Google Groups no longer supports new Usenet posts or subscriptions. Historical content remains viewable.
Dismiss

What in the HECK is going on here?

3 views
Skip to first unread message

What`s in a name?

unread,
May 27, 1989, 6:32:19 PM5/27/89
to
In article <26...@nmtsun.nmt.edu> jo...@nmtsun.nmt.edu (John Shipman) writes:
]This is a fascinating little group, but I got here late, and
]a lot of it is going over my head.
]
]Would someone please post:
]
]a. A basic postmodern reading list.
]
]b. Definitions of a few terms like postmodern, semiotics,
] deconstructionism, etc., in 25 words or less (if that
] is possible for a group this prolix).

This was originally asked in alt.postmodern, but since my answer reflects on
what's being said about Beaudrillard in rec.arts.books, I thought it would be
appropriate to cross-post.

I will consider this an interesting challenge to the readers of the group.
I won't venture to answer myself. I've been asking this question since the
incipience of the group (at least on my system), and haven't gotten an
answer yet. Perhaps that is part of the secret?! Have I gathered correctly
(though I am not at all certain that anything can indeed *be* gathered
correctly, and if it could, is it likely that the gathering could be
communicated from the gatherer to the gatheree?) (BTW, that last
parenthetical statement is an example of what I think postmodern thinking
is about) that the whole array of deconstructionists can be considered
post-modern. I'm not sure as I've heard Faulkner classed as Modern and he
deals with many of the things I consider Deconstructionist (Example: Addie).

BTW, I think Foucault would object to his common characterization as a
deconstructionist. He agrees with much of their work, and some of his own
work uses their assumptions and touches on the theory, but he feels that his
work takes on a decidedly different subject in its goals. Foucault is
none-the-less post-modern in my opinion.

Well, there are some ramblings for you. Can't give you a comprehensive
reading list, but the authors: Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, are an interesting
start.

Deconstruction I can try to define (as though one can define anything).
It is the philosophy dealing with the bankruptcy of language when attempting
to describe abstract paradoxical concepts. You can make up a word for a
concept, but can you really describe what that word means. In communicating
a concept, one can only reach around the edges, prodding the readers
imagination with images and metaphors in the hopes that the true concept
will also be grasped by the reader. It is like trying to demonstrate the
center of a sphere by outlining the surface with one's hands.

Deconstruction takes for granted such bankruptcy of language and concerns
itself with the ways of describing such abstract terms through using
language to transcend itself. This is similar to the work of some modern
poets. Note that Deconstruction itself is a term sufficiently outside the
barrier of clear linguistic understanding, so I must use deconstructionist
techiniques in my attempt to get its meaning across.

At first glance the philosophy behind Deconstruction comes across as
meaningless even if it is self consistent. Why should we throw off our
basic assumptions about language and accept these new ones, they only seem
to lead to an unclear way of speaking about things? This is the essential
criticism of Deconstruction. The answer is that it is indeed a circular
argument. None of the assumptions surrounding Deconstruction can be proved
from our logical linguistic system. It is attempting to go beyond that
system. How successful it will be has yet to be determined. The critique
is turned back by asking critics to reexamine their own linguistic
assumptions. How much that you take for granted can really be proven.
Actually none. So a deconstructionist's assumptions are as valid as any
other. Only when they are shown to be more or less *useful* will judgement
be possible as to their value.

The underlying assumption in Deconstruction is that language is not
sufficiently powerful to remain self-consistent in the face of explaining
paradoxical abstractions. It also maintains that such paradoxical
abstractions exist and must be represented somehow. These assumptions are
looking more and more believable.

Godel theorem's demonstrate that mathematical systems can never be this
powerful and proves this within the context of said non-powerful system.
The theory I have (which a deconstructionist would agree with) is that
natural languages also have this lack. I feel Godel's work needs more
attention paid to it as it has a chance to reunite humanistic critical
endeavour with scientific endeavors through the field of linguistics.

Effectively what his theorem states is that the basic assumptions we have
been using all along in our invented formal systems (math, logic, science,
language...) lead ultimately to a demostration of the incompleteness of
those systems, so if we can consider language like mathematics, then the
deconstructionist's assumptions about language's bankruptcy are in fact
proven by the very structure of language itself!

Anyway, that seems to me what deconstruction is all about. Any other ideas??

--mike
--
Mic3hael Sullivan, University of Rochester. "Life is like a sewer, what
Society for the Incurably Pompous. you get out of it, depends on
Internet: misu...@uhura.cc.rochester.edu what you put into it."
UUCP: ...!rochester!ur-cc!misu_ltd -- Tom Lehrer

Richard Shapiro

unread,
May 28, 1989, 12:57:15 AM5/28/89
to
In article <21...@ur-cc.UUCP> misu...@uhura.cc.rochester.edu (What`s in a name?) writes:
>In article <26...@nmtsun.nmt.edu> jo...@nmtsun.nmt.edu (John Shipman) writes:
>]This is a fascinating little group, but I got here late, and
>]a lot of it is going over my head.
>]
>]Would someone please post:
>]
>]a. A basic postmodern reading list.
>]
>]b. Definitions of a few terms like postmodern, semiotics,
>] deconstructionism, etc., in 25 words or less (if that
>] is possible for a group this prolix).
>...

>answer yet. Perhaps that is part of the secret?! Have I gathered correctly
>... that the whole array of deconstructionists can be considered

>post-modern. I'm not sure as I've heard Faulkner classed as Modern and he
>deals with many of the things I consider Deconstructionist (Example: Addie).

Forget 25 words or less, that's utterly hopeless.


As has been pointed out a few times (at least), we're mixing our
"posts" here. Post-modernism is an aesthetic term, originally applied
to architecture and now applied to everything from ballet to MTV.
I'm not sure it really means much anymore. "After and in reaction to
Modernism" I suppose. The best book I know of on post-modernism is "The
Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture" edited by Hal Foster,
which includes an excellent essay by Frederic Jameson, and other
essays by Jean Baudrillard, Jurgen Habermas, Douglas Crimp, Kenneth
Frampton, Edward Said and others. Some of Baudrillard's books are also
worth a look. I'd recommend "Simulations", part of Semiotext(e)'s
Foreign Agent series.


The other, more interesting "post" is post-structuralism. The two
"posts" really have nothing to do with each other. Semiotics,
deconstruction etc are sometimes called "post-structuralist", since
they share a basis with structuralism (that basis is Saussure's
linguistics) but they move quite distinctly beyond the bounds of the
latter.

Semiotics (or semiology) is just the study of signifying systems. The
version of this which is most relevant here comes from the work of
Roland Barthes. The basic theory is sketched out in Barthes' "Elements
of Semiology"; the most fascinating applications are in his books
"Mythologies", in which he studies the signification of the most mundane
of objects and the ideology which lurks within, and "S/Z" in which he
does a truly breathtaking reading of a short story by Balzac. A useful
introductory book is "Structuralism and Semiotics" by Terence Hawkes.
Incidentally, I'm giving the English titles of the French works since
I don't read French. Needless to say, you should read the originals if
you're able.


Deconstruction is the name given to Derrida's approach to philosophy.
It has been used for lit. crit. and the like, but it's really best
understood as philosophy. In any case, this is certainly Derrida's
starting point. Derrida, somewhat like Nietzsche, wants to do
philosophy without metaphysics. Deconstruction might best be
understood as a program for destroying metaphysics, and also humanism
(which presupposes the metaphysical construct "Man"). Metaphysics
typically involves binary oppositions, one term of which is said to be
prior to or more fundamental than the other, grounded in a small set
of basic, unquestionable truths. Deconstruction typically involves
the breaking apart of such oppositions, the demonstration that what
looks fundamental is, or could just as well be, derivative. The final
result of this is an unrooted philosophy, one without "ground" or
"priority" or "precedence", one which has no need of transcendentals.
Derrida's famous "endless play of signifiers". There are lots of
useful books about deconstruction around now. Reading Derrida himself,
in English at least, takes patience and a willingness to follow him as
he rigorously follows his own very non-dialectical style. It's not
easy, but it is exhilarating. The most accesible short book is
"Spurs", an examination of "Nietzsche's styles". Of the bigger and
slightly more serious books, the best are probably "Of Grammatology" and
"Writing and Difference". Michael Ryan's "Marxism and Deconstruction"
is a fascinating look at possible relationships between the two
approaches named in the title. Highly recommended.


>
>BTW, I think Foucault would object to his common characterization as a
>deconstructionist. He agrees with much of their work, and some of his own
>work uses their assumptions and touches on the theory, but he feels that his
>work takes on a decidedly different subject in its goals. Foucault is
>none-the-less post-modern in my opinion.

Foucault was once called a structuralist, which he vehemently denied.
Now he's sometimes called a post-structuralist, which is probably
true, but not really very helpful. Foucault was also looking to end
metaphysics and humanism but in the realm of history rather than the
realm of philosophy per se. His work had nothing to do with
deconstruction, and nothing very much to do with semiotics. In his
early books, Foucault did what he called "archeology", a kind of
history of how particular ways of thinking, ways which now seem
unquestionable and "natural", came into being. The classic book of
this period is "Madness and Civilization", crucial reading. "The Order
of Things" ("Les Mots et les Choses" is the French title) is also
worth a look, as he examines here the construction of the concept
"Man". This one is much harder going than M&C, however. Later
Foucault began to focus more and more on power and its workings
through discourse (in the form on "knowledge") and on bodies.
"Discipline and Punish", his "genealogy" of punishment, prison and
discipline in general, is a book of astonishing brilliance and also
great clarity, though of course it still requires fairly serious and
careful reading (the French title, once again not quite like the
English, is "Surveiller et Punir"). His last books were a history of
sexuality. I've read only the first two volumes (at least one more was
completed before his death in 1984), and would recommend them as well.
Also useful are two collections of interviews and short essays:
"Power/Knowledge" and "Foucault Live".


>Well, there are some ramblings for you. Can't give you a comprehensive
>reading list, but the authors: Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, are an interesting
>start.

Lacan is another story altogether. There's no point reading Lacan
without a VERY thorough grounding in Freud, so let's leave him aside
for now.

>Deconstruction I can try to define (as though one can define anything).
>It is the philosophy dealing with the bankruptcy of language when attempting
>to describe abstract paradoxical concepts. You can make up a word for a

Well, not really. See above. Representation may not be grounded, but
that doesn't make it bankrupt unless you simply assume that grounding
is what representation is all about. You can take this metaphysical
position if you like, but, since Derrida (since Nietzsche really), you
can't pretend that such a position has the force of Truth behind it.

>Effectively what [Godel's] theorem states is that the basic assumptions we have


>been using all along in our invented formal systems (math, logic, science,
>language...) lead ultimately to a demostration of the incompleteness of
>those systems, so if we can consider language like mathematics, then the
>deconstructionist's assumptions about language's bankruptcy are in fact
>proven by the very structure of language itself!
>


Godel's theorem makes for a nice metaphor, but you want to be careful
about making it into any more than that. All the theorem says is that
certain kinds of formal languages (in particular, any ones which are
powerful enough to express arithimetic) contain undecidable
propositions (i.e. statements which can neither be proven nor
refuted). This is crucial to meta-mathematics, but has nothing really
to do with deconstruction.


Finally, I'm typing this at home, at 2400 baud, on a small screen --
I'm sure there are typos in here. Feel free to point them out to me by
email, but don't bother posting such stuff unless some mis-typed word
is likely to lead to misunderstanding.

If anyone gets this far, and actually takes me up on any of my reading
suggestions, let me know! I'm interested in hearing your reactions.

rsha...@bbn.com (internet)

Nichael Cramer

unread,
May 30, 1989, 6:53:34 PM5/30/89
to
In article <40...@bbn.COM> rsha...@BBN.COM (Richard Shapiro) writes:
>...A useful

>introductory book is "Structuralism and Semiotics" by Terence Hawkes.

If I may presume to add a brief annotation to Rich's note, two particularly
useful features of Hawkes' book (at least for me) is that it contains 1) a
heavily commented bibliography which --althought the book was originally
published in 1977-- was updated in 1983.

2) For each of the topics it covers (e.g. structuralism, semiotics, Levi-
Strauss) it gives a suggested reading lists with sequences marked as
"introduction for beginners", "more advanced studies", "basic", etc.
(Although in this case many of the readings involving digging up, say, 20+
year old issues of _Partisan Review_, this is certainly a feature I wish
more allegedly introductory books had.)

NICHAEL

------------------------------------------------------------
| Nichael Lynn Cramer | The inside real |
| -- Nic...@BBN.Com | and the outsidereal. |
| -- NCr...@BBN.Com | -- Ed Dorn "Gunslinger" |
------------------------------------------------------------

Jeff Winslow

unread,
May 30, 1989, 3:39:40 PM5/30/89
to
In article <21...@ur-cc.UUCP> misu...@uhura.cc.rochester.edu (What`s in a name?) writes a bunch of interesting stuff.

OK, now could you explain how incompleteness equals bankruptcy?

0 new messages