Modernism, modernity, Eliot, and Kierkegaard
James Owens
I've kept up on the vitriol through Dejanews, but I cannot open the
articles in question through this account, and hence cannot reply to them
directly.]
moggin had said:
> James Owens wrote:
>> I think we are mostly in agreement. In adopting a pseudonym
>> SK is putting on a mask, so in a sense truth is wearing a
>> mask, as you say. But the pseudonymous authors themselves
>> stand for a deceived position, in order as it were to
>> befriend the deceived. The difference for some postmodern
>> thought is that various positions are not seen as
>> _deceived_ with respect to an absolute truth. Rather, they
>> are different forms or expressions of truth, each with its
>> own validity.
> Kierkegaard isn't saying that the pseudonymous authors are
> deceived, but rather that they're deceptions -- more
> specifically, deceptions which serve the truth. That's
> exactly what I was talking about above when I related them
> to his concept of indirect communication. They offer a way
> to speak obliquely about things which can't be directly
> conveyed. Emily Dickinson: Tell the truth, but tell it
> slant/Success in circuit lies.
Your paraphrase of SK gives the better account. More correctly they are
deceptions. But it's not that the pseudonymous authors "offer a way to
speak obliquely about things which can't be directly conveyed." They
adopt an aesthetic view in order to reach a public in the same stage, who
would otherwise be unimpressed or bored or frightened off. When
Kierkegaard writes under his own name, he indeed communicates directly to
the one called "my reader."
Compared to the religious stage, the aesthetic and ethical stages are in
error. To this extent the pseudonymous authors speak from a deceived
position, although it is not necessarily true that they themselves are
deceived. But Constantine Constantius, the author of _Repetition_, laments
that he cannot make the leap of faith.
>> Now I am in a precarious position indeed, for if I
>> paraphrase you I am putting words in your mouth, and if I
>> don't, I am at risk of being egregiously stupid.
> Nah, you're just being tiresomely literal again. It seems
> you're a one-trick pony.
First I "make shit up," and then I am tiresomely literal and a one-trick
pony. Losing count yet? But I have at least one other irritating trick,
which is to ignore distractions. It may seem pointless to go over our
dispute again; indeed if we were to do it endlessly, that would be
pointless, but to do it a couple of times is merely pointed.
"To resolve this apparent contradiction, Moggin suggests that we draw a
distinction between modernism and modernity. The latter, he argues, is the
proper name for the fascination with rational solutions, while the former
is, well, something else -- I'm not quite sure what." This is the passage
at which you have taken such improbable umbrage. Regarding the
distinction between modernism and modernity, perhaps initially you read me
too literally, but that is behind us; or it would be, if you would just
admit that I understand you. As to the second point, that modernity
involves a fascination with rational solutions, we were on the point of
finding out whether I understood you or not:
>>>> Quite possibly in an explicit discussion you would
>>>> dispute this general interpretation of "modernity," and I
>>>> guess I had better ask: would you?
>>> Sure. That won't get any argument from me.
>> As if by divine providence, here is a case where I really
>> can't guess what you mean. Is this "Sure, I'd dispute it,"
>> or (as I imagine) "Sure, I'd accept an interpretation of
>> this sort"?
>
Perhaps I missed your reply. It hardly matters -- my case is half-proven
already -- but why not give me an answer and finish with this ridiculous
matter, instead of acting as if I never made a defence at all?
For some reason, by crediting you with "the line of reasoning" I laid out
in detail afterward (are you still thinking about it?), I have offended
you. Far be it from me to give you too much credit! Or maybe it's simply
that I spoke on your behalf, but then that's a favour you returned:
> ale...@my-deja.com to James Owens:
>> Agreed. The notion of epoch, or periodising certain moments
>> of "time" as if they are separate entities is naive to say
>> the least.
> You're not agreeing with James, since that's not the
> point he made, or even the issue he was talking about. He
> just complained about the way that I delineated the era that
> we were discussing.
As to whether you or Joyce understands me better, for some reason I can't
get my knickers in a twist.
--
James Owens ad...@Freenet.carleton.ca
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
ale...@my-deja.com
we can justify "deception".... [think it's] Duchamp who said: "There is
no truth, only versions of it." I doubt texts can stand apart as
"islands" from which we read them in an isolated vacuum.
>
> > ale...@my-deja.com to James Owens:
>
> >> Agreed. The notion of epoch, or periodising certain moments
> >> of "time" as if they are separate entities is naive to say
> >> the least.
>
> > You're not agreeing with James, since that's not the
> > point he made, or even the issue he was talking about. He
> > just complained about the way that I delineated the era that
> > we were discussing.
>
> As to whether you or Joyce understands me better, for some reason I
can't
> get my knickers in a twist.
>
[grin] and I'll ignore that gender-specific comment. But just to make
myself clear (pretty difficult since everything's jumbled up in the
debate), from a theoretical understanding, postmodernism is a form of
political agency (ofcourse, feel free to differ :-)
Joyce
>
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Moggin
>>> > Remember that Kierkegaard _invented_ his
>>>> pseudonymous authors precisely in order to communicate the
>>>> truth -- indirectly. As I said, K wasn't just putting distance
>>>> between himself and his words -- he also wasn't merely
>>>> commenting on the personas he adopted. To him they were also a
>>>> means of conveying truth. If truth requires a mask, as
>>>> Nietzsche says, then a truthful person will be sure to wear the
>>>> appropriate costumes.
ad...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (James Owens):
[...]
>>> I think we are mostly in agreement. In adopting a pseudonym SK is
>>> putting on a mask, so in a sense truth is wearing a mask, as you say. But
>>> the pseudonymous authors themselves stand for a deceived position, in order
>>> as it were to befriend the deceived. The difference for some postmodern
>>> thought is that various positions are not seen as _deceived_ with
>>> respect to an absolute truth. Rather, they are different forms or expressions
>>> of truth, each with its own validity.
Moggin:
>> Kierkegaard isn't saying that the pseudonymous authors are
>> deceived, but rather that they're deceptions -- more
>> specifically, deceptions which serve the truth. That's exactly
>> what I was talking about above when I related them to his
>> concept of "indirect communication." They offer a way to speak
>> obliquely about things which can't be directly conveyed.
>> Emily Dickinson: "Tell the truth, but tell it slant/Success in
>> circuit lies."
James:
> Your paraphrase of SK gives the better account. More correctly they are
> deceptions. But it's not that the pseudonymous authors "offer a way to
> speak obliquely about things which can't be directly conveyed." They
> adopt an aesthetic view in order to reach a public in the same stage, who
> would otherwise be unimpressed or bored or frightened off. When
> Kierkegaard writes under his own name, he indeed communicates directly to
> the one called "my reader."
> Compared to the religious stage, the aesthetic and ethical stages are in
> error. To this extent the pseudonymous authors speak from a deceived
> position, although it is not necessarily true that they themselves are
> deceived. But Constantine Constantius, the author of _Repetition_, laments
> that he cannot make the leap of faith.
I don't entirely disagree, but I dunno about the idea that
Kierkegaard's aesthetic works are just more entertaining
expressions of his edifying writings. According to Kierkegaard
_Either/Or_ was more talked about than the _Two Edifying
Discourses_; but a person bored by the _Discourses_ is unlikely
to be thrilled by _Concluding Unscientific Postscript_.
I should mention, for those who haven't read SK, that what
he labels his "aesthetic" writings aren't novels or plays:
they're philosophy, and often pretty hard going. SK calls them
"aesthetic" in distinction from "religious."
The basic idea -- I don't think there's room for debate on
this, but you may prove me wrong -- is the one I've already
referred to: "indirect communication." That's the means which
SK uses to edify those who think in aesthetic categories --
including most supposedly religious people. Kierkegaard is
trying to do something Jesus didn't: to let those without ears
hear the Word.
You could still maintain that it's possible to communicate
directly with the eared, arguing that's what SK does in the
edifying works. Maybe so; I'm not sure, tho. Kierkegaard says
in _The Point of View for my Work as an Author_ (in 1A, I
think) that his signatures are related dialectically. Not just
his pseudonyms, since he includes "Soren Kierkegaard" in the
discussion. And who is this "S. Kierkegaard" talking about the
significance of Kierkegaard's signature? Oh, and one last
thing: if truth is subjectivity -- in SK's meaning -- then how
could it be directly communicated in language?
> First I "make shit up," and then I am tiresomely literal and a one-trick
> pony. Losing count yet?
Yep, I have. I should've known better than to count on my
counting skills.
[...]
> "To resolve this apparent contradiction, Moggin suggests that we draw a
> distinction between modernism and modernity. The latter, he argues, is the
> proper name for the fascination with rational solutions, while the former
> is, well, something else -- I'm not quite sure what." This is the passage
> at which you have taken such improbable umbrage.
[...]
No, your other mispresentations were far worse. Since you
insist on going back over this, I'll give an example.
According to you, I argued that Eliot's "rich allusions" -- I'm
quoting your so-called paraphrase -- "suggest a deep respect
for literary tradition," thus putting his case in contradiction
with a certain proposition about modernism. But I'd never
even _mentioned_ Eliot's allusions or his "respect for literary
tradition": not once. You claimed I "invoked" things I
didn't even discuss. Maybe that's what you meant when you said
you were idiosyncratic.
-- Moggin
James Owens
> . . . I dunno about the idea that
> Kierkegaard's aesthetic works are just more entertaining
> expressions of his edifying writings. According to Kierkegaard
> _Either/Or_ was more talked about than the _Two Edifying
> Discourses_; but a person bored by the _Discourses_ is unlikely
> to be thrilled by _Concluding Unscientific Postscript_.
> The basic idea -- I don't think there's room for debate on
> this, but you may prove me wrong -- is the one I've already
> referred to: "indirect communication." That's the means which
> SK uses to edify those who think in aesthetic categories --
> including most supposedly religious people. Kierkegaard is
> trying to do something Jesus didn't: to let those without ears
> hear the Word.
Kierkegaard's dazzling wit was meant to intrigue able minds, but he didn't
want to begin in an off-putting way such as "I am a Christian, and you are
not" (that would have been direct communication, and fatal.) He is
intensely difficult to read at times, but always fascinating. (Also, a
good part of _Either/Or_'s popularity was the "one-sixth" called "Diary of
a Seducer," which was relatively easy going and probably of salacious
interest to the citizens of Copenhagen.)
I agree that "indirect communication" is the basic idea. The strategy is
to approach the aesthetic individual "from behind" rather than
confrontationally; at just the right moment to introduce the category of
the religious; and then to withdraw, so that the individual might (SK
hopes) form a God-relationship in private. But he certainly wouldn't
agree that he was trying to do something Jesus didn't! Indirect
communication just improves the odds, and he even says of Christ that "in
a true sense He was incognito."
> And who is this "S. Kierkegaard" talking about the
> significance of Kierkegaard's signature?
I think the epilogue may address your question: "This interesting
distinction I lose, and for it is substituted, at the farthest remove from
the interesting, the _direct communication_ that the problem was, and is,
how to become a Christian." (original emphasis)
> Oh, and one last
> thing: if truth is subjectivity -- in SK's meaning -- then how
> could it be directly communicated in language?
He does say that he cannot communicate his God-relationship (though he
doesn't explicitly declare it a metaphysical impossibility.) But -- if I
had to give an account -- if he can communicate the urgency of the
question, "What is it to be a Christian?" or "What must I do?" that would
be to communicate that "truth is subjectivity." This might be done in a
direct or an indirect way. To say "truth is subjectivity" would be
indirect, by way of philosophical dialectic; whereas to say for example
"Purity of heart is to will one thing" would be (through his extended
meditation) to communicate the same truth directly.
I enjoy discussing SK, but it's rather dangerous for me. I wonmder if it
could be said, from the non-religious point of view, that you haven't
really understood him until you've had a psychotic episode.
--
> According to you, I argued that Eliot's "rich allusions" -- I'm
> quoting your so-called paraphrase -- "suggest a deep respect
> for literary tradition," thus putting his case in contradiction
> with a certain proposition about modernism. But I'd never
> even _mentioned_ Eliot's allusions or his "respect for literary
> tradition": not once.
This is a misunderstanding, and I have to take the blame. I said "it has
been proposed" or some such pompous phrase (Mother always warned me about
the passive voice). This referred to an exchange that took place earlier
(in late May and early June, now that I look it up):
Tinka (mul...@NOSPAMscandis-kol.dk) writes:
> James Owens wrote:
>
>> As I understand it, modernism broke radically with tradition and
>> authority to redesign the human world logically from first
>> principles. Postmodernism began to borrow again from tradition,
>> but in an eclectic, somewhat irreverent way. This is
>> particularly clear in the architecture of skyscrapers.
> UHmmmmmm.. have you read "The Waste Land"? There is no tradition
> in that?
Through no fault of yours, you missed that, and I'm sorry for the
misunderstanding. I should have been clearer. I did say afterwards "In
earlier threads (now in Deja-land) I put forth a similar position on my
own account," but even that was not clear. For this much I do apologize.
Moggin
>> ... I dunno about the idea that
>> Kierkegaard's aesthetic works are just more entertaining
>> expressions of his edifying writings. According to Kierkegaard
>> _Either/Or_ was more talked about than the _Two Edifying
>> Discourses_; but a person bored by the _Discourses_ is unlikely
>> to be thrilled by _Concluding Unscientific Postscript_.
>> The basic idea -- I don't think there's room for debate on
>> this, but you may prove me wrong -- is the one I've already
>> referred to: "indirect communication." That's the means which
>> SK uses to edify those who think in aesthetic categories --
>> including most supposedly religious people. Kierkegaard is
>> trying to do something Jesus didn't: to let those without ears
>> hear the Word.
ad...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (James Owens):
> Kierkegaard's dazzling wit was meant to intrigue able minds, but he didn't
> want to begin in an off-putting way such as "I am a Christian, and you are
> not" (that would have been direct communication, and fatal.)
Not fatal, but certainly ineffective. The question is why.
Not because talk about Christianity is off-putting --
Kierkegaard is addressing himself to Christians. (Or to people
who happily consider themselves Xian, anyway.) And not
because telling Xians that they're fooling themselves is liable
to offend them -- Kierkegaard is none too concerned about
politeness. The answer is that he's trying to dispel an
illusion. It's no use just telling someone gripped by
deception that they're been deceived, SK feels -- you've got to
undo the illusion from behind.
[...]
> I agree that "indirect communication" is the basic idea. The strategy is
> to approach the aesthetic individual "from behind" rather than
> confrontationally; at just the right moment to introduce the category of
> the religious; and then to withdraw, so that the individual might (SK
> hopes) form a God-relationship in private.
Yes, but... You make it sound as tho the big thing for SK
was to avoid offending Christians. (Remember he felt most
"religious" people inhabited aesthetic categories.) "It is not
my task, and in Christendom it cannot rightly be the task to
create alot of titular Christians or to assist in confirming
the millions in the illusion that they are Christians. No, the
task is in precise terms to throw light upon the knavish
trick which for the advantage of Church dignitaries, of parsons,
of mediocrity (under the name of Christian ardour and zeal --
Oh, how subtle!) has brought these millions into being. The
point is to illuminate this knavish trick through and through
and get it made clear that 'in Christendom' Christian ardour
and zeal mean just this thankless task (and here we have the
note which characterizes Christian activity, just as profit
characterizes worldly activity) of liberating Christianity from
some of these battalion-Christians" (P.S. to "Two Notes").
That resembles ideologiekritik much more than it does diplomacy.
> But he certainly wouldn't
> agree that he was trying to do something Jesus didn't!
I wouldn't expect him to. That was my assertion, not SK's.
You don't think I always agree with him, do you? SK's
position -- which I don't dispute, incidentally -- is that he's
following Jesus, since Jesus not only practiced but also
embodied indirect communication. But Jesus is many things, not
all of them consistent, and more than once he explains that
his message is not addressed to everyone: only to such as have
the necessary ears. By contrast, Kierkegaard's "indirect
communication" is designed to communicate with the earless, i.e.
with people deaf to the Gospel.
> Indirect
> communication just improves the odds, and he even says of Christ that "in
> a true sense He was incognito."
Yes, he does: a great line and an excellent point. Jesus
repeatedly makes a question of his identity. He's also
mysterious about the ID of his diety. And in certain cases, he
conceals even his meaning, as I was saying above. Not from
everyone: he intends for the disciples to understand, although
he's frustrated when they come up blank.
Moggin:
>> You could still maintain that it's possible to communicate
>> directly with the eared, arguing that's what SK does in the
>> edifying works. Maybe so; I'm not sure, tho. Kierkegaard says
>> in _The Point of View for my Work as an Author_ (in 1A, I
>> think) that his signatures are related dialectically. Not just
>> his pseudonyms, since he includes "Soren Kierkegaard" in the
>> discussion. And who is this "S. Kierkegaard" talking about the
>> significance of Kierkegaard's signature? Oh, and one more
>> thing: if truth is subjectivity -- in SK's meaning -- then how
>> could it be directly communicated in language?
James re "who is this 'SK'...?"
> I think the epilogue may address your question: "This interesting
> distinction I lose, and for it is substituted, at the farthest remove from
> the interesting, the _direct communication_ that the problem was, and is,
> how to become a Christian." (original emphasis)
Sez who?
James re truth:
> He does say that he cannot communicate his God-relationship (though he
> doesn't explicitly declare it a metaphysical impossibility.) But -- if I
> had to give an account -- if he can communicate the urgency of the
> question, "What is it to be a Christian?" or "What must I do?" that would
> be to communicate that "truth is subjectivity." This might be done in a
> direct or an indirect way. To say "truth is subjectivity" would be
> indirect, by way of philosophical dialectic; whereas to say for example
> "Purity of heart is to will one thing" would be (through his extended
> meditation) to communicate the same truth directly.
But if truth is subjectivity, it requires inwardness (just
another way of saying the same thing), which can't be
communicated by philosophical dialectic or religious meditation.
You could possibly motivate a person to look for the truth.
I'd buy that. Point them in a given direction. And maybe even
communicate in it in a suitably oblique fashion. By the
nature of the thing, tho, it doesn't seem there'd be any way to
convey it directly.
-- Moggin
James Owens
NOTE: The fine points of SK's philosophy wouldn't normally be discussed in
alt.postmodern, but it would be folly to discuss them in the philosophy
groups ("God exists!" -- "Does not!" --"Does so!" -- etc). Anyway, I
hope we can swing the discussion back to postmodernism. I've just learned
that Adorno did his first successful dissertation on SK and aesthetic
communication.
Moggin (mog...@mediaone.net) writes:
> James Owens writes:
>> Kierkegaard's dazzling wit was meant to intrigue able minds, but he didn't
>> want to begin in an off-putting way such as "I am a Christian, and you are
>> not" (that would have been direct communication, and fatal.)
> Not fatal, but certainly ineffective. The question is why.
> Not because talk about Christianity is off-putting --
> Kierkegaard is addressing himself to Christians. (Or to people
> who happily consider themselves Xian, anyway.) And not
> because telling Xians that they're fooling themselves is liable
> to offend them -- Kierkegaard is none too concerned about
> politeness. The answer is that he's trying to dispel an
> illusion. It's no use just telling someone gripped by
> deception that they're been deceived, SK feels -- you've got to
> undo the illusion from behind.
Ineffective, then; and the question is why. But there are two ways to ask
why. Is it ineffective for metaphysical reasons, or merely rhetorical
reasons? I'd say SK is concerned with a rhetorical problem. In that case
we could go on to discuss exactly how his rhetorical devices are supposed
to work. But first, are we talking at cross-purposes?
>> I agree that "indirect communication" is the basic idea. The strategy is
>> to approach the aesthetic individual "from behind" rather than
>> confrontationally; at just the right moment to introduce the category of
>> the religious; and then to withdraw, so that the individual might (SK
>> hopes) form a God-relationship in private.
>
> Yes, but... You make it sound as tho the big thing for SK
> was to avoid offending Christians. (Remember he felt most
> "religious" people inhabited aesthetic categories.) "It is not
> my task, and in Christendom it cannot rightly be the task to
> create alot of titular Christians or to assist in confirming
> the millions in the illusion that they are Christians. No, the
> task is in precise terms to throw light upon the knavish
> trick which for the advantage of Church dignitaries, of parsons,
> of mediocrity (under the name of Christian ardour and zeal --
> Oh, how subtle!) has brought these millions into being. The
> point is to illuminate this knavish trick through and through
> and get it made clear that 'in Christendom' Christian ardour
> and zeal mean just this thankless task (and here we have the
> note which characterizes Christian activity, just as profit
> characterizes worldly activity) of liberating Christianity from
> some of these battalion-Christians" (P.S. to "Two Notes").
> That resembles ideologiekritik much more than it does diplomacy.
IF I make it sound as though "the big thing for SK was to avoid offending
Christians," you are right to protest. I think by "Christians" here you
mean those who thought of themselves as Christians, but whom SK did not
consider Christian. It was the Church dignitaries who avoided offending
these people. SK was very impatient with this situation, as your quote
above indicates. But at the same time, he felt that a zealous
confrontation would not be effective; by tilting and preaching he would
only alienate his audience, who would then dismiss him for his religious
eccentricity as one outside Christendom and therefore "not Christian."
> . . . SK's
> position -- which I don't dispute, incidentally -- is that he's
> following Jesus, since Jesus not only practiced but also
> embodied indirect communication. But Jesus is many things, not
> all of them consistent, and more than once he explains that
> his message is not addressed to everyone: only to such as have
> the necessary ears. By contrast, Kierkegaard's "indirect
> communication" is designed to communicate with the earless, i.e.
> with people deaf to the Gospel.
It's a pity none of the disciples ever asked Jesus, "But who among us has
ears to hear?" Perhaps they didn't want to tempt him.
> Moggin:
>
>>> You could still maintain that it's possible to communicate
>>> directly with the eared, arguing that's what SK does in the
>>> edifying works. Maybe so; I'm not sure, tho. Kierkegaard says
>>> in _The Point of View for my Work as an Author_ (in 1A, I
>>> think) that his signatures are related dialectically. Not just
>>> his pseudonyms, since he includes "Soren Kierkegaard" in the
>>> discussion. And who is this "S. Kierkegaard" talking about the
>>> significance of Kierkegaard's signature? Oh, and one more
>>> thing: if truth is subjectivity -- in SK's meaning -- then how
>>> could it be directly communicated in language?
>
> James re "who is this 'SK'...?"
>
>> I think the epilogue may address your question: "This interesting
>> distinction I lose, and for it is substituted, at the farthest remove from
>> the interesting, the _direct communication_ that the problem was, and is,
>> how to become a Christian." (original emphasis)
>
> Sez who?
This time I left in your introductory remarks, since you went to the
trouble of putting them back -- but I don't know why you did.
Obviously, sez Kierkegaard; if you mean colloquially "on what authority,"
this is a case where SK communicates directly, and it just rolls off: you
hear him, you know what he means, and you don't care. So you'd be a
candidate for indirect communication, i.e. some rhetorical way of making
you more receptive.
>
> James re truth:
>
>> He does say that he cannot communicate his God-relationship (though he
>> doesn't explicitly declare it a metaphysical impossibility.) But -- if I
>> had to give an account -- if he can communicate the urgency of the
>> question, "What is it to be a Christian?" or "What must I do?" that would
>> be to communicate that "truth is subjectivity." This might be done in a
>> direct or an indirect way. To say "truth is subjectivity" would be
>> indirect, by way of philosophical dialectic; whereas to say for example
>> "Purity of heart is to will one thing" would be (through his extended
>> meditation) to communicate the same truth directly.
>
> But if truth is subjectivity, it requires inwardness (just
> another way of saying the same thing), which can't be
> communicated by philosophical dialectic or religious meditation.
> You could possibly motivate a person to look for the truth.
> I'd buy that. Point them in a given direction. And maybe even
> communicate in it in a suitably oblique fashion. By the
> nature of the thing, tho, it doesn't seem there'd be any way to
> convey it directly.
The process of motivating or pointing would use indirect communication,
and with no guarantee of success. Once a person is correctly oriented,
though, direct communication becomes possible. So for example, SK
explores "truth is subjectivity" for those with an academic turn of mind,
until its significance dawns on them -- very crudely, and within the
context of Christendom, something like "get a life." At this point, and
not before, direct communication can proceed about what sort of life to get.
James Whitehead
<mog...@mediaone.net> writes
> But if truth is subjectivity,
--
James Whitehead
Moggin
>>> Kierkegaard's dazzling wit was meant to intrigue able minds, but he
>>> didn't want to begin in an off-putting way such as "I am a Christian,
Moggin (mog...@mediaone.net):
>> Not fatal, but certainly ineffective. The question is why.
>> Not because talk about Christianity is off-putting --
>> Kierkegaard is addressing himself to Christians. (Or to people
>> who happily consider themselves Xian, anyway.) And not
>> because telling Xians that they're fooling themselves is liable
>> to offend them -- Kierkegaard is none too concerned about
>> politeness. The answer is that he's trying to dispel an
>> illusion. It's no use just telling someone gripped by
>> deception that they're been deceived, SK feels -- you've got to
>> undo the illusion from behind.
James:
> Ineffective, then; and the question is why.
That's the question I just answered. Maybe you want it in
Kierkegaard's words. "An illusion can never be destroyed
directly, and only by indirect means can it be radicaly removed."
(_Point of View_ 2.1.A.1.)
[...]
James:
> Obviously, sez Kierkegaard; if you mean colloquially "on what authority,"
> this is a case where SK communicates directly, and it just rolls off: you
> hear him, you know what he means, and you don't care. So you'd be a
> candidate for indirect communication, i.e. some rhetorical way of making
> you more receptive.
No, I don't mean "on what authority" -- I mean Kierkegaard
who? And again, the purpose of indirect communication isn't
to smooth the way to a sale, but rather to undo a deception and
"illuminate this knavish trick."
-- Moggin
Moggin
>> But if truth is subjectivity,
James:
> you shouldn't go around correcting other people.
Wrong.
-- Moggin
James Whitehead
<mog...@mediaone.net> writes
>Moggin:
>
>>> But if truth is subjectivity,
>
>
>> you shouldn't go around correcting other people.
>
> Wrong.
>
--
James Whitehead
James Owens
>> Obviously, sez Kierkegaard; if you mean colloquially "on what authority,"
>> this is a case where SK communicates directly, and it just rolls off: you
>> hear him, you know what he means, and you don't care. So you'd be a
>> candidate for indirect communication, i.e. some rhetorical way of making
>> you more receptive.
>
> No, I don't mean "on what authority" -- I mean Kierkegaard
> who? And again, the purpose of indirect communication isn't
> to smooth the way to a sale, but rather to undo a deception and
> "illuminate this knavish trick."
Sorry, I still don't get what you mean by the first part.
Indirect communication is not to smooth the way to "a sale," but to
"truth;" for which, yes, it is necessary to undo a deception.
Moggin
>> No, I don't mean "on what authority" -- I mean Kierkegaard
>> who? And again, the purpose of indirect communication isn't
>> to smooth the way to a sale, but rather to undo a deception and
>> "illuminate this knavish trick."
ad...@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (James Owens):
> Sorry, I still don't get what you mean by the first part.
You said, "You hear him, you know what he means." But you
hear _who_? The signature "S. Kierkegaard" raises as many
questions as "Anti-Climacus" or "Vigilius Haufniensis" -- maybe
more.
> Indirect communication is not to smooth the way to "a sale," but to
> "truth;" for which, yes, it is necessary to undo a deception.
Then there we agree. You wanted to bring things around to
Adorno? Consider it done. I was afraid you saw SK's
philosophy as something akin to _How to Win Friends and
Influence People_, when he's got far more in common with Adorno
or Derrida than with Dale Carnegie.
-- Moggin