differences between postmodernism and modernism???
hedonist
modernism??? any examples??????? and what is deep image?????
thanks in advance,
barbara
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G*rd*n
| exactly what are the differences between postmodernism and
| modernism??? any examples??????? and what is deep image?????
As to deep image, there's a nice one at
http://www.aao.gov.au/AAO/local/www/dfm/aat088.html
but if it isn't what you want, Danco Anodizing, at
http://www.danco.net/contact.html , will make you
one. And those two were just the top of the pile
off the search engine.
James Owens
> exactly what are the differences between postmodernism and
> modernism??? any examples??????? and what is deep image?????
As I understand it, modernism broke radically with tradition and authority
to redesign the human world logically from first principles.
Postmodernism began to borrow again from tradition, but in an eclectic,
somewhat irreverent way. This is particularly clear in the architecture of
skyscrapers.
The aim of the postmodern approach is arguably to restore a sense of human
belonging into what has become a rather sterile environment for the soul
(for want of a better term). However, the legacy of modern technology and
modern culture tend to undermine that effort.
--
James Owens ad...@Freenet.carleton.ca
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Tinka
> As I understand it, modernism broke radically with tradition and authority
> to redesign the human world logically from first principles.
> Postmodernism began to borrow again from tradition, but in an eclectic,
> somewhat irreverent way. This is particularly clear in the architecture of
> skyscrapers.
UHmmmmmm.. have you read "The Waste Land"? There is no tradition in that?
--
Tinka
-----------------
The beginning is idealized; the end is darkened.
-- Mikhail Bakhtin
James Owens
> James Owens wrote:
>
>> As I understand it, modernism broke radically with tradition and authority
>> to redesign the human world logically from first principles.
>> Postmodernism began to borrow again from tradition, but in an eclectic,
>> somewhat irreverent way. This is particularly clear in the architecture of
>> skyscrapers.
>
> UHmmmmmm.. have you read "The Waste Land"? There is no tradition in that?
That's a good point. But I'd rather start with a wrong theory than not
say anything at all.
In fact Eliot's poem is richly allusive, but isn't it also a critique of
modernity? As such it can be expected to stand outside the principles of
modernity, rather than embrace them. I'm no literary scholar, which
unfortunately makes me stand out uncomfortably on this newsgroup, but is
there no argument that in literature, as in philosophy, architecture, the
visual arts, and music, the ideal of modernity was to throw out a lot of
old clutter and begin fresh and clean and sparse (and hard and good)?
James Owens
> James Owens wrote:
>
>> As I understand it, modernism broke radically with tradition and authority
>> to redesign the human world logically from first principles.
>> Postmodernism began to borrow again from tradition, but in an eclectic,
>> somewhat irreverent way. This is particularly clear in the architecture of
>> skyscrapers.
>
> UHmmmmmm.. have you read "The Waste Land"? There is no tradition in that?
"The term Modernism commonly applies to those forward-looking architects,
designers and artisans who, from the 1880s on, forged a new and diverse
vocabulary principally to escape Historicism, the tyrany of previous
historical styles." (copyright statement)
http://www.artsmia.org/modernism/
"_The Waste Land_ is known not only for its probing subject matter but
also for its radivcal departure from traditional poetic style and
structure incorporating historical and literary allusions as well as
unconventional use of language."
http://www.bartleby.com/201/
Adam Jones
>
> exactly what are the differences between postmodernism and
Hi everyone.
Perhaps this will be of some help:
Critic Brian McHale defined the difference between Modernist and Postmodernist
literature as something like:
Modernism: foregrounds epistemological concerns
Postmodernism: foregrounds ontological concerns
Thus, Modernist literature could be described as being concerned with point of
view, assuming that each character sees the same world in different ways.
Postmodernist literature doesn't assume that there is one single real world.
This is a very hasty example.
I refer you to his books _Postmodernist Literature_ and _Constructing
Postmodernism_.
From a Postmodern point of view, any definition of Modernism and/or
Postmodernism will be incomplete. But I think McHale's definitions offer a good
starting place, especially if literature is your concern.
Best regards,
Adam
John Baglow
> hedonist wrote:
>>
>> exactly what are the differences between postmodernism and
>> modernism??? any examples??????? ...
>
> Hi everyone.
> Perhaps this will be of some help:
> Critic Brian McHale defined the difference between Modernist and Postmodernist
> literature as something like:
> Modernism: foregrounds epistemological concerns
> Postmodernism: foregrounds ontological concerns
I must read the book, because this strikes me as simplistic. Is Heidegger
a postmodernist, then?
Modernist literature, by which I mean European/North American literature,
appears obsessive about ontological concerns, but also epistemological
ones. For example, the modern poets Eliot, Pound, Hugh MacDiarmid, Jones,
and Black Mountaineers like Olson, all look for an order in apparent
chaos--they want the pattern, the meaning, certain revelation, in the face
of existential angst. But their *strategy* is epistemological--read
voraciously, looking for clues. Catalogue things. List things. Examine
various fields of expertise and try to transcend them.
Postmodernism has given up on this project entirely. There *is* no hidden
order. So play with the fragments.
--
Cheers, Help, master, help! here's a fish hangs in the net,
John like a poor man's right in the law; 'twill hardly
come out. --Pericles, Act 2 Scene 1
Adam Jones
> > Critic Brian McHale defined the difference between Modernist and
> > Postmodernist literature as something like:
> > Modernism: foregrounds epistemological concerns
> > Postmodernism: foregrounds ontological concerns
>
> I must read the book, because this strikes me as simplistic. Is
> Heidegger a postmodernist, then?
One criticism of McHale's books, I believe, was that his definitions were too
simple. What I wrote of them, though, was (necessarily) an oversimplification. I
refer all interested parties to the books.
It seems to me that McHale:
. crafted the definitions concerning *only* postmodernist literature
. is aware of the limited nature of his definitions. He stresses (especially in
Constructing Postmodernism) that they are only one way of viewing things, and
limited, at that. Furthermore, that they are a starting point for criticizing
postmodernist literature.
> Modernist literature, by which I mean European/North American
> literature, appears obsessive about ontological concerns, but also
> epistemological ones. For example, the modern poets Eliot, Pound, Hugh
> MacDiarmid, Jones, and Black Mountaineers like Olson, all look for an
> order in apparent chaos--they want the pattern, the meaning, certain
> revelation, in the face of existential angst. But their *strategy* is
> epistemological--read voraciously, looking for clues. Catalogue
> things. List things. Examine various fields of expertise and try to
> transcend them.
>
> Postmodernism has given up on this project entirely. There *is* no
> hidden order. So play with the fragments.
I think one can easily see both ontological and epistemological concerns in any
artwork. (Perhaps the term "concerns" is a poor one for me to be using.) Is the
question then which ones are more important to the artist? Audience? Society as
a whole? (If one is in fact more important to anyone.)
Please note that I'm still learning about postmodernism, so I may have
misrepresented McHale's books. I'm unfamiliar with some of the people you've
mentioned (Hugh MacDiarmid and Jones). Can you recommend some works?
Best regards,
Adam
John Baglow
> Please note that I'm still learning about postmodernism, so I may have
> misrepresented McHale's books. I'm unfamiliar with some of the people you've
> mentioned (Hugh MacDiarmid and Jones). Can you recommend some works?
My graduate work was on modern poetry. Hugh MacDiarmid was the founder of
the Scottish Literary Renaissance, and had an interesting and lengthy
career. I might recommend a book--"Hugh MacDiarmid and the Poetry of
Self," McGill-Queen's, written by yours truly [blush]. It's hard to pin
down any specific work by MacDiarmid that sums up the points I made about
him earlier. "The Kind of Poetry I Want," found in his "autobiography",
"Lucky Poet," gives a few clues, as does his earlier "A Drunk Man Looks at
the Thistle."
David Jones is a contemporary, a Welsh poet whose best known work is "The
Anathemata."
Modern poets were obsessed with fragments and ruins, and tried to put
everything back together--Pound in his Cantos, William Carlos Williams in
"Paterson," Olson in "The Maximus Poems." My only point is that
postmodernism just wants to play. It lacks (in my view) a social
conscience. It certainly isn't looking for truth or revelation.
Well, that's overstated. I rather like Foucault, who is an epistemologist
par excellence. But he would reject notions of "truth" and "revelation," no?
ale...@my-deja.com
versions), modernism is associated with modernity, a historical epoch
which has ended; it is also related to Enlightenment, of the execution
of Divine Right in 1684, and the turn from god as source of improvement
and authority to secular knowledges and individualism. In the post WWI
art/cultural context, modernism as an art movement is interested in
piecing together the fragments & to redeem humankind through art. This
is seen in TSEliot's poem "Things Fall Apart" (title may be incorrect).
Postmodernism, on the other hand, challenges the metanarratives of
modernism, which had thought itself as universally applicable to all
human cultures and experiences, and had also underpinned the ideologies
of imperialism, colonialism and patriarchy. Ptm is concerned with the
previously marginalised, minortised voices, knowledges and cultures.
Instead of seeing the world as constituted of binary oppositions such
as male/female, light/dark, knowledge/superstition, good/evil, which in
turn attributes value judgements - usually the first one as "good", the
second as "bad" or "lack"; ptm stresses plurality & diversity of
knowledge, opinions, and voices (of the people).
There is also a blurring between high and low culture: where previously
with modernist era, the two are clearly demarcated with a rigid sense
of what's refined and cultivated and what's not, ptm sees popular
culture as a potential site for resistance against the dominant
hegemonic norms and values.
Obviously, this is a very simplified description, there are much more
(conflicting and otherwise) to say about the two; and ofcourse, I am
speaking from a postmodern feminist perspective, so no prize for
guessing where my partiality goes ;-)
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
James Whitehead
and transfigures its contents as such into irrelevant end-user
functionality.
--
James Whitehead
David O'Bedlam
Hash: SHA1
On 29 May 2000, James Owens wrote:
[...]
> I'd rather start with a wrong theory than not
> say anything at all.
[...]
> I'm no literary scholar, which unfortunately makes
> me stand out uncomfortably on this newsgroup,
TWO things we have in common. (But we're NOT getting married!)
> but is there no argument that in literature, as in philosophy,
> architecture, the visual arts, and music, the ideal of modernity
> was to throw out a lot of old clutter and begin fresh and clean
> and sparse (and hard and good)?
That's how I understand it. But then by that criterion neither
Eliot's "Waste Land" nor Pound's "Cantos" were "Modernist" --
at least not as poetry/literature.
David
- --
(C) 2000 by TheDavid(TM) | "You drive us wild, we'll drive you crazy."
All Rights Reserved | David, P.O. Box 21403, Louisville, KY 40221
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.
those fragments.
Lev Lafayette
On Mon, 5 Jun 2000 ale...@my-deja.com wrote:
Firstly, we'll note that the concurrent thread on Seinfield currently has
more posts than this one. Hmmm...
> From what I understand (and please be aware there are many different
> versions), modernism is associated with modernity, a historical epoch
> which has ended; it is also related to Enlightenment, of the execution
> of Divine Right in 1684, and the turn from god as source of improvement
> and authority to secular knowledges and individualism. In the post WWI
> art/cultural context, modernism as an art movement is interested in
> piecing together the fragments & to redeem humankind through art. This
> is seen in TSEliot's poem "Things Fall Apart" (title may be incorrect).
Everything above is pretty true. I wouldn't say that as a historical epoch
it has ended. It may be _ending_ in terms of the means of communication
and production. But the institutional base of the corporation, the system
differentiation of class and to a lesser extent the individualistic mode
of consciouosness exists. As for crises induced from its own social
system, well...
> Postmodernism, on the other hand, challenges the metanarratives of
> modernism, which had thought itself as universally applicable to all
> human cultures and experiences, and had also underpinned the ideologies
> of imperialism, colonialism and patriarchy. Ptm is concerned with the
> previously marginalised, minortised voices, knowledges and cultures.
Problem was, not all those "meta" narratives were universal. Neither "The
West" nor "The East" proffered much which had universal appeal. Science,
being only one type of rationality, also fell into disrepute. Now these
were easy enough to challenge. At the moment however, postmodern theorists
such as Jameson and Lyotard both correctly note economics as the new
metanarrative, but to date, alternatives and critique has been
unconvincing.
Indeed, it is worth considering that (in leiu of an alternative) that
economics is _the_ successful metanarrative. ;-)
>
> Instead of seeing the world as constituted of binary oppositions such
> as male/female, light/dark, knowledge/superstition, good/evil, which in
> turn attributes value judgements - usually the first one as "good", the
> second as "bad" or "lack"; ptm stresses plurality & diversity of
> knowledge, opinions, and voices (of the people).
But it was only through the universalistic claims of the Enlightenment
could this diversity even _begin_ to express a voice on how
counter-factual they were. When a bunch of blokes in tights and powdered
wigs (sound like my place, actually) claimed "We are enlightened, we hold
that all people have have universal human rights" those people _without_
such human rights could made valid claims for them.
Or to put it another way, are we looking at postmodernity=diversity, or
was it inevitable - and the basis of its _universal_ claims - that
modernity had to embrace diversity.
If the latter is true, were not looking at postmodernism at all. We're
just looking at a more mature modernity. If postmodernism is to be
considered at all, it must propose entirely new content to social
structures. It is a _new_ social organisation.
> There is also a blurring between high and low culture: where previously
> with modernist era, the two are clearly demarcated with a rigid sense
> of what's refined and cultivated and what's not, ptm sees popular
> culture as a potential site for resistance against the dominant
> hegemonic norms and values.
Once upon a time the capital inputs required for mass production of
cultural products was quite high - thus in order to recoup costs, the
_kultureindustrie_ lowered the quality of their products. The Frankfurt
School analysis was quite accurate for the time.
But there has been a confusion; the Frankfurt School studies in aesthetics
have beeen interpreted as opposition to popular culture. I don't think
this is the case from what I have read. They were quite happy with the
idea of popular high art expressions. Indeed, last time I paid any
attention to this newsgroup (in 1994) there was an exciting thread on the
notion of "avant-pop", that is, mass distributed high aesthetics. Now that
wouldn't be just a _resistance_ to hegemonic non-cultures, but rather an
assault on it!
> Obviously, this is a very simplified description, there are much more
> (conflicting and otherwise) to say about the two; and ofcourse, I am
> speaking from a postmodern feminist perspective, so no prize for
> guessing where my partiality goes ;-)
And as a modern humanist, no prizes for my partiality either ;-)
Regardez,
Lev Lafayette. (who hasn't posted here since 1994!)
l...@student.unimelb.edu.au http://www.student.unimelb.edu.au/~lev
ale...@my-deja.com
100...@cassius.its.unimelb.edu.au>,
Lev Lafayette <l...@student.unimelb.edu.au> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 5 Jun 2000 ale...@my-deja.com wrote:
>
> Firstly, we'll note that the concurrent thread on Seinfield currently
has
> more posts than this one. Hmmm...
> Everything above is pretty true. I wouldn't say that as a historical
epoch
> it has ended. It may be _ending_ in terms of the means of
communication
> and production. But the institutional base of the corporation, the
system
> differentiation of class and to a lesser extent the individualistic
mode
> of consciouosness exists. As for crises induced from its own social
> system, well...
>
Point taken. Perhaps there is an overlapping btn the two movements?
Like you said, the constructs of institutions, class and consciousness
still exist today, but might not these things be reconstructed to serve
the present day interests? After all, an end of 20th century subject
cannot have access to the values, thinking & way of life of another
subject in a different historical era. So rather than still being
within the epoch of modernity, we are in an era whereby the past is
reconstituted, reconstructed, and renegotiated in accordance to our
understanding?
> Problem was, not all those "meta" narratives were universal.
Neither "The
> West" nor "The East" proffered much which had universal appeal.
The key word is modernism 'thought' itself (ie the grand narratives
which come from it) as universally applicable & hence its imposition of
imperialism, colonialism and westernisation upon the foreign "others".
Science,
> being only one type of rationality, also fell into disrepute. Now
these
> were easy enough to challenge. At the moment however, postmodern
theorists
> such as Jameson and Lyotard both correctly note economics as the new
> metanarrative, but to date, alternatives and critique has been
> unconvincing.
>
> Indeed, it is worth considering that (in leiu of an alternative) that
> economics is _the_ successful metanarrative. ;-)
>
Are you thinking of the relation btn post-Fordism & pdm whereby the
large scale factory is displaced by smaller units dispersed globally -
the emergence of global capital culture?
> But it was only through the universalistic claims of the Enlightenment
> could this diversity even _begin_ to express a voice on how
> counter-factual they were.
Agreed. It's like Chinese telling anti-Chinese jokes: the act may seem
politically and ideologically subversive, and an act of reclaiming
identities, such jokes communicated within the said culture, it can be
seen as resistance against prejudiced perception, but told across the
racial line, the point of the joke depends on the existence of racist
ideology. But on the other hand, I don't think subversion, atleast in
the postmodern destablisation of binary constructs, should be limited
as such. There should be a move away from the identication of the
inscription carried within identities, but what cultural apparatus
arranged this inscription, and what are the available agencies or means
can be utilised as way of intervention.
When a bunch of blokes in tights and powdered
> wigs (sound like my place, actually)
Charming..... I won't ask the nature or purpose of such activities ;-)
>
> If the latter is true, were not looking at postmodernism at all. We're
> just looking at a more mature modernity. If postmodernism is to be
> considered at all, it must propose entirely new content to social
> structures. It is a _new_ social organisation.
That was the project of modernity, to "make it new". Postmodernists
think that we cannot repeat such acts because - and rather than nazis,
I'll use X-Files (well both are atrocious in their little ways):
Mulder believed that "the truth is out there", that there's this
conspiracy btn aliens & govts controlling the good ol'denizens of the
world, and that once this "truth" is uncovered, we will all throw
parties & be freed. Ha. Knowledge & truth are produced out of power
struggles, & is used to legitimise authorities and governance. So now
we come to the point I really hate because you'll ask: if pomo cannot
speak or act for the subjects, what good does it do? Practical answer
would be: dammit, I'm an undergrad, not a PhD candidate! But I'm sure
there are more in-depth arguments, if only I know them :(
Any fellow postmodernists want to lend a hand?
> Once upon a time the capital inputs required for mass production of
> cultural products was quite high - thus in order to recoup costs, the
> _kultureindustrie_ lowered the quality of their products. The
Frankfurt
> School analysis was quite accurate for the time.
>
> But there has been a confusion; the Frankfurt School studies in
aesthetics
> have beeen interpreted as opposition to popular culture. I don't think
> this is the case from what I have read. They were quite happy with the
> idea of popular high art expressions.
Benjamin at any case. But didn't they also critiqued mass culture and
culturally homogenic, predictable and standardised due to mass
production? Rey Chow has argued against this notion through the example
of walkman - that it allows the user to escape into a privatise,
individual mindscape - and she illustrated this point through shop
clerks in Hong Kong.
> > Obviously, this is a very simplified description, there are much
more
> > (conflicting and otherwise) to say about the two; and ofcourse, I am
> > speaking from a postmodern feminist perspective, so no prize for
> > guessing where my partiality goes ;-)
>
> And as a modern humanist, no prizes for my partiality either ;-)
>
Hmm, another one of those. I shall add your name to The List.
> Regardez,
>
> Lev Lafayette. (who hasn't posted here since 1994!)
> l...@student.unimelb.edu.au
http://www.student.unimelb.edu.au/~lev
>
>
Lev Lafayette
On Sat, 10 Jun 2000 ale...@my-deja.com wrote:
(rm)
> Point taken. Perhaps there is an overlapping btn the two movements?
> Like you said, the constructs of institutions, class and consciousness
> still exist today, but might not these things be reconstructed to serve
> the present day interests? After all, an end of 20th century subject
> cannot have access to the values, thinking & way of life of another
> subject in a different historical era. So rather than still being
> within the epoch of modernity, we are in an era whereby the past is
> reconstituted, reconstructed, and renegotiated in accordance to our
> understanding?
Well, by definition modernity and postmodernity must overlap. Modernity,
like postmodernity, doesn't really have much of an association with the
past. Both are future orientated.
> > Problem was, not all those "meta" narratives were universal.
> Neither "The
> > West" nor "The East" proffered much which had universal appeal.
>
> The key word is modernism 'thought' itself (ie the grand narratives
> which come from it) as universally applicable & hence its imposition of
> imperialism, colonialism and westernisation upon the foreign "others".
Methinks that these were even of greater intent in traditional society it
is just they were less capable of achieving it!
(rm)
> theorists
> > such as Jameson and Lyotard both correctly note economics as the new
> > metanarrative, but to date, alternatives and critique has been
> > unconvincing.
> >
> > Indeed, it is worth considering that (in leiu of an alternative) that
> > economics is _the_ successful metanarrative. ;-)
> >
> Are you thinking of the relation btn post-Fordism & pdm whereby the
> large scale factory is displaced by smaller units dispersed globally -
> the emergence of global capital culture?
No, because I don't think that is the case. The factories have moved
offshore, as advanced capitalism starts to take up "postmodern"
computerised means of production. Modernity is synonomous with
industrialisation in this case - and that's been moved offshore.
My proposition is more than western humanism, eastern socialism, or even
scientific rationality, economics has become _the_ metanarrative.
(rm)
> > Once upon a time the capital inputs required for mass production of
> > cultural products was quite high - thus in order to recoup costs, the
> > _kultureindustrie_ lowered the quality of their products. The
> Frankfurt
> > School analysis was quite accurate for the time.
> >
> > But there has been a confusion; the Frankfurt School studies in
> aesthetics
> > have beeen interpreted as opposition to popular culture. I don't think
> > this is the case from what I have read. They were quite happy with the
> > idea of popular high art expressions.
>
> Benjamin at any case. But didn't they also critiqued mass culture and
> culturally homogenic, predictable and standardised due to mass
> production? Rey Chow has argued against this notion through the example
> of walkman - that it allows the user to escape into a privatise,
> individual mindscape - and she illustrated this point through shop
> clerks in Hong Kong.
Yes, the Frankfurters <g> did make that point. And the walkman doesn't
make any difference. It's may be a privite individual landscape, but if
everyone elses private musical topography is the same what difference is
there really?
> > And as a modern humanist, no prizes for my partiality either ;-)
> >
> Hmm, another one of those. I shall add your name to The List.
It'll be pretty short I imagine.
Regardez,
Lev Lafayette.
l...@student.unimelb.edu.au http://www.student.unimelb.edu.au/~lev
James Whitehead
b.edu.au>, Lev Lafayette <l...@student.unimelb.edu.au> writes
>
>Well, by definition modernity and postmodernity must overlap. Modernity,
>like postmodernity, doesn't really have much of an association with the
>past. Both are future orientated.
absent in Po-Mo.
>offshore, as advanced capitalism starts to take up "postmodern"
>computerised means of production. Modernity is synonomous with
>industrialisation in this case - and that's been moved offshore.
>
>My proposition is more than western humanism, eastern socialism, or even
>scientific rationality, economics has become _the_ metanarrative.
provide anything new - and now the intention not to do this - look at
the popularity of 4 by 4 off road vehicles being driven by city dwellers
- this is not progress - its extremely ironic. (similar to Marxism
today)
>>
>> Benjamin at any case. But didn't they also critiqued mass culture and
>> culturally homogenic, predictable and standardised due to mass
>> production? Rey Chow has argued against this notion through the example
>> of walkman - that it allows the user to escape into a privatise,
>> individual mindscape - and she illustrated this point through shop
>> clerks in Hong Kong.
The Walkman is an interesting artefact - but its nothing more than a
small tape player - people in the 60s would clamp transistor radios to
their heads - like the computer a product of modernist (W.W.II)
technology. As is the Internet - very old technology - copper wires and
computer systems designed in the 1930s. Look at 2001 (the movie) that
was the modernist future - yet the reality is now we (the US - the
Russians stopped playing) cant even land a probe on Mars. One of the
features of PO-MO is lack of progress - so the world will continue to
resemble the 20th C - even its visions of the future - despite the fact
that we are in its future.
--
James Whitehead
Dao Jones
Progress is a teleological idea. There is only change (perhaps - from a
given viewpoint, certainly). Progress assumes that there is something to
progress towards, and as such is almost entirely subjective. You're using
your own goalposts and you're scoring. No surprise.
The lack of fresh paradigms in engineered artefacts does not imply a halting
of 'progress' - engineering is the application of old ideas. That's the
pace of engineering. You could argue (though perhaps not profitably) that
the steam engine took a few thousand years to be evolved from the knowledge
required to build one, and that the speed of creation now is boggling.
And progress need not be measured in terms of fresh scientific paradigms -
although lord knows we're awash with them - it can be seen in societal
change. And that is probably as hard to quantify as 'progress' itself.
DJ
James Whitehead wrote in message ...
>In article <Pine.OSF.4.10.100061...@cassius.its.unimel
>b.edu.au>, Lev Lafayette <l...@student.unimelb.edu.au> writes
>>
>>Well, by definition modernity and postmodernity must overlap. Modernity,
>>like postmodernity, doesn't really have much of an association with the
>>past. Both are future orientated.
>Modernity created History and a belief (therefore) in progress - this is
>absent in Po-Mo.
>>No, because I don't think that is the case. The factories have moved
>>offshore, as advanced capitalism starts to take up "postmodern"
>>computerised means of production. Modernity is synonomous with
>>industrialisation in this case - and that's been moved offshore.
>>
>>My proposition is more than western humanism, eastern socialism, or even
>>scientific rationality, economics has become _the_ metanarrative.
>I think what is important here is the failure of industrialisation to
>provide anything new - and now the intention not to do this - look at
>the popularity of 4 by 4 off road vehicles being driven by city dwellers
>- this is not progress - its extremely ironic. (similar to Marxism
>today)
>>
>>>
>>> Benjamin at any case. But didn't they also critiqued mass culture and
>>> culturally homogenic, predictable and standardised due to mass
>>> production? Rey Chow has argued against this notion through the example
>>> of walkman - that it allows the user to escape into a privatise,
>>> individual mindscape - and she illustrated this point through shop
>>> clerks in Hong Kong.
>
ale...@my-deja.com
> And progress need not be measured in terms of fresh scientific
paradigms -
> although lord knows we're awash with them - it can be seen in
societal
> change. And that is probably as hard to quantify as 'progress'
itself.
>
> DJ
Indeed. Like you said, progress is teleological and subjective. It
would be problematic, I think, to regard societal changes as progress.
After all, nazism is partly developed from social Darwinism, and
ofcourse we all know that one person's social utopia is another's
political prison (or worse).
Joyce
James Whitehead
Jones <dao_...@NOSPAMdisinfo.net> writes
>Where to begin...
>
>Progress is a teleological idea.
but is this necessary? Certain theories propose continual progress with
no ultimate terminus - there was some debate along these lines regarding
evolution and Marxism - where Marxism I suppose has a (more) definite
goal.
>given viewpoint, certainly). Progress assumes that there is something to
>progress towards, and as such is almost entirely subjective. You're using
>your own goalposts and you're scoring. No surprise.
like writing out PI....?
>The lack of fresh paradigms in engineered artefacts does not imply a halting
>of 'progress' - engineering is the application of old ideas. That's the
>pace of engineering. You could argue (though perhaps not profitably) that
>the steam engine took a few thousand years to be evolved from the knowledge
>required to build one, and that the speed of creation now is boggling.
of progress remains. Non the less I think there is evidence for this -
certainly in the arts - but also the sciences - despite the vested
interests otherwise. In particular the Un-verifiable newer theories in
physics....
>
>And progress need not be measured in terms of fresh scientific paradigms -
>although lord knows we're awash with them - it can be seen in societal
>change. And that is probably as hard to quantify as 'progress' itself.
--
James Whitehead
James Owens
> In article <961430899.19260.0...@news.demon.co.uk>, Dao
> Jones <dao_...@NOSPAMdisinfo.net> writes
>>Where to begin...
>>
>>Progress is a teleological idea.
> I suppose if at some fixed point progress achieves a goal it would be -
> but is this necessary? Certain theories propose continual progress with
> no ultimate terminus - there was some debate along these lines regarding
> evolution and Marxism - where Marxism I suppose has a (more) definite
> goal.
Progress could also be asymptotic -- that is, approaching a fixed point
but never reaching it. But isn't the meaning of 'progress' dependent on
the discourse? For a technological discourse it is an integral concept.
When other discourses, such as the historical or economic, talk of
"progress," are they borrowing from the technological discourse,
succumbing as it were to the (dominant) core sentiment of planned
improvement?
Modernism, to the extent that it embeds the idea of progress, is a
fundamentally technological project. Because postmodernism repudiates
as accidental the dominance of technological discourse, it is
anti-technological or at least neutral with respect to the ideal of
technology and progress.
Gerry Quinn
>It's very difficult to argue that progress has ceased - when an illusion
>of progress remains. Non the less I think there is evidence for this -
>certainly in the arts - but also the sciences - despite the vested
>interests otherwise. In particular the Un-verifiable newer theories in
>physics....
When there's a theory that - given a small number of parameters - can
crank out the Standard Model of particle physics, the above statement
may have an interpretation other than "physics envy".
Nor do the other sciences (biology for example) appear to be suffering
from any lack of progress.
Science is unlike the arts (or, more precisely, the spin-off activity
known as criticism) - it does not suffer a crisis when a week goes by
without some spurious new "paradigm". This may be because the area of
"critical creativity" is limited.
- Gerry Quinn
James Whitehead
<ger...@indigo.ie> writes
>In article <Uq3ysHA4...@jliat.demon.co.uk>, James Whitehead
><jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>It's very difficult to argue that progress has ceased - when an illusion
>>of progress remains. Non the less I think there is evidence for this -
>>certainly in the arts - but also the sciences - despite the vested
>>interests otherwise. In particular the Un-verifiable newer theories in
>>physics....
>
>When there's a theory that - given a small number of parameters - can
>crank out the Standard Model of particle physics, the above statement
>may have an interpretation other than "physics envy".
silly - with inventing ever more strange particles and objects some of
which are beyond practical detection, I think we have gone through this
line before- but in the main big science has become metaphysics - I.e.
non sense.
>
>Nor do the other sciences (biology for example) appear to be suffering
>from any lack of progress.
you mean Darwin!) mapping DNA out is like stamp collecting. (of course
biology will cure cancer - and give eternal life - like the physics guys
fusion power)
Again the model is the same as in physics - promise the earth (nuclear
power or GM food - but the actuality is more expensive and kind of
dangerous - and not wanted by the public anymore)
>Science is unlike the arts (or, more precisely, the spin-off activity
>known as criticism) - it does not suffer a crisis when a week goes by
>without some spurious new "paradigm". This may be because the area of
>"critical creativity" is limited.
Science has become exactly like the arts.
--
James Whitehead
Gerry Quinn
>In article <4%K35.628$r4....@news.indigo.ie>, Gerry Quinn
><ger...@indigo.ie> writes
>>In article <Uq3ysHA4...@jliat.demon.co.uk>, James Whitehead
>><jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>>It's very difficult to argue that progress has ceased - when an illusion
>>>of progress remains. Non the less I think there is evidence for this -
>>>certainly in the arts - but also the sciences - despite the vested
>>>interests otherwise. In particular the Un-verifiable newer theories in
>>>physics....
>>
>>When there's a theory that - given a small number of parameters - can
>>crank out the Standard Model of particle physics, the above statement
>>may have an interpretation other than "physics envy".
>I'm a great fan of physics - it was cool in the 60s but now its all got
>silly - with inventing ever more strange particles and objects some of
>which are beyond practical detection, I think we have gone through this
>line before- but in the main big science has become metaphysics - I.e.
>non sense.
>>
Take for example the leptoquarks (theoretically described but
experimentally inaccessible particles which may exist at the E/M-Colour
unification scale). They do have a function in some theories, but these
theories are concerned with things we CAN measure, which may relate to
particle collisions or even the distribution of galaxies or the
superabundance of matter compared to antimatter. There are no
metaphysical problems here (nor is metaphysics nonsense, it is an
essential foundation for physics).
As for "big science" there has always been an element of showmanship in
that. Scientists are human, and even if they weren't they would
still need funding. Finally, note that the theorists who invent
the weird particles need only pencils, paper and wastebaskets, and so
are nothing to do with "big science".
>>Nor do the other sciences (biology for example) appear to be suffering
>>from any lack of progress.
>Not so here - DNA is perhaps the big idea and its 40 years old, (or do
>you mean Darwin!) mapping DNA out is like stamp collecting. (of course
>biology will cure cancer - and give eternal life - like the physics guys
>fusion power)
Mapping DNA may be stamp collecting (one physicist early this century
said that all sciences apart from physics were stamp collecting). But
what about the creation of artificial life, or growing new organs, or
maybe even curing cancer - are such ideas entirely boring to you?
>Again the model is the same as in physics - promise the earth (nuclear
>power or GM food - but the actuality is more expensive and kind of
>dangerous - and not wanted by the public anymore)
Don't mix up the promises with the science.
>>
>>Science is unlike the arts (or, more precisely, the spin-off activity
>>known as criticism) - it does not suffer a crisis when a week goes by
>>without some spurious new "paradigm". This may be because the area of
>>"critical creativity" is limited.
>So why did the US abandon the space program and the super collider.
>Science has become exactly like the arts.
>
Since when does the funding distribution of the US government define
science? (Or art for that matter - some people were outraged when
Guiliani cut municipal support for the museum showing 'Sensation', but I
don't recall anyone saying that it had stopped being art on that
account.)
- Gerry Quinn
ale...@my-deja.com
> >Nor do the other sciences (biology for example) appear to be
suffering
> >from any lack of progress.
> Not so here - DNA is perhaps the big idea and its 40 years old, (or do
> you mean Darwin!) mapping DNA out is like stamp collecting. (of course
> biology will cure cancer - and give eternal life - like the physics
guys
> fusion power)
> Again the model is the same as in physics - promise the earth (nuclear
> power or GM food - but the actuality is more expensive and kind of
> dangerous - and not wanted by the public anymore)
[first of all, I hope it's ok to join in this discussion]
Science is intrinsically linked with the notion of progress. But in
terms of GM, I seriously don't think the state govt should be so
apprehensive about it. It'd be better for GM to be govt funded as well
as being open with its progress development & information, rather than
run by private corporations whose best interest will be profit, not
public welfare.
Currently in NZ, the govt is very strict in its "green" policy to the
extent it's almost censorship. There are extremes to both sides.
> >
> >Science is unlike the arts (or, more precisely, the spin-off activity
> >known as criticism) - it does not suffer a crisis when a week goes by
> >without some spurious new "paradigm". This may be because the area
of
> >"critical creativity" is limited.
> So why did the US abandon the space program and the super collider.
> Science has become exactly like the arts.
If you're talking about the traditional western notion of both as
advancements for humanity, then yes, probably so.
>
> --
> James Whitehead
James Whitehead
>Science is intrinsically linked with the notion of progress. But in
>terms of GM, I seriously don't think the state govt should be so
>apprehensive about it.
but keeping an eye on the voters. The real problem in Europe is how you
convince us of the need for *more* efficiency in farming when we are
already overproducing , where farmers are paid not to farm. And where
Organic Food is in great demand.
>as being open with its progress development & information,
most would prefer this - low tech approach to food production.
>run by private corporations whose best interest will be profit, not
>public welfare.
Microsoft) - Here simply offer the choice - GM or Organic - and say in
the case of stuff like drugs also - instead of being in the pocket of
the drug and tobacco companies.
>
>Currently in NZ, the govt is very strict in its "green" policy to the
>extent it's almost censorship. There are extremes to both sides.
it was perfectly safe - although would not eat any beef offal themselves
at the time! General trust in science here is now low.
>> >Science is unlike the arts (or, more precisely, the spin-off activity
>> >known as criticism) - it does not suffer a crisis when a week goes by
>> >without some spurious new "paradigm". This may be because the area
>of
>> >"critical creativity" is limited.
>> So why did the US abandon the space program and the super collider.
>> Science has become exactly like the arts.
>
>If you're talking about the traditional western notion of both as
>advancements for humanity, then yes, probably so.
reply to Gerry.
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
<ger...@indigo.ie> writes
>Take for example the leptoquarks (theoretically described but
>experimentally inaccessible particles which may exist at the E/M-Colour
>unification scale).
exist yet have no existent attributes. Are you saying that?
> They do have a function in some theories,
Which is true of the tooth fairy - is it not?
> but these
>theories are concerned with things we CAN measure,
Like the missing tooth and the sixpence?
> which may relate to
>particle collisions or even the distribution of galaxies or the
>superabundance of matter compared to antimatter. There are no
>metaphysical problems here (nor is metaphysics nonsense, it is an
>essential foundation for physics).
If you build a physics on tooth fairies your in deep trouble I think. I
thought the one differentiation of science was its lack of a
metaphysical ontology - its truths were/are real yet provisional. They
require no metaphysical buttress - as does religion (include Marxism)
But maybe this was old modern-science.
>
>As for "big science" there has always been an element of showmanship in
>that. Scientists are human, and even if they weren't they would
>still need funding.
Quite allot of *modern-science* was done without government funding -
Darwin, Einstein, Kelvin, Faraday, Newton .....
> Finally, note that the theorists who invent
>the weird particles need only pencils, paper and wastebaskets, and so
>are nothing to do with "big science".
Sure - but why fund them to invent weird particles - and more
importantly why fund the experiments to try to look or create these.
Because there seems a limit to what humans can know - and what humans
generally want to know. Once this limit is reached it marks the end of
science - as a human endeavour.
>
>
>Mapping DNA may be stamp collecting (one physicist early this century
>said that all sciences apart from physics were stamp collecting). But
>what about the creation of artificial life, or growing new organs, or
>maybe even curing cancer - are such ideas entirely boring to you?
In biology the crisis is not so apparent as yet. If the goal of medicine
became that of preventing death- (physics TOE) even if this was
achievable - that is immortality - the philosophers stone - would this
be necessarily a good thing. Wouldn't the immortals cease to resemble
humans at all?
To strive (spend money) for artificial life in a world where thousands
of children die each day in Africa - while Europe burns food seems
strange?
In terms of health - good local grown food, clean water and air,
exercise - will deliver a long and healthy life to more people at less
cost. But we feed children in the west predominately vegetable free
diets of processed food and encourage them to smoke and have casual
unprotected sex. Cancer is the last hope of the science community - but
at what cost is the cure? And when is it to arrive - and what new
disease will replace it. Rather than spend millions on drugs - which
generate billions in revenue channel some money into *treatment* of
disease - we all have to die, the aim should be the quality of our lives
and deaths - not the length. And with the DNA map is offered the
irradiation of such conditions as Downes children et al. - and even
homosexuals? Hitler did the same - cheaper.
>
>>Again the model is the same as in physics - promise the earth (nuclear
>>power or GM food - but the actuality is more expensive and kind of
>>dangerous - and not wanted by the public anymore)
>
>Don't mix up the promises with the science.
(I've met girls like that!) If science wants my money i'll mix them up.
What if Nassa stopped looking for water and life on Mars and did the
same in the sub-Sahara regions of the earth.
>
>
>Since when does the funding distribution of the US government define
>science?
From about 1930?
> (Or art for that matter - some people were outraged when
>Guiliani cut municipal support for the museum showing 'Sensation', but I
>don't recall anyone saying that it had stopped being art on that
>account.)
The artists of the Sensations exhibition are state funded - in the
main. (Brit Art was prompted by Sachi who ran the thatcher propaganda
machine - and promoted via the Arts Council and Tate Gallery) Art has
also fundamentally changed in the Po-Mo period, in the UK the state
funded Tate Gallery provides legitimation, in the US funding is maybe by
private industry via government projects - but much the same in effect.
This change in art and science is sufficient for a modernist to say that
it is no longer science or art. From a modernist standpoint an argument
for the sensations works being not art could be maintained, Guiliani's
agreeing was probably accidental.
--
James Whitehead
Gerry Quinn
>In article <r0r45.1184$r4....@news.indigo.ie>, Gerry Quinn
><ger...@indigo.ie> writes
>>Take for example the leptoquarks (theoretically described but
>>experimentally inaccessible particles which may exist at the E/M-Colour
>>unification scale).
>I think you've said something quite important here - that something can
>exist yet have no existent attributes. Are you saying that?
>
I think you would have to study some elementary particle theory, as your
understanding of what I am saying appears to be vague.
Leptoquarks are the names given to some structures that (according to
certain theories) would be directly observable at incredibly high
energy densities that we have no hope of creating, but might have
existed close to the Big Bang. The matrix in which these structures
exist is not well understood - to some extent the 'theories' are more
like mathematical symmetries, and many scientists understand them this
way.
Nowadays (i.e. at energy scales relevant to familiar physical processes
in stars etc.) such structures might still play a role but - like
quarks, only worse - cannot practically be separated from their
complementary structures (particles or anti-particles, bound to them by
strong forces) . Indeed, their energy is such that it is unlikely that
their potential existence causes interference effects, as can be the
case for structures of intermediate energy.
I use the term structures, because we don't know what they are made of.
"Elementary particles" can be pulled out of the vacuum along with their
opposites, and all types can be considered to be present _in potentia_
as virtual particles which have an effect on the properties of real
particles. Perhaps they might be thought of as ways in which
a fundamental background structure can vibrate.
>> They do have a function in some theories,
>Which is true of the tooth fairy - is it not?
>> but these
>>theories are concerned with things we CAN measure,
>Like the missing tooth and the sixpence?
>> which may relate to
>>particle collisions or even the distribution of galaxies or the
>>superabundance of matter compared to antimatter. There are no
>>metaphysical problems here (nor is metaphysics nonsense, it is an
>>essential foundation for physics).
>If you build a physics on tooth fairies your in deep trouble I think. I
>thought the one differentiation of science was its lack of a
>metaphysical ontology - its truths were/are real yet provisional. They
>require no metaphysical buttress - as does religion (include Marxism)
>But maybe this was old modern-science.
I have always considered science needs a metaphysical foundation, as
follows:
1. There exists a world external to ourselves
2. Our sense perceptions correspond somewhat to this world
3. The world is not designed to deceive us
>>
>>As for "big science" there has always been an element of showmanship in
>>that. Scientists are human, and even if they weren't they would
>>still need funding.
>Quite allot of *modern-science* was done without government funding -
>Darwin, Einstein, Kelvin, Faraday, Newton .....
>> Finally, note that the theorists who invent
>>the weird particles need only pencils, paper and wastebaskets, and so
>>are nothing to do with "big science".
>Sure - but why fund them to invent weird particles - and more
>importantly why fund the experiments to try to look or create these.
>Because there seems a limit to what humans can know - and what humans
>generally want to know. Once this limit is reached it marks the end of
>science - as a human endeavour.
Who _cares_ what humans generally want to know? The only relevant
criterion is what scientists want to know. It may be assumed that the
resources available will always be less than scientists desire. None of
this is relevant to whether science is progressing. The opinions of the
average person are not relevant to whether science is progressing
either.
>>
>>
>>Mapping DNA may be stamp collecting (one physicist early this century
>>said that all sciences apart from physics were stamp collecting). But
>>what about the creation of artificial life, or growing new organs, or
>>maybe even curing cancer - are such ideas entirely boring to you?
>In biology the crisis is not so apparent as yet. If the goal of medicine
>became that of preventing death- (physics TOE) even if this was
>achievable - that is immortality - the philosophers stone - would this
>be necessarily a good thing. Wouldn't the immortals cease to resemble
>humans at all?
I think you are confusing science with technology and politics. Science
is about finding out how the natural world operates. Technology is
about creating tools to control it. Politics is about how we choose to
use these tools. Okay, I was running science and technology together,
which in a sense is logical for biology (the scientific part of which
could be described as reverse-engineering evolution's technology).
But your key argument seems to be "I don't care about this, so therefore
it is a dead field". Or maybe "I fear this, so I want to produce
arguments for killing it".
- Gerry Quinn
Russ Sadd
news:0f8950f0...@usw-ex0103-019.remarq.com...
> exactly what are the differences between postmodernism and
My immediate answer to this question will undoubtedly annoy you: it depends
on how you're constructing "modernism" and "post-modernism".
For example, in the field of sociology, I'd (perhaps unkindly) say that
"modernism" is frequently used to signify a caricature of positivism;
"post-modernism" is used vaguely to signify a general reaction to
'established positivism', confusingly juxtaposing post-structural
deconstruction with the experience of modernity. 'Modernity' and
'post-modernity', I should add, are concepts which are often referred to as
"modernism" and "post-modernism" in some circles! In the arts, we can point
to more easily definiable movements, where "modernism" (e.g. in architecture
or painting) will refer to one style and "postmodernism" (i.e. as 'after
modernism) as a reaction to these trends.
Best regards,
Russ Sadd
--
E-mail: gri...@dircon.co.uk
Russ Sadd
> Point taken. Perhaps there is an overlapping btn the two movements?
> Like you said, the constructs of institutions, class and consciousness
> still exist today, but might not these things be reconstructed to serve
> the present day interests?
Isn't the experience of modernity one of turbulence and change? Wasn't this
the basis dear old Karl Marx's critique of bourgeois modernity - the
pointlessness and waste in which a house would be torn down to make way for
a factory, then the factory torn down to make way for a fashionable mansion,
all chaotic and temporary. The point about any constructs in modernity - be
they institutions, social class, or discourses of consciousness - it surely
that they are fluid and fleeting, 'local' as a post-structuralist might say.
> After all, an end of 20th century subject
> cannot have access to the values, thinking & way of life of another
> subject in a different historical era. So rather than still being
> within the epoch of modernity, we are in an era whereby the past is
> reconstituted, reconstructed, and renegotiated in accordance to our
> understanding?
Sounds like just every other era to me! <grin> Such is the study of
history - an ongoing reinterpretation.
> The key word is modernism 'thought' itself (ie the grand narratives
> which come from it) as universally applicable & hence its imposition of
> imperialism, colonialism and westernisation upon the foreign "others".
Discourses of the study of certain meta-narratives, I'd add, that are
likewise local phenomena.
> Science,
> > being only one type of rationality, also fell into disrepute. Now
> these
> > were easy enough to challenge. At the moment however, postmodern
> theorists
> > such as Jameson and Lyotard both correctly note economics as the new
> > metanarrative, but to date, alternatives and critique has been
> > unconvincing.
> >
> > Indeed, it is worth considering that (in leiu of an alternative) that
> > economics is _the_ successful metanarrative. ;-)
> >
> Are you thinking of the relation btn post-Fordism & pdm whereby the
> large scale factory is displaced by smaller units dispersed globally -
> the emergence of global capital culture?
Oh-ho, the myth of globalisation - one of my own pet annoyances! Look
'behind' the narrative and you may read other aims, such as economic and
political dominance. Look to the 'new post-modern system of production' and
note that it chimes in pretty well with the long-established tradition of
mechanised craft production in Western European industrialisation (i.e.
'Fordism' as being discursively constructed as the dominant form of
production, but whose authority we can easily challenge by an exploration of
historical records European and American comparative industrialisation and
perceptions of it).
> Agreed. It's like Chinese telling anti-Chinese jokes: the act may seem
> politically and ideologically subversive, and an act of reclaiming
> identities, such jokes communicated within the said culture, it can be
> seen as resistance against prejudiced perception, but told across the
> racial line, the point of the joke depends on the existence of racist
> ideology.
Surely that's 'post-racism' rather than 'post-modern'?
> But on the other hand, I don't think subversion, atleast in
> the postmodern destablisation of binary constructs, should be limited
> as such.
Exactly. Foucault, old baldy himself, was pretty incensed with Derrida's
obsession with binaries, and penned some pretty sharp paragraphs about it
(well, short and to the point for Foucault!). But seriously, the idea of
'oppositional binaries' is such a terribly heterocentric way of looking at
the world, isn't it? Male/female, right/wrong, yin/yang.
> There should be a move away from the identication of the
> inscription carried within identities, but what cultural apparatus
> arranged this inscription, and what are the available agencies or means
> can be utilised as way of intervention.
>
> When a bunch of blokes in tights and powdered
> > wigs (sound like my place, actually)
>
> Charming..... I won't ask the nature or purpose of such activities ;-)
*Sigh!* I won't pass comment!
> That was the project of modernity, to "make it new". Postmodernists
> think that we cannot repeat such acts because - and rather than nazis,
> I'll use X-Files (well both are atrocious in their little ways):
> Mulder believed that "the truth is out there", that there's this
> conspiracy btn aliens & govts controlling the good ol'denizens of the
> world, and that once this "truth" is uncovered, we will all throw
> parties & be freed. Ha. Knowledge & truth are produced out of power
> struggles, & is used to legitimise authorities and governance. So now
> we come to the point I really hate because you'll ask: if pomo cannot
> speak or act for the subjects, what good does it do?
This is why I prefer to call myself a 'post-structuralist', as the entire
point of post-structuralism is not to define anything - just ongoing,
self-reflexive, subversive deconstruction.
> Practical answer
> would be: dammit, I'm an undergrad, not a PhD candidate! But I'm sure
> there are more in-depth arguments, if only I know them :(
Are there? I'm not too sure. But why deny yourself voice *because you're
'only' an undergrad'? You can't be subversive if you're bowing to discourses
of academic worth! <grin>
Russ Sadd
news:Pine.OSF.4.10.100061...@cassius.its.unimelb.edu.au...
> No, because I don't think that is the case. The factories have moved
> offshore, as advanced capitalism starts to take up "postmodern"
> computerised means of production. Modernity is synonomous with
> industrialisation in this case - and that's been moved offshore.
Umm... I'm afraid I'd have to take issue with you here, as I'd blame
*modernity* for discourses of 'post-industrialisation', a supposedly *new*
form of industrial production. Instead, I'd argue that discourses of
'Fordism' started to founder on the widening gulf between 'what industrial
production should be' and its experiential reality - mechanised craft
production is perhaps a better description of the history of European
industrialisation.
James Whitehead
<ger...@indigo.ie> writes
>In article <A9yH5GAw...@jliat.demon.co.uk>, James Whitehead
><jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>In article <r0r45.1184$r4....@news.indigo.ie>, Gerry Quinn
>><ger...@indigo.ie> writes
>>>Take for example the leptoquarks (theoretically described but
>>>experimentally inaccessible particles which may exist at the E/M-Colour
>>>unification scale).
>>I think you've said something quite important here - that something can
>>exist yet have no existent attributes. Are you saying that?
>>
>
>I think you would have to study some elementary particle theory, as your
>understanding of what I am saying appears to be vague.
however there are certainly connotations in this for the study in
general.
>
>Leptoquarks are the names given to some structures that (according to
>certain theories) would be directly observable at incredibly high
>energy densities that we have no hope of creating, but might have
>existed close to the Big Bang.
from my naive position not only can we not create this but also by its
nature the early big bang is un-observable?
> The matrix in which these structures
>exist is not well understood - to some extent the 'theories' are more
>like mathematical symmetries, and many scientists understand them this
>way.
>
>Nowadays (i.e. at energy scales relevant to familiar physical processes
>in stars etc.) such structures might still play a role but - like
>quarks, only worse - cannot practically be separated from their
>complementary structures (particles or anti-particles, bound to them by
>strong forces) . Indeed, their energy is such that it is unlikely that
>their potential existence causes interference effects, as can be the
>case for structures of intermediate energy.
How can they play a role when they cannot cause interference effects?
>
>I use the term structures, because we don't know what they are made of.
Mathematical structures are not made of anything?
>
>"Elementary particles" can be pulled out of the vacuum along with their
>opposites, and all types can be considered to be present _in potentia_
>as virtual particles which have an effect on the properties of real
>particles. Perhaps they might be thought of as ways in which
>a fundamental background structure can vibrate.
Why is it when pulled they and their opposite do not annihilate each
other?
>I have always considered science needs a metaphysical foundation, as
>follows:
>1. There exists a world external to ourselves
>2. Our sense perceptions correspond somewhat to this world
>3. The world is not designed to deceive us
This is fine - but you have not shown how these are necessary - its just
something you would like? (in actual fact you might like to add certain
axioms of logic as well) But you can do science regardless of these
foundations.
1. But whether the data gathered from an experiment is from an external
world or an internal virtual world takes no part in the experiment.
2. Sense perceptions and the world can be regarded as one and the same -
or disregarded altogether. In fact you need more than "somewhat" -
without this you have problems with 3. We can only prove ourselves to
have been mistaken to ourselves. Saying we might always be mistaken
makes no difference to any science. As I said its success was in not
bothering with any metaphysics. (In fact in deliberately avoiding them -
i.e. that God made the world in 7 days... etc.)
3. Designed? We are in the world and part of it - if its deception that
water boils at sea level at 100 C every time we boil water so be it.
>
>Who _cares_ what humans generally want to know? The only relevant
>criterion is what scientists want to know.
Scientists should - because they are humans - so wanting to know a
theory of everything might be a big mistake.
> It may be assumed that the
>resources available will always be less than scientists desire. None of
>this is relevant to whether science is progressing. The opinions of the
>average person are not relevant to whether science is progressing
>either.
Not so - for if scientists are the only judges then they delude
themselves and their patrons, which is what has happened. Now the
scientist plays the "I'll cure your Cancer" or "I'll make you a big
Bomb" card. Again the supercollider was cancelled by the opinions of
average people. If scientists do relate to average people as you say
then soon they will have no funding whatsoever. Science is not from my
average standpoint progressing.
>>>Mapping DNA may be stamp collecting (one physicist early this century
>>>said that all sciences apart from physics were stamp collecting). But
>>>what about the creation of artificial life, or growing new organs, or
>>>maybe even curing cancer - are such ideas entirely boring to you?
>>In biology the crisis is not so apparent as yet. If the goal of medicine
>>became that of preventing death- (physics TOE) even if this was
>>achievable - that is immortality - the philosophers stone - would this
>>be necessarily a good thing. Wouldn't the immortals cease to resemble
>>humans at all?
>
>I think you are confusing science with technology and politics. Science
>is about finding out how the natural world operates. Technology is
>about creating tools to control it. Politics is about how we choose to
>use these tools. Okay, I was running science and technology together,
>which in a sense is logical for biology (the scientific part of which
>could be described as reverse-engineering evolution's technology).
I'm not confusing them, the limits of science are the limits of science-
how much we can know - or want to know, the limits of technology are
both what is practical, affordable but also what is desired. Politics is
about how we manipulate our social structures - for the good of all, the
good of the state, or the individual, or some other (arbitrary)
rationale. Evolution has nothing to do with technology. The reason
science was important in the past was its source of power- and so
control, it is no different to how the Catholic dogma could have been
regarded.
>
>But your key argument seems to be "I don't care about this, so therefore
>it is a dead field". Or maybe "I fear this, so I want to produce
>arguments for killing it".
No - its a dead field - so I don't care about it (actually I was a fan)
and as a *dead* field it holds no fear. Your dreams of Star trek futures
are identical with the hopes of heaven of the religious faithful, if it
stops you from your fear of the actuality of existence - fine.
--
James Whitehead
G*rd*n
ger...@indigo.ie (Gerry Quinn):
| I have always considered science needs a metaphysical foundation, as
| follows:
| 1. There exists a world external to ourselves
| 2. Our sense perceptions correspond somewhat to this world
| 3. The world is not designed to deceive us
I think one could get by with less, whereas up until the day
they came up with the Copenhagen Interpretation I guess one
would have to say it actually carried more metaphysical
baggage.
I'm speaking literally, of course. I'm cognizant of the
great political and psychological weight which the notion of
"reality" entails, which may be socially necessary to
sustain science as an institution.
| ...
| >Sure - but why fund them to invent weird particles - and more
| >importantly why fund the experiments to try to look or create these.
| >Because there seems a limit to what humans can know - and what humans
| >generally want to know. Once this limit is reached it marks the end of
| >science - as a human endeavour.
|
| Who _cares_ what humans generally want to know? The only relevant
| criterion is what scientists want to know. It may be assumed that the
| resources available will always be less than scientists desire. None of
| this is relevant to whether science is progressing. The opinions of the
| average person are not relevant to whether science is progressing
| either.
| ...
There is if the a.p. is expected to pay for it, supply it with
metaphysics, and be its ultimate audience, which seems to be
the case.
Joyce
Very very annoying...
>Isn't the experience of modernity one of turbulence and change?
Wasn't this
>the basis dear old Karl Marx's critique of bourgeois modernity -
the
>pointlessness and waste in which a house would be torn down to
make way for
>a factory, then the factory torn down to make way for a
fashionable mansion,
>all chaotic and temporary.
Gosh, with Marx, everything's about structure & economic base!
Marxism, IMO, narrowed itself to the dichotomies of body/mind,
science/ideology, not to mention seeing human bodies & its needs
as innate & timeless, which serves to reinscribe the
construction of masculine/feminine gender identity. I really
have no patience with discourses which see the necessity to
establish for themselves some kind of "foundational" truth from
which they can irradiate from.
The point about any constructs in modernity - be
>they institutions, social class, or discourses of
consciousness - it surely
>that they are fluid and fleeting, 'local' as a post-
structuralist might say.
Let me guess, you're a poststructuralist?
>Sounds like just every other era to me! <grin> Such is the
study of
>history - an ongoing reinterpretation.
Yup. And the good news is, history is not teleological, but
contingent and discontinuous. Certainly we are seeing a revision
of history in recent films, where the previous "good guys" (ie
English imperialists) are depicted from the oppressed subject's
perspective eg "Once Upon a Time in China".
>
>Surely that's 'post-racism' rather than 'post-modern'?
Unfortunately, I doubt "postracism" will be realised in the
forseeable future. But no, I was thinking about the flip side of
subverting racist prejudices, the irony of it preserving the
ideology of racism.
>
>Exactly. Foucault, old baldy himself,
Humpty Dumpty...
But seriously, the idea of
>'oppositional binaries' is such a terribly heterocentric way of
looking at
>the world, isn't it? Male/female, right/wrong, yin/yang.
Absolutely horrid. 17th century Europe saw the "miracle" of
masculine auto-reproduction in the form of human subject, which
not only effectively cancelled the female out of the equation,
but also created the binarism of mind/body, masculine/female,
present/absent, rational/irrational & so the list goes on. No
chocolate fish for noticing that the left side is always given
the negative connotations which are naturalised as fundamental
facts over the period of time.
>This is why I prefer to call myself a 'post-structuralist',
I was right!!!
as the entire
>point of post-structuralism is not to define anything - just
ongoing,
>self-reflexive, subversive deconstruction.
>
This isn't an attack on poststructuralism, but more out of
curiousity: if, as you said, poststructuralism is "ongoing, self-
reflexive, subversive deconstruction", then would it risk
political passivity simply because of its reactionery stance
towards socio-political events?
>Are there? I'm not too sure. But why deny yourself voice
*because you're
>'only' an undergrad'? You can't be subversive if you're bowing
to discourses
>of academic worth! <grin>
Sounds good to me.
Cheers,
Joyce
>
>Best regards,
>
>Russ Sadd
>
>--
>E-mail: gri...@dircon.co.uk
>
>
>
>
Got questions? Get answers over the phone at Keen.com.
Up to 100 minutes free!
http://www.keen.com
Joyce
>I have always considered science needs a metaphysical
foundation, as
>follows:
>1. There exists a world external to ourselves
>2. Our sense perceptions correspond somewhat to this world
>3. The world is not designed to deceive us
>
subjective to individual's own perspectives.
>>>
>Who _cares_ what humans generally want to know? The only
relevant
>criterion is what scientists want to know. It may be assumed
that the
>resources available will always be less than scientists
desire. None of
>this is relevant to whether science is progressing. The
opinions of the
>average person are not relevant to whether science is
progressing
>either.
>
it to be? As a knowledge and discourse produced and managed by
human, I would think that science is less neutral, or sceptical,
as it'd like us to think. To quote Alexa Hepburn's article, "On
the Alleged Incompatibility Between Relativism and Feminist
Psychology", "[s]cientific facts are treated as doing their work
by _forcing_ themselves on the scientists who are _forced_ to
accept their existence".
Joyce
that's all]
>>If you're talking about the traditional western notion of both
as
>>advancements for humanity, then yes, probably so.
>This is a complex counter movement to science - I'll say
something in
>reply to Gerry.
>--
>James Whitehead
>
If I interpreted Gerry's message correctly, he seems to see
scientific facts as external to human experience?
Gerry Quinn
>In article <W5L45.1439$r4....@news.indigo.ie>, Gerry Quinn
>>"Elementary particles" can be pulled out of the vacuum along with their
>>opposites, and all types can be considered to be present _in potentia_
>>as virtual particles which have an effect on the properties of real
>>particles. Perhaps they might be thought of as ways in which
>>a fundamental background structure can vibrate.
>Why is it when pulled they and their opposite do not annihilate each
>other?
>
They tend to, when they meet. There are undoubtedly difficult issues
here, but they are not metaphysical. We do X. We get a consistent
response. The response suggests certain symmetries. We make models of
what's really going on, though we don't understand the nature of the
physical systems in detail, any more than the ancients understood the
chemical structure of wood.
>>I have always considered science needs a metaphysical foundation, as
>>follows:
>>1. There exists a world external to ourselves
>>2. Our sense perceptions correspond somewhat to this world
>>3. The world is not designed to deceive us
>
>This is fine - but you have not shown how these are necessary - its just
>something you would like? (in actual fact you might like to add certain
>axioms of logic as well) But you can do science regardless of these
>foundations.
>
One can do science by operating at random, and hoping for the best.
They are needed - in my opinion - to justify the application of a
scientific, as distinct from a religious or an astrological approach, to
understanding the nature of the world. Metaphysics lite, perhaps, but
it serves me well enough.
>1. But whether the data gathered from an experiment is from an external
>world or an internal virtual world takes no part in the experiment.
>2. Sense perceptions and the world can be regarded as one and the same -
>or disregarded altogether. In fact you need more than "somewhat" -
>without this you have problems with 3. We can only prove ourselves to
>have been mistaken to ourselves. Saying we might always be mistaken
>makes no difference to any science. As I said its success was in not
>bothering with any metaphysics. (In fact in deliberately avoiding them -
>i.e. that God made the world in 7 days... etc.)
>3. Designed? We are in the world and part of it - if its deception that
>water boils at sea level at 100 C every time we boil water so be it.
>
>
>>
>>Who _cares_ what humans generally want to know? The only relevant
>>criterion is what scientists want to know.
>Scientists should - because they are humans - so wanting to know a
>theory of everything might be a big mistake.
So it might.
>> It may be assumed that the
>>resources available will always be less than scientists desire. None of
>>this is relevant to whether science is progressing. The opinions of the
>>average person are not relevant to whether science is progressing
>>either.
>Not so - for if scientists are the only judges then they delude
>themselves and their patrons, which is what has happened. Now the
>scientist plays the "I'll cure your Cancer" or "I'll make you a big
>Bomb" card. Again the supercollider was cancelled by the opinions of
>average people. If scientists do relate to average people as you say
>then soon they will have no funding whatsoever. Science is not from my
>average standpoint progressing.
>
The only thing scientists can best judge is science. If it were
discovered that, due to certain processes and interactions in the human
body, no medical intervention can cure most cancers, that would be
scientific progress. None of this takes away from the your ability to
judge whether science benefits you, or whether you should pay for
supercolliders (personally, I think you shouldn't).
[--]
>>But your key argument seems to be "I don't care about this, so therefore
>>it is a dead field". Or maybe "I fear this, so I want to produce
>>arguments for killing it".
>No - its a dead field - so I don't care about it (actually I was a fan)
>and as a *dead* field it holds no fear. Your dreams of Star trek futures
>are identical with the hopes of heaven of the religious faithful, if it
>stops you from your fear of the actuality of existence - fine.
>
What can I say except, I expect you will be surprised now and again by
what emanates from what you perceive as a dead field. As for my dreams
of Star Trek futures, I quite honestly don't have such dreams. I am
fairly phlegmatic about the benefits of most high technologies, although
I am pretty confident of exciting developments in the information and
biological sectors (and their intersection).
How long have you had usenet, incidentally? Beats writing letters to
the editor in green ink!
- Gerry Quinn
Gerry Quinn
>>
>If I interpreted Gerry's message correctly, he seems to see
>scientific facts as external to human experience?
>
Sure! That, indeed, is why scientists rarely speak of "scientific
facts" - they are aware that their ideas may be coloured by their human
perspective(s).
- Gerry Quinn
Gerry Quinn
>Is science as objective & factual as the dominant belief holds
>it to be? As a knowledge and discourse produced and managed by
>human, I would think that science is less neutral, or sceptical,
>as it'd like us to think. To quote Alexa Hepburn's article, "On
>the Alleged Incompatibility Between Relativism and Feminist
>Psychology", "[s]cientific facts are treated as doing their work
>by _forcing_ themselves on the scientists who are _forced_ to
>accept their existence".
The popularity of the Popperian model as a simplistic way of describing
the methodology of science does not prove that the majority of
scientists think that is the way science works.
As for relativism and feminist psychology, I excoriate them equally!
- Gerry Quinn
Russ Sadd
news:0a0e3ad4...@usw-ex0105-038.remarq.com...
> Gosh, with Marx, everything's about structure & economic base!
> Marxism, IMO, narrowed itself to the dichotomies of body/mind,
> science/ideology, not to mention seeing human bodies & its needs
> as innate & timeless, which serves to reinscribe the
> construction of masculine/feminine gender identity. I really
> have no patience with discourses which see the necessity to
> establish for themselves some kind of "foundational" truth from
> which they can irradiate from.
Don't expect me to disagree with your (scathing) analysis! I only cited
Marx's observation as being a well-known one about modernity, although if I
were a classical scholar, I could easily have picked this or that out from
Juvenus. 'Modernity', not 'modernism'.
> The point about any constructs in modernity - be
> >they institutions, social class, or discourses of
> consciousness - it surely
> >that they are fluid and fleeting, 'local' as a post-
> structuralist might say.
>
> Let me guess, you're a poststructuralist?
Unashamedly so, yes.
> Yup. And the good news is, history is not teleological, but
> contingent and discontinuous. Certainly we are seeing a revision
> of history in recent films, where the previous "good guys" (ie
> English imperialists) are depicted from the oppressed subject's
> perspective eg "Once Upon a Time in China".
Ah, but to return to the example of That Bloody Submarine Film, we weren't
talking so much about a 'general' re-evaluation of recorded history but a
specific re-interpretation of it by a certain group of people as part of a
more widespread construction of American (imperial) power and military
dominance - re-writing the history of 20th Century warfare so that America
wins, wins, wins! Very much in the tradition of 'Saving Private Ryan', the
sixteen films in which 'America won the Gulf War', or for that matter, the
five about the 'triumph in Vietnam'! Imperialism isn't restricted to Britain
or France.
> >Surely that's 'post-racism' rather than 'post-modern'?
>
> Unfortunately, I doubt "postracism" will be realised in the
> forseeable future. But no, I was thinking about the flip side of
> subverting racist prejudices, the irony of it preserving the
> ideology of racism.
Well, I'm not too fond of the 'post-modern' desire to 'embrace labels of
hate and make them our own'. I've got a different attitude, after all! But
here, the entire idea still feeds off racism having happened. Without
discourses of racism, the 'irony' in this position wouldn't work.
> But seriously, the idea of
> >'oppositional binaries' is such a terribly heterocentric way of
> looking at
> >the world, isn't it? Male/female, right/wrong, yin/yang.
>
> Absolutely horrid. 17th century Europe saw the "miracle" of
> masculine auto-reproduction in the form of human subject, which
> not only effectively cancelled the female out of the equation,
> but also created the binarism of mind/body, masculine/female,
> present/absent, rational/irrational & so the list goes on. No
> chocolate fish for noticing that the left side is always given
> the negative connotations which are naturalised as fundamental
> facts over the period of time.
But isn't the promotion of the heterosexual binary more of a 'recent'
phenomena? Whatever people like to believe about late 20th Century
'liberalism', it's been more or less rammed down peoples' throats since the
1950s. In any case, we're still talking about self-indenties embedded within
discourse, and so we return to something fundamentally unstable. The
promotion of the stable heterosexual gender binary is another myth - isn't
this what Foucault meant by 'heterotopia'? Some people have even blamed it
for rising homophobia.
> >This is why I prefer to call myself a 'post-structuralist',
>
> I was right!!!
>
> as the entire
> >point of post-structuralism is not to define anything - just
> ongoing,
> >self-reflexive, subversive deconstruction.
> >
> This isn't an attack on poststructuralism, but more out of
> curiousity: if, as you said, poststructuralism is "ongoing, self-
> reflexive, subversive deconstruction", then would it risk
> political passivity simply because of its reactionery stance
> towards socio-political events?
Why should an analytical attitude come part and parcel with a
socio-political attitude? I'd have hoped we'd left the Bad Old Days of the
Frankfurt School well behind us! One of the main goals of
post-structuralists - insomuch as it is possible for there to be any with an
ongoing critique - is to invert/subvert authority by uncovering (hidden or
marginalised) 'political' agendas. So yes, post-structuralism might be
better described as an 'attack' or an 'attitude' than a 'philosopy': the
interest is on what something isn't, not what it should be.
Best regards,
Russ
--
E-mail: gri...@dircon.co.uk
James Whitehead
>>
>If I interpreted Gerry's message correctly, he seems to see
>scientific facts as external to human experience?
He may well do - however I think that science is not philosophy. If your
doing biology, first principals of epistemology are unimportant - to the
biology. The reality of the external world is irrelevant within the
game.
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
<ger...@indigo.ie> writes
>>
>
>They tend to, when they meet. There are undoubtedly difficult issues
>here, but they are not metaphysical. We do X. We get a consistent
>response. The response suggests certain symmetries. We make models of
>what's really going on, though we don't understand the nature of the
>physical systems in detail, any more than the ancients understood the
>chemical structure of wood.
scientific understanding is only good for a range of time/size - is a
feature of a certain scale of things - as at the very
large/distant/past/future - and in the now - it breaks down. Like a map
is only useful up to a certain scale - the world seems only logical
within a defined size.
>
>One can do science by operating at random, and hoping for the best.
>They are needed - in my opinion - to justify the application of a
>scientific, as distinct from a religious or an astrological approach, to
>understanding the nature of the world. Metaphysics lite, perhaps, but
>it serves me well enough.
metaphysics - and within a certain framework pragmatically works.
Newton, Faraday, et al. had a metaphysics predicated on a God/Creator -
more recent scientists do not - this does not effect their method or
their findings. The justification for science over astrology et al. was
that it got results. The seeming re-interest in astrology - new-ageism
et al. is a sign of sciences failure - of late.
...
>
>The only thing scientists can best judge is science.
Even this has become dubious - as they seem to be forcing their theories
through nonsensical turns to fit the observations - its getting silly.
>
>What can I say except, I expect you will be surprised now and again by
>what emanates from what you perceive as a dead field.
I think the big science in the past could always be detected - any
future breakthroughs will be incomprehensible.
> As for my dreams
>of Star Trek futures, I quite honestly don't have such dreams. I am
>fairly phlegmatic about the benefits of most high technologies, although
>I am pretty confident of exciting developments in the information and
>biological sectors (and their intersection).
It would be interesting to hear from you what these might be?
>
>How long have you had usenet, incidentally? Beats writing letters to
>the editor in green ink!
Usenet technology is based on 19th century telegraphic technology - a
teletypewriter sending ASCII codes, based on science done 150 years ago.
But the technology which underpins our discussion is in a sense
irrelevant - green ink to a periodical or over a pint in the local -
--
James Whitehead
ale...@my-deja.com
> >>
> >If I interpreted Gerry's message correctly, he seems to see
> >scientific facts as external to human experience?
> >
>
> facts" - they are aware that their ideas may be coloured by their
human
> perspective(s).
But since these "facts" have to be conveyed by scientists, wouldn't
there be an element of representation, and therefore, not as objective
as it seems?
>
> - Gerry Quinn
ale...@my-deja.com
James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk> wrote:
> In article <0669cedc...@usw-ex0105-038.remarq.com>, Joyce
> >>
> >If I interpreted Gerry's message correctly, he seems to see
> >scientific facts as external to human experience?
>
your
> doing biology, first principals of epistemology are unimportant - to
the
> biology. The reality of the external world is irrelevant within the
> game.
> --
> James Whitehead
>
ale...@my-deja.com
> The popularity of the Popperian model as a simplistic way of
describing
> the methodology of science does not prove that the majority of
> scientists think that is the way science works.
>
> As for relativism and feminist psychology, I excoriate them equally!
>
> - Gerry Quinn
>
[eyes closed tight in deep psychic pain] You're joking about the last
bit, right?
ale...@my-deja.com
> Don't expect me to disagree with your (scathing) analysis! I only
cited
> Marx's observation as being a well-known one about modernity,
although if I
> were a classical scholar, I could easily have picked this or that out
from
> Juvenus. 'Modernity', not 'modernism'.
Hope I didn't sound "scathing" in my critique. What I was trying to say
is that power is much more diverse and decentered than what Marxism
sees it to be. But that's not to disacknowledge the dominanting force
of capitalistic political economy, just that factors other than economy
should also be taken into consideration.
>
> Ah, but to return to the example of That Bloody Submarine Film, we
weren't
> talking so much about a 'general' re-evaluation of recorded history
but a
> specific re-interpretation of it by a certain group of people as part
of a
> more widespread construction of American (imperial) power and military
> dominance - re-writing the history of 20th Century warfare so that
America
> wins, wins, wins! Very much in the tradition of 'Saving Private
Ryan', the
> sixteen films in which 'America won the Gulf War', or for that
matter, the
> five about the 'triumph in Vietnam'! Imperialism isn't restricted to
Britain
> or France.
>
Oh for sure, The Epistemes of Hollywood Cinematic Production...
> Well, I'm not too fond of the 'post-modern' desire to 'embrace labels
of
> hate and make them our own'. I've got a different attitude, after
all! But
> here, the entire idea still feeds off racism having happened. Without
> discourses of racism, the 'irony' in this position wouldn't work.
Yes to certain extent the reclaimation of labels does conflate the
complexity of the culturally produced meaning of the word itself. But
on the other hand, it fits right into the postmodern ambiguity and
plurality of interpretations. Identity politics, however, is a
different story (don't start me off on that)...
>
> But isn't the promotion of the heterosexual binary more of a 'recent'
> phenomena?
If you're talking about the discourse of sexuality, then yes.
Whatever people like to believe about late 20th Century
> 'liberalism', it's been more or less rammed down peoples' throats
since the
> 1950s. In any case, we're still talking about self-indenties embedded
within
> discourse, and so we return to something fundamentally unstable. The
> promotion of the stable heterosexual gender binary is another myth -
isn't
> this what Foucault meant by 'heterotopia'? Some people have even
blamed it
> for rising homophobia.
Do you mean the construction of heterosexual norm as an imaginery ideal
landscape with restricted access?
> Why should an analytical attitude come part and parcel with a
> socio-political attitude? I'd have hoped we'd left the Bad Old Days
of the
> Frankfurt School well behind us! One of the main goals of
> post-structuralists - insomuch as it is possible for there to be any
with an
> ongoing critique - is to invert/subvert authority by uncovering
(hidden or
> marginalised) 'political' agendas. So yes, post-structuralism might be
> better described as an 'attack' or an 'attitude' than a 'philosopy':
the
> interest is on what something isn't, not what it should be.
I think there's a certain irony in the postmodern or
poststructuralism's critique of the modernist theory - in analysis
something as universal and global a notion as modernism, our own
analysis would also contain elements of universalising, wouldn't it?
But on the other hand, I wouldn't go so far as to concede with the
trans-political stance which Baudrillard took in the later stage of his
work.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Russ
>
> --
> E-mail: gri...@dircon.co.uk
>
>
G*rd*n
| > >>
| > >If I interpreted Gerry's message correctly, he seems to see
| > >scientific facts as external to human experience?
| > >
ger...@indigo.ie (Gerry Quinn) wrote:
| > Sure! That, indeed, is why scientists rarely speak of "scientific
| > facts" - they are aware that their ideas may be coloured by their
| human
| > perspective(s).
| But since these "facts" have to be conveyed by scientists, wouldn't
| there be an element of representation, and therefore, not as objective
| as it seems?
God is in the grammar -- in this case, the Unmoving Mover.
It is an article of faith that there is not only an other
Out There, but that it is utterly unaffected by what we
think about it or perceive of it. I myself find this being
superfluous to science, but some people obviously don't.
Certainly the facts which science actually treats are not
external to human experience, but part of it, but I take it
that the further end of each fact is thought by believers in
the U.M. to be attached to it, so that in this sense the fact
is _partly_ in the world but not of it, a divine messenger as
it were.
Russ Sadd
> Hope I didn't sound "scathing" in my critique. What I was trying to say
> is that power is much more diverse and decentered than what Marxism
> sees it to be.
In my opinion, Marx treats power as something economically quantifiable,
creating thereby a blunt instrument with which to bash the bourgeoisie. More
subtle approaches, such as those of knowledge/power or as an enactment do
tend to undermine his work. Not to mention Marxism.
> But that's not to disacknowledge the dominanting force
> of capitalistic political economy, just that factors other than economy
> should also be taken into consideration.
This isn't quite what I meant by 'modernity'. The 'experience of modern
life' is perhaps a better label for the context I was reaching for - the
'modernity' of, say, Kern, Bauman, Wallerstein, Braudel, or Berman.
> Yes to certain extent the reclaimation of labels does conflate the
> complexity of the culturally produced meaning of the word itself. But
> on the other hand, it fits right into the postmodern ambiguity and
> plurality of interpretations. Identity politics, however, is a
> different story (don't start me off on that)...
This is where, to my mind, 'post-modern' humour of this form jars. Yes, it
is ironic for, say, a gay man to say something homophobic *where the irony
stems from his awareness of the construction of his own position as a gay
man*, but where exactly is the irony is the *post-modern* form *where this
construction has been replaced by ambiguity*. Self-conscious irony becomes
ambiguous nastiness.
Quite different from the 'reclamation of labels', an inherently pointless
pursuit as it is to do with signifiers, not the signified (the two, as well
we know, are hardly fixed). 'Queer' might well be meant as an insult, but my
point is the *intention*, not the word (the term 'queer', for example, being
regarded as dated, but on the other hand being used ever more in academia as
'queer theory'). Nothing is fixed. Speaking from a psychoanalytic
perspective, however, I would question the degree to which the 'reclamation
of labels' concept - in so far as gay men are concerned - may be linked to a
further internalisation of homophobia and hatred.
> > But isn't the promotion of the heterosexual binary more of a 'recent'
> > phenomena?
>
> If you're talking about the discourse of sexuality, then yes.
Of *a* discourse of sexuality, yes.
> Do you mean the construction of heterosexual norm as an imaginery ideal
> landscape with restricted access?
No, I was thinking of how the heterosexual gender binary is constructed as
'normal' - its emplacement at the centre. At the centre, the HGB becomes
invisible - any alternative construct is therefore described in its
*difference*. Of course the HGB is an imaginary ideal - all ideals are - but
it is the inevitable fall-out (in consequence of it being both unreachable
and unstable) to which I was alluding.
> I think there's a certain irony in the postmodern or
> poststructuralism's critique of the modernist theory - in analysis
> something as universal and global a notion as modernism, our own
> analysis would also contain elements of universalising, wouldn't it?
Given that 'post-modernism' constructs a 'modernism' in order to oppose it,
we can argue that it is resonating with discourses of modernity: 'new' is
better than 'old'. Moreover, this constructed 'modernism' is surprisingly
easy to critique: not so much because of its 'modern' stance but its
*pre-modern* stance. Furthermore, in its critiques, post-modernism relies on
quintessentially *modern* tools and techniques (e.g. psychoanalytic modes of
thought, textual analysis, linguistics). If I wanted to stick my neck out
still further, I could brutally state that the modernism/post-modernism
debate is largely an artificial one embedded within discourses of modernity.
This is why I tend to side with Berman, who described 'post-modernity' as an
attitude characteristic of fin-de-millennium modernity. But to return to
your point, we're no more than single voices in the greater clamour of
discourse.
> But on the other hand, I wouldn't go so far as to concede with the
> trans-political stance which Baudrillard took in the later stage of his
> work.
The less said about Baudrillard, the better!
Tinka
> The less said about Baudrillard, the better!
That is *exactly* how I feel about Berman.
--
Tinka
-------
writing letters to my frenz..
telling them all about split ends..
(p.judd, 1971)
ale...@my-deja.com
> God is in the grammar -- in this case, the Unmoving Mover.
> It is an article of faith that there is not only an other
> Out There, but that it is utterly unaffected by what we
> think about it or perceive of it. I myself find this being
> superfluous to science, but some people obviously don't.
>
> Certainly the facts which science actually treats are not
> external to human experience, but part of it, but I take it
> that the further end of each fact is thought by believers in
> the U.M. to be attached to it, so that in this sense the fact
> is _partly_ in the world but not of it, a divine messenger as
> it were.
>
Let me think that one out - so you are suggesting that like the
grammatical existence of the concept of "God", scientific facts exist by
virtue of individual's perception? Sorry I'm a bit confused here (so
what's new ? :)
ale...@my-deja.com
> In my opinion, Marx treats power as something economically
quantifiable,
> creating thereby a blunt instrument with which to bash the
bourgeoisie. More
> subtle approaches, such as those of knowledge/power or as an enactment
do
> tend to undermine his work. Not to mention Marxism.
Yes a multiperspectival cultural analysis is far more feasible. What I
found problematic of Marxism is that its focus on oppression is mainly
concerned with men, ie, oppression as arisen from state and class,
whereas for women, oppression is more from specifically on ideology and
patriarchal society. Despite Emma Goldman and Alexandra Kollontai's
valuable input, in Marxist terms (or atleast early Marxism), women don't
even constitute a class because domestic labour is unwaged. But then
again, there is also the issue of gender construction which dictated the
workscape for men & women. Marxism, to my knowledge, didn't address to
that.
> This is where, to my mind, 'post-modern' humour of this form jars.
Yes, it
> is ironic for, say, a gay man to say something homophobic *where the
irony
> stems from his awareness of the construction of his own position as a
gay
> man*, but where exactly is the irony is the *post-modern* form *where
this
> construction has been replaced by ambiguity*. Self-conscious irony
becomes
> ambiguous nastiness.
Identity politics is problematic, I agree. On the one hand you subverted
the previously demonised and subjugated subject position to something as
positive, but on the other hand, there is the risk of fetishization and
prioritising one specific difference over another. Not to mention, as
you've pointed out, that the undercurrent connotation of homophobic
meaning is still at large.
>
> Quite different from the 'reclamation of labels', an inherently
pointless
> pursuit as it is to do with signifiers, not the signified (the two, as
well
> we know, are hardly fixed). 'Queer' might well be meant as an insult,
but my
> point is the *intention*, not the word (the term 'queer', for example,
being
> regarded as dated, but on the other hand being used ever more in
academia as
> 'queer theory'). Nothing is fixed. Speaking from a psychoanalytic
> perspective, however, I would question the degree to which the
'reclamation
> of labels' concept - in so far as gay men are concerned - may be
linked to a
> further internalisation of homophobia and hatred.
>
Excellently put.
> Of *a* discourse of sexuality, yes.
>
I beg your "pardon" ;-)
> No, I was thinking of how the heterosexual gender binary is
constructed as
> 'normal' - its emplacement at the centre. At the centre, the HGB
becomes
> invisible - any alternative construct is therefore described in its
> *difference*. Of course the HGB is an imaginary ideal - all ideals are
- but
> it is the inevitable fall-out (in consequence of it being both
unreachable
> and unstable) to which I was alluding.
For the sake of the advancement of gay and lesbian rights, I think we
should move away from the centre/margin, top/down dichotomy, because the
so-called victim position is not as permanent and fixed as we think them
to be.
> Given that 'post-modernism' constructs a 'modernism' in order to
oppose it,
> we can argue that it is resonating with discourses of modernity: 'new'
is
> better than 'old'. Moreover, this constructed 'modernism' is
surprisingly
> easy to critique: not so much because of its 'modern' stance but its
> *pre-modern* stance. Furthermore, in its critiques, post-modernism
relies on
> quintessentially *modern* tools and techniques (e.g. psychoanalytic
modes of
> thought, textual analysis, linguistics). If I wanted to stick my neck
out
> still further, I could brutally state that the
modernism/post-modernism
> debate is largely an artificial one embedded within discourses of
modernity.
Postmodernism as an orthodox, the big bad wolf of modernism cloaked in a
red hood? I see your point, but to deny the chance of opening up a
possiblity(ies) outside and away from modernism is better, IMO, than
nihilism. Someone else in this NG pointed out that feminism is a product
of modernity and certainly that is true, but overtime feminism has
developed from its patronomic, malestream-influenced liberal feminism &
began to challenge the traditional feminist thoughts which is deemed as
Eurocentric and limited, and sought for diversity, self-reflexivity and
acceptance of differences as well as the recent emergence of gender
performative theories which I find to be exhilariating. Is such
development so bad for a theory which was tainted (gasp) with modernity?
> This is why I tend to side with Berman, who described 'post-modernity'
as an
> attitude characteristic of fin-de-millennium modernity. But to return
to
> your point, we're no more than single voices in the greater clamour of
> discourse.
Any pretence to think we're some sort of individual standing outside the
rest of the world is just an Existentialist Narcisstic Jerk-Off.
>
> The less said about Baudrillard, the better!
>
Oh, he was okay in some aspects, such as simulation and hyperreality,
but I just can't stand the way he sets himself up as _the_ Postmodern
Authorial Dickhead. Oh, and his attack on Foucault, IMO, is more or less
a publicity stunt + sour grapes at Foucault's fame at the time. Okay,
I'm getting vicious, so better sent this off before I start a diatribe.
Joyce
> Best regards,
>
> Russ
>
> --
> E-mail: gri...@dircon.co.uk
>
>
Lev Lafayette
On Tue, 27 Jun 2000 ale...@my-deja.com wrote:
> Yes a multiperspectival cultural analysis is far more feasible. What I
> found problematic of Marxism is that its focus on oppression is mainly
> concerned with men, ie, oppression as arisen from state and class,
> whereas for women, oppression is more from specifically on ideology and
> patriarchal society. Despite Emma Goldman and Alexandra Kollontai's
> valuable input, in Marxist terms (or atleast early Marxism), women don't
> even constitute a class because domestic labour is unwaged. But then
> again, there is also the issue of gender construction which dictated the
> workscape for men & women. Marxism, to my knowledge, didn't address to
> that.
I cannot agree here. "Class" is a very specific term and no, "women" do
not constitute a class. A class refers to the _systematic_ relations of
production in capitalism. Patriarchy is a pre-capitalist form of
oppression and - under capitalism - can actually be dispensed with. The
Marxist concentration on class is because is it the organising principle
of society.
Capitalism can survive without the oppression of women. It can survive
without the oppression of different cultures. But it cannot survive
without class distinction.
Lev Lafayette.
l...@student.unimelb.edu.au http://www.student.unimelb.edu.au/~lev
G*rd*n
| > God is in the grammar -- in this case, the Unmoving Mover.
| > It is an article of faith that there is not only an other
| > Out There, but that it is utterly unaffected by what we
| > think about it or perceive of it. I myself find this being
| > superfluous to science, but some people obviously don't.
| >
| > Certainly the facts which science actually treats are not
| > external to human experience, but part of it, but I take it
| > that the further end of each fact is thought by believers in
| > the U.M. to be attached to it, so that in this sense the fact
| > is _partly_ in the world but not of it, a divine messenger as
| > it were.
| Let me think that one out - so you are suggesting that like the
| grammatical existence of the concept of "God", scientific facts exist by
| virtue of individual's perception? Sorry I'm a bit confused here (so
| what's new ? :)
A _fact_ is an objectification of some phenomena -- for
instance, if certain phenomena were perceived, one could say
something like, "It is a fact that it was raining in Tokyo on
December 12, 1899, at ten p.m." This doesn't mean that human
beings created the rain, but rather than they separated the
particular rain/place/time-phenomena from the infinitely complex
actuality in order to talk or think about it. Science is a
variety of this process. The fact is a bridge between
psychological and social states and the _Ding_an_sich_,
whatever that is, which gives rise to the phenomena which
are made into facts. In this sense one might say that facts
exist by virtue of individual (and social) perception, but
not only by virtue of that perception; we _participate_ in
facts.
There is a similarity between the Unmoved Mover and the notion
of facts as "hard" deeply embedded in thought and language,
so one might say the two were features of the same general
idea. For instance, while one may come up with a variety of
experiences and experimental results, objects falling near
the surface of the earth always appear to be accelerated by
the force of gravity at about 32 feet per second per second.
Nothing, it seems, can change this fact. It's harder than
any rock. As land animals, we are charmed by this fixity and
attribute considerable significance to it, such as conclusions
drawn about the personality and habits of God ("God is subtle,
but he is not malicious.") However, we did pull it out of
the mass of phenomena and isolate it, and not others; so it
is not independent of human experience.
James Whitehead
>A _fact_ is an objectification of some phenomena -- for
>instance, if certain phenomena were perceived, one could say
>something like, "It is a fact that it was raining in Tokyo on
>December 12, 1899, at ten p.m." This doesn't mean that human
>beings created the rain, but rather than they separated the
>particular rain/place/time-phenomena from the infinitely complex
>actuality in order to talk or think about it.
book, or some video showing images on a screen, or a recording of
someone saying they remember it was raining, what we do not have is any
rain.
As for objectification again your Japanese rain is subject to some
process - is this democratic - 65% remember rain 20% thought it sunny -
or do you apply some hierarchy - a US Meteorologist said it was raining
and everyone else thought otherwise, or rely on some lump of technology
(which is calibrated and read by some human) A dog pissed in the rain
gauge otherwise it was a sunny day.. or do you want a consensus - only
when everyone says it was raining was it raining - in which case the
roundness of the earth is no fact. Is it just as Catholics see the
Virgin and Hindus Vishnu do scientists see facts?
--
James Whitehead
G*rd*n
| >A _fact_ is an objectification of some phenomena -- for
| >instance, if certain phenomena were perceived, one could say
| >something like, "It is a fact that it was raining in Tokyo on
| >December 12, 1899, at ten p.m." This doesn't mean that human
| >beings created the rain, but rather than they separated the
| >particular rain/place/time-phenomena from the infinitely complex
| >actuality in order to talk or think about it.
James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
| But what we have is some account of the rain before us now- printed in a
| book, or some video showing images on a screen, or a recording of
| someone saying they remember it was raining, what we do not have is any
| rain.
Correct -- we have the phenomena of memory, mostly externalized
in recordings of various kinds. In some cases of rain, there
may be physical evidence attributable directly to the rain.
| As for objectification again your Japanese rain is subject to some
| process - is this democratic - 65% remember rain 20% thought it sunny -
| or do you apply some hierarchy - a US Meteorologist said it was raining
| and everyone else thought otherwise, or rely on some lump of technology
| (which is calibrated and read by some human) A dog pissed in the rain
| gauge otherwise it was a sunny day.. or do you want a consensus - only
| when everyone says it was raining was it raining - in which case the
| roundness of the earth is no fact. Is it just as Catholics see the
| Virgin and Hindus Vishnu do scientists see facts?
Science has modes of objectification which involve consensus
(the phenomena can be organized in the same way by a wide
variety of parties operating under a variety of conditions)
and material power (one can, for instance, blow things up).
I think these principles are overt and well-understood,
although there is some uncertainty at the margins.
James Whitehead
>I think these principles are overt and well-understood,
>although there is some uncertainty at the margins.
>
local phenomenon.
--
James Whitehead
Gerry Quinn
>> The popularity of the Popperian model as a simplistic way of
>describing
>> the methodology of science does not prove that the majority of
>> scientists think that is the way science works.
>>
>> As for relativism and feminist psychology, I excoriate them equally!
>>
>> - Gerry Quinn
>>
>[eyes closed tight in deep psychic pain] You're joking about the last
>bit, right?
Isms and ologies are a dangerous mixture!
- Gerry Quinn
Gerry Quinn
>In article <cml55.1850$r4....@news.indigo.ie>, Gerry Quinn
><ger...@indigo.ie> writes
>Even this has become dubious - as they seem to be forcing their theories
>through nonsensical turns to fit the observations - its getting silly.
>
less silly, you will get a hearing! As for "nonsensical turns", do you
mean things like compactified dimensions etc.? It is true, I think,
that some areas of physics are infested with an excess of
mathematicians, and the language used has tended to be dragged in that
direction. But maybe "position in a compact dimension" could be
represented instead by "the phase of something that rotates or vibrates"
- would that make you feel better?
Also, we shouldn't either over- or underestimate the extent to which the
world as discussed at the deepest known (physics) level is different to
the "everyday world" of large objects. Physics is probing below the
level of the phenomena we know as causality and even time itself (don't
worry, there's not going to be a time machine, or an acausality bomb!).
>>
>>What can I say except, I expect you will be surprised now and again by
>>what emanates from what you perceive as a dead field.
>I think the big science in the past could always be detected - any
>future breakthroughs will be incomprehensible.
To you, perhaps. Not to everyone.
>> As for my dreams
>>of Star Trek futures, I quite honestly don't have such dreams. I am
>>fairly phlegmatic about the benefits of most high technologies, although
>>I am pretty confident of exciting developments in the information and
>>biological sectors (and their intersection).
>It would be interesting to hear from you what these might be?
Artificial intelligence is the big one, of course. Growing new organs
will make a lot of lives better. Programming bacteria to make chemicals
will revolutionise some industrial sectors. Just a few probable
developments off the top of my head (hmm, let's throw in the cure for
baldness, too, before this patch gets bigger...)
>>
>>How long have you had usenet, incidentally? Beats writing letters to
>>the editor in green ink!
>Usenet technology is based on 19th century telegraphic technology - a
>teletypewriter sending ASCII codes, based on science done 150 years ago.
>
But those codes themselves are based on marks scratched on clay tablets.
There's nothing new under the sun, so long as you set your mind on
denying any novelty!
>But the technology which underpins our discussion is in a sense
>irrelevant - green ink to a periodical or over a pint in the local -
>
First you say that science only matters to you when it delivers cool new
technologies, then you say the cool new technologies don't matter
anyway. And besides, scientific ideas are too silly for your liking.
Is the deadness in science or in you?
- Gerry Quinn
Joyce
>I cannot agree here. "Class" is a very specific term and
no, "women" do
>not constitute a class. A class refers to the _systematic_
relations of
>production in capitalism. Patriarchy is a pre-capitalist form of
>oppression and - under capitalism - can actually be dispensed
with. The
>Marxist concentration on class is because is it the organising
principle
>of society.
Is it? Let's approach it from a different way in terms of
corporeal specificity in which I'd like Marxism to address to.
It seems to me that Marxism sees it in a matter of
biological 'facts'/ideology, in which the dichotomies of
body/mind, science/ideology distinctions remain static,
permanent positioning when in fact sex/gender may very well be
within these distinctions. Therefore, Marxism can be seen as
committed to a form of humanism which assumes a universal
sameness across time & culture, as though body & its needs are
timeless, in sync with "nature". Thus allowing naturalisation of
socially produced masculine/feminine subject.
The point being? Well, I think Mxm needs to address to the
social and political status of women, otherwise, the issue of
women, let alone other issues such as race, will be ignored.
>
>Capitalism can survive without the oppression of women. It can
survive
>without the oppression of different cultures. But it cannot
survive
>without class distinction.
>
I agree that class and capitalism are intrinsically linked, but
I cannot concede to the notion of any ideological discursive
practic as _the_ only narrative of society/ies, it is much more
unstable, open, contingent, constantly negotiable. HOWEVER, to
quote Chantal Mouffe, just as society is not a pregiven unity,
so it is not a "heterogeneous ensemble of isolated practices".
To follow both extremes can be considered a form of didactic
essentialism.
>
>Lev Lafayette.
>l...@student.unimelb.edu.au
http://www.student.unimelb.edu.au/~lev
>
>
>
Joyce
>A _fact_ is an objectification of some phenomena -- for
>instance, if certain phenomena were perceived, one could say
>something like, "It is a fact that it was raining in Tokyo on
>December 12, 1899, at ten p.m." This doesn't mean that human
>beings created the rain, but rather than they separated the
>particular rain/place/time-phenomena from the infinitely
complex
>variety of this process. The fact is a bridge between
>psychological and social states and the _Ding_an_sich_,
>whatever that is, which gives rise to the phenomena which
>are made into facts. In this sense one might say that facts
>exist by virtue of individual (and social) perception, but
>not only by virtue of that perception; we _participate_ in
>facts.
>
facts - human produce, negotiate and reproduce facts and
knowledges because they certainly don't fall out of the sky &
onto our head (the facts, I mean).
To be ultra-pendantic, I could wrangle with the rain statement:
what if back in 19th century Japan didn't use a western form of
calendar or time setting? What if it wasn't rain but just
sulfuric particles? How do you define rain? In ancient times
Europeans reported frogs raining from the sky - are they still
rain or frogs? And what would happen if your understanding of
rain is different from the understanding of rain back in 19th
century Japan? They might saw it as a storm/hail/drizzle/fog/god
pissing from the sky... (ok, that last bit was plain crazy ;)
As land animals, we are charmed by this fixity and
>attribute considerable significance to it, such as conclusions
>drawn about the personality and habits of God ("God is subtle,
>but he is not malicious.") However, we did pull it out of
>the mass of phenomena and isolate it, and not others; so it
>is not independent of human experience.
>
I find your statement about god to be problematic. Religion is -
are - discourses with their fields in society to lay down
regulations, procedures and governance as well as surveillance.
It is a sociopolitical construted institution, not something
inherent.
Joyce
G*rd*n
| >I think these principles are overt and well-understood,
| >although there is some uncertainty at the margins.
James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
| Just so - and it seems we have reached these margins - science is a
| local phenomenon.
One has always reached the margins.
G*rd*n
| >instance, if certain phenomena were perceived, one could say
| >something like, "It is a fact that it was raining in Tokyo on
| >December 12, 1899, at ten p.m." This doesn't mean that human
| >beings created the rain, but rather than they separated the
| >particular rain/place/time-phenomena from the infinitely
| >complex
| >actuality in order to talk or think about it. Science is a
| >variety of this process. The fact is a bridge between
| >psychological and social states and the _Ding_an_sich_,
| >whatever that is, which gives rise to the phenomena which
| >are made into facts. In this sense one might say that facts
| >exist by virtue of individual (and social) perception, but
| >not only by virtue of that perception; we _participate_ in
| >facts.
Joyce <aleesas_at...@yahoo.com.invalid>:
| That last sentence is very important: human participate in
| facts - human produce, negotiate and reproduce facts and
| knowledges because they certainly don't fall out of the sky &
| onto our head (the facts, I mean).
|
| To be ultra-pendantic, I could wrangle with the rain statement:
| what if back in 19th century Japan didn't use a western form of
| calendar or time setting? What if it wasn't rain but just
| sulfuric particles? How do you define rain? In ancient times
| Europeans reported frogs raining from the sky - are they still
| rain or frogs? And what would happen if your understanding of
| rain is different from the understanding of rain back in 19th
| century Japan? They might saw it as a storm/hail/drizzle/fog/god
| pissing from the sky... (ok, that last bit was plain crazy ;)
Right. Although I was thinking of meteorologists or historians
examining historical evidence -- they'd know what they meant
by "rain" and the way in which Japanese records were likely
to correspond to it (assuming there are any -- I don't know
if the Japanese of December 12th, 1899 were interested in
recording weather conditions, but I would guess that they
were.)
Joyce <aleesas_at...@yahoo.com.invalid>:
| >As land animals, we are charmed by this fixity and
| >attribute considerable significance to it, such as conclusions
| >drawn about the personality and habits of God ("God is subtle,
| >but he is not malicious.") However, we did pull it out of
| >the mass of phenomena and isolate it, and not others; so it
| >is not independent of human experience.
Gordon:
| I find your statement about god to be problematic. Religion is -
| are - discourses with their fields in society to lay down
| regulations, procedures and governance as well as surveillance.
| It is a sociopolitical construted institution, not something
| inherent.
Insisting on such a judgment would be reductive, a form of
governance and surveillance in itself. And, in the case of
science and mathematics, it might cloud our perceptions of
some of the significant figures. Einstein and Newton were
strongly religious; Goedel was a convinced Platonist. However,
if the idea of God or the gods makes you uncomfortable, it
can be construed as a figure of speech in the paragraph above.
James Whitehead
<ger...@indigo.ie> writes
>In article <+QaYyIAU...@jliat.demon.co.uk>, James Whitehead
><jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>In article <cml55.1850$r4....@news.indigo.ie>, Gerry Quinn
>><ger...@indigo.ie> writes
>>>The only thing scientists can best judge is science.
>>Even this has become dubious - as they seem to be forcing their theories
>>through nonsensical turns to fit the observations - its getting silly.
>>
>But we've got the observations. If you can produce a theory that is
>less silly, you will get a hearing! As for "nonsensical turns", do you
>mean things like compactified dimensions etc.? It is true, I think,
>that some areas of physics are infested with an excess of
>mathematicians, and the language used has tended to be dragged in that
>direction. But maybe "position in a compact dimension" could be
>represented instead by "the phase of something that rotates or vibrates"
>- would that make you feel better?
terms of its explanations - and its reached it. e.g. The science
establishment laughs at perpetual motion machines then dreams up
inflation! to help patch up some dodgy data.
>Also, we shouldn't either over- or underestimate the extent to which the
>world as discussed at the deepest known (physics) level is different to
>the "everyday world" of large objects. Physics is probing below the
>level of the phenomena we know as causality and even time itself (don't
>worry, there's not going to be a time machine, or an acausality bomb!).
butts up against our world, Toads I understand can detect a single
photon - are they quantum objects? Physics is probing beyond the
verifiable - therefore it is no longer physics.
>>>
>>>What can I say except, I expect you will be surprised now and again by
>>>what emanates from what you perceive as a dead field.
>>I think the big science in the past could always be detected - any
>>future breakthroughs will be incomprehensible.
>
>To you, perhaps. Not to everyone.
>>> As for my dreams
>>>of Star Trek futures, I quite honestly don't have such dreams. I am
>>>fairly phlegmatic about the benefits of most high technologies, although
>>>I am pretty confident of exciting developments in the information and
>>>biological sectors (and their intersection).
>>It would be interesting to hear from you what these might be?
>
>Artificial intelligence is the big one, of course. Growing new organs
>will make a lot of lives better. Programming bacteria to make chemicals
>will revolutionise some industrial sectors. Just a few probable
>developments off the top of my head (hmm, let's throw in the cure for
>baldness, too, before this patch gets bigger...)
technologies or just not wanted. The baldness problem in particular -
its better to face up to and enjoy the process of ageing than want to be
forever 18, which would be hell.
>>>
>>>How long have you had usenet, incidentally? Beats writing letters to
>>>the editor in green ink!
>>Usenet technology is based on 19th century telegraphic technology - a
>>teletypewriter sending ASCII codes, based on science done 150 years ago.
>>
>
>But those codes themselves are based on marks scratched on clay tablets.
> There's nothing new under the sun, so long as you set your mind on
>denying any novelty!
>
>>But the technology which underpins our discussion is in a sense
>>irrelevant - green ink to a periodical or over a pint in the local -
>>
>
>First you say that science only matters to you when it delivers cool new
>technologies, then you say the cool new technologies don't matter
>anyway. And besides, scientific ideas are too silly for your liking.
>Is the deadness in science or in you?
the car, computer, rocket, TV, radio, came from science which was fairly
well sorted out at the end of the century before last. Even the bomb was
a product of early 20th C science. We now have the technologies we need
- which is capable of giving most of the planet a reasonable life, its
lack of organisation - not any new science which is the problem it
seems.
As for science being dead - I think the evidence fits this.
--
James Whitehead
ale...@my-deja.com
>
> Right. Although I was thinking of meteorologists or historians
> examining historical evidence -- they'd know what they meant
> by "rain" and the way in which Japanese records were likely
> to correspond to it (assuming there are any -- I don't know
> if the Japanese of December 12th, 1899 were interested in
> recording weather conditions, but I would guess that they
> were.)
I am not quite sure about the "authenticity" of representation of
historical facts by cultural institutions. A historian or ethnographer
might do researches in to interested sites/archives/subject with
specific methodologies, but s/he is still under the regulation and
guidelines of the institution s/he is working under.
ale...@my-deja.com
> I feel fine, I'm just supposing that science has a finite extent in
> terms of its explanations - and its reached it. e.g. The science
> establishment laughs at perpetual motion machines then dreams up
> inflation! to help patch up some dodgy data.
Well, not really. A recent example would be Celera's completion of
sequencing the human genome - although in a sense, you could say they've
reached an "end" in regards to sequencing, now the focus has turned to
deconstruct what they've extracted. So rather than having a measurable
extent, scientific discourse has more to branch out to.
> >
Joyce
Lev Lafayette
On Wed, 28 Jun 2000, Joyce wrote:
>
> >I cannot agree here. "Class" is a very specific term and
> no, "women" do
> >not constitute a class. A class refers to the _systematic_
> relations of
> >production in capitalism. Patriarchy is a pre-capitalist form of
> >oppression and - under capitalism - can actually be dispensed
> with. The
> >Marxist concentration on class is because is it the organising
> principle
> >of society.
>
> Is it? Let's approach it from a different way in terms of
> corporeal specificity in which I'd like Marxism to address to.
> It seems to me that Marxism sees it in a matter of
> biological 'facts'/ideology, in which the dichotomies of
> body/mind, science/ideology distinctions remain static,
> permanent positioning when in fact sex/gender may very well be
> within these distinctions. Therefore, Marxism can be seen as
> committed to a form of humanism which assumes a universal
> sameness across time & culture, as though body & its needs are
> timeless, in sync with "nature". Thus allowing naturalisation of
> socially produced masculine/feminine subject.
OK, let's take this one point at a time.
Marxism sees a distinction between facts and ideology. I don't see any
particular problem with that as a methodology. Some statements are truer
than others and sometimes that falsity is not just an error on observation
or rational analysis but due to ideology.
I don't think the dichotomy between body and mind is peculiar to Marxism -
or that Marxism has been fond, now or originally of using that dichotomy.
I see no evidence within Marxism that sex and gender are considered the
same. Indeed, the particular attachment that Marxism had with anthropology
menat that it was probably the first "ism" to take into account the
historical and cultural relativity of sex/gender distinctions.
> The point being? Well, I think Mxm needs to address to the
> social and political status of women, otherwise, the issue of
> women, let alone other issues such as race, will be ignored.
The claim that it doesn't is in error, imho. As I mentioned before, a
marxist analysis (or for that a social scientific analysis) will state
quite clearly that social differentiation based on sex is pre-capitalist,
even pre-state. Ditto for "race" (whatever that's supposed to mean).
> >Capitalism can survive without the oppression of women. It can
> survive
> >without the oppression of different cultures. But it cannot
> survive
> >without class distinction.
> >
> I agree that class and capitalism are intrinsically linked, but
> I cannot concede to the notion of any ideological discursive
> practic as _the_ only narrative of society/ies, it is much more
> unstable, open, contingent, constantly negotiable. HOWEVER, to
> quote Chantal Mouffe, just as society is not a pregiven unity,
> so it is not a "heterogeneous ensemble of isolated practices".
> To follow both extremes can be considered a form of didactic
> essentialism.
Hang on... At what point did anyone suggest adopting "any ideological
discursive pratic[e] as _the_ narrative of society/ies"? And does this
statement suggest that there are non-ideological discursive practices that
we should adopt?
BTW, I think Chantal Mouffe is incorrect. Society is a pregiven unity,
one is born into it and we don't choose the conditions.
Regards,
Lev Lafayette
On Wed, 28 Jun 2000, Joyce wrote:
>
> As land animals, we are charmed by this fixity and
> >attribute considerable significance to it, such as conclusions
> >drawn about the personality and habits of God ("God is subtle,
> >but he is not malicious.") However, we did pull it out of
> >the mass of phenomena and isolate it, and not others; so it
> >is not independent of human experience.
> >
> are - discourses with their fields in society to lay down
> regulations, procedures and governance as well as surveillance.
> It is a sociopolitical construted institution, not something
> inherent.
The comment wasn't about religion it was about the "habits of God", which
does seem to be universal. Human beings, as a species, seem to have an
inherent interest in metaphysics.
Regards,
Lev Lafayette. (empirical atheist, rational agnostic, subjective theist)
l...@student.unimelb.edu.au http://www.student.unimelb.edu.au/~lev
G*rd*n
| > no, "women" do
| > >not constitute a class. A class refers to the _systematic_
| > relations of
| > >production in capitalism. Patriarchy is a pre-capitalist form of
| > >oppression and - under capitalism - can actually be dispensed
| > with. The
| > >Marxist concentration on class is because is it the organising
| > principle
| > >of society.
Joyce wrote:
| > Is it? Let's approach it from a different way in terms of
| > corporeal specificity in which I'd like Marxism to address to.
| > It seems to me that Marxism sees it in a matter of
| > biological 'facts'/ideology, in which the dichotomies of
| > body/mind, science/ideology distinctions remain static,
| > permanent positioning when in fact sex/gender may very well be
| > within these distinctions. Therefore, Marxism can be seen as
| > committed to a form of humanism which assumes a universal
| > sameness across time & culture, as though body & its needs are
| > timeless, in sync with "nature". Thus allowing naturalisation of
| > socially produced masculine/feminine subject.
Lev Lafayette <l...@student.unimelb.edu.au>:
| OK, let's take this one point at a time.
|
| Marxism sees a distinction between facts and ideology. I don't see any
| particular problem with that as a methodology. Some statements are truer
| than others and sometimes that falsity is not just an error on observation
| or rational analysis but due to ideology.
|
| I don't think the dichotomy between body and mind is peculiar to Marxism -
| or that Marxism has been fond, now or originally of using that dichotomy.
|
| I see no evidence within Marxism that sex and gender are considered the
| same. Indeed, the particular attachment that Marxism had with anthropology
| menat that it was probably the first "ism" to take into account the
| historical and cultural relativity of sex/gender distinctions.
Joyce wrote:
| > The point being? Well, I think Mxm needs to address to the
| > social and political status of women, otherwise, the issue of
| > women, let alone other issues such as race, will be ignored.
Lev Lafayette <l...@student.unimelb.edu.au>:
| The claim that it doesn't is in error, imho. As I mentioned before, a
| marxist analysis (or for that a social scientific analysis) will state
| quite clearly that social differentiation based on sex is pre-capitalist,
| even pre-state. Ditto for "race" (whatever that's supposed to mean).
I'm not really up on my Marxism, but from reading here and
there it seems to me that many contemporary Marxists see social
differentiation of sex as having been adopted by capitalism
if not originated by it. Race in the American sense seems to
have been created in the 17th and 18th century; I think that
one could argue that that occurred under capitalist conditions.
| > ....
G*rd*n
| > examining historical evidence -- they'd know what they meant
| > by "rain" and the way in which Japanese records were likely
| > to correspond to it (assuming there are any -- I don't know
| > if the Japanese of December 12th, 1899 were interested in
| > recording weather conditions, but I would guess that they
| > were.)
| I am not quite sure about the "authenticity" of representation of
| historical facts by cultural institutions. A historian or ethnographer
| might do researches in to interested sites/archives/subject with
| specific methodologies, but s/he is still under the regulation and
| guidelines of the institution s/he is working under.
Yes, of course -- in any case the metholodogies are part of
the ideology of institutional regulation. In the case of
meteorology, though, they probably don't want to just make
it all up, since historical records are a source of theory
leading to better predictions. Occasionally, therefore, and
maybe more than occasionally, they have to submit to the
_physis_, if only in order to overcome it.
Joyce
at will. So I don't know whether this will even be posted.
>Marxism sees a distinction between facts and ideology. I don't
see any
>particular problem with that as a methodology. Some statements
are truer
>than others and sometimes that falsity is not just an error on
observation
>or rational analysis but due to ideology.
The foundational claim and distinction between facts and
ideology remains problematic - they are subjective perspectives
open for negotiation as well as contestation. That is not to say
that all judgments to be equally "valid", but rather that I have
reservations in regards to the "guarantees" which comes along
with the reassuring label of foundational truth.
>
>I don't think the dichotomy between body and mind is peculiar
to Marxism -
>or that Marxism has been fond, now or originally of using that
dichotomy.
Mxm sees history as teleological, that events & concepts can be
categorised and evaluated. Underpinning this narrative is the
construction of two distinct ideologies: true and false - from
which all activities can be seen as class warfare. The problem
with this theory is that it reinscribes to the binary construct
of fact/value, capitalism/mxm, and so on.
>
>I see no evidence within Marxism that sex and gender are
considered the
>same. Indeed, the particular attachment that Marxism had with
anthropology
>menat that it was probably the first "ism" to take into account
the
>historical and cultural relativity of sex/gender distinctions.
Albeit through an essentially economic perspective. Race,
gender, nationality & other forms of identities are at times of
more immediate concern and relevance to people in their specific
cultural-political contexts. To construct the world through
metanarrative of any kind is another form of domination.
>The claim that it doesn't is in error, imho. As I mentioned
before, a
>marxist analysis (or for that a social scientific analysis)
will state
>quite clearly that social differentiation based on sex is pre-
capitalist,
>even pre-state. Ditto for "race" (whatever that's supposed to
mean).
>
However, these discourses are reproduced and circulated the
subsequent successors.
As for the notion of social differentiation based on sex, I
would argue that sex and gender are isomorphic in their mutual
shaping and construction of one another's discourse. The
dichotomies of masculine/feminine reinscribes the sex
difference, just as male/female serves to validate the gender
attributes. To risk mimicking my postings at elsewhere, sex is
not a tabula rasa for which culture leaves its pawprints on.
>> I agree that class and capitalism are intrinsically linked,
but
>> I cannot concede to the notion of any ideological discursive
>> practic as _the_ only narrative of society/ies, it is much
more
>> unstable, open, contingent, constantly negotiable. HOWEVER, to
>> quote Chantal Mouffe, just as society is not a pregiven unity,
>> so it is not a "heterogeneous ensemble of isolated practices".
>> To follow both extremes can be considered a form of didactic
>> essentialism.
>
>Hang on... At what point did anyone suggest adopting "any
ideological
>discursive pratic[e] as _the_ narrative of society/ies"? And
does this
>statement suggest that there are non-ideological discursive
practices that
>we should adopt?
Sure, if you can find one ;)
What I mean is, it is not feasible to follow any one set of
ideology. And certainly, power relations are much more fluid
than the "top-down" linear oppression as seen by mxm. Ideology
alone cannot "capture" the less "spectacular" but insidious
forms of power relations at work. Nor do I believe in a unified
social utopia purported by any quasi-transcendental idealism
which claims to be of universal redemptive value. And no, in
refusing to see modernity as an "unfinished" project, it does
not mean we should resort to nihilism, but to respect
differences. And to identify the ulterior motives or co-
optations before one buys into it wholesale..... Well, there
goes my not-so-grand-micronarratives! Completely OT and will
probably saw my head chopped off by objective realists...
-----------------------------------------------------------
Joyce
>In article <8ja8k7$p63$1...@news.panix.com>, G*rd*n
<g...@panix.com> writes
>>instance, if certain phenomena were perceived, one could say
>>something like, "It is a fact that it was raining in Tokyo on
>>December 12, 1899, at ten p.m." This doesn't mean that human
>>beings created the rain, but rather than they separated the
>>particular rain/place/time-phenomena from the infinitely
complex
>>actuality in order to talk or think about it.
printed in a
>book, or some video showing images on a screen, or a recording
of
>someone saying they remember it was raining, what we do not
have is any
>rain.
>
some
>process - is this democratic - 65% remember rain 20% thought it
sunny -
>or do you apply some hierarchy - a US Meteorologist said it was
raining
>and everyone else thought otherwise, or rely on some lump of
technology
>(which is calibrated and read by some human) A dog pissed in
the rain
>gauge otherwise it was a sunny day.. or do you want a
consensus - only
>when everyone says it was raining was it raining - in which
case the
>roundness of the earth is no fact. Is it just as Catholics see
the
>Virgin and Hindus Vishnu do scientists see facts?
>James Whitehead
>
All this rain debate reminds me of an excruciatingly funny
dialogue between Jack & his son in Delillo's WHITE NOISE, which
is, btw, a great postmodern novel.
James Whitehead
recent scientific breakthrough was trumpeted by Blair and Clinton - its
a media hype. The principles of genetics - the ability to selectively
breed out traits has been known for well over 200 years.
--
James Whitehead
Gerry Quinn
>I feel fine, I'm just supposing that science has a finite extent in
>terms of its explanations - and its reached it. e.g. The science
>establishment laughs at perpetual motion machines then dreams up
>inflation! to help patch up some dodgy data.
There's nothing dodgy about the data. Inflation is one way of
explaining certain very clear observations. (Incidentally, you are not
obliged to believe that there is something called "space" that expands,
either fast or slow - in general relativity, one can select from a
variety of consistent sets of coordinates. Thus, a particular
theoretical spacetime - which may well be a reasonably good model
for ours - can be described in terms of an infinite and expanding space,
or a finite and static one - and the choice is arbitrary. Popular
science literature is grievously at fault when it comes to these
issues.) But again, if you can do better, feel free to join in the fun.
The concepts involved have not nearly reached the limits of human
comprehension!
>>
>>Also, we shouldn't either over- or underestimate the extent to which the
>>world as discussed at the deepest known (physics) level is different to
>>the "everyday world" of large objects. Physics is probing below the
>>level of the phenomena we know as causality and even time itself (don't
>>worry, there's not going to be a time machine, or an acausality bomb!).
>Then you face a similar problem to Mind / Body - where the quantum world
>butts up against our world, Toads I understand can detect a single
>photon - are they quantum objects? Physics is probing beyond the
>verifiable - therefore it is no longer physics.
Toads are considered classical objects. The multiple histories of a toad
- or a man - rapidly become decoherent and do not interfere with each
other. Whether a single photon can be measured is nothing to do with
it. Ater all, if a toad can detect a photon, then so can any system
containing a toad, such as the planet Earth.
And what do you mean by non-verifiable. The toad (whose eye, according
to George Orwell, is the most beautiful of any creature's) either can or
cannot detect a single photon. Either way it is easy to test.
>>>It would be interesting to hear from you what these might be?
>>
>>Artificial intelligence is the big one, of course. Growing new organs
>>will make a lot of lives better. Programming bacteria to make chemicals
>>will revolutionise some industrial sectors. Just a few probable
>>developments off the top of my head (hmm, let's throw in the cure for
>>baldness, too, before this patch gets bigger...)
>But AI flopped didn't it. All your revolutions are either utilizing old
>technologies or just not wanted. The baldness problem in particular -
>its better to face up to and enjoy the process of ageing than want to be
>forever 18, which would be hell.
AI hasn't achieved many wonders so far. Give it 25-50 years. As for
the process of ageing, you'll change your tune when you have enjoyed
some more of it! Would always driving a new car instead of some beat up
banger be hell? I think not...
>>First you say that science only matters to you when it delivers cool new
>>technologies, then you say the cool new technologies don't matter
>>anyway. And besides, scientific ideas are too silly for your liking.
>>Is the deadness in science or in you?
>What I'm saying is that all the cool inventions - of modernity - like
>the car, computer, rocket, TV, radio, came from science which was fairly
>well sorted out at the end of the century before last. Even the bomb was
>a product of early 20th C science. We now have the technologies we need
>- which is capable of giving most of the planet a reasonable life, its
>lack of organisation - not any new science which is the problem it
>seems.
Even if you separate science from technology, you cannot really justify
the above. The transistor was invented in 1947 and the IC came later -
modern computers would not be possible without them. Tomorrow's
computers (and I'm not talking about possibly chimeric "quantum
computers") will depend on quantum physics. But in any case, I have not
attempted to justify science in terms of the technological toys it helps
make possible. It's about finding out how the world works.
In the end, technology will outstrip science in terms of interest
(because more of the cool stuff around us will be made by us rather than
"God"). But neither science nor technology are anywhere near finished
yet, nor have we reached any sort of serious impasse. Sure, some
particle guys would like to crash things together faster and more
expensively than the public may be willing to pay for, at least with
todays accelerator technology. Does that equate to a crisis, the End of
Science? Maybe we will find out how to build better accelerators. Even
if we don't, atom smashing is by no means our only window on the
constituents of matter. And even if we do have to draw a line at some
point and say "now we have probed as far as possible into the structure
of matter, it behaves according to these equations, but there are
reasons why we cannot find out more about deeper levels of structure" -
that is just one line of enquiry complete. There are more.
- Gerry Quinn
Joyce
>Wasn't DNA discovered sometime in the 60s - i.e. 40 years ago.
This
>recent scientific breakthrough was trumpeted by Blair and
Clinton - its
>a media hype. The principles of genetics - the ability to
selectively
>breed out traits has been known for well over 200 years.
>--
>James Whitehead
>
mapped out some 20 yrs ago due to their small size. However, the
human genome (another copy of DNA) is much larger - if mt DNA is
an OED, then genome would be equivalent to encyclopedia!
James Whitehead
<aleesas_at...@yahoo.com.invalid> writes
>
>>Wasn't DNA discovered sometime in the 60s - i.e. 40 years ago.
>This
>>recent scientific breakthrough was trumpeted by Blair and
>Clinton - its
>>a media hype. The principles of genetics - the ability to
>selectively
>>breed out traits has been known for well over 200 years.
>>--
>>James Whitehead
>>
>If you're talking about mitochondria DNA, yes, they've been
>mapped out some 20 yrs ago due to their small size. However, the
>human genome (another copy of DNA) is much larger - if mt DNA is
>an OED, then genome would be equivalent to encyclopedia!
>
being to identify DNA and its purpose - the mapping a fairly clerical
exercise.
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
<ger...@indigo.ie> writes
>There's nothing dodgy about the data. Inflation is one way of
>explaining certain very clear observations.
once was. Where in this is the experiment to determine or refute that
inflation occurred?
>obliged to believe that there is something called "space" that expands,
>either fast or slow - in general relativity, one can select from a
>variety of consistent sets of coordinates. Thus, a particular
>theoretical spacetime - which may well be a reasonably good model
>for ours - can be described in terms of an infinite and expanding space,
>or a finite and static one - and the choice is arbitrary. Popular
>science literature is grievously at fault when it comes to these
>issues.)
written by the likes of Fennyman, Gould, Barrow... is to read the
mathematical papers these are based on. However my point is that this
activity has essentially become metaphysics. And future recent problems
within the ontology of mathematics maybe (to quote Barrow) stymie
Physics!
> But again, if you can do better,
nothing. Science is flogging a dead horse - of course I cant do better-
the horse is dead.
> feel free to join in the fun.
> The concepts involved have not nearly reached the limits of human
>comprehension!
problems which Russell was unable to deal with.
>- or a man - rapidly become decoherent and do not interfere with each
>other.
however the Toad is not. Surely a Toad reacting to a single electron is
part of the quantum event.
> Whether a single photon can be measured is nothing to do with
>it. Ater all, if a toad can detect a photon, then so can any system
>containing a toad, such as the planet Earth.
you average them out so they make very little effect - so classical
theories hold as approximations. But threes a subtle shift here from
what is the case - to what is known not to be the case but works.
>
>And what do you mean by non-verifiable. The toad (whose eye, according
>to George Orwell, is the most beautiful of any creature's) either can or
>cannot detect a single photon. Either way it is easy to test.
theory.
Witnesses ideas of the end of the world.
>the process of ageing, you'll change your tune when you have enjoyed
>some more of it!
each day.
>banger be hell? I think not...
>>What I'm saying is that all the cool inventions - of modernity - like
>>the car, computer, rocket, TV, radio, came from science which was fairly
>>well sorted out at the end of the century before last. Even the bomb was
>>a product of early 20th C science. We now have the technologies we need
>>- which is capable of giving most of the planet a reasonable life, its
>>lack of organisation - not any new science which is the problem it
>>seems.
>
>Even if you separate science from technology, you cannot really justify
>the above. The transistor was invented in 1947 and the IC came later -
>modern computers would not be possible without them.
They would just be bigger, but again this just proves my point, all the
science was well in place 50 years ago.
> Tomorrow's
>computers (and I'm not talking about possibly chimeric "quantum
>computers") will depend on quantum physics. But in any case, I have not
>attempted to justify science in terms of the technological toys it helps
>make possible. It's about finding out how the world works.
But there is always a conflation of the two. If science is finding out
how the world works maybe the Quantum Guys should just give up.
>
>
>In the end, technology will outstrip science in terms of interest
>(because more of the cool stuff around us will be made by us rather than
>"God"). But neither science nor technology are anywhere near finished
>yet, nor have we reached any sort of serious impasse. Sure, some
>particle guys would like to crash things together faster and more
>expensively than the public may be willing to pay for, at least with
>todays accelerator technology. Does that equate to a crisis, the End of
>Science? Maybe we will find out how to build better accelerators. Even
>if we don't, atom smashing is by no means our only window on the
>constituents of matter. And even if we do have to draw a line at some
>point and say "now we have probed as far as possible into the structure
>of matter, it behaves according to these equations, but there are
>reasons why we cannot find out more about deeper levels of structure" -
>that is just one line of enquiry complete. There are more.
The above is exactly what has happened - but it doesn't behave according
to any equations.
"Inflation acts as a cosmological filter. It pushes information about
the initial structure of the universe out beyond our present horizon
where we cannot see it; then, it overwrites the region that we can see
with new information. Its the ultimate cosmic censor."
>
>>As for science being dead - I think the evidence fits this.
Sometime in the year 2050
Computer Scientist - Gerry here's the computer - using quantum devices
its capable of modelling the human brain and emulating you perfectly. We
simply scan your brain and upload the computer - and here you can live a
virtual life, without pain, in eternal youth - care to try it out.
Gerry - Sure!
(Scientist places Gerry in a scanner - suitable fizz - humm - etc.
Computer Scientist - there done - you will now live forever.
Gerry Gee - Wow...
Computer Scientist - So there's no need for this biological structure..
(pulls a gun and fires two shots into Gerry)
Gerry - Uggghh... Aghhh...
Computer Scientist - don't worry the virtual you is not feeling a thing
(strokes computer)
Gerry - Agggggghhhh (dies)
Computer Scientist - (Still stroking computer - his brow furrows ) Dam !
Not plugged in - !
--
James Whitehead
Joyce
>Correct me otherwise - isn't it then like train spotting- The
science
>being to identify DNA and its purpose - the mapping a fairly
clerical
>exercise.
>--
>James Whitehead
>
but you do need those information in order to carry out the
more "interesting" genetic researches.
Gerry Quinn
>In article <jr375.3170$r4....@news.indigo.ie>, Gerry Quinn
><ger...@indigo.ie> writes
>>There's nothing dodgy about the data. Inflation is one way of
>>explaining certain very clear observations.
>But isn't it always going to be conjecture - which is not what science
>once was. Where in this is the experiment to determine or refute that
>inflation occurred?
If models containing inflation give a reasonable description of how the
current universe might have evolved, if no better descriptions exist, if
the inflationary theory is reasonably simple and lacking in what look
like ad hoc elements, if the results of atom-smashing experiments are
consistent with the sort of descriptions of fundamental particles that
are compatible with inflation, then inflation will become the consensus
view - otherwise not. Currently it falls somewhat short of being a
consensus.
When was science not conjecture? When Newton or Einstein invented laws
of gravity that are both now known to be only approximations? When
eminent theoreticians denied the reality of atoms well into the last
century?
>> (Incidentally, you are not
>>obliged to believe that there is something called "space" that expands,
>>either fast or slow - in general relativity, one can select from a
>>variety of consistent sets of coordinates. Thus, a particular
>>theoretical spacetime - which may well be a reasonably good model
>>for ours - can be described in terms of an infinite and expanding space,
>>or a finite and static one - and the choice is arbitrary. Popular
>>science literature is grievously at fault when it comes to these
>>issues.)
>The only alternative to popular science literature - which is normally
>written by the likes of Fennyman, Gould, Barrow... is to read the
>mathematical papers these are based on. However my point is that this
>activity has essentially become metaphysics. And future recent problems
>within the ontology of mathematics maybe (to quote Barrow) stymie
>Physics!
Mathematics and physics are not the same thing. But anyway, if reading
popular science books is metaphysics, then if you want to read science
you will just have to bite the bullet and read it. You may find you can
pick up a surprising amount by 'osmosis' even if you skip the equations!
Frankly, if a popular science book contains _no_ equations, it's
probably not worth reading. Why should readers be assumed literate but
innumerate?
>> feel free to join in the fun.
>> The concepts involved have not nearly reached the limits of human
>>comprehension!
>I would maintain otherwise - underneath all of this are the same
>problems which Russell was unable to deal with.
Russell's paradox _has_ been dealt with, and in any case there is no
reason to believe it impinges on physics.
>>Toads are considered classical objects. The multiple histories of a toad
>>- or a man - rapidly become decoherent and do not interfere with each
>>other.
>But I understood we are protected from witnessing the single electron,
>however the Toad is not. Surely a Toad reacting to a single electron is
>part of the quantum event.
Yes, a toad, or the Earth. The toad might be placed at the controls of
a super bomb, in effect replicating Schrodinger's cat paradox for the
planet. The paradox has been answered, although debate continues with
regard to whether the "collapse of the wave function" is a real effect.
>> Whether a single photon can be measured is nothing to do with
>>it. Ater all, if a toad can detect a photon, then so can any system
>>containing a toad, such as the planet Earth.
>Then we can extrapolate the quantum effects - I quite understand that
>you average them out so they make very little effect - so classical
>theories hold as approximations. But threes a subtle shift here from
>what is the case - to what is known not to be the case but works.
Approximate laws of large numbers have been meat and drink to physicists
since the nineteenth century.
>>
>>And what do you mean by non-verifiable. The toad (whose eye, according
>>to George Orwell, is the most beautiful of any creature's) either can or
>>cannot detect a single photon. Either way it is easy to test.
>This is where you cant do an experiment. Such as would prove inflation
>theory.
>>AI hasn't achieved many wonders so far. Give it 25-50 years.
>Repeat the above every 25-50 years. This smacks of the Jehovah's
>Witnesses ideas of the end of the world.
We have had considerable progress in the first 50 years, although not
anything as much as the enthusiasts would have predicted. I daresay the
predictions of current-day enthusiasts will be found to be extreme. If
we can make machines as smart as chimps in 50 years, I think it will be
fair to say that the project is on track. I think that current progress
is sufficient to say that is true of today also.
>> As for
>>the process of ageing, you'll change your tune when you have enjoyed
>>some more of it!
>Well by my calculation I'm well over half way and its getting better
>each day.
>> Would always driving a new car instead of some beat up
>>banger be hell? I think not...
>My favourite car was a Citroen 2CV.
>
>>>What I'm saying is that all the cool inventions - of modernity - like
>>>the car, computer, rocket, TV, radio, came from science which was fairly
>>>well sorted out at the end of the century before last. Even the bomb was
>>>a product of early 20th C science. We now have the technologies we need
>>>- which is capable of giving most of the planet a reasonable life, its
>>>lack of organisation - not any new science which is the problem it
>>>seems.
>>
>>Even if you separate science from technology, you cannot really justify
>>the above. The transistor was invented in 1947 and the IC came later -
>>modern computers would not be possible without them.
>They would just be bigger, but again this just proves my point, all the
>science was well in place 50 years ago.
No, the number of vacuum tubes would be so large that some would pop
before what would be a very slow computer could complete a significant
calculation. Sometimes a technological improvement makes a qualitative
difference.
Anyway, tomorrow's supercomputers may be giant genetically engineered
brains, for all I know.
[-]
>>
>>In the end, technology will outstrip science in terms of interest
>>(because more of the cool stuff around us will be made by us rather than
>>"God"). But neither science nor technology are anywhere near finished
>>yet, nor have we reached any sort of serious impasse. Sure, some
>>particle guys would like to crash things together faster and more
>>expensively than the public may be willing to pay for, at least with
>>todays accelerator technology. Does that equate to a crisis, the End of
>>Science? Maybe we will find out how to build better accelerators. Even
>>if we don't, atom smashing is by no means our only window on the
>>constituents of matter. And even if we do have to draw a line at some
>>point and say "now we have probed as far as possible into the structure
>>of matter, it behaves according to these equations, but there are
>>reasons why we cannot find out more about deeper levels of structure" -
>>that is just one line of enquiry complete. There are more.
>The above is exactly what has happened - but it doesn't behave according
>to any equations.
>"Inflation acts as a cosmological filter. It pushes information about
>the initial structure of the universe out beyond our present horizon
>where we cannot see it; then, it overwrites the region that we can see
>with new information. Its the ultimate cosmic censor."
>
"Erosion acts as an archeological filter. It pushes information about
the initial history of man down below the Earth's surface where we
cannot see it, then it overwrites the region that we can see with new
information. It is the ultimate geological censor."
What's the difference?
>Sometime in the year 2050
>Computer Scientist - Gerry here's the computer - using quantum devices
>its capable of modelling the human brain and emulating you perfectly. We
>simply scan your brain and upload the computer - and here you can live a
>virtual life, without pain, in eternal youth - care to try it out.
>Gerry - Sure!
Gerry - Although I always thought this was a silly fantasy. Maybe I'm
getting senile. Why do they want a senile twentieth century mind in
their shiny new machine? Where's the toilet?
>(Scientist places Gerry in a scanner - suitable fizz - humm - etc.
>Computer Scientist - there done - you will now live forever.
>Gerry Gee - Wow...
>Computer Scientist - So there's no need for this biological structure..
> (pulls a gun and fires two shots into Gerry)
>Gerry - Uggghh... Aghhh...
>Computer Scientist - don't worry the virtual you is not feeling a thing
>(strokes computer)
>Gerry - Agggggghhhh (dies)
>Computer Scientist - (Still stroking computer - his brow furrows ) Dam !
>Not plugged in - !
Suddenly there is a power failure. Computer scientist looks surprised,
starts to fade to transparency... stage goes dark.
- Gerry Quinn
G*rd*n
| >Correct me otherwise - isn't it then like train spotting- The
| science
| >being to identify DNA and its purpose - the mapping a fairly
| clerical
| >exercise.
Joyce <aleesas_at...@yahoo.com.invalid>:
| Well yes, the sequencing is pretty time-consuming and banal -
| but you do need those information in order to carry out the
| more "interesting" genetic researches.
As with celestial mechanics: a huge mass of forgotten pettifogging
was needed before and after the great discoveries to make them
possible and useful. Science, too, has a working class, of
both persons and ideas. It was not only the shoulders of
giants that Newton stood upon.
Joyce
>As with celestial mechanics: a huge mass of forgotten
pettifogging
>was needed before and after the great discoveries to make them
>possible and useful. Science, too, has a working class, of
>both persons and ideas. It was not only the shoulders of
>giants that Newton stood upon.
>
relations... that'd be interesting.
Joyce
>>>What I'm saying is that all the cool inventions - of
modernity - like
>>>the car, computer, rocket, TV, radio, came from science which
was fairly
>>>well sorted out at the end of the century before last. Even
the bomb was
>>>a product of early 20th C science. We now have the
technologies we need
>>>- which is capable of giving most of the planet a reasonable
life, its
>>>lack of organisation - not any new science which is the
problem it
>>>seems.
>>
preservation, disease prevention and cure, as well as
technological advancement (for starters, having the option to
italicize your emails rather than using awkward _underlines_ or
CAPS, would be nice!).
But I think what's at stake as well is the issue of information,
access, power, and representation of the so-called "facts".
Oh well, progress demands sacrifice ;-)
G*rd*n
| >As with celestial mechanics: a huge mass of forgotten
| pettifogging
| >was needed before and after the great discoveries to make them
| >possible and useful. Science, too, has a working class, of
| >both persons and ideas. It was not only the shoulders of
| >giants that Newton stood upon.
Joyce <aleesas_at...@yahoo.com.invalid>:
| Hmm, a marxist analsis of the scientific institutions and power
| relations... that'd be interesting.
I don't think this is a new idea. Besides being good at the
game as an individual, part of being a big name in science
has been the ability to use the work of other people, either
by absorbing it from publications or through direct political
manipulation. One usually has to acquire funds from governments
or investors for the work. Often, a talent for public relations
proves helpful. One can see the similarity to more ordinary
capitalist exploitation and production, and to the big-ticket
fine arts identities as well (e.g. Picasso, Warhol).
Richard Crew
:
: Joyce <aleesas_at...@yahoo.com.invalid>:
: | Hmm, a marxist analsis of the scientific institutions and power
: | relations... that'd be interesting.
:
: I don't think this is a new idea. Besides being good at the
: game as an individual, part of being a big name in science
: has been the ability to use the work of other people, either
: by absorbing it from publications or through direct political
: manipulation. One usually has to acquire funds from governments
: or investors for the work. Often, a talent for public relations
: proves helpful. One can see the similarity to more ordinary
: capitalist exploitation and production, and to the big-ticket
: fine arts identities as well (e.g. Picasso, Warhol).
This *is* getting interesting. Exactly how do I use the work of
other people "through direct political manipulation." Please explain
in terms that a mere mathematician could understand. Cheers,
--Rich
--
Better to toss a stone at random, then a word.
-Porphyry
James Whitehead
<ger...@indigo.ie> writes
>If models containing inflation give a reasonable description of how the
>current universe might have evolved, if no better descriptions exist, if
>the inflationary theory is reasonably simple and lacking in what look
>like ad hoc elements, if the results of atom-smashing experiments are
>consistent with the sort of descriptions of fundamental particles that
>are compatible with inflation, then inflation will become the consensus
>view - otherwise not. Currently it falls somewhat short of being a
>consensus.
all our observations exactly - that quantum effects are but illusions
generated by GOD to hide his existence - he being acknowledged only
through faith. This explanation fits the facts better than the
Inflation model as has better evidence for it.
>When was science not conjecture?
metaphysics places post-modern science in the same category as
superstition.
>of gravity that are both now known to be only approximations?
> When
>eminent theoreticians denied the reality of atoms well into the last
>century?
>Mathematics and physics are not the same thing. But anyway, if reading
>popular science books is metaphysics, then if you want to read science
>you will just have to bite the bullet and read it. You may find you can
>pick up a surprising amount by 'osmosis' even if you skip the equations!
> Frankly, if a popular science book contains _no_ equations, it's
>probably not worth reading. Why should readers be assumed literate but
>innumerate?
But the popular science books are written by professors at MIT,
Cambridge... etc. Penrose, Hawking, Crick, Dawkins, Dennett, Davies,
Wheeler... etc. - so they are doing metaphysics - you seem to say so.
>
>
>Russell's paradox _has_ been dealt with, and in any case there is no
>reason to believe it impinges on physics.
Of course mathematics isn't physics - or science - its the language used
by science, but if this language has in it inconsistencies then it will
undermine the science. As it can be seen using English and the mistake
in saying that existence is a predicate, from such errors or
inconsistencies a metaphysics can be generated.
>
>>>Toads are considered classical objects. The multiple histories of a toad
>>>- or a man - rapidly become decoherent and do not interfere with each
>>>other.
>>But I understood we are protected from witnessing the single electron,
>>however the Toad is not. Surely a Toad reacting to a single electron is
>>part of the quantum event.
>
>Yes, a toad, or the Earth. The toad might be placed at the controls of
>a super bomb, in effect replicating Schrodinger's cat paradox for the
>planet. The paradox has been answered, although debate continues with
>regard to whether the "collapse of the wave function" is a real effect.
Not so because we have no direct way of knowing if the Toad (detonating
the bomb) reacted to the photon, two photons, or was dreaming of a
fly... we are shielded from this. The paradox has not been answered - in
the case of Schrodinger's cat - but the Toad is a different case.
>
>>> Whether a single photon can be measured is nothing to do with
>>>it. Ater all, if a toad can detect a photon, then so can any system
>>>containing a toad, such as the planet Earth.
>>Then we can extrapolate the quantum effects - I quite understand that
>>you average them out so they make very little effect - so classical
>>theories hold as approximations. But threes a subtle shift here from
>>what is the case - to what is known not to be the case but works.
>
>Approximate laws of large numbers have been meat and drink to physicists
>since the nineteenth century.
19thC physicists thought exactness could be achieved - even if only in
principle - not so now.
>
>>>
>>>And what do you mean by non-verifiable. The toad (whose eye, according
>>>to George Orwell, is the most beautiful of any creature's) either can or
>>>cannot detect a single photon. Either way it is easy to test.
>>This is where you cant do an experiment. Such as would prove inflation
>>theory.
>>>AI hasn't achieved many wonders so far. Give it 25-50 years.
>>Repeat the above every 25-50 years. This smacks of the Jehovah's
>>Witnesses ideas of the end of the world.
>
>We have had considerable progress in the first 50 years, although not
>anything as much as the enthusiasts would have predicted. I daresay the
>predictions of current-day enthusiasts will be found to be extreme. If
>we can make machines as smart as chimps in 50 years, I think it will be
>fair to say that the project is on track. I think that current progress
>is sufficient to say that is true of today also.
I see no evidence of progress in the last 10 years - and submit the
dismal failure of the Japanese who threw billions at it to produce
anything - other than maybe microwaves which automatically defrost.
>
>>They would just be bigger, but again this just proves my point, all the
>>science was well in place 50 years ago.
>
>No, the number of vacuum tubes would be so large that some would pop
>before what would be a very slow computer could complete a significant
>calculation. Sometimes a technological improvement makes a qualitative
>difference.
Your talking about technology here- the concept of the computer is over
100 years old - very old science.
>
>Anyway, tomorrow's supercomputers may be giant genetically engineered
>brains, for all I know.
The earth is already full of genetically engineered brains -
>[-]
>>"Inflation acts as a cosmological filter. It pushes information about
>>the initial structure of the universe out beyond our present horizon
>>where we cannot see it; then, it overwrites the region that we can see
>>with new information. Its the ultimate cosmic censor."
>>
>
>"Erosion acts as an archeological filter. It pushes information about
>the initial history of man down below the Earth's surface where we
>cannot see it, then it overwrites the region that we can see with new
>information. It is the ultimate geological censor."
>What's the difference?
One can be excavated the other not.
>
All I ask is some prediction, as for instance one could have predicted
domestic nuclear power in the mid 40s as primitive reactors had been
made. In computer technology for instance again - parallel processing -
failed - AI failed.... in science the returns are now diminishing - we
are on the downward slope of the bell curve and the evidence fits this
quite well.
--
James Whitehead
Joyce
>| Hmm, a marxist analsis of the scientific institutions and
power
>| relations... that'd be interesting.
>
>I don't think this is a new idea. Besides being good at the
>game as an individual, part of being a big name in science
>has been the ability to use the work of other people, either
>by absorbing it from publications or through direct political
>manipulation.
Very true. So now we come to the question: just how accurate are
those scientific facts - or discoveries - are, if they are
appropriated by the institutions/politics/hierarchical power
relations etc? I think I've mentioned this earlier, but it seems
that the notion of representation is also at hand.
One usually has to acquire funds from governments
>or investors for the work. Often, a talent for public relations
>proves helpful. One can see the similarity to more ordinary
>capitalist exploitation and production, and to the big-ticket
>fine arts identities as well (e.g. Picasso, Warhol).
>
Indeed, the big names, as you've mentioned, does wield
substantial "cultural capitals" whether in the academic or
popular culture. So I guess one of the resistance deployed by
(some) postmodern-cultural theorists is to celebrate, or to
"uncover" the "other" aspects - the pop culture itself as site of
resistance. But then again, how much the mass culture is tied
with economy itself is anyone's guess...
G*rd*n
| : | relations... that'd be interesting.
| :
| : I don't think this is a new idea. Besides being good at the
| : game as an individual, part of being a big name in science
| : has been the ability to use the work of other people, either
| : by absorbing it from publications or through direct political
| : or investors for the work. Often, a talent for public relations
| : proves helpful. One can see the similarity to more ordinary
| : capitalist exploitation and production, and to the big-ticket
| : fine arts identities as well (e.g. Picasso, Warhol).
| This *is* getting interesting. Exactly how do I use the work of
| other people "through direct political manipulation." Please explain
| in terms that a mere mathematician could understand. Cheers,
Are you a big name in science?
James Whitehead
<aleesas_at...@yahoo.com.invalid> writes
>
>>| Hmm, a marxist analsis of the scientific institutions and
>power
>>| relations... that'd be interesting.
>>
>>I don't think this is a new idea. Besides being good at the
>>game as an individual, part of being a big name in science
>>has been the ability to use the work of other people, either
>>by absorbing it from publications or through direct political
>>manipulation.
>
>those scientific facts - or discoveries - are, if they are
>appropriated by the institutions/politics/hierarchical power
>relations etc? I think I've mentioned this earlier, but it seems
>that the notion of representation is also at hand.
>
>>or investors for the work. Often, a talent for public relations
>>proves helpful. One can see the similarity to more ordinary
>>capitalist exploitation and production, and to the big-ticket
>>fine arts identities as well (e.g. Picasso, Warhol).
>>
>substantial "cultural capitals" whether in the academic or
>popular culture. So I guess one of the resistance deployed by
>(some) postmodern-cultural theorists is to celebrate, or to
>"uncover" the "other" aspects - the pop culture itself as site of
>resistance. But then again, how much the mass culture is tied
>with economy itself is anyone's guess...
>>
UK a Nobel Prize winner remarked that science was a social activity...
The program was desert island disks btw - and a classic art school
question was "would you do art on a desert island" - it seems you cant
do science.
--
James Whitehead
Richard Crew
: | : I don't think this is a new idea. Besides being good at the
: | : game as an individual, part of being a big name in science
: | : has been the ability to use the work of other people, either
: | : by absorbing it from publications or through direct political
: | : or investors for the work. Often, a talent for public relations
: | : proves helpful. One can see the similarity to more ordinary
: | : capitalist exploitation and production, and to the big-ticket
: | : fine arts identities as well (e.g. Picasso, Warhol).
: cr...@math.ufl.edu:
: | This *is* getting interesting. Exactly how do I use the work of
: | other people "through direct political manipulation." Please explain
: | in terms that a mere mathematician could understand. Cheers,
:
: Are you a big name in science?
No. Are you? Nonetheless, I've never noticed any of the big names of my
acquaintance using the work of others "through direct political
manipulation." Usually, one uses someone else's work by *quoting* it
(with attribution, of course).
G*rd*n
| : | : I don't think this is a new idea. Besides being good at the
| : | : game as an individual, part of being a big name in science
| : | : has been the ability to use the work of other people, either
| : | : by absorbing it from publications or through direct political
| : | : manipulation. One usually has to acquire funds from governments
| : | : or investors for the work. Often, a talent for public relations
| : | : proves helpful. One can see the similarity to more ordinary
| : | : capitalist exploitation and production, and to the big-ticket
| : | : fine arts identities as well (e.g. Picasso, Warhol).
cr...@math.ufl.edu:
| : | This *is* getting interesting. Exactly how do I use the work of
| : | other people "through direct political manipulation." Please explain
| : | in terms that a mere mathematician could understand. Cheers,
G*rd*n <g...@panix.com> wrote:
| : Are you a big name in science?
cr...@math.ufl.edu:
| No. Are you?
I didn't present myself as an example. You did; see above.
| Nonetheless, I've never noticed any of the big names of my
| acquaintance using the work of others "through direct political
| manipulation." Usually, one uses someone else's work by *quoting* it
| (with attribution, of course).
I've noticed that a lot of scientific work is done by teams
of people. In order to put yourself at the head of a team,
you have to be good at politics, no matter how smart you are
or how much you know -- in fact, being very smart can be a
hindrance to playing a good political game, which is usually
a fairly intuitive practice, jock-like rather than nerd-like.
Since you seem to have read my little paragraph with even less
attention than it deserved -- or perhaps I write very obscurely
-- I'll also call your attention to the fact (verifiable above)
that I did not say that _all_ science was done by political
manipulation, for fear that will be the next non-statement to
be hotly challenged.
G*rd*n
| >| Hmm, a marxist analsis of the scientific institutions and
| power
| >| relations... that'd be interesting.
G*rd*n:
| >I don't think this is a new idea. Besides being good at the
| >game as an individual, part of being a big name in science
| >has been the ability to use the work of other people, either
| >by absorbing it from publications or through direct political
| >manipulation.
Joyce <aleesas_at...@yahoo.com.invalid>:
| Very true. So now we come to the question: just how accurate are
| those scientific facts - or discoveries - are, if they are
| appropriated by the institutions/politics/hierarchical power
| relations etc? I think I've mentioned this earlier, but it seems
| that the notion of representation is also at hand.
Well, the stuff they do still has to work. That is, in
order to get power over Nature, they have to listen to what
she says; in a sense, forego any desire to order her around
right from the beginning, and, as it were, submit a bit.
_Then_ they can take power (or they think they can). That
seems to be the way things are with Nature, and that is
different from human politics as it portrays itself, with
great heroes telling everyone where it's at and what to do.
G*rd*n:
| One usually has to acquire funds from governments
| >or investors for the work. Often, a talent for public relations
| >proves helpful. One can see the similarity to more ordinary
| >capitalist exploitation and production, and to the big-ticket
| >fine arts identities as well (e.g. Picasso, Warhol).
Joyce <aleesas_at...@yahoo.com.invalid>:
| Indeed, the big names, as you've mentioned, does wield
| substantial "cultural capitals" whether in the academic or
| popular culture. So I guess one of the resistance deployed by
| (some) postmodern-cultural theorists is to celebrate, or to
| "uncover" the "other" aspects - the pop culture itself as site of
| resistance. But then again, how much the mass culture is tied
| with economy itself is anyone's guess...
Some science, astronomy for example, has a significant popular
and amateur component. Other kinds of science are moving
towards corporate control, plutocracy, and secrecy. There
are definitely parallels in the realm of the arts. I don't
know about the non-scientific academic realm.
Joyce
>Some science, astronomy for example, has a significant popular
>and amateur component. Other kinds of science are moving
>towards corporate control, plutocracy, and secrecy. There
>are definitely parallels in the realm of the arts. I don't
>know about the non-scientific academic realm.
>
>
could be related to government's lack of financial support for
the scientific society. But going back to your comment about the
popularisation of certain branches of science.... dare I mention
those back-of-the-magazine-page horoscopes?
Joyce
>In article <2424719e...@usw-ex0103-024.remarq.com>, Joyce
><aleesas_at...@yahoo.com.invalid> writes
>>
>>power
>>>| relations... that'd be interesting.
>>>
>>>game as an individual, part of being a big name in science
>>>has been the ability to use the work of other people, either
>>>by absorbing it from publications or through direct political
>>>manipulation.
>>
are
>>those scientific facts - or discoveries - are, if they are
>>appropriated by the institutions/politics/hierarchical power
>>relations etc? I think I've mentioned this earlier, but it
seems
>>that the notion of representation is also at hand.
>>
>>>or investors for the work. Often, a talent for public
relations
>>>proves helpful. One can see the similarity to more ordinary
>>>capitalist exploitation and production, and to the big-ticket
>>>fine arts identities as well (e.g. Picasso, Warhol).
>>>
>>substantial "cultural capitals" whether in the academic or
>>popular culture. So I guess one of the resistance deployed by
>>(some) postmodern-cultural theorists is to celebrate, or to
>>"uncover" the "other" aspects - the pop culture itself as site
of
>>resistance. But then again, how much the mass culture is tied
>>with economy itself is anyone's guess...
>>>
I'm confused. Please explain the meaning of the phrase.
On a recent radio programme
in the
>UK a Nobel Prize winner remarked that science was a social
activity...
>The program was desert island disks btw - and a classic art
school
>question was "would you do art on a desert island" - it seems
you cant
>do science.
>--
>James Whitehead
>
Well, according to Thomas de Quincey, the murderer is an artist
through his/her inscription of wound infliction upon the victim's
body - sort of serving as a blank canvas for the
murderer/artist's "creativity", so I guess art does stretch a
long way.
Joyce
>
>Well, the stuff they do still has to work. That is, in
>order to get power over Nature, they have to listen to what
>she says; in a sense, forego any desire to order her around
>right from the beginning, and, as it were, submit a bit.
>_Then_ they can take power (or they think they can). That
>seems to be the way things are with Nature, and that is
>different from human politics as it portrays itself, with
>great heroes telling everyone where it's at and what to do.
>
Do you see nature as in direct opposition with science (as in the
nature/culture debate), or were you thinking about the
traditional scientific construction of the notion of "nature" and
its given attributes?
James Whitehead
<aleesas_at...@yahoo.com.invalid> writes
>>I think now "we are cooking on gas"!
>
>I'm confused. Please explain the meaning of the phrase.
>
--
James Whitehead
G*rd*n
| >Some science, astronomy for example, has a significant popular
| >and amateur component. Other kinds of science are moving
| >towards corporate control, plutocracy, and secrecy. There
| >are definitely parallels in the realm of the arts. I don't
| >know about the non-scientific academic realm.
Joyce <aleesas_at...@yahoo.com.invalid>:
| One explanation for the privitisation of scientific research
| could be related to government's lack of financial support for
| the scientific society. But going back to your comment about the
| popularisation of certain branches of science.... dare I mention
| those back-of-the-magazine-page horoscopes?
No -- those are purely a consumer item. The nearest analogy
to the amateur astronomer would be the amateur astrologer,
but astrology lacks the discipline, social coherence, and
engagement with phenomena that astronomy evidences. Hence
amateur astronomers discover new comets, which are recognized
by everyone involved in astronomy, but if an amateur astrologer
discovers a new effect of the opposition of Mars and Uranus
nobody cares -- the discovery is lost in the noise of people
making things up or observing in a different way with different
standards of evidence.
As for the government's lack of support for scientific
research: the government and the corporations (in modern
industrialized states) are two aspects of bourgeois power,
and I'd assume the movement towards privatization reflects
a strategy of improving control of the products, some of which
may turn out to produce enormous wealth which the better-off
would prefer to keep among themselves. The usual strategy
(as with the railroads in the U.S. and the Internet) is to
have the government fund or subsidize great projects using
taxpayer money, and then, if the project seems successful,
to facilitate its appropriation by private parties.
G*rd*n
| >Well, the stuff they do still has to work. That is, in
| >order to get power over Nature, they have to listen to what
| >she says; in a sense, forego any desire to order her around
| >right from the beginning, and, as it were, submit a bit.
| >_Then_ they can take power (or they think they can). That
| >seems to be the way things are with Nature, and that is
| >different from human politics as it portrays itself, with
| >great heroes telling everyone where it's at and what to do.
Joyce <aleesas_at...@yahoo.com.invalid>:
| Overlooked this paragraph, which seems important to address to.
| Do you see nature as in direct opposition with science (as in the
| nature/culture debate), or were you thinking about the
| traditional scientific construction of the notion of "nature" and
| its given attributes?
In this case I'm dichotomizing science and "Nature", but of
course that is an artifice, used to simplify an observation
of kinds of behavior (scientific work versus politics).
Joyce
In all seriousness, I am not sure whether they can be solely
classified as consumer item, but rather a set of truth produced
by popular culture which positions ourselves in a specific
manner to see our experience, "truth" (whatever that is) and
subjectivity. Kind of reminds me of the ancient oracles, but
standarised for public consumption.
As for the government's lack of support for scientific research:
the government and the corporations (in modern industrialized
states) are two aspects of bourgeois power, and I'd assume the
movement towards privatization reflects a strategy of improving
control of the products, some of which may turn out to produce
enormous wealth which the better-off would prefer to keep among
themselves. The usual strategy (as with the railroads in the
U.S. and the Internet) is to have the government fund or
subsidize great projects using taxpayer money, and then, if the
project seems successful, to facilitate its appropriation by
private parties.
Excellent analysis. What's your opinion of the Russian police's
access to websites, as well as private citizen's email contents?
Joyce
>In this case I'm dichotomizing science and "Nature", but of
>course that is an artifice, used to simplify an observation
>of kinds of behavior (scientific work versus politics).
>
dualistic mode of thinking & doing, but the notion of
dichotomous hierarchy, and the deeply entrenched assumption of
mind=transcendance, body=immanence is, to say the least, well
past its use-by date.