late capitalism?
jle...@utdallas.edu
> Is the Internet a primarily white, middle-class, bourgeois, postmodern,
> late-capitalist phenomenon? (PoMo being, according to some, the cultural
> logic of late capitalism, the internet is on the way to a logical
> conclusion...)
A catfish swims by and sniffs/feels the bait. Detecting the
trolling hook, it swims away.
--
============================================================================
James L Elson: |<o When you stare into the abyss too long o>|
School of Arts & Humanities |<o the abyss stares back into you. o>|
University of Texas-Dallas | --Nietzsche-- |
sunny shah
Is the Internet a primarily white, middle-class, bourgeois, postmodern,
late-capitalist phenomenon? (PoMo being, according to some, the cultural
logic of late capitalism, the internet is on the way to a logical
conclusion...)
I happen to belong to none of the categories. Where am I?
Also, does anyone think that the info-revolution taking place today
(apparently) could have been culled from the writings of Raymond Williams?
Regards.
Sunny, a mere ideonode.
"Crappy pretentious maxim to make oneself seem wise and kind"
William G. Sacks
: Is the Internet a primarily white, middle-class, bourgeois, postmodern,
: late-capitalist phenomenon? (PoMo being, according to some, the cultural
: logic of late capitalism, the internet is on the way to a logical
: conclusion...)
: I happen to belong to none of the categories. Where am I?
Right. You attend Cambridge, but you're not part of the bourgeois
power structure. You really need to give us yanks a break once in a
while: we're used to MUCH more sophisticated attempts at self-deception
than this, and you're likely to discombobulate us right into therapy.
sunny
(William G. Sacks) wrote:
Sadly, you're concept of Cambridge university is simply stereotypical. Poor
people can in fact go there. I am relying of government grants, loans and
basically scrounging every penny I can get. I do not feel that the fact
that I have no money should stop me from having the best education that I
can. Granted, Cambridge is full of white middle-class people, and I have
had to take a fair deal of racist and class abuse, either implicit or
explicit. And all of this on top of trying to live on less than £5 a week.
I am not part of the bourgeois power structure as you put it, since I am
marginalised here as a person. I do not fit into Cambridge's neat little
categories. I do not fit, since I am a working class person who desired an
education. Am I self-deceiving?
michael calvin mcgee
In article <ss10040-03...@mac104.sidg.pwf.cam.ac.uk>, sunny (ss1...@hermes.cam.ac.uk) writes:
>In article <3gs73h$6...@newsreader.wustl.edu>, wgs...@artsci.wustl.edu
>(William G. Sacks) wrote:
>
>> sunny shah (ss1...@hermes.cam.ac.uk) wrote:
>>
>> : Is the Internet a primarily white, middle-class, bourgeois, postmodern,
>> : late-capitalist phenomenon?
>> Right. You attend Cambridge, but you're not part of the bourgeois
>> power structure. You really need to give us yanks a break once in a
>> while: we're used to MUCH more sophisticated attempts at self-deception
>> than this, and you're likely to discombobulate us right into therapy.
>
>Sadly, you're concept of Cambridge university is simply stereotypical.
>I am not part of the bourgeois power structure as you put it, since I am
>marginalised here as a person. I do not fit into Cambridge's neat little
>categories. I do not fit, since I am a working class person who desired an
>education. Am I self-deceiving?
England has a long tradition of appropriating the "best and the
brightest" among marginals by giving them a subsidized education.
A wise person would understand that, sooner or later, the people
paying for his/her learning are going to get something for their
subsidy, no?
michael
Gordon Fitch
| England has a long tradition of appropriating the "best and the
| brightest" among marginals by giving them a subsidized education.
| A wise person would understand that, sooner or later, the people
| paying for his/her learning are going to get something for their
| subsidy, no?
Who knows but that in the last days, ancient rituals will be
performed, not for their power (in any case departed), but
for the sentimental evocation of a faded glory.
--
>< Gordon Fitch >< g...@panix.com ><
and...@phoenix.princeton.edu
> performed, not for their power (in any case departed), but
> for the sentimental evocation of a faded glory.
their original component purposes.
>
> --
> >< Gordon Fitch >< g...@panix.com ><
Omar Haneef '96
> for an intellectual revolution. Paris, 1968 ? I can fight from within the
> system since the old academic sites do not bow readily to external pressure
> (observe the Colin MacCabe affair in 1981 or the Derrida honorary degree
> fracas).
Please. I don't know about any of this. I would love to (and I betray a side
of myself that I would rather not, but anyway) here all this juicy gossip.
What is the Derrida honorary degree "scandal", what is the Colin MacCabe
affair? What is this talk of 'Raymond Williams treatment at the hands of
Cambridge'? (Or was it Oxford?) Whatever.
I realise all this is probably outside the scope of this group but where
else am I to get ahold of this Soap Opera Academia?
Thanx in advance
-Omar Haneef
jle...@utdallas.edu
Aaaahhhh, confessions of guilty pleasures. ;) We might think such
"goings-on" are not germane. But to argue for that wouldn't we
also have to maintain the "ascetic ideal" and marginalize all but
the "mind?" Reason alone is not persuasive. What sort of
metaphysics sustains the notion that simply by the virtue, _agon_,
of being thinkers that we have 'magically' "transcended" our
common, all too human motivations which inform and play a major
role in the construction of our lives?
Rob De Villiers
Michael Mcgee wrote:
>
>England has a long tradition of appropriating the "best and the
>brightest" among marginals by giving them a subsidized education.
>A wise person would understand that, sooner or later, the people
>paying for his/her learning are going to get something for their
>subsidy, no?
>
>michael
Is this an example of Pomo cant and confusion? "England" does the
slimey "appropriating" but then you start talking about "the people"
who pay. What people? England? The tax payer or some demonic
"establishment" no doubt? Ask those crying out for an education if
they would prefer to forgo it for the sake of not being thus
"appropriated". So those paying (whoever they are) are going to
expect something back are they? Well I think they know damn well that they
might or might not get something back and if they do get something back
they do not always know in advance what exactly it is that they will get
back. These are risks they take because they believe them worth taking.
It is called having a modern, fairly open, education system.
Most societies do invest in some such in some way or t'other. Some try to
make it widely available , including to "marginals", others prefer to
enslave or practice genocide against their "marginals". Any special Pomo
preferances?
Rob.
Rob De Villiers
>The question I have (well, ok, one of many), is how good are Cambridge and
>Oxford for philosophy now?
>Who are the stars?
Oxford have (or did up to a few years ago) P.M.S.Hacker and G.P.Baker the
best Wittgenstein commentators bar none.
>2 of pm stars, Crowther and Norris are in Scotland and Wales. Where are the
>others?
If Christopher Norris is a pm star then God help pm.
Rob.
Italy74
Quebec. The internet is part of a revolution within capitalism--a move
from money to "information" as the basic unit of exchange. This new
arrangement, or new world order, is radically exclusive. In fact, the one
institution in democratic societies which can ensure broad
participation--government, the state--is fast becoming irrelevant.
Rather, the state is just another player, just another user of information
systems set up by private firms. Today, we see more and more maps of the
world divided not by political boundaries but by the marketting rights of
multinational corporations. There is no America, no England, no
Japan--there is only Exxon, AT&T, Chevron, IBM, Dow, GE, Time-Warner...And
with information, with knowledge, as currency--who controls that currency,
controls our very perception of our world and ourselves. The capitalist
mode of production has created a technology which penetrates our language
and molds our conceptual scheme. Overthrowing this arrangement is next to
impossible when open, public--not private or privatized--education falls
to the wayside.
Please excuse how disorganized and choppy this reply is; I just hope I got
my point across...
PR...@cunyvm.cuny.edu
>
>arrangement, or new world order, is radically exclusive. In fact, the one
>institution in democratic societies which can ensure broad
>participation--government, the state--is fast becoming irrelevant.
>Rather, the state is just another player, just another user of information
>systems set up by private firms.
has many ties to public universities and the military. These were, after all,
how it all started. Gore's packaging of the information super highway might
set the stage for a government take-over which will challenge or regulate
internet's market expansion... but you are certainly correct in suggesting
that this might not mean increased public access, but I doubt a super-power
like the US will allow itself to be carved up into little IBM kingdoms without
a fight. Even Newt has picked up on the information-speak.
I think it is just as likely that an information infrastructure will
secure federal power even more securely, just like the opening of the West
through a new railroad system did for the US in the 19th century.
Sam Vagenas
>Aaaahhhh, confessions of guilty pleasures. ;) We might think such
>"goings-on" are not germane. But to argue for that wouldn't we
>also have to maintain the "ascetic ideal" and marginalize all but
>the "mind?" Reason alone is not persuasive. What sort of
>metaphysics sustains the notion that simply by the virtue, _agon_,
>of being thinkers that we have 'magically' "transcended" our
>common, all too human motivations which inform and play a major
>role in the construction of our lives?
Jim, if it's not too personal, please share with us your all-too-human
motivations.
>============================================================================
>James L Elson: |<o When you stare into the abyss too long o>|
>School of Arts & Humanities |<o the abyss stares back into you. o>|
>University of Texas-Dallas | --Nietzsche-- |
Does the abyss ever talk?
Laura Wedner
: >also have to maintain the "ascetic ideal" and marginalize all but
: >metaphysics sustains the notion that simply by the virtue, _agon_,
: >of being thinkers that we have 'magically' "transcended" our
: >common, all too human motivations which inform and play a major
: >role in the construction of our lives?
Abyss metaphysics, to coin an ugly phrase?
: Does the abyss ever talk?
Case-in-point. What do you mean by ABYSS? Oh, it doesn't talk! How
convenient.
LAW
jle...@utdallas.edu
>
> > [Jim Elson wrote:]
> > [snip] Reason alone is not persuasive. What sort of
> >of being thinkers that we have 'magically' "transcended" our
> >common, all too human motivations which inform and play a major
> >role in the construction of our lives?
>
> Jim, if it's not too personal, please share with us your all-too-human
> motivations.
Okay. :) I exist in a world not of my own making. I eventually
became aware of this 'fact' and how this influenced/'determined'
my 'identity'/'ego'. I _need_ some way/'method'/'philosophy' of
organizing/constructing my experiences in manner that advances
my interests. What I think/agree-with/stand-for is simply not
independent of my context as a particular form of life with its
particular needs. Yet, I don't want to become my-optic--thanks
to sasq? for pointing out this nice hyphenation to me--by positing
that my way of constructing the world is the "correct"/"valid"
way of doing so. So, what are my motivations for becoming
a philosopher? Simply that I find contemporary ways of thinking and
ethics are inadequate to the tasks at hand. Tribal ethics which
are intolerant of, and, far more often than not, demonize, 'otherness'
are inimical to the survival of our species. (Need I mention
how they threathen anyone like myself who does not follow the
crowd?) If we are to survive the next few centuries, we are
going to have to make some rapid adaptations. I'd like to
think I can play a small role in this. Is 'self-interest'
all too human enough?
--
jle...@utdallas.edu
> Sam Vagenas (nol...@primenet.com) [quoted]:
> : >also have to maintain the "ascetic ideal" and marginalize all but
> : >the "mind?" Reason alone is not persuasive. What sort of
>
> How are those two practices compatible?
Laura, Sam was quoting me. Perhaps, I'm dense, but I'm not
sure which two practices you're referring to or precisely
what your question is.
> : >metaphysics sustains the notion that simply by the virtue, _agon_,
> : >of being thinkers that we have 'magically' "transcended" our
> : >common, all too human motivations which inform and play a major
> : >role in the construction of our lives?
>
> Abyss metaphysics, to coin an ugly phrase?
Hmm, abyssmal metaphysics? ;)
>[Sam wrote:]
>
> : Does the abyss ever talk?
>
> Case-in-point. What do you mean by ABYSS? Oh, it doesn't talk! How
> convenient.
Abyss is the prevalent translation of _Abgrund_, that is the absence
of "ground"/"foundation" in the philosophical sense. It's not
a thing. Perhaps, the best first approximation is it's an experience.
Hope this helps.
--Jim
Laura Wedner
: > : >also have to maintain the "ascetic ideal" and marginalize all but
: > How are those two practices compatible?
: Laura, Sam was quoting me. Perhaps, I'm dense, but I'm not
: sure which two practices you're referring to or precisely
: what your question is.
These two: 1) maintaining the ascetic idea, and 2) marginalizing all but
the mind.
: Abyss is the prevalent translation of _Abgrund_, that is the absence
: of "ground"/"foundation" in the philosophical sense. It's not
: a thing. Perhaps, the best first approximation is it's an experience.
Maybe I can ask a more pointed question: is this abyss feminine?
Thanks for your answers--the note about the translation of Abgrund is in
fact quite helpful.
LAW
Rob De Villiers
Micahel Calvin Mcgee wrote:
>My goodness! A nettled Brit!
[snipped - some arm-waving moralising cant about British imperialism]
>Everyone in the world needs an
^^^^^^^^^
>education, not just those who qualify intellectually to enter
>Cambridge.
And I certainly never said C. was the only place they could
get it... BUT unfortunately "the world" does not provide (yet?)
that sort of education nor does "the world" support the O.U.
and the equally excellent education provided there by the likes
of the said Stuart Hall from who's balanced and critical mind
I suggest you try to learn something. No, Britain, or at least a
British foundation, for the most part supports the O.U. - it is
in fact a British (bad luck) educational institution like Cantab.
with quite extensive ties with Cantab. and if you are proposing
some brilliant alternative arrangement by all means lets hear it.
>And, IMO, it ought to be a "free" education, insofar
>as anything is ever "free."
NO education system is ever free in the $ sense - be it some tribe's initiation
processes or a nation's universities - and those who like Michael Mcgee
rant and rave about "capitalist imperialism" and "ruling elites",
have had quite a good crack at setting up alternative systems during
the course of this century - with little apparent success and even less
freedom in any sense of the word.
>As for what the ruling elites of
>Merrie Olde England get for their pounds sterling, seems to me
>they get some docile, skillful economic imperialists, the same
>sort their American counterparts get from Harvard and McGill.
>You can get a free education at the Open University,
If you mean $ free then you are just plain simple wrong and if you
mean free in some other sense then you are behoven to explain it.
Free from the pressures of conspiratorial capitalists interests?
Well, everyone I know at the O.U. ( several colleagues and my own staff)
is there DIRECTLY by the grace their capitalist employer's support (and
if I were to go there that would be the only way I could afford it) whereas
those I know a C. are there thanks to the ANONYMOUS taxpayer. This
is because the O.U. is predominantly mature students part-time who therefore
dont so easily get taxpayer handouts whereas C. is mostly young people f/t
straight from school who atomatically qualify. So who and which
institution is likely to be under greater pressure to deliver to meet
the capitalists imperialists experctations?
>and enjoy
>the knowledge and wit of one of the planet's smartest people,
^^^^^^^^
>Stuart Hall.
That's overstating it a bit but he is not bad and he is certainly
not an idiotic conspiracy theorist like yourself.
All you really seem to have to say is you think it would be nicer
to be taught by someone who you think is a cool dude PoMo at the
O.U. than by someone who you are certain must by definition fit
your farcical stereotype of a stuffy old Cambridge Don. In both
respects you are quite out of touch with reality - if i may use that
idiom in a pomo news group.
>So if you really believe what you said, why are
>you so quick to defend Cambridge? Next you'll be telling us that
>the Royals are really populists in disguise!
Well, they are a bit of a joke but why are YOU so full of angst,
so twitter and blistered about something you are so out of touch with,
so removed from?
Cheers,
Rob.
>
>michael
>
>In article <1995Feb9.1...@planet.bt.co.uk>, Rob De Villiers
>(r...@planet.bt.co.uk) writes:
>
>>Michael Mcgee wrote:
>>>
>>>England has a long tradition of appropriating the "best and the
>>>brightest" among marginals by giving them a subsidized education.
>>>A wise person would understand that, sooner or later, the people
>>>paying for his/her learning are going to get something for their
>>>subsidy, no?
>>
NS Brown
[I asked:]
: > What would be your heuristics for a viable philosophy? Note that
: > I'm not asking "what is your philosophy," but rather "how should
: > a viable philosophy be constructed?" What would be the metrics
: > that we could look at and say "this is a pretty good philosophy,"
: > or "that philosophy sucks?"
[Jim Elson replies:]
: Would it surprise you that ethics would be central?
Not from you it wouldn't. That's why I asked. :)
(This *is* a compliment, by the way. :) )
: Ethics revolves around twin questions: "How should I deal with
: others?"; and "How should I deal with myself?" This places the
: question of 'philosophy' in the context of a particular superset
: of forms of life, i.e., _homo saps_, at a particular point in
: history. Is philosophy even possible within these constraints?
: Philosophy "writ large" as "universal"/"eternal"/"absolute"?: no.
It goes without saying that this approach to ethics cements
(at least to some degree) the Self-Other dichotomy. Are you
sure you want to preserve this dichotomy at so basic a level?
For example, one could posit an ethical system which suggests
that to deal with 'another' is to deal with 'the self,' and
to deal with 'the self' is to deal with 'another.' This mode
of thought isn't particularly new, but there are times when I
find it a very useful approach to ethical concerns. (E.g.:
we've heard the expression "He can forgive anyone *except*
himself," or "When you hate someone else, you poison your own
soul." The former looks toward a symptom of low self-esteem;
the latter recognizes the reflexive harm of 'Other-ing.')
: To answer your question requires inquiring into the relationship
: of the faculty of 'intellect' with the other aspects/faculties
: of humans. In 'fact', it hinges upon the answer to the latter.
: Heretofore, philosophy has cloistered itself within the ivory
: tower far beyond the reach of the vagarities/"vulgarities" of
: embodied life. Given the ascetic ideal, that follows.
I agree. There's a joke which, in its silliness, points to
what you're saying here:
Socrates: To think is to do.
Descartes: To think is to be.
Kant: To do is to be.
Sinatra: Do be do be do ....
The point being that there are links between 'thinking,' 'doing,'
and 'being.' They are interconnected constructs which suffer
when considered in isolation.
: To cut this short, I would value a 'philosophy' according to
: how well it addresses the the twin questions of how to live.
: It would have to be able to address the needs of diverse
: forms of human life equally well. To this end, it would need
: to support a variety of unified perspectives of the world. In
: a sense, it would have a skeleton based upon what all forms
: of human life have in common, but would be fleshed out dependent
: upon the context of particular forms of human life.
I think this is one of the most difficult dilemmas in all
of ethical thinking. On the one hand, we need some sort of
uniform structure to make society predictable enough for
there to be any freedom at all. On the other hand, too
much uniformity unnecessarily 'Others' the non-conformists
and makes society intolerable for anyone. Law looks at
these problems at a nation-society (or smaller) level, most
of the time. Philosophy *ought* to look at these problems
from a world-society (or larger?) level, at at that point
the difficulties increase exponentially.
When is it permissible, indeed *necessary*, to say: "This
person *is* an 'Other,' and one we cannot tolerate?"
That's the sticky wicket ....
: I recognize that my response is somewhat dense, but this is
: one occassion where a "quick dip in cold water" is appropriate.
: Now that I've climbed out on a limb, I'll try to respond to
: further questions.
Let's hope you get more questions than the (basically nodding-
in-agreement) comments I've made. How we turn thinking-about-
thinking into doing-and-being-our-thinking-about-thinking is
one of the primary challenges postmodernism must face.
Just an opinion, worth what you paid for it. :)
Cris
jle...@utdallas.edu
> Cris here. :)
> [I asked:]
> : > What would be your heuristics for a viable philosophy? Note that
> : > I'm not asking "what is your philosophy," but rather "how should
> : > a viable philosophy be constructed?" What would be the metrics
> : > that we could look at and say "this is a pretty good philosophy,"
> : > or "that philosophy sucks?"
> [Jim Elson replies:]
> : Would it surprise you that ethics would be central?
> : Ethics revolves around twin questions: "How should I deal with
> : others?"; and "How should I deal with myself?" This places the
> : question of 'philosophy' in the context of a particular superset
> : of forms of life, i.e., _homo saps_, at a particular point in
> : history. Is philosophy even possible within these constraints?
> : Philosophy "writ large" as "universal"/"eternal"/"absolute"?: no.
> It goes without saying that this approach to ethics cements
> (at least to some degree) the Self-Other dichotomy. Are you
> sure you want to preserve this dichotomy at so basic a level?
Yes and no. :)
> For example, one could posit an ethical system which suggests
> that to deal with 'another' is to deal with 'the self,' and
> to deal with 'the self' is to deal with 'another.'
That is what I'm working towards since I see the "Self"/"Other"
dichotomy as a 'false' one. There are "twin questions": I chose
this a metaphor since twins are genetically identical, but each
is a separate 'person', i.e., they 'represent' different
perspectives. To speak of the 'self' is to speak of the 'not-self'
since both entail each other.
[some good bits by Cris deleted]
> : I recognize that my response is somewhat dense, but this is
> : one occassion where a "quick dip in cold water" is appropriate.
> : Now that I've climbed out on a limb, I'll try to respond to
> : further questions.
> Let's hope you get more questions than the (basically nodding-
> in-agreement) comments I've made. How we turn thinking-about-
> thinking into doing-and-being-our-thinking-about-thinking is
> one of the primary challenges postmodernism must face.
Well, I'm just glad there's finally been a response. :) And a
good one, I might add. I look forward to more questions, but
newsgroups are not condusive to dense discussions. It's just
the "nature of the beast."
Omar Haneef '96
> Cris here. :)
> [I asked:]
> : > What would be your heuristics for a viable philosophy? Note that
> : > I'm not asking "what is your philosophy," but rather "how should
> : > a viable philosophy be constructed?" What would be the metrics
> : > that we could look at and say "this is a pretty good philosophy,"
> : > or "that philosophy sucks?"
> [Jim Elson replies:]
> : Would it surprise you that ethics would be central?
> Not from you it wouldn't. That's why I asked. :)
> (This *is* a compliment, by the way. :) )
Well, even if he is not surprised, I ceratinly am.
> : Ethics revolves around twin questions: "How should I deal with
> : others?"; and "How should I deal with myself?" This places the
> : question of 'philosophy' in the context of a particular superset
> : of forms of life, i.e., _homo saps_, at a particular point in
> : history. Is philosophy even possible within these constraints?
> : Philosophy "writ large" as "universal"/"eternal"/"absolute"?: no.
Isn't this a tautology? Philosophy helps us determine which actions
to take and we should choose a philosophy based on what actions it
recommends?
[One response about a pre-mature naissance of the self-other dichotomy
edited out]
> : To answer your question requires inquiring into the relationship
> : of the faculty of 'intellect' with the other aspects/faculties
> : of humans. In 'fact', it hinges upon the answer to the latter.
> : Heretofore, philosophy has cloistered itself within the ivory
> : tower far beyond the reach of the vagarities/"vulgarities" of
> : embodied life. Given the ascetic ideal, that follows.
> I agree. There's a joke which, in its silliness, points to
> what you're saying here:
> Socrates: To think is to do.
> Descartes: To think is to be.
> Kant: To do is to be.
> Sinatra: Do be do be do ....
> The point being that there are links between 'thinking,' 'doing,'
> and 'being.' They are interconnected constructs which suffer
> when considered in isolation.
Aha, but the joke stopped one step short of getting into the philosophers
who DO consider being as part of doing and thinking. Lets not forget the old
Kant-> Hegel -> Nietzsche line and then there is Heidegger and Freud. Also
(ho-hum) I guess Derrida. Would we agree that all of these post-Kantian
philosophers do try to present the kind of think-do-be models we want?
> : To cut this short, I would value a 'philosophy' according to
> : how well it addresses the the twin questions of how to live.
How "well" it addresses THE question depends on what philosophy you ALREADY
believe in. It seems the philosophy is beside the point, you already believe
in a system of life and you only require support in the form of a philosophy.
> : It would have to be able to address the needs of diverse
> : forms of human life equally well. To this end, it would need
> : to support a variety of unified perspectives of the world.
We have here a completely arbitrary judgement based on a liberal philosophy.
I'm not saying you can step out of your subjectivity but if the question
asks "How would you rate a philosophy?" does the response necessarily have
to be in the form of "My favourite philosophy is...?"
> : In
> : a sense, it would have a skeleton based upon what all forms
> : of human life have in common, but would be fleshed out dependent
> : upon the context of particular forms of human life.
In a word: Why? What DO human lives have in common? Why not just follow MY
personal philosophy? (Which is EXACTLY what you advocate: following YOUR
personal philosophy)
> I think this is one of the most difficult dilemmas in all
> of ethical thinking. On the one hand, we need some sort of
> uniform structure to make society predictable enough for
> there to be any freedom at all. On the other hand, too
> much uniformity unnecessarily 'Others' the non-conformists
> and makes society intolerable for anyone. Law looks at
> these problems at a nation-society (or smaller) level, most
> of the time. Philosophy *ought* to look at these problems
> from a world-society (or larger?) level, at at that point
> the difficulties increase exponentially.
This presupposes values such as freedom and choice. I'm all for them as well
but let us explicitly state that we DO believe in these values, that for no
reason at all we want to perpetuate these and that this discussion is a
forum for dealing with the problems of freedom and choice. Or something
along those lines. I'm a little shaken at how quickly the argument went from
a question of rating philosophies to solving the problem of the philosophy
we have ALREADY accepted (there was no window of opportunity for criticism
to sink in there)
> When is it permissible, indeed *necessary*, to say: "This
> person *is* an 'Other,' and one we cannot tolerate?"
> That's the sticky wicket ....
Is that such a sticky wicket? I would suspect that since we have already
pre-supposeds a particular philosophy, I could guess the response: We
tolerate the person until such tolerance endangers one's own freedom. Was
that a good guess?
> : I recognize that my response is somewhat dense, but this is
> : one occassion where a "quick dip in cold water" is appropriate.
> : Now that I've climbed out on a limb, I'll try to respond to
> : further questions.
> Let's hope you get more questions than the (basically nodding-
> in-agreement) comments I've made. How we turn thinking-about-
> thinking into doing-and-being-our-thinking-about-thinking is
> one of the primary challenges postmodernism must face.
And here I am! :)
-Omar Haneef
jle...@utdallas.edu
> > : > What would be your heuristics for a viable philosophy? Note that
> > : > I'm not asking "what is your philosophy," but rather "how should
> > : > a viable philosophy be constructed?" What would be the metrics
> > : > that we could look at and say "this is a pretty good philosophy,"
> > : > or "that philosophy sucks?"
> > [Jim Elson replies:]
> > : Would it surprise you that ethics would be central?
> Well, even if he is not surprised, I ceratinly am.
Consider that ethics is a backwaters subject in the tradition since
it is bounded by the notions of the "Good"/"Being"/"Truth" which
are "properly" determined by metaphysics. Moreover, ethics is a
dirty business since it involves the world of the body and leaving
the "pure, rarified" air of pure reason.
Now how important is ethics in philosophies which reject metaphysics
and binary dichotomies? What happens when there are no "universal
foundations", "Truth" has become recognized as a hollow idol which
is merely a necessary "error", and the great dragon "Thou Shalt"
has been crushed under the weight of its scales?
> > : Ethics revolves around twin questions: "How should I deal with
> > : others?"; and "How should I deal with myself?" This places the
> > : question of 'philosophy' in the context of a particular superset
> > : of forms of life, i.e., _homo saps_, at a particular point in
> > : history. Is philosophy even possible within these constraints?
> > : Philosophy "writ large" as "universal"/"eternal"/"absolute"?: no.
> Isn't this a tautology? Philosophy helps us determine which actions
> to take and we should choose a philosophy based on what actions it
> recommends?
And what wrong with tautology? ;) Afterall, what the tradition has
understood as "Truth" is tautological. But of course, there are
tautologies and then there are tautologies.
But more seriously, people do not choose a philosophy based upon
intellecutal criteria alone. Reason alone is not persausive. It
never has been. (This is one of the traditions greatest hypocracies.)
> > : To cut this short, I would value a 'philosophy' according to
> > : how well it addresses the the twin questions of how to live.
> How "well" it addresses THE question depends on what philosophy you ALREADY
> believe in. It seems the philosophy is beside the point, you already believe
> in a system of life and you only require support in the form of a philosophy.
The point is, regardless of how rigorously I deconstruct/destructure
my 'internalization' of the tradition, I continue to exist as a
subset of a particular form of life whose superset of forms can be
described as the human species. Even though I realize in a rigorous
sense that they are "errors", I have to act as if some things are
"true". If you wish, you could call this constellation of "true"
"errors" a philosophy. However, I wouldn't claim that many, much
less all, people have a philsophy. Though they have some habitual
ways of proceeding, some myths and notions to they subscribe and
upon which their sense of identity rests.
Now, what are the advantages of obtaining a philosophy? What is
advantageous about knowing where you want to go/do, the various
ways to get there and their advantages/liabilities/conflicts, what
you might expect to run into on the way, what adaptations/changes of
custom may be necessary, and how to plan out the journey effectively,
remembering the journey's one-way and only have one ticket? In this
sense philosophy is not some activity that is confined to an ivory
tower, but concerns all aspects of life.
> > : It would have to be able to address the needs of diverse
> > : forms of human life equally well. To this end, it would need
> > : to support a variety of unified perspectives of the world.
> We have here a completely arbitrary judgement based on a liberal philosophy.
Not at all, this follows from the untenability of the notion of
a "universal" "Truth" that is indepedent of one's form of life.
> I'm not saying you can step out of your subjectivity but if the question
> asks "How would you rate a philosophy?" does the response necessarily have
> to be in the form of "My favourite philosophy is...?"
No, but most of the time that is the hidden basis of the answer.
> > : In
> > : a sense, it would have a skeleton based upon what all forms
> > : of human life have in common, but would be fleshed out dependent
> > : upon the context of particular forms of human life.
> In a word: Why? What DO human lives have in common? Why not just follow MY
> personal philosophy? (Which is EXACTLY what you advocate: following YOUR
> personal philosophy)
Of course, all of this is questionable, but we breathe air, require
frequent intakes of energy (food), and other basic needs. We have
at least that much in common.
Why not just follow your philosophy? Why should I?
Now I'm going to be exceedingly blunt. You have absolutely
no idea what my personal philosophy is, nor does anyone else
here on the Net. I don't talk about it since I see no use
in doing so: it is valid _only_ for very particular forms of
human life. (Don't bother asking, your only answer will be
silence.) As such, it is worse than useless to discuss it
with others. I limit myself to talking about most of us, and
sometimes, all of us, have in common.
> > : I recognize that my response is somewhat dense, but this is
> > : one occassion where a "quick dip in cold water" is appropriate.
> > : Now that I've climbed out on a limb, I'll try to respond to
> > : further questions.
> And here I am! :) -Omar Haneef
Hello, Omar. I appreciate your response, but what I find puzzling
is the traditional flavor of your questions. It's as if you were
asking me why I don't play according to the traditions rule
even though I'm an apostate.
P.S. please limit your lines to about 60 characters, otherwise
quoting your posts will make your response word-wrap akwardly.
NS Brown
[BACKGROUND: I posed the question of what might be the
heuristics of a viable philosophy. Jim Elson replied
that ethics would be central, and went on to explain:]
: > : Ethics revolves around twin questions: "How should I deal with
: > : others?"; and "How should I deal with myself?" This places the
: > : question of 'philosophy' in the context of a particular superset
: > : of forms of life, i.e., _homo saps_, at a particular point in
: > : history. Is philosophy even possible within these constraints?
: > : Philosophy "writ large" as "universal"/"eternal"/"absolute"?: no.
: Isn't this a tautology? Philosophy helps us determine which actions
: to take and we should choose a philosophy based on what actions it
: recommends?
I don't see this as a tautology, at least not in the formal
sense of that term. It's more like a "reflexive system," of
which there are many in life. This is particularly common
in jurisprudence, where we style the law to produce desired
outcomes, and then expect people to style their behavior
because of the law.
Jim Elson's "tautology" was tautological only to the extent
that he didn't come right out and state his desired outcomes;
they'd been stated in prior posts (over the past months) and
I read this post in that context. One of those desired out-
comes was "basic human decency" (what could perhaps be called
"kindness"), and that value-construct underlies the ethical-
philosophical system he outlined here.
[Jim wrote:]
: > : To cut this short, I would value a 'philosophy' according to
: > : how well it addresses the the twin questions of how to live.
[Omar replies:]
: How "well" it addresses THE question depends on what philosophy you
: ALREADY believe in. It seems the philosophy is beside the point, you
: already believe in a system of life and you only require support in
: the form of a philosophy.
You seem to be seeking some extrinsic validation for philo-
sophical principles ... that they must be proved up in a
domain which is devoid of pre-existing bias. Well, if there
is an Out There out there, we certainly don't have access to
it except by means of our individual and collective In Here's.
So I think you create an insurmountable and unnecessary hurdle
by suggesting that a philosophical schema must be objectively
anchored in the Out There.
[Jim wrote:]
: > : It would have to be able to address the needs of diverse
: > : forms of human life equally well. To this end, it would need
: > : to support a variety of unified perspectives of the world.
[Omar replies:]
: We have here a completely arbitrary judgement based on a liberal
: philosophy. I'm not saying you can step out of your subjectivity
: but if the question asks "How would you rate a philosophy?" does
: the response necessarily have to be in the form of "My favourite
: philosophy is...?"
I don't think Jim has done that. What he's done is to suggest that
philosophies which unnecessarily Other non-conformity have proven
to be counterproductive (and I agree). Thus, one of the things we
can say about a "good philosophy" is that it doesn't Other the
non-conformist absent some truly compelling reason. The question
then becomes "what is a truly compelling reason?"
[As I wrote:]
: > I think this is one of the most difficult dilemmas in all
: > of ethical thinking. On the one hand, we need some sort of
: > uniform structure to make society predictable enough for
: > there to be any freedom at all. On the other hand, too
: > much uniformity unnecessarily 'Others' the non-conformists
: > and makes society intolerable for anyone. Law looks at
: > these problems at a nation-society (or smaller) level, most
: > of the time. Philosophy *ought* to look at these problems
: > from a world-society (or larger?) level, at at that point
: > the difficulties increase exponentially.
[Omar replies:]
: This presupposes values such as freedom and choice. I'm all for
: them as well but let us explicitly state that we DO believe in
: these values, that for no reason at all we want to perpetuate
: these and that this discussion is a forum for dealing with the
: problems of freedom and choice. Or something along those lines.
: I'm a little shaken at how quickly the argument went from
: a question of rating philosophies to solving the problem of the
: philosophy we have ALREADY accepted (there was no window of
: opportunity for criticism to sink in there)
If you'll reread my paragraph above, you'll see that it *does
not* "presuppose values such as freedom and choice," nor does
it seek to "perpetuate these" "for no reason at all." I gave
my reasons, both in that paragraph and (more fully) in prior
posts here on alt.pm. Liberty is not a "given" in my system;
I value liberty because individual decisionmakers are better
able to customize their decisions to the parameters of their
individual problems. More distant decisionmakers tend to make
their decisions based on aggregate problems, and often these
decisions are counterproductive with regard to an individual.
"The greater good for the greater number" has a corollary:
that some individuals will be hurt in the process.
Alas, we can't leave *every* decision to individuals, because
then there are no real decisions to make. If there is *no*
order, there is no predictability and thus no opportunity to
plan one's decisions and implement them. Thus, given *total*
freedom, there is no freedom at all. The whole of law involves
trying to find an acceptible balance between the two poles; this
is made all the more difficult in that it's a dynamic system, so
there is no "perfect balance" that will always work.
This hardly "presupposes values like liberty and choice." It
recognizes that these are useful constructs in a society.
[I asked:]
: > When is it permissible, indeed *necessary*, to say: "This
: > person *is* an 'Other,' and one we cannot tolerate?"
: > That's the sticky wicket ....
[Omar replies:]
: Is that such a sticky wicket? I would suspect that since we have already
: pre-supposeds a particular philosophy, I could guess the response: We
: tolerate the person until such tolerance endangers one's own freedom. Was
: that a good guess?
Not exactly, but you're closer than you probably realized. There
remains the question of order to consider, although your question
gets to that in the end, because order is a way of preserving
liberty (which in turn preserves order, etc.).
In the abstract, it's an easy question to answer: "Your right to
swing your fist ends at my nose," or the less colloquial (but no
more precise) formulation: "A given individual's freedom to act
ends when that act would harm another."
The problem with these seemingly obvious solutions is that there
is still a lot of hard work left to do, and they avoid that work
entirely. What constitutes the type of "harm" of which we as a
society will say "No, you can't do that?"
Physical harm? What about parental discipline?
Emotional harm? Do we *really* want society to step in every
time someone's feelings are hurt? And how do we prove that
those feelings really *were* hurt ... or do we even need to
prove the harm before Othering the malefactor?
Inconvenience? Before you rule this out, remember that many
of the rules we have are rules of convenience ... that we
don't let children talk whenever they want in the classroom
is a rather simple example, but a more far-reaching example
is the monetary system and the laws which protect it. We
switched from barter to currency because the latter was more
convenient, and thus all of our laws relating to commerce and
finance are matters of convenience.
So which "harms" are really "harms," and which are merely the
expected impedimentia of existence, against which society cannot
and should not protect?
Omar Haneef '96
> > > : > What would be your heuristics for a viable philosophy? Note that
> > > : > I'm not asking "what is your philosophy," but rather "how should
> > > : > a viable philosophy be constructed?" What would be the metrics
> > > : > that we could look at and say "this is a pretty good philosophy,"
> > > : > or "that philosophy sucks?"
> > > [Jim Elson replies:]
> > > : Ethics revolves around twin questions: "How should I deal with
> > > : others?"; and "How should I deal with myself?" This places the
> > > : question of 'philosophy' in the context of a particular superset
> > > : of forms of life, i.e., _homo saps_, at a particular point in
> > > : history. Is philosophy even possible within these constraints?
> > > : Philosophy "writ large" as "universal"/"eternal"/"absolute"?: no.
[Omar Asked]
> > Isn't this a tautology? Philosophy helps us determine which actions
> > to take and we should choose a philosophy based on what actions it
> > recommends?
[Jim Elson responded with]
> And what wrong with tautology? ;) Afterall, what the tradition has
> understood as "Truth" is tautological. But of course, there are
> tautologies and then there are tautologies.
> But more seriously, people do not choose a philosophy based upon
> intellecutal criteria alone. Reason alone is not persausive. It
> never has been. (This is one of the traditions greatest hypocracies.)
[Jim Elson's bottom line]
> > > : To cut this short, I would value a 'philosophy' according to
> > > : how well it addresses the the twin questions of how to live.
[Omar's response]
> > How "well" it addresses THE question depends on what philosophy you ALREADY
> > believe in. It seems the philosophy is beside the point, you already believe
> > in a system of life and you only require support in the form of a philosophy.
Dear Jim Elson,
The problem I had was NOT with the fact that your ethics was
entirely subjective as we both seem to recognize that a morality cannot
"escape" subjectivity. This is not because the problem is insurmountable but
because there IS NO problem. That is to say that the very idea of an
objective morality is an illusion and if someone were questioned on this
point they would reveal their subjectivity. My objection was directed
towards the question. IF an ethics is subjective THEN it doesn't make sense
to ask "How do you rate an ethical system?" because the answer is "A system
is good depending on how closely it approximates mine." Instead, one could
ask "What is your ethical system?" which is far more direct. I agree with
you in that arguments are fundamentally personal assertions backed up by
demonstrations of the viability of the assertions but you presented your
argument in the context of some sort of objective measurement of subjective
moralities. I suspent you give the game away with "Whats wrong with a
tautology?" and "A philosophy is a 'true' 'error'". This may be, but then
the question "How do you rate a philosophy?" has to be discarded as
meaningless.
Are we communicating?
-Omar Haneef
Omar Haneef '96
Wait a second. The "value-construct", in this case kindness, should be the
subject matter of the "ethical-philosophical" system, it should not
"underlie" it. The system is supposed to figure out what value constructs
are the ones we want, not merely figure out how to implement them.
> [Jim wrote:]
> : > : To cut this short, I would value a 'philosophy' according to
> : > : how well it addresses the the twin questions of how to live.
> [Omar replies:]
> : How "well" it addresses THE question depends on what philosophy you
> : ALREADY believe in. It seems the philosophy is beside the point, you
> : already believe in a system of life and you only require support in
> : the form of a philosophy.
> You seem to be seeking some extrinsic validation for philo-
> sophical principles ... that they must be proved up in a
> domain which is devoid of pre-existing bias. Well, if there
> is an Out There out there, we certainly don't have access to
> it except by means of our individual and collective In Here's.
> So I think you create an insurmountable and unnecessary hurdle
> by suggesting that a philosophical schema must be objectively
> anchored in the Out There.
The only reason for asking for extrinsic validation is because the question
implied extrinsic validation of some sort. A question about how to rate
value systems seems, to me, to be asking for the working out of some
meta-philosophy which will measure philosophies. Instead, Jim Elson decides
to pick up a philosophy (his own) and measure the others against it.
> [Jim wrote:]
> : > : It would have to be able to address the needs of diverse
> : > : forms of human life equally well. To this end, it would need
> : > : to support a variety of unified perspectives of the world.
> [Omar replies:]
> : We have here a completely arbitrary judgement based on a liberal
> : philosophy. I'm not saying you can step out of your subjectivity
> : but if the question asks "How would you rate a philosophy?" does
> : the response necessarily have to be in the form of "My favourite
> : philosophy is...?"
> I don't think Jim has done that. What he's done is to suggest that
> philosophies which unnecessarily Other non-conformity have proven
> to be counterproductive (and I agree). Thus, one of the things we
> can say about a "good philosophy" is that it doesn't Other the
> non-conformist absent some truly compelling reason. The question
> then becomes "what is a truly compelling reason?"
"Counterproductive?" This is a similair tautology isn't it? You are saying
By the standards of MY philosophy, this other philosophy (Other philosophy?)
is counterproductive SO we should stop doing what this other philosophy has
been doing and give space to non-conformists. Thus, we judge the other
philosophy by the standards of our own.
Furthermore, "What is a truly compelling reason?" gives us all the room of
the spectrum between fascism and chaos. This really is an act of
restatement, I don't see any progress in restating the question.
But this is a restatement. Now the "give" is that we want to "customize our
decisions to the parameters of our individual problems". Your given may be
different but it IS a given and I ask only that you recognize it as such.
> More distant decisionmakers tend to make
> their decisions based on aggregate problems, and often these
> decisions are counterproductive with regard to an individual.
> "The greater good for the greater number" has a corollary:
> that some individuals will be hurt in the process.
> Alas, we can't leave *every* decision to individuals, because
> then there are no real decisions to make. If there is *no*
> order, there is no predictability and thus no opportunity to
> plan one's decisions and implement them. Thus, given *total*
> freedom, there is no freedom at all. The whole of law involves
> trying to find an acceptible balance between the two poles; this
> is made all the more difficult in that it's a dynamic system, so
> there is no "perfect balance" that will always work.
> This hardly "presupposes values like liberty and choice." It
> recognizes that these are useful constructs in a society.
The very word "useful" recognizes that there is SOME presupposition. Useful
to what end? The answer to that question will reveal your presupposition.
> [I asked:]
> : > When is it permissible, indeed *necessary*, to say: "This
> : > person *is* an 'Other,' and one we cannot tolerate?"
> : > That's the sticky wicket ....
> [Omar replies:]
> : Is that such a sticky wicket? I would suspect that since we have already
> : pre-supposeds a particular philosophy, I could guess the response: We
> : tolerate the person until such tolerance endangers one's own freedom. Was
> : that a good guess?
> Not exactly, but you're closer than you probably realized. There
> remains the question of order to consider, although your question
> gets to that in the end, because order is a way of preserving
> liberty (which in turn preserves order, etc.).
> In the abstract, it's an easy question to answer: "Your right to
> swing your fist ends at my nose," or the less colloquial (but no
> more precise) formulation: "A given individual's freedom to act
> ends when that act would harm another."
> The problem with these seemingly obvious solutions is that there
> is still a lot of hard work left to do, and they avoid that work
> entirely. What constitutes the type of "harm" of which we as a
> society will say "No, you can't do that?"
Yes, the "who will take out the garbage question?"
The following is a list of problems with the implementation of your system,
I agree that these are problems but they DO not belong in the context of
"What is your favourite ethical system?"
[List deleted]
> Just an opinion, worth what you paid for it. :)
> Cris
-Omar Haneef
Andy Perry
han...@engin.swarthmore.edu (Omar Haneef '96) wrote:
> IF an ethics is subjective THEN it doesn't make sense
> to ask "How do you rate an ethical system?" because the answer is "A system
> is good depending on how closely it approximates mine." Instead, one could
> ask "What is your ethical system?" which is far more direct.
Nietzsche would say the answer to "how do you rate an ethical system" is
"a system is good depending on how closely it HELPS ME LIVE/SURVIVE AND
GROW," which is a very different answer. Not everyone has the ethical
system that they want to have, after all.
Andy, waiting for the false consciousness argument to begin all over again...
--
Andy Perry "This life has been a test.
Brown University Had this been an actual life,
Dept of English you would have received instructions
Andrew...@Brown.edu OR on where to go and what to do."
st00...@Brownvm.bitnet -- Angela Chase
jle...@utdallas.edu
> Dear Jim Elson,
> The problem I had was NOT with the fact that your ethics was
> entirely subjective as we both seem to recognize that a morality cannot
> "escape" subjectivity. This is not because the problem is insurmountable but
> because there IS NO problem. That is to say that the very idea of an
> objective morality is an illusion and if someone were questioned on this
> point they would reveal their subjectivity. My objection was directed
> towards the question. IF an ethics is subjective THEN it doesn't make sense
> to ask "How do you rate an ethical system?" because the answer is "A system
> is good depending on how closely it approximates mine." Instead, one could
> ask "What is your ethical system?" which is far more direct. I agree with
> you in that arguments are fundamentally personal assertions backed up by
> demonstrations of the viability of the assertions but you presented your
> argument in the context of some sort of objective measurement of subjective
> moralities. I suspent you give the game away with "Whats wrong with a
> tautology?" and "A philosophy is a 'true' 'error'". This may be, but then
> the question "How do you rate a philosophy?" has to be discarded as
> meaningless.
> Are we communicating?
Yes, Omar. I see your point now. First the tautology question.
All 'true' statements are fundamentally "tautologies" since there is
no "objective" ground/foundation.
I take it that your objection concerns how one can talk rating
a philosophy if "objectivity" is a myth. However, to say that
everything then becomes "subjective" is an inversion that
remains just as metaphysical as before. When "objectivity"
is abolished, so is "subjectivity": the world of "appearances" is
abolished along with the "real" world.
We are left in a difficult position since the metaphysics built
within our grammar is unable to cope. Thus, an 'error' is not
the same thing as an "error" since there is no "truth" which
could reveal it as such. I'll assume you're with me so far
and proceed directly to the crucial point. (If not, let me
know and I'll try to address your objections.)
Upon what basis do we rate a philosophy? Clearly, the degree to
which it supports/conforms to what one sees as what's in the interests
of one's identity is rather important. But my main objection to the
idea that is the only basis is that it forgets that we have many
things and interests in common. Thus, the are some boundary conditions
on our forms of life. These boundaries form the most rudimentary
'errors' which are 'truths' for all _homo saps_ at this time in
history. However, I don't see these as a sufficient basis for
rating a philosophy. What does form such a basis is a rhetoric
appeal based upon experiences/needs/interests that most of us
have in common. This has always been the "foundation" of all
philosophical systems.
What I'm working towards is an ethical system that is skeletal:
only the bare minimum that most of us can agree on without
getting too far into the question of "how should I deal with
myself." Also, my ethical motivations for this are appearant
as I think they should be. The main obstacle are those who
say "my system is the best and therefore you should conform
with mine." My response, maybe best for you, but I'm not
you and you're not me. This is a point I won't budge on.
Any system which does not entail this will be rejected.
I will rate a system based primarily on how well it
delivers on the "tolerance" issue. However, that is
not the same thing as rating it on how well it matches
my own. I know the difference is subtle, but it's
vitally important. Does this help?
jle...@utdallas.edu
> han...@engin.swarthmore.edu (Omar Haneef '96) wrote:
> > IF an ethics is subjective THEN it doesn't make sense to ask "How
> > do you rate an ethical system?" because the answer is "A system is
> > good depending on how closely it approximates mine." Instead, one
> > could ask "What is your ethical system?" which is far more direct.
> Nietzsche would say the answer to "how do you rate an ethical system" is
> "a system is good depending on how closely it HELPS ME LIVE/SURVIVE AND
> GROW," which is a very different answer. Not everyone has the ethical
> system that they want to have, after all.
Andy has just provided the succint, final answer to that question.
However, I would submit that the above also entails an interest
helping others survive and grow.
NS Brown
[Omar Haneef wrote:]
: > IF an ethics is subjective THEN it doesn't make sense
: > to ask "How do you rate an ethical system?" because the answer is
: > "A system is good depending on how closely it approximates mine."
: > Instead, one could ask "What is your ethical system?" which is far
: > more direct.
[Andy Perry replies:]
: Nietzsche would say the answer to "how do you rate an ethical system" is
: "a system is good depending on how closely it HELPS ME LIVE/SURVIVE AND
: GROW," which is a very different answer. Not everyone has the ethical
: system that they want to have, after all.
Agreed. That last sentence is particularly cogent and to
the point here. One of the few reliable metrics for eval-
uating an Other's philosophy and/or behavior is whether
that philosophy and/or behavior is likely to produce outcomes
which HE/SHE values as desirable (that is, which comport with
*his/her* value-constructs).
Example: Assume Allen states "I desire that other people
should treat me with dignity, respect and kindness," thus
stating a value-construct. Allen then states "Under my
philosophy, people must recognize the inherent superiority
of white males; we built the modern world and we have a
natural right to rule it." At this point, I believe we
*can* state with confidence that Allen's philosophy of
white male supremacy is *wrong* ... because that philosophy
is likely to engender antipathy from others, and Allen has
already stated that he wants to be treated with dignity,
respect and kindness (his own value-construct). Thus,
given *his* stated value-construct, his philosophy of
white male supremacy is false as a matter of Pragmatic
Truth, in that if he *acts as if* his philosophy is true
he is *less* likely to receive the kind of treatment *he*
desires from other people.
This is quite different from saying "the philosophy of
white male supremacy is wrong because *I* find it repul-
sive." It's not a matter of personal preference. It's
a matter of recognizing that what Allen espouses as a
philosophy will be counterproductive to Allen, in terms
of Allen's own stated value-constructs.
So when I ask "what are the heuristics of a good philo-
sophy," implying by the article "a" that I'm seeking
generalizable metrics, we necessarily begin the search
for reasonably generalizable value-constructs ... and we
have to recognize that there *will* be those who do not
ascribe to those generalized value-constructs. The tough
question then becomes how we deal with those people ...
how we deal with folks whose value-constructs would lead
them to construct a philosophy which would be antithetic
to even the "skeletal" philosophies Jim Elson argues for.
It's all well and good to argue for "tolerance," and I
think tolerance (in general) is a useful metric in a
philosophical construct. But do we tolerate those who
would harm (or even destroy) all Others but their own?
Do we say "I realize that your philosophy is that none
of the rest of us are worthy to live, and I'm going to
tolerate that philosophy, so I guess I'm going to die?"
Omar Haneef '96
(1) Andy Perry: A good philosophy is one that helps me grow and survive, not
necessarily the one I have.
(2) Jim Elson: A good philosophy is one that can support the most points of
view because intolerance is the factor that prevents the "success" of many
philosophical systems.
(3) NS Brown: A good philosophy is one which is free of internal
contradictions. (i.e. entirely tautological, and therefore logical, in Jim
Elson's terms - which I now agree with)
I think all three are VERY smart responses. It is easiest to see the
validity of NS Brown's response: A philosophical system which is free of
contradictions is most robust against external "arguments".
Jim Elson idea makes sense because a philosophical system is also a social
system and therefore a general consensus is desirable in a reasonably
democratic environment. (I take it Elson is a liberal democrat)
Andy Perry's system makes sense for the same reason that Elson's does.
Survival. It is the one desire that we ALL have in common,those who don't
want to survive are dead. This one value WOULD be at the heart of all
philosophies.
We are saying that there are traits that describe a SUCCESSFUL philosophy
where success is defined as the ability to (1) convert people to this system
(2) hold on to these converts and (3) last.
right?
Omar Haneef
NS Brown
[Regarding whether James Elson's heuristics for philosophy were
tautological, I wrote:]
: > Jim Elson's "tautology" was tautological only to the extent
: > that he didn't come right out and state his desired outcomes;
: > they'd been stated in prior posts (over the past months) and
: > I read this post in that context. One of those desired out-
: > comes was "basic human decency" (what could perhaps be called
: > "kindness"), and that value-construct underlies the ethical-
: > philosophical system he outlined here.
[Omar replies:]
: Wait a second. The "value-construct", in this case kindness, should be the
: subject matter of the "ethical-philosophical" system, it should not
: "underlie" it. The system is supposed to figure out what value constructs
: are the ones we want, not merely figure out how to implement them.
"We have to figure out how to get what we want."
"No, first we have to figure out what we want."
"Okay, let's figure out what we want."
"No, first we have to figure out how we decide
what we want."
"Okay, let's figure out how we decide what we want."
"No, first we have to figure out the process of
deciding how we decide what we want ...."
Does the phrase "infinite recursive loop" spring to mind, Omar?
At some point we have to stop justifying our discourse and get
on with the discourse itself, or else we never do anything but
justify our justifications of justifications of justifications.
It's like the old joke about a boy who asks his father what keeps
the world from falling into space. The father answers "the world
sits on the back of a big turtle." The boy then asks what the
turtle sits on. "Another turtle," dad answers. "And what does
*that* turtle sit on?" the boy asks. "Look son," dad finally
says, "it's turtles ALL THE WAY DOWN!"
There are assumptions "all the way down." If we have to explain
*every* one in order to get anywhere, we're going to spend a lot
of time explaining. A matter of "when all is said and done, a
lot more will be said than done."
[Thus, as I wrote previously:]
: > You seem to be seeking some extrinsic validation for philo-
: > sophical principles ... that they must be proved up in a
: > domain which is devoid of pre-existing bias. Well, if there
: > is an Out There out there, we certainly don't have access to
: > it except by means of our individual and collective In Here's.
: > So I think you create an insurmountable and unnecessary hurdle
: > by suggesting that a philosophical schema must be objectively
: > anchored in the Out There.
[Omar replies:]
: The only reason for asking for extrinsic validation is because the
: question implied extrinsic validation of some sort. A question about
: how to rate value systems seems, to me, to be asking for the working
: out of some meta-philosophy which will measure philosophies. Instead,
: Jim Elson decides to pick up a philosophy (his own) and measure the
: others against it.
Without putting *too* many words in his mouth, I think I can
suggest that Jim's expressed meta-philosophy might be stated
as: "A set of value-constructs is intersubjectively reliable
to the extent that it: (a) permits those who hold those value-
constructs to achieve desirable outcomes as measured by those
value-constructs; and, (b) permits those who hold different
value-constructs to achieve desirable outcomes as measured by
*those* (different) value-constructs."
Part (a) measures the intrinsic (subjective) reliability of the
system -- whether it is self-contradictory in counterutilitarian
ways, etc. I think most of us would agree that a philosophical
construct which is *so* self-contradictory that it denies the
possibility of meeting *its own* stated ends is not reliable.
In other words, if we could properly (in the analytic sense, in
the sense that the logic is valid) say "I realize that these are
your sincerely held beliefs, but they are structured such that
*they themselves* prevent their own realization," that would be
a valid criticism of a philosophical system.
Part (b) measures the extrinsic (intersubjective) reliability of
the system, whether it advances itself to the detriment of all
Others. At this point we're certainly on debatable ground. I
happen to agree with Jim; I eschew philosophical systems which
advance the believers to the detriment of non-believers, because
I believe that 'in the long run' such systems tend to be counter-
productive. That is, the non-believers eventually get tired of
being marginalized and then stomp on the believers. But then we
are left with the bromide "'In the long run,' we'll all be dead."
In other words, this requirement can fairly be criticized from
the perspective of "I don't care what happens to this philosophy
20, 200 or 2000 years after I'm dead, so long as it helps *me*
get what *I* want when I'm alive [Part (a), above]."
Jim and I tend to take the longer view, or at least attempt to.
I, at least, believe this is the better-reasoned course when
attempting to construct (or critique) a philosophy, because I
think looking beyond immediate self-interest is an essential
aspect of mature thinking. But I can't *prove* that in any
extrinsic, intersubjective sense.
[I wrote:]
: > I don't think Jim has done that. What he's done is to suggest that
: > philosophies which unnecessarily Other non-conformity have proven
: > to be counterproductive (and I agree). Thus, one of the things we
: > can say about a "good philosophy" is that it doesn't Other the
: > non-conformist absent some truly compelling reason. The question
: > then becomes "what is a truly compelling reason?"
[Omar replies:]
: "Counterproductive?" This is a similair tautology isn't it? You are
: saying By the standards of MY philosophy, this other philosophy
: (Other philosophy?) is counterproductive SO we should stop doing
: what this other philosophy has been doing and give space to non-
: conformists. Thus, we judge the other philosophy by the standards
: of our own.
No, at some point we get back to Part (a), above. A philosophy
which sows the seeds of its own (eventual) destruction can be
termed "counterproductive" *by reference to its own values*.
Experience (history) has shown that unnecessarily Othering non-
conformists *does* sow the seeds of self-destruction, because
sooner or later those Others decide they've had enough. The
U.S. is seemingly (to hear the media tell it) full of "angry
white males" who are discovering this very thing; in Othering
all others, they created large groups of people who (in the 50's
and 60's) finally said "Enough!" and began to topple the system.
(Oddly, the system is far more intact than these "angry white
males" seem to believe; white males still control a vastly
disproportionate amount of the wealth, power and opportunity
in our society. Apparently it's not vastly disproportionate
*enough* though.)
To assess this notion of white male supremacy as "counter-
productive" is not to say that *I* disagree with it (although
I do). It is to say that *it undermines its own ends*.
: Furthermore, "What is a truly compelling reason?" gives us all the
: room of the spectrum between fascism and chaos. This really is an
: act of restatement, I don't see any progress in restating the question.
Asking the question, and *recognizing* that it *is* the question,
is more important than finding the "right answer." There IS NO
"right answer" for this question, because societies are dynamic
systems. The "perfect balance" is only "perfect" until the system
changes, and the system changes all the time.
E.g.: our legal system recognizes whole classes of actionable
harms which simply *were not actionable* 50 or 100 years ago.
A case in point is employment discrimination. Fifty or 100
years ago, it was accepted that an employer could hire, promote,
retain or fire whomever he pleased, for patently discriminatory
reasons, and the employee had no legal recourse whatever. Along
came the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (and its subsequent amendments
and jurisprudential development), and the employer's options are
far more limited. We have created a new class of "Other" --
employers who discriminate based on prohibited classifications
of race, gender, ethnicity, age, religion and disability. We
have decided that this discrimination is an actionable harm now.
Similarly, we we have decided that some harms to our environment
are now actionable, and we've developed a system of environmental
laws and regulations to Other those who harm our environment.
Again, 50 or 100 years ago this wasn't seen as a "harm." It was
just part-and-parcel of doing business.
Are discriminatory employment practices and/or harming the en-
vironment "truly compelling reasons" to Other these persons? As
a society, acting through our legislators and courts, we've said
that they are. But regardless of the *is* of the situation,
*ought* they to be? *I* think so, but that's open to debate
(as the GOP's Contract With America will insist).
[Regarding whether "liberty" is a "given" in my ethical system,
I wrote that it is not. Liberty is a useful societal construct,
because it allows individuals to customize our decisions to the
parameters of our individual problems. Omar replies:]
: But this is a restatement. Now the "give" is that we want to
: "customize our decisions to the parameters of our individual
: problems". Your given may be different but it IS a given and
: I ask only that you recognize it as such.
No, it's not. The "given" is what I stated as a heuristic when
I first opened this disussion: a philosophy should lead to the
greatest number of better-reasoned decisions. Given *that*
value-construct, decisionmaking should, whenever possible, be
done by the person with the most information about the specific
problem to be solved. In the case of individual problems, this
will generally be the individual him/herself. And *that* is
why I think liberty is a good thing; when properly balanced
against the need for societal order (and that's a constantly-
shifting balance, as I said above), liberty produces the greatest
number of better-reasoned decisions by virtue of permitting the
decision to be made by the person with the most information about
the individual problem.
Now, can I extrinsically *prove* that "a philosophy should lead
to the greatest number of better-reasoned decisions?" No, I can't.
At *this* point, we're dealing with a given value-construct which
can be either accepted or rejected, but not proven.
Laura Wedner
: philosophy is the disease for which it is the cure, the best
: philosophy is one which does most to destroy philosophy, or
: at least reduce its virulence.
At first, this definition was very attractive; but then I read on:
: otherwise to get control of or do harm to other people.
: This practice was called _sophisteia_, that is, the making
: of wise guys. (A _sophistes_ was a master of some art.) The
Isn't this a big problem for Socrates: what art IS the Sophist a master
of? I don't think a satisfactory solution is ever reached, unless you
want to count something appearing Plato's sophist? Perhaps their art is
doing harm to other people indiscriminately? Is that an "art"?
: related projects: first, how to do it better -- if
: possible, infallibly -- or contrarily, how to construct an
: infallible immunity or defense against it. Second, since
would we say, given these things, that you are a big fan of skepticism,
the most "virulent" kinds? that would be cool, I'm just wondering
: quality in the case itself. In other words, right at the
: beginning, philosophy was trying to cure itself. The
though you didn't say it exactly, I assume you mean that philosophy has
henceforth been unable to find a "cure"? Would a successful cure be one
only that "solved" logically the logical difficulties and language
difficulties presented by the sophists (or various others), or would it
be one that "cured" other sicknesses.... after all, we could find a good
deal of this in even Nietzsche.
: We do not need philosophy to tell us how to live well; our
: instincts and intuitions are very good at that. But having
here we part ways completely; my observations tell me repeatedly that our
intuitions and instincts are largely violent, and people who don't care
to love wisdom scare the shit out of me with their violence. maybe it's
my naivete that tells me philosophy is a "cure" for this, and can be a
help for living well, but I do believe this. such the platonist, heh!
: developed language, we are subject to being poisoned, as
: well as nourished, with words; millions and millions of
: people in this century (and many others) have been tortured
: and murdered only because of words. And of course, we cannot
: get away from words, because we have increasingly
: constructed a world of them. But we can hope that philosophy,
Here I'm not even sure we're parting ways--I'm just totally lost.
How has the construction of the world been "increasingly" from words?
What was, for example, a time when we had less
word-construction-of-the-world going on? And if we had this time, what
happened to make us leave it?
I can imagine a torture by words.... (every newsgroup alone!), but I have
to say that murder by words escapes me. Can you explain further?
Do you think that every 'phrase' or 'meaning' or even, why not,
'thought', is inevitably tangled in words? If you do believe this I
guess I can see where you're coming from a bit better, but I don't
believe this is true--countless counterexamples.
NS Brown
[Omar Haneef wrote:]
: I found 3 basic responses to the problem of rating a philosophy:
: (1) Andy Perry: A good philosophy is one that helps me grow and survive, not
: necessarily the one I have.
: (2) Jim Elson: A good philosophy is one that can support the most points of
: view because intolerance is the factor that prevents the "success" of many
: philosophical systems.
: (3) NS Brown: A good philosophy is one which is free of internal
: contradictions. (i.e. entirely tautological, and therefore logical, in Jim
: Elson's terms - which I now agree with)
Actually, I posted three of my own in my original question:
(a) A philosophy should have the broadest possible range of
applicability. Hence, I eschew "scientific" philosophical
systems which demand intersubjective empirical verification
as the test of validity; such systems are forced to margi-
nalize many domains of experienfce (where intersubjective
empirical verification isn't available).
(b) A philosophy should lead us to the highest possible
number of better-reasoned choices. Hence, I eschew "pure
relativist" philosophical systems which say that no veri-
fication is possible and thus all things are equally true.
These systems lead to poorly-reasoned choices, because they
make no demands of good reasoning.
(c) A philosophy should not require us to make choices in
the absence of some experiential need to choose. Hence, I
eschew "absolutist" philosophical systems which purport to
make normative choices in each and every possible situation.
Oftentimes, there's no real need for a society to choose A
over B, and absent such a need the choice should be left to
individual preferences.
These three are at least implied in all of the responses
given above, by the way. My heuristic (c) is merely a
different way of stating Jim's "tolerance" argument.
: I think all three are VERY smart responses. It is easiest to see the
: validity of NS Brown's response: A philosophical system which is free of
: contradictions is most robust against external "arguments".
I didn't say "free of contradictions," by the way. My own
philosophical system has lots of contradictions, but those
contradictory principles reflect contradictions I see in my
experience. (E.g.: the contradictory principles of liberty
and social order in the philosophy of law.) The key is
whether the logical contradictions cancel each other such
that the value-constructs become wholly unattainable.
(E.g.: I recognize that we can have neither perfect liberty
nor perfect order, but we can find a balance which is at least
temporarily satisfactory.)
: Jim Elson idea makes sense because a philosophical system is also a social
: system and therefore a general consensus is desirable in a reasonably
: democratic environment. (I take it Elson is a liberal democrat)
: Andy Perry's system makes sense for the same reason that Elson's does.
: Survival. It is the one desire that we ALL have in common,those who don't
: want to survive are dead. This one value WOULD be at the heart of all
: philosophies.
: We are saying that there are traits that describe a SUCCESSFUL philosophy
: where success is defined as the ability to (1) convert people to this
: system (2) hold on to these converts and (3) last.
: right?
Well, if by "last" you mean "permit people to achieve their
value-constructs sufficiently that they do not abandon the
philosophical structure," then I'd agree. I think that's
what you meant, but just in case ....
Gordon Fitch
| I found 3 basic responses to the problem of rating a philosophy:
|
| (1) Andy Perry: A good philosophy is one that helps me grow and survive, not
| necessarily the one I have.
| (2) Jim Elson: A good philosophy is one that can support the most points of
| view because intolerance is the factor that prevents the "success" of many
| philosophical systems.
| (3) NS Brown: A good philosophy is one which is free of internal
| contradictions. (i.e. entirely tautological, and therefore logical, in Jim
| Elson's terms - which I now agree with)
|
I'd like to add a dumb one, just to round things out. As
philosophy is the disease for which it is the cure, the best
philosophy is one which does most to destroy philosophy, or
at least reduce its virulence.
I believe that, at least by the time of the Ancient Greeks,
the leisured classes had noted that words -- language --
could be used to make the worse case appear the better, and
otherwise to get control of or do harm to other people.
This practice was called _sophisteia_, that is, the making
of wise guys. (A _sophistes_ was a master of some art.) The
success of _sophisteia_ led immediately to interest in two
related projects: first, how to do it better -- if
possible, infallibly -- or contrarily, how to construct an
infallible immunity or defense against it. Second, since
the worst case could be made to appear the better, some
investigators wanted to find out whether the better case
could be made to appear the better due to some inherent
quality in the case itself. In other words, right at the
beginning, philosophy was trying to cure itself. The
struggle has come right down to our own times; my favorite
curer at the moment is Wittgenstein, to whom the quip I
mention above has been attributed -- but of course he must
also be suspected.
We do not need philosophy to tell us how to live well; our
instincts and intuitions are very good at that. But having
developed language, we are subject to being poisoned, as
well as nourished, with words; millions and millions of
people in this century (and many others) have been tortured
and murdered only because of words. And of course, we cannot
get away from words, because we have increasingly
constructed a world of them. But we can hope that philosophy,
being part of the poison, can also provide us with a
prophylaxis, an immunity, to itself.
--
>< Gordon Fitch >< g...@panix.com ><
Brian Dell
: Nietzsche would say the answer to "how do you rate an ethical system"
To the extent that this implies that Nietzsche is the champion of
"getting by" (and such seems to be the way this comment has been
interpreted in this thread) it couldn't be more unrepresentative of that
German iconoclast:
The most cautious people ask today: 'How may man still be preserved?'
Zarathustra, however, asks as the sole and first one to do so: 'How
shall man be _overcome_?' ....
What is womanish, what stems from slavishness and especially from the
mob hotchpotch: _that_ now wants to become master of mankind's entire
destiny - oh disgust! disgust! disgust!
_That_ questions and never tires: 'How may man preserve himself best,
longest, most agreeably?' With that - they are the masters of the present.
Overcome for me these masters of the present, o my brothers - these
petty people: _they_ are the superman's greatest danger!
Overcome, you higher men, the petty virtues, the petty prudences, the
sand-grain discretion, the ant-swarm inanity, miserable ease, the
'happiness of the greatest number!'
- Thus Spake Zarathustra, part IV, "Of the Higher Man"
He who shot the doctrine of "will to existence" at truth certainly did
not hit the truth: this will - does not exist!
For what does not exist cannot will; but that which is in existence, how
could it still want to come into existence?
Only where life is, there is also will: not will to life, but - so I
teach you - will to power!
The living creature values many things higher than life itself: yet out
of this evaluation itself speaks - the will to power!
- TSZ, part II, "Of Self-Overcoming"
"You want, if possible - and there is no madder "if possible" - _to
abolish suffering_. And we? It really seems that _we_ would rather
have it higher and worse than ever. Well-being as you understand it -
that is no goal, that seems to us an _end_, a state that soons makes man
ridiculous and contemptible - that makes his destruction _desirable_.
The discipline of suffering, of _great_ suffering - do you not know that
only _this_ discipline has created all the enhancements of man thus far?"
- Beyond Good & Evil 225, "Our Virtues"
What is a "good" philosophy in Nietzschean eyes?
One that merely abets survival? Obviously not! One that grants us
"knowledge"; - one that gives us the pensive hope we'll one day get a
clammy grasp on that elusive pile of icy sawdust: Truth? I think not.
The greatest philosopher wills his own downfall *so that the preterman
may live*.
--
Brian Dell
http://gpu.srv.ualberta.ca/~dellb/index.html
jle...@utdallas.edu
> I found 3 basic responses to the problem of rating a philosophy:
> (2) Jim Elson: A good philosophy is one that can support the most points of
> view because intolerance is the factor that prevents the "success" of many
> philosophical systems.
I wouldn't gloss it this way, but it's an acceptable first approximation. :)
> Jim Elson idea makes sense because a philosophical system is also a social
> system and therefore a general consensus is desirable in a reasonably
> democratic environment. (I take it Elson is a liberal democrat)
Well, I'm not saying. :) Regardless of the political/economic structures
there has to be some form of cooperation/consensus/acquiscence. My
lengthy argument for tolerance centers upon the fact that it's
the intelligent course of action and that the notion of 'self' entails
the notion of 'other than self'.
> We are saying that there are traits that describe a SUCCESSFUL philosophy
> where success is defined as the ability to (1) convert people to this system
> (2) hold on to these converts and (3) last.
> right?
I think Andy's answer is closer to the bottom line since the
maintainence of one's existence is the barest minimum requirement
of any form of life. However, you are pointing out that a successful
philosophy must be rhetorically persuasive. The only problem is that
rheotrical persuasiveness does not necessarily entail that a 'system'
will be efficacious in promoting survival or flourishing.
Brian Dell
:| I found 3 basic responses to the problem of rating a philosophy:
:|
:| (1) Andy Perry: A good philosophy is one that helps me grow and
:| survive,
Better: advances the end of Evolution (reifies the Ubermensch).
:| not necessarily the one I have.
A key proviso: the best philosophy could be independent of my
recognition of it as such.
:| (2) Jim Elson: A good philosophy is one that can support the most
:| points of view
Ideally, *all* "points of view", the weight of which would collapse the
structure. If you're going to find the lowest common denominator you're
going to have to dig all the way down to the primordial goo. Send me a
postcard.
:| because intolerance is the factor that prevents the
:| "success" of many philosophical systems.
I'm not suggesting you couldn't reasonably demand universal fealty to
something so generic; I'm suggesting that no one would champion
something so far removed from one's individual and particular sense of
identity.
:| (3) NS Brown: A good philosophy is one which is free of internal
:| contradictions. (i.e. entirely tautological, and therefore logical,
:| in Jim Elson's terms - which I now agree with)
Necessary but not sufficient. This justifies each part, but gives no
account for the whole.
Gordon Fitch>
: I'd like to add
the most postmodern "philosophy" of the bunch (a la Derrida).
: a dumb one...
Presume not what one's not entitled to, be it modesty or pride.
: the best philosophy is one which does most to destroy philosophy, or
: at least reduce its virulence. ...
: ... having developed language, we are subject to being poisoned, as
: well as nourished, with words; millions and millions of people in
: this century (and many others) have been tortured and murdered only
: because of words. And of course, we cannot get away from words,
: because we have increasingly constructed a world of them.
The antidote to sophistry is logic. "But you're claiming the foil for
words is words," you'd say, "the conflict is as institutionalized
into the very nature of the language game as the military-industrial
complex into the economy." Do we then remain mute, refuse to take up the
weapons of the enemy on pacifist principle; stoically enduring the
incoming arrows like St. Sebastian? No, - we must prove our mettle by
outplaying the dark forces.
: We do not need philosophy to tell us how to live well; our
: instincts and intuitions are very good at that.
I suggest you acquire a healthy suspicion of the inclinations.
Today's technological man walks in the land of milk and honey; the
spiritual man of this age wanders in a moral desert of unprecedented
aridity.
We're all dressed up but don't know where to go.
Omar Haneef '96
situation. That the problem of infinite regressions of metaphilosophies is
exactly the problem we should be engaging. But anyway...
IF it is true that we should find a philosophy which is robust, that is one
that allows ANYONE in and doesn't want to exclude anyone, that is a healthy
social system, that strikes the perfect balance between chaos and oppression
(lets call it freedom) and we want to this whole support philosophy by a
relatively objective (ha ha ha) reliance on internal consistency THEN what
is wrong with Christianity? Let me examine the benefits of Christianity:
(1) Lasted a DAMN long time, certainly seems to be robust. Andy Perry will
note that many of those who ascribe to Christianity or that
converted to Christianity did survive and benefitted in many colonized
countrues whereas those who did not were wiped out.
(2) Despite certain unconscienciable behaviour (such as the crusades), it
espouse, PHILOSOPHICALLY, a turn the other cheeck attitude. (So Jim Elson
should give the PHILOSOPHY - if not the practice - a stamp of approval)
(Note: (1) and (2) contradict of course, a factor that helped Christianity
survive and thrive is COLONIZATION, its ability to economicallty exploit the
colonized by forcing the natives to internalize a whole discourse of
oppression. The philosophy itself remains pretty Other friendly. This brings
us to point (3))
(3) Funny, the internal contradiction between practice and preaching was
exactly what allowed Christianity to thrive. (The same is true of Islam -
the prophet dies and the populace decides to conquer the planet!) NS Brown
would not approve? Ah, but it is the LONG TERM resilience that Brown wants
to argue for, Christianity is on the wane because it claims all
non-believers will go to hell?
Persoanlly I believe in Marxist/Economic explanations for the success of
philosophical system of thought. Thus, I would argue, resilience CAN NOT be
a basis of judgement for a philosophy. Philosophies can Other, hurt
millions, (poison them, as Fitch points out) and get away with it scot free.
I don't see why one long term resilience is (1) a criteria for a good
philosophy and (2) regarded a standard feature of tolerant philosophies.
-Omar Haneef
jle...@utdallas.edu
> Cris here. :)
> [In response to Omar Haneer's challenges to James Elson's
> heuristics for philosophy, James wrote in part:]
> : What I'm working towards is an ethical system that is skeletal:
> : only the bare minimum that MOST OF US can agree on without
> : getting too far into the question of "how should I deal with
> : myself." Also, my ethical motivations for this are apparant
> : as I think they should be. The main obstacle are those who
> : say "my system is the best and therefore you should conform
> : with mine." My response, maybe best for you, but I'm not
> : you and you're not me. This is a point I won't budge on.
> : ANY SYSTEM WHICH DOES NOT ENTAIL THIS WILL BE REJECTED.
> [ALLCAPS added for emphasis.]
> I think the emphasized language is crucial here, because it
> points to the issue I'm trying to bring to the fore. That
> "bare mimimum that MOST OF US can agree on" implies an iden-
> tifiable "us." Who decides who is "us" and who is "them?"
> And why?
Quite. At this time I want to restrict the conversation to
_homo saps_. I say most of us since not everyone will agree
in valuing the continuation of their own existence, much less
its enrichment. In general, when I use "us" in this sort of
context, read our species.
> Westerners? Easterners? All literate people? All people?
> All life forms? All everything-with-which-we-interact? The
> wider the net we cast for "Us," the narrower the range of the
> "bare minimum that most of us can agree on."
Quite. This is why I'm interested in a skeletal system.
> Regarding tolerance, and the intolerance for intolerance ...
> at what point does intolerance become so intolerable that we
> stomp down and say "No more?" Is causing physical harm, in
> and of itself, sufficient? What about emotional harm, in and
> of itself? What about the two taken together? How much of
> each/both?
At this point in our history, I'd be pleased to see an end to the
demonization of "Otherness" or simply a toleration of the existence
of hated "Others" which concomitatantly restrains acting out this
hatred/resentment.
NS Brown
[I wrote:]
: > I think the emphasized language is crucial here, because it
: > points to the issue I'm trying to bring to the fore. That
: > "bare mimimum that MOST OF US can agree on" implies an iden-
: > tifiable "us." Who decides who is "us" and who is "them?"
: > And why?
[James Elson replies:]
: Quite. At this time I want to restrict the conversation to
: _homo saps_. I say most of us since not everyone will agree
: in valuing the continuation of their own existence, much less
: its enrichment. In general, when I use "us" in this sort of
: context, read our species.
We have slightly different scopes of "Us," then ... worth
remembering in such conversations. I lean toward the all-
everything-with-which-we-interact notion of "Us," because
I see more interconnectedness, both in processes and out-
comes. This isn't persuasion, by the way; merely information.
One of those "Oh, that's right, you're thinking of [this]
where I'm thinking of [that]" things to keep in mind.
[I wrote:]
: > Regarding tolerance, and the intolerance for intolerance ...
: > at what point does intolerance become so intolerable that we
: > stomp down and say "No more?" Is causing physical harm, in
: > and of itself, sufficient? What about emotional harm, in and
: > of itself? What about the two taken together? How much of
: > each/both?
[Jim replies:]
: At this point in our history, I'd be pleased to see an end to the
: demonization of "Otherness" or simply a toleration of the existence
: of hated "Others" which concomitatantly restrains acting out this
: hatred/resentment.
Assume _arguendo_ that, after we've put our heuristics together
and constructed the basic framework of *a* 'good philosophy.'
(Note: not *the* 'good philosophy,' just *a* 'good philosophy.')
Assume _arguendo_ that this philosophy rejects behaviors which
intentionally and deliberately cause unnecessary harm, solely
for the purpose of causing that harm. (Sadism, essentially.)
I would agree that we neither need to demonize nor hate those
who *would* (if left unchecked) intentionally cause unnecessary
harm. However, how do we protect ourselves from them? Do we
simply tolerate them, sighing expansively at the harms they
cause, wishing they would stop, but recognizing that -- while
we see this behavior as unacceptible -- there's nothing we can
properly do to prevent it? (That's one extreme.) Do we
ruthlessly eradicate these people? (Another extreme.) Do
we choose some middle course, and if so ... what? Keep in
mind our overarching (again, assuming _arguendo_ that this
is an element of our Good Philosophy) value-construct of
tolerance for non-conforming views.
To get to my point, I think a value-construct of tolerance is
important, but I think we have to recognize that we can't be
tolerant all the time toward everyone. There are some folks
who, by their own behaviors/attitudes, become intolerable and
virtually *compel* some form of Other-ing in societal self-
defense. (Folks who delight in causing unnecessary harm fall
into that category for me.) So what's the counter-construct
to tolerance?
NS Brown
[Omar Haneef wrote:]
: I believe we should try to find our way OUT of a turtles all the
: way down situation. That the problem of infinite regressions of
: metaphilosophies is exactly the problem we should be engaging.
So propose a solution instead of just challenging the proposals
of others. It's easy to sit there and say "Yes, but your 'answer'
is based upon an assumption, and thus it's not The Answer." You
can do this forever (if an emerging methaphysic is true, and I
believe it is), because *there is no 'there' there*. However, by
insisting that we find the 'there' there, without ever suggesting
a 'there' of your own, you can conveniently remain the center of
the discourse forever, without ever advancing the conversation
beyond your own skepticism.
In short, it's time to shit or get off the pot, Omar. What is
the bottom-most turtle, in *your* opinion? (And be prepared for
us to suggest that your bottom-most turtle *also* rests on your
own assumptions ....)
[Description of Christianity elided.]
Actually, Christianity *is* surprisingly postmodern in many of
its fundamental precepts. One of the few separators I've found
between Christianity (as a philosophy, without regard to how it's
practiced) and many postmodern perspectives is that Christianity
*seems* to posit an objective and distinct Diety which is the
measure of Absolute Truth. But this may have more to do with an
ontological assumption about the nature of God than it does with
Christianity itself, to wit: "Beloved, let us love one another,
because love is from God; everyone who loves is born of God and
knows God. Whoever does not love does not know God, FOR GOD
*IS* LOVE." I John 4:7,8 (NRSV, emphasis added).
This verse can be read as providing an ontology of the Diety
which is entirely different from the common assumption. That
is, the emphasized language can be read as saying not "God
loves," or "love is one of the characteristics of God," but
"Love is the ontological essence of God." This suggests
*away* from a ontologically distinct and separate Diety, and
toward an ontologically distributed Diety which is present
in anyone who loves. And given *that* spin, Christianity
becomes something quite different from the common construction
of it; it becomes something *very much* approaching postmodern
in its outlook.
: Persoanlly I believe in Marxist/Economic explanations for the success of
: philosophical system of thought. Thus, I would argue, resilience CAN NOT
: be a basis of judgement for a philosophy. Philosophies can Other, hurt
: millions, (poison them, as Fitch points out) and get away with it scot
: free. I don't see why one long term resilience is (1) a criteria for a
: good philosophy and (2) regarded a standard feature of tolerant
: philosophies.
The ability of a forceful, dominant system to preserve itself has
little to do with what Jim, Andy or I was suggesting as a heuristic.
Systemic self-preservation can come in any number of ways, and most
of those have to do with repressing dissent; that *wasn't* what I
was implying, nor do I think it's what Jim or Andy implied.
Suggesting that a philosophical system ought to be survivable in
that it remains attractive over time, by virtue of applicability
to everyday problems, is something quite different from merely
saying "if it lasts, it must be good."
Mark Weinles
> Nietzsche would say the answer to "how do you rate an ethical
>system" is "a system is good depending on how closely it HELPS ME
>LIVE/SURVIVE AND GROW," which is a very different answer. Not
>everyone has the ethical system that they want to have, after all.
I'm not sure how Andy meant this, but regardless, all of the
responses I've seen have taken it far too literally -- or rather, they
haven't taken it literally _enough_.
The general reading has been that, for Nietzsche, "a good
ethical system is one that helps me live, grow, etc." Several posts
have even happily accepted this idea. But in Andy's paraphrase (which
I think is acccurate), Nietzsche isn't indulging in the mindless
glorification of "life" and "growth" -- he's making a critical
observation about the way that humanity rates ethical systems. Despite
all their pretensions, Nietzsche says, people judge an ethical system
by how well it helps them survive, not how well it gets them into
heaven: their judgement is based on self-interest, rather than the
"higher considerations" they decorate it with.
In short, Nietzsche isn't rating ethical systems -- he's
answering the question, "How do you rate an ethical system?" And he
doesn't answer it with a rating system, but with a comment on how
ethical systems are inevitably rated by humanity.
Andy brings this out, it seems to me, when he adds that people
don't always have the ethics they would like -- indicating that the
ethics which are most practical wouldn't rate as highly if measured by
other criteria. (But I could be reading in.)
-- Mark Weinles
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Brian Dell
: In short, Nietzsche isn't rating ethical systems -- he's
: answering the question, "How do you rate an ethical system?" And he
: doesn't answer it with a rating system, but with a comment on how
: ethical systems are inevitably rated by humanity.
Nietzsche is NOT *just* revealing what lies behind things a la Derrida.
After exposing the Will, he *embraces it*!
He isn't just "commenting" he's *claiming*. Deconstruction is *passive*
whereas Nietzsche is sounding a call for *action*.
Nietzsche does not merely describe how the old law tables came to be.
Discovery of their origin is not an end in itself but a *means* for
transcending their dogmatic authority.
"Zarathustra has seen many lands and many peoples: Zarathustra has found
no greater power on earth than the works of those loving men: these works
are named 'good' and 'evil'.
Truly, the power of this praising and blaming is a monster. But who will
subdue it for me, brothers? Tell me, who will fasten fetters upon the
thousand necks of this beast?
Hitherto there have been a thousand goals, for there have been a thousand
peoples. Only fetters are still lacking for these thousand necks, the
one goal is still lacking.
Yet tell me, my brothers: if a goal for humanity is still lacking, is
there not still lacking - humanity itself?"
"Free from what? Zarathustra does not care about that! But your eye
should clearly tell me: free _for_ what?"
THE question for postmodernism, nicht wahr?
Andy Perry
Brown) wrote:
> One of the few reliable metrics for eval-
> uating an Other's philosophy and/or behavior is whether
> that philosophy and/or behavior is likely to produce outcomes
> which HE/SHE values as desirable (that is, which comport with
> *his/her* value-constructs).
>
> Example: Assume Allen states "I desire that other people
> should treat me with dignity, respect and kindness," thus
> stating a value-construct. Allen then states "Under my
> philosophy, people must recognize the inherent superiority
> of white males; we built the modern world and we have a
> natural right to rule it." At this point, I believe we
> *can* state with confidence that Allen's philosophy of
> white male supremacy is *wrong* ... because that philosophy
> is likely to engender antipathy from others, and Allen has
> already stated that he wants to be treated with dignity,
> respect and kindness (his own value-construct).
Um, Cris, I hate to break it to you, but by this reasoning, the statement
"Gay people are human beings with just as many rights and just as much
dignity as straight people" is in all ways equivalent to white male
supremacy.
In fact, according to your reasoning above, someone who desires to be
treated with dignity and respect and kindness should have no ideas or
opinions about anything of consequence, because any such ideas will
generate a good deal of antipathy from others.
You might want to rethink this position a bit...