Reply to Josh Soffer, III
TL
......
Please let me address these quote of yours, reconstituted in this order
because I think I can address them together:
(1)
>I think you misunderstood my point concerning Penrose's argument about
>the limits of formalism.
....
(2)
>If we examine Hume's postion, we find that the mind attains reality
>through the senses, by the laws of association (contiguity, simularity
>, etc.) .
.....
(3)
>Now, here is where what could be called MODERNISM, also referred to as
>Kantianism, neo-platonism, Romantic or German Idealism (as opposed to
>the more traditional idealism of Berkeley) differs from Hume's
>associationistic model. Actually, my first exposure to such ideas was
>via the cognitive science critique of behaviorism (Chomsky vs. Skinner).
>Hume assumes that each object we perceive can understood indenpently of
>what preceded it in mind. We proceed from the modeling of individual
>objects to their participation in groups. But the Modernist view is
>that we percieve objects via getalts, not from part to whole but from
>whole to part.
....
(4)
> Let me offer an analogy.....
>This is how we perceive objects in the world. The
>meaning of an object is determined by a pre-existing gestalt or scheme
>of interpretation. At the same time, when we discover a new element or
>detail of a scene, say of the old lady, we subtly alter the
>relationships of the pre-existing scheme of the old lady. This (what) [is]
not
>just postmodernism, but [what] modernism has in mind with its focus on
language
>and discourse. An object depends for its very menaing on a scheme of
>interpretation , a 'language'.
Let's see if I understand you here. I think Penrose is refering to a Gestalt
notion in his book (the Emp. New Mind). This notion, although by no means
originated with, is fairly exhaustively treated in the notion of "Parallel
Distributed Processing", with a fine (classical) 2 volume set titled:
"Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the MicroStrucure of
Cognition" by David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland and the PDP Research
Group (1986). Here, they make the case that PDP (parallel distributed
processing - including neural networks) is NECESSARY for doing "human"
stuff - like image recognition, language understanding, learning (they
include your vase example as well as many others). They make the case not
just for the speed of PDP, but that they have capabilities beyond serialized
computation. I agree. I think that this was the case Penrose was making -
but with the added "requirement" of the quantum mechanics.
Although "real" neurons may have "quantum mechanical" characteristics, I
don't fully buy Penroses argument that PDP's or NN's (neural networks)
necessarily HAVE to be quantum mechanical in order to be "mind-capable".
I DO, however, buy the argument that not just "minds" and "brains" have to
be PDP but the physical world as well. This is what quantum mechanics is all
about - physical systems consist of parallel "entangled" states that
interact with other physical systems by "collapsing" their wave functions
(or whatever intuitive understanding of the process you prefer). Similarly,
NN's consist of simultaneously exisiting states exisiting in an "entangled"
form, by virtue of the many perceptron layers and their feedforward and
feedback processes. The output of the NN is the solution of this system.
Many systems have what is refered to as "uncontrollable" and "unobservable"
states. If you look at any particular hierarchical level with the universe,
lets say the mind (or brain) level. (there are levels above, such as social
groups, and levels below, such as molecules, physics (i.e. the guts of the
components of the level of interest)). These NN's may end up consisting of
quantum mechanical structures such as molecules, but these substructures may
exisit as "uncontrollable" and "unobservable" from within the mind or brain
level, yet being completely necessary.
Are social groups PDP structures? Yes. Do they depend on minds? yes. Do they
depend on molecules and atoms? Yes. Does the social "system" a direct
extension of molecular quantum mechanical systems? No.
Is there a way to make one hierarchical level "observe" and "control"
another level? Yes. I get to this next. Is the "observability" and
"controllability" of a lower (or higher) level from within another level
"perfect"? No. Does it have to be? No. Is it possible? Yes.
Let me address the following quotes together:
(5)
>I was trying to say that rigorous proof cannot
>establish for a construct an indubitable truth. Why not?
(6)
>Even if deductive logic and abstraction are not part of
>the outside world but only mental apparatuses, I assume Hume would argue
>that the world must be constructed in such a way as to make it amenable
>to our approximations.
(7)
>The mind's capacities of abstraction and deduction are applied
>to the objects of sense in order to , piece by piece, through trial and
>error, construct an accurate map of the world. Objects may not
>accord to perfect numeric self-identicality, but we must assume
>that what we do when we create theories is is to represent, to copy,
>to correspond our models to a real world.
(8)
>Let me explain it by referring back to the point where philosophy began
>to question the assumptions which you may hold concerning the basis of
>scientific and mathetical truth. The crux of the matter concerns the
>nature of the relationshsip between the mind and the external world, or
>between the subject and the object.
(9)
>Hilary Putnam says:
>"Elements of what we call "language" or "mind" penetrate so deeply into
>what we call "reality" that the very project of representing ourselves
>as being "mappers" of something "language-independent" is fatally
>compromised from the very start .(Realism with a Human Face,p.28)"
To me, its clear that we have minds and abilities to learn and create
concepts and ideas. Its also clear that we have a means of remembering and
communicating these understandings. In many ways, our understanding preceeds
our memory and communications - for example in many ways I have to
intentionally (or not) "translate" my understanding into an appropriate
language for communications purposes.
For example in this e-mail, I have to translate what I'm trying to say into
what I'm saying, by means far more complex than "cutting, pasting and
editing".
Another example, In my mind right now I can "hear" (understand) Bach's trio
sonatas #1 that I heard earlier. I can express this knowledge to you in this
e-mail, but I'm "translating". There are other examples.
So, the impact of our "minds" on reality is clear and understood (by no
means competely or by the same standards that some insist that mathematical
theorums must have).
It is also clear that the "outside world" also has an impact on "reality".
Yes we have senses that transduce forces in the word into our minds. Yes, we
have comprehension mechanisms that we use to process these transducer
signals. But the outside world is there and communicating to us just as much
as we can communicate to each other. And it goes both ways: we can
communicate to the outside world as well. As an engineer I am very
sensitive to my abilities to communicate to the outside world through my
abilities to create in that world (as would any fine artist that utilizes
technique: musicians, figurative sculptors, painters, potters, etc...)
Our minds, our language, and our language abilities enable us to comunicate
bewteen each other as human beings, because the structure of our minds can
be somehow encoded and compressed and transfered between minds using our
natural language. We can do this with nonverbal mental structures as well -
music is a fine candidate as an example.
With math and science we similarly communicate with the world. Our
mathematics and physical laws is our language that we use to communicate
with the physical world at a structural level: just like natural language
can encode, compress and transfer mental states between individual people,
so is mathematics and science used to encode, compress and transfer physical
and structural states between the outside world and the mind of a person.
You state that "something 'language independant is fatally compromised from
the start." Compromised?? - how - like original sin? "Fatally" - like in
"dead" or non-functional?. What makes language dependancies so
"non-compromised"?
I agree that we should reject this metaphysical search for "complete
perfection" or "complete absolute truth" - paramartha. I reject this search
because of its metaphysical nature: it can't be defined, cann't be test for,
and would be useless even if it existed.
However I do not reject "imperfect truth" or "incomplete truth". I accept
"small truths" - they enable us to make measurements, to compare, to make
judgements based on some measureable criterion, allow us to communicate,
allow me to understand the object of my interest and allow me transform the
world in a way that I need to. I aspire to no larger, or more perfect or any
less compromised truth.
>Nelson Goodman argues:
>"Our hypotheses, decriptions, depictions, perceptions cannot be checked
>aginst the inaccessible 'external world'. Construed as correspondence
>between discourse and the readymade world beyond discourse, truth runs
>into double trouble:there is no such world independent of description;
>and correspondence between description and the undescribed is
>incomprehensible."
I don't buy this. Do you? Would you trust Nelson Goodman to perform surgery
on your daughter? Or would Goodman reject any diagnosis of your daughter
because "Our hypotheses, decriptions, depictions, perceptions cannot be
checked aginst the inaccessible 'external world'". Or would Goodman simply
say, "of course I'll help your daughter, I was just making a point, not
because I actually believe it, or think that it represent the world and
life, but because I thought it would make a useful argument!". Nelson would
be a prime candidate to trip Searle's third Law. How would Goodman's
philosophy help me in life: in my work as an engineer, as a father and
teacher to my childern, as a friend to my fellows?
Earlier you asked which philosophical program or schools I subscribed to.
I've been priviledged to be a member of an Epicurian garden. As Epicurus
writes in his "Sovran Maxims" :
"...
23. If you fight against all your sensations, you will have no standard to
which to refer, and thus no means of judging even those sensations which you
claim are false.
24. If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to
distinguish between opinion about things awaiting confirmation and that
which is already confirmed to be present, whether in sensation or in
feelings or in any application of intellect to the presentations, you will
confuse the rest of your sensations by your groundless opinion and so you
will reject every standard of truth. If in your ideas based upon opinion you
hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that which
does not, you will not avoid error, as you will be maintaining the entire
basis for doubt in every judgment between correct and incorrect opinion.
...."
>From the vantage of Modernism, the Humean belief in the ability to
>accumulate objects of truth like apples in a basket presumes what in
>fact does not happen ; the preservation of the exact meaning of each
>apple as we add to it. The belief that an exactly assigned definition of
>an object, whether it be an object in the world or a mathematical object
>, can persist as itself in our mind until we decide to rename it, is the
>presumption of a META-NARRATIVE, the preserving of a specific meaning
>indefinitely over time. One doesn't realize that to assume this is to
>assume a metaphsical faith in the cosntancy of meanings in this way. As
>you can see, when we conceive of meaning as only located with respect to
>a relational gestalt, or narrative, the movement of experieince
>generates transformations of the geltalt (new narratives).
>Nothing is claimed to be preserved outside of this process (no
>meta-narrative, or GOd's eye view).
I think I begin to addressed this. From a systems engineering perspective
(one that has quite a number of successes to its credit, I might add - its
not just a speculative metaphysics), separate systems are able be observe
and control each other. These systems may be at the same level or at
different hierarchical levels. Is the controllability and observability
"perfect" - NO. Is it possible - YES. To what extent - to the extent
(order) that we specify. Can we tell (observe) that our specified order
(i.e. approximation level) is "good enough?" Yes - the accuracy (i.e. error)
is also observable.
>Actually, for the modernist, there
>are ultimate standards which Do perserve themselves. For the Kantians
>(like Popper, Putnam), these standards of scientific parsimony,
>elegance, consitency, ecetera, allow us to compare different theories
>and perfer one over the other, and thus approach truth assymptotically
>this way, even though they eschew the idea that mathematical proof nails
>down truth. Postmodernists deny that there are any grand scientific
>criteria which protect themselves from their own transformation through
>cultural change. Rorty , for instance, believes in progress, but a
>relativistic or pragmatic measure of progress as the progress in
>reducing human suffering.
Let me deal with Rorty last.
>What is the implication of the Modernist idea for the grounding of
>mathematical constructs via formal proof? If we treat a construct as an
>object, and the axiomatic system we attempt to integrate it into in a
>deductive web as a gestalt, then our first question is, is this object
>itself non-empirical? Certainly it was 'discovered' at a particular time
>and place. Furthermore, it's acceptance withi the mathematical community
>as proven is soemtimes controversial. And even after a consensus has
>been reached concerning its legitimacy or truth, some within the
>community are never won over. Doesn't this sound like the process of
>scientific validation?
>Does'nt a new mathematical construct, even though it is generated within
>the mind rather than perceived 'out there' introduce a new object to
>the world? And therefore, does this new object not require a subtle
>redefinition of the meaning of the scheme of relationships of the
>pre-existing aximiatic system, in order to accomodate it? And isn't it
>this need to accomodate to something newly invented which leads to
>controversy and the need for a new consensus? As you said, the process
>of formalization leads to good approximations, (as long as we recognize
>that the very meaning of what we are approximating is subject to shifts
>from one era of mathematics to another, and even within eras.)
Now, as an observation, I find that "systems engineering" is extremely
usefull and fruitfull for the physical/engineering universe (i.e. not just
the "found" word of physics but the "created" world of computers, software,
models, simulations, hardware, fusion reactors, and financial neural
networkd). I don't think its that useful in cultural matters such as
literary criticism, or art criticism or religious criticism (Joseph Campbell
stuff).
Similary, I find that Post Modern frame analysis, although extremely usefull
as an analytic tool for literary/cultural analysis is also limited in its
analysis of math/physics/engineering.
For example, as a youth I was educated at the elementary level in a highly
"framed" environment, with lots of dogma and such. I of couse have traveled
a long way since then. I have returned for a visit on occasion, but having
stepped out of the "frame" I can no longer return to "within" it in the same
way. One cann't go back home again - i believe is the saying. Is systems
engineering the right tools for this context? No. Is Quantum mechanics? No.
Post-Modern frame analysis - yes, of course.
Science or math makes not claim that it has a single - all embracing
metaphysical theory that explains everything, reguardless of context or
focus of enquiry. It would, of course, be as equally fruitless if
post-modern frame analysis were to claim such a metaphysical position for
itself, irrespective of subject matter. But I assume that your not making
such a claim.
(As an aside, I even found it difficult to pee in those much lower urinals!)
>>Ted wrote:
>>"It seems that...
>>...... Ordinary language has stopped growing
>>syntactically probably way back in prehistory, and only seems to grow
>>semantically (our vocabulary keps growing), whereas ...
>I think it is a mistake to assume that natural languages are not
>amenable to continual evolution syntactically as well as semantically.
>Compare , for example, Shakepearean English with contemporary English.
>The significant changes in grammatical form parallel the changes in...
I am no expert in such matters. I would be interested in how a linguist or
more interestingly a philologist (philologists just seem to be more
interesting then anyone ;-) ). However, I have noticed a few trends. Among
them are:
a. Every page of Rorty looks like any other page of Rorty's (including lack
of references). In fact a page of rorties looks the same as any page of
derrida. In fact a page from attic greek (say Homer's Illiad) looks
amazingly similar to a modern greek romance novel. or an american one for
that matter. yes there have been innovations: putting spaces between words,
capitalization of words, fonts, and of course new vocabulary along with a
lot of different idiomatic patterns 'n stuff. However, have we invented
verbs or adverbs as a recent innovation?
b. A page from Euclid looks very different from a page of, say fractal
geometry.
c. If viewed in binary form, a page of Rorty looks exactly the same as a
page from fractal geometry (assuming, for example, PDF file formats). Just
0's and 1's. But so does a picture of an ape in a zoo.
(P.S. there are 10 types of people in this world, those that know the binary
number system and those that don't...)
d. Does the fact that all human knowledge, both ancient and modern, can be
expressed as a bunch binary 0's and 1's imply that no progress has been made
in human language?
The positivists Russell, Wittgenstien and the "Wieners" attributed all the
paradoxes so beloved of methaphysicians to linguistic artifacts based on the
structure of our indo-european language. They considered paradoxes to be
"linguistic illusions" similar to optical illusions. They reguarded ordinary
language not capable of avoiding them, and therefore considered more
symbolic forms, such as symbolic logic as well as other mathematical
symbolic systems to be free of them. At least to a much larger extent, by
virtue of dropping the indo-european baggage of of "subject-object", as well
as other fixtures. This Indo-euro linguistic furniture, appears to be
"received" from our prehistoric roots. However, a philologist is needed
here.....
>Only with the luxury of hindsight can one assume, for instance, that a
>Newton would embrace Einstein's contributions,
We know that Newton would NOT have embraced Einstein. Actually Newton was a
compete ASSHOLE, who spent much of his career stealing the credit from his
contemporaries. The history of his relations with Robert Hook and WIlliam
Halley (I think I have the right names here) is illustrative. He used his
position in the Royal Academy and the Government Mint much like Stalin. So
we know that Newton would have launched all the political capital at his
disposal in a massive slander campagn against Einstein. That is not to say
that Newton wasn't a genius and a towering figure in classical mechanics,
optics, mathematics , etc.. But a monumental asshole as well.
>............................................ or Aristotle would have
>embraced Newton. We don't realize the way in which we automatically
>re-define the meanings of our previous systems of description in order
>to accomodate a new construct. Working our way backward through the
>history of mathematics or science is very different from moving forward
>through it.................
I know what you're saying here but I think (like I mentioned previously)
that Post Modern frame analysis, isn't equally fruitfull in the history of
math/science as say, in the history of art (unless Post Modern frame
Analysis assumes that it is applicable every where and is incapable of being
"wrong" or "irrelevent" or irrefuitable).
For example, in going forwards in physics history there is alot more
empiricism then going backwards, which in turm is characterised by
mathematical rigor (securing fundations rather than building
superstructure - "fundamentalism" if you will).
For example electro-magnetism. The early physicists, Coulomb, Lenz, Henry,
etc did a Ton of experimental work before they laid out the physical laws
named after them. Maxwell took their individual laws and formulated a
mathematical structure that elegantly expressed all these laws in a
symmetrical and consise and easily usable format, as well as expressed their
empirical results. Looking backwards we condense all that experimental work
into a few "illustrative cannonical experiments" and focus on the equations
of Maxwell. We do construct the final equations out of the individual laws,
but the final form of Maxwells equations clearly is the final pedagogical
goal. The original individual physical laws then fall out as instances of
Maxwell's equations under various restrictive conditions, whereas the entire
maxwell equations are the "unrestricted, general equation". I.e. Maxwells
equations become the "entire gestalt" with with the individual laws as
particular restricted views - perspectives - a particular collapse of the
entagled wave-function of EM.
In other words, the "backwards process" makes them much more "secure", more
stable, more "obvious" then they were going "forwards".
I get the impression that in the post-modern frame analysis of culture, the
process of "going backwards" makes the original frames less secure then they
originally were during the process of going forward.
For example, assume you grow up in a closed world of, say, Greek paganism
where the dogmatic theology of the Olympian Gods is assumed and never
questioned, and is intrinsically part of your world view. You then grow up
and get sent to a far off place where people of various nationalities and
associated tribal religions co-mingle and communicate with each other, as in
a platonic academy. You become involved in the meta-narrative of
philosophical critical inquiry, where the assumptions of individual frames
(of the various tribal relgions) can no longer be assumed as they were
inside their own narratives, because now in the meta-narrative of critical
philosophy, *** they contradict each other ***. So now the person has to
find some other new assumptions that don't contradict each other, and in
turm can explain the original frames as well as their assumptions (now no
longer assumptions in the meta-frame). In this way "goings backwards" in PM
Frame analysis (i.e. examining the individual narratives from the new
meta-frame analysis) weakens the "solidity" of the original frames, and
especially their assumptions (i.e. their axioms).
*****
In science/ math this doesn't happen because the "assumptions" of the
individual "frames" are based on empirical data that is anchored in
observable data, and doesn't dissapear. For example in electromagnetism you
have a number of separate "frames" that make up the "meta-frame" of EM
(Elect-magnetism - or Maxwell's equations). You have the electrostatic frame
(of fixed charges - coulomb, franklin, etc). You have the magnetostatic
frame, the electro-dynamic frame, the "dynamo" frame (Faraday), etc. The
assumptions of these frames is their empirical data, which is expressed as
physical laws. The ethno-religious frames on the other hand typically don't
involve much empirical data - how much empirical data is there for Brahma,
compared to Athena, compared to Venus, compared to Yahweh - not much.
*****
So the assumptions in physics (i.e. the physical empirical data) is retained
and in fact strengthened by "going backwards" in physics. The assumptions in
etho-religions are "simply" social beliefs and traditions, which are
changable by simple whim and by *** A SIMPLE ACT OF WILL ***. No amount of
"belief" will keep you from getting bruized when you try to walk through a
door without opening it first.
I am of course not arguing that the "hard" sciences are "more important" or
"less important" than the social sciences or the arts. I am saying that
nature of the beast is different and in fact, the social sciences may be
more difficult and more important, because they concern themselves with
human belief and human will and decision making. It may need different
tools, such as PM, for its problem set and subject matter.
James Whitehead bitches about the amount of money spent on the "hard
sciences" such as the CERN project. But I assure you that an incredible
amount of money is wasted in the soft human sciences as well - examples
include the "war on drugs" and the "war in iraq" as well as many other wars.
There are "good" wars as well; war on poverty, war on illiteracy, etc.
Science/math, etc differs from the arts is many ways, in my opinion. To try
force them to be identical I don;t believe will be a gruitful project. some
differences include: (all my personal opinion/observation)
- art is about life. About its practise. Take Finigan's Wake, for instance.
It tells alot about life and what we think and why. Science is about the
rules that seem to govern the physical world. PDP, for instance concerns
itself about the underlying machinery of HOW we think and how we might
manufacture/simulate a artificial "thinking thing"
- art directly interacts with the human culture - it takes it in and
refashions it directly. It has "intermediaries", such as art sellers and
crtitics, as well as fairly well of folks that "commission" works of art.
However artists (and related field, such as writers, journalists, etc are
"culture workers" because they work directly on our culture. Physics (lets
take as an example) interacts with the physical world by empirical tests and
construction of physical laws that characterise the behaviour of the
physical world. It is less directly in contact with human culture. Now there
are lots of intermediaries between the physicists and human culture:
businesses, manufacturers, the dept of defence, dept of energy, various
science foundations. These intermediaries loom large in our society and
economy and actual control our society and economy. These intermediaries are
also concerned with culture in many cases - such as the entertainment
industry which "commissions" much of technology - video, audi, multimedia,
etc. However physicists, engineers and mathematicians themselves are not
"cultural workers" as such, even if much as their output is used by culture.
They themselves do not determine the cultural use or specifications of the
output of their work.
PM frame analysis works fruitfully in cultural studies, physics/math is very
fruitful in physical studies. You should therefore expect a certain
rejection of PM analysis by hard science, since by most hard science
practicioners (no sociologists or linguists) PM fails to accurate capture
the reality of science and math , however does a very good job in cultural
analysis (as i hope I illustrated earlier). Just as if an engineer decided
that PM was false and, say, Thermodynamics was the correct analysis tool of
cultural analysis. This should rightfully set off certain "BS" alarms in
cultural studues.
PM Frame Analysis seems much simpler to implement in a computer AI system as
a model of "assumption and assumption re-evaluation and recalculation" or
whatever the right term is. However being fairly simple to implement doesn't
necessarily imply that the resulting model is the best model of the way
mathematicians and physicists operate. Just a running start. Enough to get
DOD funding :-) !
In fact I've heard rummors that Leibnizian "monads" have been implemented in
certain AI constructs... Or perhaps AI is just the words worst reuser of
prexisting names of concepts and hoping that using the name will be enough
to convince people of its veracity - e.g. its 'AI', therefore it's
'Artificially Intelligent' (Marvin Minky's version of Decartes 'cogito ergo
sum') (relax, just joking! I don't mean it - really!)
>.....The very disagreement we are having here (if it is a
>disagreement) relfects the fact that innovation in ideas is not linear,
>cumulative but qualitatively transformative.
>It is no accident that many
>of the most significant mathematical devices were generated by
>philosophers (Descartes and analytic geometry, Leibnitz and the
>co-invention of Calculus). These constructs could not have been
>generated at just any time and place in history , but represented a
>qualtiatively new scheme in the world, which derived from and
>paralleled the larger philosophical innovations of these scholars.
>Just as we cannot derive Hegel from Kant or Hume from Berkeley, or
>Baco from Popper without quatiatively trasnforming the prior system, ,
>we canot derive an new mathematical construct from pre-existing premises
>without re-defining the overall meaning of those premises.
>Mathematicians may assume that what they are doing is a cumulative
>enterprise when in fact each new 'addition' to the body of mathematical
>fact requires subtle reassessment of its history.
PM analysis extended to physics. Although true to the program of PM, it is
NOT true to the actual history of the hard sciences/math. Would you like me
to apply Thermodynamics to art history? Why not? Inappropriate - doesn't
capture the importance and unique characteristics of the history of art.
Same with PM; it makes the history of physics and math resemble the history
of art, and doesn't deal with the particular characteristics of math and
physics (its consistency, empiricism and predictive abilities in the
physical world).
>Certainly there is a precision to the language of mathematics, but how
>effective is this precision at preserving the meanings of the scientific
>theories to which it is applied ?
As I mentioned earlier, physics (and math as well) are solidified and
reinforced by subsquent related developments. For example - Maxwells
equations does make coloumbs law invalid, it provides it with increased
mathematical support and extends its without contradicting it.
As mentioned in earlier e-mails, Quantum mechanics doesn't deny or
contradict EM, but extends models with new mathematical structure to take
into account new, previously unaccounted for empirical data - the empirical
data that the speed of light is the same in all velocity reference "frames",
atomic spectra, empirical data about two slit interfeence of single
electrons, bending of star light in the vecinity of massive objects, etc.
>I think of cultural creaivity as running in cycles. Lets say that the
>first phase of a cycle of theorietical invention involoves the
>tentative, impressionistic, emotive generating of a sketch. Lets call
>this the aesthetic or artistic phase. Then ther would be a phase
>transforming this sketchy language into a more concrete and formal one.
>Lets call this the scientific pahse. Then there would be a phase in
>which the more far-reaching impications of the new theoretical
>orientation were integraeted into a comprehensive unity. Lets call this
>the philosophical phase. (These phases could just as easilty be
>undersood as concurrent as sequential)
I agree. But this doesn't happen enough. I don't see why not - its very fun
(aesthetically thrilling) as well as productive.
>The important point here is that the fact that each theoretical cycle
>will be followed by another which cannot be assimilated to the previous
>in a logical or linear way means that the most detailed mathematical
>relationships involved in a particular theory lose their claim to
>strict compatibility within the new theory without reaaranging their
>sense.
>...........
Clearly a PM view, but not necessarily universally true or applicable over
ALL realms of knowledge (relatively speaking). As I'm tried to state
previously. It DOES tell us a lot about ebb and flow of various artistic
trends: futurism, cubism, impressionism, expressionism, social realism, etc.
The rate of cultural change seemed to have speeded up from a slow
evolutionary pace during the early indutrial revolution until in the 20th
century it seemed to change almost on a weekly basis - due to increase in
communications. This clearly screemed for explaination and PM analysis, in
my view, is the way we can understand this change.
>So if it comes down to choosing more or less fuzzy or
>impressionistic forms of description, can we say that one is superior to
>the other if both are destined to be transformed?
Various models can be objectively conmpared in science because of empirical
data, which is what science concerns itself with. I can tell which
approximation (model) is best because i know the accuracy I need.
Although very different, a fine artist know what kind of tools, paints,
armatures, etc he/she needs. Not because he has "special metaphysical
knowledge of "things in themselves"" but because he (say) knows what effects
he needs and what effects his tools (and his skill of them) will have.
>Is the cutting-edge
>artist less efffective at leading into new experiential territory than
>the scientist?
They are doing different things. Is the musician less effective then the
sculptor? "Science v.s. art" war is characteristic of the Romantic era and
not the Renaissance or the Enlightenment.
>If we look at the history of music, or art or philosophy,
>we can see an evolutioparalleling that of the sciences. That is why
>movements like Renassiance, Romatic, Modernist and Postmdernist
>accomodate the whole spectrum of cultural creativity, because there are
>profound and insperable interralionships between the arts and the
>sciences during these periods which distinguish them from other eras.
I would put the Renaissence together with the Enlightenment (modernism, as
you call it) and separate it from Romanticism/PostModernism.
The people of the Ren. and Enlightenment, you correctly state, were
polymaths in that they were scientists as well as artists as well as
humanists and classicists as well as philosophers. In them, science and art
were united - and in that, that were united with their Greek/Roman
intellectual ancestors. They didn't separate Truth and beauty either in
theory or within their own lives. They didn't try to deny "truth" but
defended it against dogmatc authorities - Galileo - "... yet it moves!".
The Romantics and their PM children reject the classics, and see the Greeks
as the source of all error. They favor emotional vanity and disparage the
sciences- see them as enemies and not allies.
The best "scientists" that I have had the honor of associating with, didn't
just do science, but concerned themselves also with music, art, the
classics, politics, and cultivating a likeminded circle of friends, both
scientific as well as artistic, humanistic, etc. i presume that this is true
of great artists as well...
>It is intersting that our only mention of the postmodern was in
>connection with certain liiterary theories. What abut teh work of many
>within cogntivie science (Daniel Dennett, Franscisco Varela, etc) and
>the debates between advocates of parallel distributed processing
>appraoches vs. the old guard (first versus second generation cog.sci.).
>Youll find the Humean-Modernist debate duplicated here on the edge of
>science.
If you're talking about how Neural Networks were put on the back burner for
30 years by Minsky's "proof" that perceptrons cann't do EXORs, I sympathise.
>Thus we cannot say that the language of science is a privileged avenue
>to progress over that of the arts or philosophy.
>-------------------------------------------------------
> Josh Soffer
I'm not claiming that, as I hope I've explained previously. Neither is PM
Frame Analysis, as I've hoped I've explained, also. I'm glad we got that
behind us; now we can get to the important stuff.
What I originally said was that by denying "objective truth", PM (and Rorty)
is denying the only vehicle individuals have to effect their own lives and
their societies in a positive manner.
As I mentioned previously, all social groups exist to benefit the "high
Priests" and other beneficiaries of the system through the use of irrational
coercive methods - they seem to contain the same structure - the "story",
the "outside threat", the "high priests", the "dogma"...
Now its all very well to perform frame analysis on a system such as the
radical islamic societies or North Korea from the safety of an armchair in
the US/UK/AUS/CAN/EU etc, but within those totalitarian, intellectually
closed societies the going is a little bit tougher.
The only working model we have, is how the Renaissance humanists and
Enligtenment Philosophs created a superstition-free and
authoritarianism-free space for themselves and their fellows by appeals to
objectivity and reason. And in this they had the confidence of knowing that
their Greek (and roman) predecessors were sucessfull in their time and thus
the Greeks "program" could maybe work in the humanists contemporary world
as well....
How else can people in authoritarian/irrational-dogmatic societies be agents
for change other then making people aware in an unrefutable way the
objective social and material conditions that they live in using empirical
and objective methods?
Ted Lechman
Utica, New York