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David M Hasen

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Mar 8, 1995, 1:34:05 PM3/8/95
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> dha...@uclink2.berkeley.eduMon Feb 27 13:07:42 1995 wrote:
>
> > Let me add, though this does not address your question, a small
> >observation about a debate I recently observed on this newsgroup. This
> >was the Weinles/Fitch v. anonymous brouhaha about consistency, conducted
> >with unbridled foolishness on all sides. In the midst of all the
> >vituperation that "debate" occasioned, one thing did not escape notice:
> >that neither Mr. Weinles nor Mr. Fitch ever gave a simple answer to the
> >question posed, a perfectly fine question, which is whether so-called
> >critics of reason really do or can dispense with reason as completely as
> >they claim to. So let me ask the question again: are they on the
> >elevator or not?
>
> Many postmodernists, myself included, tire and bore easily when asked
> both to push our bus and to ride in it. This is not because questions
> about presuppositions are bad ones, nor because we want to escape the
> responsibility to respond; but rather because most problems of this sort
> emanate from people who want to take our bus away from us, and who also
> disguise themselves as seriously interested in a reply to what ends up
> being a rhetorical question.
>
> Since you ask again, I'll assume you're serious. They +are+ on the ele-
> vator--but they are also in the building, on the way to an attorney, up
> to no good, and decidedly ugly. What justifies the observation-claim
> of "on-ness" with regard to "elevator" as the "logical" or "rational"
> claim to make?

Thank you for answering the question. Now, it seems to me that their
being on the elevator indicates their acceptance of reason. It does so
because, contrary to your claims about the nature of reason, what was at
issue in the initial question (posed by anonymous, not me) was merely
whether those who claim to deny reason (understood merely as: not (p and
not-p); the specific was whether they deny modus ponens) really do
so. Clearly, if you speak for them, they do not deny reason.


I don't understand the drift of your final sentence quoted above.
Whatever considerations apply to me in deciding what counts as being "on"
the elevator would seem, by virtue of your answer, to apply to the
postmoderns who decide not to ride the thing in case of fire.


> Those who mind their "p's" and "q's" too frequently rely
> on examples that check up on the theoretical truth of an always-already
> theoretical claim masquerading as "fact." This despite the fact that no
> "p's" and "q's" can ever mind the truth, for as formal statements based
> on a formal, quantitative conception of things, they can never index the
> specifics of an instance.


The "necessarily theoretical" nature of putatively observational claims is
beside the point; it has nothing to do with whether you accept "reason."
I may accept that my empirical claim (I am riding/not riding the elevator)
rests on a theory, or on several theories, but the issue is whether that
claim, whatever its basis, means that when I perceive a fire (however
theoretically or observationally defined) I refrain from riding the
elevator (ditto). If so, then we accept reason. By way of illustration,
thinkers as traditional as Kuhn, Wittgenstein (no doubter of the validity
of modus ponens) and Lakatos accept that facts are "theoretical" in the
sense you are describing, but none of them thinks that we may or must
dispense with "reason." You seem to be assuming that if you're not Michel
Foucault you're Karl Popper.

> "2+2=4" says nothing about the world, until
> we fill the form with substance, "2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples." But,
> unless you're in the canning business, the filling of the form tells you
> nothing interesting about apples. In fact, it distracts attention from
> other, perhaps more relevant, considerations about the quality or beauty
> or significance of the apples in question.

All of this strikes me as speculative if it's to count as some sort of
general statement of what reason is.

> Of course minding one's "p's" and "q's" can be very enlightening, if you
> also invest a lot of sweat in the trial-and-error school of science. The
> practice can underwrite the effort that puts a person on the moon, makes
> a cure for leukemia, and creates a world-wide web of linked information

This is science, not reason. Science uses reason; we may question it, or
treat it pragmatically; in doing so we don't a priori question reason.

> Riders of the postmodernity bus are not interested in repealing logic so
> much as they are committed to rooting out atomistic, behavioristic ideas
> of a universal or monistic "reason." That "reason" which puts a rocket
> on Jupiter is not sufficient to get a room gracefully appointed, or to
> run a government, or to settle moral questions of any sort.

Talk about speculation. It's not clear to me that reason can't do this.
It's also not clear it can. But unless you have some argument (and then
we're back at the thorny problem of needing reason again) for why it
can't, I don't see why I or anyone should accept your claims. Perhaps
others do, but apparently it's not because it makes sense to accept them
(dare I say "because they rationally believe the claims are true") but
because accepting the claims makes them happy. Presumably even you're not
happy with merely this, since you would like to persuade me to accept
certain beliefs, yet you recognize that I am not happy to accept them.
Oddly, your argument, though I don't find it persuasive, exhibits all the
earmarks of just the sort of thing you purport to eschew.

As far as "riding the bus" is concerned, obviously you're entitled
to think whatever you wish. From the outside, however, it looks like
those who are riding the bus - that is, thinking whatever they wish - are
doing so as a way of avoiding thinking hard about certain things, for
instance, about whether there is a rational criterion of beauty, or, if
there isn't, why there isn't. The notion that in order to undertake such
an inquiry one requires a full-blown, metaphysical concept of Reason is
simply false; all we need is the one you accept: not (p and not-p).

> One way to
> articulate this view (not the best, nor my own way), is to pluralize our
> conception of reason. On this view, logic is neither transcendental nor
> universal. On the contrary, it is nothing more than "being reasonable"
> within limitations provided by a specific, praxical context. Now if one
> believes, with Russell and the atomists, that only those human endeavors
> where science is possible can hope to achieve knowledge, this pluralist
> account of reason seems hopelessly bogus. Hence, the claim is common
> that postmodernity is either ignorant of, or disinterested in, reason
> and rationality. Some postmodernists will accept this proclamation from
> Lord Bertie, because it at least permits them to ride in their own bus,
> without some philosopher-cum-backseat-driver trying to tell them how to
> paint a portrait or craft a government.

Again, this is a straw man if it purports to say anything about a
commitment to reason beyond that espoused by Russell and those persuaded
by his views.


-- David Hasen

Stephen A. Schwartz

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Mar 13, 1995, 1:53:47 PM3/13/95
to
Gordon Fitch (g...@panix.com) wrote:
: One thing that's been kind of interesting about this
: discussion is that two or three people who seem to believe
: they are arguing for logic and against "postmodernism"
: referred to the discussion in victory-and-defeat terms, that
: is, a combat.

Not that it matters, but weren't both you and Weinles recently seen
crowing about how Mr. Anon could not "hold up his end" or "take the heat"?
The first formulation, it seems, merely pays lip-service to the idea of
discussion as cooperation and the second is clearly just the sort of
agonistic model you decry among anti-postmodernists, who clearly don't
have a monopoly on this way of thinking.

: The development of logic is,
: to me, most closely associated with achieving power over the
: minds of other people -- "proving" things to them against
: their will -- and also over the physical world -- science as
: it's usually practiced.

Do you believe that everything that one is forced to accept against one's
will constitutes an abuse of power?

Steve

Gordon Fitch

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Mar 15, 1995, 5:50:27 PM3/15/95
to
Gordon Fitch (g...@panix.com) wrote:
| : One thing that's been kind of interesting about this
| : discussion is that two or three people who seem to believe
| : they are arguing for logic and against "postmodernism"
| : referred to the discussion in victory-and-defeat terms, that
| : is, a combat.

ssc...@larry.cc.emory.edu (Stephen A. Schwartz):


| Not that it matters, but weren't both you and Weinles recently seen
| crowing about how Mr. Anon could not "hold up his end" or "take the heat"?
| The first formulation, it seems, merely pays lip-service to the idea of
| discussion as cooperation and the second is clearly just the sort of
| agonistic model you decry among anti-postmodernists, who clearly don't
| have a monopoly on this way of thinking.

There are different kinds of _agon_. As I said, I thought
Mr. Anon was just interested in a little shoving match, not
the sort of thing where there's a victory and a score. I
assume he huffed off after showing us goddamned
postmodernists a thing or two, etc., in boredom rather
than defeat. He didn't seem like the type you could show
anything to, and Dog forbid I should use logic and _prove_
anything to him.

gcf:


| : The development of logic is,
| : to me, most closely associated with achieving power over the
| : minds of other people -- "proving" things to them against
| : their will -- and also over the physical world -- science as
| : it's usually practiced.

ssc...@larry.cc.emory.edu (Stephen A. Schwartz):


| Do you believe that everything that one is forced to accept against one's
| will constitutes an abuse of power?

Do we want to talk about abuse of power or just plain power?
_Abuse_ of power conveys a moral or aesthetic judgment, so
we really have two issues: (1) the relation of logic to
power, (2) the moral or aesthetic aspects of power and our
judgment of them. It is but a short step from this confusion
to someone saying something like "Gordon believes logic is
immoral", an eventuality I know you will want to avoid.
--
>< Gordon Fitch >< g...@panix.com ><

Stephen A. Schwartz

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Mar 15, 1995, 8:04:00 PM3/15/95
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Gordon Fitch (g...@panix.com) wrote:

: There are different kinds of _agon_. As I said, I thought


: Mr. Anon was just interested in a little shoving match, not
: the sort of thing where there's a victory and a score. I
: assume he huffed off after showing us goddamned
: postmodernists a thing or two, etc., in boredom rather
: than defeat. He didn't seem like the type you could show
: anything to,

Speak for yourself.

: gcf:


: | : The development of logic is,
: | : to me, most closely associated with achieving power over the
: | : minds of other people -- "proving" things to them against
: | : their will -- and also over the physical world -- science as
: | : it's usually practiced.

: ssc...@larry.cc.emory.edu (Stephen A. Schwartz):
: | Do you believe that everything that one is forced to accept against one's
: | will constitutes an abuse of power?

: Do we want to talk about abuse of power or just plain power?

Well, if all you're saying is that logic has a power, then there's
nothing to argue about. But if you are claiming that logic's power is
somehow "pernicious," that it involves the "subjugation" of those it
compels, that, consequently, true freedom involves "escaping" from its
constraints or "uncomfortable assumptions", then it seems to me that you
are then claiming that logic's power is illegitimate, that it is an
_abuse_ of power. In short, if it's not "abusive" then what are you
complaining about?

It is interesting to me that where Weinles sees logic as "comfortable"
you have cast it as something onerous. Which is it? A burden or a crutch?

Steve S.

PR...@cunyvm.cuny.edu

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Mar 16, 1995, 11:55:53 PM3/16/95
to
In article <3k7qvj$r...@panix.com>, g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) says:
>
>
>Do we want to talk about abuse of power or just plain power?
>_Abuse_ of power conveys a moral or aesthetic judgment, so
>we really have two issues: (1) the relation of logic to
>power, (2) the moral or aesthetic aspects of power and our
>judgment of them. It is but a short step from this confusion
>to someone saying something like "Gordon believes logic is
>immoral", an eventuality I know you will want to avoid.
>--
Isn't logic immoral??? or, at least, NOT moral?
Isn't logic supposed to transcend good and evil... and this is
the whole problem... the point where it begins to break from myth and history?
Just wondering.

Brian Dell

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Mar 17, 1995, 12:16:13 AM3/17/95
to
Gordon Fitch:
:: The development of logic is, to me,

:: most closely associated with achieving power over the minds
:: of other people -- "proving" things to them against their will
: and against the testimony of their experience

One can demonstrate to another his or her own self-contradiction for
purely humanitarian reasons.

:: -- and also over the physical world -- science as it's usually
:: practiced.

The power game is the game of Life. If you can't stand the heat you'll
have to get off planet Earth.

: One of the most profound forms of domination is
: to separate one's victim from her own perceptions and
: thoughts and replace these with whatever authority
: prescribes, usually a Truth which is far away, as if on a
: high mountain, and firmly in the possession of the Elect.

I haven't seen anyone defend logic as a negative proof *while* denying
its positive capacity (to assert truth _ex nihilo_ or independently of
contingent premises).

--
Brian Dell
http://gpu.srv.ualberta.ca/~dellb/index.html

MARK WEINLES

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Mar 17, 1995, 3:29:15 AM3/17/95
to
Stephen Schwartz wrote:

Mark Weinles wrote (to David Hasen):

>> I addressed Anon's question directly. If I didn't answer it to
>>your satisfaction, that's another thing, but you'll have to be more
>>specific in your complaints.

Schwarz answers:

>He's dead wrong about this. I read that debate with keen interest and
>at no point did Weinles ever come up with a semblance of an answer to
>the question Anon repeatedly asked, namely, "What's wrong with reason
>and logic?" (modus ponens, more specifically). The analogy with
>Dr. Johnson did not go to the point, as far as I'm concerned. If it
>did, maybe Weinles could put it into the form of an argument rather
>than an analogy the relevance of which is not clear.

You've torpedoed your own assertion: if I gave a answer that
you believe wasn't to the point, then plainly I gave at least "a
semblance of an answer." As a matter of fact, I gave several
different answers. You might not like any of them, but I'm not
accountable for the deficiencies in your taste. More on Dr. Johnson
below. (Meaning in part two, since I'm splitting up this post.)

>Apparently, you're so used to condescending that you don't
>know when you're doing it.

Trust me, I know exactly -- if you want, I'll send you memos
so that you won't keep making the wrong guess.

>> Hardly anything that Anon or I said is worth repeating -- if
>>you really want a summary, send me a note, and I'll do the best I can.

>Hardly anything *you* said is worth repeating. I thought Anon had a
>point, one to which you still haven't responded in my opinion.

Since you followed the debate with "keen interest," you must
know that I responded at length. What you mean, therefore, is that my
response didn't meet with your approval. If you want to explain why,
then we can discuss the matter. So far, however, all you've done is
repeat yourself.

>>In any case, I never claimed that I caused devastation: I simply
>>pointed out that the value of Anon's question was one debate (contrary
>>to your assertion that it consisted purely of ad hominem attacks).

>In other words you didn't responde to the question. Nor have you
>responded to the question of why you think the question ("What's wrong
>with reason, specifically modus ponens?") is a bad or meaningless one.

You sound like a broken record. See above. Something else
just occurred to me, though: it's obvious that you don't approve of
the replies I made to Anon. In fact, your disapproval is so heavy
that you refuse to accredit my replies _as replies_. And that's the
key. I replied by criticizing Anon's question in a number of
different ways, while you think that his question is sacrosanct.
There's the difference between us. From my point of view, disputing
the value of Anon's question _was_ an appropriate reply -- but as far
as you're concerned, it was an act of _lese-majeste_.

>You obviously don't think the question "Is there something wrong with
>reason?" is a meaningless one, since your mocking statement that Anon
>kept citing about "the comfortable assumptions of reason and logic" is
>what started the debate in the first place. So why is the followup
>question ("Why do you think so?") out of place?

What started the debate was Vance's post about Foucault's
"What is Enlightenment" --I have yet to hear anything from you on that
topic. Anyway, those are both meaningful questions. If either you or
Anon had begun by asking them, we might be having a different
conversation right now. Instead, Anon started off with, "You don't
know anything" (that's a paraphrase), and your opening words to me
were roughly, "That's absurd" and "You're intolerable." They say you
get what you paid for -- obviously you paid for an argument. And tell
me something: just how _uncomfortable_ do you find the assumptions of
reason? You seem pretty happy with them -- so why are you taking
issue with my description?

David Hasen wrote:

>>>I've said this before, but apparently it bears repetition I don't see
>>>how a question about the possibility of rejecting modus ponens is
>>>*conceivably* valueless in the context of a debate (already
>>>"certified" as worthwhile by its participants, by virtue of their
>>>participation) about rejecting reason. It would appear that the only
>>>thing "valueless" about it is that you don't like its proponent.

Mark Weinles replied:

>> No, that didn't need repeating, since you could see the answer
>>for yourself in the different objections that Gordon and I raised to
>>Anon's question during the original debate. Wait a minute, don't tell
>>me -- they've slipped your mind, too!

And Stephen Schwarz answers:

>Well, they seem to have slipped mine as well.

If you and Mr. Hasen are any guide, the belief in reason
causes severe memory loss.

Schwarz:

>The more these non-debates go on, the more I get the sneaking
>suspicion that the self-appointed critics of reason and logic are
>doing everything in their power to avoid answering a question they
>find troublesome.

This confirms my theory that the real problem here is with
your criteria of judgement. To put it another way, what you define as
a question about ethics is actually a question in the theory of value.
I offered a number of different answers, Gordon has contributed just
as many, and Michael has put together a thorough response -- but
you're oblivious to all of that. I'm tempted to say that the problem
must be your bad memory, but there's also another, more important
factor at work: your inability to see a critical response as any
response at all. You insist on imposing your terms of discussion, and
you accuse anyone who questions them of being evasive -- a domineering
attitude which practically defines the history of reason. It's an
open question, and an interesting one, whether reason is inherently
domineering, or if that quality is a product of historical conditions.
Any speculations?

Just out of curiosity, what board does one apply to in order
to become a properly appointed critic of reason and logic? (I assume
it's the same one that made you and Mr. Hasen their appointed
defenders.)

>If the problems with modus ponens and reason in general are so
>obvious, why not just make your case so we can dispense with the
>insults and discuss the issue?

In my last post to you, I said that there wasn't any reason to
call you a hypocrite -- this is what I get for leaping to conclusions.
Anon began with a barrage of insults and got the same in return. When
Sunny re-opened the subject, I made a point of replying in a civil
voice, in order to keep from setting off another fireworks display.
However, you and Mr. Hasen leaped in with a new set of attacks and
distortions. I don't have any complaints about that -- I like
watching fireworks as much anybody, and I also enjoy lighting them.
But it was foolish for Anon to insist that all he ever wanted was a
serious discussion, and the same is true for you (even though your
comments have been mild, compared to Anon's).

Both Michael and Jim have been persistently trying to discuss
the issue without insults or hostility. Why haven't you taken them up
on it?

I wrote to David Hasen:

>>Since you can't recall any of the central points of the discussion,
>>you shouldn't be so quick to pontificate about it. I don't see any
>>reason to call you "intellectually dishonest," but "intellectually
>>incompetent" seems about right.

Schwarz replies:

>This is totally out of line. Weinles has a habit of assessing the
>intellectual competence of everyone who disagrees with him. The fact
>is, Weinles, you know nothing about any of your interlocutors and
>their "intellectual competence" or lack thereof.

This sounds strangely familiar -- like many of your comments,
it repeats a point that Anon made and I responded to. You could at
least have the sense to take the _next_ step of attacking my reply,
instead of making me repeat it for your instruction. (This was
supposed to be a 200-level debate, but you seem to have missed the
intro class.) As I said to Anon, I'm assessing what you put on the
screen: I'm judging what you say, and what you say provides my basis.
Mr. Hasen drew some very strong conclusions on a subject that he
didn't know anything about. How would you describe that?

Since you've decided to be the village moralist and rule on
what's "out of line" in these exchanges, why didn't Mr. Hasen's
accusation of "intellectual dishonesty" draw the same response from
you as my comment about "intellectual incompetence"? You aren't out
of line -- you're out of whack.

-- Mark


MARK WEINLES

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Mar 17, 1995, 3:47:33 AM3/17/95
to
Stephen Schwarz wrote:

Mark Weinles wrote:

>> I'm not sure this is worth re-hashing; it may not even have
>>been worth hashing, in the first place. But in brief, Anon's question
>>about the elevator reminds me of Johnson's "refutation" of Berkeley.

David Hasen:

> Please explain why this is not a non-sequitur.

Mark Weinles:

>> Alright, but this is a point that even Anon understood.
>>(Something else you've forgotten?) He disagreed by arguing that
>>Foucault isn't Berkeley -- irrelevant, but true (metempsychosis
>>aside).

Schwarz:

>That is not what happened. As I recall, Anon argued that this Dr.
>Johnson thing was utterly irrelevant. Rightly.

What little you manage to remember isn't very accurate. Yes,
Anon argued that it was irrelevant, but for exactly the reason that I
stated. (Your interest may have been keen, support his argument
(support its relevancy, I mean -- it's agreed that Foucault's not
Berkeley), or offer another one in its place, that would be fine --
but as usual, you're long on bluster and short on specifics.

Weinles to Hasen:

>> Johnson and Anon both tried to demonstrate that the "hard
>>facts" of reality were sufficient to refute a certain abstract theory
>>which contradicted elements of "common sense." Johnson did the job
>>himself: he found a rock, kicked it, and stated his conclusion (valid
>>or not). Anon wanted me to do his work for him by standing in front
>>of the elevator of a burning library building and reporting on my
>>deliberations. In both cases, though, the idea is the same: that airy
>>thinking can't withstand a confrontation with a supposedly concrete
>>piece of evidence.

Schwarz replies:

>In Anon's example, it seems to me, the point was that *your own
>behavior* (yes, you, Mark Weinles) is in contradiction with your
>professed beliefs. Since that's obviously the case (I have no doubt
>that you would take the stairs), are you not troubled by the fact that
>you routinely make use of the reason you impugn? And, given this,
>what exactly is it that's supposed to be wrong with modus ponens?

Nothing's obvious -- but I'm glad that you've finally raised a
specific point. First, let me get rid of a few small details. One, I
never "impugned" the stairs. Two, we aren't talking about a routine
case, but an exceptional one (unless, wherever you are, the library is
constantly on fire). Third, what difference does it make if I have
more contradictions than a platypus? You explicitly objected to the
use of ad hominem arguments -- yet here you are, delivering one of
your own. Supposedly you were defending the eternal verities of
reason -- but now it seems that you just want to criticize _me_.

I've been trying to avoid repeating myself, but since you've
forgotten practically everything, I'm going to have to. I already
showed you the charming way that Anon introduced himself. After that
he posed the question that you're interested in. Here's the relevant
passage.

Anon wrote:

"In the library I frequent, there is a sign posted next to the
elevators that reads 'In case of fire, use stairs.' I'm sure even
Mr. Weinles will recognize that the logical form of this message is
that of 'modus ponens' i.e., If p, then q. It safe to assume that,
were Mr. Weinles to find himself in this library and the library were
ablaze (i.e., 'p'), we would find him rejecting "the comfortable
assumptions of reason and logic"-- at the risk of great personal
discomfort--by taking the elevator (i.e., 'not q')?"

I replied in part by saying:

"The sign next to the elevator in _my_ library (if we're going
to quote buildings, mine is just as good an authority as yours) says
'This life is a test. It is only a test. If it had been a real life,
you would have received further instructions on where to go and what
to do.' Your mistake lies in believing that you have the instruction
manual."

The same goes for you. Anyway, Anon responded as follows:

"Your mistake lies in the sort of arrogance that lays waste to
thousands of years of human history and the beliefs of millions of
people much more intelligent than I (or even you) and does so in the
name of the purest narcissism."

In other words, if we accept Anon as an authority, reason
isn't based on anything more than custom and belief, but challenging
it is necessarily arrogant. That makes it indistinguishable from a
religion. I said as much to Anon. If you're wondering about his
answer, he never gave one: instead, he claimed to have forgotten
making his comments (more evidence that faith in reason promotes
memory loss).

I could stop right there and let you respond, but let's go
on a bit.

Johnson's "refutation" didn't work because it was, in effect,
a tautology. By kicking the rock, he was saying that "experience is
experience," a statement that, like all of its kind, is equally true
and meaningless. If you and Anon are correct in your assumption that
I'd take the elevator, then your conclusion has just as much merit as
Johnson's: in a given case, a reasonable person will act reasonably.
To which I can only reply, yes, and what of it?

But what about the other possibility, that I'd take the
stairs? (Note that I'm talking about all of this in the conditional
-- I still don't accept the validity of the question.) That means
you'd have to concede reason doesn't always hold -- but I don't think
you'd be willing to. If my guess is right, you would happily conclude
that since I'm being unreasonable, I'm a nut case without the
qualifications to discuss the subject (but with good credentials for
entering a loony-bin). In short, it's a rigged question, based on a
logic of "heads I win, tails you lose."

Even in the best possible case for you -- I take the elevator
and admit I'm guilty of the inconsistency you want to pin on me --
what would you have you proved? At most, you would have made a point
about psychology: something like, "people behave rationally during
fires" (assuming that you wanted to generalize from my case to people
in general -- probably a bad idea). Your goal, however, was to
demonstrate the universal validity of reason, not to make an
observation about human behavior.

One last item: it was nice of you to come to Mr. Hasen's
defense, but you have some work of your own to do. In your last post,
you boasted about "debunking post-structuralism." I was interested
and asked for more details. Now, I don't want to rush you (I often
take a long time with my own replies, for one reason or another), but
I'm waiting to see how you go about it.

-- Mark


Russell Turpin

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Mar 18, 1995, 3:07:13 PM3/18/95
to
-*----

In article <95075.23...@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU>, <PR...@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU> wrote:
> Isn't logic immoral??? or, at least, NOT moral?

The word you want is "amoral," which is quite different
from "immoral."

Russell

--
"How can I be called conservative? I'm pro-prostitution,
pro-pornography, pro-abortion, pro-legalization of drugs,
pro-homosexuality, and pro-drag queens." -- Camille Paglia

Gordon Fitch

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Mar 18, 1995, 6:31:25 PM3/18/95
to
g...@panix.com (Gordon Fitch) says:
| >Do we want to talk about abuse of power or just plain power?
| >_Abuse_ of power conveys a moral or aesthetic judgment, so
| >we really have two issues: (1) the relation of logic to
| >power, (2) the moral or aesthetic aspects of power and our
| >judgment of them. It is but a short step from this confusion
| >to someone saying something like "Gordon believes logic is
| >immoral", an eventuality I know you will want to avoid.

<PR...@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU>:


| Isn't logic immoral??? or, at least, NOT moral?
| Isn't logic supposed to transcend good and evil... and this is
| the whole problem... the point where it begins to break from myth and history?
| Just wondering.

One can relate some of the assumptions and intentions of
logic to slavery through the medium of monotheism. For
instance, the law of the excluded middle promulgates the
idea that there is one single Truth, the Truth of the
monotheos, who is the projection into the heavens of the
earthly slavemaster, the unique authority. However, logic
of this sort is the sort which is not confined to logical
objects but is said to apply to everything, everywhere, at
all times; a universe which is wired to frozen language and
compelled to obey it. All this is a bit different from the
pragmatic and skeptical approach to logic its use as a tool
is associated with.

Of course, one may say that our tools can overpower us.
--
>< Gordon Fitch >< g...@panix.com ><

David Smith

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Mar 20, 1995, 2:02:23 PM3/20/95
to
In article <3kfehh$6...@peaches.cs.utexas.edu>, tur...@cs.utexas.edu
says...

>
>-*----
>In article <95075.23...@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU>,
<PR...@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU> wrote:
>> Isn't logic immoral??? or, at least, NOT moral?
>
>The word you want is "amoral," which is quite different
>from "immoral."
>

Is it really that different?


David A. Smith

Gordon Fitch

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Mar 21, 1995, 11:49:30 AM3/21/95
to
| >In article <95075.23...@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU>,
| <PR...@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU> wrote:
| >> Isn't logic immoral??? or, at least, NOT moral?

tur...@cs.utexas.edu

| >The word you want is "amoral," which is quite different
| >from "immoral."
| >

d...@cassas2.artsci.hawaii.edu (David Smith):


| Is it really that different?
|

To a moralist, no; to an amoralist, yes.

--
>< Gordon Fitch >< g...@panix.com ><

Andy Perry

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Mar 21, 1995, 6:07:42 PM3/21/95
to
In article <D5rA4...@news.hawaii.edu>, d...@cassas2.artsci.hawaii.edu
(David Smith) wrote:

Yes.
--
Andy Perry "This life has been a test.
Brown University Had this been an actual life,
Dept of English you would have received instructions
Andrew...@Brown.edu OR on where to go and what to do."
st00...@Brownvm.bitnet -- Angela Chase

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