed as
> "understanding" or "interpretation" and to explain the distinction --
> but if I were to guess, I'd say that you're distinguishing and
> classifying, which both fall under "interpreting." (Arguably they're
> forms of understanding, too; opinions differ.)
You're making the distinction yourself here, so I assume you know what it is.
> Frieda:
>
> > I don't deny any of that, as long as "understanding the passage" does not
> > *necessarily* imply passing through a prior act of interpretation. I also
> > have to know what all the words in the sentence mean and the other ways in
> > which they can be used. I interpret none of this, by the way. The
> > question is: does this background knowledge make of any understanding a
> > mere interpretation? I maintain that it does not for the reasons
> > contained in the argument you conveniently dismissed.
>
> Your argument didn't contain any reasons to maintain that you're
> not interpreting the statement (which wasn't quite so perfectly
> clear).
At least I have an argument. All you apparently have is the declaration,
repeated over and over, that all understanding requires interpretation. I
haven't seen an argument for that position and it is not self-evident.
Given that I have shown some of the thorny conclusions to which it leads,
it is now up to you to defend it.
>Ditto for your comments here. When you bring your knowledge
> into play, you're using it to help you construct an interpretation.
Sometimes I might be. I never said interpretation doesn't exist.
Sometimes we have to interpret, no question about it. We just don't do it
every time we understand something. It cannot be the case that all
understanding requires interpretation. And when we interpret, the whole
point of the exercise is to produce something that is not itself in need
of interpretation.
Frieda
SSHazle
In article <WHAP-30109...@ts11-04.dublin.indigo.ie>, Frieda wrote:
>In article <19971030042...@ladder01.news.aol.com>,
>ssh...@aol.com (SSHazle) wrote:
>
>> Whap squeak squeak etc etc:
>>
>> >I asked a question about a stone, not about a loaf of bread. You avoided
>> >it. Once again: faced with a stone, do I interpret that it is not a loaf
>> >of bread or do I understand that it's not?
>>
>> OK, let's give this one a try, since you insist on taking on this point
>> incessantly. I'm sure you won't like my answer, but whose answer have you
>> liked thus far?
>>
>> Yes, you must interpret that. Faced with a stone, you may say empirically
>> *only* that you have a stone. Faced with a loaf of bread, you may say
>*only*
>> that you have a loaf of bread. To say, then, quite logically, that the
>stone
>> is quite different from a loaf of bread, you must perform an act of
>> interpretation on the relationship, or lack thereof, between the two.
>
>No, you *understand* the relationship. You don't interpret it. The
>difference is this: if I only interpret that a stone is not bread then I
>can just as well interpret that a stone *is* a loaf of bread. The fact
>that I consistently "interpret" that stones are not bread (that I offer
>*just this* interpretation) indicates that the distinction is not one of
>meaning, but one of being. This crucial distinction (meaning vs. being)
>is the one that is lost if all I do is interpret that a stone is not a
>loaf of bread.
>
Bullshit. Understanding is a form of interpretation. If I may quote Silke,
"To interpret is to think, to do something." So, yes, you have.
smw
Certainly, you could just as easily interpret that the stone is a loaf of
bread. You'd be wrong, and you'd figure that out eventually, but you *could*.
I could interpret de Man's articles as a huge joke between himself and his
uncle. I'd be dead wrong, but I *could*, certainly.
>they say, they are
>> simply words. In order to assign a meaning to them
>
>I don't, like Humpty Dumpty, "assign a meaning to them." (HD: "My words
>can mean whatever I want them to mean.") They have a meaning already.
>That is a necessary condition for them being used as words.
>
Wrong, since you used Humpty Dumpty, I'll use "The Jabberwocky". "Twas
brillig, and the slithy toves..." What is the "necessary meaning" of those
words? In another post, you yourself "establish" meaning in a text. If the
meaning is a necessary condition of their being words (not according to
Saussure, btw), then you can't "establish" meaning, either; it would already
be there. So we'll play your dumbass word game-- use "establish" in place of
"assign" if you please. The point remains.
PS--should I interpret you as haughty and anal, or is that a necessary
condition of your words? Just an innocent flame...
tejas
Does this mean that a detective (like Joe Friday/Jack Webb on DRAGNET)
would be unable to say:
"We want the facts, Ma'am."
if he practiced deconstruction?
ObBookWithTurtleEating: SUTTREE by Cormac McCarthy
--
TBSa...@richmond.infi.net (also te...@infi.net)
'Do the boogie woogie in the South American way'
Hank Snow THE RHUMBA BOOGIE
FIDO
In English english turtles often mean turtledoves: The
Voice of the Turtle is heard ...
FIDO
Andy Lowry
What's most appalling in all this talk about de Man is that his critics
might as well be attacking a phantom they encountered in Christopher
Norris or "The New Criterion." If nobody can be bothered to drag out an
article by de Man, read it, & say what's wrong with it, then what is the
point of all this gossip? (I think it was M. J. Devaney who at least
cited an actual interpretation of de Man's, some time back.)
(Mikhail in fact could probably get a job _writing_ for the New Crit,
based on his diction & views.)
The burden of proof, sensibly enough, lies on those who say "it's
nonsense." Let's see some nonsense, please -- nonsense by de Man, that
is. Otherwise, we might as well rename this thread
"alt.postmodern.gossip."
-- Andy Lowry
-Mammel,L.H.
In article <34590C...@richmond.infi.net>,
tejas <tbsa...@richmond.infi.net> wrote:
>
>Does this mean that a detective (like Joe Friday/Jack Webb on DRAGNET)
>would be unable to say:
>
>"We want the facts, Ma'am."
>
>if he practiced deconstruction?
>
I believe his catch phrase was, "Just the facts, Ma'am".
Probably what nobody ever knew was that ( lunar fashion )
there was an a, or [ moon base ] alpha under erasure,
and his exhortation was properly to be understood as
"Adjust the facts, Ma'am", placing him well within the
decentered and decentering Derridean orbit.
Lew Mammel, Jr.
Andy Lowry
On Thu, 30 Oct 1997, Mikhail Zeleny wrote:
> I dismiss Paul de Man's corpus no more and no less than I dismiss
> _Mein Kampf_, valuing both as historically significant specimens of
> misological polemic that deserve a prominent place in any scholarly
> library in the humanities, under the rubric of the repudiation of
> reason and the pathologies of rhetoric.
If I recall my reception history correctly, people were putting Kant in
the same part of the library after the 1st Critique. Can't speak for
Hitler, but de Man is interested in testing the limits of "interpretive
reason" (my term, not his) & especially its often covert reliance on
aesthetic categories held questionable by reason itself. Mikhail only
makes himself appear stupid when he fails to distinguish between such a
project and "the repudiation of reason." Reason's discovering its own
limits scarcely equals its self-repudiation -- or does he take Plato to
have initiated the "repudiation of reason"?
> >>>Excellent summary of the problem, Andy.
[Thanks, Melissa; sorry I missed your original post.]
> To use your own words, you were "totally mesmerized by de Man [...]
> immediately, and traumatically closely before the disclosure" of his
> repugnant wartime behavior. To paraphrase ever so slightly, you have
> been duped by your idol and exposed as a mark by his fall.
Does Mikhail really talk like this in person? Does he have any friends?
Is he, god forbid, an academic empowered by tenure to treat students this
way?
Discovering that de Man collaborated does _not_ demonstrate that anyone
was "duped" by his later writings. Such a demonstration seems to escape
the powers of those posting their adjectives here.
> cordially,
> mikhail zel...@math.ucla.edu a.k.a m...@ptyx.com
> writing from the disneyland of formal philosophy
> "Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
Lovely sentiment, that.
-- Andy Lowry
Keith Turner
> -Mammel,L.H. <l...@ihgp167e.ih.lucent.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>"We want the facts, Ma'am."
> >>
> >
> >I believe his catch phrase was, "Just the facts, Ma'am".
When I saw the Turtles a few years ago, Mark Volman's catch phase was
"I'm Jim Morrison and I'm going to drop my pants."
Keith
Paul D. Lanier
On 31 Oct 1997, -Mammel,L.H. wrote:
>
> In article <34590C...@richmond.infi.net>,
> tejas <tbsa...@richmond.infi.net> wrote:
> >
> >Does this mean that a detective (like Joe Friday/Jack Webb on DRAGNET)
> >would be unable to say:
> >
> >"We want the facts, Ma'am."
> >
> >if he practiced deconstruction?
> >
>
> I believe his catch phrase was, "Just the facts, Ma'am".
> Probably what nobody ever knew was that ( lunar fashion )
> there was an a, or [ moon base ] alpha under erasure,
> and his exhortation was properly to be understood as
> "Adjust the facts, Ma'am", placing him well within the
> decentered and decentering Derridean orbit.
>
> Lew Mammel, Jr.
>
Huh? I understood Dragnet to be somewhat satirical in a silly fashion
sometimes, but decentered to mean "Adjust the facts, Ma'am" really that's
a stretch. Please explain or corroborate.
Doremus Jessup
-Mammel,L.H.
In article <moggin-ya02408000...@news.mindspring.com>,>Moggin [re "The Jews in Contemporary Literature"]:
>
>> > It's also where
>> >de Man names Kafka, Gide, Hemingway, and Lawrence as the
>> >representative figures of modern literature: a Jew, a homosexual,
>> >an anti-fascist, and a pornographer, as somebody has noted.
>
>Lew:
>
>> But he is citing them as moderns in the sense of "bad" isn't he?
>
> No -- that's just it. de Man is writing in _defense_ of modern
>literature, and _against_ its attackers. And look who he lists,
>when he names some of its main figures. That's why I say that there
>are some complexities here. The essay as a whole contains
>out-and-out anti-Semitism -- there's no debating about that. But it
>also has some small puzzles.
It looks a lot more like submission than defense to me.
He labels these moderns as "mere continuators" of the system
laid down by the great Stendahl. Then he says "Likewise,
the Jews cannot pretend to be its creators." So yes he's
putting the Jews and the moderns together, but he is exalting
neither.
This essay looks very personal to me. It looks like de Man
reconciling himself and accommodating his thinking to life
under the Nazi's. The mood of it reminds of the line in
The_Giaconda_Smile ( paraphrasing ) "he felt himself
descending into a lower circle of hell, from one filled
with clouds and storms to one filled with slime and mud."
I don't see even one little speck of rebellion or subversion
in it. Obviously, the antisemitism is doctrinal and not
heartfelt at all, which is what makes it so sad.
Lew Mammel, Jr.
Puss in Boots
WH...@squeak.squeak.ie (Frieda Fieldmouse):
>mog...@mindspring.com (Puss in Boots) wrote:
>[A bunch of blather that does not address the argument]
>Moggin,
>How very typical of you. Everything but the issue at hand.
>This is the only reply you'll get.
>Asshole.
Let's see now: that would have been where I addressed "the issue
at hand." I agree you haven't replied; it's probably just as well,
given your contributions to this point. Besides, there really wasn't
much left for you to say. The only trouble is, you've continued
typing, and at quite some length. Agreed the results aren't what one
would call a _reply_ -- still.
Frieda:
>>>>>If you would do us all the favour of citing the text from the Jews in
>>>>>modern literature, then maybe I could go about "interpreting" it for you.
>>>>>The fact of the matter--cold, hard, brutal--is that that declaration is
>>>>>not in need of any interpretation whatever: it means exactly what it
>>>>>says.
Moggin:
>>>> Perhaps it does -- but when you establish "what it says," you're
>>>> interpreting it. And when you establish what it means, and decide
>>>> that its meaning coincides with "what it says," the same goes -- acts
>>>> of interpretation, every step of the way.
>>>> Now, you may be able to argue that your interpretation possesses
>>>> certain qualities, e.g., validity, necessity, self-evidence, truth,
>>>> accuracy, adequacy, or moral virtue. But even if it has every single
>>>> item on the list, it's no less an interpretation.
Frieda:
Moggin:
>> Well, no -- that's not the claim. To say that interpretation is
>> impossible because the chain doesn't end would be like saying that
>> if chains never have a final link, there can't be any chains. False,
>> of course -- what would follow, in that case, would be that chains
>> would never reach a link you could call "final" -- not that they were
>> impossible. And what would follow, in the case of interpretation,
>> would be that it's necessarily an open-ended process -- not that it's
>> impossible to perform.
>> Put it this way. According to you, the argument goes as follows:
>> "My car doesn't have any brakes -- therefore it won't start." Now,
>> I'm not going to claim _nobody_ has ever said that. It's a big world,
>> filled with alot of stupid people. But if you're going to insist
>> that's what Derrida and de Man are arguing, then I'd sure like to see
>> you demonstrate it.
>> Anyway, none of this has got anything to do with my point, above.
>> When you read a text and establish "what is says," "what it means,"
>> and the relationship between the two, you've performed interpretation.
>> You may be able to argue that your interpretation has qualities such
>> as validity, necessity, self-evidence, truth, accuracy, adequacy, and
>> moral virtue, but it won't be any less an interpretation. _That's_
>> the argument you promised to show false; but as yet, you haven't even
>> addressed it.
Frieda:
> _That_ is not an argument at all. It is a set of declarations. I have,
> elsewhere, once again provided an argument against this position. Maybe
> you'd like to come up with an argument in its favour this time, rather
> than simply asserting that it is the case.
Actually, your statement that "_That_ is not an argument at all.
It is a set of declarations" is the plainest example of a
non-argument here. You've made a flat assertion and offered nothing
of any kind to go along. But call my comments what you will; no
matter what label you put on them, you claimed they were false (more
specifically, you called them a "succinct expression" of a "false
view"), and promised to demonstrate that ("now I will show you why").
That's what you've failed to do. You _did_ provide an argument
against _some_ position, but your reasoning had serious flaws, which
I pointed out above. As you say, you haven't replied.
Frieda:
>>>What's wrong with this picture? What is wrong with it is that the
>>>*conditions* for interpretation to be possible at all preclude
>>>interpretation being necessary in order for there to be understanding of
>>>any meaning whatever. The problem is not so much that interpretation is
>>>endless (A leading to B leading to C, ad infinitum) but rather that
>>>interpretation in such a conception can never begin. If interpretation B
>>>requires the production of C in order to be understood (i.e., if the
>>>interpretation itself requires an interpretation, ad infinitum), then
>>>intepretation is not in fact endless because it never gets off the ground
>>>in the first place. If we cannot understand an interpretation (Text B)
>>>without interpreting it (Text C), then Text B is never actually produced.
>>>Our understanding of Text B turns out to have been in fact Text C and Text
>>>B does not exist. Interpretation, on this model, never gets off the
>>>ground.
Moggin:
>> I don't see anything here which would lead to that conclusion --
>> in the model you've described (which, again, has got damn-all to do
>> with the point you're supposedly rebutting), there's nothing to stand
>> in the way of interpretation, or to keep it from getting off the
>> ground. More the opposite -- interpretation _keeps_ taking off, time
>> after time.
Frieda:
> No. If the my understanding of Text B is really Text C (the
> interpretation of B) and my understanding of C is D, then Text B never
> really gets produced. Nor do the others since my understanding of each of
> them is always the next one.
Another non-reply -- you're merely repeating yourself. There's
nothing in your assertion here to support your conclusion that
"Text B never really gets produced," or that "Text B does not exist."
If your understanding of Text B is really Text C (meaning its
interpretation), and so on, then you could say that you don't really
_understand_ Text B. I don't know just how to understand _that_,
since it depends on how you're using "really," which isn't clear. I
would certainly agree that on the reasoning you've described, it
follows that you don't reach a final understanding; that's just what
I was getting at when I said that interpretation keeps taking off
again. But you that claim that it "never gets off the ground" -- in
your view (i.e., your view of the view that you're criticizing),
"Text B [the interpretation of Text A] does not exist." Nonetheless,
you've described a situation containing, in your own words, an
"endless chain" of interpretations, and nothing that you've said has
has conjured them out of existence.
Frieda:
>>>A better view is then that, in order for interpretation to be possible,
>>>some texts (I would say *most texts*) have to be understandable without
>>>interpretation.
Moggin:
>> If you've arrived at an understanding of a text, then ipso facto,
>> you _have_ interpreted it. Your understanding constitutes an
>> interpretation. Get it? When you say, "Here's what I understand the
>> text to mean," you're explaining how you interpret it. You seem to
>> have the wrong end of the stick -- I'm not saying that interpretation
>> is necessary _in addition_ to "understanding." My point is that
>> understanding _already_ involves interpretation; without interpreting
>> a text, you wouldn't _have_ an understanding of it. Interpretation
>> isn't necessarily a "labor" (to borrow your term) piled on top of the
>> understanding you already have -- it's what your understanding has
>> already done.
Frieda:
> You've now said this about 50 times. You have, unfortunately, provided no
> evidence for it. I have provided evidence that this cannot be the case.
> Your turn to put up or shut up.
You've provided no such evidence. You _did_ offer an argument,
but it was faulty (as I showed), and failed to address my point --
so your promise to show me wrong has gone unfulfilled. I can't say
I'm surprised.
Moggin:
>> Interpretation
>> isn't necessarily a "labor" (to borrow your term) piled on top of the
>> understanding you already have -- it's what your understanding has
>> already done.
Frieda:
> This is neither a fair characterisation of what I said, nor is it
> intelligent.
The non-reply continues.
Wittgenstein:
[...]
>>> "It seems to us as if by understanding the order we
>>> add something to it, something that fills the gap between command and
>>> execution. So that if someone said 'You understand it, don't you, so it
>>> is not incomplete' we could reply 'Yes, I understand it, but only because
>>> I add something to it, namely the interpretation.' --But what makes you
>>> give just _this_ interpretation? Is it the order? In that case it was
>>> already unambiguous, since it demanded this interpretation. Or did you
>>> attach the interpretation arbitrarily? In that case what you understood
>>> was not the command, but only what you made of it. . . .
Frieda:
> The preceding is the part of W's argument that you ought to think about.
Done. But maybe you're soliciting an observation. Here's one:
W. argues that commands can carry commands (a "rider," one might
even say, although W. would rather not). A command that's "already
unambiguous" will _demand_ a certain interpretation. Actually W.
comes at it from the other direction and says that when "just _this_
interpretation" is demanded by an order, then the order must have
already been unambiguous. Reasonable enough. Notice, though, what
it argues for: not the absence of interpretation (regardless of
what W.'s hopes might have been), but the possibility of delivering
a command that would command its own reading (by virtue of being
unambiguous, although it could have other leadership qualities too).
Wittgenstein:
>>> "But an interpretation is something that is given in signs. It is
>>> _this_ interpretation as opposed to a different one (running
>>> differently). So if one were to say 'Any sentence still stands in need of
>>> an interpretation' that would mean: no sentence can be understood without
>>> a rider.
> > "Of course sometimes I do _interpret_ signs, give signs an
>>> interpretation; but that does not happen every time I understand a sign.
>>> (If someone asks me 'What time is it?' there is no inner process of
>>> laborious interpretation; I simply react to what I see and hear. If
>>> someone whips out a knife at me, I do not say 'I interpret that as a
>>> threat.'"
Moggin:
> > Even Homer nods. If someone pulls out a knife, you certainly do
> > interpret that. You probably don't give an interpretation out loud,
> > but that's irrelevant. You make it all the same.
Frieda:
> I do not *interpret* it as a threat. I understand that it is a threat.
> The difference is between being and meaning. Pulling out a knife at
> someone else *is* a threatening gesture; it is not something I'm free to
> interpret or not interpret as threatening.
Sure it is -- even though you and Wittgenstein have loaded the
dice. Wittgenstein borrows a phrase from the detective fiction
that gave him so much pleasure and describes someone _whipping out_
a knife. The expression already implies an aggressive gesture.
Therefore we take Wittgenstein as talking of a threat. And who are
"we"? We are the ones who know how to interpret the code which
includes expressions like "someone whips out a knife." Notice that
the process isn't at all laborious. Not for us, anyhow -- for
somone unfamiliar with the idiom, the statement might be completely
obscure.
But let's get back to Wittgenstein -- he's performed a sleight-
of-hand by placing the interpretation he claims not to make into
his description of the incident. In more neutral language, I could
say "Someone takes out a knife." Is that a threatening gesture?
Not necessarily -- it requires considerable interpretation. What's
she taking it out of? Her pocket? A display case? A kitchen
drawer? What kind of knife _is_ it? Is it a switchblade? A Swiss
Army knife? Or maybe a kitchen knife? What's her posture like?
Is she in a crouch? Standing at the counter? Sitting cross-legged
on the floor? What type of movement is she making? Is she
jabbing the knife at me, or letting it dangle loosely from her hand
while she tries to remember where she put the carrots? Oh, and
what's it made out of? Metal? Rubber? Stone?
Without answering those kinds of questions, it's impossible to
understand the gesture. Even _with_ the answers, you might still
still go wrong -- without them, you're completely in the dark. Any
chance of understanding comes from interpreting the evidence that
you have available. Wittgenstein doesn't "simply react" to what he
sees (despite his claim to the contrary). Instead, he uses his
ability to interpret human gestures and determines that someone has
removed a knife in a threatening manner -- i.e., this person has
_whipped it out_. What's more, the threat is directed specifically
at Our Hero: we know this because W. writes that the knife is
whipped out "at me." (Presumably the knife-wielder is busy jabbing
his weapon in Wittgenstein's direction; he's probably scowling,
too.)
So interpretation is already present in W.'s description of
the incident. He's probably right when he claims, "I do not say 'I
interpret that as a threat.'" He _could_ say that -- it's not
impossible to imagine -- it's just not necessary that he does. But
it doesn't follow that he hasn't supplied an interpretation. He
has -- he's interpreted the gesture as a threat. He may not say it
out loud -- nonetheless, he's _written_ it here: "someone whips
out a knife at me." His interpretation of somebody's behavior, and
probably the basis of his 'simple' reaction.
Moggin:
> > If you're standing
> > in the kitchen and somebody pulls a chef's knife out of a drawer,
> > then you'll probably read it in terms of cooking. You might even ask,
> > "Anything I can do to help?"
Frieda:
> That case *is not* a threat.
Oh, but it very easily might be! There's nothing about chef's
knives that keeps them from ever being used threateningly. And I
doubt that kitchens have some, special property which prevents them
from being the scene of a crime. But if you're in a kitchen and
somebody pulls a chef's knife out of a drawer, then as you just now
demonstrated, you probably won't interpret that as a threat --
most likely, you'll read it as a sign that they're going to do some
cooking. (If that turns out to be a misinterpretation, you may
wind up in the morgue.)
> But it's not the one Wittgenstein is discussing.
Exactly -- Wittgenstein has chosen to discuss a case where the
interpretation serves as a given -- that is, where "someone whips
out a knife at me." So his claim to _not_ be interpreting is false
-- he's _already_ performed the interpretation and embedded it in
his account.
Moggin:
But now imagine that you're standing in
>> a dark alley when someone pulls a switchblade out of their pocket --
>> you'll probably interpret _that_ as a threat of violence.
Frieda:
> Not probably and it's not an interpretation: it is a threat of violence.
> If I understand that, I will flee. If I merely interpret that it's a
> threat of violence, I might just as well interpret that it's not and hang
> around for a while (this is what W meant when he wrote "what makes you
> give just _this_ interpretation?"). Do so would be an error. Why?
> Because it *is* a threat of violence and I have misunderstood if I think
> it's anything else.
Not necessarily. You've simply put a reading on some evidence
at your disposal. Dark alley: sounds like a dangerous place.
Switchblades: often used violently. But that doesn't make it into
a threat of violence. The alley might be a safe, albeit poorly
lighted place. And the person pulling out the switchblade might be
planning to whittle. Not as likely, I grant you -- still, you
_could_ hang around, and you might _not_ be in error -- depends how
well you read the situation that you're in. You say that's not
possible: according to you, to think it isn't a threat of violence
is necessarily a mistake. But why do you think that? I see you
already answered -- "Why? Because it *is* a threat of violence and
I have misunderstood if I think it's anything else." Thank you.
That's a great example of an argument-from-asterisks -- one for the
files.
[...]
Moggin:
> > I'm saying that if you understand it, you _have_ interpreted it,
> > ipso facto. Take the example here. You might happen to know that
> > the speaker is a Nazi, and not a Zionist. That would be information
> > you could use to interpret the statement. Or you could base your
> > interpretation on a close reading. ("Rounded up" doesn't sound very
> > friendly to me.) Either way, interpreting the statement is what
> > produces your understanding. If you _didn't_ interpret it, then you
> > wouldn't _have_ an understanding -- the statement would be
> > meaningless to you.
Frieda:
> Really? So you do believe that language is defective and that all
> sentences are in need of a rider (their interpretation), without which
> they are meaningless. I suggest you meditate long and hard on the
> Wittgenstein passage. Then try providing me with an argument (rather than
> a set of declarations) for why you think that all understanding has to be
> the result of interpretation, especially after I've shown you (elsewhere)
> the incoherencies to which that view leads.
You've shown your ability to be incoherent, yes -- but you've
also showed something a wee bit more interesting, namely that
the "understanding" you claim to have arrived at exclusive of _any_
interpreting is a product of interpretation. Here's the place:
[Frieda:]
>> Furthermore, it is almost impossible to imagine that a Zionist would use
>> the verbs "to round up" and "send," which imply forcible removal and are
>> in no need of interpretation. Any putative Zionist who said it in this
>> way probably _is_ a Nazi.
I responded with a question: "Identifying the implications of
key terms and using them to help determine the meaning of a
statement isn't interpreting?" Instead of answering, you quietly
deleted the exchange. It still seems like a good question,
though. We've talked about two ways in which to "understand" what
the statement says. In one, you learn who made it. Then you
apply that knowledge to the statement to help decide what it meant.
In the other, you do a close reading where you identify the
implications of its key terms and phrases -- you focused on "round
up" and "send" -- and use them to help you determine the
statement's meaning. How are you _not_ performing interpretation?
-- Moggin
Puss in Boots
Frieda:
>>>>:Now, since we are
>>>>:not admitting the possibility of understanding without interpretation,
>>>>:Text B (the interpretation) will entail a further labour of interpretation
>>>>:in order to be understood. This leads to the production of a further
>>>>:interpretation, C. We end up with the type of endless chain of
>>>>:interpretations so dear to both hermeneuticists and deconstructors. So it
>>>>:is that the claim that interpretation is necessary leads one to the view
>>>>:that interpretation is ultimately impossible (since the chain is endless).
Silke:
>>>> Not that interpretation is impossible -- interpretation, in your
>>>> scenario, has already happened.
Frieda:
>>> No, it hasn't. If you'd read the rest of my argument, you'd understand
>>>why.
Moggin:
>> I just finished reading your entire argument, start to finish; it
>> looks as though Silke is right. Your scenario clearly contains two
>> (count 'em) interpretations -- the ones you labeled "B" and "C." It's
>> also got a chain containing indefinitely more. Interpretation _has_
>> occurred, and it won't stop. You do make a relevant assertion -- that
>> those interpretations don't exist. Unfortunately, you don't support
>> it, except with the statement that we don't understand them -- I don't
>> see anywhere you support that, either; but even taking it as given,
>> their non-existence wouldn't seem to follow.
Frieda:
> Let's start again. We are taking as given your view that there is no
> understanding without a prior labour of interpretation. That means: in
> order to understand anything, we have to interpret it and interpretation
> is therefore ubiquitous, a necessary condition for the use of language
> itself. This, as Wittgenstein points out, amounts to the view that
> language is defective, that no sentence is complete without a rider
> (Zusatz). A couple of other clarifications are in order.
Seems to me we already need a few here. Despite your claims, you
aren't addressing what I said -- what I said repeatedly, as you've
observed. You've ignored every opportunity to reply. Instead, you're
crafting me a position of your own. I'll go ahead and reply, since
there are some things we can discuss, regardless of who, if anyone, we
assign to the view in question. But to fulfill your promise to show
me wrong, you'll need to direct yourself to what I was saying when you
made it.
Onward. The idea that language is defective doesn't invalidate a
view of which it's part. Language may well have its flaws,
shortcomings, defects, and limitations. But we needn't argue about it,
because the view you're addressing doesn't "amount to the view that
language is defective." It's easily possible (which isn't to say that
it's required) to think that interpretation is part of the ordinary
and adequate use of language.
> One is that, if
> interpretation is to mean anything, it has to involve some kind of effort
This is how you clarify? You're the one who introduced the term
"labour of interpretation" and you're the one who's employed it --
I'm the one who _disputed_ it with you, writing, "Interpretation isn't
necessarily a labor." If you're determined to argue with me, be so
good as to reply to what I've said rather than battling with your own
"clarifications" (to use your term for them).
> This means that interpretation is a
> process and it consequently takes some time (though perhaps not much).
> As Wittgenstein put it: "To interpret is to think, to do something"
> (Investigations, p. 213).
I've got no problem with describing interpretation as a "process"
-- I do it myself. But it seems as if the term has outfoxed you.
(Y'know -- the bewitchments of language and all that.) If you wanted
to make it work better, you could say that the labor precedes the
interpretation. With the work done ahead of time, the interpretation
sometimes can write itself in an instant. That may be what leads
Wittgenstein to believe that he's not interpreting when he interprets
a certain gesture as a threat: he's _already_ performed the
necessary labor. He can tell a switchblade from a kitchen knife, and
both of them from a rubber one. What's more, he knows what all of
them can signify in a given situation. And he knows some stuff about
situations, e.g., what it means to be in an alley, as opposed to a
kitchen, and how that, in turn, has to be factored in, when trying to
interpret the meaning of the knife. He knows how to interpret
body-language and what to make of the expressions on somebody's face.
Which makes him half-right: "There is no inner process of
laborious interpretation" because the labor was already done -- which
is also what allows him to believe himself when he says, "I simply
react to what I see and hear."
"Suppose I had agreed on a code with someone; 'tower' means bank.
I tell him, 'Now go to the tower' -- he understands me and acts
accordingly, but he feels the word 'tower' to be strange in this use,
it has not yet 'taken on' the meaning." Thus Wittgenstein
(_Investigations_ 214). Now consider this person after some time has
passed. Following W.'s suggestion, the word "tower" doesn't seem
strange to him anymore when used to mean "bank." Its new meaning has
"taken." Now ask him, "Are you using a code?" Comes the answer:
"What? No, are you kidding? Why?" "Because you're interpreting the
word "tower" as "bank," one explains. "You gotta be nuts," he says.
"I'm not _interpreting_ anything -- I just understand what it means."
> Second, an interpretation of, say, an utterance
> cannot merely be the repetition of the utterance itself. It must differ
> from the utterance that is being interpreted. Third, if an interpretation
> must differ from that of which it is the interpretation, then it must be
> expressible in signs. In order to be *this particular interpretation*
> rather than some other interpretation that it is not, the interpretation
> must be capable of being enunciated. If you and I are looking at some
> smoke signals and I say "What's your interpretation?", assuming you have
> one you have to be able to tell me what it is.
As you show here, the statement "An interpretation is something
that is given in signs" is vulnerable to exaggeration -- in
particular, it stands open to a reading of the kind, "Anything which
_is_ an interpretation _must_ be given in signs," or "Nothing that
isn't given, and given in signs, can be an interpretation." You may
remember the idiot who argued in another thread, "If you had the
answer, you would have given it." (Excuse me if the idiot was you.)
Obviously one can have an answer and decide to keep it (or, as in
the case I'm remembering, one may have given an answer, only to have
it go unrecognized). Same here. If we're looking at some smoke
signals and you ask for my interpretation, I _don't_ have to let you
know what it is (assuming I have one). I have an alternative:
ignoring you. That doesn't turn my interpretation into a pumpkin --
it just means that you won't know what it is.
> Now, on your view, any
> interpretation of the smoke signals that you offered me would itself be in
> need of interpretation. Smoke signals (Text A) give rise to your
> interpretation (Text B) which in turn gives rise to my interpretation of
> your interpretation (Text C), which may or may not rest unspoken. But we
> can't just leave it at Text C. Because we've excluded as a matter of
> principle that a text can be understood without interpretation, Text C
> will itself be in need of interpretation by a Text D and so on ad
> infinitum. This view would seem to imply that interpretation is endless.
Again, this has only a tenuous connection with what I've said in
our discussion. Kindly drop the pretense of addressing my views
until you reply to what I've written; not your "clarifications" of it.
I'd like to be less strict about this, but as we've seen, what you
offer as "clarifications" would more aptly be called "distortions" --
at the same time, you avoid coming to grips with the points that I
_have_ made. (When you don't just deep-six them, you show a tendency
to offer labels instead of arguments.) It seems to be a pattern of
yours -- just the other day you attributed a statement to Derrida and
de Man that I don't believe either one of them ever made. (Silke
requested a quote, but you never produced one.) And before that, you
invented some views that you attached to Silke. (That time I asked
for quotes -- needless to say, you didn't come up with any.)
>I will now address the problems with this view (which I have not hitherto
>done, having conceded strategically that such a thing is possible) before
>proceeding to show why, on this view, what really happens is not that
>interpretation never ends but rather it never begins.
Or in the famous words of Stephen Stills, "I will now proceed,
to entangle, the entire area."
It seems that you think so -- what that says about the view is
another question. You're merely repeating the argument that you
offered the other day; I've already pointed out where your mistakes
are. You didn't respond, so I take that you prefer to not talk
about them, and I'll be brief here. You claim that this view means
interpretations don't exist. ("Our understanding of Text B turns
out to have been in fact Text C and Text B does not exist.") Which
requires somehow dispelling the interpretations that you just
finished pointing to -- fortunately or unfortunately, your argument
ain't got the mojo. As I said before, it can show that
interpretation keeps taking off. It can show interpretation has no
final destination. But it fails to demonstrate what you claim --
that interpretations are not produced. For that, you would have to
undo the existence of the interpretations you've already listed.
> As for your (you and Silke's) constant harping on what constitutes an
> understanding as opposed to an interpretation, I note with interest that
> Silke writes:
I'm afraid you have it backwards: the harping has been yours.
The distinction between "understanding" and "interpretation" is
your central theme -- which makes it all the more strange that you
refuse to explain how you use it.
[Silke:]
>>> Since your further elucidations rest on a misunderstanding (i.e. the
>>> substitution of "there is no interpretation" for "there is no final
>>> interpretation), all that follows rest on a false premise.
Frieda:
>Since she accuses me of misunderstanding, I assume she already has some
>idea of what it would be for me to understand. Otherwise the charge makes
>no sense. So, if you're still obsessed with it, I suggest you ask her.
Silke doubtless has some idea of what she means by the word
"understanding" -- what she was asking about was the way that _you_
use the term, especially when you stress the distinction between
"understanding" and "interpretation." (I'm curious about it, too.)
Frieda:
>>> Do I interpret that a stone is not a loaf of bread or do I understand
>>> that it is not?
Moggin:
>> You may well do both; I'm not certain, since you've neglected to
>> describe what it is that you're doing which might be viewed as
>> "understanding" or "interpretation" and to explain the distinction --
>> but if I were to guess, I'd say that you're distinguishing and
>> classifying, which both fall under "interpreting." (Arguably they're
>> forms of understanding, too; opinions differ.)
Frieda:
>You're making the distinction yourself here, so I assume you know what it
>is.
So you're willing to let my understanding define yours? O.k.;
I'll keep that in mind.
[...]
Frieda:
>>:>> If everything
>>:>>needs to be interpreted, then there's wiggle room in even the clearest
>>:>>declarative sentence, for example: "It would be a salutary thing if all
>>:>>the Jews were rounded up and sent to an island somewhere."
Moggin:
>>:> Since you mention it, that sentence, as you offer it here (i.e.,
>>:> not necessarily as de Man makes a similar remark) leaves a huge
>>:> amount of room for interpretation -- consider how different it would
>>:> sound coming from a Nazi and a Zionist, respectively.
Frieda:
>> So I understand it based on who said it. Nobody would deny that
>>:background knowledge plays a role in understanding. That is still not
>>:enough to make the sentence _need_ an interpretation in order to
>>:understand it.
Silke:
>>But most certainly it does, since "background knowledge" is, as you say,
>>part of understanding the passage as you do understand it -- knowing
>>about Nazis, what and where Belgium is, what Jews are, what the position
>>of the Jews is in Europe of the time, etc. etc. etc. They are all
>>necessary for you to arrive at your conclusions, or for me to arrive at
>>mine.
Frieda:
>>>I don't deny any of that, as long as "understanding the passage" does not
>>>necessarily* imply passing through a prior act of interpretation. I also
>>>have to know what all the words in the sentence mean and the other ways in
>>>which they can be used. I interpret none of this, by the way. The
>>>question is: does this background knowledge make of any understanding a
>>>mere interpretation? I maintain that it does not for the reasons
>>>contained in the argument you conveniently dismissed.
Moggin:
>> Your argument didn't contain any reasons to maintain that you're
>> not interpreting the statement (which wasn't quite so perfectly
>> clear).
Frieda:
>At least I have an argument. All you apparently have is the declaration,
>>repeated over and over, that all understanding requires interpretation. I
>haven't seen an argument for that position and it is not self-evident.
So you keep declaring; any time you want to supply an argument
for that assertion, you go right ahead. Alternatively, you could
address what I wrote, instead of either attempting to dismiss it or
replacing it with a set of "clarifications." (You promised to
show me wrong, remember?) But getting back to the point, you claim
that although you have an _understanding_ of the statement, "It
would be a salutary thing if all the Jews were rounded up and sent
to an island somewhere," you can't be said to have _interpreted_ it.
Problem is, the argument that you gave to support that claim was
missing something: namely, any reasons you could maintain that you
weren't interpreting.
[...]
Moggin:
>> Ditto for your comments here. When you bring your knowledge
>> into play, you're using it to help you construct an interpretation.
Frieda:
>Sometimes I might be. I never said interpretation doesn't exist.
>Sometimes we have to interpret, no question about it. We just don't do it
>every time we understand something. It cannot be the case that all
>understanding requires interpretation. And when we interpret, the whole
>point of the exercise is to produce something that is not itself in need
>of interpretation.
You're speaking of yourself and the mouse in your pocket? No,
wait -- you _are_ a mouse, aren't you? So you must be talking
about yourself and whoever owns the pocket you're speaking, or make
that squeaking from. Anyway, what you _did_ say was that you
weren't interpreting the statement at issue. (The one you provided
about about rounding up Jews.) Which seems to be false; as I
pointed out before, the statement would sound very different coming
from a Nazi instead of a Zionist. You replied that you could
figure out who said it using background knowledge, thus eliminating
the need for interpretation. But as Silke and I pointed out to
you, bringing your knowledge into play is no sign that you're _not_
interpreting the statement -- if anything, it's one part of the
process. Nonetheless, you maintained you _weren't_ interpreting it,
even if you were relying on background knowledge to help you
decide between its possible meanings -- which is where things broke
down, since your reasons for saying so were contained in an
argument that didn't contain any.
-- Moggin
Puss in Boots
Melissa [to Frieda Fieldmouse]:
[...]
> Who *are* you?
Maybe she's MJ's id.
-- Moggin
tejas
-Mammel,L.H. wrote:
>
> In article <Pine.OSF.3.95.97103...@email.uah.edu>,
> Paul D. Lanier <lan...@email.uah.edu> wrote:
>
> >On 31 Oct 1997, -Mammel,L.H. wrote:
> >>
> >> I believe his catch phrase was, "Just the facts, Ma'am".
> >> Probably what nobody ever knew was that ( lunar fashion )
> >> there was an a, or [ moon base ] alpha under erasure,
> >> and his exhortation was properly to be understood as
> >> "Adjust the facts, Ma'am", placing him well within the
> >> decentered and decentering Derridean orbit.
> >
> >sometimes, but decentered to mean "Adjust the facts, Ma'am" really that's
> >a stretch. Please explain or corroborate.
>
> the farthest thing from satire. It was always totally serious.
ObTrivia: Jack Webb got his start in broadcasting as the announcer
for the Bob Wills and the Texas Playboys radio broadcasts from
Bakersfield, California in the late '40s.
Mikhail Zeleny
> > I dismiss Paul de Man's corpus no more and no less than I dismiss
> > _Mein Kampf_, valuing both as historically significant specimens of
> > misological polemic that deserve a prominent place in any scholarly
> > library in the humanities, under the rubric of the repudiation of
> > reason and the pathologies of rhetoric.
> If I recall my reception history correctly, people were putting Kant in
> the same part of the library after the 1st Critique. Can't speak for
> Hitler, but de Man is interested in testing the limits of "interpretive
> reason" (my term, not his) & especially its often covert reliance on
> aesthetic categories held questionable by reason itself. Mikhail only
> makes himself appear stupid when he fails to distinguish between such a
> project and "the repudiation of reason." Reason's discovering its own
> limits scarcely equals its self-repudiation -- or does he take Plato to
> have initiated the "repudiation of reason"?
You seem to be forgetting that "all readings are in error because
they assume their own readability." What power licenses you to read
my critique of de Man apodictically, instead of following its target
by imputing allegory? In what sense is asseverating that "Allegories
are always allegories of metaphor and, as such, they are always
allegories of the impossibility of reading" an instance of testing
the limits of interpretive reason rather than dogmatically positing
its impotence? Do you have any evidence of Plato's having put forth
similar claims of textual undecidability, or are you donning his
chiton in a fatuous appeal ad verecundiam?
How does reception history modify the nature of the message being
received? After WWII, Dewey amended his obiter dicta on German
intellectual history to identify Kant among the causes of National
Socialism. Did his reception of Kantian ethics, as corroborated
by the authorities of Adolf Eichmann and Ayn Rand, determine the
meaning of the Categorical Imperative thenceforth?
Your reading ability will increase dramatically once you learn
to distinguish the thing from the way it has been understood.
> > >>>Excellent summary of the problem, Andy.
> [Thanks, Melissa; sorry I missed your original post.]
> > To use your own words, you were "totally mesmerized by de Man [...]
> > immediately, and traumatically closely before the disclosure" of his
> > repugnant wartime behavior. To paraphrase ever so slightly, you have
> > been duped by your idol and exposed as a mark by his fall.
> Does Mikhail really talk like this in person? Does he have any friends?
> Is he, god forbid, an academic empowered by tenure to treat students this
> way?
Mikhail's dog Cosmo is no dupe.
> Discovering that de Man collaborated does _not_ demonstrate that anyone
> was "duped" by his later writings. Such a demonstration seems to escape
> the powers of those posting their adjectives here.
Bad logic. I was not adducing de Man's collaboration as evidence
of "anyone" having been duped by his later writings. My point
rests squarely on Melissa's own florid confession of traumatic
mesmerizing.
> > "Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
> Lovely sentiment, that.
So deconstruct it already.
cordially,
mikhail zel...@math.ucla.edu a.k.a. m...@ptyx.com
writing from the disneyland of formal philosophy
"Nous donnons la mort et savons la subir."
SSHazle
Moggin, Andy, Melissa, et al.:
Anyone have an opinion on Shoshana Felman's assertion that de Man was
essentially bullied into the Soir articles by his uncle and/or Nazi
authorities? Does this have *any* validity at all?
Puss in Boots
Moggin [re "The Jews in Contemporary Literature"]:
>>>> It's also where
>>>> de Man names Kafka, Gide, Hemingway, and Lawrence as the
>>>> representative figures of modern literature: a Jew, a homosexual,
>>>> an anti-fascist, and a pornographer, as somebody has noted.
Lew:
>>> But he is citing them as moderns in the sense of "bad" isn't he?
Moggin:
>> No -- that's just it. de Man is writing in _defense_ of modern
>> literature, and _against_ its attackers. And look who he lists,
>> when he names some of its main figures. That's why I say that there
>> are some complexities here. The essay as a whole contains
>> out-and-out anti-Semitism -- there's no debating about that. But it
>> also has some small puzzles.
[...]
Lew:
> It looks a lot more like submission than defense to me.
> He labels these moderns as "mere continuators" of the system
> laid down by the great Stendahl. Then he says "Likewise,
> the Jews cannot pretend to be its creators." So yes he's
> putting the Jews and the moderns together, but he is exalting
> neither.
Exalting, no. But his essay is plainly a defense of modern lit.
against its enemies, the vulgar anti-Semites. Just look how it
begins -- "Vulgar anti-Semitism likes to consider cultural phenomena
in the post-War period to be decadent and degenerate because
_enjuivé_. Literature has not escaped this lapidary judgement: it
has sufficed that some Jewish writers have been discovered under
Latinized pseudonyms for all contemporary production to be considered
polluted and harmful [_néfaste_]. This conception entails some
rather dangerous consequences. First of all, it causes a whole
literature to be condemned _a priori_ which in no way merits that
fate." (The second consequence, if anyone is wondering, is that it
overestimates the influence of Jews on Western literature.)
When de Man describes the modernists as "mere continuators," he
isn't putting them down -- that's what I was trying to show you
before. (So much for the context, eh?) He's connecting them with
tradition in order to defend them against the criticism that they're
making an unwarranted departure from custom and history. To the
charge that they're just a bunch of Jewish degenerates, he responds
that their work has evolved directly from the honored past, as
represented by Stendhal. Note that his thesis on modernism -- which
you see as a submission -- is similar to Auerbach's thinking in
_Mimesis_ (which he was writing about the same time). Was A. caving
in to the Nazis, too?
I mean, seriously: how can the argument that surrealism (which
de Man explicitly names) is a continuation of the valued past be
a "submission" to the folks who put on the "Degenerate Art" exhibit?
The anti-Semitism, yes, obviously. But the cultural politics are
something else again.
I've got to differ about how he describes the relation between
the modernists and the Jews, too. It seems plain to me that he's
trying to distinguish them. That leads to one of the puzzles of the
essay. de Man sets out to rescue modern lit. from the vulgar
anti-Semitic attack by arguing that it _isn't_, in reality, a Jewish
phenomenon -- but then he names _Kafka_ as one of its exemplary
figures.
> This essay looks very personal to me. It looks like de Man
> reconciling himself and accommodating his thinking to life
> under the Nazi's. The mood of it reminds of the line in
> The_Giaconda_Smile ( paraphrasing ) "he felt himself
> descending into a lower circle of hell, from one filled
> with clouds and storms to one filled with slime and mud."
> I don't see even one little speck of rebellion or subversion
> in it. Obviously, the antisemitism is doctrinal and not
> heartfelt at all, which is what makes it so sad.
Very possibly he was going along to get along: one of the most
common crimes in the world. Personally, I think it oughta get the
death penalty; that would go a long ways toward reducing the surplus
population. (I realize I'm getting ahead of my holidays here.)
> BTW, this looks like you are relying on David Lehman's
> translation. Could it be this great enemy has done the
> same service for you that he did for me? Namely, letting us
> peek into this particular little corner of history?
You betcha. Alot of the book consists of mindless polemic, but
especially in the second half, L. offers plenty of info; not all
that he could, but enough to be very useful. I was quoting him just
the other day. He gives me the opportunity to say things like,
"Even Lehman, one of de Man's worst enemies, has to admit..." Can't
beat it.
-- Moggin
Robert Sterner
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
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SSHazle <ssh...@aol.com> wrote in article
<19971101204...@ladder01.news.aol.com>...
> Moggin, Andy, Melissa, et al.:
>
> Anyone have an opinion on Shoshana Felman's assertion that de Man was
> essentially bullied into the Soir articles by his uncle and/or Nazi
> authorities? Does this have *any* validity at all?
>
Well, I for one would hate to think that someone who happened to know deMan
would be better informed than our expert commentators on this newsgroup.
And, contrary to most of the people who pontificate about deMan's evils,
I'm sure Felman has read deMan's writings in Le Soir...
Regards...
Robert
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wrote in article <<font =
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nt color=3D"#000000">>...<br>> Moggin, Andy, Melissa, et =
al.:<br>> <br>> Anyone have an opinion on Shoshana Felman's =
assertion that de Man was<br>> essentially bullied into the =
Soir articles by his uncle and/or Nazi<br>> authorities? =
Does this have *any* validity at all?<br>> <br>Well, I for one =
would hate to think that someone who happened to know deMan would be =
better informed than our expert commentators on this newsgroup. =
And, contrary to most of the people who pontificate about deMan's =
evils, I'm sure Felman has read deMan's writings in Le =
Soir...<br><br>Regards...<br>Robert</p>
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Mikhail Zeleny
Andy Lowry <a...@Ra.MsState.Edu> wrote:
You are confusing me with a figment of your imagination. I never
claimed that de Man promulgated nonsense in the sense relevant to
your placement of the burden of proof. Nor do I believe that his
sophistry is self-refuting, except for the pragmatic sense, whereby
it is merely hypocritical. Furthermore, I never undertook a public
analysis of de Man's critical opera, either here or elsewhere. My
point is modestly methodological: that biographical facts impinge
on the meaning of literary output. Of course, it is a consequence
of this approach that deconstructionist aporematic does not arise,
because such facts supply a ground for preferring a historically
validated interpretation over the alternatives.
I already posted a couple of deManian sound bites. Here is another
gem, apposite to the issue at hand: "Autobiography veils a defacement
of the mind of which it is itself the cause." I will not undertake
another close reading of the deconstructionist gospels until and unless
my previous efforts in this direction have been attended to. If you
wish to do so, I will repost and summarize my critique of a typical
passage in Derrida's _De la grammatologie_ -- and I am not concerned
with his ignorant name-dropping of Curtius et alii, either.
As regards your journalistic imputations, feel free to collect the
litotes you are trolling for from the next unfortunate observer of
your nakedness.
Puss in Boots
[...]
Andy Lowry:
> The sheer egotism of suggesting that de Man was _unconsciously_
> led to his theories as an escape from guilt is pretty darn amazing.
> You honestly think he never thought about connections himself?
> Such suggestions tell all too much about the person making them.
Zeleny:
> Maybe so. To me, they tell that the person making them was being
> charitable in his interpretation of de Man's theoretic conceits by
> ruling out the likelihood that they were concocted ad hoc, to excuse
> his sordid past.
Moggin:
> Speaking of ad hoc concoctions...
Zeleny:
> Tu quoque is neither original nor persuasive. How is my interpretive
> hypothesis any worse than Andy's?
Moggin:
> Tu quoque is beside the point, since you never established that
> de Man's work was "concocted ad hoc, to excuse his sordid past."
> that's a bit of ad hoc speculation; physician, heal thyself, y'know?
Zeleny:
> You are missing out on the burden of proof. I am arguing against
> ruling out the likelihood that de Man's interpretive inevitability and
> impossibility doctrines were concocted to excuse his collaborationist
> screeds. As regards the likelihood, the evidence presented to date
> will suffice: Le Soir articles are manifest, and so are the attempts
> of deconstructionist acolytes to question their odious meaning or
> otherwise exculpate their author from the moral responsibility for
> promulgating Judeophobic propaganda in collusion with the Nazis.
You're referring to some folks who've given detailed readings
(no matter how you judge the results). What you're offering is
just some hand-waving in the direction of Vickers along with an ad
hoc hypothesis that de Man concocted his work ad hoc. (Yes, the
_Le Soir_ articles are manifest. One can't say the same for their
relationship to the writing de Man did thirty years later.) But
if you're content with that, then so am I.
> Theoretically speaking, in addition to already mentioned Sainte-Beuve,
> there are the principles of Taine most apposite to the present case:
> "race, milieu, moment." In the beginning of his career Paul de Man
> defined himself racially as a Flemish nationalist in opposition to the
> Judaic "infection"; he integrated himself into the collaborationist
> milieu; he paid his tribute to the Nazi ideology of the moment. His
> ensuing literary corpus is a reflection on these choices. If you wish
> to impugn the legitimacy of this reading with a rational argument, by
> all means do so.
It's a perfectly legitimate reading. Of course, it's also an
entirely baseless one, since you make no case for your central
claim (that de Man's "literary corpus is a reflection" of his life
during the war). And it's an uninteresting one, since you don't
make any attempt to reflect on the meaning of the "reflection" you
hypothesize. So I won't pick up the burden of disproof (thanks
anyhow). I'll just add a few notes.
To state "de Man integrated himself into the collaborationist
milieu" skirts outright falsehood, but succeeds in being
misleading, all the same. For several years during the war -- Dec.
'40 to Nov. '42 -- he earned his living by writing articles for
_Le Soir_, a state-controlled newspaper. At the same time, de Man
maintained relationships with Jewish aquaintances and members of
the resistance (not mutally exclusive categories). After quitting
_Le Soir_, he went to work for a publishing company, _l'Argence
Dechenne_, also under German control, where he helped to bring out
a book linked to the French resistance (_Exercice du silence_)
that was unable to find a willing publisher in Paris. (It may not
be any coincedence that he was fired just a short while later.)
"In the beginning of his career Paul de Man defined himself
racially as a Flemish nationalist in opposition to the Judaic
'infection'" is a similar case -- without being strictly false, it
still manages to cast doubt on your ability to treat the subject
with care. (Not to be confused with caring for de Man -- _that's_
entirely optional.) Are the _Le Soir_ articles really the
beginning of de Man's career? It's true that they're his earliest
published writing (as far as I know). But locating them as one
part of a "career" that also includes de Man's later work makes an
assumption out of what you want to show.
It makes more sense, I'd suggest, to say that de Man had more
than one career: early in life, he worked for a few years as a
literary journalist. Giving that up, he went into publishing; not
a success. Several years after the war he moved to the U.S.,
where he eventually became an academic -- his third career, at the
least. I'm collapsing his academic work with the language
classes he taught to support himself, e.g., at Berlitz. Otherwise
we end up with four.
No matter how you count, there's a gap of fully eleven years
between the _Le Soir_ articles you name as "the beginning" and
the next time that de Man expressed himself in print, in the early
50's (leaving aside his work as a translator). And it was two
decades more before he produced the work that you're hypothesizing
about. So the notion these are all a part of one and the same
"career," with _Le Soir_ as the start, has some obstacles in front
of it.
I've also got some questions about the manner you say that de
Man defined himself. It's certainly true that in "The Jews in
Contemporary Literature," de Man "opposes the Judaic 'infection.'"
He also opposes worrying about it, though: according to what he
writes, European culture is too healthy, and the threat offered by
the Jews too small, to make it a matter of concern. The article
is undoubtedly anti-Semitic -- and yet, it's misleading to suggest
that it's whipping up anti-Jewish sentiment. On the contray --
de Man argues that European culture has no reason to fear the Jews
(and of course no reason to miss them, either, if they were sent
to a distant colony).
Besides, is this the whole story about the way in which "Paul
de Man defined himself" during the war? Sounds like it, in your
telling -- one would think he was a committed anti-Semite, as well
as a full-time propagandist. Yet it seems he wasn't. And if de
Man defined himself with "The Jews in Contemporary Literature," he
must also have defined himself when he sheltered the Slusznys in
his apartment. So either he has more than one definition, or else
defining him requires something more complex that what you've
supplied.
Zeleny:
>>>>>Numerous Nazi officials covertly protected Jews from deportation and
>>>>>extermination, which is decidedly more than Paul de Man is known to
>>>>>have done. Are you really suggesting that this common practice of
>>>>>making special dispensations for personal relations or acquaintances
>>>>>in any way exculpates or even mitigates the war crimes of genocide
>>>>>perpetrators and their accomplices?
Moggin:
>>>> I'm suggesting precisely what I said just above, after "It seems
>>>>fair to conclude..." -- that interpreting de Man's behavior during
>>>>the war is no simple thing. Anyone intent on bringing down a ringing
>>>>judgement will have to contend with certain complexities. For
>>>>example, that de Man sheltered Jews in his own apartment, and that he
>>>>was the confidant of an active member of the resistance. I'm also
>>>>saying that anybody reading his work of the 70's in light of his life
>>>>during the early 40's would want to rembember those details, along
>>>>with the articles that he wrote for _Le Soir_.
Zeleny:
>>>Done and accounted for. The ensuing picture is one of a war criminal
>>>that escaped justice by lying about his wartime activities.
Moggin:
>> You've just left out any details that don't fit into the picture
>>you want to draw. The result is a portrait that's incomplete, at best.
Zeleny:
> By the standard of fitness you are promoting, Hitler's "sheltering" of
> his Jewish physician does not "fit into the picture" of him as a
> maniacal genocidal Judeophobe. In my trade, this is called a reductio
> ad absurdum. Nobody but a dedicated Nazi apologist gives a rat's arse
> for your putatively nuanced presentation of a Nazi collaborator with a
> soft spot for his Jewish friends. Deal with it.
Looks more like nearsightedness. Trying standing closer. Right
now you're too far away to make out any of the details. Why, you
can't even tell de Man apart from Hitler -- and if I recall correctly,
you had trouble distinguishing him from Himmler the other day. (By
the way, "Deal with it" is good. Not quite on the level of a classic
like "Like, duh" -- but maybe with some polishing...)
[...]
Moggin:
>>>>>> By-the-by, I'd think that de Man's body was "on the
>>>>>> line," and not just hypothetically, when he used his apartment
>>>>>> to shelter Jews.
Zeleny:
>>>>>Your thoughts in this matter notwithstanding, the historical reality
>>>>>is that sheltering Jews was not prosecuted as a crime in occupied
>>>>>Belgium prior to their deportation, when the events in question must
>>>>>have occurred, as witness the reference to curfew.
Moggin:
>>>> That's not clear. The deportation of Jews from Belgium began in
>>>>the summer of 1942 (late July, to be specific). By the end of the
>>>>year, 15,000 Jews had been sent to Auschwitz -- as in France, Belgian
>>>>citizens were allowed exemptions, at first, while the focus was on
>>>>non-Belgian Jews. (See Arendt, or since you've got a thing about her,
>>>>try Judah Pilch, _The Jewish Catastrophe in Europe_.) Sluszny says
>>>>that she and her husband stayed in de Man's apartment sometime in '42
>>>>or '43.
Zeleny:
>>>Attend to your own evidence. The incident, as you reported it,
>>>specifically names the missed curfew as the cause of the couple's
>>>temporary homelessness.
Moggin:
>> Yep -- it also dates the episode to the period of deportations.
>> But the dates aren't precise, memory can err, etc., etc. So as
>> things stand, we don't have perfect clarity; we can say that de Man
>> sheltered a Jewish couple (Esther and Nahum Sluszny) in his
>> apartment when they were caught out after curfew. Beyond that, the
>> details become harder to pin down.
Zeleny:
> Right. And how is being able to say that supposed to attenuate his
> portrait as a war criminal? Is his favor to Esther and Nahum Sluszny
> supposed to have made things easier for the six million Jews not so
> fortunate to have had their very own pet Nazi collaborator?
I'm not sure about attenuating a portrait -- that sounds wrong.
Do portraits attentuate, exactly? They fade. But you want
something like "whitewash," it seems. And of course I'm not trying
to whitewash anything. I hope that de Man's actions made things
easier for the Sluszys. And plainly they complicate the picture of
his behavior during the war. Neither of those items is any help
for the six million. Not to speak of the millions of other victims
of the Holocaust. Of course, they don't benefit from the way you
use them as a stick, either. But you've heard that countless times
before.
Frieda Fieldmouse:
>>>>>>>What I find most amazing about all of this is that, rather than
>>>>>>>admitting that Paul De Man was probably a fairly despicable
>>>>>>>character who wrote some unforgiveable things, you all are
>>>>>>>determined to make sure that he is seen to have accumulated
>>>>>>>*every virtue*, merely because you happen to like his writings.
Moggin:
>>>>>> Nobody here has so much as hinted that de Man "accumulated
>>>>>>*every virtue*." You're just making shit up. By now it's
>>>>>>become plain that's your standard procedure. (I don't think my
>>>>>>point was unclear: "His past makes an easier target than his
>>>>>>work -- but on examination, they both have their complexities.")
Zeleny:
>>>>>If that was your point, what bearing does it have on the legitimacy of
>>>>>Sayan's interpretation of de Man's rhetoric? Whatever the complexity
>>>>>of his past or his work, surely it cannot preempt a reading of the
>>>>>former into the latter. ...
Moggin:
>>>> Yet if you're trying to read his work on the basis of his life,
>>>>then it's necessary to take into account the complexities of them
>>>>both -- and that's precisely what Sayan's interpretation fails to do.
Zeleny:
>>>So you say. But the fact of the matter remains that de Man was a Nazi
>>>collaborationist shill who went to a great deal of trouble to conceal
>>>his war crimes. And that is all that Sayan's reading requires. The
>>>circumstances you bring up in no way vitiate it. As Himmler noted,
>>>every good Nazi has his own favorite Jew.
Moggin:
>> Sayan's reading (or rather, as he reminds us, the reading Sayan
>>forwarded -- not necessarily _his_) requires ignoring the other
>>elements in de Man's personal history: the ones that add complexity
>>to the picture, and make it into more than a caricature.
Zeleny:
> No more so than the received reading of Hitler requires ignoring his
> famous concern for the humane treatment of lobsters. This sort of
> added complexity I am content to neglect.
I'm sure that you're a deeply contented soul. And I'll try to
remember that in these matters, contentedly ignoring complexity
isn't only your practice, but also your principle.
[...]
Moggin:
> No, I was trying to say something else. Sayan is offering an ad
>hominem argument -- that should be obvious. What's more, the
>argument doesn't add up. Sayan reasons that de Man was unconsciously
>trying to make an episode of his past "less damning" by
>downplaying the importance of empirical facts -- but facts don't hold
>the power of damnation. You can't get an ought-not from an is any
>more than you can get an ought. So if Sayan was right, then de Man's
>unconscious should have made "Just the facts, ma'am" his motto,
>while de Man's work focused on reading and interpretation: the items
>necessary to make his damnation even possible.
Zeleny:
>Nonsense. The _Le Soir_ screeds comprise an actus reus that would
>have been sufficient to guarantee cozy state-secured confinement for
>their author after the liberation of Belgium.
Moggin:
> Not unless they were read and interpreted, honeybear. Otherwise
>you're left with the fact that de Man wrote some newspaper articles.
>(Somebody with a powerful animosity toward journalists might've found
>that grounds for conviction, I guess.)
Zeleny:
>>Kindly save your charming vocatives for your arsehole buddies.
>Robert Brasillach was executed for the same sort of collaborationist
>propaganda that de Man indulged in. The difference between them was
>in degree, not in kind. The court judged actus reus, with mens rea
>never questioned, and interpretation never made into an issue. Deal
>with it.
Moggin:
> Interpretation may not have been an issue, but it was certainly
>a _practice_. Without it, the court wouldn't have had anything to
>consider beyond the fact that Brasillach was a writer. But instead,
>it made a reading of Brasillach's work that allowed it to convict
>him. Result -- one dead Brasillach. (Incidentally, de Man reviewed
>B.'s _Notre Avant-Guerre_ in _Le Soir_. He panned it.)
Zeleny:
> Thus what you deem interpretation the world undertakes as a practice.
That shouldn't come as any surprise: the world is chock-full
of practices of interpretation.
> Consequently it cannot be identical to the interminably deferred
> interpretive chimaera that de Man conjures in his deconstructionist
> doctrines. Case closed.
Since the chimerical nature of de Man's readings isn't plain,
it's no basis to conclude they couldn't possibly resemble any,
given practice of interpretation. But don't worry about it; they
don't have to be identical, anyhow. The argument that Sayan
forwarded claims de Man is trying to avoid the damnation which he
so richly deserves by steering clear of "empirical _facts_."
What I've pointed out in reply (by now I must be getting close to
a half-dozen times) is that absent interpretation, the _facts_
won't damn anybody. So the argument fails -- if it was right, de
Man, or rather his unconscious (because that's supposed to be
what's at work) would have steered straight toward them, strictly
ignoring the Sirens of interpretation.
Zeleny:
>No postwar court ever
>concerned itself with the mens rea of a collaborationist hack, much
>less the interpretation of his clarion call for ethnic purification
>of Europe.
Moggin:
> Ever hear of Nuremberg? (A postwar court which concerned itself
>with that kinda thing.) Anyway, the accusations against de Man
>are based on his articles in _Le Soir_ -- unless you put them forward
>for interpretation, there isn't a case.
Zeleny:
>First of all, Nuremberg was not the venue for judging collaborationist
>hacks.
Moggin:
> Of course not -- but it concerned itself with "clarion calls" for
>the "ethnic purification of Europe" on the part of some well known
>Nazis; so statements of that sort were a concern of the postwar courts.
Zeleny:
> Nuremberg was excused from this concern by Goebbels' suicide.
And yet Nuremberg didn't excuse itself: it retained a concern
for the statements and beliefs of the defendents about the Final
Solution.
> At any
> rate, concern with statements does not equal concern with their
> "problematized" interpretation. There is nothing problematic about
> understanding de Man or Brasillach.
D'ya think so? Guess it depends how you mean.
Zeleny:
>>>Secondly, interpretation is still not on the judicial menu in
>>>the relevant cases such as the one I cited above. There are legal
>>>distinctions that could be plausibly grounded in interpretive issues.
>>>A classic example is the distinction between murder and involuntary
>>>manslaughter, which entirely rests upon mens rea, in the presence or
>>>absence of malice aforethought that is the mental element for murder.
>>>Given that mens rea must be imputed on the basis of verbal and factual
>>>evidence, you could make a claim that the extent of judicial damnation
>>>is subject to the vagaries of interpretation. But the brute fact of
>>>judging a defendant innocent or guilty almost never is so dependent,
>>>certainly not when he is charged with collaboration with Nazis.
Moggin:
> > One more time. While you might describe any given judgement as a
> >"brute fact," no brute fact will lead directly to a conviction. To
> >convict a person requires interpreting the facts of their behavior, no
> >matter how brutal it may have been. So interpretation is _always_ a
> >part of the judicial process (whether or not it's printed on the menu).
Zeleny:
> Your repeated asseveration of this doctrine against all evidence to
> the contrary is duly noted.
While you've got your steno pad out, jot down that such evidence
has been lacking.
> You must have gotten a great kick out of stomping your foot in early
> life.
I leave that to Dr. Johnson and his many fans -- it's their forte.
Zeleny:
>For that matter, I heartily recommend deploying your
>doctrine that "facts don't hold the power of damnation" next time
>you have to defend yourself against a traffic ticket.
Moggin:
> You make my point. Let's say you're driving on some, given road
>at such-and-such a speed. For the sake of argument, I'll call that
>the "fact." To make that into a conviction for speeding will require
>an entire apparatus of regulation and interpretation. The fact, by
>itself, doesn't give you a ticket or earn you a fine -- it sits there.
>But if you supply a whole set of "speed limits," highway signs,
>traffic laws, and so on, then driving at a certain speed on a certain
>highway turns into "speeding" and inspires a fat-assed, jack-booted
>state trooper to put down his donut, haul you over to the side of the
>road, and give you a ticket.
> Go to court and you'll find a dull-brained judge dressed up like
>it was Halloween (these folks all like to wear costumes) ready to
>convict you of going too damn fast. But if you could restrict him to
>the _facts_, then you'd be home free -- there's no guilt in the
>_facts_ about your driving. (Like I said, you can't get an ought-not
>from an is any more than you can get an ought.) Making you guilty
>requires turning the _facts_ into a _crime_. And _that's_ impossible
>without an act of interpretation. The _fact_ that you were driving
>at a given speed at a specific place is no crime until you read it in
>a particular way -- it has to be interpreted as "breaking the law"
>before it turns into something you can be convicted of.
Zeleny:
>Legal regulation is a given fact. Granted that interpretation of the
>regulation as it is expressed in the letter of the law is part of the
>court's duties. But you are not talking about that. Your point could
>stand only if the prosecution were required to perform hermeneutic
>rites over the elements of the offense. And that is not a requirement
>that obtains in real life. Deal with it.
Moggin:
> The legal system _does_ perform what you might call "hermeneutic
>rites." That's what I was just describing. "Rites" might not be a
>good term, since they're usually absorbed into business-as-usual; but
>"hermeneutic" will fit.
Zeleny:
> If you say so. So take a concrete case of relevant judicial action,
> that of Brasillach, and show the questionable hermeneutic elements of
> his conviction.
What would I want to do that for? I haven't claimed that there's
anything questionable about Brasillach's conviction, or, for that
matter, anybody else's. Undoubtedly plenty of judgements _do_ go awry,
for any number of different reasons. I've heard figures as high as
ten percent, for wrongful convictions in the U.S. courts. Which would
add up to alot of people. But I'm not addressing that issue.
> This is not an argument that can be settled merely by
> identifying the established practice of passing legal judgment with
> the allegedly problematic art of textual analysis. Your point, if you
> have one, depends on there always existing a factual nuance that makes
> all such judgment impossible, or at least indefinitely defers it. If
> so, kindly support it with argument; if not, kindly spell out what you
> have in mind.
?? I have no idea where you're getting this from -- I'm not even
_trying_ to show that the legal system and lit. crit. are identical.
And I've spelled out my point umpteen times, or umpteen and one, since
Rick offered a helpful explanation for anybody who still didn't get
it. The act of damnation (or conviction, since that's the language we
slipped into) involves interpreting. You could even say it _is_ an
act of interpretation (allowing for the exception I noted at the start,
since when God performs it, the result then might be an "empirical
_fact_"). What you seem to be talking about is the outcome: does the
resulting judgement have "problematic" qualities? Can it always be
questioned, or postponed by reference to empirical details? (That one
got habeas corpus gutted on the slogan, "Fry 'em before they rot!")
Lots of interesting questions, but nothing to do with the simple point
I've been making: that no matter _how_ you evaluate any, given
judgement (e.g. as good, bad, problematic, impossible, or indefinitely
deferred), arriving at it will have involved interpretation. You
can't get there from "just the facts," because the facts, taken alone,
don't contain a judgement. They don't know from "guilt" or
"innocence" -- you want to reach judgements like that, you're going to
have to step in and make them.
Zeleny:
> >>If you could restrict the judge to the facts whilst maintaining their
> >>Humean distinction from the norms, you would merely make him into a
> >>legal positivist. Curiously enough, not even the numerous legal
> >>positivists flattening their spotted arses on traffic court perches
> >>across this country feel compelled to engage in haruspicy before
> >>handing down your sentence. The brute facts suffice.
Moggin:
> > Of course they don't: that's what I just finished explaining to
> >you. The mere fact that you were driving at such a speed on such a
> >highway doesn't suffice to establish your "guilt" or "innocence." To
> >make it into a _crime_ requires wheeling an entire system of
> >interpretation into play. Which is just what happens, beginning with
> >the moment when some cop decides that you can help him meet his
> >monthly quota of tickets. It's what turns the _fact_ about the speed
> >of your car into a _judgement_ that you were "speeding."
Zeleny:
> Your sleight of hand is in presupposing that the "wheeling" of an
> entire system of interpretation into play is arbitrary.
Couldn't be, since I haven't made any such presupposition -- I'm
just pointing out that it's required for the purposes I described.
You want to argue that laws on speeding in the U.S. are governed only
by the highest and most perfect necessity, fine. And good luck.
> But the
> letter of the law is always prior to the actus reus, and therefore
> necessary relative to it. And so, in most cases, is the interpretive
> precedent. Now, if you want to classify the practice of fitting the
> actus reus to legal precedent as hermeneutics, you have to show some
> relevant similarities between what takes place in the courtroom and
> what transpires in a library.
Really? Why would I have to do that? But o.k. -- in both spots,
people use copy machines. There you go. Seemed like a pointless
exercise, but anything to make you happy. (Incidentally, you brought
in the term "hermenuetics." It's perfectly fine with me, but if
you've become disenchanted with it, kindly address your objections to
yourself.)
> But even if I were to grant you this
> much for the sake of the argument, this reclassification will get you
> nowhere in refuting my point that the war crimes of Paul de Man differ
> from the precedent set by Robert Brasillach only in degree, rather
> than in kind.
You're short a few things: to speak of a "reclassification" you
may or may not be willing to "grant," you'll have to establish both
a classification and its claim to priority -- a claim with sufficient
strength to put you into the business of handing out grants, or
witholding them, from anyone who so much as happens to depart from it.
What that means, in this instance, is that you'll need to show that
it's possible to make judgemnts without ever resorting interpretation
of any kind (except in those presumably rare cases where, in an
untypical act of generosity, you make a special dispensation for that
otherwise unnecessary and indeed, inapplicable term). That done, you
can try explaining why I should care about your opinions concerning
de Man's ostensible resemblence to Brasillach, or anyone else you may
name. (Although I admit that if you said Donnie Osmond, it would
pique my curiosity.)
> Which is what the de Man affair is all about.
Say hi to Elvis for me.
-- Moggin
Puss in Boots
[...]
Andy Lowry:
Moggin:
Zeleny:
Zeleny:
Zeleny:
[...]
Moggin:
Zeleny:
Frieda Fieldmouse:
[...]
Moggin:
Zeleny:
Zeleny:
Zeleny:
it's possible to pass judgement _without_ resorting to interpretation
(except in those presumably rare cases where, in a highly untypical
act of generosity, you make a special dispensation for that otherwise
unnecessary and indeed, inapplicable term). That done, you can try
explaining why I should care about your opinions on de Man's supposed
resemblence to Brasillach, or anyone else you may name. Although I
admit if you said Donnie Osmond, it would pique my curiosity.
Ron Hardin
Andy Lowry wrote:
> "The demand that one not leave out any steps, our inheritance from
> pre-psychoanalytic Brit-twit culture, has merged, in the last fifteen
> years, with the fundamentally anti-intellectual (not to mention
> anti-pleasure, anti-love, anti-life ...) byword of American populism:
> that everything should be written so as to be capable of being understood
> by the average, illiterate American, for whom the _New York Times_ is
> something like what Mallarme used to be.
``Even the press, whose information is usually twenty years old, is
suddenly, on the correct date, busying itself with the subject.'' - Mallarmé
--
Ron Hardin
r...@research.att.com
On the internet, nobody knows you're a jerk.
Andy Lowry
Found a quote in Thomas A. Pepper's new book, "Singularities: Extremes of
Theory in the Twentieth Century" ...
Pepper (on the idea of avoiding "gaps" in one's argument):
"The demand that one not leave out any steps, our inheritance from
pre-psychoanalytic Brit-twit culture, has merged, in the last fifteen
years, with the fundamentally anti-intellectual (not to mention
anti-pleasure, anti-love, anti-life ...) byword of American populism:
that everything should be written so as to be capable of being understood
by the average, illiterate American, for whom the _New York Times_ is
something like what Mallarme used to be.
"The tendency of our all but consumed, consumptive society is to say: If
I have to do any work to read it, then forget it. There is no joy
anymore, there is the massive imperative toward passivity."
I hope the relevance of the quote to some strains of alt.postmodern
doesn't require all the gaps to be filled in?
(The Pepper book is in some ways annoying, so far as I've read in it; he
seems to take Kierkegaard as a personal & stylistic hero. But I'm liking
it. One third of the book is a chapter on de Man, but I've not got there
yet. The book is in that rather spotty "Literatue, Culture, Theory"
series outta Cambridge.)
-- Andy Lowry
Andy Lowry
On Sat, 1 Nov 1997, Mikhail Zeleny wrote:
> Andy Lowry <a...@Ra.MsState.Edu> wrote:
>
> > What's most appalling in all this talk about de Man is that his critics
> > might as well be attacking a phantom they encountered in Christopher
> > Norris or "The New Criterion." If nobody can be bothered to drag out an
> > article by de Man, read it, & say what's wrong with it, then what is the
> > point of all this gossip? (I think it was M. J. Devaney who at least
> > cited an actual interpretation of de Man's, some time back.)
> >
> > (Mikhail in fact could probably get a job _writing_ for the New Crit,
> > based on his diction & views.)
> >
> > The burden of proof, sensibly enough, lies on those who say "it's
> > nonsense." Let's see some nonsense, please -- nonsense by de Man, that
> > is. Otherwise, we might as well rename this thread
> > "alt.postmodern.gossip."
>
> You are confusing me with a figment of your imagination. I never
> claimed that de Man promulgated nonsense in the sense relevant to
> your placement of the burden of proof. Nor do I believe that his
> sophistry is self-refuting, except for the pragmatic sense, whereby
> it is merely hypocritical. Furthermore, I never undertook a public
> analysis of de Man's critical opera, either here or elsewhere.
No, didn't you cite Vickers as a decisive refutation of de Man? I had a
look, & while the book as a whole looks interesting, Vickers seems mainly
clueless about de Man; I'll have to study some of his finer points
however.
> My
> point is modestly methodological: that biographical facts impinge
> on the meaning of literary output.
It's when you get to defining that impingement that trouble arises.
> Of course, it is a consequence
> of this approach that deconstructionist aporematic does not arise,
> because such facts supply a ground for preferring a historically
> validated interpretation over the alternatives.
Such appeals to history turn out to be excuses for not reading texts; for
example, reading Kant as a precursor of Nazism.
> I already posted a couple of deManian sound bites.
Yes, which is what's so boring about your style of argument. Why do think
"sound bites" are the material for serious discussion?
> Here is another
> gem, apposite to the issue at hand: "Autobiography veils a defacement
> of the mind of which it is itself the cause." I will not undertake
> another close reading of the deconstructionist gospels until and unless
> my previous efforts in this direction have been attended to. If you
> wish to do so, I will repost and summarize my critique of a typical
> passage in Derrida's _De la grammatologie_ -- and I am not concerned
> with his ignorant name-dropping of Curtius et alii, either.
Derrida, frankly, I'm in need of stronger acquaintance with, but I'd
welcome the repost.
> As regards your journalistic imputations, feel free to collect the
> litotes you are trolling for from the next unfortunate observer of
> your nakedness.
I was a bit snippish, wasn't I?
-- Andy Lowry
Mikhail Zeleny
Do that. I would be happy to discuss Vickers' alleged cluelessness
in some detail, as I would any objections to Meyer Abrams' take on
the same subject in _Doing Things with Texts_. My present interest
in de Man is insufficient to motivate an unassisted close reading of
his own writings, but if somebody wants to send me a beat-up copy of
his _Allegories of Reading_, I could be persuaded to change my mind.
>>My
>>point is modestly methodological: that biographical facts impinge
>>on the meaning of literary output.
>It's when you get to defining that impingement that trouble arises.
Get real. It is a critical commonplace that such impingement takes
place. We naturally read _A Farewell to Arms_ through the historical
experience of WWI, particularly as lived by Ernest Hemingway. To read
it otherwise requires an argument to the effect that the meaning of
literary texts is somehow autonomous, in the sense of being independent
of the circumstances of their production. While the roots of all such
arguments are to be found in the head of Gorgias, its modern expression
is due to Marcel Proust's ad hominem polemic contre Sainte-Beuve, which
I already rebutted in this thread. Not much else than an ad hominem
rebuttal is called for, because the Gorgian argument is essentially an
ad hominem one, sustaining the irrationalist conviction that an effect
not only can be, but ought to be understood in isolation from its cause.
But there is nothing else but causes available for our understanding of
any phenomena in nature, as there is nothing else but reasons available
for our understanding of any concepts therein. To dirempt causes from
reasons in the manner of Proust or de Man is to subvert the possibility
of understanding. In each case, this misological subversion can be
plausibly understood as a shameful attempt to hide details of personal
life, because repudiation of impartial reason can be undertaken only
from the standpoint of private interest.
>>Of course, it is a consequence
>>of this approach that deconstructionist aporematic does not arise,
>>because such facts supply a ground for preferring a historically
>>validated interpretation over the alternatives.
>Such appeals to history turn out to be excuses for not reading texts;
>for example, reading Kant as a precursor of Nazism.
I don't think anyone can accuse Dewey of not having read Kant -- maybe
not having read him too well, but read him all the same. Nor is it a
priori nonsensical to read Kant as a precursor of Nazism; in general,
this form of reading instantiates the familiar figurative hermeneutics
of type and anti-type, originated in the Christian biblical criticism.
As any historical act, meaning can only be understood in retrospect,
and knowledge of its consequences is no less valuable to the project
of understanding than the knowledge of its causes. As you ought to
have said, such appeals to history can be dangerous only if and when
they turn out to be excuses for not reading texts in the first place;
for example, "reading" Kant as a precursor of Nazism without having
read Kant.
>>I already posted a couple of deManian sound bites.
>Yes, which is what's so boring about your style of argument. Why do
>think "sound bites" are the material for serious discussion?
Because I think that anything is a matter for serious discussion,
After all, seriousness is an attitude that need not reflect the
nature of its object, as witness the methodology of `pataphysics.
If you wish to discuss de Man's doctrines, which are an exemplary
subject for `pataphysical research, the citations are furnished
are as good a place to start as any.
>>Here is another
>>gem, apposite to the issue at hand: "Autobiography veils a defacement
>>of the mind of which it is itself the cause." I will not undertake
>>another close reading of the deconstructionist gospels until and unless
>>my previous efforts in this direction have been attended to. If you
>>wish to do so, I will repost and summarize my critique of a typical
>>passage in Derrida's _De la grammatologie_ -- and I am not concerned
>>with his ignorant name-dropping of Curtius et alii, either.
>Derrida, frankly, I'm in need of stronger acquaintance with, but I'd
>welcome the repost.
See below.
>>As regards your journalistic imputations, feel free to collect the
>>litotes you are trolling for from the next unfortunate observer of
>>your nakedness.
>I was a bit snippish, wasn't I?
No more so than is customary in this medium.
>-- Andy Lowry
A year ago, Mario Taboada suggested in this venue a public thread
on Derrida's _De la grammatologie_, in order to give everyone "an
opportunity to discuss *specific* points, both of content and style,
with a specific book in mind -- rather than the generalized pro and
con posts that do not really say much about Derrida." I seconded
Mario's suggestion and recommended as supplementary texts Plato's
_Sophist_, _Theaetetus_, and _Statesman_; _La logique ou l'art de
penser_ of Port-Royal; Frege's "Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung"; as well
as Guthrie's History of Greek Philosophy, Edwards' Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, and Peters' lexicon of Greek Philosophical Terms. Once
again I leave it to someone else to recommend the odium of Heidegger.
Starting with the first chapter, "la fin du livre et le commencement
de l'écriture", my first text is Derrida's argument that in due course
leads to his key assertion that "en dernière instance, la différence
entre le signifié et le signifiant _n'est rien_":
L'évidence rassurante dans laquelle a dû s'organiser et doit
vivre encore la tradition occidentale serait donc celle-ci:
l'ordre du signifié n'est jamais contemporain, est au mieux
l'envers ou le parallèle subtilement décalé -- le temps d'un
souffle -- de l'ordre du signifiant. Et le signe doit être
l'unité d'une hétérogénéité, puisque le signifié (sens ou
chose, noème ou réalité) n'est pas en soi un signifiant, une
_trace_: en tout cas n'est pas constitué dans son sens par son
rapport à la trace possible. L'essence formelle du signifié
est la _présence_, et le privilège de sa proximité au logos
comme _phonè_ est le privilège de la présence. Réponse
inéluctable dès lorsqu'on se demande "qu'est-ce que le signe?",
c'est-à dire lorsqu'on soumet le signe à la question de
l'essence, au "ti esti". L'"essence formelle" du signe ne
peut être déterminée qu'à partir de la présence. On ne peut
contourner cette réponse, sauf à recuser la forme même de la
question et commencer à penser que le signe [est] cette
[chose] mal nommée, la seule, qui échappe à la question
institutrice de la philosophie: "Qu'est-ce que...?"
I translate:
The reassuring evidence wherein the Western tradition had to
organize itself and must continue to live even now, would
therefore be as follows: The order of the signified is never
contemporaneous, is at best the inverse or the parallel subtly
displaced -- displaced by the time of a breath -- from the
order of the signifier. And the sign must be the unity of a
heterogeneity, since the signified (sense or thing, noema or
reality) is not in itself a signifier, a _trace_: at any rate
is not constituted in its sense by its relation to a possible
trace. The formal essence of the signified is the _presence_,
and the privilege of its proximity to the logos as _phone_ is
the privilege of the presence. This is the inevitable response
as soon as one inquires: "What is the sign?", that is to say,
when one submits the sign to the question of theessence, to
the "ti esti". The "formal essence" of the sign cannnot be
determined, except in terms of the presence. One cannot avoid
this response, except by recusing the very form of the question
and beginning to think that the sign [is] that ill-named [thing],
the only one, that escapes the founding question of philosophy:
"What is...?"
So let us take a concrete example: the string of physical tokens
(phonemes or graphemes) `y', `o', `n', `d', `e', `r', ` ', `p', `u',
`p', `p', and `y' as our signifier, the concept of yonder puppy as
our signified, and yonder puppy as our thing. Now, what Derrida is
claiming cannot be true of the Platonic stratification of meaning.
For Plato, unlike the concrete event that comprises the signifier,
the abstract object that is the signified exists outside of the
spatiotemporal realm, and hence can be neither identified with nor
explained in terms of physical or mental states or events, which
are characterized by ubiety and duration. For the same reason, the
kind of palpable presence manifested by phonemes or graphemes that
comprise the signifier, cannot be imputed to the signified, which
is present only in so far as it is grasped by the intellect of a
party in intra- or interlocution. And for the same reason, it is
unintelligible to talk about some displacement in the sense of a
temporal gap between "the order of the signifier" and "the order
of the signified". For the former relation is physical, being
exemplified by the temporal succession of phonemes and the spatial
succession of graphemes, whereas the latter one is logical, being
characterized by the relation of implication or the one of logical
containment such as the one that obtains between the concept of
yonder puppy and the concepts of there and of now, and of a young
domesticated carnivorous mammal Canis familiaris, as well as the
conceptual associations of conceited or inexperienced youth or
man's best friend. And since the two orders in question are
clearly incommensurable, the signified can be said to precede the
signifier only in the ontological sense, as being a necessary
component in signification. Which is Plato's point in the first
place.
Let us suppose to the contrary that, as Derrida sets himself up to
conclude, the string of tokens `y', `o', `n', `d', `e', `r', ` ',
`p', `u', `p', `p', and `y' nowise differs from its associated
concept of yonder puppy. To square this view with the canonical
definition of a sign as "aliquid stat pro aliquo" or something
standing for something else, Derrida's denial of difference has
to be taken in kind rather than in in degree, for otherwise no
signifier could signify anything strictly distinct from itself.
So a charitable interpretation of Derrida's claim would be that
the signifier does not differ from the signified in kind: as long
as the physical realm has not been "put under erasure", if the
former is physical, so must be the latter. One problem with this
view is that it fails to leave any room for the origins of language,
either generally, as a historically evolved capacity of thitherto
inarticulate beings to designate things and convey their properties
and relations to each other and themselves, or in particular, as a
revolutionary innovation precipitated by an instance of thitherto
unconventional and unaccounted for linguistic practice.
Put yourself in the shoes of Stéphane Mallarmé agonizing over a
novel, thitherto unexpressed meaning of the word "ptyx", formerly
used in ancient and modern Greek to designate a seashell:
Ses purs ongles très haut dédiant leur onyx,
L'Angoisse, ce minuit, soutient, lampadophore,
Maint rêve vespéral brûlé par le Phénix
Que ne recueille pas de cinéraire amphore
Sur les crédences, au salon vide: nul ptyx
Aboli bibelot d'inanité sonore,
(Car le Maître est allé puiser des pleurs au Styx
Avec ce seul objet dont le Néant s'honore.)
Mais proche la croisée au nord vacante, un or
Agonise selon peut-être le décor
Des licornes ruant du feu contre une nixe,
Elle, défunte nue en le miroir, encor
Que, dans l'oubli fermé par le cadre, se fixe
De scintillations sitôt le septuor.
In awkward but faithful terms, the second quatrain means
approximately as follows:
Her pure nails very high dedicating their onyx,
Anxiety, this midnight, sustains, lamp-bearing,
Many a vesperal dream burnt by the Phoenix
That are not collected by a cinerary [sepulchral] urn.
On the credenzas [sideboards] in the empty salon: no ptyx
Abrogated trinket of resonant inanity
Because the Master went to draw tears from Styx
With that unique object wherein Nothingness takes pride.
But near the crossing to the vacant north, a gold
Agonizes, perhaps, according to the decor
Of unicorns breathing fire at a water-nymph,
She, defunct naked in the mirror, again
Whom in the lapse of memory enclosed by the frame, fixes
Of scintillations as soon as the septuor [seven-part composition].
By apposition, a ptyx is an abrogated trinket of resonant inanity,
whereas the absent ptyx in question, having been carried away by
the Master to be used for drawing tears from Styx, is that unique
object wherein Nothingness takes pride. (Incidentally, the second
line refers to the word itself as well as the thing it is intended
thenceforth to designate, since the sonnet is described by its
author as auto-allegorical: the frame, also the outer part of the
sonnet, namely the first quatrain and the second tercet, determines
the meaning of the septuor, a seven-part composition, in the present
case a well-known constellation and the middle part (second quatrain
plus first tercet) of the sonnet; and constellations, as every
schoolchild knows, are among the few things that exist in the eyes
of the beholder only.) The point relevant to our discussion is that
Mallarmé's linguistic innovation, forced upon him purely by the
paucity of the French vocabulary in supplying masculine rhymes in
ix/yx, is inexplicable by any linguistic events anterior thereto.
Put yourself in the shoes of the first man called upon to designate
yonder puppy by a proper name, prior to the discovery of any other
linguistic device. (It should go without saying that this scenario
is compatible with any other choice of the hypothetical object of
the original dubbing.) Thus instead of your customary inarticulate
grunts, you muster the word "Fido". From the hypothesis, your word
is the very first signifier in the human history, and therefore a
sign, that is something standing for something else, namely the
signified concept of Fido. Again, from the hypothesis, there are
no other signifiers around as yet. In what sense could the formal
essence of the signified be the "presence", and the privilege of its
proximity to the logos as _phone_, or concrete significant speech,
be the privilege of the presence? In so far as your circumstances
defer all possible explanations of your signification to the future,
the signified of "Fido" is absent, contrary to what Derrida claims.
Indeed, consider that if the signifier "Fido" does not stand for a
contemporaneous and therefore transcendent "something else" that it
signifies, but merely serves as a proxy for other signifiers, be
they preceding or succeeding, in our scenario they can only be the
latter. So now suppose that shortly after your dramatic discovery
of language, your tongue is scorched as you enjoy the deliverances
of your prior discovery of fire, and no human successor of yours
ever has the wherewithal to recover your accomplishment. It follows
that your one and only significant deployment of the name "Fido" was
meaningless, contrary to the initial hypothesis. Thus Derrida stands
refuted.
Mikhail Zeleny
mog...@mindspring.com (Puss in Boots) wrote:
> [...]
Moggin:
> You're referring to some folks who've given detailed readings
> (no matter how you judge the results). What you're offering is
> just some hand-waving in the direction of Vickers along with an ad
> hoc hypothesis that de Man concocted his work ad hoc. (Yes, the
> _Le Soir_ articles are manifest. One can't say the same for their
> relationship to the writing de Man did thirty years later.) But
> if you're content with that, then so am I.
You know better than call my hypothesis ad hoc. There are plenty of
substantive and methodological reasons to suppose that deconstruction
was de Man's way of evading guilt for his collaboration with the Nazis.
In the former category are the facts that it purports to do just that,
that de Man's postwar behavior demonstrably aimed at obfuscation and
falsification of his war record, and that it is generally in the human
nature to concoct an outlook that puts one in the most favorable light.
In the latter category, there are the principles of Sainte-Beuve and
Taine. And since I already cited both kinds of reasons in support of
my hypothesis, your deeming it ad hoc makes you a liar.
Zeleny:
>> Theoretically speaking, in addition to already mentioned Sainte-Beuve,
>> there are the principles of Taine most apposite to the present case:
>> "race, milieu, moment." In the beginning of his career Paul de Man
>> defined himself racially as a Flemish nationalist in opposition to the
>> Judaic "infection"; he integrated himself into the collaborationist
>> milieu; he paid his tribute to the Nazi ideology of the moment. His
>> ensuing literary corpus is a reflection on these choices. If you wish
>> to impugn the legitimacy of this reading with a rational argument, by
>> all means do so.
Moggin:
> It is a perfectly legitimate reading. Of course, it's also an
Your tendency to regard complexity as a salutary contribution
to any subject matter has been noted and derided by a number of
observers. In the present case, the unambiguous effect of your
imputation of ambiguity is the deferral of judgment in the case
of de Man's wartime record. But since it is too late to visit
criminal justice upon his person, I am not interested in arguing
this point. The key biographical fact relevant to the proposed
interpretation of de Man's theoretical screeds as a smokescreen
for his collaborationist background is that he considered the
activities in question worthy of falsification. So if you won't
pick up the burden of disproving the obvious, spare yourself
further embarrassment and shut the fuck up.
Moggin:
> Looks more like nearsightedness. Trying standing closer. Right
> now you're too far away to make out any of the details. Why, you
> can't even tell de Man apart from Hitler -- and if I recall correctly,
> you had trouble distinguishing him from Himmler the other day. (By
> the way, "Deal with it" is good. Not quite on the level of a classic
> like "Like, duh" -- but maybe with some polishing...)
Characteristically, you don't remember correctly: Himmler enjoined
his subordinates from favoring their pet Jews, even as Hitler spared
his pet Jewish physician, even as Paul de Man, a small cog in the
machine of Nazi genocide, obligingly supplied lofty justifications
for ridding the Aryan Lebensraum of the Jewish pestilence, whilst
maintaining personal relations with his pet Jews. Your grooming
yourself for a docile pet will doubtless contribute a useful extra
fitness advantage to your self-acknowledged sophistry.
> [...]
Moggin:
> I'm not sure about attenuating a portrait -- that sounds wrong.
> Do portraits attentuate, exactly? They fade. But you want
> something like "whitewash," it seems. And of course I'm not trying
> to whitewash anything. I hope that de Man's actions made things
> easier for the Sluszys. And plainly they complicate the picture of
> his behavior during the war. Neither of those items is any help
> for the six million. Not to speak of the millions of other victims
> of the Holocaust. Of course, they don't benefit from the way you
> use them as a stick, either. But you've heard that countless times
> before.
The point is to benefit the living by discrediting an ideology
thoroughly dedicated to asseverating plausible deniability of
any wrongdoing, as you have been demonstrating over and over.
I continue this argument not in the futile hope of changing your
meretricious mind, but in continually rewarded expectations of
your sophistical contortions vividly discrediting sophistry as
such. Thank you for playing along.
Moggin:
> I'm sure that you're a deeply contented soul. And I'll try to
> remember that in these matters, contentedly ignoring complexity
> isn't only your practice, but also your principle.
My principle is never to shie away from moral judgment, be it of
myself or of anyone else, just as your practice, which cannot
rightly be deemed principle, is to controvert, distort, and mock
any principle whatsoever.
> [...]
Moggin:
> That shouldn't come as any surprise: the world is chock-full
> of practices of interpretation.
Quite so. Furthermore, their manifest success gives the lie
to the deconstructionist gainsaying of the possibility of
interpretation.
Zeleny:
>> Consequently it cannot be identical to the interminably deferred
>> interpretive chimaera that de Man conjures in his deconstructionist
>> doctrines. Case closed.
Moggin:
> Since the chimerical nature of de Man's readings isn't plain,
> it's no basis to conclude they couldn't possibly resemble any,
> given practice of interpretation. But don't worry about it; they
> don't have to be identical, anyhow. The argument that Sayan
> forwarded claims de Man is trying to avoid the damnation which he
> so richly deserves by steering clear of "empirical _facts_."
> What I've pointed out in reply (by now I must be getting close to
> a half-dozen times) is that absent interpretation, the _facts_
> won't damn anybody. So the argument fails -- if it was right, de
> Man, or rather his unconscious (because that's supposed to be
> what's at work) would have steered straight toward them, strictly
> ignoring the Sirens of interpretation.
Your pointing-out must give you great comfort, since its probative
force is no greater than that of parrotlike squawks. Socrates
dedicated his life to the proposition that virtue is knowledge,
which directly contradicts your contention that facts alone won't
suffice to damn anybody. Your gainsaying adds nothing new to the
issue.
Zeleny:
>>No postwar court ever
>>concerned itself with the mens rea of a collaborationist hack, much
>>less the interpretation of his clarion call for ethnic purification
>>of Europe.
Moggin:
>> Ever hear of Nuremberg? (A postwar court which concerned itself
>>with that kinda thing.) Anyway, the accusations against de Man
>>are based on his articles in _Le Soir_ -- unless you put them forward
>>for interpretation, there isn't a case.
Zeleny:
>>First of all, Nuremberg was not the venue for judging collaborationist
>>hacks.
Moggin:
>> Of course not -- but it concerned itself with "clarion calls" for
>>the "ethnic purification of Europe" on the part of some well known
>>Nazis; so statements of that sort were a concern of the postwar courts.
Zeleny:
>> Nuremberg was excused from this concern by Goebbels' suicide.
Moggin:
> And yet Nuremberg didn't excuse itself: it retained a concern
> for the statements and beliefs of the defendents about the Final
> Solution.
Only in so far as they entered into the actus reus.
Zeleny:
>> At any
>> rate, concern with statements does not equal concern with their
>> "problematized" interpretation. There is nothing problematic about
>> understanding de Man or Brasillach.
Moggin:
> D'ya think so? Guess it depends how you mean.
Just like everything you think or say, with the convenient proviso
that your meaning is subject to ex post facto modification according
to whichever way the wind blows. Which is to say that you are a worthy
sycophant of Paul de Man.
Zeleny:
>>>>Secondly, interpretation is still not on the judicial menu in
>>>>the relevant cases such as the one I cited above. There are legal
>>>>distinctions that could be plausibly grounded in interpretive issues.
>>>>A classic example is the distinction between murder and involuntary
>>>>manslaughter, which entirely rests upon mens rea, in the presence or
>>>>absence of malice aforethought that is the mental element for murder.
>>>>Given that mens rea must be imputed on the basis of verbal and factual
>>>>evidence, you could make a claim that the extent of judicial damnation
>>>>is subject to the vagaries of interpretation. But the brute fact of
>>>>judging a defendant innocent or guilty almost never is so dependent,
>>>>certainly not when he is charged with collaboration with Nazis.
Moggin:
>> > One more time. While you might describe any given judgement as a
>> >"brute fact," no brute fact will lead directly to a conviction. To
>> >convict a person requires interpreting the facts of their behavior, no
>> >matter how brutal it may have been. So interpretation is _always_ a
>> >part of the judicial process (whether or not it's printed on the menu).
Zeleny:
>> Your repeated asseveration of this doctrine against all evidence to
>> the contrary is duly noted.
Moggin:
> While you've got your steno pad out, jot down that such evidence
> has been lacking.
The evidence has been entered overwhelmingly: the fact that the
practice of legal judgment does not respect, much less acknowledge
your Humean dogma, is a matter of court record. Go back to traffic
court.
Zeleny:
>> You must have gotten a great kick out of stomping your foot in early
>> life.
Moggin:
> I leave that to Dr. Johnson and his many fans -- it's their forte.
Your vapid solipsism comes as no surprise.
Moggin:
> What would I want to do that for? I haven't claimed that there's
> anything questionable about Brasillach's conviction, or, for that
> matter, anybody else's. Undoubtedly plenty of judgements _do_ go awry,
> for any number of different reasons. I've heard figures as high as
> ten percent, for wrongful convictions in the U.S. courts. Which would
> add up to alot of people. But I'm not addressing that issue.
If there is nothing questionable about Brasillach's conviction,
by parity of reasoning there is nothing questionable about de
Man's characterization as a junior league Brasillach, or for
that matter your characterization as a would-be inheritor of
de Man's sophistical credentials.
Zeleny:
>> This is not an argument that can be settled merely by
>> identifying the established practice of passing legal judgment with
>> the allegedly problematic art of textual analysis. Your point, if you
>> have one, depends on there always existing a factual nuance that makes
>> all such judgment impossible, or at least indefinitely defers it. If
>> so, kindly support it with argument; if not, kindly spell out what you
>> have in mind.
Moggin:
> ?? I have no idea where you're getting this from -- I'm not even
> _trying_ to show that the legal system and lit. crit. are identical.
> And I've spelled out my point umpteen times, or umpteen and one, since
> Rick offered a helpful explanation for anybody who still didn't get
> it. The act of damnation (or conviction, since that's the language we
> slipped into) involves interpreting. You could even say it _is_ an
> act of interpretation (allowing for the exception I noted at the start,
> since when God performs it, the result then might be an "empirical
> _fact_"). What you seem to be talking about is the outcome: does the
> resulting judgement have "problematic" qualities? Can it always be
> questioned, or postponed by reference to empirical details? (That one
> got habeas corpus gutted on the slogan, "Fry 'em before they rot!")
> Lots of interesting questions, but nothing to do with the simple point
> I've been making: that no matter _how_ you evaluate any, given
> judgement (e.g. as good, bad, problematic, impossible, or indefinitely
> deferred), arriving at it will have involved interpretation. You
> can't get there from "just the facts," because the facts, taken alone,
> don't contain a judgement. They don't know from "guilt" or
> "innocence" -- you want to reach judgements like that, you're going to
> have to step in and make them.
It is a fact that de Man could have abstained from collaborating
with the Nazis. Since moral responsibility depends on the ability
to act morally, which is a fact, there is no distinction between
brute facts and moral judgments. And none of your repetitive
claims to the contrary will impugn this argument in the absence
of counterargument, as distinct from gainsaying.
Zeleny:
>> >>If you could restrict the judge to the facts whilst maintaining their
>> >>Humean distinction from the norms, you would merely make him into a
>> >>legal positivist. Curiously enough, not even the numerous legal
>> >>positivists flattening their spotted arses on traffic court perches
>> >>across this country feel compelled to engage in haruspicy before
>> >>handing down your sentence. The brute facts suffice.
Moggin:
>> > Of course they don't: that's what I just finished explaining to
>> >you. The mere fact that you were driving at such a speed on such a
>> >highway doesn't suffice to establish your "guilt" or "innocence." To
>> >make it into a _crime_ requires wheeling an entire system of
>> >interpretation into play. Which is just what happens, beginning with
>> >the moment when some cop decides that you can help him meet his
>> >monthly quota of tickets. It's what turns the _fact_ about the speed
>> >of your car into a _judgement_ that you were "speeding."
Zeleny:
>> Your sleight of hand is in presupposing that the "wheeling" of an
>> entire system of interpretation into play is arbitrary.
Moggin:
> Couldn't be, since I haven't made any such presupposition -- I'm
> just pointing out that it's required for the purposes I described.
> You want to argue that laws on speeding in the U.S. are governed only
> by the highest and most perfect necessity, fine. And good luck.
The argument is made for me in _De interpretatione_, which introduces
the terms in question and relates their predication to the passage of
time. Consider educating yourself about the issues before choosing
sides. Again, the point is that temporal priority is tantamount to
relative necessity of the past with respect to anything more recent,
including most conspicuously the present.
Zeleny:
>> But the
>> letter of the law is always prior to the actus reus, and therefore
>> necessary relative to it. And so, in most cases, is the interpretive
>> precedent. Now, if you want to classify the practice of fitting the
>> actus reus to legal precedent as hermeneutics, you have to show some
>> relevant similarities between what takes place in the courtroom and
>> what transpires in a library.
Moggin:
> Really? Why would I have to do that? But o.k. -- in both spots,
> people use copy machines. There you go. Seemed like a pointless
> exercise, but anything to make you happy. (Incidentally, you brought
> in the term "hermenuetics." It's perfectly fine with me, but if
> you've become disenchanted with it, kindly address your objections to
> yourself.)
A comic reductio is not an argument recognized for its validity.
Unsurprisingly, it figures most prominently among the sophist's
bag of tricks. Once again, with terms adjusted to your preference,
if you want to classify the practice of fitting the actus reus to
legal precedent as interpretation on par with that practiced by a
deconstructionist prestidigitator delving into the relation between
Jane Austen and the Masturbating Girl, you will have to show some
*relevant* similarities between what takes place in the courtroom
and what transpires at an MLA toss-off session. Go for it.
Zeleny:
>> But even if I were to grant you this
>> much for the sake of the argument, this reclassification will get you
>> nowhere in refuting my point that the war crimes of Paul de Man differ
>> from the precedent set by Robert Brasillach only in degree, rather
>> than in kind.
Moggin:
> You're short a few things: to speak of a "reclassification" you
> may or may not be willing to "grant," you'll have to establish both
> a classification and its claim to priority -- a claim with sufficient
> strength to put you into the business of handing out grants, or
> witholding them, from anyone who so much as happens to depart from it.
> What that means, in this instance, is that you'll need to show that
> it's possible to make judgemnts without ever resorting interpretation
> of any kind (except in those presumably rare cases where, in an
> untypical act of generosity, you make a special dispensation for that
> otherwise unnecessary and indeed, inapplicable term). That done, you
> can try explaining why I should care about your opinions concerning
> de Man's ostensible resemblence to Brasillach, or anyone else you may
> name. (Although I admit that if you said Donnie Osmond, it would
> pique my curiosity.)
You already have a counterexample to your claim: a demonstration
of fact, namely the speed of a vehicle driven by X in excess of
the posted absolute speed limit suffices to secure a conviction
of X for breaking the speed limit law. As regards your reasons
for caring about de Man's moral paradeigmata, my guess is that
they are analogous to your manifest caring about de Man as your
own moral paradigm. Aim a bit higher, and you will be just like
Brasillach.
Zeleny:
>> Which is what the de Man affair is all about.
Moggin:
> Say hi to Elvis for me.
Only if you give my regards to that most accomplished
deconstructionist Nazi historian David Irving.
cordially,
mikhail zel...@math.ucla.edu a.k.a m...@ptyx.com
writing from the disneyland of formal philosophy
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
-------------------==== Posted via Deja News ====-----------------------
Andy Lowry
By the way, a horrible error led to a screen's worth or more of messages
on this thread being wiped out from my computer; so if anyone's put me
down in some resounding manner, I'm not merely ignoring it, & would
welcome a repost to put me in my place.
-- Andy Lowry
Detlef Borchers
>Hendrik was
>(quoting Felman) "a charismatic intellectual and political authority
>in Belgium, the author of a number of successful books on Marxism
>and on socialist theory. He had also been a successful politician
>and a minister in several Belgian governments." So it's not hard to
>imagine that his example (he took a pro-German stance) had an
>effect on his young nephew. That's just speculation, of course, but
>it doesn't seem unreasonable.
Well, Hendrik de Man was one of the leading collaborateurs in Belgium
and prime minister at that time.
He certainly had enough influence to exempt this Paul de Man
from any needs of writing. At that time, his son, Jan de Man dont wanted
to write and Hendrik de Man took the necessary steps that he could row
along the Danube up to the black sea. As intermediary between the king
and the German occupators, de Man sheltered a couple of people (and was
sheltered later on by Ernst Juenger, when Belgium sentenced him to death).
In the de Man Archives there are a couple of clippings annotated by the
uncle.
--Detlef (computer journalist looking for the Sokal-Debate, finding this
one... wrote my thesis on Hendrik de Man.)
Detlef Borchers, Topspin Press Agency, Germany
mj devaney
Silke-Maria Weineck wrote:
Frieda:
> : The view was that of Nietzsche ("there are no facts, only
> : interpretations") and more recent hermeneutic philosophers like Gadamer
> : and Ricoeur. It has been given a "radical" but nonsensical spin by the
> : likes of Derrida and De Man, who maintain that interpretation is not only
> : *necessary* it is also *impossible*.
Silke:
> Not that interpretation per se is impossible. Interpretation happens all
> the time. Please provide a quotation, so we can see which tenet you are
> talking about specifically.
Will Foucault do? "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx": "If interpretation can never
be brought to an end, it is simply because there is nothing to
interpret. There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, because at
bottom everything is already interpretation." The hermeneutic experience
is "this convergence of interpretation toward a point that renders it
impossible."
What Foucault says here is very similar to what Frieda says below:
> Now, since we are
> : not admitting the possibility of understanding without interpretation,
> : Text B (the interpretation) will entail a further labour of interpretation
> : in order to be understood. This leads to the production of a further
> : interpretation, C. We end up with the type of endless chain of
> : interpretations so dear to both hermeneuticists and deconstructors. So it
> : is that the claim that interpretation is necessary leads one to the view
> : that interpretation is ultimately impossible (since the chain is endless).
--MJ
Puss in Boots
Andy Lowry:
Zeleny:
Moggin:
Zeleny:
Moggin:
Zeleny:
Moggin:
Zeleny:
> You know better than call my hypothesis ad hoc. There are plenty of
> substantive and methodological reasons to suppose that deconstruction
> was de Man's way of evading guilt for his collaboration with the Nazis.
> In the former category are the facts that it purports to do just that,
> that de Man's postwar behavior demonstrably aimed at obfuscation and
> falsification of his war record, and that it is generally in the human
> nature to concoct an outlook that puts one in the most favorable light.
> In the latter category, there are the principles of Sainte-Beuve and
> Taine. And since I already cited both kinds of reasons in support of
> my hypothesis, your deeming it ad hoc makes you a liar.
Deconstruction does not, of course, purport to be "de Man's way
of evading guilt for his collaboration with the Nazis." But oddly
enough, that's exactly what _you_ purport about deconstruction. You
seem to have confused yourself with de Man -- something to take up
with your analyst (or reason to go find one). Anyway, de Man wasn't
honest about his past -- that's a matter of record. But it's not
obvious what, if anything, follows concerning his literary criticism.
Frieda is considerably more persuasive about this; do you remember
what she said? After remarking that de Man was "probably a fairly
despicable character who wrote some unforgiveable things," she added:
[Frieda:]
> Céline was a fairly rotten fucker who wrote stuff that even De Man
> wouldn't sign off on, but that doesn't mean that he wasn't a good
> writer. If someone says he was a shitty writer, I'll defend him on
> that score. If they say he was an anti-semitic scumbag, I'm forced
> to agree. That's called being intellectually honest, to use an
> expression that is especially out of date.
I should say, for clarity's sake, that naturally you're free to
suppose what you like. I'm sure you suppose a great many things;
far be it from me to stand in your way. Your suppositions seem more
reasonable to you than to me, but don't let that prevent you from
making them, or any others that may pop into your head.
[...]
Zeleny:
> Your tendency to regard complexity as a salutary contribution
> to any subject matter has been noted and derided by a number of
> observers.
So it has; you'll recall that those were same the observers who
had a good laugh over the idea that complexity might be of value in
discussions of literature. "Yahoos" is the usual term for them; are
you signing up?
> In the present case, the unambiguous effect of your
> imputation of ambiguity is the deferral of judgment in the case
> of de Man's wartime record.
Not at all. Since you neglected to supply the reasoning -- I'm
making an assumption here -- behind your conclusion, I'm not sure
where you go wrong, but go there you do. I've just added some notes
to the record, and corrected a few of the misleading observations
you made.
> But since it is too late to visit
> criminal justice upon his person, I am not interested in arguing
> this point.
Andy already mentioned this, but it's relevant here, so I'll
repeat the point: de Man was examined by the Belgian justice system
after the war ended -- he was interrogated by a prosecutor and
released without any charges. Obviously it's possible to have one's
doubts about that outcome, but I'm sure that won't be the case with
you, since you were quick to criticize me when you thought I had
implied that the legal system might have an element of the arbitrary
to it.
> The key biographical fact relevant to the proposed
> interpretation of de Man's theoretical screeds as a smokescreen
> for his collaborationist background is that he considered the
> activities in question worthy of falsification. So if you won't
> pick up the burden of disproving the obvious, spare yourself
> further embarrassment and shut the fuck up.
What are you proposing as "obvious" here? That de Man wasn't
honest when questioned about his actions during the war? Agreed --
there's no debate about that. The question is what it says, if
anything, about his literary criticism; arguments-from-it's-obvious
won't help.
[...]
Zeleny:
> My principle is never to shie away from moral judgment, be it of
> myself or of anyone else ...
Neither did the Nazis shy from passing judgement on the Jews.
Moggin:
Zeleny:
Moggin:
Zeleny:
Moggin:
Zeleny:
Moggin:
Zeleny:
> Quite so. Furthermore, their manifest success gives the lie
> to the deconstructionist gainsaying of the possibility of
> interpretation.
You've gotta be kidding -- or then, maybe you just don't have
any idea. Interpretation is considered a common occurrence; Derrida
could even quote Ringo -- "I'm certain that it happens all the
time..."
Zeleny:
>> Consequently it cannot be identical to the interminably deferred
>> interpretive chimaera that de Man conjures in his deconstructionist
>> doctrines. Case closed.
Moggin:
> Since the chimerical nature of de Man's readings isn't plain,
> it's no basis to conclude they couldn't possibly resemble any,
> given practice of interpretation. But don't worry about it; they
> don't have to be identical, anyhow. The argument that Sayan
> forwarded claims de Man is trying to avoid the damnation which he
> so richly deserves by steering clear of "empirical _facts_."
> What I've pointed out in reply (by now I must be getting close to
> a half-dozen times) is that absent interpretation, the _facts_
> won't damn anybody. So the argument fails -- if it was right, de
> Man, or rather his unconscious (because that's supposed to be
> what's at work) would have steered straight toward them, strictly
> ignoring the Sirens of interpretation.
Zeleny:
> Your pointing-out must give you great comfort, since its probative
> force is no greater than that of parrotlike squawks. Socrates
> dedicated his life to the proposition that virtue is knowledge,
> which directly contradicts your contention that facts alone won't
> suffice to damn anybody. Your gainsaying adds nothing new to the
> issue.
You've got the shoe on the wrong foot -- the gainsaying (as you
like to say) is coming from you. And you're doing a very poor job
of it, since you have yet to give a substantial criticism. Socrates'
proposition doesn't contradict me in any observable way. I'm
standing by what I've said -- if you can make a cogent objection, go
ahead; if not, keep on as you are.
Zeleny:
>>No postwar court ever
>>concerned itself with the mens rea of a collaborationist hack, much
>>less the interpretation of his clarion call for ethnic purification
>>of Europe.
Moggin:
>> Ever hear of Nuremberg? (A postwar court which concerned itself
>>with that kinda thing.) Anyway, the accusations against de Man
>>are based on his articles in _Le Soir_ -- unless you put them forward
>>for interpretation, there isn't a case.
Zeleny:
>>First of all, Nuremberg was not the venue for judging collaborationist
>>hacks.
Moggin:
>> Of course not -- but it concerned itself with "clarion calls" for
>>the "ethnic purification of Europe" on the part of some well known
>>Nazis; so statements of that sort were a concern of the postwar courts.
Zeleny:
>> Nuremberg was excused from this concern by Goebbels' suicide.
Moggin:
> And yet Nuremberg didn't excuse itself: it retained a concern
> for the statements and beliefs of the defendents about the Final
> Solution.
Zeleny:
> Only in so far as they entered into the actus reus.
Naturally.
[...]
Zeleny:
>>>>Secondly, interpretation is still not on the judicial menu in
>>>>the relevant cases such as the one I cited above. There are legal
>>>>distinctions that could be plausibly grounded in interpretive issues.
>>>>A classic example is the distinction between murder and involuntary
>>>>manslaughter, which entirely rests upon mens rea, in the presence or
>>>>absence of malice aforethought that is the mental element for murder.
>>>>Given that mens rea must be imputed on the basis of verbal and factual
>>>>evidence, you could make a claim that the extent of judicial damnation
>>>>is subject to the vagaries of interpretation. But the brute fact of
>>>>judging a defendant innocent or guilty almost never is so dependent,
>>>>certainly not when he is charged with collaboration with Nazis.
Moggin:
>>> One more time. While you might describe any given judgement as a
>>> "brute fact," no brute fact will lead directly to a conviction. To
>>> convict a person requires interpreting the facts of their behavior, no
>>> matter how brutal it may have been. So interpretation is _always_ a
>>> part of the judicial process (whether or not it's printed on the menu).
Zeleny:
>> Your repeated asseveration of this doctrine against all evidence to
>> the contrary is duly noted.
Moggin:
> While you've got your steno pad out, jot down that such evidence
> has been lacking.
Zeleny:
> The evidence has been entered overwhelmingly: the fact that the
> practice of legal judgment does not respect, much less acknowledge
> your Humean dogma, is a matter of court record. Go back to traffic
> court.
That "fact" seems more like a falsehood, as demonstrated by the
existence of the legal system. If the facts alone were enough to
convict, laws, courts, and trials would be unnecessary; yet the last
time I checked, there was an abundance (some would even say an
overabundance) of them. Take traffic court. That's a place where a
judge weighs the evidence, listens to the arguments, considers the
law, and offers her interpretation. In specific, her judgement. If
she was strictly limited to the facts, she couldn't function as a
judge -- she'd be restricted to repeating them. Given evidence that
I was driving at such-and-such a speed, all she could do would be
repeat, "You were driving at such-and-such a speed." To decide that
I'm guilty requires interpreting the fact that I was driving at a
certain speed as a sign of my guilt or innocence.
In other words, she decides whether to read the speed of my car
as an act of "speeding" on my part. The latter isn't obvious from
the former. For instance, call it a "fact" I'm driving 65 m.p.h. on
a given stretch of U.S. road. That makes me a law-abiding citizen.
No, it makes me a law-breaker; no, it makes me a law-abiding citizen
again. What's going on? Simple: the _facts_ stay the same (I'm
driving the same speed on the same piece of highway), but the speed
limit keeps changing. It was 70 m.p.h. to begin with. Then the
federal gov't. imposed the famous double-nickel -- and then the feds
relented and let it go back up to 65. The interpretation of the
facts kept altering, and my "guilt" or "innocence" shifted alongside
it -- even though the _facts_ of my behavior remained the same.
[...]
Zeleny:
Moggin:
Zeleny:
Moggin:
Zeleny:
Moggin:
Zeleny:
> If there is nothing questionable about Brasillach's conviction,
> by parity of reasoning there is nothing questionable about de
> Man's characterization as a junior league Brasillach, or for
> that matter your characterization as a would-be inheritor of
> de Man's sophistical credentials.
Parity of bullshitting, that should be, since de Man, unlike
Brasillach, wasn't ever convicted. On the contrary, he was released
by the Belgian prosecutor without any charges. And even _if_ we
said, for the sake of argument, that he had been convicted, it still
wouldn't be plain how much or little he resembled Brasillach.
That's not to say it's impossible to compare them -- simply that one
would need to _make_ the comparison, as opposed to waving in its
general direction. Take for example Alice Kaplan -- she's done just
what you haven't: examined de Man's _Le Soir_ articles in the
context of francophone collaboration. (You'll be happy to know that
Brasillach gets a whole section.)
Zeleny:
Moggin:
Zeleny:
> It is a fact that de Man could have abstained from collaborating
> with the Nazis. Since moral responsibility depends on the ability
> to act morally, which is a fact, there is no distinction between
> brute facts and moral judgments. And none of your repetitive
> claims to the contrary will impugn this argument in the absence
> of counterargument, as distinct from gainsaying.
Your reasoning is defective -- "there is no distinction between
brute facts and moral judgments" doesn't follow from "moral
responsibility depends on the ability to act morally." I see you've
slipped in an additional premise, though: that "the ability to act
morally" is a fact. Which isn't plain. Once you've determined what
"moral behavior" consists of, you can go on to look at any, given
situation and see whether or not it would be possible there. That's
what you're calling a "fact." But the "fact" concerns the options
for behavior that will fall within your interpretation of "moral act."
Zeleny:
>> >>If you could restrict the judge to the facts whilst maintaining their
>> >>Humean distinction from the norms, you would merely make him into a
>> >>legal positivist. Curiously enough, not even the numerous legal
>> >>positivists flattening their spotted arses on traffic court perches
>> >>across this country feel compelled to engage in haruspicy before
>> >>handing down your sentence. The brute facts suffice.
Moggin:
>> > Of course they don't: that's what I just finished explaining to
>> >you. The mere fact that you were driving at such a speed on such a
>> >highway doesn't suffice to establish your "guilt" or "innocence." To
>> >make it into a _crime_ requires wheeling an entire system of
>> >interpretation into play. Which is just what happens, beginning with
>> >the moment when some cop decides that you can help him meet his
>> >monthly quota of tickets. It's what turns the _fact_ about the speed
>> >of your car into a _judgement_ that you were "speeding."
Zeleny:
>> Your sleight of hand is in presupposing that the "wheeling" of an
>> entire system of interpretation into play is arbitrary.
Moggin:
> Couldn't be, since I haven't made any such presupposition -- I'm
> just pointing out that it's required for the purposes I described.
> You want to argue that laws on speeding in the U.S. are governed only
> by the highest and most perfect necessity, fine. And good luck.
Zeleny:
> The argument is made for me in _De interpretatione_, which introduces
> the terms in question and relates their predication to the passage of
> time. Consider educating yourself about the issues before choosing
> sides. Again, the point is that temporal priority is tantamount to
> relative necessity of the past with respect to anything more recent,
> including most conspicuously the present.
You seem to be mistaken -- to be on the safe side, I checked in
Aristotle, and sure enough, he doesn't mention your name anywhere.
Zeleny:
>> But the
>> letter of the law is always prior to the actus reus, and therefore
>> necessary relative to it. And so, in most cases, is the interpretive
>> precedent. Now, if you want to classify the practice of fitting the
>> actus reus to legal precedent as hermeneutics, you have to show some
>> relevant similarities between what takes place in the courtroom and
>> what transpires in a library.
Moggin:
> Really? Why would I have to do that? But o.k. -- in both spots,
> people use copy machines. There you go. Seemed like a pointless
> exercise, but anything to make you happy. (Incidentally, you brought
> in the term "hermeneutics." It's perfectly fine with me, but if
> you've become disenchanted with it, kindly address your objections to
> yourself.)
Zeleny:
> A comic reductio is not an argument recognized for its validity.
> Unsurprisingly, it figures most prominently among the sophist's
> bag of tricks. Once again, with terms adjusted to your preference,
> if you want to classify the practice of fitting the actus reus to
> legal precedent as interpretation on par with that practiced by a
> deconstructionist prestidigitator delving into the relation between
> Jane Austen and the Masturbating Girl, you will have to show some
> *relevant* similarities between what takes place in the courtroom
> and what transpires at an MLA toss-off session. Go for it.
To repeat, the objection to speaking of "hermeneutics" belonged
to you, not me. (You already mixed yourself up with de Man -- now
you're having trouble telling you and me apart.) How you managed to
misunderstand the statement, "it's perfectly fine with me" I can't
guess. And as I just said, "I'm not even _trying_ to show that the
legal system and lit. crit. are identical."
Zeleny:
>> But even if I were to grant you this
>> much for the sake of the argument, this reclassification will get you
>> nowhere in refuting my point that the war crimes of Paul de Man differ
>> from the precedent set by Robert Brasillach only in degree, rather
>> than in kind.
Moggin:
> You're short a few things: to speak of a "reclassification" you
> may or may not be willing to "grant," you'll have to establish both
> a classification and its claim to priority -- a claim with sufficient
> strength to put you into the business of handing out grants, or
> witholding them, from anyone who so much as happens to depart from it.
> What that means, in this instance, is that you'll need to show that
> it's possible to make judgemnts without ever resorting interpretation
> of any kind (except in those presumably rare cases where, in an
> untypical act of generosity, you make a special dispensation for that
> otherwise unnecessary and indeed, inapplicable term). That done, you
> can try explaining why I should care about your opinions concerning
> de Man's ostensible resemblence to Brasillach, or anyone else you may
> name. (Although I admit that if you said Donnie Osmond, it would
> pique my curiosity.)
Zeleny:
> You already have a counterexample to your claim: a demonstration
> of fact, namely the speed of a vehicle driven by X in excess of
> the posted absolute speed limit suffices to secure a conviction
> of X for breaking the speed limit law.
As I've already observed, your example illustrates my point --
the "brute fact" is my speed on a certain stretch of road. Taken by
itself, it's simply a measurement. The reading on my speedometer
is just a report on the speed that I'm driving my car -- to judge me
guilty or innocent requires interpreting it. And that's just what
you've done here -- you've taken the fact that I was driving at some
number of miles-per-hour and interpreted it in light of the posted
speed limit. Since my car was going faster than the law happened to
allow, you were able read my speed as "breaking the law" and
"speeding."
> As regards your reasons
> for caring about de Man's moral paradeigmata, my guess is that
> they are analogous to your manifest caring about de Man as your
> own moral paradigm. Aim a bit higher, and you will be just like
> Brasillach.
You misunderstand. I'm quite interested in de Man; what's not
clear to me is why I should necessarily have an interest in your
opinions. (Better check your paperwork, by the way. It looks like
you've made another mistake on your manifest.)
-- Moggin
Andy Lowry
Zeleny, on Andy's skepticism re: biographical impingement on reading:
> > Get real. It is a critical commonplace that such impingement takes
> > place. We naturally read _A Farewell to Arms_ through the historical
> > experience of WWI, particularly as lived by Ernest Hemingway.
"Nature" is precisely the appropriate adverb here, & the one I'm
disinclined to take as implying how we ought to read, or what ways of
reading are good.
But even if WWI and Hem's life bore us, we may well read "Farewell" & love
it because it's beautifully written, or because we find it to convey
truths beyond biographical trivia. Further, there is no reason to think
that anything about Hem's real-life romances or degradations tells us how
to read the book.
> > To read
> > it otherwise requires an argument to the effect that the meaning of
> > literary texts is somehow autonomous, in the sense of being independent
> > of the circumstances of their production.
Not at all; it requires only that their reading be potentially
independent. Which it generally is; Silke mentioned the "Phaedrus."
> > While the roots of all such
> > arguments are to be found in the head of Gorgias, its modern expression
> > is due to Marcel Proust's ad hominem polemic contre Sainte-Beuve, which
> > I already rebutted in this thread. Not much else than an ad hominem
> > rebuttal is called for, because the Gorgian argument is essentially an
> > ad hominem one, sustaining the irrationalist conviction that an effect
> > not only can be, but ought to be understood in isolation from its cause.
Is there any need to dive into the morass of causality? What is the
"cause" of my feeling anything when I read "Farewell"--Hem's experiences,
or the words on the page? I begin to amuse myself thinking of rewriting
deconstruction in Aristotelian jargon ...
> > But there is nothing else but causes available for our understanding of
> > any phenomena in nature, as there is nothing else but reasons available
> > for our understanding of any concepts therein. To dirempt causes from
> > reasons in the manner of Proust or de Man is to subvert the possibility
> > of understanding.
No, no, no. The question is simply WHAT we're trying to understand:
Proust, or his novel. If you want to understand Proust, then by all
means, read the "Recherche" biographically (with due care, of course).
But if you're trying to construe the language of the novel, then
assumptions about the life/art relation tend to put on blinders. Vaguely
recalling an example out of Fish, it's wrong to read "A Rose for Emily" as
about one's aunt; it's also wrong to read it as about Bill Faulkner -- if
you're reading the story, & not your aunt, or B. F.
Why this gets taken for an extreme point of view, I don't know.
> > In each case, this misological subversion can be
> > plausibly understood as a shameful attempt to hide details of personal
> > life, because repudiation of impartial reason can be undertaken only
> > from the standpoint of private interest.
Here's where, rather than simply disagreeing with Zeleny, I find him
grandiose. (What's the French root, "daring much"?) "Can be" is weak;
and does the entire realm of the aesthetic count as shameful? As for the
part after "because," I find it high-phrased hand-waving--the ideas need
to be connected meaningfully to the discussion. WHO is repudiating
impartial reason?
-- Andy Lowry
Mikhail Zeleny
Andy Lowry <a...@Ra.MsState.Edu> wrote:
>Zeleny, on Andy's skepticism re: biographical impingement on reading:
>>Get real. It is a critical commonplace that such impingement takes
>>place. We naturally read _A Farewell to Arms_ through the historical
>>experience of WWI, particularly as lived by Ernest Hemingway.
>"Nature" is precisely the appropriate adverb here, & the one I'm
>disinclined to take as implying how we ought to read, or what ways
>of reading are good.
A familiar starting point for the sophist. In no time at all, you
will be telling me that reading against nature is the only way to go.
Your trouble is that without this extreme conclusion, your observation
amounts to nothing.
The relevant sense of nature is not the first inclination of the soul,
famously derided by Talleyrand as dangerous because the most noble,
though it can be brought into play later on, as we discuss the ethical
implications of deconstruction. Rather, it is the sense of being
definitive of and proper to the subject matter of our inquiry, the
sense of the Aristotelian ti esti in the Derrida passage I discussed
at the origin of this thread, and everything that ensues therefrom.
Recall that it is precisely the deconstructionist insistence to the
contrary, that a sign cannot be submitted to the question of its
nature, that is being questioned here. Since ought implies can, a
point you have missed on a previous occasion, the imputation of
inability must be addressed before addressing the issue of ought.
>But even if WWI and Hem's life bore us, we may well read "Farewell" &
>love it because it's beautifully written, or because we find it to
>convey truths beyond biographical trivia. Further, there is no reason
>to think that anything about Hem's real-life romances or degradations
>tells us how to read the book.
Don't let me stop you from reading the book any way you please, be it
as a Bildungsroman, a cryptohomoerotic paean, a manual for the proper
deployment of golf clubs, or a diagnostic treatise on gonorrhea. The
salient point is that in its capacity as a sign, Hemingway's book has
a determinate significance grounded in its author's lived experience,
a significance that enters into its nature or ti esti. If you wish to
take the side of the deconstructors, it is incumbent upon you to argue
to the contrary, instead of retailing the platitude that the same book
can also be taken in any number of other ways. Otherwise your claim
reduces to the logical form that meaning being what you can make of
it, a shortage of toilet tissue brings on the condition of literature
being full of shit.
>>To read
>>it otherwise requires an argument to the effect that the meaning of
>>literary texts is somehow autonomous, in the sense of being independent
>>of the circumstances of their production.
>Not at all; it requires only that their reading be potentially
>independent. Which it generally is; Silke mentioned the "Phaedrus."
Silke's mentioning stands in the same relation to dialectics as yonder
shitty scraps stand to literature. In other words, it proves only
that Plato is as susceptible to willful misinterpretation as any other
writer. But I suppose that it has the academic value of fabricating a
prestigious genealogy for her views, provided that one can get past
the incongruousness of a logically deficient, Greekless "old-fashioned
hermeneut" proudly fashioning herself into an institutionally certified
authority on Greek philosophy. At any rate, her refusal to preserve
her ephemeral pronouncements for future scrutiny betokens her opinion
of their value to the preemption of any need for serious consideration.
The flies of the marketplace are a proper subject for an entomologist,
not a philosopher.
>>While the roots of all such
>>arguments are to be found in the head of Gorgias, its modern expression
>>is due to Marcel Proust's ad hominem polemic contre Sainte-Beuve, which
>>I already rebutted in this thread. Not much else than an ad hominem
>>rebuttal is called for, because the Gorgian argument is essentially an
>>ad hominem one, sustaining the irrationalist conviction that an effect
>>not only can be, but ought to be understood in isolation from its cause.
>Is there any need to dive into the morass of causality? What is the
>"cause" of my feeling anything when I read "Farewell"--Hem's experiences,
>or the words on the page? I begin to amuse myself thinking of rewriting
>deconstruction in Aristotelian jargon ...
Diving into the morass of causality is infinitely preferable to being
stuck in the quagmire of sentimentality. The fixation on your feeling
anything whatsoever when you read a given text is certainly at odds
with understanding it. For consider that if Hemingway's book has a
determinate meaning, neither you nor your feelings can modify it for
trivial chronological reasons, assuming, as the appearances suggest,
that you were at best in the planning stage at the time Papa sucked
down on his 12-gauge. Your thinking otherwise is spurious arrogation
of power to change the past.
>>But there is nothing else but causes available for our understanding of
>>any phenomena in nature, as there is nothing else but reasons available
>>for our understanding of any concepts therein. To dirempt causes from
>>reasons in the manner of Proust or de Man is to subvert the possibility
>>of understanding.
>No, no, no. The question is simply WHAT we're trying to understand:
>Proust, or his novel. If you want to understand Proust, then by all
>means, read the "Recherche" biographically (with due care, of course).
>But if you're trying to construe the language of the novel, then
>assumptions about the life/art relation tend to put on blinders.
>Vaguely recalling an example out of Fish, it's wrong to read "A Rose
>for Emily" as about one's aunt; it's also wrong to read it as about
>Bill Faulkner -- if you're reading the story, & not your aunt, or B. F.
I don't know Faulkner's text and don't care to discuss Fish. Again,
the only relevant critic is Derrida, and I will be happy to discuss
any of the texts he purports to read, within the limitations of my
familiarity therewith. For practical purposes, this means Baudelaire
and Mauss in _Donner le temps_, or Plato in _La dissimulation_, or if
you insist, Jean-Jacques in _De la grammatologie_, in decreasing order
of preference. But let us address the theoretical point first. The
question of what we are trying to understand is logically posterior to
the rationalist thesis that understanding is possible, in the sense of
being prempted by its refutation, such as is attempted by deconstruction.
>Why this gets taken for an extreme point of view, I don't know.
Because denying intrinsic nature to signs is an extreme position.
Consider a legal analogy: some judges espouse natural law; others
favor historicist interpretation; yet others are positivists; but
there are no self-professed interpretive nihilists on the bench.
>>In each case, this misological subversion can be
>>plausibly understood as a shameful attempt to hide details of personal
>>life, because repudiation of impartial reason can be undertaken only
>>from the standpoint of private interest.
>Here's where, rather than simply disagreeing with Zeleny, I find him
>grandiose. (What's the French root, "daring much"?) "Can be" is weak;
>and does the entire realm of the aesthetic count as shameful? As for the
>part after "because," I find it high-phrased hand-waving--the ideas need
>to be connected meaningfully to the discussion. WHO is repudiating
>impartial reason?
The weakness is intentional: I never claimed to put forth anything
more certain than an interpretive hypothesis. Any realm that serves
to obfuscate the truth is shameful. Now we experience truth through
causes and explain it through reasons. The postulate of explanatory
rationalism is that to each cause there corresponds a reason, whereas
a consequence of determinism is that each reason is necessitated by a
cause. Together, these two principles make understanding possible.
Hence to dirempt causes from reasons is to subvert the possibility of
understanding -- though perhaps not to preempt it altogether. But it
is up to the sophist to tell us how understanding could be achieved,
except by congruence of reasons and causes.
_____________________________________________________________________
My translation of Derrida from the original article follows:
The reassuring evidence wherein the Western tradition had to
organize itself and must continue to live even now, would
therefore be as follows: The order of the signified is never
contemporaneous, is at best the inverse or the parallel subtly
displaced -- displaced by the time of a breath -- from the
order of the signifier. And the sign must be the unity of a
heterogeneity, since the signified (sense or thing, noema or
reality) is not in itself a signifier, a _trace_: at any rate
is not constituted in its sense by its relation to a possible
trace. The formal essence of the signified is the _presence_,
and the privilege of its proximity to the logos as _phone_ is
the privilege of the presence. This is the inevitable response
as soon as one inquires: "What is the sign?", that is to say,
when one submits the sign to the question of theessence, to
the "ti esti". The "formal essence" of the sign cannnot be
determined, except in terms of the presence. One cannot avoid
this response, except by recusing the very form of the question
and beginning to think that the sign [is] that ill-named [thing],
the only one, that escapes the founding question of philosophy:
"What is...?"
_____________________________________________________________________
Cordially -- Mikhail * God: "Sum id quod sum." Descartes: "Cogito ergo
sum." Zel...@math.ucla.edu *** Popeye: "Sum id quod sum et id totum est
quod sum." itinerant philosopher *** will think for food ** www.ptyx.com
** M...@ptyx.com ptyx, 7576 W Willow Glen Road, LA, CA 90046,
213-876-8234/213-876-8054 (fax) Come to the Alonzo Church Archive at
http://www.alonzo.org **** 213-874-9358
T.H. Chance
>In article <63ilnf$o1d$1...@netnews.upenn.edu> wein...@mail2.sas.upenn.edu
writes:
>>Andy Lowry (a...@Ra.MsState.Edu) wrote:
>>[...]
>>: > Do you have any evidence of Plato's having put forth
>>: > similar claims of textual undecidability, or are you donning his
>>: > chiton in a fatuous appeal ad verecundiam?
>>
>>: You didn't mention "textual undecidability" in the paragraph I replied to,
>>: did you? I was thinking of how the polis regarded that Socrates fellow
>>: with his nattering about how we can't even say what virtue is.
>>
>>Try Phaedrus as well:
In a nousless attempt to support Mr. Lowry in his polemic against Mr.
Zeleny, Silke quotes Hackforth零 translation of Plato's Phaedrus (278 B 8
- D 1), which goes as follows:
>>"Do you now go and tell Lysias that we two went down to the stream where
>>is the holy place of the nymphs, and there listened to words which
>>charged us to deliver a message, [...] that if any of
>>them has done his work with a knowledge of the truth, can defend his
>>statements when challenged, and can demonstrate the inferiority of his
>>writings out of his own mouth, he ought not to be designated by a name
>>drawn from those writings, but by one that indicates his serious
>>pursuit." Which is, needless to say, philosopher.
Silke writes:
>>We may read this to mean that every written text is, indeed, in potential
>>need of paraphrase,
Not if one knows how to read Greek. There is no reference at all in this
passage (278 B 8 - D 1) to the need for "paraphrase". In fact, the Greek
word *paraphrasis* is not even in the text. Here, Plato is being very
precise. He mentions three different types of logoi (speech writing,
poetry, and law writing), each given three concrete embodiments in the
historical figures Lysias, Homer, and Solon; cf. 278 E 1 - 2. Thus, Plato
is not referring to "every written text." Consequently, Silke has
committed, as they say in the language of fallacy, a "hasty
generalization" or "secundum quid."
The only mention of philosophical discourse in this passage is in the use
of logOn (at 278 B 9), which are heard (Ekousamen), not written.
In this passage, Plato is establishing the conditions (ei
men.....apodeixai) on the basis of which a poet, a speech writer, or a law
writer can be converted into and so renamed "philosopher." Those
conditions are very clear: He must know "how truth holds" (hE to alEthes
exhei), which is then explicated by *kai* through *apodeixai*.
Silke continues:
>and there is nothing in the passage above to suggest
>>that this paraphrase, if written down in turn, wouldn't necessitate
>>another, ad infinitum, and certainly nothing to suggest that Plato's
>>written dialogues are in any sense exempt.
There is nothing in this passage about my grandmother either. There are an
infinite number of things which ARE NOT (ta mE onta) in the above passage.
As we know from the Sophist (256 E 6), "that which is not" (to mE on) or
"otherness" (thateron) is infinitely distributed (apeiron de plEthei); in
fact, the most widely distributed of all the megista genE. What Silke
needs to do, if she wants to be taken seriously as woman who can interpret
Plato in a socially responsible manner, is to tell us what is actually
there, in the Greek text itself. It is the sophistEs or sophistria who
hides in the darkness of Not Being (254 A 4-5).
Should Silke or any other beginner in Greek Philosophy need more technical
assistance in reading Plato's Greek in an adequate (hikanOs) manner, be
sure to let me know.
regards,
thc
Puss in Boots
Mikhail Zeleny <m...@ptyx.com>:
> At any rate, her refusal to preserve
> her ephemeral pronouncements for future scrutiny betokens her opinion
> of their value to the preemption of any need for serious consideration.
> The flies of the marketplace are a proper subject for an entomologist,
> not a philosopher.
That's why philosophers never concern themselves with Socrates.
-- Moggin
Ron Hardin
> Mikhail Zeleny (m...@ptyx.com) wrote:
>
> [...]
> : At any rate, her refusal to preserve
> : [Silke] ephemeral pronouncements for future scrutiny betokens her opinion
> : of their value to the preemption of any need for serious consideration.
If you hear the stars in ``consideration,'' then ``ephemeral'' resonates
pleasantly and the sentence becomes excellent.
David Christopher Swanson
> You are postulating a post-Platonic difference, but I'm used to that --
> Zeleny does it all the time. As you well know (well, I don't know you so
> here's some credit flying your way), Aristotle still grouped Plato's
> dialogues with poetry.
Yeah, I've always had a hard time figuring out how a Platonic rejection
of poetry doesn't reject itself. How do we define art so as to exclude
the dialogues?
DCS
http://www.cstone.net/~dcswan
"Leonardo virtually announced the birth of the method of science when
he said that true knowledge begins with opinion. The saying involves a
revolution; no other statement could be so shocking to traditional
logic." Dewey "Experience and Nature" p.124
David Christopher Swanson
In article <63q6p2$9m5$1...@netnews.upenn.edu>
wein...@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) writes:
> Well, the _Republic_ doesn't reject poetry per se -- it leaves a few
> loopholes for the acceptable kind, what Chance would call "socially
> responsible" poetry -- of course, it's ironic, but since the text doesn't
> say, in Greek, "attention irony," it's lost on some readers (even good
> ones, Gadamer is amazing in this regard sometimes).
Hey, I'm missing it, and you just explained it to me, so I wouldn't be
too hard on him. What do you mean it's ironic? He does or does not
want to admit certain poetry? He does or does not specify what kind?
Mikhail Zeleny
> > At any rate, her refusal to preserve
> > her ephemeral pronouncements for future scrutiny betokens her opinion
> > of their value to the preemption of any need for serious consideration.
> > The flies of the marketplace are a proper subject for an entomologist,
> > not a philosopher.
> That's why philosophers never concern themselves with Socrates.
"Far from the marketplace and from fame happens all that is
great. Far from the marketplace and from fame the inventors
of new values have always dwelt."
Then again, Silke needs only to supplement her sycophants
Moggin and Andy with Plato and Xenophon as her amanuenses.
cordially,
mikhail zel...@math.ucla.edu a.k.a. m...@ptyx.com
writing from the disneyland of formal philosophy
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
-------------------==== Posted via Deja News ====-----------------------
Mikhail Zeleny
>> [...]
>>>At any rate, her refusal to preserve
>>>[Silke] ephemeral pronouncements for future scrutiny betokens her opinion
>>>of their value to the preemption of any need for serious consideration.
>If you hear the stars in ``consideration,'' then ``ephemeral'' resonates
>pleasantly and the sentence becomes excellent.
Sure, if you hear the stars in "consideration", then "ephemeral"
resonates with "femme", since your name is Festus, and you are
imputing a spurious etymology unsupported by anything in the
classical literary corpus. Thus the salient meaning of "hear"
is a synonym of "By the way, that reminds me..." in the lexicon
of a Borscht Belt comedian in his anecdotage. Henny Youngman as
the paradigm of deconstructionist critical thinking; gotta love it.
cordially,
mikhail zel...@math.ucla.edu a.k.a. m...@ptyx.com
writing from the disneyland of formal philosophy
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
-------------------==== Posted via Deja News ====-----------------------
David Christopher Swanson
In article <63qb8q$cei$1...@netnews.upenn.edu>
wein...@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) writes:
> : Hey, I'm missing it, and you just explained it to me, so I wouldn't be
> : too hard on him. What do you mean it's ironic? He does or does not
> : want to admit certain poetry? He does or does not specify what kind?
>
> First of all, Socrates is being coerced into discussing the whole thing,
> under threat of the Athenian power elite youth. Second, he'll get the
> hemlock for lack of socially responsible thinking -- as the reader already
> knows, obviously. Third, the argument against poetry is in part an
> argument against manipulation and misrepresentation while some of
> Socrates' advice is, explicitly, to manipulate the guardians through
> misrepresentation. Etc.
That's helpful. And I'm not being ironic. But my questions remain.
Maybe what you're saying is that Socra-Plato is making fun of the
accusations against Soc by taking them to absurd lengths in arguing
against poetry, and that all the philosophers who have since read this
straight are missing the joke. But as one who, unlike you, finds MOST
EVERYTHING in Plato to be - shall we say - lacking in intelligence, I
don't find the absurdness alone enough to make this case. Are there
supporting passages elsewhere? Is that what the rest of your previous
post was about?
Frieda Fieldmouse
In article <moggin-ya02408000...@news.mindspring.com>,
mog...@mindspring.com (Puss in Boots) wrote:
> Moggin:
>
> >> I just finished reading your entire argument, start to finish; it
> >> looks as though Silke is right. Your scenario clearly contains two
> >> (count 'em) interpretations -- the ones you labeled "B" and "C." It's
> >> also got a chain containing indefinitely more. Interpretation _has_
> >> occurred, and it won't stop. You do make a relevant assertion -- that
> >> those interpretations don't exist. Unfortunately, you don't support
> >> it, except with the statement that we don't understand them -- I don't
> >> see anywhere you support that, either; but even taking it as given,
> >> their non-existence wouldn't seem to follow.
>
> Frieda:
>
> > Let's start again. We are taking as given your view that there is no
> > understanding without a prior labour of interpretation. That means: in
> > order to understand anything, we have to interpret it and interpretation
> > is therefore ubiquitous, a necessary condition for the use of language
> > itself. This, as Wittgenstein points out, amounts to the view that
> > language is defective, that no sentence is complete without a rider
> > (Zusatz). A couple of other clarifications are in order.
>
> Seems to me we already need a few here. Despite your claims, you
> aren't addressing what I said -- what I said repeatedly, as you've
> observed.
Allow me to address things you've said. You said:
> To say that interpretation is
> impossible because the chain doesn't end would be like saying that
> if chains never have a final link, there can't be any chains. False,
> of course -- what would follow, in that case, would be that chains
> would never reach a link you could call "final" -- not that they were
> impossible. And what would follow, in the case of interpretation,
> would be that it's necessarily an open-ended process -- not that it's
> impossible to perform.
You also said:
> Anyway, none of this has got anything to do with my point, above.
> When you read a text and establish "what is says," "what it means,"
> and the relationship between the two, you've performed interpretation.
> You may be able to argue that your interpretation has qualities such
> as validity, necessity, self-evidence, truth, accuracy, adequacy, and
> moral virtue, but it won't be any less an interpretation. _That's_
> the argument you promised to show false; but as yet, you haven't even
> addressed it.
_That_, I repeat once again, is not an argument. It is a declaration.
The view it expresses amounts to this: whenever anyone understands
anything, and even when they don't, they must be interpreting. It makes
no argument as to why this must be the case. It just says that it must.
Yet that is precisely the view against which my arguments have been
directed, so it really is audacious (to say nothing of mendacious) of you
to claim that "Despite your claims, you aren't addressing what I said."
Your "arguments," of course, also rely on a defective metaphor (what,
pray tell, is a "chain that never has a final link" when we are talking
about a real, metal chain?).
Now, you say "interpretation has occurred and it won't stop." I've argued
that the notion that interpretation could *fail to stop* (i.e., that it go
on ad infinitum) is fraught with difficulties. You haven't addressed that
argument, which is directly germane to your assertions, and which I'll
summarize for you again as follows:
If interpretation had to go on ad infinitum, any single act of
interpretation would last forever or the chain would stop at an arbitrary
point. But if the chain can *stop*, that implies that there is at least
one interpretation (the one I stop on) that I can understand without
further interpretation. Therefore understanding without interpretation is
possible and you've contradicted yourself.
All of this is leaving aside the argument about the non-existence of
interpretations which clearly eludes you and is, in fact, just another way
of thinking about the problem.
>You've ignored every opportunity to reply. Instead, you're
> crafting me a position of your own.
Horseshit. Anyone who's looked at this debate can see that there's one
side that's producing arguments and another that's producing guff.
> Onward. The idea that language is defective doesn't invalidate a
> view of which it's part. Language may well have its flaws,
> shortcomings, defects, and limitations. But we needn't argue about it,
> because the view you're addressing doesn't "amount to the view that
> language is defective." It's easily possible (which isn't to say that
> it's required) to think that interpretation is part of the ordinary
> and adequate use of language.
Defective in the sense that: every sentence needs a rider (its interpretation).
> > One is that, if
> > interpretation is to mean anything, it has to involve some kind of effort
>
> This is how you clarify? You're the one who introduced the term
> "labour of interpretation" and you're the one who's employed it --
> I'm the one who _disputed_ it with you, writing, "Interpretation isn't
> necessarily a labor."
Oh really. So what is it? A nothing? By labour I did not mean to
suggest that it was laborious. But it is a mental act, an activity. Do
you dispute this? Do you believe that, when I interpret, I am doing
*nothing*? If I am doing *something*, then it is a labour.
> > This means that interpretation is a
> > process and it consequently takes some time (though perhaps not much).
> > As Wittgenstein put it: "To interpret is to think, to do something"
> > (Investigations, p. 213).
>
> I've got no problem with describing interpretation as a "process"
> -- I do it myself. But it seems as if the term has outfoxed you.
> (Y'know -- the bewitchments of language and all that.)
You really are insufferable.
> If you wanted
> to make it work better, you could say that the labor precedes the
> interpretation. With the work done ahead of time, the interpretation
> sometimes can write itself in an instant.
That "instant" cannot be zero time. That is the important point. Even if
it takes an instant, it takes time to interpret. Now, if interpretation
takes time and if there is no understanding without interpretation we are
led inexorably to both the endless chain of interpretations (we'll leave
aside the argument about how interpretation doesn't really even get off
the ground since it really is just another way of looking at the same
problem) and the following problem: if interpretation takes time (even an
instant) and if it is endless then any given interpretive act could never
finish.
>That may be what leads
> Wittgenstein to believe that he's not interpreting when he interprets
> a certain gesture as a threat: he's _already_ performed the
> necessary labor. He can tell a switchblade from a kitchen knife, and
> both of them from a rubber one. What's more, he knows what all of
> them can signify in a given situation. And he knows some stuff about
> situations, e.g., what it means to be in an alley, as opposed to a
> kitchen, and how that, in turn, has to be factored in, when trying to
> interpret the meaning of the knife. He knows how to interpret
> body-language and what to make of the expressions on somebody's face.
> Which makes him half-right: "There is no inner process of
> laborious interpretation" because the labor was already done -- which
> is also what allows him to believe himself when he says, "I simply
> react to what I see and hear."
Why do you call *this* interpreting? He doesn't interpret the difference
between a switchblade and a kitchen knife. He understands it. By
"understanding" I mean: he knows what each can be used for, indeed, he can
use them. But these are facts about the different kinds of knives, not
just "interpretations." Cf. the difference between stones and bread.
> "Suppose I had agreed on a code with someone; 'tower' means bank.
> I tell him, 'Now go to the tower' -- he understands me and acts
> accordingly, but he feels the word 'tower' to be strange in this use,
> it has not yet 'taken on' the meaning." Thus Wittgenstein
> (_Investigations_ 214). Now consider this person after some time has
> passed. Following W.'s suggestion, the word "tower" doesn't seem
> strange to him anymore when used to mean "bank." Its new meaning has
> "taken." Now ask him, "Are you using a code?" Comes the answer:
> "What? No, are you kidding? Why?" "Because you're interpreting the
> word "tower" as "bank," one explains. "You gotta be nuts," he says.
> "I'm not _interpreting_ anything -- I just understand what it means."
You've just made my point for me, which is: it must be possible to
understand some utterances without interpreting them. Now think of the
entire language this way and you'll agree with me.
> > Second, an interpretation of, say, an utterance
> > cannot merely be the repetition of the utterance itself. It must differ
> > from the utterance that is being interpreted. Third, if an interpretation
> > must differ from that of which it is the interpretation, then it must be
> > expressible in signs. In order to be *this particular interpretation*
> > rather than some other interpretation that it is not, the interpretation
> > must be capable of being enunciated. If you and I are looking at some
> > smoke signals and I say "What's your interpretation?", assuming you have
> > one you have to be able to tell me what it is.
>
> As you show here, the statement "An interpretation is something
> that is given in signs" is vulnerable to exaggeration -- in
> particular, it stands open to a reading of the kind, "Anything which
> _is_ an interpretation _must_ be given in signs," or "Nothing that
> isn't given, and given in signs, can be an interpretation."
That would be a stupid view and I thought I took sufficient precautions in
using the words "expressible," "capable," and "able" to describe this, all
of which are expressions of the mode of *possibility* and not
*necessity*. Then again, you seem to have trouble understanding the most
basic concepts. Perhaps your trouble is that you interpret everything
instead of trying to understand it. Anyway, it is clearly the case that
an interpretation must be able to be given in sings. As Derrida likes to
say, it is a necessary possibility.
>You may
> remember the idiot who argued in another thread, "If you had the
> answer, you would have given it." (Excuse me if the idiot was you.)
> Obviously one can have an answer and decide to keep it (or, as in
> the case I'm remembering, one may have given an answer, only to have
> it go unrecognized). Same here. If we're looking at some smoke
> signals and you ask for my interpretation, I _don't_ have to let you
> know what it is (assuming I have one). I have an alternative:
> ignoring you. That doesn't turn my interpretation into a pumpkin --
> it just means that you won't know what it is.
Talk about irrelevant. Nothing I said suggested that interpretations
*must* be given in signs. Only that they *must be able to be* given in
signs. Congratulations on demolishing your straw man.
> > Now, on your view, any
> > interpretation of the smoke signals that you offered me would itself be in
> > need of interpretation. Smoke signals (Text A) give rise to your
> > interpretation (Text B) which in turn gives rise to my interpretation of
> > your interpretation (Text C), which may or may not rest unspoken. But we
> > can't just leave it at Text C. Because we've excluded as a matter of
> > principle that a text can be understood without interpretation, Text C
> > will itself be in need of interpretation by a Text D and so on ad
> > infinitum. This view would seem to imply that interpretation is endless.
>
> Again, this has only a tenuous connection with what I've said in
> our discussion. Kindly drop the pretense of addressing my views
> until you reply to what I've written;
I have, repeatedly. If I missed something in your mass of verbiage (do
you live in this newsgroup or what?), please cite again the passage you'd
like to see addressed.
> I'd like to be less strict about this, but as we've seen, what you
> offer as "clarifications" would more aptly be called "distortions" --
> at the same time, you avoid coming to grips with the points that I
> _have_ made.
What do you mean by "points" you've "made"? You mean things you've asserted?
>It seems to be a pattern of
> yours -- just the other day you attributed a statement to Derrida and
> de Man that I don't believe either one of them ever made. (Silke
> requested a quote, but you never produced one.)
No, I did not attribute a statement to them. I attributed a viewpoint,
that they incontrovertibly share, and then explained why I would be
unlikely to find it stated nakedly in their work.
>You didn't respond, so I take that you prefer to not talk
> about them, and I'll be brief here. You claim that this view means
> interpretations don't exist. ("Our understanding of Text B turns
> out to have been in fact Text C and Text B does not exist.") Which
> requires somehow dispelling the interpretations that you just
> finished pointing to -- fortunately or unfortunately, your argument
> ain't got the mojo.
I stand by what I said. If what was taken to be Text B turns out to be
Text C and so on ad infinitum, we race to the end (which we never get to)
with none of our interpretations being produced.
> > As for your (you and Silke's) constant harping on what constitutes an
> > understanding as opposed to an interpretation, I note with interest that
> > Silke writes:
>
> I'm afraid you have it backwards: the harping has been yours.
> The distinction between "understanding" and "interpretation" is
> your central theme -- which makes it all the more strange that you
> refuse to explain how you use it.
I needn't put forward a full-blown epistemology in order to make the
argument I've made here. I tend to think of understanding in
Wittgenstein's terms as a capacity to use things (words, sentences). But
that really isn't germane to what we're talking about here.
> >At least I have an argument. All you apparently have is the declaration,
> >>repeated over and over, that all understanding requires interpretation. I
> >haven't seen an argument for that position and it is not self-evident.
>
> So you keep declaring; any time you want to supply an argument
> for that assertion, you go right ahead. Alternatively, you could
> address what I wrote, instead of either attempting to dismiss it or
> replacing it with a set of "clarifications."
This is disingenuous in the extreme. Time to put up or shut up, Moggin.
I'm through being the only generous party in this pissing contest (take
that however you like).
(You promised to
> show me wrong, remember?) But getting back to the point, you claim
> that although you have an _understanding_ of the statement, "It
> would be a salutary thing if all the Jews were rounded up and sent
> to an island somewhere," you can't be said to have _interpreted_ it.
> Problem is, the argument that you gave to support that claim was
> missing something: namely, any reasons you could maintain that you
> weren't interpreting.
Here are some reasons: it's a well-formed sentence in english and I'm a
native speaker of that language. The person who wrote it clearly means by
it that he thinks it would be a good thing if the Jews were sent off to an
island. No interpretation was necessary because I know what the words
mean and what their combination in that sentence means. If you think that
I have interpreted, then the onus is on you to show why you think so,
without relying on the view that all understanding requires
interpretation, which I've demolished. That view, which was De Man's (and
Barthes' and Foucault's) and is Derrida's, is incoherent, as I have
shown. You hold that view as well. Therefore you are confused, because
the view is incoherent. If you think I haven't demolished that view, then
I suggest you produce an argument against this passage specifically which
I reproduce here:
> > Let's suppose, as we have been, that any act of interpreting implies an
> > endless chain of interpretations. You say (A), which I interpret as (B)
> > which requires further interpretation into (C) and so on, ad infinitum.
> > Since this chain is *endless*, and since interpretation takes time, one
> > would expect that the interpretation of any given utterance would last
> > forever. Since this is manifestly not the case (it doesn't take me
> > *forever* to understand what people say to me), the chain of
> > interpretations must stop at some point. Now, what does it mean for the
> > chain of interpretations to *stop*? If, as a matter of principle, there
> > can be no understanding without interpretation, the chain can *never*
> > stop. Conversely, if you accept the idea that, at some point, the chain
> > stops (for practical reasons, whatever), then you accept the idea that at
> > least one interpretation (let's say Text X, the one you stop on) is not in
> > need of further interpretation to be understood. You have then accepted
> > the idea that contradicts your entire hermeneutic philosophy. For if you
> > can stop on Text X, why can you not stop on Text A?
>Anyway, what you _did_ say was that you
> weren't interpreting the statement at issue. (The one you provided
> about about rounding up Jews.) Which seems to be false; as I
> pointed out before, the statement would sound very different coming
> from a Nazi instead of a Zionist.
It is inconceivable that the statement would come from a Zionist, due to
the meaning of the words "rounded up" and "sent." Please note: this
meaning is not simply my interpretation of them. If a Zionist were to
utter these words, it could not be in his capacity as Zionist. Faced with
a Zionist uttering those words, I don't necessarily *interpret* the words
differently. Rather, because I understand the words, I may interpret that
my interlocutor is not a real Zionist.
You replied that you could
> figure out who said it using background knowledge, thus eliminating
> the need for interpretation. But as Silke and I pointed out to
> you, bringing your knowledge into play is no sign that you're _not_
> interpreting the statement -- if anything, it's one part of the
> process.
Nor is it a sign that I am interpreting the statement. So what's your point?
Be forewarned that my patience is running thin and my time is running
out. Unlike you, I cannot be connected to alt.postmodern 16 hours a day
so as to take you to task for every irrelevancy you might come up with in
one of your self-serving and self-admiring 400-line screeds.
Frieda
Mikhail Zeleny
Andy Lowry <a...@Ra.MsState.Edu> wrote:
>On Mon, 3 Nov 1997, Mikhail Zeleny wrote:
>[various snips due to ponderous length; "you(r)" in Zeleny = Moggin]
Moggin:
>>> You're referring to some folks who've given detailed readings
>>>(no matter how you judge the results). What you're offering is
>>>just some hand-waving in the direction of Vickers along with an ad
>>>hoc hypothesis that de Man concocted his work ad hoc. (Yes, the
>>>_Le Soir_ articles are manifest. One can't say the same for their
>>>relationship to the writing de Man did thirty years later.) But
>>>if you're content with that, then so am I.
>>You know better than call my hypothesis ad hoc. There are plenty of
>>substantive and methodological reasons to suppose that deconstruction
>>was de Man's way of evading guilt for his collaboration with the Nazis.
>Fine. Name three. (Since there are "plenty.") Let's hear three
>"substantive and methodological reasons to suppose" this assertion.
>We're all listening.
I did: vide infra. Learn to read, Mr. Lowry, learn to read ...
>>In the former category are the facts that it purports to do just that,
>>that de Man's postwar behavior demonstrably aimed at obfuscation and
>>falsification of his war record, and that it is generally in the human
>>nature to concoct an outlook that puts one in the most favorable light.
>This is why we're still waiting. "Postwar behavior"? Yeah, de Man
>pretty plainly lied or fudged on some occasions. That does not even
>REMOTELY give you "deconstruction was de Man's way of evading guilt."
>_Lying_ was his way of evading _public shame_.
To quote de Man quoting Archie Bunker, What's the difference?
>As for your exceedingly lame "it is generally ..." -- that proves
>NOTHING. Should we discount YOUR posts, on the grounds that "it is
>generally," etc.?
Sure thing -- as soon as I stake my reputation on the propositions
that nothing is true, that no text can be interpreted determinately,
and that no attribution of meaning or motive can be made reliably, you
should start looking for the lies and betrayals in my past, as a simple
matter of cui bono.
>>In the latter category, there are the principles of Sainte-Beuve and
>>Taine. And since I already cited both kinds of reasons in support of
>>my hypothesis, your deeming it ad hoc makes you a liar.
>Don't cite KINDS OF REASONS; cite _reasons_.
I did: vide supra. Learn to read, Mr. Lowry, learn to read ...
Zeleny:
>>>>Kindly save your charming vocatives for your arsehole buddies.
>>>>Robert Brasillach was executed for the same sort of collaborationist
>>>>propaganda that de Man indulged in. The difference between them was
>>>>in degree, not in kind. The court judged actus reus, with mens rea
>>>>never questioned, and interpretation never made into an issue. Deal
>>>>with it.
>And yet no Belgian court cared to convict de Man of anything, despite the
>thoroughly public nature of his actions. If every semi-collaborationist
>had been executed, WW2 would've claimed several million more lives.
So?
Moggin:
>>> That shouldn't come as any surprise: the world is chock-full
>>>of practices of interpretation.
>>Quite so. Furthermore, their manifest success gives the lie
>>to the deconstructionist gainsaying of the possibility of
>>interpretation.
>Not even close; "practices" doesn't equal success. Little distinctions
>like this are what you learn from close reading. Helps ya think, too.
A practice that does not succeed is a practice only in the nugatory
sense that your masturbation is a manifestation of your sexuality.
Zeleny:
>>>> Consequently it cannot be identical to the interminably deferred
>>>> interpretive chimaera that de Man conjures in his deconstructionist
>>>> doctrines. Case closed.
>Awfully eager to close the case without demonstrating anything!
Attempting to demonstrate to a sterile mind is as futile as attempting
to impregnate a mirror image.
>>Your pointing-out must give you great comfort, since its probative
>>force is no greater than that of parrotlike squawks. Socrates
>>dedicated his life to the proposition that virtue is knowledge,
>>which directly contradicts your contention that facts alone won't
>>suffice to damn anybody. Your gainsaying adds nothing new to the
>>issue.
>Oh, Plato is that simple, right? "Virtue is knowledge." Learn to read,
>Mr. Zeleny, learn to read ...
I know reading well enough to muster a direct quotation, though
perhaps not well enough to undermine it by imputing antinomian
implications to its surroundings.
>>It is a fact that de Man could have abstained from collaborating
>>with the Nazis. Since moral responsibility depends on the ability
>>to act morally, which is a fact, there is no distinction between
>>brute facts and moral judgments.
>I just wanted to make sure everybody read this stunning syllogism ...
It is actually a trivial application of modus tollens: since ought
implies can, the fact of lacking ability entails the value of lacking
obligation.
Mikhail Zeleny
In article <Pine.SOL.3.96.971102...@Ra.MsState.Edu>
>>Andy Lowry <a...@Ra.MsState.Edu> wrote:
>>Mikhail Zeleny wrote:
>>>>I dismiss Paul de Man's corpus no more and no less than I dismiss
>>>>_Mein Kampf_, valuing both as historically significant specimens of
>>>>misological polemic that deserve a prominent place in any scholarly
>>>>library in the humanities, under the rubric of the repudiation of
>>>>reason and the pathologies of rhetoric.
>>>If I recall my reception history correctly, people were putting Kant in
>>>the same part of the library after the 1st Critique. Can't speak for
>>>Hitler, but de Man is interested in testing the limits of "interpretive
>>>reason" (my term, not his) & especially its often covert reliance on
>>>aesthetic categories held questionable by reason itself. Mikhail only
>>>makes himself appear stupid when he fails to distinguish between such a
>>>project and "the repudiation of reason." Reason's discovering its own
>>>limits scarcely equals its self-repudiation -- or does he take Plato to
>>>have initiated the "repudiation of reason"?
>>You seem to be forgetting that "all readings are in error because
>>they assume their own readability." What power licenses you to read
>>my critique of de Man apodictically, instead of following its target
>>by imputing allegory?
>Oh, dear. What power? The power of my own attempt at reading de Man.
In other words, you do not bother to apply de Man's interpretive
nihilism to his own text, his antisemitic screeds excepted. Why am I
not surprised?
>And, tho I haven't a dictionary handy, can one "impute allegory"? or
>does it have to be imputed _to_ somehow?
Not if Johnson, Tennyson, Swift, Gibbon, or Herbert are to be admitted
as qualified English writers.
>The point of the quote, out of context, seems to be that when a reading
>forgets its own textuality, it risks error; risks being taken
>apodictically, if you like. Nothing in de Man ever suggests that we can
>_evade_ this problem, so neither I nor PdM are contradicting ourselves.
Then you should have no trouble deconstructing my evaluation of de Man
into a sycophantic encomium. Herewith is a clue: "valuing" from being
worthy; "misological polemic" from a just contraphallogocentric war
against patriarchic hegemony of binary oppositions foisted upon the
self-anointed intelligentsia by the tyranny of demonstrative reason;
"rubric" will enable you to invoke red chalk and drag in Freud's roter
Fadian for a gratuitous digression into psychoanalysis, culminating in
the Foucauldian exposition of the tension between the free play of
sexuality and the social straightjacket of heterocentric relations
implicit in the divorce proceedings of "repudiation", inveigling
against the arbitrarily clinical construction of "pathologies", and
retiring for a productive interlude of kike-baiting and fistfucking.
>>In what sense is asseverating that "Allegories
>>are always allegories of metaphor and, as such, they are always
>>allegories of the impossibility of reading" an instance of testing
>>the limits of interpretive reason rather than dogmatically positing
>>its impotence?
>Well, if that were PdM's entire essay, it would be dogmatic. (Not
>that I think you have any problem with dogmatic assertion.) As
>Moggin pointed out to me, this isn't the kind of claim that could
>be theoretically demonstrated "apodictically." Having read lots of
>de Man, I find the idea at least superficially persuasive, though
>I'm planning to study him in greater detail with an open mind.
In other words, taking superficial persuasion in lieu of rational
demonstration is what deconstruction is all about.
>>Do you have any evidence of Plato's having put forth
>>similar claims of textual undecidability, or are you donning his
>>chiton in a fatuous appeal ad verecundiam?
>You didn't mention "textual undecidability" in the paragraph I replied
>to, did you? I was thinking of how the polis regarded that Socrates
>fellow with his nattering about how we can't even say what virtue is.
That Socrates fellow only nattered against those purporting to say
what virtue is. Note that it is very different from nattering about
how we can't even say what virtue is, as the erotetic differs from the
apodictic.
>>How does reception history modify the nature of the message being
>>received? After WWII, Dewey amended his obiter dicta on German
>>intellectual history to identify Kant among the causes of National
>>Socialism.
>Then Dewey said something really stupid, didn't he?
So it seems.
>>Did his reception of Kantian ethics, as corroborated
>>by the authorities of Adolf Eichmann and Ayn Rand, determine the
>>meaning of the Categorical Imperative thenceforth?
>How precious to find Eichmann and Rand cited as parallel authorities!
>I think Rand was a _little_ brighter than Eichmann, but neither of them
>seems to have known shit about Kant.
Like Dewey, both of them were pragmatists, in their own inimitable ways.
>>Your reading ability will increase dramatically once you learn
>>to distinguish the thing from the way it has been understood.
>All of us would benefit from this. But, Mikhail, look back: I was
>insulting you. Sorry you missed the point.
There was nothing to miss. What you are overlooking is that insults
by definition have no point.
>[snip]
>>>Discovering that de Man collaborated does _not_ demonstrate that anyone
>>>was "duped" by his later writings. Such a demonstration seems to escape
>>>the powers of those posting their adjectives here.
>>Bad logic. I was not adducing de Man's collaboration as evidence
>>of "anyone" having been duped by his later writings. My point
>>rests squarely on Melissa's own florid confession of traumatic
>>mesmerizing.
>None of which seemed to me to support her having been "duped."
So be seemed to more scrupulously.
Mikhail Zeleny
Philip A. Gunderson <pgun...@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>>Get real. It is a critical commonplace that such impingement takes
>>place. We naturally read _A Farewell to Arms_ through the historical
>>experience of WWI, particularly as lived by Ernest Hemingway. To read
>>it otherwise requires an argument to the effect that the meaning of
>>literary texts is somehow autonomous, in the sense of being independent
>>of the circumstances of their production. While the roots of all such
>>arguments are to be found in the head of Gorgias, its modern expression
>>is due to Marcel Proust's ad hominem polemic contre Sainte-Beuve, which
>>I already rebutted in this thread. Not much else than an ad hominem
>>rebuttal is called for, because the Gorgian argument is essentially an
>>ad hominem one, sustaining the irrationalist conviction that an effect
>>not only can be, but ought to be understood in isolation from its cause.
>>But there is nothing else but causes available for our understanding of
>>any phenomena in nature, as there is nothing else but reasons available
>>for our understanding of any concepts therein. To dirempt causes from
>>reasons in the manner of Proust or de Man is to subvert the possibility
>>of understanding. In each case, this misological subversion can be
>>plausibly understood as a shameful attempt to hide details of personal
>>life, because repudiation of impartial reason can be undertaken only
>>from the standpoint of private interest.
>What's being picked up on here is Kant's "antinomy of pure
>reason"--specifically as regards causality--you find yourself in a
>contradiction whichever position you take. Setting of context as the
>origin of text is, I fully agree, a requirement of language and thought.
>Unfortunately it's somewhat difficult (yes I'm being facetious) to
>demonstrate the origins of discursivity (forgive the preciosity of my
>phrasing). Historicist literary criticism has never had any means of
>justifying the claim that events A,B, and C, led to the formal qualities
>of text Z. De Man and other deconstructionists will pick up on this
>antinomy and say that it is language itself that makes possible the
>positing of causality--language causes "causes"--which is of course still
>caught within the antinomy. In this sense, langauge is autonomous from
>history/context; one of de Man's more upsetting claims statements is that
>there is something utterly "inhuman" in language. Cutting causes off from
>effects is, moreover, exactly what Hume does in his epistemological
>speculations. As far as I am aware, no one has ever developed a refutation
>of Hume (Kant's "awakening" is about the categories of thought involved in
>causality, not a refutation). Neither the historicist nor the formalist
>approaches to language can be maintained--nor can either be abandoned. But
>at least the deconstructionists call attention to their inability to
>transcend appeals to signifieds--which seems rather more modest than making
>grand historical claims (e.g., that Kant's thought had a hand in producing
>fascism). But, of course, where would we be if we didn't make such
>historical claims?
Consider the technique of your reading. You pick on Kant's antinomian
pure reason in the Analytic without mentioning that it is superseded
by the synthetic aspects of the Dialectic. Then you adduce Hume as if
he were unvanquished, notwithstanding Kant's conviction of having done
so, and resolutely ignoring the fact that Hume's empiricist premiss,
that there is nothing in reason that was not first in experience, and
therefore his nihilistic repudiation of causality derived therefrom,
bear no relevance whatsoever to the context of this discussion. Doing
so enables you to derive the desired aporematic doctrine that neither
the idiographic historicist nor the nomothetic formalist approach to
language can be maintained -- nor can either be abandoned. But surely
you could have saved yourself the trouble of appealing to inadequately
considered, mutually incompatible authorities by premissing your
argument on the ipse dixitism of the Old Man of the Mountain: "Nothing
is true; everything is permitted." The end result, in the character
of your conclusion and the force of your demonstration, would have
been the same.
cordially,
mikhail zel...@math.ucla.edu a.k.a. m...@ptyx.com
writing from the disneyland of formal philosophy
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
-------------------==== Posted via Deja News ====-----------------------
David Christopher Swanson
In article <63qfqd$gi4$1...@netnews.upenn.edu>
wein...@mail1.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) writes:
> : That's helpful. And I'm not being ironic. But my questions remain.
> : Maybe what you're saying is that Socra-Plato is making fun of the
> : accusations against Soc by taking them to absurd lengths in arguing
> : against poetry, and that all the philosophers who have since read this
> : straight are missing the joke.
>
> I think many of Socrates' arguments in the Republic are reductions ad
> absurdum, yes -- what's being ridiculed, in my mind, is a preoccupation
> with justice that gets too extreme, that proceeds at the cost of other
> considerations.
I'll take that as an affirmation that, yes, you believe Socr-Plato was
NOT really arguing to ban poetry or even most poetry but was rather
making a backhanded attack on S's accusers and "extreme justice" in
general.
>
> : But as one who, unlike you, finds MOST
> : EVERYTHING in Plato to be - shall we say - lacking in intelligence,
>
> That's truly astounding to me. I know of no texts more intelligent and
> more provoking. Many of his arguments against poetry make perfect sense
> considering the alleged goals.
I know you see it that way, but we are talking about a guy who believes
learning is remembering, and things are shadows of another realm, a man
who goes aroung asking questions like "What's justice?" and is given
several answers but complains that he wants one very special answer,
and actually convinces an INTELLIGENT person that HE's a fool for
having given several. But we don't need to go into this. You admire
him. I resent him.
>
> I
> : don't find the absurdness alone enough to make this case. Are there
> : supporting passages elsewhere? Is that what the rest of your previous
> : post was about?
>
>
> I think Strauss makes a good case for eso-/exoteric readings of Plato.
> I'll send you my Plato chapter if you want. It goes through much of this
> at considerable length.
Yes, please. And, am I to take that as a "yes" response to oe or both
of my questns?
>
> smw
DCS
http://www.cstone.net/~dcswan
"I will never understand Plato because it's nonsense, and nonsense
cannot be understood." Thomas Jefferson
Ron Hardin
Mikhail Zeleny wrote:
> >If you hear the stars in ``consideration,'' then ``ephemeral'' resonates
> >pleasantly and the sentence becomes excellent.
>
> Sure, if you hear the stars in "consideration", then "ephemeral"
> resonates with "femme", since your name is Festus, and you are
> imputing a spurious etymology unsupported by anything in the
> classical literary corpus. Thus the salient meaning of "hear"
> is a synonym of "By the way, that reminds me..." in the lexicon
> of a Borscht Belt comedian in his anecdotage. Henny Youngman as
> the paradigm of deconstructionist critical thinking; gotta love it.
Ephemeral means lasting a day, <ephemeros, my dictionary says; ``consider''
is from Latin considerare, which is from Latin sidus, star, acc. to
the Oxford Latin Dictionary. There is a pleasant definition in the
latter,
5. A constellation considered a. as marking the progression
of the seasons, sometimes practically = season...
which uses ``consider'' with its starry resonance, a poetic impulse
in the lexicographer.
So if you hear ``ephemeral pronouncements for future scrutiny betokens
her opinion of their value to the preemption of any need for serious
consideration'' there is this saving resonance between the flighty day
and the serious night, albeit across rough ground in the middle.
I claim that a native speaker hears the etymologies, that is, he will
recognize something right about usage in accord with etymology; and will
conversely recognize something ridiculous about an unusual word where
it is not.
There's a secondary resonance between ``value'' and ``preemption'' I
suppose, that only needs its Q raised a little to hear the sea.
Michael S. Morris
Wednesday, the 5th of Novembert, 1997
David says:
Yeah, I've always had a hard time figuring out how a
Platonic rejection of poetry doesn't reject itself.
How do we define art so as to exclude the dialogues?
Well, Silke's gone off in her own direction on this
(and that a perfectly reasonable one in its own right),
but I would like to suggest that to me at least it is
darn unclear that Plato in the Republic (to cite
the usual instance) *is* rejecting poetry. In fact,
and again to my mind, he might just as easily be read
as rejecting his toy state. Maybe if you would try
reading him with a touch of that infinite charity you
apparently afford Nietzsche this would at least
become apparent as a possibility.
Mike Morris
(msmo...@netdirect.net)
Michael S. Morris
Wednesday, the 5th of November, 1997
David:
Yeah, I've always had a hard time figuring out how a
Platonic rejection of poetry doesn't reject itself.
How do we define art so as to exclude the dialogues?
I said:
Well, Silke's gone off in her own direction on this
(and that a perfectly reasonable one in its own right),
but I would like to suggest that to me at least it is
darn unclear that Plato in the Republic (to cite
the usual instance) *is* rejecting poetry. In fact,
and again to my mind, he might just as easily be read
as rejecting his toy state.
Silke:
Well, that is pretty much what I suggested as well.
If the desire for perfection breeds the ludicrous
(as the desire for perfection in politics will), then
there's something wrong with the idea of justice as the
highest ideal to which all others ought to be subordinated.
My apologies. I responded only seeing your first response to
David and its suggestion that Plato was not banning *all*
poetry, only some, and then on to other dialogues. It
sounds to me like our takes on the Republic are closer
than I imagined, though I'll say that I'm not even
convinced that the toy state is even meant to be taken
seriously (i.e. as a workable constitution for a state,
or even as an ideal constitution), except as an analog about
the soul itself.
By the way, there's a letter of Jefferson's in his
later correspondence with Adams where he confesses
to finally getting around to read the Republic and finds
it appalling, with which judgment I believe Adams
concurs. That is, it's clear they were reading the toy
state as a serious political proposal in its own right.
A practically-minded reading, I suppose.
Mike Morris
(msmo...@netdirect.net)
Puss in Boots
Frieda:
>Let's start again. We are taking as given your view that there is no
>understanding without a prior labour of interpretation. That means: in
>order to understand anything, we have to interpret it and interpretation
>is therefore ubiquitous, a necessary condition for the use of language
>itself. This, as Wittgenstein points out, amounts to the view that
>language is defective, that no sentence is complete without a rider
>(Zusatz). A couple of other clarifications are in order.
Moggin:
> Seems to me we already need a few here. Despite your claims, you
> aren't addressing what I said -- what I said repeatedly, as you've
> observed.
Frieda:
>Allow me to address things you've said. You said:
I'm going to quote a bit more of the exchange than you offered.
[Frieda:]
> ... So it
> is that the claim that interpretation is necessary leads one to the view
> that interpretation is ultimately impossible (since the chain is endless).
[Moggin:]
> Well, no -- that's not the claim. To say that interpretation is
> impossible because the chain doesn't end would be like saying that
> if chains never have a final link, there can't be any chains. False,
> of course -- what would follow, in that case, would be that chains
> would never reach a link you could call "final" -- not that they were
> impossible. And what would follow, in the case of interpretation,
> would be that it's necessarily an open-ended process -- not that it's
> impossible to perform.
> Put it this way. According to you, the argument goes as follows:
> "My car doesn't have any brakes -- therefore it won't start." Now,
> I'm not going to claim _nobody_ has ever said that. It's a big world,
> filled with alot of stupid people. But if you're going to insist
> that's what Derrida and de Man are arguing, then I'd sure like to see
> you demonstrate it.
> Anyway, none of this has got anything to do with my point, above.
> When you read a text and establish "what is says," "what it means,"
> and the relationship between the two, you've performed interpretation.
> You may be able to argue that your interpretation has qualities such
> as validity, necessity, self-evidence, truth, accuracy, adequacy, and
> moral virtue, but it won't be any less an interpretation. _That's_
> the argument you promised to show false; but as yet, you haven't even
> addressed it.
As a note, the phrases I was quoting came from your claim that
some statements, e.g., "The Jews in Contemporary Literature," are
"not in need of any interpretation whatever." Why not? Because "it
means exactly what it says." So as I was saying, you've read the
article and determined -- at least to your own satisfaction -- three
things: "what it means," "what it says," and the relationship
between the two (namely, that they're identical). And yet you claim
that you haven't performed interpretation.
Frieda:
>_That_, I repeat once again, is not an argument. It is a declaration.
So you declare, repeatedly. We've been over this before; here's
how it looked on one of the earlier occasions:
[Frieda:]
> _That_ is not an argument at all. It is a set of declarations. I have,
> elsewhere, once again provided an argument against this position. Maybe
> you'd like to come up with an argument in its favour this time, rather
> than simply asserting that it is the case.
[Moggin:]
> Actually, your statement that "_That_ is not an argument at all.
> It is a set of declarations" is the plainest example of a
> non-argument here. You've made a flat assertion and offered nothing
> of any kind to go along. But call my comments what you will; no
> matter what label you put on them, you claimed they were false (more
> specifically, you called them a "succinct expression" of a "false
> view"), and promised to demonstrate that ("now I will show you why").
> That's what you've failed to do. You _did_ provide an argument
> against _some_ position, but your reasoning had serious flaws, which
> I pointed out above. As you say, you haven't replied.
Frieda:
>The view it expresses amounts to this: whenever anyone understands
>anything, and even when they don't, they must be interpreting. It makes
>no argument as to why this must be the case. It just says that it must.
>Yet that is precisely the view against which my arguments have been
>directed, so it really is audacious (to say nothing of mendacious) of you
>to claim that "Despite your claims, you aren't addressing what I said."
You're not.
Frieda:
>Your "arguments," of course, also rely on a defective metaphor (what,
>pray tell, is a "chain that never has a final link" when we are talking
>about a real, metal chain?).
Finally, something relevant. I'm not sure why we're limited to
the case of literal chains, but let's go ahead and consider it.
Regular chains don't have a "final link," since it's always possible
to add another link, or any number of links. Yes, the chain will be
only so long, at any given moment, but the link on the end isn't
necessarily the "final link," since nothing prevents you from adding
any many more as you like. Casually speaking, it's at "the end of
the chain," but it doesn't function as an ending in the strong sense
of a final, decisive stopping point: the chain can continue
indefinitely. That doesn't keep factories from manufacturing chains.
Or think about my other example. You can reasonably argue that
without working brakes, you won't be able to stop your car. But
it's ridiculous to say, "My car doesn't have any brakes -- therefore
it won't start."
>Now, you say "interpretation has occurred and it won't stop." I've argued
>that the notion that interpretation could *fail to stop* (i.e., that it go
>on ad infinitum) is fraught with difficulties. You haven't addressed that
>argument, which is directly germane to your assertions, and which I'll
>summarize for you again as follows:
Actually, I've addressed it two or three separate times -- they
include the one not far above and the one that you're quoting from.
It's amazing -- you're claiming I haven't addressed your argument in
the same breath that you quote from my reply. Obviously you found
my response. So far you've begged off from answering it. (I should
say that "interpretation has occurred and it won't stop" isn't an
assertion of principle on my part -- it's a description of what goes
on in your own scenario, where you try to show that interpretation
can't exist.)
Frieda:
>If interpretation had to go on ad infinitum, any single act of
>interpretation would last forever or the chain would stop at an arbitrary
>point. But if the chain can *stop*, that implies that there is at least
>one interpretation (the one I stop on) that I can understand without
>further interpretation. Therefore understanding without interpretation is
>possible and you've contradicted yourself.
You're making so little sense that it's barely worth the trouble
of correcting you. An endless chain doesn't require any given link
to be of infinite length. Chains can and do stop at arbitrary points.
That a chain of interpretation happens to pause at this or that
stopping point doesn't imply the end of interpretation. One point we
agree on: you can claim understanding of one sort or another any
place you like. Goes on all the time.
>All of this is leaving aside the argument about the non-existence of
>interpretations which clearly eludes you and is, in fact, just another way
>of thinking about the problem.
The argument about the supposed non-existence of interpretations
has defects that I already addressed, including the presence of
several interpretations, neatly labeled, along with indefinitely more
unnamed ones.
Moggin:
> You've ignored every opportunity to reply. Instead, you're
> crafting me a position of your own. I'll go ahead and reply, since
> there are some things we can discuss, regardless of who, if anyone, we
> assign to the view in question. But to fulfill your promise to show
> me wrong, you'll need to direct yourself to what I was saying when you
> made it.
Frieda:
>Horseshit. Anyone who's looked at this debate can see that there's one
>side that's producing arguments and another that's producing guff.
Yep.
Moggin:
> Onward. The idea that language is defective doesn't invalidate a
> view of which it's part. Language may well have its flaws,
> shortcomings, defects, and limitations. But we needn't argue about it,
> because the view you're addressing doesn't "amount to the view that
> language is defective." It's easily possible (which isn't to say that
> it's required) to think that interpretation is part of the ordinary
> and adequate use of language.
Frieda:
> Defective in the sense that: every sentence needs a rider (its
> interpretation).
You're just repeating yourself again. You said, "to understand
anything, we have to interpret it and interpretation is therefore
ubiquitous, a necessary condition for the use of language itself.
This, as Wittgenstein points out, amounts to the view that language
is defective, that no sentence is complete without a rider..." Which
requires the premises that language is perfect, and that
interpretation couldn't possibly be part of the ordinary and adequate
use of language.
Frieda:
>One is that, if
>interpretation is to mean anything, it has to involve some kind of effort
Moggin:
> This is how you clarify? You're the one who introduced the term
> "labour of interpretation" and you're the one who's employed it --
> I'm the one who _disputed_ it with you, writing, "Interpretation isn't
> necessarily a labor." If you're determined to argue with me, be so
> good as to reply to what I've said rather than battling with your own
> "clarifications" (to use your word for them).
Frieda:
>Oh really. So what is it? A nothing? By labour I did not mean to
>suggest that it was laborious. But it is a mental act, an activity. Do
>you dispute this? Do you believe that, when I interpret, I am doing
>*nothing*? If I am doing *something*, then it is a labour.
Not necessarily. "Labor" carries a strong implication that what
you're doing is laborious. Take that away and all you're saying is
that when you're doing something, you're doing something. (I agree.)
Frieda:
>This means that interpretation is a
>process and it consequently takes some time (though perhaps not much).
>As Wittgenstein put it: "To interpret is to think, to do something"
>(Investigations, p. 213).
Moggin:
> I've got no problem with describing interpretation as a "process"
> -- I do it myself. But it seems as if the term has outfoxed you.
> (Y'know -- the bewitchments of language and all that.) If you wanted
> to make it work better, you could say that the labor precedes the
> interpretation. With the work done ahead of time, the interpretation
> sometimes can write itself in an instant.
Frieda:
>That "instant" cannot be zero time. That is the important point. Even if
>it takes an instant, it takes time to interpret.
Wittgenstein seems to feel differently. In the passage that you
pulled out, he claims to be not interpreting. Now, as I tried to
show, in my other post, that seems false. Yet clearly he believes it.
How come? Part of the answer might be that the process is
instantaneous, so it escapes his attention. Alternatively, one could
suggest that the work has been done before the moment arrives.
>Now, if interpretation
>takes time and if there is no understanding without interpretation we are
>led inexorably to both the endless chain of interpretations (we'll leave
>aside the argument about how interpretation doesn't really even get off
>the ground since it really is just another way of looking at the same
>problem) and the following problem: if interpretation takes time (even an
>instant) and if it is endless then any given interpretive act could never
>finish.
I don't believe you've ever shown that "No understanding without
interpretation" leads "inexorably" to an endless chain. Not that I
disagree, necessarily, but it's not obvious to me, and thus far we've
simply made the chain a supposition. Quoting you: "Let's suppose,
as we have been, that any act of interpreting implies an endless chain
of interpretations." See? We just took it as given. Anyway, the
mistake here repeats the one you made above: we can take the endless
chain as given, but it doesn't follow that "any given interpretive
act" (that is, any given link) "could never finish." What you _could_
conclude is that no given link would be the finishing one.
Moggin:
> That may be what leads
> Wittgenstein to believe that he's not interpreting when he interprets
> a certain gesture as a threat: he's _already_ performed the
> necessary labor. He can tell a switchblade from a kitchen knife, and
> both of them from a rubber one. What's more, he knows what all of
> them can signify in a given situation. And he knows some stuff about
> situations, e.g., what it means to be in an alley, as opposed to a
> kitchen, and how that, in turn, has to be factored in, when trying to
> interpret the meaning of the knife. He knows how to interpret
> body-language and what to make of the expressions on somebody's face.
> Which makes him half-right: "There is no inner process of
> laborious interpretation" because the labor was already done -- which
> is also what allows him to believe himself when he says, "I simply
> react to what I see and hear."
Frieda:
>Why do you call *this* interpreting? He doesn't interpret the difference
>between a switchblade and a kitchen knife. He understands it. By
>"understanding" I mean: he knows what each can be used for, indeed, he can
>use them. But these are facts about the different kinds of knives, not
>just "interpretations." Cf. the difference between stones and bread.
You mean your interpretation of the difference? We've been over
that, although briefly. Anyway, it's beside the point, since what
Wittgenstein claims that he doesn't interpret isn't the knife -- it's
the gesture that somone makes with the knife. I've already talked
about why the claim is false, so I won't repeat the exercise. Here I
was trying to explain how W. can believe himself when he says that
he's only reacting to what he sees and hears. Part of the answer, it
seems to me, is that he already knows so well how to interpret the
elements of the situation. Call the difference between a switchblade
and a kitchen knife a "fact," if you like -- makes no matter. What
counts is what it signifies. "She pulled out a kitchen knife." "She
pulled out a switchblade." "She pulled out a rubber knife." "She
pulled out a piece of stone with sharpened edges." In each case, she
pulled out a knife. But the significance varied with type of knife
that she pulled out. Of course, the knife doesn't tell you the whole
story: as I was saying above, you have to correlate that with time
and place, the stance of the person holding the knife, the expression
on her face, etc., etc., to begin to interpret the meaning of the
gesture.
Moggin:
> "Suppose I had agreed on a code with someone; 'tower' means bank.
> I tell him, 'Now go to the tower' -- he understands me and acts
> accordingly, but he feels the word 'tower' to be strange in this use,
> it has not yet 'taken on' the meaning." Thus Wittgenstein
> (_Investigations_ 214). Now consider this person after some time has
> passed. Following W.'s suggestion, the word "tower" doesn't seem
> strange to him anymore when used to mean "bank." Its new meaning has
> "taken." Now ask him, "Are you using a code?" Comes the answer:
> "What? No, are you kidding? Why?" "Because you're interpreting the
> word "tower" as "bank," one explains. "You gotta be nuts," he says.
> "I'm not _interpreting_ anything -- I just understand what it means."
Frieda:
>You've just made my point for me, which is: it must be possible to
>understand some utterances without interpreting them. Now think of the
>entire language this way and you'll agree with me.
You better look again -- the person in the story is interpreting
a code ("Suppose I had agreed on a code with someone; 'tower' means
bank"), but he becomes thoroughly oblivious to it -- so when one asks
him if he's using a code, he immediately says no. The very notion
seems crazy to him. Even after he's heard the explanation -- "you're
interpreting the word 'tower' as 'bank'" -- he still insists that
he's _not_ interpreting anything. "I just understand what it means."
Remind you of anybody you know?
Frieda:
>Second, an interpretation of, say, an utterance
>cannot merely be the repetition of the utterance itself. It must differ
>from the utterance that is being interpreted. Third, if an interpretation
>must differ from that of which it is the interpretation, then it must be
>expressible in signs. In order to be *this particular interpretation*
>rather than some other interpretation that it is not, the interpretation
>must be capable of being enunciated. If you and I are looking at some
>smoke signals and I say "What's your interpretation?", assuming you have
>one you have to be able to tell me what it is.
Moggin:
> As you show here, the statement "An interpretation is something
> that is given in signs" is vulnerable to exaggeration -- in
> particular, it stands open to a reading of the kind, "Anything which
> _is_ an interpretation _must_ be given in signs," or "Nothing that
> isn't given, and given in signs, can be an interpretation."
Frieda:
>That would be a stupid view and I thought I took sufficient precautions in
>using the words "expressible," "capable," and "able" to describe this, all
>of which are expressions of the mode of *possibility* and not
>*necessity*.
Yet you _also_ used the words "must" (four times), "cannot," and
everyone's favorite, "have to" -- all of which express necessity.
>Anyway, it is clearly the case that an interpretation must be able to be
>given in sings. ...
Preaching to the choir?
Moggin:
> You may
> remember the idiot who argued in another thread, "If you had the
> answer, you would have given it." (Excuse me if the idiot was you.)
> Obviously one can have an answer and decide to keep it (or, as in
> the case I'm remembering, one may have given an answer, only to have
> it go unrecognized). Same here. If we're looking at some smoke
> signals and you ask for my interpretation, I _don't_ have to let you
> know what it is (assuming I have one). I have an alternative:
> ignoring you. That doesn't turn my interpretation into a pumpkin --
> it just means that you won't know about it.
Frieda:
>Talk about irrelevant. Nothing I said suggested that interpretations
>*must* be given in signs. Only that they *must be able to be* given in
>signs. Congratulations on demolishing your straw man.
Thanks. I take it we're agreed, then -- I _don't_ have to give
you my interpretation in order to have one any more than I have to
give you an answer in order to have one of those. The question then
is why, if I don't have to give you the interpretion, I have to be
able to give you the interpretation.
Frieda:
>Now, on your view, any
>interpretation of the smoke signals that you offered me would itself be in
>need of interpretation. Smoke signals (Text A) give rise to your
>interpretation (Text B) which in turn gives rise to my interpretation of
>your interpretation (Text C), which may or may not rest unspoken. But we
>can't just leave it at Text C. Because we've excluded as a matter of
>principle that a text can be understood without interpretation, Text C
>will itself be in need of interpretation by a Text D and so on ad
>infinitum. This view would seem to imply that interpretation is endless.
Moggin:
> Again, this has only a tenuous connection with what I've said in
> our discussion. Kindly drop the pretense of addressing my views
> until you reply to what I've written; not your "clarifications" of it.
Frieda:
>I have, repeatedly.
You haven't. Instead you say, "on your view," or "We are taking
as given your view that..." or "This view, which I presume is your
own" -- then you offer "clarifications" of the "views" you've assigned.
> If I missed something in your mass of verbiage (do
>you live in this newsgroup or what?), please cite again the passage you'd
>like to see addressed.
Do what you like. I'm just observing that you can't claim to be
addressing what I said unless you, y'know, address what I said,
instead of what you say about what you claim that I said. (Maybe you
could've figured that out for yourself.)
Moggin:
> I'd like to be less strict about this, but as we've seen, what you
> offer as "clarifications" would more aptly be called "distortions" --
> at the same time, you avoid coming to grips with the points that I
> _have_ made. (When you don't just deep-six them, you show a tendency
> to offer labels instead of arguments.) It seems to be a pattern of
> yours -- just the other day you attributed a statement to Derrida and
> de Man that I don't believe either of them ever made. (Silke
> requested a quote, but you never produced one.)
Frieda:
>No, I did not attribute a statement to them. I attributed a viewpoint,
>that they incontrovertibly share, and then explained why I would be
>unlikely to find it stated nakedly in their work.
Not so -- you referred to "Derrida and De Man, who maintain that
interpretation is not only *necessary* it is also *impossible*."
Notice the key word: "maintain." You didn't say that Derrida and de
Man _imply_ that, or that it follows from something they said --
instead you said that they "maintain" it. So what you're claiming is
that it's one of their stated beliefs. "Maintain ... To support or
uphold in speech or argument; to defend (an opinion, statement, tenet,
etc.); to assert the truth of, contend to be true or right" (OED).
Yet you haven't produced any relevant quotations.
Moggin:
> And before that, you
> invented some views that you attached to Silke. (That time I asked
> for quotes -- needless to say, you didn't come up with any.)
Like I said, there seems to be a pattern here.
[...]
Frieda:
> These are perhaps just two ways of thinking about the same idea, but in
> either case, the view that all understanding requires interpretation is a
> false one.
Moggin:
> It seems that you think so -- what that says about the view is
> another question. You're merely repeating the argument that you
> offered the other day; I've already pointed out where your mistakes
> are. Since you didn't respond, I take it you prefer to not talk
> about them, and I'll be brief here. You claim that this view means
> interpretations don't exist. ("Our understanding of Text B turns
> out to have been in fact Text C and Text B does not exist.") Which
> requires somehow dispelling the interpretations that you just
> finished pointing to -- fortunately or unfortunately, your argument
> ain't got the mojo. As I said before, it can show that
> interpretation keeps taking off. It can show interpretation has no
> final destination. But it fails to demonstrate what you claim --
> that interpretations are not produced. For that, you would have to
> undo the existence of the interpretations you've already listed.
Frieda:
>I stand by what I said. If what was taken to be Text B turns out to be
>Text C and so on ad infinitum, we race to the end (which we never get to)
>with none of our interpretations being produced.
That's exactly what you haven't shown; instead, you've described
a scenario containing several interpretations with labels ("Text B"
and "Text C") as well an indefinite number of others forming what you
call an "endless chain."
Frieda:
>As for your (you and Silke's) constant harping on what constitutes an
>understanding as opposed to an interpretation ...
Moggin:
> I'm afraid you have it backwards: the harping has been yours.
> The distinction between "understanding" and "interpretation" is
> your central theme -- which makes it all the more strange that you
> refuse to explain how you use it.
Frieda:
>I needn't put forward a full-blown epistemology in order to make the
>argument I've made here. I tend to think of understanding in
>Wittgenstein's terms as a capacity to use things (words, sentences). But
>that really isn't germane to what we're talking about here.
No one has asked you for "a full-blown epistemology" -- just for
a good explanation of the distinction between "understanding" and
"interpretation" that you're relying on so heavily. But you're right:
if it isn't germane here, then there's no point in you trying to
explain it. You shouldn't even have brought it up. We might as well
forget you said anything about it; and I'm sure you won't be
mentioning it again.
Frieda:
> If everything
>needs to be interpreted, then there's wiggle room in even the clearest
>declarative sentence, for example: "It would be a salutary thing if all
>the Jews were rounded up and sent to an island somewhere."
Moggin:
> Since you mention it, that sentence, as you offer it here (i.e.,
> not necessarily as de Man makes a similar remark) leaves a huge
> amount of room for interpretation -- consider how different it would
> sound coming from a Nazi and a Zionist, respectively.
Frieda:
> So I understand it based on who said it. Nobody would deny that
>background knowledge plays a role in understanding. That is still not
>enough to make the sentence _need_ an interpretation in order to
>understand it.
Silke:
>But most certainly it does, since "background knowledge" is, as you say,
>part of understanding the passage as you do understand it -- knowing
>about Nazis, what and where Belgium is, what Jews are, what the position
>of the Jews is in Europe of the time, etc. etc. etc. They are all
>necessary for you to arrive at your conclusions, or for me to arrive at
>mine.
Frieda:
>I don't deny any of that, as long as "understanding the passage" does not
>necessarily* imply passing through a prior act of interpretation. I also
>have to know what all the words in the sentence mean and the other ways in
>which they can be used. I interpret none of this, by the way. The
>question is: does this background knowledge make of any understanding a
>mere interpretation? I maintain that it does not for the reasons
>contained in the argument you conveniently dismissed.
Moggin:
> Your argument didn't contain any reasons to maintain that you're
> not interpreting the statement (which wasn't quite so perfectly
> clear).
Frieda:
>At least I have an argument. All you apparently have is the declaration,
>>repeated over and over, that all understanding requires interpretation. I
>haven't seen an argument for that position and it is not self-evident.
Moggin:
> So you keep declaring; any time you want to supply an argument
> for that assertion, you go right ahead. Alternatively, you could
> address what I wrote, instead of either attempting to dismiss it or
> replacing it with a set of "clarifications." (You promised to
> show me wrong, remember?)
Frieda:
>This is disingenuous in the extreme. Time to put up or shut up, Moggin.
>I'm through being the only generous party in this pissing contest (take
>that however you like).
It's true you're very generous to yourself: you hand yourself
compliments, for example. And it seems you're easily flattered.
Moggin:
> But getting back to the point, you claim
> that although you have an _understanding_ of the statement, "It
> would be a salutary thing if all the Jews were rounded up and sent
> to an island somewhere," you can't be said to have _interpreted_ it.
> Problem is, the argument that you gave to support that claim was
> missing something: namely, any reasons you could maintain that you
> weren't interpreting.
Frieda:
>Here are some reasons: it's a well-formed sentence in english and I'm a
>native speaker of that language.
Entirely compatible with interpretation; no reason to say that
you're not interpreting.
>The person who wrote it clearly means by
>it that he thinks it would be a good thing if the Jews were sent off to an
>island.
Shows that you think your interpretation is clearly right; not
that you aren't interpreting.
> No interpretation was necessary because I know what the words
>mean and what their combination in that sentence means.
Both very helpful when interpreting -- no sign that you aren't.
> If you think that
>I have interpreted, then the onus is on you to show why you think so,
>without relying on the view that all understanding requires
>interpretation, which I've demolished.
And Godzilla destroyed the Chrysler Building. Film at eleven.
That view, which was De Man's (and
>Barthes' and Foucault's) and is Derrida's, is incoherent, as I have
>shown.
Have I mentioned about how generously you compliment yourself?
> You hold that view as well. Therefore you are confused, because
>the view is incoherent. If you think I haven't demolished that view, then
>I suggest you produce an argument against this passage specifically which
>I reproduce here:
[The "endless chain" argument again.]
We've been over that repeatedly; you have my criticism, if you
ever want to reply.
Frieda:
>Sometimes I might be. I never said interpretation doesn't exist.
>Sometimes we have to interpret, no question about it. We just don't do it
>every time we understand something. It cannot be the case that all
>understanding requires interpretation. And when we interpret, the whole
>point of the exercise is to produce something that is not itself in need
>of interpretation.
Moggin:
> You're speaking of yourself and the mouse in your pocket? No,
> wait -- you _are_ a mouse, aren't you? So you must be talking
> about yourself and whoever owns the pocket you're speaking, or make
> that squeaking from. Anyway, what you _did_ say was that you
> weren't interpreting the statement at issue. (The one you provided
> about rounding up all the Jews.) Which seems to be false; as I
> pointed out before, the statement would sound very different coming
> from a Nazi instead of a Zionist.
Frieda:
>It is inconceivable that the statement would come from a Zionist, due to
>the meaning of the words "rounded up" and "sent." Please note: this
>meaning is not simply my interpretation of them.
Regardless, you're doing a close reading where you identify the
implications of key terms and phrases -- "round up" and "send" --
and use them to help you determine the meaning of the sentence. How
is that _not_ performing interpretation?
>If a Zionist were to
>utter these words, it could not be in his capacity as Zionist. Faced with
>a Zionist uttering those words, I don't necessarily *interpret* the words
>differently. Rather, because I understand the words, I may interpret that
>my interlocutor is not a real Zionist.
Your politics are irrelevant.
Moggin:
> You replied that you could
> figure out who said it using background knowledge, thus eliminating
> the need for interpretation. But as Silke and I pointed out to
> you, bringing your knowledge into play is no sign that you're _not_
> interpreting the statement -- if anything, it's one part of the
> process.
Frieda:
>Nor is it a sign that I am interpreting the statement. So what's your
>point?
In trying to show that you're not interpreting, you keep citing
your use of background knowledge. But it doesn't show any such
thing. That's my point, and I'm glad to see that you've conceded it.
Moggin:
> Nonetheless, you maintained you _weren't_ interpreting it,
> even if you were relying on background knowledge to help you
> decide between its possible meanings -- which is where things broke
> down, since your reasons for saying so were contained in an
> argument that didn't contain any.
Frieda:
>Be forewarned that my patience is running thin and my time is running
>out. Unlike you, I cannot be connected to alt.postmodern 16 hours a day
>so as to take you to task for every irrelevancy you might come up with in
>one of your self-serving and self-admiring 400-line screeds.
Heat. Kitchen. Door ->
-- Moggin
Puss in Boots
Zeleny:
> > > At any rate, her refusal to preserve
> > > her ephemeral pronouncements for future scrutiny betokens her opinion
> > > of their value to the preemption of any need for serious consideration.
> > > The flies of the marketplace are a proper subject for an entomologist,
> > > not a philosopher.
Moggin:
> > That's why philosophers never concern themselves with Socrates.
Aaron Boyden:
> Philosophers devote a great deal of attention to a recurring literary
> character in the dialogues of perhaps the greatest philosopher ever to have
> lived.* Though that character was apparently loosely based on a marketplace
> fly named Socrates, and even has the same name, philosophers pay fairly
> little attention to what the marketplace fly might have believed, except
> accidentally when it happens to correspond with what the literary character
> advocated. * I'd certainly rank him top three, with Hume and Nietzsche. ...
No need to argue over any of that -- it's the Socrates of Plato
(in particular the Socrates of the _Phaedrus_) who, on Zeleny's
account, is an improper topic for a philosopher. Which explains why
philosophers have so thoroughly ignored him.
-- Moggin
David Christopher Swanson
In article <346118...@netdirect.net>
"Michael S. Morris" <msmo...@netdirect.net> writes:
> David says:
> Yeah, I've always had a hard time figuring out how a
> Platonic rejection of poetry doesn't reject itself.
> How do we define art so as to exclude the dialogues?
>
> Well, Silke's gone off in her own direction on this
> (and that a perfectly reasonable one in its own right),
> but I would like to suggest that to me at least it is
> darn unclear that Plato in the Republic (to cite
> the usual instance) *is* rejecting poetry. In fact,
> and again to my mind, he might just as easily be read
> as rejecting his toy state. Maybe if you would try
> reading him with a touch of that infinite charity you
> apparently afford Nietzsche this would at least
> become apparent as a possibility.
>
> Mike Morris
> (msmo...@netdirect.net)
In a sense I LIKE this and Silke's readings. Both answer my question
by saying that we don't necessarily need to try to define art so as to
exclude dialogues. But at the moment I doubt both of them.
Mario Taboada
Silke-Maria Weineck wrote, answering Chance:
<<The discussion between Frieda and others
was that texts ought to be "just understood" not interpreted if well
written (and Plato writes will), that they can stand and yield their
understanding w/o interpretation. I think the passage above contradicts
that.>>
No, no. That was not really Frieda's point. You really ought to read and
address the points brought up by our esteemed friend from Ireland.
Despite Moggin's (and in a minor, amusing way, your) attempts to drag
her into the ballroom for the customary dirty boogie, her analysis
stands and is lapidary.
But then, you can always recognize the Sophist in that, even after being
thoroughly refuted, he or she shrugs it off and proceeds to spout more
of the same. Unfortunately, the latter stance is good enough for TV
commentators (in fact, it's a requirement), but not for a serious forum
like r.a.b.
And you really should brush up on elementary logic. If nothing else, it
will be good for your health. Maybe after that we'll see the return of
the intelligent and witty poster you used to be before you turned to
aiding and abetting the sophist cults.
Regards,
Mario Taboada
Ron Hardin
Mario Taboada wrote:
> No, no. That was not really Frieda's point. You really ought to read and
> address the points brought up by our esteemed friend from Ireland.
> Despite Moggin's (and in a minor, amusing way, your) attempts to drag
> her into the ballroom for the customary dirty boogie, her analysis
> stands and is lapidary.
Lapidoptery would be stone-winged, I guess; like David and Goliath, who
does not stand.
Mikhail Zeleny
mog...@mindspring.com (Puss in Boots) wrote:
Zeleny:
>>>>At any rate, [Silke's] refusal to preserve
>>>>her ephemeral pronouncements for future scrutiny betokens her opinion
>>>>of their value to the preemption of any need for serious consideration.
>>>>The flies of the marketplace are a proper subject for an entomologist,
>>>>not a philosopher.
Moggin:
>>> That's why philosophers never concern themselves with Socrates.
Aaron Boyden:
>>Philosophers devote a great deal of attention to a recurring literary
>>character in the dialogues of perhaps the greatest philosopher ever to have
>>lived.* Though that character was apparently loosely based on a marketplace
>>fly named Socrates, and even has the same name, philosophers pay fairly
>>little attention to what the marketplace fly might have believed, except
>>accidentally when it happens to correspond with what the literary character
>>advocated.
This is plainly false, regardless of how one evaluates the efforts of
Guthrie, Vlastos, and others to distinguish Socrates from the literary
characters in the texts by Plato, Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Aristotle.
>>* I'd certainly rank him top three, with Hume and Nietzsche. I have no firm
>>opinions on how to rank those three relative to one another. Nietzsche's
>>philosophy is certainly the best of the three, but he also had access to more
>>of the philosophical tradition than the others, through the simple expedient
>>of being the last of the three. The same problem crops up in comparing Hume
>>to Plato; Hume's philosophy is clearly better, but he had access to the works
>>of so many more philosophers who had grappled with the same issues.
It appears that your admiration of Nietzsche is based on something
other than a reading of his work.
Moggin:
> No need to argue over any of that -- it's the Socrates of Plato
>(in particular the Socrates of the _Phaedrus_) who, on Zeleny's
>account, is an improper topic for a philosopher. Which explains why
>philosophers have so thoroughly ignored him.
One way is Socrates', of taking leave of the agora to discuss
eros with Phaedrus. The other way is Gorgias' and Protagoras',
of staying there to ply their eristic wares to the highest bidder.
Is there any question as to which way of life is excoriated in
Zarathustra's diatribe against the flies of the marketplace? is
there any question as to which way has been chosen by Silke and
Moggin?
cordially,
mikhail zel...@math.ucla.edu a.k.a. m...@ptyx.com
writing from the disneyland of formal philosophy
"Le cul des femmes est monotone comme l'esprit des hommes."
-------------------==== Posted via Deja News ====-----------------------
Sourcerer
In article <moggin-ya02408000...@news.mindspring.com>,
Puss in Boots <mog...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>Frieda:
>
>>Let's start again. We are taking as given your view that there is no
>>understanding without a prior labour of interpretation. That means: in
>>order to understand anything, we have to interpret it and interpretation
>>is therefore ubiquitous, a necessary condition for the use of language
>>itself. This, as Wittgenstein points out, amounts to the view that
>>language is defective, that no sentence is complete without a rider
>>(Zusatz). A couple of other clarifications are in order.
I am presented with two similar objects and comply with the request to
pick them up, one in each hand, and judge which is heavier. Immediately,
I know which is heavier. Are you asking where the labor is in that --
where thought, judgement, estimation or interpretation occured?
Assuming the difference in weight between them is substantial enough
to be noticed, my understanding is 'instantaneous' or nearly so as to
make no difference. Clearly, I am unapprised of an act of cognition.
Then again, language is not involved, except before and after the
fact. The 'instant' of judgment is, like all 'instants', defined by the
absence of language.
--
(__) Sourcerer
/(<>)\ O|O|O|O||O||O"You don't care how deep or how long you dig,
\../ |OO|||O|||O|O as long as you think there's a badger at the
|| OO|||OO||O||O bottom of the hole. Then life is good" -Sweet Poly
Paul D. Lanier
> Regards,
> Philip
>
>
>
Philip, that was nicely said. But consider this. Hume in his Enquiry on
Human Understanding (I believe that's the title, but I've got to go back
and check), specifically sets sense impressions as the only means of
gaining knowledge- his precedent being Locke- and therefore cause and
effect are merely abstractions from the concrete sense impressions. He
questions the necessity of each cause to its effect, but admits we think
of such- by force of habit!- because one thing happens and brings on its
heel another thing. That such cause may bring something else to fruition
is a possibility. Scientists find often that a number of causes bring a
certain effect and if a certain cause is present or absent, a different
effect will come to pass. Hume would indeed say this scientific reasoning
a force of habit from sense impressions and not necessary logically at
all, and therefore science is a sort of instinct of a human's thinking
process brought to pass through impressions of the sense. Right? Yet,
if the sense impressions are there acting upon a person, then causation is
already working. Implied in the whole diatribe of speculation is the
notion of impressions causing thought processes. Hume has to know this,
and so his enquiry is a puzzle, leading Hume to believe in probability and
free will thereby. His logic shows the inadequacy of reason making Hume
the agnostic willing to admit revelation into his scheme of the
understanding of the world (however reluctantly).
Paul Lanier
BA in Philosophy and English
Jeff Solomon
David Christopher Swanson wrote:
> In article <63qb8q$cei$1...@netnews.upenn.edu>
> wein...@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) writes:
>
> > : Hey, I'm missing it, and you just explained it to me, so I wouldn't be
> > : too hard on him. What do you mean it's ironic? He does or does not
> > : want to admit certain poetry? He does or does not specify what kind?
I think your making an error in assuming that what Plato called "poetry"
(translated to english) is what you or I would think of as poetry. My ancient
Greek is pretty poor, but I believe he was slamming _mimesis_, which is closer
to television than poetry (i.e. it encourages the same kind of slack-jawed
trance-like state).
> [response deleted]
> Third, the argument against poetry is in part an
> > argument against manipulation and misrepresentation while some of
> > Socrates' advice is, explicitly, to manipulate the guardians through
> > misrepresentation. Etc.
I think the argument is about the kind and quality of manipulation. Clearly,
Plato felt that almost all people needed to be manipulated for their own good.
> That's helpful. And I'm not being ironic. But my questions remain.
> Maybe what you're saying is that Socra-Plato is making fun of the
> accusations against Soc by taking them to absurd lengths in arguing
> against poetry, and that all the philosophers who have since read this
> straight are missing the joke. But as one who, unlike you, finds MOST
> EVERYTHING in Plato to be - shall we say - lacking in intelligence
I don't think I've ever heard or seen anyone make that claim before.
> , I
> don't find the absurdness alone enough to make this case. Are there
> supporting passages elsewhere? Is that what the rest of your previous
> post was about?
I think the "support" that you're asking for would come from an education in the
culture and atmosphere of 5th-4th century (b.c) Athens. Maybe I'm reading you
wrong, but it sounds like you're equating mimesis with poetry. That is
definitely a mistake. Literature as we know it did not exist during Plato's
time, and poetry as Plato knew it does not exist our world (at least not in the
Western world).
--
Jeff Solomon
e-mail:ser...@cruzio.com
Paul D. Lanier
Zeleny:
At any rate, [Silke's] refusal to preserve
her ephemeral pronouncements for future scrutiny betokens her opinion
of their value to the preemption of any need for serious consideration.
The flies of the marketplace are a proper subject for an entomologist,
not a philosopher.
Moggin:
That's why philosophers never concern themselves with Socrates.
Aaron Boyden:
Philosophers devote a great deal of attention to a recurring literary
character in the dialogues of perhaps the greatest philosopher ever to have
lived.* Though that character was apparently loosely based on a marketplace
fly named Socrates, and even has the same name, philosophers pay fairly
little attention to what the marketplace fly might have believed, except
accidentally when it happens to correspond with what the literary character
advocated.
> This is plainly false, regardless of how one evaluates the efforts of
> Guthrie, Vlastos, and others to distinguish Socrates from the literary
> characters in the texts by Plato, Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Aristotle.
How plainly false is it?
Aaron Boyden:
* I'd certainly rank him top three, with Hume and Nietzsche. I have no firm
opinions on how to rank those three relative to one another. Nietzsche's
philosophy is certainly the best of the three, but he also had access to more
of the philosophical tradition than the others, through the simple expedient
of being the last of the three. The same problem crops up in comparing Hume
to Plato; Hume's philosophy is clearly better, but he had access to the works
of so many more philosophers who had grappled with the same issues.
I'd rate Witgenstein as better than Nietzche. He had more philosophy work
to build off than N., and of course, his game theory dominates
much of scientific, sociological, economic, and philosophical discourse.
Moggin:
No need to argue over any of that -- it's the Socrates of Plato
(in particular the Socrates of the _Phaedrus_) who, on Zeleny's
account, is an improper topic for a philosopher. Which explains why
philosophers have so thoroughly ignored him.
Paul:
Yet, the Socrates of Plato animates much political philosophy discourse.
Especially over democracy and monarchy and socialism. Else the Republic
would not be the centerpiece of philosophical thought that it is.
Ignoring Socrates is of course another way of saying he matters, though
one would rather not deal with the issues he raises.
> One way is Socrates', of taking leave of the agora to discuss
> eros with Phaedrus. The other way is Gorgias' and Protagoras',
> of staying there to ply their eristic wares to the highest bidder.
> Is there any question as to which way of life is excoriated in
> Zarathustra's diatribe against the flies of the marketplace? is
> there any question as to which way has been chosen by Silke and
> Moggin?
Yes. What is the way chosen by Silke and Moggin respectively? Both seem
to be following their own particular path rather than some universal
anti-marketplace of Zarathustra.
Regards,
Paul David Lanier
M. Taboada
On 6 Nov 1997, Silke-Maria Weineck wrote:
> Mario Taboada (matr...@sprintmail.com) wrote:
> : Silke-Maria Weineck wrote, answering Chance:
>
> : <<The discussion between Frieda and others
> : was that texts ought to be "just understood" not interpreted if well
> : written (and Plato writes will), that they can stand and yield their
> : understanding w/o interpretation. I think the passage above contradicts
> : that.>>
>
> : No, no. That was not really Frieda's point.
>
> It most certainly was. "Most sentences in any language," if I remember
> correctly, can be understood w/o interpretation according to her.
She was just pointing out what is obvious from direct human experience.
This is not at all what you had suggested.
> : her into the ballroom for the customary dirty boogie, her analysis
> : stands and is lapidary.
>
> Her "analysis" was sophomoric and didn't address de Man's writing -- as
> evidenced by the simple fact that she had to impugn a position to de Man
> and Derrida which neither articulates. Now _that's_ sophism -- to first
> claim that interpretation isn't necessary and to then engage in a type of
> interpretation that impugns positions not held, claiming that it's
> obvious that the texts in question do contain a position they explicitly
> refute.
It is lapidary. Assuming you mean "impute" instead of "impugn" above, I
would say that even a casual reading will show that Frieda did
indeed address Derrida's and de Man's main "theoretical assumption" (or
tenet, or what have you). Her argument, therefore, destroys the
foundation (if such a word may be used in relation to sophistry) of the
entire deconstructionist joke.
> : But then, you can always recognize the Sophist in that, even after being
> : thoroughly refuted, he or she shrugs it off and proceeds to spout more
> : of the same.
> That would refer to your practice of asking about Lacan's
> contributions and then denying to have ever received an
> answer, I suppose?
You directed me to some vaguely formulated post of Abalovich and to a
totally vacuous post of yours. I found nothing there that merits
discussion, inasmuch as there is no substance. This practice of
attributing dishonesty to your opponents in a debate seems throughly
Derridean in its avoidance of the issues.
> : And you really should brush up on elementary logic. If nothing else, it
> : will be good for your health. Maybe after that we'll see the return of
> : the intelligent and witty poster you used to be before you turned to
> : aiding and abetting the sophist cults.
>
> Smarting from recent exchanges?
Which ones? Nothing hurts so far. Perhaps there are side effects...
Cordially yours,
Mario Taboada
Andy Lowry
On Wed, 5 Nov 1997, Mikhail Zeleny wrote:
> >>You know better than call my hypothesis ad hoc. There are plenty of
> >>substantive and methodological reasons to suppose that deconstruction
> >>was de Man's way of evading guilt for his collaboration with the Nazis.
Andy:
> >Fine. Name three. (Since there are "plenty.") Let's hear three
> >"substantive and methodological reasons to suppose" this assertion.
> >We're all listening.
Mikhail:
> I did: vide infra. Learn to read, Mr. Lowry, learn to read ...
Note this promise, not to be fulfilled.
> >>In the former category are the facts that it purports to do just that,
> >>that de Man's postwar behavior demonstrably aimed at obfuscation and
> >>falsification of his war record, and that it is generally in the human
> >>nature to concoct an outlook that puts one in the most favorable light.
>
> >This is why we're still waiting. "Postwar behavior"? Yeah, de Man
> >pretty plainly lied or fudged on some occasions. That does not even
> >REMOTELY give you "deconstruction was de Man's way of evading guilt."
> >_Lying_ was his way of evading _public shame_.
>
> To quote de Man quoting Archie Bunker, What's the difference?
Okay, I think we'll all agree this isn't an argument?
> >As for your exceedingly lame "it is generally ..." -- that proves
> >NOTHING. Should we discount YOUR posts, on the grounds that "it is
> >generally," etc.?
>
> Sure thing -- as soon as I stake my reputation on the propositions
> that nothing is true, that no text can be interpreted determinately,
> and that no attribution of meaning or motive can be made reliably, you
> should start looking for the lies and betrayals in my past, as a simple
> matter of cui bono.
Too bizarre to worry about, leaving aside its hazy characterizations of de
Man. (I've just reread the "rhetoric of persuasion" chapter of
ALLEGORIES, which shows how poorly dM's critics bother to read him.) If
you're going to take it as a priori that skepticism has to have some
skeleton in its closet, then I think you should shelve yourself under that
destruction-of-reason section of your library, right next to Rand.
> >>In the latter category, there are the principles of Sainte-Beuve and
> >>Taine. And since I already cited both kinds of reasons in support of
> >>my hypothesis, your deeming it ad hoc makes you a liar.
>
> >Don't cite KINDS OF REASONS; cite _reasons_.
>
> I did: vide supra. Learn to read, Mr. Lowry, learn to read ...
Um, I've cut some, but "supra" there weren't any. I would like just _one_
argument here, & I can't get any. Which begins to feel rather fatiguing.
-- Andy Lowry
Andy Lowry
On Tue, 4 Nov 1997, Mikhail Zeleny wrote:
> Andy Lowry <a...@Ra.MsState.Edu> wrote:
> >Zeleny, on Andy's skepticism re: biographical impingement on reading:
>
> >>Get real. It is a critical commonplace that such impingement takes
> >>place. We naturally read _A Farewell to Arms_ through the historical
> >>experience of WWI, particularly as lived by Ernest Hemingway.
>
> >"Nature" is precisely the appropriate adverb here, & the one I'm
> >disinclined to take as implying how we ought to read, or what ways
> >of reading are good.
>
> A familiar starting point for the sophist. In no time at all, you
> will be telling me that reading against nature is the only way to go.
> Your trouble is that without this extreme conclusion, your observation
> amounts to nothing.
Now, who's the sophist here? Slippery slope & bizarre assertion.
_Questioning_ whether something is (1) natural & (2) good scarcely strikes
me as meriting such a reply.
> The relevant sense of nature is not the first inclination of the soul,
> famously derided by Talleyrand as dangerous because the most noble,
> though it can be brought into play later on, as we discuss the ethical
> implications of deconstruction.
Did I SAY "first inclination of the soul"? No, I did not. X. falsely
impputes this to me: More sophistry.
> Rather, it is the sense of being
> definitive of and proper to the subject matter of our inquiry, the
> sense of the Aristotelian ti esti in the Derrida passage I discussed
> at the origin of this thread, and everything that ensues therefrom.
> Recall that it is precisely the deconstructionist insistence to the
> contrary, that a sign cannot be submitted to the question of its
> nature, that is being questioned here.
Can you explain this, since I would say that questioning the nature of the
sign _is_ what deconstruction does?
> Since ought implies can, a
> point you have missed on a previous occasion, the imputation of
> inability must be addressed before addressing the issue of ought.
What inability? Can you write so as to keep your antecedents clear?
> >But even if WWI and Hem's life bore us, we may well read "Farewell" &
> >love it because it's beautifully written, or because we find it to
> >convey truths beyond biographical trivia. Further, there is no reason
> >to think that anything about Hem's real-life romances or degradations
> >tells us how to read the book.
>
> Don't let me stop you from reading the book any way you please, be it
> as a Bildungsroman, a cryptohomoerotic paean, a manual for the proper
> deployment of golf clubs, or a diagnostic treatise on gonorrhea. The
> salient point is that in its capacity as a sign, Hemingway's book has
> a determinate significance grounded in its author's lived experience,
> a significance that enters into its nature or ti esti.
Tossing around Greek isn't going to help you here. By definition,
"Farewell" is a fiction, which means it has no real referent; is it, then,
a sign with "a determinate significance"? Or are you denying the
existence of fiction? This is a damn hard problem, & you aren't going to
win anyone's respect by pooh-poohing it, whichever side you take.
> If you wish to
> take the side of the deconstructors, it is incumbent upon you to argue
> to the contrary, instead of retailing the platitude that the same book
> can also be taken in any number of other ways. Otherwise your claim
> reduces to the logical form that meaning being what you can make of
> it, a shortage of toilet tissue brings on the condition of literature
> being full of shit.
See my prior post on the violence of Z's "thought." I've just argued that
fiction by definition has no determinate significance. Kindly reply,
scatologically or otherwise.
> >>To read
> >>it otherwise requires an argument to the effect that the meaning of
> >>literary texts is somehow autonomous, in the sense of being independent
> >>of the circumstances of their production.
>
> >Not at all; it requires only that their reading be potentially
> >independent. Which it generally is; Silke mentioned the "Phaedrus."
>
> Silke's mentioning stands in the same relation to dialectics as yonder
> shitty scraps stand to literature. In other words, it proves only
> that Plato is as susceptible to willful misinterpretation as any other
> writer.
Does or does not Plato record the objection to writing that its meaning
isn't self-evident, since one has no access to its origin? (Where he goes
with this is another thing, of course, & I'm not going to pretend to
understand it.)
> But I suppose that it has the academic value of fabricating a
> prestigious genealogy for her views, provided that one can get past
> the incongruousness of a logically deficient, Greekless "old-fashioned
> hermeneut" proudly fashioning herself into an institutionally certified
> authority on Greek philosophy.
Not bound by any determinate significance to Silke's actual posts. Don't
be a snob.
> At any rate, her refusal to preserve
> her ephemeral pronouncements for future scrutiny betokens her opinion
> of their value to the preemption of any need for serious consideration.
> The flies of the marketplace are a proper subject for an entomologist,
> not a philosopher.
What did Disraeli say of Gladstone? "Intoxicated by the exuberance of his
own verbosity"?
> >>While the roots of all such
> >>arguments are to be found in the head of Gorgias, its modern expression
> >>is due to Marcel Proust's ad hominem polemic contre Sainte-Beuve, which
> >>I already rebutted in this thread. Not much else than an ad hominem
> >>rebuttal is called for, because the Gorgian argument is essentially an
> >>ad hominem one, sustaining the irrationalist conviction that an effect
> >>not only can be, but ought to be understood in isolation from its cause.
>
> >Is there any need to dive into the morass of causality? What is the
> >"cause" of my feeling anything when I read "Farewell"--Hem's experiences,
> >or the words on the page? I begin to amuse myself thinking of rewriting
> >deconstruction in Aristotelian jargon ...
>
> Diving into the morass of causality is infinitely preferable to being
> stuck in the quagmire of sentimentality. The fixation on your feeling
> anything whatsoever when you read a given text is certainly at odds
> with understanding it. For consider that if Hemingway's book has a
> determinate meaning, neither you nor your feelings can modify it for
> trivial chronological reasons, assuming, as the appearances suggest,
> that you were at best in the planning stage at the time Papa sucked
> down on his 12-gauge.
Leaving aside the "if" which I've challenged, the assumption that an
emotional response to a work of art must be sloppy-sentimental betrays an
impoverished soul.
> Your thinking otherwise is spurious arrogation
> of power to change the past.
Don't be silly, if you can help it. The identification of the text with
the historical past is precisely what's in dispute here.
> >>But there is nothing else but causes available for our understanding of
> >>any phenomena in nature, as there is nothing else but reasons available
> >>for our understanding of any concepts therein. To dirempt causes from
> >>reasons in the manner of Proust or de Man is to subvert the possibility
> >>of understanding.
>
> >No, no, no. The question is simply WHAT we're trying to understand:
> >Proust, or his novel. If you want to understand Proust, then by all
> >means, read the "Recherche" biographically (with due care, of course).
> >But if you're trying to construe the language of the novel, then
> >assumptions about the life/art relation tend to put on blinders.
> >Vaguely recalling an example out of Fish, it's wrong to read "A Rose
> >for Emily" as about one's aunt; it's also wrong to read it as about
> >Bill Faulkner -- if you're reading the story, & not your aunt, or B. F.
>
> I don't know Faulkner's text and don't care to discuss Fish. Again,
> the only relevant critic is Derrida,
"the only relevant critic"? Says you? Are we supposed to be impressed?
> and I will be happy to discuss
> any of the texts he purports to read, within the limitations of my
> familiarity therewith. For practical purposes, this means Baudelaire
> and Mauss in _Donner le temps_, or Plato in _La dissimulation_, or if
> you insist, Jean-Jacques in _De la grammatologie_, in decreasing order
> of preference. But let us address the theoretical point first. The
> question of what we are trying to understand is logically posterior to
> the rationalist thesis that understanding is possible, in the sense of
> being prempted by its refutation, such as is attempted by deconstruction.
>
> >Why this gets taken for an extreme point of view, I don't know.
>
> Because denying intrinsic nature to signs is an extreme position.
> Consider a legal analogy: some judges espouse natural law; others
> favor historicist interpretation; yet others are positivists; but
> there are no self-professed interpretive nihilists on the bench.
De Man is not a nihilist, as you would know if you read him.
> >>In each case, this misological subversion can be
> >>plausibly understood as a shameful attempt to hide details of personal
> >>life, because repudiation of impartial reason can be undertaken only
> >>from the standpoint of private interest.
>
> >Here's where, rather than simply disagreeing with Zeleny, I find him
> >grandiose. (What's the French root, "daring much"?) "Can be" is weak;
> >and does the entire realm of the aesthetic count as shameful? As for the
> >part after "because," I find it high-phrased hand-waving--the ideas need
> >to be connected meaningfully to the discussion. WHO is repudiating
> >impartial reason?
>
> The weakness is intentional: I never claimed to put forth anything
> more certain than an interpretive hypothesis. Any realm that serves
> to obfuscate the truth is shameful.
And any that claims to render the discovery of truth unproblematic is
demagogic.
> Now we experience truth through
> causes and explain it through reasons. The postulate of explanatory
> rationalism is that to each cause there corresponds a reason, whereas
> a consequence of determinism is that each reason is necessitated by a
> cause. Together, these two principles make understanding possible.
> Hence to dirempt causes from reasons is to subvert the possibility of
> understanding -- though perhaps not to preempt it altogether. But it
> is up to the sophist to tell us how understanding could be achieved,
> except by congruence of reasons and causes.
You can pontificate indefinitely, but the "cause" of words in a novel is
no clearer for it.
> My translation of Derrida from the original article follows:
>
>
> The reassuring evidence wherein the Western tradition had to
> organize itself and must continue to live even now, would
> therefore be as follows: The order of the signified is never
> contemporaneous, is at best the inverse or the parallel subtly
> displaced -- displaced by the time of a breath -- from the
> order of the signifier. And the sign must be the unity of a
> heterogeneity, since the signified (sense or thing, noema or
> reality) is not in itself a signifier, a _trace_: at any rate
> is not constituted in its sense by its relation to a possible
> trace. The formal essence of the signified is the _presence_,
> and the privilege of its proximity to the logos as _phone_ is
> the privilege of the presence. This is the inevitable response
> as soon as one inquires: "What is the sign?", that is to say,
> when one submits the sign to the question of theessence, to
> the "ti esti". The "formal essence" of the sign cannnot be
> determined, except in terms of the presence. One cannot avoid
> this response, except by recusing the very form of the question
> and beginning to think that the sign [is] that ill-named [thing],
> the only one, that escapes the founding question of philosophy:
> "What is...?"
And your problem with this is ...?
-- Andy Lowry
Andy Lowry
On Tue, 4 Nov 1997, T.H. Chance wrote:
> In a nousless attempt to support Mr. Lowry in his polemic against Mr.
> Zeleny,
Do I have a polemic against Mr. Z.? I just want him to give a clear
argument why a work of fiction supposedly has its determinate meaning in
the circumstances of the author's life. Mr. Z. insists on being a
Nietzschean ("every philosophy is the secret confession of its author")
instead of judging on merits; it's easier, he's found, to learn that de
Man was a German sympathizer & take that as the "determinate significance"
of de Man's complex theories than to actually study them.
Too bad we
don't have Plato's biography to perform a similar dismissal, since it
would save us the trouble of trying to understand him -- tho I hear that,
even with the historical scraps available, some "readers" have gone
impressively far in this direction.
-- Andy Lowry
Andy Lowry
I've just about to give up on Zeleny's doing more than posturing, but:
Notice the word "attempt."
> >And, tho I haven't a dictionary handy, can one "impute allegory"? or
> >does it have to be imputed _to_ somehow?
>
> Not if Johnson, Tennyson, Swift, Gibbon, or Herbert are to be admitted
> as qualified English writers.
Sounds good to me.
> >The point of the quote, out of context, seems to be that when a reading
> >forgets its own textuality, it risks error; risks being taken
> >apodictically, if you like. Nothing in de Man ever suggests that we can
> >_evade_ this problem, so neither I nor PdM are contradicting ourselves.
>
> Then you should have no trouble deconstructing my evaluation of de Man
> into a sycophantic encomium. Herewith is a clue: "valuing" from being
> worthy; "misological polemic" from a just contraphallogocentric war
> against patriarchic hegemony of binary oppositions foisted upon the
> self-anointed intelligentsia by the tyranny of demonstrative reason;
> "rubric" will enable you to invoke red chalk and drag in Freud's roter
> Fadian for a gratuitous digression into psychoanalysis, culminating in
> the Foucauldian exposition of the tension between the free play of
> sexuality and the social straightjacket of heterocentric relations
> implicit in the divorce proceedings of "repudiation", inveigling
> against the arbitrarily clinical construction of "pathologies", and
> retiring for a productive interlude of kike-baiting and fistfucking.
The frustrated violence in Z's rants often pops out. Beats thinking.
> >>In what sense is asseverating that "Allegories
> >>are always allegories of metaphor and, as such, they are always
> >>allegories of the impossibility of reading" an instance of testing
> >>the limits of interpretive reason rather than dogmatically positing
> >>its impotence?
>
> >Well, if that were PdM's entire essay, it would be dogmatic. (Not
> >that I think you have any problem with dogmatic assertion.) As
> >Moggin pointed out to me, this isn't the kind of claim that could
> >be theoretically demonstrated "apodictically." Having read lots of
> >de Man, I find the idea at least superficially persuasive, though
> >I'm planning to study him in greater detail with an open mind.
>
> In other words, taking superficial persuasion in lieu of rational
> demonstration is what deconstruction is all about.
Notice the clauses before and after the independent clause in my last
sentence.
[snip; I'll let Chance et al. figure out Plato for us.]
> >>How does reception history modify the nature of the message being
> >>received? After WWII, Dewey amended his obiter dicta on German
> >>intellectual history to identify Kant among the causes of National
> >>Socialism.
>
> >Then Dewey said something really stupid, didn't he?
>
> So it seems.
Then why did you think it authoritative enough to cite? Was there some
point?
> >>Did his reception of Kantian ethics, as corroborated
> >>by the authorities of Adolf Eichmann and Ayn Rand, determine the
> >>meaning of the Categorical Imperative thenceforth?
>
> >How precious to find Eichmann and Rand cited as parallel authorities!
> >I think Rand was a _little_ brighter than Eichmann, but neither of them
> >seems to have known shit about Kant.
>
> Like Dewey, both of them were pragmatists, in their own inimitable ways.
Oh, so Kant & Dewey & Eichmann & Rand are all in the same camp,
hyperbolically speaking?
But enough. If Z. wants to pose by pronouncing on de Man while admitting
he hasn't time to read him, then so be it. But who would want to join
that game?
-- Andy Lowry