Modernism to postmodernism
Claire
society?
James Whitehead
Claire <claire...@hotmail.com> writes
>What kind of effect did the change form modernism to postmodernism have on
>society?
>
>
said that there was no such thing - she should know she destroyed it in
the UK.
--
James Whitehead
ale...@my-deja.com
I don't think postmodernism attempts to narrate changes in societies -
it is not a prescriptive methodology to achieve The Perfect Society.
Its function is more of a critical analysis, self-reflexive and open to
a plurality of discourses and voices.
best regards,
Joyce
In article <f4OQ4FAY...@jliat.demon.co.uk>,
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
Peter McInnes
self-reflexive and open plurality of dscourses and voices.' It itself falls
into the patterns of being a movement that consistently challenges
institutional power. In doing this there are some very clever intillectual
arguements that attempt to evade taking a position and, as such, defeating
postmodernism's key arguement of plurality. If 'postmodern' society is
anything it is the 'progression' towards the individual as the 'ultimate'
unit of existence.
ale...@my-deja.com wrote in message <92gips$61u$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>...
Kenn
society?
Have we ever been modern, and, ARE we postmodern? I would think not.
Ken
ale...@my-deja.com
positions at hand and to see where they will take us. It is not about
assuming a specific soapbox because of its awareness of a person's
capability of assumind diverse, polyvocal subjectivities.
Joyce
In article <92l1di$s08$1...@news8.svr.pol.co.uk>,
"Peter McInnes" <peter....@strath.ac.uk> wrote:
> Of course in post-modernism's attempt to provide 'critical analysis,
> self-reflexive and open plurality of dscourses and voices.' It itself
falls
> into the patterns of being a movement that consistently challenges
> institutional power. In doing this there are some very clever
intillectual
> arguements that attempt to evade taking a position and, as such,
defeating
> postmodernism's key arguement of plurality. If 'postmodern' society is
> anything it is the 'progression' towards the individual as
the 'ultimate'
> unit of existence.
kitters
for years and years. Or at least until schools and educators all come round
to the idea that there are no definitive answers - possibly!
"Claire" <claire...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:xJI26.18268$ca6.3...@news6-win.server.ntlworld.com...
Franklin Cacciutto
society upon the wasteland of the World Wars. Modernism was profoundly
constructive and contributed greatly to the survival of civilization.
Postmodernism seeks to debunk and demean all forms. It seeks to do what
nihilism and fascism failedto do: that is, to reduce society to
meaninglessness and chaos. Postmodernism is profoundly destructive and
threatens a resurgence of nihilism and fascism.
u...@nadaredhotant.com
> Modernism sought to create new forms. The effect on society was to rebuild
> society upon the wasteland of the World Wars. Modernism was profoundly
> constructive and contributed greatly to the survival of civilization.
This is, I think, a rather partial history. Certainly some Modernism was
involved in a post war rebuilding, particularly architecture in a period
after WW2 - (Modernism's rebuilding quotient was not high after WW1 - those
that tried were mainly killed or exiled, unless you were Dutch - or you were
ignored if you were French). But you seem to claim that this is true of
Modernism per se? You would have to make clear how this was true of Joyce,
Musil, Kafka, Beckett, Manet, Cezanne, Ernst. Miro, Picasso, Pollock,
Newman, Mahler, Schoenberg, Webern, etc. etc.. New forms, it seems to me,
could also be profoundly negative - a refusal of what is/was, even if often
an ambiguous one.
> Postmodernism seeks to debunk and demean all forms. It seeks to do what
> nihilism and fascism failedto do: that is, to reduce society to
> meaninglessness and chaos. Postmodernism is profoundly destructive and
> threatens a resurgence of nihilism and fascism.
Umm, I hate to mention it, but nihilism and fascism are thoroughly
different. Nihilism, to coin a phrase, finds all values worthless, whilst
Fascism not only relies on maintaining or creating values where they are
perceived as under attack or missing, but does so with a violent insistence.
Oh, by the way, Nihilism was never an organised, coherent or limited group -
so how could it 'fail'? I am, though, interested to know what a 'successful'
nihilism might look like.
Postmodernism - well, it depends what you mean. What is called Postmodern
architecture doesn't demean forms, it utterly relies on a style manual
called 'the past', its only new forms are the juxtaposition of old ones.
What is called Postmodern in cinema and TV involves references to other,
ermm, works, past and present, and an ironic relation to its own status as a
product - from Bladerunner and Body Heat to the Simpsons. Do the Simpsons
threaten a resurgence of Fascism?
But you probably mean something else, so please tell me, what is this
'profoundly destructive' postmodernism?
> Claire wrote:
>
>> What kind of effect did the change form modernism to postmodernism have on
>> society?
Yours
Giles
ale...@my-deja.com
Franklin Cacciutto <shad...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> Modernism sought to create new forms. The effect on society was to
rebuild
> society upon the wasteland of the World Wars. Modernism was profoundly
> constructive and contributed greatly to the survival of civilization.
>
culture and elitism - the sort of avant-garde "depth" which is
experienced by a "detached subjectivity" where the world is objectified
and manipulated for the subject's own ends.
Postmodernism is a reaction against that sort of distinction between
subject/object dualism, as well as the homogenisation of an ideal
Universal System which is peculiar to the traditional western
philosophy.
best regards,
Joyce
> Postmodernism seeks to debunk and demean all forms. It seeks to do
what
> nihilism and fascism failedto do: that is, to reduce society to
> meaninglessness and chaos. Postmodernism is profoundly destructive and
> threatens a resurgence of nihilism and fascism.
>
> Claire wrote:
>
> > What kind of effect did the change form modernism to postmodernism
have on
> > society?
>
>
G*rd*n
| > Modernism sought to create new forms. The effect on society was to rebuild
| > society upon the wasteland of the World Wars. Modernism was profoundly
| > constructive and contributed greatly to the survival of civilization.
<u...@NADAredhotant.com>:
| This is, I think, a rather partial history. ...
I'd say so! If we're talking about Modernism in the plastic
arts, design, architecture, and the like, then a big problem
with the theory given above is that the appearance of
Modernism preceded both World Wars.
I think it is more sensible to look on World Wars I and II
as a grand Modernist work which destroyed the complex,
traditional Europe that had existed up until 1914 and cleared
the ground for new developments in the name of Enlightenment,
like the monolithic (minimalist?) populations envisioned by
Nazi and Communist leaders and the boxy ice-cube trays they
planned to house them in. The Nazis went mad and had to be
put down, but Modernism marched on in corporate offices and
State Department shows. The end of Modernism as a spiritual
and commercial force in the New York City galleries in the
mid-1960s -- occasioned by the incursion of the taxi-owning
Sculls and their kind into the _haute_bourgeoisie_ -- thus
presaged the revolts of the later '60s, the rise of radical
identity fragmentation, and the deterioration and collapse
of the very Modernist Soviet dream.
In postmodernity we play with the detritus while awaiting
the next onset of Faith and Discipline. Enjoy it while you
can!
--
}"{ G*rd*n }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
{ http://www.etaoin.com | latest new material 12/21/0 <-adv't
Ned Ludd
>Franklin Cacciutto wrote:
> Modernism sought to create new forms. The effect on society was to
> rebuild society upon the wasteland of the World Wars. Modernism
> was profoundly constructive and contributed greatly to the survival
> of civilization.
<u...@NADAredhotant.com>:
| This is, I think, a rather partial history. ...
G*rd*n:
> I'd say so! If we're talking about Modernism in the plastic
> arts, design, architecture, and the like, then a big problem
> with the theory given above is that the appearance of
> Modernism preceded both World Wars.
> I think it is more sensible to look on World Wars I and II
> as a grand Modernist work which destroyed the complex,
> traditional Europe that had existed up until 1914 and cleared
> the ground for new developments in the name of Enlightenment,
> like the monolithic (minimalist?) populations envisioned by
> Nazi and Communist leaders and the boxy ice-cube trays they
> planned to house them in. The Nazis went mad and had to be
> put down, but Modernism marched on in corporate offices and
> State Department shows. The end of Modernism as a spiritual
> and commercial force in the New York City galleries in the
> mid-1960s -- occasioned by the incursion of the taxi-owning
> Sculls and their kind into the _haute_bourgeoisie_ -- thus
> presaged the revolts of the later '60s, the rise of radical
> identity fragmentation, and the deterioration and collapse
> of the very Modernist Soviet dream.
> In postmodernity we play with the detritus while awaiting
> the next onset of Faith and Discipline. Enjoy it while you
> can!
>
Nice. From the memory hole:
----------------------------------------------------------------
You could see World War I as the first great work of Modernism,
sucking up all the remnant illogical junk of the 19th century
and before, the cupolas, gazebos, spires, and empires, and
grinding it all down to a uniform mass of concrete, anxiety,
and death. The artists were behind as always -- didn't get
the word until about ten years later. - Gordon
----------------------------------------------------------------
Can we agree that a modernist extravaganza extraordinaire
would be thermonuclear war? (prairie fire in the extreme)
It seems as if both modernism and postmodernism did some things
that had never been done before. You've described pomo as an
interregnum of sorts, where we are "playing with the detritus
while awaiting the next onset of Faith and Discipline". Pomo
may have done more damage than that, though. It seems to have
undermined the basic validity of language, and the foundation
of 'knowing' anything.
Once that cat is out of the bag, even the return of Fascism
(which is happening), or Communism, or some forms of Theocracy
(which also appears to be happening) may not be possible in the
ways it was possible in the past. The absolute isolation of a
population would, imo, be necessary for it to succeed. That has
become extremely difficult.
Ned
G*rd*n
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| Nice. From the memory hole:
|
| ----------------------------------------------------------------
|
| You could see World War I as the first great work of Modernism,
| sucking up all the remnant illogical junk of the 19th century
| and before, the cupolas, gazebos, spires, and empires, and
| grinding it all down to a uniform mass of concrete, anxiety,
| and death. The artists were behind as always -- didn't get
| the word until about ten years later. - Gordon
Sigh. I both repeat _and_ contradict myself. But the old
Gordon was wrong -- Modernism got started up before 1924.
Modernism was complex, though -- some was slack, some was
Whiggery, some was pure icetray totalitarianism, in about
that order, too. The theme that binds all together was
that it was the artist who posed.
| Can we agree that a modernist extravaganza extraordinaire
| would be thermonuclear war? (prairie fire in the extreme)
No, I think that would be too weird. Having a war which
everyone prayed for and expected, the fire-next-time idiot
Messiah, would be just too over the top. Pomo, then. Look
at Duerer's _Revelations_ woodcuts. We've seen it, so we
don't need to act it out.
| It seems as if both modernism and postmodernism did some things
| that had never been done before. You've described pomo as an
| interregnum of sorts, where we are "playing with the detritus
| while awaiting the next onset of Faith and Discipline". Pomo
| may have done more damage than that, though. It seems to have
| undermined the basic validity of language, and the foundation
| of 'knowing' anything.
|
| Once that cat is out of the bag, even the return of Fascism
| (which is happening), or Communism, or some forms of Theocracy
| (which also appears to be happening) may not be possible in the
| ways it was possible in the past. The absolute isolation of a
| population would, imo, be necessary for it to succeed. That has
| become extremely difficult.
Think pomo has undermined phrases like "Heil Hitler"? I
don't. I wish it had. We need something to sprinkle on the
great leaders and heroes the next time they get restless and
start grunting.
u...@nadaredhotant.com
[snip]
This reminded me of something. From the end of Italo Svevo's 'Confessions of
Zeno' - 1923.
"Perhaps some incredible disaster produced by machines will lead us back to
health. When all the poison gases are exhausted, a man, made like other men
of flesh and blood, will in the quiet of his room invent an explosive of
such potency that all the explosives in existence will seem like harmless
toys beside it. And another man, made in his image and in the image of all
the rest, but a little weaker than they, will steal that explosive and crawl
to the centre of the earth with it, and place it just where he calculates it
would have the maximum effect. There will be a tremendous explosion, but no
one will hear it and the earth will return to its nebulous state and go
wandering through the heavens, free at last of parasites and disease."
For a novel which starts with trying to give up smoking, it is quite an
ending, but an ending with no possibility of a new beginning.
[...]
> Ned
Regards
GIles
Franklin Cacciutto
is only will. Ergo, fascism and the strong man, whose might is the only right.
That was the lesson of the twentieth century; Postmodernists in their easy
cynical obliviousness failed to learn that lesson.
Franklin Cacciutto
ale...@my-deja.com wrote:
Postmodernism is a reaction against that sort of distinction between
subject/object dualism, as well as the homogenisation of an ideal
Universal System which is peculiar to the traditional western
philosophy.
That sentence is ungrammatical and meaningless babble. Learn to write.
Ned Ludd
news:B67EACC1.19B96%u...@NADAredhotant.com...
Ned:
...
> Nice. From the memory hole:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> You could see World War I as the first great work of Modernism,
> sucking up all the remnant illogical junk of the 19th century
> and before, the cupolas, gazebos, spires, and empires, and
> grinding it all down to a uniform mass of concrete, anxiety,
> and death. The artists were behind as always -- didn't get
> the word until about ten years later. - Gordon
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> Can we agree that a modernist extravaganza extraordinaire
> would be thermonuclear war? (prairie fire in the extreme)
Giles:
> This reminded me of something. From the end of Italo Svevo's
> 'Confessions of Zeno' - 1923.
> "Perhaps some incredible disaster produced by machines will lead
> us back to health. When all the poison gases are exhausted, a man,
> made like other men of flesh and blood, will in the quiet of his
> room invent an explosive of such potency that all the explosives
> in existence will seem like harmless toys beside it. And another
> man, made in his image and in the image of all the rest, but a
> little weaker than they, will steal that explosive and crawl to the
> centre of the earth with it, and place it just where he calculates
> it would have the maximum effect. There will be a tremendous
> explosion, but no one will hear it and the earth will return to
> its nebulous state and go wandering through the heavens, free at
> last of parasites and disease."
> For a novel which starts with trying to give up smoking, it is
> quite an ending, but an ending with no possibility of a new
> beginning.
>
What a wonderful ending, it turns quite effortlessly from disaster.
'Nebulous state' has memories of Eden in it, or Chaos before the lord
of the north and lord of the south requited his kindness by drilling
seven holes in him, one for each day of the week, and on the seventh
day he died.
Ned
Ned Ludd
news:3A5911C4...@earthlink.net...
Ned:
> Nice. From the memory hole:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> You could see World War I as the first great work of Modernism,
> sucking up all the remnant illogical junk of the 19th century
> and before, the cupolas, gazebos, spires, and empires, and
> grinding it all down to a uniform mass of concrete, anxiety,
> and death. The artists were behind as always -- didn't get
> the word until about ten years later. - Gordon
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> Can we agree that a modernist extravaganza extraordinaire
> would be thermonuclear war? (prairie fire in the extreme)
> It seems as if both modernism and postmodernism did some things
> that had never been done before. You've described pomo as an
> interregnum of sorts, where we are "playing with the detritus
> while awaiting the next onset of Faith and Discipline". Pomo
> may have done more damage than that, though. It seems to have
> undermined the basic validity of language, and the foundation
> of 'knowing' anything.
> Once that cat is out of the bag, even the return of Fascism
> (which is happening), or Communism, or some forms of Theocracy
> (which also appears to be happening) may not be possible in the
> ways it was possible in the past. The absolute isolation of a
> population would, imo, be necessary for it to succeed. That has
> become extremely difficult.
Franklin:
> Where there is no knowledge, there is nihilism; where there is
> nihilism, there is only will. Ergo, fascism and the strong man,
> whose might is the only right. That was the lesson of the
> twentieth century; Postmodernists in their easy cynical
> obliviousness failed to learn that lesson.
>
Nihilism was born of men with great knowledge. It was a powerful
medicine for an overwhelming disease. The 'might' and will of a
strong man is the oldest lesson of history. Fascism is a new name
for what is, imo, an ancient phenomena, viewed through the skewed
technological/industrial lens of the last century. (That thing on
the back of your Roosevelt dime is a 'fasces', by the way.)
Freedom and the diffusion of power into the largest number of
hands has created some difficulties and discontinuities which were
never problems in a totally-controlled state. And the solution
always seems to be to re-create the totally-controlled state, to
restrict that power which got into "too many" hands. But this is
unusually difficult if people have access to the electromagnetic
spectrum.
The great revolutions started in the late 1700's. They were an
expression mass will. This has happened before, but the American,
French, Russian, Chinese, and de-colonizing revolutions were new
and different in some respects. Cynicism played a big part in
these revolutions and Pomo's cynicism reflects that. As for
'obliviousness', I'm not sure pomo is oblivious. If anything it's
too aware. It endeavors to reveal all that is hidden, and tear
up the very floorboards that any position or belief stands on.
Ned
Ned Ludd
Ned:
| Nice. From the memory hole:
| ----------------------------------------------------------------
| You could see World War I as the first great work of Modernism,
| sucking up all the remnant illogical junk of the 19th century
| and before, the cupolas, gazebos, spires, and empires, and
| grinding it all down to a uniform mass of concrete, anxiety,
| and death. The artists were behind as always -- didn't get
| the word until about ten years later. - Gordon
| ----------------------------------------------------------------
G:
> Sigh. I both repeat _and_ contradict myself. But the old
> Gordon was wrong -- Modernism got started up before 1924.
> Modernism was complex, though -- some was slack, some was
> Whiggery, some was pure icetray totalitarianism, in about
> that order, too. The theme that binds all together was
> that it was the artist who posed.
>
Napoleon. The turn of the 18th to the 19th century. Would
you consider him an honorary modernist? Or is that too absurd?
>| Can we agree that a modernist extravaganza extraordinaire
>| would be thermonuclear war? (prairie fire in the extreme)
>
> No, I think that would be too weird. Having a war which
> everyone prayed for and expected, the fire-next-time idiot
> Messiah, would be just too over the top. Pomo, then. Look
> at Duerer's _Revelations_ woodcuts. We've seen it, so we
> don't need to act it out.
>
We haven't been over the top in a long time. If fact, it's
long overdue.
>| It seems as if both modernism and postmodernism did some things
>| that had never been done before. You've described pomo as an
>| interregnum of sorts, where we are "playing with the detritus
>| while awaiting the next onset of Faith and Discipline". Pomo
>| may have done more damage than that, though. It seems to have
>| undermined the basic validity of language, and the foundation
>| of 'knowing' anything.
>| Once that cat is out of the bag, even the return of Fascism
>| (which is happening), or Communism, or some forms of Theocracy
>| (which also appears to be happening) may not be possible in the
>| ways it was possible in the past. The absolute isolation of a
>| population would, imo, be necessary for it to succeed. That has
>| become extremely difficult.
>
> Think pomo has undermined phrases like "Heil Hitler"? I
> don't. I wish it had. We need something to sprinkle on the
> great leaders and heroes the next time they get restless and
> start grunting.
>
All the witch-hunts for war-crimes criminals? - Can we tip our hat
to pomo for these? (In the past these were never a problem because
the conquered state was always taken over and any possible claimants
to future redress were exterminated.)
Does pomo prevent "Heil Hitler" from being said too loudly in
many quarters nowadays? Try to say it here and see what happens.
Why hasn't a Hitler materialized in Russia and taken power? It is,
imo, a perfect milieu for such a recurrence, but it doesn't happen.
Maybe it's all just fine background work by the CIA, but the old
Idi Amins and Pol Pots have become Rwandan generals and Milosevic
of Serbia.
Is it Pax Americana or Pomo?
Ned
James Whitehead
<shad...@earthlink.net> writes
Well I understood it - so in some small way its not *meaningless* -
grammar is a different matter as in the english language its not fixed.
Even english teachers in the citadels of english grammar will admit. As
to it being babble - it that as in like the sound of a brook - or the
biblical tower?
learning to write? - modernism teaches that having something to say is
far more important and should come first.
--
James Whitehead
ale...@my-deja.com
James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> In article <3A59130A...@earthlink.net>, Franklin Cacciutto
> <shad...@earthlink.net> writes
> >
> > ale...@my-deja.com wrote:
> >
> >> Postmodernism is a reaction against that sort of distinction
> >> between
> >> subject/object dualism, as well as the homogenisation of an
> >> ideal
> >> Universal System which is peculiar to the traditional
western
> >> philosophy.
babble. Learn to
> > write.
>
> Well I understood it - so in some small way its not *meaningless* -
> grammar is a different matter as in the english language its not
fixed.
> Even english teachers in the citadels of english grammar will admit.
As
> to it being babble - it that as in like the sound of a brook - or the
> biblical tower?
>
> learning to write? - modernism teaches that having something to say is
> far more important and should come first.
> --
> James Whitehead
Don't worry about this man - an insult in reference to grammar or
spelling usually indicates the poster's inability to come up with a
sound argument against the content.
ale...@my-deja.com
conservative" that I am, I"ve always agreed with Deleuze's comparison
on theory as a box of tools - that it does not totalise, but as an
instrument of multiplication, and to multiply itself. To that extent, I
do not see postmodernism as a past time indulgence for the privileged
academics, but a very active agency in dismantling the normative
assumption of what is "useful" or "good" or "moral".
Another thing: postmodernism - the theory itself, arises mainly after
WWII, that is, after the realisation of the failure of modernity's
recovering project. We had Matthew Arnold telling us that the mass
needs to be "cultured" (another word: tamed by a set social behaviour
and mindframe), and that culture is all things "sweet and proper". But
what we have is death camps where the Nazis retire home after a hard
day of murders and listen to, what? Mozart? Bach? All the sweet and
proper aspects of culture, mixed with the crematorium ashes. Now here's
a nice mixture to "redeem" humanity from. Are we still talking about
the complicity and collaboration between facism and postmodernism?
Joyce
G*rd*n
| Don't worry about this man - an insult in reference to grammar or
| spelling usually indicates the poster's inability to come up with a
| sound argument against the content.
It wasn't ungrammatical or meaningless anyway, although if I
were an English teacher I might suggest recasting it to make
it easier for the casual reader to grasp. There are a lot
of extremely casual readers out there.
G*rd*n
ale...@my-deja.com:
| ...
| Another thing: postmodernism - the theory itself, arises mainly after
| WWII, that is, after the realisation of the failure of modernity's
| recovering project. We had Matthew Arnold telling us that the mass
| needs to be "cultured" (another word: tamed by a set social behaviour
| and mindframe), and that culture is all things "sweet and proper". But
| what we have is death camps where the Nazis retire home after a hard
| day of murders and listen to, what? Mozart? Bach? All the sweet and
| proper aspects of culture, mixed with the crematorium ashes. Now here's
| a nice mixture to "redeem" humanity from. Are we still talking about
| the complicity and collaboration between facism and postmodernism?
I think it would be Modernistic -- or at least a product of
the Enlightenment -- to regard the mixing of crematorium
ashes and Mozart as something of a difficulty. In the
Middle Ages and the ancient world, such mixings were assumed
to be a normal outcome of the workings of the natural world.
If they were evil or repellent, that was only to be expected
in this vale of tears. The Enlightenment, liberalism,
capitalism, science, and progress in general caused the
vision of a realizable, material heaven on earth to appear.
But mankind evidently does not want heaven on earth -- and so
they must send each other into the gulag, the gas chambers,
the nuclear fire. So in the end there are more crematoria
than ever. And, I would think, more yearning for saviors
and redeemers.
"After the Revolution, comrade, you _will_ like
strawberries!"
James Whitehead
--
James Whitehead
Ned Ludd
Joyce:
> Another thing: postmodernism - the theory itself, arises mainly
> after WWII, that is, after the realisation of the failure of
> modernity's recovering project. We had Matthew Arnold telling us
> that the mass needs to be "cultured" (another word: tamed by a set
> social behaviour and mindframe), and that culture is all things
> "sweet and proper". But what we have is death camps where the Nazis
> retire home after a hard day of murders and listen to, what? Mozart?
> Bach? All the sweet and proper aspects of culture, mixed with the
> crematorium ashes. Now here's a nice mixture to "redeem" humanity
> from. Are we still talking about the complicity and collaboration
> between facism and postmodernism?
Gordon:
> I think it would be Modernistic -- or at least a product of
> the Enlightenment -- to regard the mixing of crematorium
> ashes and Mozart as something of a difficulty. In the
> Middle Ages and the ancient world, such mixings were assumed
> to be a normal outcome of the workings of the natural world.
> If they were evil or repellent, that was only to be expected
> in this vale of tears. The Enlightenment, liberalism,
> capitalism, science, and progress in general caused the
> vision of a realizable, material heaven on earth to appear.
> But mankind evidently does not want heaven on earth -- and so
> they must send each other into the gulag, the gas chambers,
> the nuclear fire. So in the end there are more crematoria
> than ever. And, I would think, more yearning for saviors
> and redeemers.
> "After the Revolution, comrade, you _will_ like
> strawberries!"
>
Yeah, Joyce, are you saying pomo precludes genocide? I mean
modernism would not CLAIM genocide as an attribute, but it happened.
Pomo doesn't claim it, but would it happen under pomo? Gordon once
claimed that one of the attributes of pomo is multi-culti.
Are you going to build your whole edifice of non-genocidal pomo
on this one stone of multi-culti? There is a very multi-cultural
population in the old Yugoslavia, and genocide was/is very apparent.
Also, the "failure of modernity's recovering project" is a
recurring failure, and has recurred repeatedly in the last 500
years. Beginning about 200 years ago it even started to look like
a heartbeat.
Modernity's goal may have been "heaven on earth". But the oldest
myth is Eden. It is stated in the Nam-shub of Enki. It is a
destroyer myth. A myth designed to wipe out other myths, in this
case all other myths.
When Joyce cannot comprehend a pomo society that is genocidal and
loves Mozart, isn't the myth of Eden alive and well in pomo?
Ned
G*rd*n
| ...
| loves Mozart, isn't the myth of Eden alive and well in pomo?
On the other hand we pussycats, we softies, can't stomach a
little genocide, a little mass murder, unlike so many of our
elders, including some _very_ recent ones. All roads lead to
Rome, so we wander in the woods. Something must have happened.
What was it?
http://members.aa.net/~urizen/mhh/mhh.html
u...@nadaredhotant.com
> Where there is no knowledge, there is nihilism;
Wrong way round. Where there is knowledge, there is the possibility of
nihilism, although I guess it might be more accurate to say where there are
values, there is the possibility of nihilism. After all, if nihilism is a
devaluing of value, then there have to be values to be devalued, and so far
at least, there are always values.
As it turns out, even you can't separate nihilism and continuing values...
> where there is nihilism, there
> is only will.
'Will' would be a form of the 'overcoming' of nihilism, not nihilism, and
so...
> Ergo, fascism and the strong man, whose might is the only right.
'Might is the only right' sounds pretty much like a value to me - not a very
pleasant one, I'd agree, but a value nonetheless.
> That was the lesson of the twentieth century; Postmodernists in their easy
> cynical obliviousness failed to learn that lesson.
So your response to the question of nihilism is firstly to suggest that we
shouldn't think about it because it leads to bad things and secondly to call
it names (assuming that postmodernists are actually concerned with
nihilism).
Regards
Giles
"Hey Johnny, what are you rebelling against?
What ya got?"
u...@nadaredhotant.com
> <u...@NADAredhotant.com> wrote in message
> news:B67EACC1.19B96%u...@NADAredhotant.com...
>
> Ned:
[snip]
Extraordinary, isn't it. The earth's freedom is the freedom from having to
bear life, though, so not quite Eden, at least not the Genesis version. The
bit that really intrigues me is the man 'a little weaker' than all the rest.
Weaker how? Not able to face going on? Perhaps, but this doesn't quite seem
like suicide. The best I have come up with so far is that he is weaker than
the rest in not being able to resist the temptation or desire to do it; he
is not quite self-denying enough to not destroy life and free the earth.
> Ned
Regards
Giles
ale...@my-deja.com
has beaten me to it ;)
ale...@my-deja.com
post.... But I _was_ thinking about the futility of the project of
modernity, the sort of hegemonic (and sometimes downright tyrannical)
regime imposed upon a generalised mass - inevitably, some groups will
marginalised, as we seen in the case of women in the post French
Revolution era: equality, liberty and fraternity, the social contract
between men, and the replacement of one dominant regime (patriarchy) to
another (paternalism).....
ale...@my-deja.com
g...@panix.com (G*rd*n) wrote:
> ale...@my-deja.com:
> | Don't worry about this man - an insult in reference to grammar or
> | spelling usually indicates the poster's inability to come up with a
> | sound argument against the content.
>
> It wasn't ungrammatical or meaningless anyway, although if I
> were an English teacher I might suggest recasting it to make
> it easier for the casual reader to grasp. There are a lot
> of extremely casual readers out there.
>
>
> }"{ G*rd*n }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
> { http://www.etaoin.com | latest new material 12/21/0 <-adv't
>
ale...@my-deja.com
and I was writing in appreciation of your methodology! ;)
Ned Ludd
>
>"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
>| ...
>| When Joyce cannot comprehend a pomo society that is genocidal and
>| loves Mozart, isn't the myth of Eden alive and well in pomo?
>| ...
>
> On the other hand we pussycats, we softies, can't stomach a
> little genocide, a little mass murder, unlike so many of our
> elders, including some _very_ recent ones. All roads lead to
> Rome, so we wander in the woods. Something must have happened.
> What was it?
>
> http://members.aa.net/~urizen/mhh/mhh.html
>
"How do you know but ev'ry Bird that cuts the airy way,
Is an immense world of delight, clos'd by your senses five?"
OK, pick a date. I was thinking back. When did genocide become
Absolutely Forbidden? Christ? Except that tons of Christians were
heavy exterminators well into modern times. (Some still are.)
Still, pick a date. Then offer undeniable evidence that it is
wrong and there is an earlier (or later) one.
How about... oh, let's agree with Joyce... and pick... how about...
The Nuremberg War Crimes trials, November, 1945?
Ned
G*rd*n
| > don't. I wish it had. We need something to sprinkle on the
| > great leaders and heroes the next time they get restless and
| > start grunting.
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| All the witch-hunts for war-crimes criminals? - Can we tip our hat
| to pomo for these? (In the past these were never a problem because
| the conquered state was always taken over and any possible claimants
| to future redress were exterminated.)
I would say the war-criminal thing is another example of
attempting to clean up human life and make it orderly -- a
project which seems pretty Modernist to me. A postmodern
acceptance of polysemy and contradiction would lead one to
expect that if one had a war, atrocities as well as idealism
would be part of the story. _War_ itself would be the other
side of _peace_, both states of the State in which the
fundamental atrocities of death and domination inhere.
| Does pomo prevent "Heil Hitler" from being said too loudly in
| many quarters nowadays? Try to say it here and see what happens.
| ...
I was speaking metaphorically.
G*rd*n
| >| ...
| >| When Joyce cannot comprehend a pomo society that is genocidal and
| >| loves Mozart, isn't the myth of Eden alive and well in pomo?
| >| ...
G*rd*n:
| > On the other hand we pussycats, we softies, can't stomach a
| > little genocide, a little mass murder, unlike so many of our
| > elders, including some _very_ recent ones. All roads lead to
| > Rome, so we wander in the woods. Something must have happened.
| > What was it?
| >
| > http://members.aa.net/~urizen/mhh/mhh.html
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| "How do you know but ev'ry Bird that cuts the airy way,
| Is an immense world of delight, clos'd by your senses five?"
|
|
| OK, pick a date. I was thinking back. When did genocide become
| Absolutely Forbidden? Christ? Except that tons of Christians were
| heavy exterminators well into modern times. (Some still are.)
|
| Still, pick a date. Then offer undeniable evidence that it is
| wrong and there is an earlier (or later) one.
|
| How about... oh, let's agree with Joyce... and pick... how about...
| The Nuremberg War Crimes trials, November, 1945?
(Dates approximate)
in 1850 -- British given free pass for partially
exterminating Irish.
to 1900 -- US, Argentina given free passes for exterminating
Indians.
to 1900 -- King Leopold of Belgium given free pass for
partially exterminating Congolese, although a few
people make nasty remarks.
1915 -- Turks strongly deprecated for Armenian genocide.
Both the events themselves and the way they're
spoken of are tied to World War I. Trials of
perps were threatened but never materialized.
Ned Ludd
G*rd*n wrote:
|> Think pomo has undermined phrases like "Heil Hitler"? I
|> don't. I wish it had. We need something to sprinkle on the
|> great leaders and heroes the next time they get restless and
|> start grunting.
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| All the witch-hunts for war-crimes criminals? - Can we tip our hat
| to pomo for these? (In the past these were never a problem because
| the conquered state was always taken over and any possible claimants
| to future redress were exterminated.)
G*rd*n:
> I would say the war-criminal thing is another example of
> attempting to clean up human life and make it orderly -- a
> project which seems pretty Modernist to me. A postmodern
> acceptance of polysemy and contradiction would lead one to
> expect that if one had a war, atrocities as well as idealism
> would be part of the story. _War_ itself would be the other
> side of _peace_, both states of the State in which the
> fundamental atrocities of death and domination inhere.
>
When DOESN'T pomo have an "acceptance of polysemy"? I have felt
that Political Correctness (in all its pejorativeness) is a direct
result of pomo. If you are suggesting that pomo would tolerate
genocide more than modernism, then why have we seen the reverse?
Modernists "cleaned up" the language in their own peculiar way,
striving, imo, for more exactness and precision. Postmodernists
are "cleaning up" the language in an entirely different way, with
purge lists of proscribed words, and forbidden ways of speaking.
Ned
Ned Ludd
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
|> When Joyce cannot comprehend a pomo society that is genocidal and
|> loves Mozart, isn't the myth of Eden alive and well in pomo?
G*rd*n:
|> On the other hand we pussycats, we softies, can't stomach a
|> little genocide, a little mass murder, unlike so many of our
|> elders, including some _very_ recent ones. All roads lead to
|> Rome, so we wander in the woods. Something must have happened.
|> What was it?
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| OK, pick a date. I was thinking back. When did genocide become
| Absolutely Forbidden? Christ? Except that tons of Christians were
| heavy exterminators well into modern times. (Some still are.)
| Still, pick a date. Then offer undeniable evidence that it is
| wrong and there is an earlier (or later) one.
| How about... oh, let's agree with Joyce... and pick... how about...
| The Nuremberg War Crimes trials, November, 1945?
G*rd*n:
> (Dates approximate)
> in 1850 -- British given free pass for partially
> exterminating Irish.
> to 1900 -- US, Argentina given free passes for exterminating
> Indians.
> to 1900 -- King Leopold of Belgium given free pass for
> partially exterminating Congolese, although a few
> people make nasty remarks.
> 1915 -- Turks strongly deprecated for Armenian genocide.
> Both the events themselves and the way they're
> spoken of are tied to World War I. Trials of
> perps were threatened but never materialized.
>
Does "strongly deprecated" qualify as a first instance of the
prohibition of genocide? Stalin got a free pass to exterminate
tens of millions of Russians, including the starving to death
of three million of his fellow Georgians.
Maybe there is no change, and all this is just Pax Americana
hiding its own global brutality under a cloak of moral outrage
at other nations' genocides.
Ned
G*rd*n
| |> Think pomo has undermined phrases like "Heil Hitler"? I
| |> don't. I wish it had. We need something to sprinkle on the
| |> great leaders and heroes the next time they get restless and
| |> start grunting.
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| | All the witch-hunts for war-crimes criminals? - Can we tip our hat
| | to pomo for these? (In the past these were never a problem because
| | the conquered state was always taken over and any possible claimants
| | to future redress were exterminated.)
G*rd*n:
| > I would say the war-criminal thing is another example of
| > attempting to clean up human life and make it orderly -- a
| > project which seems pretty Modernist to me. A postmodern
| > acceptance of polysemy and contradiction would lead one to
| > expect that if one had a war, atrocities as well as idealism
| > would be part of the story. _War_ itself would be the other
| > side of _peace_, both states of the State in which the
| > fundamental atrocities of death and domination inhere.
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| When DOESN'T pomo have an "acceptance of polysemy"? I have felt
| that Political Correctness (in all its pejorativeness) is a direct
| result of pomo. If you are suggesting that pomo would tolerate
| genocide more than modernism, then why have we seen the reverse?
I don't know if poMo would tolerate genocide more readily
than Mo. My idea was that poMo would not expect to have
clean bombs and clean wars. Political Correctness is
generally an academic, that is, authoritarian response to
multiculti, so I don't think you should blame poMo for it.
You didn't see it in 1955 because everyone was White and
all right, etc. That is, the multiculti came about because
they let _Them_ in.
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| Modernists "cleaned up" the language in their own peculiar way,
| striving, imo, for more exactness and precision. Postmodernists
| are "cleaning up" the language in an entirely different way, with
| purge lists of proscribed words, and forbidden ways of speaking.
I think that's very funny. Well, the more the merrier.
Maybe we'll get back to the dense, humid sexuality of the
Victorians, that made them too shy to refer to people's legs
at all, and covered the legs of tables with skirts, only now
you won't be able to refer to _anything_human_. How about
we all take the veil?
But can we call what Judith Butler does "cleaning up"?
G*rd*n
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| Does "strongly deprecated" qualify as a first instance of the
| prohibition of genocide? Stalin got a free pass to exterminate
| tens of millions of Russians, including the starving to death
| of three million of his fellow Georgians.
Oh, no, the Communists in general and Stalin in particular
were roundly abused at length. No free pass for them. In
fact, it's my impression that in several cases their tickets
were punched more than once. We're talking about rhetoric
here, right? Not many war criminals actually get punished.
I'd say by 1920, genocide is no longer considered okay,
even though people are still going to do it _more_than_
_ever_.
And what happened in between 1900 and 1920? Modernism,
World War I, Bolshevism, Kitty Hawk, Ford, all that.
| Maybe there is no change, and all this is just Pax Americana
| hiding its own global brutality under a cloak of moral outrage
| at other nations' genocides.
That would be a pretty old story. But the U.S., as far as I
know, isn't trying to exterminate any populations -- just
exploit them.
James Whitehead
>side of _peace_, both states of the State in which the
>fundamental atrocities of death and domination inhere.
Isn't War a product of the state, and isn't the refinement of the state
with its ideologies and hierarchies a modernist construct. Atrocities
death and domination seem to continue regardless of politicians
signatures on treaties. I had an aunt who drove a crane in the last
war - she enjoyed this and the money - but was fired as soon a peace
broke out and the *men* returned home needing *real* jobs.
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
>I'd say by 1920, genocide is no longer considered okay,
>even though people are still going to do it _more_than_
>_ever_.
Some very bad things were done to Australian aborigines around this
time? In the name of civilization.
--
James Whitehead
Ned Ludd
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| Does "strongly deprecated" qualify as a first instance of the
| prohibition of genocide? Stalin got a free pass to exterminate
| tens of millions of Russians, including the starving to death
| of three million of his fellow Georgians.
G*rd*n:
> Oh, no, the Communists in general and Stalin in particular
> were roundly abused at length. No free pass for them. In
> fact, it's my impression that in several cases their tickets
> were punched more than once. We're talking about rhetoric
> here, right? Not many war criminals actually get punished.
> I'd say by 1920, genocide is no longer considered okay,
> even though people are still going to do it _more_than_
> _ever_.
>
We've been killing war criminals at least since Eichmann
was hanged in 1962. So, is it a "new thing"? And is it
the result of pomo?
> And what happened in between 1900 and 1920? Modernism,
> World War I, Bolshevism, Kitty Hawk, Ford, all that.
>
I'm sure there has always be 'rhetoric' against genocide.
The Edda contains many a diatribe against the genocide of
Atli (Attila) and subsequent (fanciful) revenge against him.
But it is now broadly accepted and has become "world policy"
of a sort. Is this the last gasp of Modernism, is it Pax
Americana, or is it pomo?
Ned
Ned Ludd
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| When DOESN'T pomo have an "acceptance of polysemy"? I have felt
| that Political Correctness (in all its pejorativeness) is a direct
| result of pomo. If you are suggesting that pomo would tolerate
| genocide more than modernism, then why have we seen the reverse?
G*rd*n:
> I don't know if poMo would tolerate genocide more readily
> than Mo. My idea was that poMo would not expect to have
> clean bombs and clean wars. Political Correctness is
> generally an academic, that is, authoritarian response to
> multiculti, so I don't think you should blame poMo for it.
> You didn't see it in 1955 because everyone was White and
> all right, etc. That is, the multiculti came about because
> they let _Them_ in.
>
If PC is a result of multiculti, and multiculti is a result
of pomo, why can't I blame pomo for PC?
Ned
G*rd*n
| | When DOESN'T pomo have an "acceptance of polysemy"? I have felt
| | that Political Correctness (in all its pejorativeness) is a direct
| | result of pomo. If you are suggesting that pomo would tolerate
| | genocide more than modernism, then why have we seen the reverse?
|
| G*rd*n:
| > I don't know if poMo would tolerate genocide more readily
| > than Mo. My idea was that poMo would not expect to have
| > clean bombs and clean wars. Political Correctness is
| > generally an academic, that is, authoritarian response to
| > multiculti, so I don't think you should blame poMo for it.
| > You didn't see it in 1955 because everyone was White and
| > all right, etc. That is, the multiculti came about because
| > they let _Them_ in.
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| If PC is a result of multiculti, and multiculti is a result
| of pomo, why can't I blame pomo for PC?
You can if you want. I would prefer to blame the
fundamental authoritarianism which is its main source
of energy, whereas multiculti is just the thing the
energy bumps up against.
Ned Ludd
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
> When DOESN'T pomo have an "acceptance of polysemy"? I have felt
> that Political Correctness (in all its pejorativeness) is a direct
> result of pomo. If you are suggesting that pomo would tolerate
> genocide more than modernism, then why have we seen the reverse?
G*rd*n:
> I don't know if poMo would tolerate genocide more readily
> than Mo. My idea was that poMo would not expect to have
> clean bombs and clean wars. Political Correctness is
> generally an academic, that is, authoritarian response to
> multiculti, so I don't think you should blame poMo for it.
> You didn't see it in 1955 because everyone was White and
> all right, etc. That is, the multiculti came about because
> they let _Them_ in.
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| If PC is a result of multiculti, and multiculti is a result
| of pomo, why can't I blame pomo for PC?
G*rd*n:
> You can if you want. I would prefer to blame the
> fundamental authoritarianism which is its main source
> of energy, whereas multiculti is just the thing the
> energy bumps up against.
>
OK. Perhaps PC and anti-genocide is just the result of
multinational corporations needing more and larger markets
to dump their goods.
Ned
ale...@my-deja.com
I've just finished emptying the entire contents of our house into a 20
ft metal cube, so don't blame me if this sounds incoherent....
To my thinking, PC (not personal computers!!!) has more to do with the
creation and edification of a morality code. It is ineffective in the
sense it has more to do with "playing" with languages than "actual"
political activism.
HOWEVER, to call PC as a form of silencing is initself a suspect, as it
seems to me to be reluctant to re-think about the various meanings and
implications of a word (or words).
Hmm, hope that makes sense....
best regards,
Joyce
ale...@my-deja.com
infrastructures of modernity, postmodernism would only be in opposition
to it, rather than an accomplice.
G*rd*n
| > You can if you want. I would prefer to blame the
| > fundamental authoritarianism which is its main source
| > of energy, whereas multiculti is just the thing the
| > energy bumps up against.
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| OK. Perhaps PC and anti-genocide is just the result of
| multinational corporations needing more and larger markets
| to dump their goods.
It's an interesting question. Is capitalism served or
hindered by genocide? Or is it genocide-neutral?
Ned Ludd
Ned:
> When DOESN'T pomo have an "acceptance of polysemy"? I have felt
> that Political Correctness (in all its pejorativeness) is a direct
> result of pomo. If you are suggesting that pomo would tolerate
> genocide more than modernism, then why have we seen the reverse?
> Modernists "cleaned up" the language in their own peculiar way,
> striving, imo, for more exactness and precision. Postmodernists
> are "cleaning up" the language in an entirely different way, with
> purge lists of proscribed words, and forbidden ways of speaking.
Joyce:
> I've just finished emptying the entire contents of our house into
> a 20 ft metal cube, so don't blame me if this sounds incoherent...
> To my thinking, PC (not personal computers!!!) has more to do with
> the creation and edification of a morality code. It is ineffective
> in the sense it has more to do with "playing" with languages than
> "actual" political activism.
>
It gets people fired. Really and truly. It looks like a cabinet
nominee is not going to get her apppointment because once, many years
ago, she referred to slavery in a non-negative light when discussing
the subject of 'States Rights'. PC is very much a tool of political
activism, imo.
> HOWEVER, to call PC as a form of silencing is in itself a suspect,
> as it seems to me to be reluctant to re-think about the various
> meanings and implications of a word (or words).
>
If you're saying PC forces us to examine the meaning and
implication of words, fine. When it predictably gets people fired,
then it becomes a powerful tool with vast political and social
dimensions.
Ned
(Hope the move went well.)
Ned Ludd
G*rd*n:
|> You can if you want. I would prefer to blame the
|> fundamental authoritarianism which is its main source
|> of energy, whereas multiculti is just the thing the
|> energy bumps up against.
Ned:
| OK. Perhaps PC and anti-genocide is just the result of
| multinational corporations needing more and larger markets
| to dump their goods.
G*rd*n:
> It's an interesting question. Is capitalism served or
> hindered by genocide? Or is it genocide-neutral?
>
Does it (genocide) increase or decrease the wealth of capitalist
institutions? Deep in their black hearts, the capitalists of the
world probably know that their wealth DOES in some way depend on
there being huge numbers of subsistence-level people, scrambling
and scraping to buy the few goods they can afford, and willing
to work for a pittance to do it.
Ned
ale...@my-deja.com
g...@panix.com (G*rd*n) wrote:
> G*rd*n:
> | > You can if you want. I would prefer to blame the
> | > fundamental authoritarianism which is its main source
> | > of energy, whereas multiculti is just the thing the
> | > energy bumps up against.
>
> "Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
> | OK. Perhaps PC and anti-genocide is just the result of
> | multinational corporations needing more and larger markets
> | to dump their goods.
>
> It's an interesting question. Is capitalism served or
> hindered by genocide? Or is it genocide-neutral?
>
> --
>
> }"{ G*rd*n }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
> { http://www.etaoin.com | latest new material 12/21/0 <-adv't
>
ale...@my-deja.com
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> <ale...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:93p0vk$rv$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
>
> Ned:
> > When DOESN'T pomo have an "acceptance of polysemy"? I have felt
> > that Political Correctness (in all its pejorativeness) is a direct
> > result of pomo. If you are suggesting that pomo would tolerate
> > genocide more than modernism, then why have we seen the reverse?
> > Modernists "cleaned up" the language in their own peculiar way,
> > striving, imo, for more exactness and precision. Postmodernists
> > are "cleaning up" the language in an entirely different way, with
> > purge lists of proscribed words, and forbidden ways of speaking.
>
> Joyce:
> > I've just finished emptying the entire contents of our house into
> > a 20 ft metal cube, so don't blame me if this sounds incoherent...
> > To my thinking, PC (not personal computers!!!) has more to do with
> > the creation and edification of a morality code. It is ineffective
> > in the sense it has more to do with "playing" with languages than
> > "actual" political activism.
> >
>
> It gets people fired. Really and truly. It looks like a cabinet
> nominee is not going to get her apppointment because once, many years
> ago, she referred to slavery in a non-negative light when discussing
> the subject of 'States Rights'. PC is very much a tool of political
> activism, imo.
>
that famous (or infamous?) episode - several years back - in the States
about the banning of Mark Twain's books for primary schools, because
they have the "n***er" word in them. Just wondering, how far can we go
in the name of "free speech"? I certainly would not encourage people to
uuse that offensive word in text or speech. Or maybe the kids need to
have some social studies about racism before getting to these terms -
what the heck am I on about?
> > HOWEVER, to call PC as a form of silencing is in itself a suspect,
> > as it seems to me to be reluctant to re-think about the various
> > meanings and implications of a word (or words).
> >
>
> If you're saying PC forces us to examine the meaning and
> implication of words, fine. When it predictably gets people fired,
> then it becomes a powerful tool with vast political and social
> dimensions.
>
> Ned
>
Like Marxism's "correct lineism"? Thank you - the move was ok - now my
Rubicon is cleaning up those 5 yr old dusts ;)
Jo
> (Hope the move went well.)
>
>
James Whitehead
- more to question Ned's critique of PC? from my own experience those
who attack PC are just bigots wishing to defend their bigotry. Should we
ridicule an absurdity from PC then why not ridicule the absurdities of
the establishment.
"Taffy, Paddy, Jock and the girls in the office don't mind do they - if
you ask them - there's no harm in it"
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
Is it? I'm more of the opinion that what appears now as modernity isn't.
That what appears as society isn't. After all we had atrocities and wars
before modernity, modernity delivered these to the masses.
--
James Whitehead
Peter Marendy
"against that sort of distinction between
System which is peculiar to the traditional western
(or even deconstruct!) this dense sentence.
Regards.
PM.
Ned Ludd
Joyce:
>> To my thinking, PC (not personal computers!!!) has more to do with
>> the creation and edification of a morality code. It is ineffective
>> in the sense it has more to do with "playing" with languages than
>> "actual" political activism.
Ned:
> It gets people fired. Really and truly. It looks like a cabinet
> nominee is not going to get her apppointment because once, many years
> ago, she referred to slavery in a non-negative light when discussing
> the subject of 'States Rights'. PC is very much a tool of political
> activism, imo.
Joyce:
> Yes, deployed by the neoconservative right-wings.... But then there was
> that famous (or infamous?) episode - several years back - in the States
> about the banning of Mark Twain's books for primary schools, because
> they have the "n***er" word in them. Just wondering, how far can we go
> in the name of "free speech"? I certainly would not encourage people to
> use that offensive word in text or speech. Or maybe the kids need to
> have some social studies about racism before getting to these terms -
> what the heck am I on about?
>
But people FAMOUSLY use the word 'nigger'. Samuel Jackson has used
that word repeatedly in most of the films I've seen him in in the last
five years (except the last 'Star Wars'). Spike Lee's movies contain
scores of uses of that word.
THAT is what is scary about PC. It not only proscribes certain words
(and gets people fired for using them!) but ALLOWS certain people to use
them, depending on their ethnic qualifications.
Joyce:
>> HOWEVER, to call PC as a form of silencing is in itself a suspect,
>> as it seems to me to be reluctant to re-think about the various
>> meanings and implications of a word (or words).
Ned:
> If you're saying PC forces us to examine the meaning and
> implication of words, fine. When it predictably gets people fired,
> then it becomes a powerful tool with vast political and social
> dimensions.
Joyce:
> Like Marxism's "correct lineism"?
>
With a vengeance.
-----
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone,
"it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you CAN make words mean so
many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be the master -
that's all."
-----
> Thank you - the move was ok - now my Rubicon is cleaning up those
> 5 yr old dusts ;)
>
After a point, the only workable solution is napalm.
Ned
ale...@my-deja.com
useful to reclaim previously derogatory terms - but what I find
problematic is that you cannot use those words in a subversive way
without referring to the original meaning.
> THAT is what is scary about PC. It not only proscribes certain
words
> (and gets people fired for using them!) but ALLOWS certain people to
use
> them, depending on their ethnic qualifications.
>
I guess that's one of the motivations for the sort of "white power"
movements - white people being a "marginal majority", so on and so
forth....
> Joyce:
> >> HOWEVER, to call PC as a form of silencing is in itself a suspect,
> >> as it seems to me to be reluctant to re-think about the various
> >> meanings and implications of a word (or words).
> Ned:
> > If you're saying PC forces us to examine the meaning and
> > implication of words, fine. When it predictably gets people fired,
> > then it becomes a powerful tool with vast political and social
> > dimensions.
> Joyce:
> > Like Marxism's "correct lineism"?
> >
>
> With a vengeance.
>
> -----
> "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone,
> "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."
>
> "The question is," said Alice, "whether you CAN make words mean so
> many different things."
>
> "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be the master -
> that's all."
> -----
Or who is the dominant cultural reader.
> > Thank you - the move was ok - now my Rubicon is cleaning up those
> > 5 yr old dusts ;)
> >
>
> After a point, the only workable solution is napalm.
>
> Ned
>
I'm tempted to declare the house to be biohazard, and to seal it off.
Too bad houses don't come with self-destruction sequences....
Joyce
ale...@my-deja.com
more? ;)
ale...@my-deja.com
lanuage and terms yet at the same time has the sugar-coating effect of
displacing the right to point out and critique the repressive tactics
underlying the derogatory labels.
G*rd*n
| > | > You can if you want. I would prefer to blame the
| > | > fundamental authoritarianism which is its main source
| > | > of energy, whereas multiculti is just the thing the
| > | > energy bumps up against.
"Ned Ludd" <ned...@ix.netcom.com>:
| > | OK. Perhaps PC and anti-genocide is just the result of
| > | multinational corporations needing more and larger markets
| > | to dump their goods.
G*rd*n:
| > It's an interesting question. Is capitalism served or
| > hindered by genocide? Or is it genocide-neutral?
| I think the phrase "World Bank" should be synonymous to genocide....
My impression of the World Bank and similar institutions is
that they just want to make the world safe for Capital --
existing, established Capital -- not exterminate categories
of people.
James Whitehead
conservative party, together with a *little England* mentality. Oh and
the idea of *family* Dad with pipe reading paper, son making model
spitfire, wife washing dishes helped by daughter. Maybe PC covers up
rather than replaces, but at minimum it annoys bigots, which is
something!
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
[...]
>> >Yes, if the society at large is still operating under the
>> >infrastructures of modernity, postmodernism would only be in
>opposition
>> >to it, rather than an accomplice.
James:
>> Is it? I'm more of the opinion that what appears now as modernity
>isn't.
>> That what appears as society isn't. After all we had atrocities and
>wars
>> before modernity, modernity delivered these to the masses.
Joyce:
>James, these are illuminating yet profound sentences, care to delineate
>more? ;)
It appears that wars were common events long ago - there's a quote in
the O.T. to this phenomenon - though it was perhaps more like an annual
bash between local tribes. And the taking of wives etc. which was
probably good for the gene pool? - i think it took place every year
before harvest. Perhaps still echoed in youth culture - football & gang
violence. Further the demands placed on the Israelites to kill all
living things a times in their occupation of Palestine. This is another
issue - but certainly ethnic cleansing is a feature of this occupation.
It made better economic sense to carry the vanquished off to slavery -
so it can be regarded as a sign of a commitment to some God to the
exclusion of profit.
Such is human nature - and always was - but modernity gave it new
technologies - gunpowder, paper and printing - telecommunications and
thermonuclear weapons. World war 2 is an interesting case - of competing
manufacturing systems in which America had to win, a victory for
Fordism. Mass production / mass destruction brought to everyone - even
in the comfort of your own home. In effect modernism gives power but the
underlying stuff of humanity remains the same.
Information turns everything into a virtual world, nothing new is added
self awareness today marks us off from modernity. We have virtual wars,
virtual elections etc. and live in a *modern* world. Modern is one of
any style we can adopt. Whereas society was a structure observed from
outside we no longer have this standpoint...
these are just some impressions ...
--
James Whitehead
Curtiss Leung
<ale...@my-deja.com> wrote in message news:93p16b$ud$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> Yes, if the society at large is still operating under the
> infrastructures of modernity, postmodernism would only be in opposition
> to it, rather than an accomplice.
Doesn't imputing an unequivocally oppositional stance to postmodernism
deny one of the central tenets of its criticisms of traditional philsophical
systems, i.e., that complete and certain knowledge is impossible from
an immanent perspective? For example, doesn't Lyotard dismiss the viability
of grand systems (a la Hegel) and total critiques (a la Marx) and state that
the reality of social knowledge is just on-going friction between
competing specialized vocabularies?
G*rd*n
| ...
| Yes, some people find that sort of identity politics tactics to be
| useful to reclaim previously derogatory terms - but what I find
| problematic is that you cannot use those words in a subversive way
| without referring to the original meaning.
In fact, we can't do any kind of identity-group politics
without referring to the identity as a term of oppression.
In this, identity politics differs from class politics,
because class is a inherently a term of oppression, whereas
"Black", "female", "Gay" and so forth are not supposed to
be -- there's supposed to be something positive about each
category. I think this explains the drift of identity
politics toward particularism and the ease with which it's
coopted and diverted.
u...@nadaredhotant.com
Not if postmodernism is taken as what you suggest - a constant critique,
refusal or undoing of any claim to complete or certain knowledge. Then it
would be an eternal opposition without ever quite occupying the position of
'opponent' (which is a projected mirror image), perhaps rather more
resembling the position of 'self doubt'. Unequivocably equivocal.
But this might still make it an accomplice. Doubt, even self-doubt, is not
independent of certainties, and might even be complicit in producing them
where needed. Joyce's conviction of modernity possibly being an example.
But the ventriloquising of a claim by Marx for 'complete and certain
knowledge' puzzles me. I suspect that it is your contribution, as it isn't
Lyotard's, as far as I know (marxisms, yes, Marx, no). I could well be
wrong, but I haven't come across that in the Lyotard I have read.
So, this leads me to ask how and where does Marx claim or enact a 'total
critique' via 'complete and certain knowledge'?
Regards
Giles
G*rd*n
| >> Yes, if the society at large is still operating under the
| >> infrastructures of modernity, postmodernism would only be in opposition
| >> to it, rather than an accomplice.
Curtiss Leung wrote:
| > Doesn't imputing an unequivocally oppositional stance to postmodernism
| > deny one of the central tenets of its criticisms of traditional philsophical
| > systems, i.e., that complete and certain knowledge is impossible from
| > an immanent perspective? For example, doesn't Lyotard dismiss the viability
| > of grand systems (a la Hegel) and total critiques (a la Marx) and state that
| > the reality of social knowledge is just on-going friction between
| > competing specialized vocabularies?
<u...@NADAredhotant.com>:
| Not if postmodernism is taken as what you suggest - a constant critique,
| refusal or undoing of any claim to complete or certain knowledge. Then it
| would be an eternal opposition without ever quite occupying the position of
| 'opponent' (which is a projected mirror image), perhaps rather more
| resembling the position of 'self doubt'. Unequivocably equivocal.
|
| But this might still make it an accomplice. Doubt, even self-doubt, is not
| independent of certainties, and might even be complicit in producing them
| where needed. Joyce's conviction of modernity possibly being an example.
|
| But the ventriloquising of a claim by Marx for 'complete and certain
| knowledge' puzzles me. I suspect that it is your contribution, as it isn't
| Lyotard's, as far as I know (marxisms, yes, Marx, no). I could well be
| wrong, but I haven't come across that in the Lyotard I have read.
|
| So, this leads me to ask how and where does Marx claim or enact a 'total
| critique' via 'complete and certain knowledge'?
I think it is well to get down to specific authors as you're
doing. "Postmodernism" is an extremely vague term into
which people read whatever they want. On the other hand,
asking for a cite for claims made about Marx is pretty cold
water. I don't think I've ever succeeded in getting one on
Usenet (except in the Marxism newsgroup).
Curtiss Leung
> | Not if postmodernism is taken as what you suggest - a constant critique,
> | refusal or undoing of any claim to complete or certain knowledge. Then
it
> | would be an eternal opposition without ever quite occupying the position
of
> | 'opponent' (which is a projected mirror image), perhaps rather more
> | resembling the position of 'self doubt'. Unequivocably equivocal.
> |
> | But this might still make it an accomplice. Doubt, even self-doubt, is
not
> | independent of certainties, and might even be complicit in producing
them
> | where needed. Joyce's conviction of modernity possibly being an example.
> |
> | But the ventriloquising of a claim by Marx for 'complete and certain
> | knowledge' puzzles me. I suspect that it is your contribution, as it
isn't
> | Lyotard's, as far as I know (marxisms, yes, Marx, no). I could well be
> | wrong, but I haven't come across that in the Lyotard I have read.
> |
I was thinking of Marx's quip that "the ruthless criticism of everything
existing"
being (the intellectual component) of his project, but I don't have a source
for it (it might be apocryphal!). As far as Lyotard attacking such total
critiques,
I was thinking of his essay "Adorno as the Devil" (Telos 19), where, among
other things, Lyotard writes:
It is vain to reinforce composition in the Schoenbergian sense, as it is
vain
to search out the right position from which to struggle in the leftist
sense:
these activities remain inside faith. In a sense, capitalism is stronger
than
these kinds of projects, not because it engulfs them, "co-opts" them, but
rather because it renders them useless, and its deployment is posed
otherwise,
elsewhere. (p. 130)
-----
and a page later:
But one sees that such an analysis, made by Marx-Adorno, is constrained
to produce its antibody, the natural, as that which capitalism comes to
lack.
Capitalism is thought nihilistically, relative to a natural subject. That
is
found in Marx as well. The price paid for the apparatus of representation.
-----
So: if there is no "natural subject" relative to the real "expense and
metamorphosis
of libidinal energy" (Lyotard-ese for the Will to Power?) and Marx suffers
from
this defect---well, you get my drift.
> | So, this leads me to ask how and where does Marx claim or enact a 'total
> | critique' via 'complete and certain knowledge'?
>
I dunno whether he does or not. It seems that Lyotard at the time of his
essay
thought so, though.
Some questions that looking back to this essay raises for me are:
(1) Why should capitalism be, if not natural, neutral?
(2) Lyotard calls use value a "naive concept" and calls for its abandonment.
What is his call but a price--no, make that a *TAX* paid for
representational categories, namely exchange and surplus value?
(3) At the end of the essay Lyotard takes a swipe at Adorno
for leaving unanswered the question of what "affirmative
politics" might be. Why not attack Nietzsche for having
nothing good to say about David Strauss?
u...@nadaredhotant.com
>> <u...@NADAredhotant.com>:
[snip]
>> | But the ventriloquising of a claim by Marx for 'complete and certain
>> | knowledge' puzzles me. I suspect that it is your contribution, as it isn't
>> | Lyotard's, as far as I know (marxisms, yes, Marx, no). I could well be
>> | wrong, but I haven't come across that in the Lyotard I have read.
>> |
>
> I was thinking of Marx's quip that "the ruthless criticism of everything
> existing" being (the intellectual component) of his project, but I don't have
> a source for it (it might be apocryphal!).
No, you are right. He said it and it is a lovely phrase, but I don't see how
that corresponds to 'complete and certain knowledge', quite the reverse if
anything.
> As far as Lyotard attacking such total
> critiques,
Doesn't the sense of 'total' shift here? In your first post you associated
it with 'complete and certain knowledge' - total critique was given as an
example of that. But now it turns out that total critique means a critique
of 'everything existing', no completion or certainty necessary.
The 'critique of everything existing' could also apply to your account of
Lyotard; for instance in your precis of the quotes below. After all, in your
first post, you had Lyotard announce 'the reality of social knowledge is
just on-going friction between competing specialized vocabularies'. That
would be quite total, as critiques go.
> I was thinking of his essay "Adorno as the Devil" (Telos 19), where, among
> other things, Lyotard writes:
>
> It is vain to reinforce composition in the Schoenbergian sense, as it is
> vain to search out the right position from which to struggle in the leftist
> sense: these activities remain inside faith. In a sense, capitalism is
> stronger than these kinds of projects, not because it engulfs them, "co-opts"
> them, but rather because it renders them useless, and its deployment is posed
> otherwise, elsewhere. (p. 130)
> -----
> and a page later:
>
> But one sees that such an analysis, made by Marx-Adorno, is constrained
> to produce its antibody, the natural, as that which capitalism comes to
> lack. Capitalism is thought nihilistically, relative to a natural subject.
> That is found in Marx as well. The price paid for the apparatus of
> representation.
> -----
>
> So: if there is no "natural subject" relative to the real "expense and
> metamorphosis
> of libidinal energy" (Lyotard-ese for the Will to Power?) and Marx suffers
> from this defect---well, you get my drift.
I don't see how any of this involves or leads to an accusation of a claim to
complete and certain knowledge on Marx' part.
I'll leave aside my opinions on the iffyness of Lyotard's reading of Marx
and Adorno.
>> | So, this leads me to ask how and where does Marx claim or enact a 'total
>> | critique' via 'complete and certain knowledge'?
> I dunno whether he does or not. It seems that Lyotard at the time of his
> essay thought so, though.
I don't know this essay - I'll try to find it - but the passages you cite
don't seem to make that accusation. They apparently say that M&A remain
within the 'apparatus of representation', or 'faith' and this constrains
them to produce a 'nature' in opposition to capitalism's nihilism. So, for
Lyotard, their critique is both wrong and useless.
But there is nothing about 'completion and certainty' or 'total critique'
that I can see - if anything the problem must be that the critique is not
total enough, not as total as, say, Lyotard's own, as they don't critique
the 'apparatus of representation'. (Not exactly true, but that is another
matter).
Digressions:
> Some questions that looking back to this essay raises for me are:
> (1) Why should capitalism be, if not natural, neutral?
A good question. Why indeed?
> (2) Lyotard calls use value a "naive concept" and calls for its abandonment.
> What is his call but a price--no, make that a *TAX* paid for
> representational categories, namely exchange and surplus value?
I'm not sure that I follow, but I'll go along with the tone.
> (3) At the end of the essay Lyotard takes a swipe at Adorno
> for leaving unanswered the question of what "affirmative
> politics" might be.
Adorno is quite clear what an 'affirmative politics' might be, it is what he
has a go at Brecht and Sartre about. But there is more than a touch of pot
and kettle in such a comment from Lyotard.
> Why not attack Nietzsche for having
> nothing good to say about David Strauss?
Regards
Giles
u...@nadaredhotant.com
[snip]
> | So, this leads me to ask how and where does Marx claim or enact a 'total
> | critique' via 'complete and certain knowledge'?
>
> I think it is well to get down to specific authors as you're
> doing. "Postmodernism" is an extremely vague term into
> which people read whatever they want. On the other hand,
> asking for a cite for claims made about Marx is pretty cold
> water. I don't think I've ever succeeded in getting one on
> Usenet (except in the Marxism newsgroup).
But it worked (except there wasn't a cite). Must be either my naive charm or
Curtiss' generosity. My money is on the latter.
Giles
G*rd*n
| > | So, this leads me to ask how and where does Marx claim or enact a 'total
| > | critique' via 'complete and certain knowledge'?
G*rd*n wrote:
| > I think it is well to get down to specific authors as you're
| > doing. "Postmodernism" is an extremely vague term into
| > which people read whatever they want. On the other hand,
| > asking for a cite for claims made about Marx is pretty cold
| > water. I don't think I've ever succeeded in getting one on
| > Usenet (except in the Marxism newsgroup).
<u...@NADAredhotant.com>:
| But it worked (except there wasn't a cite). Must be either my naive charm or
| Curtiss' generosity. My money is on the latter.
Yes, this is a historic moment. At least for my little
history.
Curtiss Leung
<u...@NADAredhotant.com> wrote
>
> I'll leave aside my opinions on the iffyness of Lyotard's reading of Marx
> and Adorno.
>
No, no, please! Inquiring minds want to know!
> > But one sees that such an analysis, made by Marx-Adorno,
> > is constrained to produce its antibody, the natural, as that which
> > capitalism comes to lack. Capitalism is thought nihilistically, relative
> > to a natural subject. That is found in Marx as well. The price paid
> > for the apparatus of representation.
> > -----
> >
> > So: if there is no "natural subject" relative to the real "expense and
> > metamorphosis of libidinal energy" (Lyotard-ese for the Will to
> > Power?) and Marx suffers from this defect---well, you get my drift.
>
> I don't see how any of this involves or leads to an accusation of a claim
to
> complete and certain knowledge on Marx' part.
For me it's implicit in Lyotard's charge that the "natural" is what
capitalism
lacks. His charges against Marx/Adorno seems to be these:
(a) one cannot mount the critique of capitalism unless one posits the
categories
of the "natural" in general and the "natural subject" in particular;
(b) Claims that an entity is other than natural when the entity criticized
actually exists are normative claims;
(c) Normative claims must be grounded in certainties for them to hold good.
Now, this is my (mis?)understanding of Lyotard on Marx and Adorno. (a) is
simply a paraphrase of what Lyotard wrote above; (b) and (c) follow (for me)
from Lyotard denigrating tone regarding "natural" predicates. Elsewhere in
the
essay, Lyotard identifies Marx and Adorno's critique with religious motifs,
e.g., "Art is a kind of Christ in its denunciating function," "...the
'radical' religious
function in Marxism covers another operation, perfectly effective in the
most
modern capitalism, and which permits doing much more than 'criticism' allows
for, the operation of revealing the entire society as an economy...as the
expense
and metamorphosis of libidinal energy," "In Marx, as in Freud, the laying
bare of the
economic, of the political and libidinal economy, remains inhibited by a
theology,"
all of which indicate (again, to me at least) that for Lyotard the "natural"
is normative,
and that these normative claims are ascetic ideals.
Now, for me that the ruthless criticism of everything existing (or the
analysis
of commodity fetishism or the economics of surplus value, for that matter)
are attacks on bogus certitudes rather than certidues or aecetic ideals
themselves,
which makes me want to hear know more when you write that:
> But there is nothing about 'completion and certainty' or 'total critique'
> that I can see - if anything the problem must be that the critique is not
> total enough, not as total as, say, Lyotard's own, as they don't critique
> the 'apparatus of representation'. (Not exactly true, but that is another
> matter).
>
> > (2) Lyotard calls use value a "naive concept" and calls for its
abandonment.
> > What is his call but a price--no, make that a *TAX* paid for
> > representational categories, namely exchange and surplus value?
>
> I'm not sure that I follow, but I'll go along with the tone.
>
Let me put it this way: Lyotard himself seems to naturalize capitalism by
turning
it into transformations of the Will to Power. There may be Marxisms that
confute
the concept of use value with dogmas of "only the bare necessities!" or
wearing
hair shirts, but if it doesn't matter whether the use one gets from a
commodity arises
from a need of the stomach or the imagination, isn't it use values that are
manifold
transformations of Will to Power (this is probably the unlovliest
combination of
Marx and Nietzsche on record, but what the hell...)? Marx himself gives a
definite
example of the manifold nature of use value in Ch. 3, Sec 2 of Captial in
his little
parable of the linen weaver who goes to market to sell his goods and then
"being
a man of the old school," buys a bible--from a reprobate who spends the 2
quid
from the linen weaver on drink (not the point of the passage, sure, but I
got a chuckle out of it).
So use values are manifold, realized only in the consumption of the
commodity--no
dreaded "representation" or ascetic ideals here, but the real "expense and
metamorphosis of libidinal energy." What *is* representation, exchange and
surplus
value--and which Lyotard does not mention--is now the suddenly neutral
capitalism,
for which Lyotard says we must give up the "naive" concept of use value. In
other
word, give up our real *doings* for an alledged theoretical sophistication
(I was about
to say *spectacular* sophistication, but I restrained myself).
Ah, this terrible gibberish. Where will it end?
Curtiss
u...@nadaredhotant.com
> I'm taking this out of order; hope no one minds...
Not a lot, but it does confuse some things.
[Giles]
>> I'll leave aside my opinions on the iffyness of Lyotard's reading of Marx
>> and Adorno.
>>
[Curtiss]
> No, no, please! Inquiring minds want to know!
Nah, another time. I'm trying very hard to stick to the subject. (But bits
appear below).
[Curtiss]
>>> But one sees that such an analysis, made by Marx-Adorno,
>>> is constrained to produce its antibody, the natural, as that which
>>> capitalism comes to lack. Capitalism is thought nihilistically, relative
>>> to a natural subject. That is found in Marx as well. The price paid
>>> for the apparatus of representation.
>>> -----
>>>
>>> So: if there is no "natural subject" relative to the real "expense and
>>> metamorphosis of libidinal energy" (Lyotard-ese for the Will to
>>> Power?) and Marx suffers from this defect---well, you get my drift.
[Giles]
>> I don't see how any of this involves or leads to an accusation of a claim
>> to complete and certain knowledge on Marx' part.
[Curtiss]
> For me it's implicit in Lyotard's charge that the "natural" is what
> capitalism lacks.
Ah. Implicit. Of course.
> His charges against Marx/Adorno seems to be these:
> (a) one cannot mount the critique of capitalism unless one posits the
> categories of the "natural" in general and the "natural subject" in
> particular;
Surely not. He does say that M&A bring in the 'natural subject', but not, at
least in the passages you cited, that a critique of capitalism absolutely
requires the 'natural subject'.
> (b) Claims that an entity is other than natural when the entity criticized
> actually exists are normative claims;
Whoa, that is quite a jump. They can be normative claims (e.g. the
unnaturalness of homosexuality), sure, but look at what Lyotard says in your
quote:
> But one sees that such an analysis, made by Marx-Adorno, is constrained
> to produce its antibody, the natural, as that which capitalism comes to
> lack. Capitalism is thought nihilistically, relative to a natural subject.
> That is found in Marx as well. The price paid for the apparatus of
> representation.
The natural in this is not some pre-existing constant, it is something that
Marx-Adorno are 'constrained to produce' - a 'reactive antibody'. The
natural is a figure for 'that which capitalism comes to lack'. From this
passage, it seems that Nature cannot be deduced as normative, as it is
produced as a necessary figure of capitalism's lack by the analysis itself.
Bluntly, Lyotard seems to be saying that to produce a critique of capital as
'lacking' has to produce a figure for that lack, and that for M&A, Nature
takes that place. One might as well suggest that the Unnatural is normative,
as the Natural is produced as its 'antibody'.
That is addressed to the Lyotard passage. I differ from his reading of the
place of nature and the natural subject in M&A, though. For instance,
Adorno's use of the concept of the Natural is highly nuanced and deeply
dialectical. He is entirely capable of describing capitalism as 'natural',
e.g. part of the use of the term 'natural history'. For Marx, well, it is
hard to see a 'natural subject' that is not 'cultural', as for Marx one
could say we are cultural by our nature. For neither could the category of
Nature be described as normative.
> (c) Normative claims must be grounded in certainties for them to hold good.
But there aren't any normative claims, not even, as far as I can see,
implied in the Lyotard quote.
> Now, this is my (mis?)understanding of Lyotard on Marx and Adorno. (a) is
> simply a paraphrase of what Lyotard wrote above;
I don't think it is. Lyotard does not make the category of the natural
essential to the critique of capitalism in the quotes you provided. He says
that M & A failed in their critique of capitalism because they were
constrained to oppose it by the 'natural'. (I don't know the article, so
maybe he says it elsewhere, but not in those quotes. I can see how it might
follow though).
> (b) and (c) follow (for me)
> from Lyotard denigrating tone regarding "natural" predicates.
See below.
> Elsewhere in the essay, Lyotard identifies Marx and Adorno's critique with
> religious motifs,
> e.g., "Art is a kind of Christ in its denunciating function,"
We are back to Nature. Again what is apparently sought is a figure for lack,
not a substantive (or normative) content.
> "...the
> 'radical' religious function in Marxism covers another operation, perfectly
> effective in the most modern capitalism, and which permits doing much more
> than 'criticism' allows for, the operation of revealing the entire society as
> an economy...as the expense and metamorphosis of libidinal energy,"
See below.
> "In Marx, as in Freud, the laying bare of the
> economic, of the political and libidinal economy, remains inhibited by a
> theology,"
Bingo. Lyotard doesn't like 'nature', 'art as christ' etc. not because they
are normative, but because they are positions of negation in relation to
capitalism. They are posits of a lack internal to capitalism, whereas
Lyotard. here at least, sees it as a complete 'economy'. Thus negation is at
best irrelevant (and allegedly takes place inside the economy anyway), in
any case inhibiting and crippled.
> all of which indicate (again, to me at least) that for Lyotard the "natural"
> is normative, and that these normative claims are ascetic ideals.
You'll have guessed by now that I disagree. I just can't see where Lyotard
even approaches saying that about M&A in your quotes.
> Now, for me that the ruthless criticism of everything existing (or the
> analysis of commodity fetishism or the economics of surplus value, for that
> matter) are attacks on bogus certitudes rather than certidues or aecetic
> ideals themselves,
Not attacks on bogus certitudes, surely. Commodity fetishism is not bogus,
but the upshot of concrete experience, for instance.
> which makes me want to hear know more when you write that:
>> But there is nothing about 'completion and certainty' or 'total critique'
>> that I can see - if anything the problem must be that the critique is not
>> total enough, not as total as, say, Lyotard's own, as they don't critique
>> the 'apparatus of representation'. (Not exactly true, but that is another
>> matter).
I don't know what you are after. This is pasted out of context, my original
point was quite simple. In the quotes you posted, Lyotard says that M&A are
wrong in their critique of capitalism and 'pay the price of the apparatus of
representation'. Clearly, Lyotard's own critique of capital, because it does
deal with the 'apparatus of representation' is more thorough, for him at
least.
>>> (2) Lyotard calls use value a "naive concept" and calls for its
>>> abandonment.
>>> What is his call but a price--no, make that a *TAX* paid for
>>> representational categories, namely exchange and surplus value?
>>
>> I'm not sure that I follow, but I'll go along with the tone.
> Let me put it this way: Lyotard himself seems to naturalize capitalism by
> turning it into transformations of the Will to Power. There may be Marxisms
> that confute the concept of use value with dogmas of "only the bare
> necessities!" or wearing hair shirts, but if it doesn't matter whether the use
> one gets from a commodity arises from a need of the stomach or the
> imagination, isn't it use values that are manifold transformations of Will to
> Power (this is probably the unlovliest combination of Marx and Nietzsche on
> record, but what the hell...)? Marx himself gives a definite example of the
> manifold nature of use value in Ch. 3, Sec 2 of Captial in his little parable
> of the linen weaver who goes to market to sell his goods and then "being a man
> of the old school," buys a bible--from a reprobate who spends the 2 quid from
> the linen weaver on drink (not the point of the passage, sure, but I got a
> chuckle out of it).
I have no problem with the manifold and endless possibilities and variations
of use value. It can't be quantified. I suspect that this is what Lyotard
calls 'natural', but I really don't know. Someone has a problem with
nature/culture, but I'm not sure that it is necessarily M&A.
> So use values are manifold, realized only in the consumption of the
> commodity--no dreaded "representation" or ascetic ideals here, but the real
> "expense and metamorphosis of libidinal energy." What *is* representation,
> exchange and surplus value--and which Lyotard does not mention--is now the
> suddenly neutral capitalism, for which Lyotard says we must give up the
> "naive" concept of use value. In other word, give up our real *doings* for an
> alledged theoretical sophistication (I was about to say *spectacular*
> sophistication, but I restrained myself).
Go on, say it.
> Ah, this terrible gibberish. Where will it end?
Oh, it could go on for ages.
> Curtiss
Regards
Giles
Curtiss Leung
Giles: I agree with you vis a vis Adorno and Marx's concepts of nature as
being other than what Lyotard imputes them to be, although we differ on
what Lyotard meant--at least in the essay "Adorno as the Devil.". For me,
Lyotard's attitude towards capitalism in this essay and _Postmodern
Condition:
Report on Knowledge_ seems to be one of bland acceptance. Maybe I
just prefer more strident rhetoric (i.e., Debord) or dialectics straight, no
chaser (Adorno, Marx)? Until you lay hands on the essay (and if it's
easier I could mail or fax it you), there are other points to ponder here:
> > Now, for me that the ruthless criticism of everything existing (or the
> > analysis of commodity fetishism or the economics of surplus value, for
that
> > matter) are attacks on bogus certitudes rather than certidues or aecetic
> > ideals themselves,
>
> Not attacks on bogus certitudes, surely. Commodity fetishism is not bogus,
> but the upshot of concrete experience, for instance.
>
I'm surprised by this. Commodity fetishism is a feature of capitalism, and
surely is an upshot of representation, and by it I simply mean real
activity,
i.e., the production of a use value, appears as its representation in
(exchange)
value, and this is the cloak for exploitation. It's *ubiquitious* because
of
capitalism, and is therefore a feature of our experience, certainly, but it
is
not a necessary feature of our lives. For example, in the states, there
were
the wage and price controls of the 40s and 70s--of course, not what Marx
intended (or Keynes for that matter, probably), but it seems to me that
shows
the constructed, representational status of value/price and the fetishism
that
attaches to it.
----------
> I differ from his reading of the place of nature and the natural
> subject in M&A, though. For instance, Adorno's use of the concept
> of the Natural is highly nuanced and deeply dialectical. He is entirely
> capable of describing capitalism as 'natural', e.g. part of the use of
> the term 'natural history'.
Sure, but for Adorno, a contingent artifact of natural history, don't
you think? Likewise for Adorno, the bourgeois subject is real and
ideological at the same time: such individuals do exist, and the fiction
of their being the constituent elements of society not only pervades
their thoughts and deeds, but exists in the legal and economic fabric
of our society. But just as Hegel's absolute subject was and is not
constituent of reality, neither is the bourgeois subject constituent of
society.
> For Marx, well, it is hard to see a 'natural subject' that is not
> 'cultural', as for Marx one could say we are cultural by our nature.
Yes! Where is it that Marx writes that Human Nature is nothing but
the creation of Human Beings, i.e, we have no fixed essence but in
reproducing and altering our physical world, reproduce and alter
ourselves? A great insight.
--
Curtiss
ale...@my-deja.com
I think it was either Baudrillard, or Jameson, who said something about
contemporary human practice as _consumption_ (of expenditures and
goods) itself. Georg Simmel has argued that consumption may be used to
construct a pseudo-individuality, where the consumer is to blieve that
through the process of consumption, s/he is differentiating him/herself
as an individual. Sort of puts a spin on subcultures, where often the
code of attire is a mark of oppositional position against the
mainstream culture.... Don't know why I'm writing this - the
word "capitalism" must've stirred the shopaholic in me ;)
best regards,
Joyce
u...@nadaredhotant.com
> And the terrible gibberish continues...
>
> Giles: I agree with you vis a vis Adorno and Marx's concepts of nature as
> being other than what Lyotard imputes them to be, although we differ on
> what Lyotard meant--at least in the essay "Adorno as the Devil.". For me,
> Lyotard's attitude towards capitalism in this essay and _Postmodern
> Condition:
> Report on Knowledge_ seems to be one of bland acceptance.
Could well be, but I never said it wasn't. A critique, even a thorough going
one, isn't necessarily opposed to its material. In the quotes, Lyotard was
finding fault with M&A's 'analysis' of capitalism, which was limited and
constrained. So, by implication, his own critique of capitalism is more
total. And in some ways it might be, as he claims to understand 'the entire
society as an economy'.
Critique and criticism are not the same thing, although they might often
work together. I think you misunderstood what I was trying to say - I wasn't
taking Lyotard's side, I was attempting to suggest that the passages you
quoted didn't necessarily say what you said they did, specifically accusing
Marx of claiming 'complete knowledge and certainty'.
[Curtiss]
> Maybe I
> just prefer more strident rhetoric (i.e., Debord) or dialectics straight, no
> chaser (Adorno, Marx)? Until you lay hands on the essay (and if it's
> easier I could mail or fax it you), there are other points to ponder here:
If you have it on disk, then please do email it (remove the NADA in my
address), otherwise, unless you are in the UK, it could be awkward. But
thanks for the offer.
[Curtiss]
>>> Now, for me that the ruthless criticism of everything existing (or the
>>> analysis of commodity fetishism or the economics of surplus value, for
>>> that
>>> matter) are attacks on bogus certitudes rather than certidues or aecetic
>>> ideals themselves,
[Giles]
>> Not attacks on bogus certitudes, surely. Commodity fetishism is not bogus,
>> but the upshot of concrete experience, for instance.
[Curtiss]
> I'm surprised by this. Commodity fetishism is a feature of capitalism, and
> surely is an upshot of representation, and by it I simply mean real
> activity, i.e., the production of a use value, appears as its representation
> in (exchange) value, and this is the cloak for exploitation.
I am surprised by your surprise. Here's a bit of Capital, vol 1, ch 1
(p164-5 in the Penguin edition, the section on commodity fetishism):
"Whence, then, arises the enigmatic character of the product of labour, as
soon as it assumes the form of a commodity? Clearly it arises from this form
itself. The equality of the kinds of human labour takes on a physical form
in the equal objectivity of the products of labour as values; the measure of
the expenditure of human labour-power by its duration takes on the form of
the magnitude of the value of the products of labour; and finally the
relationships between the producers, within which the social character of
their labours are manifested, take on the form of a social relation between
the products of labour.
The mysterious character of the commodity form consists therefore simply in
the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men's own
labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as
the socio-natural properties of those things".
So commodity fetishism arises from the commodity form, and the commodity
form involves a specific social organisation and characterisation of labour.
(Quantification in particular). Commodity fetishism might 'hide'
exploitation, but it is not 'bogus'. It is both a product and reflection of
the social organisation of labour.
Another snippet:
"The sum total of the labour of all these private individuals forms the
aggregate labour of society. Since the producers do not come into social
contact until they exchange the products of their labour, the specific
social characteristics of their private labours appear only within this
exchange".
Do you see what I mean?
[Curtiss]
> It's *ubiquitious* because of capitalism, and is therefore a feature of our
> experience, certainly, but it is not a necessary feature of our lives.
It is as long as the commodity form and the associated social organisation
of labour dominates. One can't simply see through it and make it go away.
[Curtiss]
> For
> example, in the states, there were the wage and price controls of the 40s and
> 70s--of course, not what Marx intended (or Keynes for that matter, probably),
> but it seems to me that shows the constructed, representational status of
> value/price and the fetishism that attaches to it.
This is a rather different issue, but note that wages *and* prices were
controlled. But in any case, although one could say that exchange value is
both constructed (social organisation of labour) and representational (it
represents abstract human labourtime), I don't think that this is quite what
you mean. Exchange value is 'congealed labour-time', Marx insists. Oh and
fetishism is not attached to 'value/price', but to the commodity as a social
form.
[Giles]
>> I differ from his reading of the place of nature and the natural
>> subject in M&A, though. For instance, Adorno's use of the concept
>> of the Natural is highly nuanced and deeply dialectical. He is entirely
>> capable of describing capitalism as 'natural', e.g. part of the use of
>> the term 'natural history'.
[Curtiss]
> Sure, but for Adorno, a contingent artifact of natural history, don't
> you think?
In what sense? Adorno imports the categories of human history into 'Nature'
as well, neither is the pure or originary category.
[Curtiss]
> Likewise for Adorno, the bourgeois subject is real and
> ideological at the same time: such individuals do exist, and the fiction
> of their being the constituent elements of society not only pervades
> their thoughts and deeds, but exists in the legal and economic fabric
> of our society. But just as Hegel's absolute subject was and is not
> constituent of reality, neither is the bourgeois subject constituent of
> society.
I think I probably agree, but what do you mean by 'constituent'?
[Giles]
>> For Marx, well, it is hard to see a 'natural subject' that is not
>> 'cultural', as for Marx one could say we are cultural by our nature.
[Curtiss]
> Yes! Where is it that Marx writes that Human Nature is nothing but
> the creation of Human Beings, i.e, we have no fixed essence but in
> reproducing and altering our physical world, reproduce and alter
> ourselves? A great insight.
All over the place in one form or another. The German Ideology, The
Grundrisse, The Communist Manifesto, Capital, etc..
> Curtiss
Regards
Giles
Curtiss Leung
Regarding the essay, I don't have it on disc, but I'll see what I can
do about scanning it in over the next few days....
> I think you misunderstood what I was trying to say - I wasn't
> taking Lyotard's side, I was attempting to suggest that the passages you
> quoted didn't necessarily say what you said they did, specifically
accusing
> Marx of claiming 'complete knowledge and certainty'.
>
No, I realize that. Apologies if I was somewhat strident.
> I am surprised by your surprise. Here's a bit of Capital, vol 1, ch 1
> (p164-5 in the Penguin edition, the section on commodity fetishism):
>
> "Whence, then, arises the enigmatic character of the product of labour, as
> soon as it assumes the form of a commodity? Clearly it arises from this
form
> itself. The equality of the kinds of human labour takes on a physical form
> in the equal objectivity of the products of labour as values; the measure
of
> the expenditure of human labour-power by its duration takes on the form of
> the magnitude of the value of the products of labour; and finally the
> relationships between the producers, within which the social character of
> their labours are manifested, take on the form of a social relation
between
> the products of labour.
>
> The mysterious character of the commodity form consists therefore simply
in
> the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men's
own
> labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves,
as
> the socio-natural properties of those things".
>
> <snippage>
> Exchange value is 'congealed labour-time', Marx insists. Oh and
> fetishism is not attached to 'value/price', but to the commodity as a
social
> form.
Well, exchange value as it appears in capitalism is not only necessary but
surplus labour time, no? And while I don't dispute that the fetishism of
commodities arises from the commodity form, what is the content of the
fetish; that is, that is fetishized about the commodity? Use value isn't;
it springs from the physical attributes of the commodity and is realized
in the commodity's consumption/use (Marx, p.126 in the same ed.)
It's the commodity's phantom objectivity as an exchange value, (and
a Trojan horse for surplus value) isn't it? Immediately after the passage
you cite, Marx writes (the emphases are mine, of course):
"Hence it also reflects the social relation of the producers to the
sum total of labour as a social relation between objects, a relation
which exists apart from and outside the producers. Through this
substitution, the products of labour become commodities, sensuous
things which are at the same time suprasensible or social. In the same
way, the impression made by a thing on the optic nerve is perceived
not as a subjective exicitation of that nerve but as the objective form
of a thing outside the eye. In the act of seeing, of course, light really
is transmitted from one thing, the external object, to another thing,
the eye. It is a physical relation between physical things.
***As against this, the commodity-form, and the value-relation of
the products of labour within which it appears, have absolutely no
connection with the physical nature of the commodity and the
material relations arising out of this. It is nothing but the definite
social relation between men themselves which assumes here the
fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to
find an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion.
There the products of the human brain appear as autonomous
figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations
both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world
of commodities with the products of men's hands. I call this the
fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon
as they are produced as commodities, the is therefore inseparable
from the production of commodities."
"As the foregoing analysis has already demonstrated, this fetishism
of the world of commodities arises from the peculiar social character
of the labour which produces them."
If the "value-relation of the products of labour" are not in any way
connected to "the physical nature of the commodity and the
material relations relations arising out of this," then the exchange
values within whose network commodities are found form the
content of the fetishism of commodities. Going forward
with this: (now at pp 166-167):
"Men do not therefore bring the products of their labour into
relation with each other as values because they see these
objects merely as the material integuments of homogeneous
human labour. The reverse is true: by equating their different
products to each other in exchange as values, they equate
their different kinds of labour as human labour. They do this
without being aware of it. ***Value, therefore, does not have its
description branded on its forehead; it rather transforms every
product of labour into a social hieroglyphic. ***Later on, men try
to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of their
own social product: for the characteristic which object of utility
have of being values is as much men's social product as is their
language. The belated scientific discovery that the products of
labour, in so far as they are values, are merely the material
expressions of the human labour expended to produce them,
marks an epoch in the history of mankind's development, but
by no means banishes the ****semblance of objectivity possessed
by the social characteristics of labour****. Something which is
****only valid for this particular form of production ****, the
production of commodities, namely the fact that the specific
social character of private labours carried on independently of
each other consists in their equality as human labour, and in the
product, ****assumes the form of the existence of value****,
appears to those caught up in the relations of commodity product
(and this is true both before and after the above-mentioned
scientific discovery) to be just as ultimately valid as the fact
that the scientific dissection of the air into its component parts
left the atmosphere itself unaltered in its physical configuration."
So when you write:
> Commodity fetishism might 'hide' exploitation, but it is not
> 'bogus'. It is both a product and reflection of
> the social organisation of labour.
>
How about instead of "bogus", I substitute the word "ideological"?
> It is as long as the commodity form and the associated social organisation
> of labour dominates. One can't simply see through it and make it go away.
>
Claiming that the act of seeing through it would make it go away would make
us left-Hegelians, no? OTOH, we *can* see through it.
> > Likewise for Adorno, the bourgeois subject is real and
> > ideological at the same time: such individuals do exist, and the fiction
> > of their being the constituent elements of society not only pervades
> > their thoughts and deeds, but exists in the legal and economic fabric
> > of our society. But just as Hegel's absolute subject was and is not
> > constituent of reality, neither is the bourgeois subject constituent of
> > society.
>
> I think I probably agree, but what do you mean by 'constituent'?
>
"Constituent" -> composing, making up, forming the underlying substrate
of, et cetera....So in Kant, the subject is constituent because it construes
the world for all men via the shared categorial appartus; in Hegel, the
subject is constituent because its self-knowledge is absolute knowing
and the stuff of reality itself; in the classical economists, the
(individual
bourgeois) subject is constituent because he (and it is a he) just falls
out of the sky and starts trading with others of his kind....
--
Curtiss
Curtiss Leung
> I think it was either Baudrillard, or Jameson, who said something about
> contemporary human practice as _consumption_ (of expenditures and
> goods) itself. Georg Simmel has argued that consumption may be used to
> construct a pseudo-individuality, where the consumer is to blieve that
> through the process of consumption, s/he is differentiating him/herself
> as an individual. Sort of puts a spin on subcultures, where often the
> code of attire is a mark of oppositional position against the
> mainstream culture.... Don't know why I'm writing this - the
> word "capitalism" must've stirred the shopaholic in me ;)
>
This is interesting--by "consumption" do Baudrillard, Jameson, Simmel
mean purchase or use? The two seem conflated in today's speech
and writing; I suppose each one stipulates something different. As
far as attire being a mark of opposition, it seems a bit...well,
*spectacular*
to me. There. I said it, and I'm not sorry.
--
Curtiss, lousy pro-situ for all usenet to see
ale...@my-deja.com
"Curtiss Leung" <hn...@panix.com> wrote:
> Joyce:
>
> > I think it was either Baudrillard, or Jameson, who said something
about
> > contemporary human practice as _consumption_ (of expenditures and
> > goods) itself. Georg Simmel has argued that consumption may be used
to
> > construct a pseudo-individuality, where the consumer is to blieve
that
> > through the process of consumption, s/he is differentiating
him/herself
> > as an individual. Sort of puts a spin on subcultures, where often
the
> > code of attire is a mark of oppositional position against the
> > mainstream culture.... Don't know why I'm writing this - the
> > word "capitalism" must've stirred the shopaholic in me ;)
> >
>
> This is interesting--by "consumption" do Baudrillard, Jameson, Simmel
> mean purchase or use?
Purchase and use of products, yes.
The two seem conflated in today's speech
> and writing; I suppose each one stipulates something different. As
> far as attire being a mark of opposition, it seems a bit...well,
> *spectacular*
> to me. There. I said it, and I'm not sorry.
> --
> Curtiss, lousy pro-situ for all usenet to see
>
Well, that _is_ what subcultures were striving to aim at - developing
their own formulas and traditions as counter-alternatives to what is
predominantly at hand. You're right in using the word "spectacular",
because it is to a sense, performative - like a social ritual - wearing
the "right" clothing, hearing the "right" music, so on and so forth. A
rather self-defeating stance in a sense, since their own meaning cannot
exist if they are not situated in the specific locale and context from
which they are resisting to.
Joyce
u...@nadaredhotant.com
Curtiss, between us these posts have got lengthy. I know I started it, but
perhaps we should cut down on the quote length.
> Giles:
>
> Regarding the essay, I don't have it on disc, but I'll see what I can
> do about scanning it in over the next few days....
Thanks alot, but don't put yourself out, really. I can track it down, I
just need to find a library that holds Telos.
>> I think you misunderstood what I was trying to say - I wasn't
>> taking Lyotard's side, I was attempting to suggest that the passages you
>> quoted didn't necessarily say what you said they did, specifically
>> accusing Marx of claiming 'complete knowledge and certainty'.
> No, I realize that. Apologies if I was somewhat strident.
No, no, it wasn't that and you weren't anyway. I was just trying to explain
myself, sorry if I sounded snappish in return.
[snip]
>> <snippage>
>> Exchange value is 'congealed labour-time', Marx insists. Oh and
>> fetishism is not attached to 'value/price', but to the commodity as a
>> social form.
> Well, exchange value as it appears in capitalism is not only necessary but
> surplus labour time, no?
No, there is no 'surplus labour time'. Surplus value is the difference
between the exchange value of the commodity (generated by labour-time) and
the amount needed to reproduce the commodity labour, paid as wages in
exchange for the commodity 'labour-time'. Hence surplus value is generated
by unpaid labour. An hour's work produces exchange value X, however in
return for the hour's work, (labour-time being a commodity which I sell, but
over the exchange value of which, like any other commodity, I have no
individual control), I receive Y, where Y<X.
> And while I don't dispute that the fetishism of
> commodities arises from the commodity form, what is the content of the
> fetish; that is, that is fetishized about the commodity? Use value isn't;
> it springs from the physical attributes of the commodity and is realized
> in the commodity's consumption/use (Marx, p.126 in the same ed.)
> It's the commodity's phantom objectivity as an exchange value, (and
> a Trojan horse for surplus value) isn't it? Immediately after the passage
> you cite, Marx writes (the emphases are mine, of course):
Certainly it is not use value, as Marx points out in the passages you cite.
Exchange value and use value are completely separate things (except perhaps
in the case of the commodity labour-time?). For what is fetishised, see my
response below. But the word 'phantom' reduces exchange value to being
somewhat illusory again. Exchange value in some ways IS objective. It is the
index of the labour-time (abstract or homogenised labour) required to
produce something. It is, as Marx points out, the mark of a definite social
relation between men. The 'semblance' is that the commodity somehow
generates its own value (which is it's 'objectivity' in Marx' terms).
I'm not sure if the 'Trojan horse' for surplus value is exchange value per
se. After all, one can imagine a production of commodities in which there
was a straight one to one relation between the exchange value of the
commodity labour-time and the exchange value of the commodities produced by
that labour-time. Thus no surplus value. It wouldn't be capitalism, nor
would it be socialism, but it would still be commodity production. The
Trojan horse would be the way in which labour-time is taken as a commodity
in capitalism, I think, but I could well be wrong.
[snip as we both have the Marx passage to refer to]
[Marx]
> "As the foregoing analysis has already demonstrated, this fetishism
> of the world of commodities arises from the peculiar social character
> of the labour which produces them."
[Curtiss]
> If the "value-relation of the products of labour" are not in any way
> connected to "the physical nature of the commodity and the
> material relations relations arising out of this," then the exchange
> values within whose network commodities are found form the
> content of the fetishism of commodities.
Not quite, I think. Look what Marx says in the analogy - the products appear
as autonomous, endowed with a life of their own. Specifically, in the case
of commodities, they appear to generate their own value (exchange value) and
enter into relations (of equivalence) with other things. The content of
fetishism is not the exchange value of the commodity, because that has a
very real source, but the commodity's apparent ability to value *itself* in
relation to other commodities. Fetishism appears as the attribution of human
qualities to the inanimate.
> Going forward
> with this: (now at pp 166-167):
>
> "Men do not therefore bring the products of their labour into
> relation with each other as values because they see these
> objects merely as the material integuments of homogeneous
> human labour. The reverse is true: by equating their different
> products to each other in exchange as values, they equate
> their different kinds of labour as human labour".
Yes. Exchange value results from 'abstract labour' not individual labour.
Quantitive, not qualitative, hence labour-time. But in doing so, exchange
value marks the social component of individual labour
> "They do this
> without being aware of it.
Hence the appearance of commodity fetishism; exchange value appears to be
independent of individual labour - it has nothing to with the individual
producer (except of course it does in its 'hidden' aspect as the social
character of individual labour).
> ***Value, therefore, does not have its
> description branded on its forehead; it rather transforms every
> product of labour into a social hieroglyphic. ***Later on, men try
> to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of their
> own social product: for the characteristic which object of utility
> have of being values is as much men's social product as is their
> language. The belated scientific discovery that the products of
> labour, in so far as they are values, are merely the material
> expressions of the human labour expended to produce them,
> marks an epoch in the history of mankind's development, but
> by no means banishes the ****semblance of objectivity possessed
> by the social characteristics of labour****.
And what Marx means by the semblance of objectivity is the apparent
self-valuation of commodities, as if exchange value were a property of the
thing, not the social characteristics of labour (homogenised, quantified,
abstract labour-time).
> Something which is
> ****only valid for this particular form of production ****, the
> production of commodities, namely the fact that the specific
> social character of private labours carried on independently of
> each other consists in their equality as human labour, and in the
> product, ****assumes the form of the existence of value****,
I'm not sure why this last bit is emphasised. Exchange value results from
labour-time, labour-time being the equalisation of human labour in
capitalism, and, as above, it marks the social character of private labour.
> appears to those caught up in the relations of commodity product
> (and this is true both before and after the above-mentioned
> scientific discovery) to be just as ultimately valid as the fact
> that the scientific dissection of the air into its component parts
> left the atmosphere itself unaltered in its physical configuration."
>
> So when you write:
>
>> Commodity fetishism might 'hide' exploitation, but it is not
>> 'bogus'. It is both a product and reflection of
>> the social organisation of labour.
> How about instead of "bogus", I substitute the word "ideological"?
Naturally, that depends how you define ideology. If it was something like a
false appearance that arises out of actual conditions, then I might well
agree. This was my point from the beginning, commodity fetishism is not a
bogus certitude because it arises directly from, and as a result of, real
conditions. It is not simply in error, but also tells the truth - in this
case about the social organisation of production and the experience of
commodity production. See the first paragraph of your second Marx quote
above ('Men do not therefore...').
>> It is as long as the commodity form and the associated social organisation
>> of labour dominates. One can't simply see through it and make it go away.
> Claiming that the act of seeing through it would make it go away would make
> us left-Hegelians, no? OTOH, we *can* see through it.
Only intellectually. Experientially it remains. When shopping, do you
experience yourself entering into a social relationship with producers? Look
again at the second passage from Marx you quote above. To those caught up in
commodity production, the 'scientific discovery' that exchange value is
congealed labour-time 'by no means banishes' the commodity's semblance of
objectivity (self-determining value). He emphasises that twice, and adds an
analogy for good measure. Marx presumably includes himself in this
situation.
[snip]
>> I think I probably agree, but what do you mean by 'constituent'?
> "Constituent" -> composing, making up, forming the underlying substrate
> of, et cetera....So in Kant, the subject is constituent because it construes
> the world for all men via the shared categorial appartus; in Hegel, the
> subject is constituent because its self-knowledge is absolute knowing
> and the stuff of reality itself; in the classical economists, the
> (individual
> bourgeois) subject is constituent because he (and it is a he) just falls
> out of the sky and starts trading with others of his kind....
Oh, fine, then I certainly agree. Although the bourgeois subject is *a*
constituent of society - as something which is a part of it and determinate
within it (laws etc), but not a underlying substrate, sure.
> Curtiss
Regards
Giles
u...@nadaredhotant.com
[snip]
> This is interesting--by "consumption" do Baudrillard, Jameson, Simmel
> mean purchase or use? The two seem conflated in today's speech
> and writing; I suppose each one stipulates something different. As
> far as attire being a mark of opposition, it seems a bit...well,
> *spectacular*
> to me. There. I said it, and I'm not sorry.
Yes... You said it. Now stand tall and be proud. Remember you are not alone.
> Curtiss, lousy pro-situ for all usenet to see
Giles, always up for a good derive.
u...@nadaredhotant.com
[snip]
> Well, that _is_ what subcultures were striving to aim at - developing
> their own formulas and traditions as counter-alternatives to what is
> predominantly at hand.
Speak for your own subculture. Some, admittedly short lived and rapidly
turned into consumption, were based rather more on a shifting position of
negation - ugliness, offensiveness, lack (of talent, of values, of definable
stance etc.). Naturally this quickly became a new set of values and
traditions, and thus consumable (ugliness is not a fixed value in
capitalism, after all), but, from Dada on, some subcultures were, initially
at least, based on negation pretty much pure and simple. Been there, done
that, had the haircut (briefly).
> You're right in using the word "spectacular",
> because it is to a sense, performative - like a social ritual - wearing
> the "right" clothing, hearing the "right" music, so on and so forth.
Performative? Yes. Social ritual? not necessarily. You give away something
here - that you identify practices solely in terms of their media
performance. To be sure, these days they become that almost instantly, if
not before. Most even behave that way right from the get go (if not before).
But practices of negation can appear and flicker. Surely you are not naive
enough to consider that any viable oppositional stance should be somehow
pure in itself?
> rather self-defeating stance in a sense, since their own meaning cannot
> exist if they are not situated in the specific locale and context from
> which they are resisting to.
Oh, it turns out that you are. You seem to insist that they should have a
meaning 'of their own' independent of the situation in which they exist.
How, well, modern of you
> Joyce
Giles
Ob books. Greil Marcus, Lipstick Traces, and Naomi Klein, No Logo
ale...@my-deja.com
<u...@NADAredhotant.com> wrote:
> ale...@my-deja.com wrote:
>
> [snip]
>
> > Well, that _is_ what subcultures were striving to aim at -
developing
> > their own formulas and traditions as counter-alternatives to what is
> > predominantly at hand.
>
> Speak for your own subculture. Some, admittedly short lived and
rapidly
> turned into consumption, were based rather more on a shifting
position of
> negation - ugliness, offensiveness, lack (of talent, of values, of
definable
> stance etc.).
Uh oh. Giles has jumped onto the plane of morality.... yes, how deviant
these young rascals are.... diabolical, really....
Naturally this quickly became a new set of values and
> traditions, and thus consumable (ugliness is not a fixed value in
> capitalism, after all), but, from Dada on, some subcultures were,
initially
> at least, based on negation pretty much pure and simple. Been there,
done
> that, had the haircut (briefly).
>
Hmm, perhaps I have been too absolute in defining subculture as the
negation of the predominant cultures. Certainly there are mainstream
cultural products such as manga, pop idols and so on which have been re-
interpreted and revamped with new definitions by the subcultures. In
that case, a merge or cultural collusion [sic?] occurs.
> > You're right in using the word "spectacular",
> > because it is to a sense, performative - like a social ritual -
wearing
> > the "right" clothing, hearing the "right" music, so on and so forth.
>
> Performative? Yes. Social ritual? not necessarily. You give away
something
> here - that you identify practices solely in terms of their media
> performance.
We were talking about Baudrillard, and I was taking cultural practice
and consumption in view of mass media influence.
To be sure, these days they become that almost instantly, if
> not before. Most even behave that way right from the get go (if not
before).
> But practices of negation can appear and flicker. Surely you are not
naive
> enough to consider that any viable oppositional stance should be
somehow
> pure in itself?
>
And surely you are not naive enough to assume questions like that? I
think in one of my old posts somewhere, I talked about subjects as
subject of, and subject to the cultures from which they situate in. So
in that sense, ofcourse it'd be problematic to assume a wholly
consistent and consicious position.
> > rather self-defeating stance in a sense, since their own meaning
cannot
> > exist if they are not situated in the specific locale and context
from
> > which they are resisting to.
>
> Oh, it turns out that you are. You seem to insist that they should
have a
> meaning 'of their own' independent of the situation in which they
exist.
> How, well, modern of you
>
Geez, even intellectual anger is no justifiable reasoning for this
hostility.... hold on, did I owe you $$$ in the past life?
> > Joyce
>
> Giles
>
> Ob books. Greil Marcus, Lipstick Traces, and Naomi Klein, No Logo
>
>
u...@nadaredhotant.com
Oh dear. I should have known it was too late at night to try for playful
boisterousness. Sorry Joyce, really. Still, there was a point in there, so
I'll have another bash (this time bash meaning attempt, not blow).
ale...@my-deja.com wrote:
[Joyce]
>>> Well, that _is_ what subcultures were striving to aim at -
>>> developing
>>> their own formulas and traditions as counter-alternatives to what is
>>> predominantly at hand.
[Giles]
>> Speak for your own subculture. Some, admittedly short lived and
>> rapidly
>> turned into consumption, were based rather more on a shifting
>> position of
>> negation - ugliness, offensiveness, lack (of talent, of values, of
>> definable stance etc.).
>
> Uh oh. Giles has jumped onto the plane of morality
Really? Where? Honestly, where? The first line was a joke - I presumed that
you would have guessed that identity politics aren't my thing. What I was
aiming to point out was that the taking of oppositional positions by
subcultures did not always depend on formulating counter-alternatives. For
some, being oppositional depended precisely on not having
counter-alternatives, but instead shifting across whatever was held to be
bad, worthless, abject, etc. in the 'mainstream' culture, or by attacks on
whatever was held to be of great value in the mainstream, or by detourning
spectacular culture against itself. No counter-traditions or
counter-alternatives involved, terms which do, to me at least, smack rather
more of identity politics.
>.... yes, how deviant
> these young rascals are.... diabolical, really....
And in the heat and put down, my point slipped by. Deviant, surely, suggests
an alternative set of values. I mentioned a shifting position of negation -
no specific or fixed content - at least until it is rapidly seized upon and
turned into part of the spectacle. Maybe we have a clash of terminologies?
For my usage, negation is not just opposition.
>> Naturally this quickly became a new set of values and
>> traditions, and thus consumable (ugliness is not a fixed value in
>> capitalism, after all), but, from Dada on, some subcultures were,
>> initially
>> at least, based on negation pretty much pure and simple. Been there,
>> done
>> that, had the haircut (briefly).
> Hmm, perhaps I have been too absolute in defining subculture as the
> negation of the predominant cultures.
But you didn't. An 'oppositional position', yes; an attempted
'counter-alternative' to what is at hand, yes, but not the, or even a,
negation. But then, I didn't define subculture as that either.
> Certainly there are mainstream
> cultural products such as manga, pop idols and so on which have been re-
> interpreted and revamped with new definitions by the subcultures. In
> that case, a merge or cultural collusion [sic?] occurs.
Really? Surely only if you take the subculture as a separate and distinct
culture, which can then merge or collude with the mainstream. I would have
thought that they (sub and main) were deeply entwined or enmeshed in the
first place, and, yes, often enough competing over the definition of the
same cultural product (unless the product was aimed as subcultural in the
first place. Happens all the time). It is hard to think of a subculture that
wasn't in some sense parasitic upon the 'mainstream'. But that can take many
forms - a rapidly reincorporated redefinition, yes, but also a reworking
which does not replace the 'mainstream' value but comments upon or undoes
it. E.g. put alongside manga and pop idols, Jamie Reid's safety-pinning of
the Queen, Duchamp's LHOOQ or anything from the KLF. Not a proclaimed space
'outside' media culture, but a working on its forms and practices; not a
contest of meanings, but an undoing of the existing one. Doesn't last long,
but still not quite the same thing as an opposition which is exactly the
same as what it opposes.
>>> You're right in using the word "spectacular",
>>> because it is to a sense, performative - like a social ritual -wearing
>>> the "right" clothing, hearing the "right" music, so on and so forth.
>>
>> Performative? Yes. Social ritual? not necessarily. You give away
>> something
>> here - that you identify practices solely in terms of their media
>> performance.
>
> We were talking about Baudrillard, and I was taking cultural practice
> and consumption in view of mass media influence.
I realised that, which was why I stuck in the bit about ugliness (one of
Baudrillard's riffs in Symbolic Exchange and Death, I vaguely remember). But
you didn't just give a version of subcultures in relation to or in view of
mass media or the spectacle (if that was what you had said, I would have
agreed with every word). Instead you offered a definition of subcultures as
something like identity formation through consumption. 'That _is_ what
subcultures were striving to aim at', (emphasis yours). The element I was
disagreeing with was the identity bit -'developing their own formulas and
traditions as counter-alternatives to what is predominantly at hand'. Taking
subcultures as packageable sets of values, meanings and images is precisely
the media view - a version of branding and the more 'deviant' the better.
People make a lot of money from doing just that. I didn't disagree that this
is true of many and eventually (sooner rather than later) of all
subcultures. I'll go further, many subcultures are media creations in the
first palce. I even said so (below), but I will stick by my point that in
this definition of subcultures of yours, you are echoing media culture.
>> To be sure, these days they become that almost instantly, if
>> not before. Most even behave that way right from the get go (if not
>> before).
>> But practices of negation can appear and flicker. Surely you are not
>> naive enough to consider that any viable oppositional stance should be
>> somehow pure in itself?
> And surely you are not naive enough to assume questions like that?
Why do you think I asked, apart from getting a cheap point in - on which
more below? I was surprised, frankly, given what you have said before.
> I think in one of my old posts somewhere, I talked about subjects as
> subject of, and subject to the cultures from which they situate in. So
> in that sense, ofcourse it'd be problematic to assume a wholly
> consistent and consicious position.
Not quite what I meant, although connected. See below.
>>> rather self-defeating stance in a sense, since their own meaning
>>> cannot exist if they are not situated in the specific locale and context
>>> from which they are resisting to.
>> Oh, it turns out that you are. You seem to insist that they should
>> have a meaning 'of their own' independent of the situation in which they
>> exist. How, well, modern of you
> Geez, even intellectual anger is no justifiable reasoning for this
> hostility.... hold on, did I owe you $$$ in the past life?
Intellectual anger? Hostility? I'm sorry that that was how it read (although
I can see how it might. I called you 'modern', after all). It was not
intended. Still, beneath the point scoring there is a serious argument,
honest. Given that I have seen you argue strongly in the past for a
positional, situational and non-universal politics, e.g. about postmodernist
feminism, to find you suggesting that something was 'self-defeating' because
its meaning did not transcend its 'specific locale and context' was a
surprise.
Even if you meant that subcultures' meaning was dependent on that which they
were resisting, which would also obviously be true of my fleeting
negationary subcultures, then this is still a surprising claim from you -
what else could they be? It then reads to me as if you were condemning them
as self-defeating because they could not be more than, or even other to,
their context. You have criticised claims to be such in the past, and do so
again above.
The most unself-contradictory interpretation I have come up with is that you
meant that the attempt to establish an identity ('formulas and
counter-traditions') was self-defeating, because it relied on the social
context. That would more or less fit with the identity politics version of
subcultures you partially outline above, but then falls down because the
traditions are 'counter-traditions' and the position is 'oppositional', thus
not merely different, but opposed. So I remain baffled - why is subculture's
situatedness self-defeating?
Apologetic regards
Giles
By the way, I'll take it in UK pounds. Cash, no cheques.
ale...@my-deja.com
<u...@NADAredhotant.com> wrote:
>
> Oh dear. I should have known it was too late at night to try for
playful
> boisterousness. Sorry Joyce, really. Still, there was a point in
there, so
> I'll have another bash (this time bash meaning attempt, not blow).
>
expression through Internet communication... 'tis quite understandable.
Hmm. Well, the queer communities do like to adopt mainstream popular
cultures (Patsy Stones of AbFab, Madonna, and Kylie Minogue [goddess
forgive me in mentioning that name]) as part of their cultures. Yet the
gays and lesbian people also exhibit a strong sense identity
politics....
>
> >.... yes, how deviant
> > these young rascals are.... diabolical, really....
>
> And in the heat and put down, my point slipped by. Deviant, surely,
suggests
> an alternative set of values. I mentioned a shifting position of
negation -
> no specific or fixed content - at least until it is rapidly seized
upon and
> turned into part of the spectacle. Maybe we have a clash of
terminologies?
> For my usage, negation is not just opposition.
>
Negation as resistance? Denial? I do apologise for the "heat of the
moment" - it couldn't be helped!
You seem to see spectacle as something, um, less positive (scrambling
brain to think of less obstrusive adjective)? I like to think
of "spectacle" in Bahktin's sense - of spectacle of the body, the
subversive acts against the dominant institutions. Of reversing the
power of the gaze and the gazed.
> >> Naturally this quickly became a new set of values and
> >> traditions, and thus consumable (ugliness is not a fixed value in
> >> capitalism, after all), but, from Dada on, some subcultures were,
> >> initially
> >> at least, based on negation pretty much pure and simple. Been
there,
> >> done
> >> that, had the haircut (briefly).
>
> > Hmm, perhaps I have been too absolute in defining subculture as the
> > negation of the predominant cultures.
>
> But you didn't. An 'oppositional position', yes; an attempted
> 'counter-alternative' to what is at hand, yes, but not the, or even a,
> negation. But then, I didn't define subculture as that either.
>
Negation - definitely not in the sense of effacement! _If_ that is how
you interpret it, I am impinging no absolute assumption or statement of
beliefs upon your head ;)
> > Certainly there are mainstream
> > cultural products such as manga, pop idols and so on which have
been re-
> > interpreted and revamped with new definitions by the subcultures. In
> > that case, a merge or cultural collusion [sic?] occurs.
>
> Really? Surely only if you take the subculture as a separate and
distinct
> culture, which can then merge or collude with the mainstream. I would
have
> thought that they (sub and main) were deeply entwined or enmeshed in
the
> first place, and, yes, often enough competing over the definition of
the
> same cultural product (unless the product was aimed as subcultural in
the
> first place. Happens all the time).
Exactly. Take the "underground" culture of S&M, Betty Page (pin-up
model of 1950's bondage queen) and whatnot - previously condemned
as "immoral", are now the darling of those who are "with it". Certainly
there is the element of change of social and political climate and
context - sorry if this is incoherent - my turn to be discumboculated -
just got off the plane...
I'm sorry if you'd interpreted my post in that way. Clearly, mass media
plays a large part in the formation and interaction between sub and
mainstream culture. But other factors, such as political, also come
into play (eg. hip hop).
in terms of audience response and interpretation of mass media
representation, I do not think it is a dominant, linear reading by the
reader of cultural texts.
but, argh, too tired to talk more. I'll resume later. Advice for
everyone who's listening: pack your things in advance. Never try to
bring your cat to the airport. And do NOT allow your family member to
bring sharp objects in their bags.........
u...@nadaredhotant.com
>> Oh dear. I should have known it was too late at night to try for playful
>> boisterousness. Sorry Joyce, really. Still, there was a point in there, so
>> I'll have another bash (this time bash meaning attempt, not blow).
>>
> The e-rasure of the delicate nuances of voice tone and facial expression
> through Internet communication... 'tis quite understandable.
Graceful, ta.
[snip]
>> What I was
>> aiming to point out was that the taking of oppositional positions by
>> subcultures did not always depend on formulating counter- alternatives. For
>> some, being oppositional depended precisely on not having
>> counter-alternatives, but instead shifting across whatever was held to be
>> bad, worthless, abject, etc. in the 'mainstream' culture, or by attacks on
>> whatever was held to be of great value in the mainstream, or by detourning
>> spectacular culture against itself. No counter-traditions or
>> counter-alternatives involved, terms which do, to me at least, smack rather
>> more of identity politics.
>>
> Hmm. Well, the queer communities do like to adopt mainstream popular cultures
> (Patsy Stones of AbFab, Madonna, and Kylie Minogue [goddess forgive me in
> mentioning that name]) as part of their cultures. Yet the gays and lesbian
> people also exhibit a strong sense identity politics....
Oh yes, to be sure. I wasn't making a general definition, but a distinction.
Still, I'd have thought that in the case of Madonna and Kylie, gay icon
status was actively sought by them/their marketing machines, in part to give
them that tinge of 'deviance' in the mainstream - the process of subcultural
reading already anticipated and deployed in the mainstream product.
[snip]
>> And in the heat and put down, my point slipped by. Deviant, surely, suggests
>> an alternative set of values. I mentioned a shifting position of negation -
>> no specific or fixed content - at least until it is rapidly seized upon and
>> turned into part of the spectacle. Maybe we have a clash of terminologies?
>> For my usage, negation is not just opposition.
>>
> Negation as resistance? Denial? I do apologise for the "heat of the moment" -
> it couldn't be helped!
A resistance of a sort, yes, but not denial. Um. Oh hell, I set myself up
for this, didn't I?
How about negation as the 'not X', the contradiction of something? Not a
simple 'no' but the opposite of X. The thing is that 'not X' is not simply
different or just 'nothing' but in a relation of contradiction which shapes
it. As a crude f'rinstance, a mainstream culture values immediate pleasure,
displays of consumption and sexual activity. A not-X might appear as a
stance of boredom, clothing from rubbish and a claim to asexuality. But what
might appear as 'not-X' is clearly determined in its content by X, rather
than by the establishment of another set of values, Y say. (Although it is
entirely possible for Y and X to be in a contradictory and negationary
relation, but I'll leave that aside for now). A disclaimer before I get
jumped all over by irate Hegelians: I'm not offering this as a definition,
just a fragment of description.
> You seem to see spectacle as something, um, less positive (scrambling brain to
> think of less obstrusive adjective)? I like to think of "spectacle" in
> Bahktin's sense - of spectacle of the body, the subversive acts against the
> dominant institutions. Of reversing the power of the gaze and the gazed.
The sense I have been picking up on was the one Curtiss introduced - the
spectacle as found in Situationist work, like Guy Debord's 'Society of the
Spectacle', and that is indeed somewhat less than positive - "The spectacle
subjugates living men to itself to the extent that the economy has totally
subjugated them". It has some kinship with Baudrillard and more so with
Lefebvre. I can't say that spectacle had occurred to me as being a
Bhaktinian concept. It sounds like you are describing Carnival, but that is
participatory rather than spectacular. I'll have to have a reread.
[snip]
>>> Hmm, perhaps I have been too absolute in defining subculture as the negation
>>> of the predominant cultures.
>>>
>> But you didn't. An 'oppositional position', yes; an attempted
>> 'counter-alternative' to what is at hand, yes, but not the, or even a,
>> negation. But then, I didn't define subculture as that either.
>>
> Negation - definitely not in the sense of effacement! _If_ that is how you
> interpret it, I am impinging no absolute assumption or statement of beliefs
> upon your head ;)
Hopefully the bit above has clarified this.
>>> Certainly there are mainstream cultural products such as manga, pop idols
>>> and so on which have been re- interpreted and revamped with new definitions
>>> by the subcultures. In that case, a merge or cultural collusion [sic?]
>>> occurs.
>>>
>> Really? Surely only if you take the subculture as a separate and distinct
>> culture, which can then merge or collude with the mainstream. I would have
>> thought that they (sub and main) were deeply entwined or enmeshed in the
>> first place, and, yes, often enough competing over the definition of the same
>> cultural product (unless the product was aimed as subcultural in the first
>> place. Happens all the time).
>>
> Exactly. Take the "underground" culture of S&M, Betty Page (pin-up model of
> 1950's bondage queen) and whatnot - previously condemned as "immoral", are now
> the darling of those who are "with it". Certainly there is the element of
> change of social and political climate and context - sorry if this is
> incoherent - my turn to be discumboculated - just got off the plane...
Sure - but the 50s S&M was not a separate culture from the mainstream,
rather more of an intensification and explicit statement of what was already
in the mainstream e.g. the polite sadism of Elvgren's pinups. The emergence
of S&M into the mainstream certainly does mark a social change, but it
isn't, I think, the merging or collusion of distinct cultures.
[snip]
>>> We were talking about Baudrillard, and I was taking cultural practice and
>>> consumption in view of mass media influence.
>> I realised that, which was why I stuck in the bit about ugliness (one of
>> Baudrillard's riffs in Symbolic Exchange and Death, I vaguely remember). But
>> you didn't just give a version of subcultures in relation to or in view of
>> mass media or the spectacle (if that was what you had said, I would have
>> agreed with every word). Instead you offered a definition of subcultures as
>> something like identity formation through consumption. 'That _is_ what
>> subcultures were striving to aim at', (emphasis yours). The element I was
>> disagreeing with was the identity bit -'developing their own formulas and
>> traditions as counter-alternatives to what is predominantly at hand'. Taking
>> subcultures as packageable sets of values, meanings and images is precisely
>> the media view - a version of branding and the more 'deviant' the better.
>>
> I'm sorry if you'd interpreted my post in that way. Clearly, mass media plays
> a large part in the formation and interaction between sub and mainstream
> culture. But other factors, such as political, also come into play (eg. hip
> hop).
Yes, certainly, but... I wasn't saying that you saw subcultures as formed
through the mass media (although some are), but that you were taking
subcultures as engaged in identity formation through the assembly and
reinterpretation of signs. That could well include the other factors. An
understanding of a subculture as an identity (or values) articulated through
a set of signs closely parallels the media view - hence the marketing
attempt to get a product incorporated as one of those signs (see Kylie
above).
> in terms of audience response and interpretation of mass media representation,
> I do not think it is a dominant, linear reading by the reader of cultural
> texts.
Hmm, neither is it by mainstream representation.
> but, argh, too tired to talk more. I'll resume later. Advice for everyone
> who's listening: pack your things in advance. Never try to bring your cat to
> the airport. And do NOT allow your family member to bring sharp objects in
> their bags.........
or cats?
[snip]
Regards
Giles
ale...@my-deja.com
what else????]
> > Hmm. Well, the queer communities do like to adopt mainstream
popular cultures
> > (Patsy Stones of AbFab, Madonna, and Kylie Minogue [goddess forgive
me in
> > mentioning that name]) as part of their cultures. Yet the gays and
lesbian
> > people also exhibit a strong sense identity politics....
>
> Oh yes, to be sure. I wasn't making a general definition, but a
distinction.
> Still, I'd have thought that in the case of Madonna and Kylie, gay
icon
> status was actively sought by them/their marketing machines, in part
to give
> them that tinge of 'deviance' in the mainstream - the process of
subcultural
> reading already anticipated and deployed in the mainstream product.
>
prepackaged - you simply add water and stir ;)
> [snip]
> >> And in the heat and put down, my point slipped by. Deviant,
surely, suggests
> >> an alternative set of values. I mentioned a shifting position of
negation -
> >> no specific or fixed content - at least until it is rapidly seized
upon and
> >> turned into part of the spectacle. Maybe we have a clash of
terminologies?
> >> For my usage, negation is not just opposition.
> >>
> > Negation as resistance? Denial? I do apologise for the "heat of the
moment" -
> > it couldn't be helped!
>
> A resistance of a sort, yes, but not denial. Um. Oh hell, I set
myself up
> for this, didn't I?
>
No, I don't think you're doing too badly ;) But I do think that there
is some sort of "scholarly construction" occuring in portraying these
different cultures and people. After all, these groups don't just form
and sit there waiting for the academics to "discover" them. Rather, the
theorists themselves have a lot to do in the framing, shaping, and
bringing into existence of the so-called subcultures.
> How about negation as the 'not X', the contradiction of something?
Not a
> simple 'no' but the opposite of X. The thing is that 'not X' is not
simply
> different or just 'nothing' but in a relation of contradiction which
shapes
> it.
Sort of like intertextuality? Text in relation to another text, but
with different nuances and structure of meaning? Sorry, I'm struggling
here.
As a crude f'rinstance, a mainstream culture values immediate pleasure,
> displays of consumption and sexual activity. A not-X might appear as a
> stance of boredom, clothing from rubbish and a claim to asexuality.
But what
> might appear as 'not-X' is clearly determined in its content by X,
rather
> than by the establishment of another set of values, Y say. (Although
it is
> entirely possible for Y and X to be in a contradictory and negationary
> relation, but I'll leave that aside for now).
Excellent! Yes, not-X as still within the subset of X, its meaning and
trajectories starting from X itself.
A disclaimer before I get
> jumped all over by irate Hegelians: I'm not offering this as a
definition,
> just a fragment of description.
Hey, to paraphrase Feyerabend: the only method which will not inhibit
progress: anything goes! :)
>
> > You seem to see spectacle as something, um, less positive
(scrambling brain to
> > think of less obstrusive adjective)? I like to think of "spectacle"
in
> > Bahktin's sense - of spectacle of the body, the subversive acts
against the
> > dominant institutions. Of reversing the power of the gaze and the
gazed.
>
> The sense I have been picking up on was the one Curtiss introduced -
the
> spectacle as found in Situationist work, like Guy Debord's 'Society
of the
> Spectacle', and that is indeed somewhat less than positive - "The
spectacle
> subjugates living men to itself to the extent that the economy has
totally
> subjugated them". It has some kinship with Baudrillard and more so
with
> Lefebvre. I can't say that spectacle had occurred to me as being a
> Bhaktinian concept. It sounds like you are describing Carnival, but
that is
> participatory rather than spectacular. I'll have to have a reread.
>
And that Debord's article sounds interesting - where can I find it? In
terms of carnival, I see it as a way for the performer/subject of
spectacle to reverse the power relation of the gaze... sort of... will
go back to think about that one.
> [snip]
> > Negation - definitely not in the sense of effacement! _If_ that is
how you
> > interpret it, I am impinging no absolute assumption or statement of
beliefs
> > upon your head ;)
>
> Hopefully the bit above has clarified this.
>
Yup, thanks.
[snippy-doo]
> > Exactly. Take the "underground" culture of S&M, Betty Page (pin-up
model of
> > 1950's bondage queen) and whatnot - previously condemned
as "immoral", are now
> > the darling of those who are "with it". Certainly there is the
element of
> > change of social and political climate and context - sorry if this
is
> > incoherent - my turn to be discumboculated - just got off the
plane...
>
> Sure - but the 50s S&M was not a separate culture from the mainstream,
> rather more of an intensification and explicit statement of what was
already
> in the mainstream e.g. the polite sadism of Elvgren's pinups. The
emergence
> of S&M into the mainstream certainly does mark a social change, but it
> isn't, I think, the merging or collusion of distinct cultures.
>
Don't worry - looking back, I have no idea what I'm talking about
either!
> [snip]
>
> >>
> > I'm sorry if you'd interpreted my post in that way. Clearly, mass
media plays
> > a large part in the formation and interaction between sub and
mainstream
> > culture. But other factors, such as political, also come into play
(eg. hip
> > hop).
>
> Yes, certainly, but... I wasn't saying that you saw subcultures as
formed
> through the mass media (although some are), but that you were taking
> subcultures as engaged in identity formation through the assembly and
> reinterpretation of signs. That could well include the other factors.
An
> understanding of a subculture as an identity (or values) articulated
through
> a set of signs closely parallels the media view - hence the marketing
> attempt to get a product incorporated as one of those signs (see Kylie
> above).
>
Yes, subcultures can be labelled and confined to the "lower" stratum of
social and economical hierarchies due to social differences of class,
ethnicity, age etc. It's definitely not just all about nightclubbing
teeny boppers (or is that poppers?).
> > in terms of audience response and interpretation of mass media
representation,
> > I do not think it is a dominant, linear reading by the reader of
cultural
> > texts.
>
> Hmm, neither is it by mainstream representation.
>
Exactly. Moral panic.... spare me.
> > but, argh, too tired to talk more. I'll resume later. Advice for
everyone
> > who's listening: pack your things in advance. Never try to bring
your cat to
> > the airport. And do NOT allow your family member to bring sharp
objects in
> > their bags.........
>
> or cats?
>
Oh, the cat escaped before I even put her in the cage. And as for sharp
objects... nevermind....
> [snip]
>
> Regards
>
> Giles
u...@nadaredhotant.com
[snipping snipped]
>>> Oh yes, to be sure. I wasn't making a general definition,
>>> but a distinction. Still, I'd have thought that in the case of Madonna and
>>> Kylie, gay icon status was actively sought by them/their marketing machines,
>>> in part to give them that tinge of 'deviance' in the mainstream - the
>>> process of subcultural reading already anticipated and deployed in the
>>> mainstream product.
> Well said. A market produced oppositional reading - preplanned and prepackaged
> - you simply add water and stir ;)
Oppositional?
[snip]
>> A resistance of a sort, yes, but not denial. Um. Oh hell, I set myself up for
>> this, didn't I?
>>
> No, I don't think you're doing too badly ;) But I do think that there is some
> sort of "scholarly construction" occuring in portraying these different
> cultures and people. After all, these groups don't just form and sit there
> waiting for the academics to "discover" them. Rather, the theorists themselves
> have a lot to do in the framing, shaping, and bringing into existence of the
> so-called subcultures.
Au contraire. I suspect that most, quite rightly, couldn't give a monkey's
about the academics.
>> How about negation as the 'not X', the contradiction of something? Not a
>> simple 'no' but the opposite of X. The thing is that 'not X' is not simply
>> different or just 'nothing' but in a relation of contradiction which shapes
>> it.
> Sort of like intertextuality? Text in relation to another text, but with
> different nuances and structure of meaning? Sorry, I'm struggling here.
Interrelation, but not just reference.
>> As a crude f'rinstance, a mainstream culture values immediate pleasure,
>> displays of consumption and sexual activity. A not-X might appear as a stance
>> of boredom, clothing from rubbish and a claim to asexuality. But what might
>> appear as 'not-X' is clearly determined in its content by X, rather than by
>> the establishment of another set of values, Y say. (Although it is entirely
>> possible for Y and X to be in a contradictory and negationary relation, but
>> I'll leave that aside for now).
>
> Excellent! Yes, not-X as still within the subset of X, its meaning and
> trajectories starting from X itself.
Nearly. It exists as the negation of X, and so it's specific content,
meanings etc. are determined by the relation to X, one of contradiction.
> >A disclaimer before I get jumped all over by irate Hegelians: I'm not
>> offering this as a definition, just a fragment of description.
>
> Hey, to paraphrase Feyerabend: the only method which will not inhibit
> progress: anything goes! :)
Progress?
[snipette]
>> The sense I have been picking up on was the one Curtiss introduced - the
>> spectacle as found in Situationist work, like Guy Debord's 'Society of the
>> Spectacle', and that is indeed somewhat less than positive - "The spectacle
>> subjugates living men to itself to the extent that the economy has totally
>> subjugated them". It has some kinship with Baudrillard and more so with
>> Lefebvre. I can't say that spectacle had occurred to me as being a Bhaktinian
>> concept. It sounds like you are describing Carnival, but that is
>> participatory rather than spectacular. I'll have to have a reread.
> And that Debord's article sounds interesting - where can I find it? In terms
> of carnival, I see it as a way for the performer/subject of spectacle to
> reverse the power relation of the gaze... sort of... will go back to think
> about that one.
Society of the Spectacle is a book written in 1967. It should be pretty easy
to get your hands on it. Go for the deliberately non-copyrighted versions
(mine's from Rebel Press), not Zone Book's scandalously copyrighted one.
There is also his later 'Comments on the Society of the Spectacle' from 1988
(trans. Verso 1991). You could try Lefebrve's 'Introduction to Modernity' or
'Critique of Everyday Life' as well.
[snip]
> Oh, the cat escaped before I even put her in the cage. And as for sharp
> objects... nevermind....
I've been kept away from sharp objects for years, so I wouldn't know.
Regards
Giles
ale...@my-deja.com
>
> > Well said. A market produced oppositional reading - preplanned and
prepackaged
> > - you simply add water and stir ;)
>
> Oppositional?
Hmm, now's my term to explain - oppositional in the sense that as soon
as there is a subversive movement or practice, it is immediately
adopted by the mainstream cultural-manufacturing machine to replicate
that deviancy for mass-consumption.
>
> [snip]
>
> >> A resistance of a sort, yes, but not denial. Um. Oh hell, I set
myself up for
> >> this, didn't I?
> >>
> > No, I don't think you're doing too badly ;) But I do think that
there is some
> > sort of "scholarly construction" occuring in portraying these
different
> > cultures and people. After all, these groups don't just form and
sit there
> > waiting for the academics to "discover" them. Rather, the theorists
themselves
> > have a lot to do in the framing, shaping, and bringing into
existence of the
> > so-called subcultures.
>
> Au contraire. I suspect that most, quite rightly, couldn't give a
monkey's
> about the academics.
>
For some strange reason, I'd like to know what you think about the
notion of "author function" - you know, the sort of authentication and
founding of a knowledge or discipline through the labelling of big
names: Woolfian stream-of-consciousness, Foucauldian theories,
Newtonian physics, Wuist system of raving (kidding...). Are we reading
these texts (or told to) because they are socially accepted "great
Works" rather than because we find them relevant to our way of thinking
and specific purposes?
[snippy snap]
> > Hey, to paraphrase Feyerabend: the only method which will not
inhibit
> > progress: anything goes! :)
>
> Progress?
>
Well, he is a scientist, hence the word choice. But you will like his
book, _Against Method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge_
(1975). Here's what he say about science: "...'Western thought', far
from being a lonely peak of human development, is troubled by problems
not found in other ideologies - but they exclude science from their
relativization of all forms of thought. Even for them science is a
_neutral structure_ containing _positive language_ that is independent
of culture, ideology, prejudice" (Feyerabend, 1975, p.302).
[snip of the snipette]
> Society of the Spectacle is a book written in 1967. It should be
pretty easy
> to get your hands on it. Go for the deliberately non-copyrighted
versions
> (mine's from Rebel Press), not Zone Book's scandalously copyrighted
one.
> There is also his later 'Comments on the Society of the Spectacle'
from 1988
> (trans. Verso 1991). You could try Lefebrve's 'Introduction to
Modernity' or
> 'Critique of Everyday Life' as well.
>
[face paling] Umm, I'll try.... it's just that everytime I venture into
a newsgroup, my reading list quadruples. They should make surgical
implantations of books - insert micro-chips of the texts into your
brain for immediate reading and comprehension.
[snippe]
>
> I've been kept away from sharp objects for years, so I wouldn't know.
>
Voluntarily or legally imposed? ;)
u...@nadaredhotant.com
> [snippers]
>
>>> Well said. A market produced oppositional reading - preplanned and
>>> prepackaged - you simply add water and stir ;)
>>>
>> Oppositional?
>>
> Hmm, now's my term to explain - oppositional in the sense that as soon as
> there is a subversive movement or practice, it is immediately adopted by the
> mainstream cultural-manufacturing machine to replicate that deviancy for
> mass-consumption.
Well, yes. I've said that a few times. I was just wondering why 'queer
culture' was necessarily 'oppositional'. But forget it.
[sneeep]
>> Au contraire. I suspect that most, quite rightly, couldn't give a monkey's
>> about the academics.
> For some strange reason, I'd like to know what you think about the notion of
> "author function" - you know, the sort of authentication and founding of a
> knowledge or discipline through the labelling of big names:
Umm, the 'author function', for Foucault, which is where I presume you got
that term from, is not straightforwardly the authentication and founding of
a discipline. In fact, in those cases - Marx and Freud are among his
examples - the author function is supplanted by that of 'founders of
discursivity' (What is an Author). Meaning that "they are not just the
authors of their own works. They have produced something else: the
possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts." (What is an
Author).
The author function serves, AFAIK, mostly to delineate the *kind* of text,
(scientific treatise have no 'author' for example), and thereby the kind of
reading involved and the presumed source of meaning - t'author. Basically,
the author function is related to literature (or rather *writing*), although
anything with an 'author', artwork, auteur film etc. might come under its
sway.
> Woolfian
> stream-of-consciousness, Foucauldian theories, Newtonian physics, Wuist system
> of raving (kidding...).
In Foucault's terms, Newtonian physics doesn't have an 'author', so no
author function ("the inventor's name served only to christen a theorem,
proposition...." WIAA); Woolf, yes; Foucault - hmm.
> Are we reading these texts (or told to) because they
> are socially accepted "great Works" rather than because we find them relevant
> to our way of thinking and specific purposes?
I would suspect a range of complex mixes of the two, and many other reasons
besides.
One possible case - one reads the 'great works' in a book club edition
because of a desire to become socially acceptable to the apparently
'cultured' classes. Another possible case, one is fascinated by the essays
of Montaigne, despite them being written by a feudal lord in the 16th
century, because they say something about a certain possibility of thought
and writing - and a kind of attention - which one had not encountered
elsewhere. Or, as another possible case, one really might not care at all,
but are being made to read 'great works' as part of a semi-forced education.
These are, obviously, not a full range of possibilities.
No simple answer is possible, I think.
[snip of books and other things]
> [face paling] Umm, I'll try.... it's just that everytime I venture into a
> newsgroup, my reading list quadruples. They should make surgical implantations
> of books - insert micro-chips of the texts into your brain for immediate
> reading and comprehension.
Hey, it was only a suggestion. There won't be a quiz. You asked about the
Debord. SOTS is a very short book... BTW who would preprogramme the
comprehension?
>> I've been kept away from sharp objects for years, so I wouldn't know.
>>
> Voluntarily or legally imposed? ;)
It was after that thing with the Barbie dolls.
Regards
Giles
ale...@my-deja.com
>
> Well, yes. I've said that a few times. I was just wondering why 'queer
> culture' was necessarily 'oppositional'. But forget it.
>
oppositional stance is required in face of the predominantly
heterosexual culture and society. But certainly it'd be limiting if we
take any sort of position - men, women, lesbian, gays, to be some sort
of grounding category. I guess one of the subversive elements of drag
queens and cross-dressing is the denaturalisation of the naturalising
of gender constructs, going along Judith Butler's argument in _Gender
Trouble_.
But ofcourse, to go on a wholesale denaturalisation might become, as
Michael Warner suggested, to reduce the term of lesbian into "the
incoherence of gender binarism and heterosexuality condensed to the
point of parody" (p.19 of his article 'From queer to eternity: an army
of theorists cannot fail' in _Village Voice Lit Supplement_, June 92).
Maybe we should start to denaturalise the denaturalisation of
naturalisation ;)
[snipper snapper]
> Umm, the 'author function', for Foucault, which is where I presume
you got
> that term from, is not straightforwardly the authentication and
founding of
> a discipline. In fact, in those cases - Marx and Freud are among his
> examples - the author function is supplanted by that of 'founders of
> discursivity' (What is an Author). Meaning that "they are not just the
> authors of their own works. They have produced something else: the
> possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts." (What
is an
> Author).
>
So in that sense, Barthes' statement about the death of the author will
never be realised? Because the production of cultural capitalism
demands the generation of this "founders of discursivity"?
> The author function serves, AFAIK, mostly to delineate the *kind* of
text,
> (scientific treatise have no 'author' for example), and thereby the
kind of
> reading involved and the presumed source of meaning - t'author.
I wonder if there's a kind of expectation for an uniform understanding
of the text?
Basically,
> the author function is related to literature (or rather *writing*),
although
> anything with an 'author', artwork, auteur film etc. might come under
its
> sway.
>
> > Woolfian
> > stream-of-consciousness, Foucauldian theories, Newtonian physics,
Wuist system
> > of raving (kidding...).
>
> In Foucault's terms, Newtonian physics doesn't have an 'author', so no
> author function ("the inventor's name served only to christen a
theorem,
> proposition...." WIAA); Woolf, yes; Foucault - hmm.
>
Well, you know how there is a trend of applying Foucauldian theories to
other branches of theories and studies, such as feminism.
> > Are we reading these texts (or told to) because they
> > are socially accepted "great Works" rather than because we find
them relevant
> > to our way of thinking and specific purposes?
>
> I would suspect a range of complex mixes of the two, and many other
reasons
> besides.
>
> One possible case - one reads the 'great works' in a book club edition
> because of a desire to become socially acceptable to the apparently
> 'cultured' classes.
Oh goddess yes, the sort of equivalence of reading Karl Marx at
MacDonalds.
Another possible case, one is fascinated by the essays
> of Montaigne, despite them being written by a feudal lord in the 16th
> century, because they say something about a certain possibility of
thought
> and writing - and a kind of attention - which one had not encountered
> elsewhere. Or, as another possible case, one really might not care at
all,
> but are being made to read 'great works' as part of a semi-forced
education.
> These are, obviously, not a full range of possibilities.
>
> No simple answer is possible, I think.
[sn.. oh, run out of ideas!]
> >> I've been kept away from sharp objects for years, so I wouldn't
know.
> >>
> > Voluntarily or legally imposed? ;)
>
> It was after that thing with the Barbie dolls.
This is getting scary... what did you do???
u...@nadaredhotant.com
Belated, sorry. Things got in the way.
[sneeep]
> Maybe we should start to denaturalise the denaturalisation of
> naturalisation ;)
Barthes declared that demythologising had become a new mythology circa 1971
(? any corrections?). But isn't this the old avant-gardist problem? I hear
echoes of Tristan Tzara (Dadaist) from 1918.
>> Umm, the 'author function', for Foucault, which is where I presume
>> you got
>> that term from, is not straightforwardly the authentication and
>> founding of
>> a discipline. In fact, in those cases - Marx and Freud are among his
>> examples - the author function is supplanted by that of 'founders of
>> discursivity' (What is an Author). Meaning that "they are not just the
>> authors of their own works. They have produced something else: the
>> possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts." (What
>> is an Author).
>>
> So in that sense, Barthes' statement about the death of the author will
> never be realised? Because the production of cultural capitalism
> demands the generation of this "founders of discursivity"?
Bluntly, no. We seem to have been a little short of founders of discursivity
lately (Baudrillard? I don't think so), but anyway that is not what Foucault
describes. As I had just pointed out, a 'founder of discursivity' is not, or
not simply, an author (function). Marx is not the 'author' of Marxism, Freud
is not the 'author' of Psychoanalysis. Nobody is. They produced the
possibilities for other texts - and that is far closer to Barthes' 'text'
than it is to Barthes' 'work' (i.e. the authored version).
And then, after all, doesn't capital these days prefer the Brand as author
as pure name, not a biographical individual?
>> The author function serves, AFAIK, mostly to delineate the *kind* of
>> text,
>> (scientific treatise have no 'author' for example), and thereby the
>> kind of
>> reading involved and the presumed source of meaning - t'author.
>
> I wonder if there's a kind of expectation for an uniform understanding
> of the text?
What? Across scientific and 'literary' texts? I can't see it. Scientific
texts expect a uniform understanding, if not a uniform response, but those
are the ones without authors. Literary texts - yes, the search, according to
Foucault, is for a unitary source and conclusion of the text's meaning in
the author, but there is no sense in Foucault that this will be found,
rather a series of versions of the same Name can be and are constructed.
>> Basically, the author function is related to literature (or rather
>> *writing*),
>> although anything with an 'author': artwork, auteur film etc. might come
>> under its sway.
>>
[snip]
Regards
Giles