Help--Adorno & WWII Quote Needed
ken...@bway.net
I'm looking for the exact Adorno famous quote that goes something like:
"After World War II, poetry can never be written again."
Does anybody know have the correct phrase?
Thanks for your help.
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Lev Lafayette
In <8739519...@dejanews.com> ken...@bway.net writes:
>I'm looking for the exact Adorno famous quote that goes something like:
>"After World War II, poetry can never be written again."
>Does anybody know have the correct phrase?
From the top of my head it was "After Auswitchz (sp? you know that town in
Poland) there can be no art".
And I tend to agree with him.
Best wishes,
Lev
Puss in Boots
ken...@bway.net:
> >I'm looking for the exact Adorno famous quote that goes something
> >like: "After World War II, poetry can never be written again."
> >Does anybody know have the correct phrase?
Lev Lafayette:
> From the top of my head it was "After Auswitchz (sp? you know that town in
> Poland) there can be no art". And I tend to agree with him.
I want to quote it as, "There can be no poetry after Auschwitz,"
but the closest I can find is, "To write poetry after Auschwitz is
barbaric" ("Cultural Criticism and Society"). A related idea: "Today
I think that if for no other reason than that an Auschwitz existed,
no one in our age should speak of Providence" (Primo Levi, _Survival
in Auschwitz_).
-- Moggin
Andrew Bernstein
>I'm looking for the exact Adorno famous quote that goes something like:
>
>"After World War II, poetry can never be written again."
>
>Does anybody know have the correct phrase?
Same phrase, except replace "World War II" with "Auschwitz"
BTW, why are you posting this in alt.postmodern? Adorno is definately not
postmodern.
------------------------------------------
* Andrew Bernstein * "Fair is foul *
* ha...@total.net * Foul is fair *
* Montreal, QC * Hover through fog *
* CANADA * And filthy air" *
* * --W. Shakespeare *
------------------------------------------
Puss in Boots
Andrew Bernstein (ha...@total.net):
> : BTW, why are you posting this in alt.postmodern? Adorno is definately not
> : postmodern.
Silke-Maria Weineck:
> No? By whose definition? Don't some passages in Minima Moralia strike you
> as rather anticipatory? I'm thinking esp. of the Freud critique.
Couldn't agree more. "Anticipatory" doesn't even half say it
-- think of Foucault's remark that reading the Frankfurt School
would have saved him years. Or of Adorno's critique of the social
critic in the essay we were just talking about ("Cultural
Criticism and Society"). The parallels are even clear to Eagleton,
although naturally they don't make him happy. In "Art after
Auschwitz," he compares Adorno and de Man, claiming that they both
"prefer to court impotence, deadlock and failure rather than risk
the dogmatism of affirmation" (_The Significance of Theory_ 61) --
not a bad observation (Eagleton's concern with potency and
courting rituals to the side).
-- Moggin
Andrew Bernstein
In article <moggin-ya02408000...@news.mindspring.com>,
mog...@mindspring.com (Puss in Boots) wrote:
>Andrew Bernstein (ha...@total.net):
>
>> : BTW, why are you posting this in alt.postmodern? Adorno is definately not
>> : postmodern.
>
>Silke-Maria Weineck:
>
>> No? By whose definition? Don't some passages in Minima Moralia strike you
>> as rather anticipatory? I'm thinking esp. of the Freud critique.
>
> Couldn't agree more. "Anticipatory" doesn't even half say it
>-- think of Foucault's remark that reading the Frankfurt School
[Molto SNIPagia vis-a-vis similarities between various theorists]
By any definition, Adorno could be found to be within the comfortable
confines of what is loosely called "modernity." I am getting slightly
perturbed, quite frankly, over hearing/reading people refer to any social
constructivist or anti-foundationalist thinker as "postmodern": Among the
thinkers who have been so mislabled are Habermas (neo-Hegelian critical
pragmatism), Rorty (refreshed American pragmatism), Fraser (feminism),
Stuart Hall (creative pastiche of incomesurable philosophies for the
purpose of social science research), and Allan Bloom (who was such a
pathetic revisionist as to invalidate the legacy any philosopher born since
Schopenhauer). Adorno is only the another example of this.
Adorno's critique of positivism was from a plainly Hegelian standpoint:
since positivism is clearly in the service of the bourgeoise culture
industry and elite interests, the critical consciousness invokes the
imperative to "negate" positivism; positivism and foundationalism are the
thesis, anti-foundationalism and ideological interpretations are the
antithesis.
The postmodern critique of foundationalism is entirely different. It is
based on a renunciation of any unifying discourse, be it in Foucault's
identification of such unities as arbitrary apparatuses in the service of
power, Derrida's deconstruction of such unities as being far from coherent
based on the instability of contextual themes, or Baudrillard's insistance
that _everything_ is simulated.
Here's the guide, folks: I've said it once, I've said it a thousand
times; the legacy of Hegel is your clue; postmodernism is against Hegel
incarnate, if it's Hegelian, it ain't postmodern. Adorno dialectically
constucted a systemic concept of a "culture industry". This involves a
classification of knowledge which would make any postmodernist retch.
Seriously, calling Adorno "postmodern" would be akin to calling Russel
and Whitehead "Spinozan" simply because they, like Spinoza, used
mathematics!
Puss in Boots
Andrew Bernstein (ha...@total.net):
> >> : BTW, why are you posting this in alt.postmodern? Adorno is definately not
> >> : postmodern.
Silke-Maria Weineck:
> >> No? By whose definition? Don't some passages in Minima Moralia strike you
> >> as rather anticipatory? I'm thinking esp. of the Freud critique.
mog...@mindspring.com (Puss in Boots):
> > Couldn't agree more. "Anticipatory" doesn't even half say it
> > -- think of Foucault's remark that reading the Frankfurt School
> > would have saved him years. Or of Adorno's critique of the social
> > critic in the essay we were just talking about ("Cultural
> > Criticism and Society"). The parallels are even clear to Eagleton,
> > although naturally they don't make him happy. In "Art after
> > Auschwitz," he compares Adorno and de Man, claiming that they both
> > "prefer to court impotence, deadlock and failure rather than risk
> > the dogmatism of affirmation" (_The Significance of Theory_ 61) --
> > not a bad observation (Eagleton's concern with potency and
> > courting rituals to the side).
A note here. Adorno writes, as if he was replying to Eagleton, "I
am not afraid of the reproach of unfruitful negativity..." And _that's_
just the theme: Eagleton's worry is about courting, potency, and so
ultimately it centers on _reproduction_ -- Adorno, by contrast, is
willing to risk a much more radical negativity, one Eagleton chooses to
reject because it threatens his reproductive thrusts -- that is, his
determination to be _fruitful_. (And, I presume, to multiply, although
that's not strictly certain.)
> By any definition, Adorno could be found to be within the comfortable
> confines of what is loosely called "modernity."
Not by _any_ definition -- which one did you have in mind? Adorno
is a strong opponent of the consequences of "modernity" in the usual
sense, where it includes the Enlightment, the advent of capitalism, and
the rise of the bourgeoisie. Not to be confused with "modernism" --
e.g., Beckett, Kafka, Schoenberg -- where Adorno clearly _does_ belong.
(Remember, too, that "modernism" and "post-modernism" are often used
almost interchangeably. Just to make things that much more confusing.)
> I am getting slightly
> perturbed, quite frankly, over hearing/reading people refer to any social
> constructivist or anti-foundationalist thinker as "postmodern": Among the
> thinkers who have been so mislabled are Habermas (neo-Hegelian critical
> pragmatism), Rorty (refreshed American pragmatism), Fraser (feminism),
> Stuart Hall (creative pastiche of incomesurable philosophies for the
> purpose of social science research), and Allan Bloom (who was such a
> pathetic revisionist as to invalidate the legacy any philosopher born since
> Schopenhauer). Adorno is only the another example of this.
You meant to say Harold Bloom, didn't you? Or did you mean Allan,
after all? Sound like you might have, but I've never hear him called
a post-modernist. Makes me curious. Can you fill a little about that?
Anyway, I can see your point about Habermas and Rorty -- but I don't
think Adorno is another instance.
> Adorno's critique of positivism was from a plainly Hegelian standpoint:
> since positivism is clearly in the service of the bourgeoise culture
> industry and elite interests, the critical consciousness invokes the
> imperative to "negate" positivism; positivism and foundationalism are the
> thesis, anti-foundationalism and ideological interpretations are the
> antithesis.
Oh, right. Just slap a simplistic "thesis, antithesis" frame onto
Adorno, then claim that shows he was working "from a plainly Hegelian
standpoint" -- remember to ignore the critique of Hegel running through
his work. For Adorno, the Hegelian system was condemned to untruth
(_Negative Dialectics_ 27) -- he couldn't have put it much more bluntly.
> The postmodern critique of foundationalism is entirely different. It is
> based on a renunciation of any unifying discourse,
Adorno (alluding to Hegel): "The whole is the false."
> be it in Foucault's
> identification of such unities as arbitrary apparatuses in the service of
> power,
Foucault:
" ... At that point I realized how the Frankfurt School had tried
ahead of time to assert things that I too had been working for years to
sustain. This even explains a certain irritation shown by some of them
who saw that in France there were experiences that were -- I wouldn't
say identical but in some ways very similar. In effect, correctness
and theoretical fecundity would have asked for a much more thorough
acquaintance with and study of the Frankfurt School. As far as I'm
concerned, I think that the Frankfurt School set of problems are still
being worked on. Among others, the effects of power that are connected
to a rationality that has been historically and geographically defined
in the West, starting from the sixteenth century on. The West could
never have attained the economic and cultural effects that are unique to
it without the exercise of that specific form of rationality. Now, how
are we to separate this rationality from the mechanisms, procedures,
techniques, and effects of power that determine it, which we no longer
accept and which we point to as the form of oppression typical of
capitalist societies, and perhaps of socialist societies too? Couldn't
it be concluded that the promise of _Aufklärung_ (Enlightenment), of
attaining freedom through the exercise of reason, has been, on the
contrary, overturned within the domain of Reason itself, that it is
taking more and more space away from freedom? It's a fundamental
problem that we all debate, that is common to so many, whether
Communists or not. And this problem, as we know, was singled out by
Horkheimer before the others; and it was the Frankfurt School that
measured its relationship with Marx on the basis of this hypothesis.
Wasn't it Horkheimer who suggested that in Marx there was the idea of a
society as being like an immense factory?
" ... When I recognize all these merits of the Frankfurt School, I
do so with the bad conscience of one who should have known them and
studied them much earlier than was the case. Perhaps if I had known
these works earlier on, I would have saved useful time, surely: I
wouldn't hvae needed to write some things and I would have avoided
certain errors. At any rate, if I had encountered the Frankfurt School
while young, I would have been seduced to the point of doing nothing
else in life but the job of commenting on them. Instead, their
influence on me remains retrospective, a contribution reached when I
was no longer at the age of intellectual 'discoveries.' And I don't
even know whether to be glad or feel sorry about it (_Remarks on Marx_
115-120).
Foucault goes on to draw some distinctions between himself and the
Frankfurt School -- interesting material, but we agree that the two
aren't identical. Not to mention that I'm getting real tired of typing.
> Derrida's deconstruction of such unities as being far from coherent
> based on the instability of contextual themes, or Baudrillard's insistance
> that _everything_ is simulated.
"Deconstruction" doesn't even possibly resemble Adorno's "logic of
disintegration"? And anyhow, Adorno doesn't practice this "unifying
discourse" you attribute to him -- he explicitly rejects it. Parataxis
is _the_ trope of his writing. (de Man has some insightful criticism
on that.)
> Here's the guide, folks: I've said it once, I've said it a thousand
> times; the legacy of Hegel is your clue; postmodernism is against Hegel
> incarnate, if it's Hegelian, it ain't postmodern. Adorno dialectically
> constucted a systemic concept of a "culture industry". This involves a
> classification of knowledge which would make any postmodernist retch.
The term you've forgotten is "negative dialectics." And if taking
on Hegel is your criterion, then Adorno is a post-modernist _par
excellence_. Have you actually read, let's say, _Negative Dialectics_?
> Seriously, calling Adorno "postmodern" would be akin to calling Russel
> and Whitehead "Spinozan" simply because they, like Spinoza, used
> mathematics!
Good example -- kinda like calling Adorno "plainly Hegelian" just
because he used dialectics.
-- Moggin
Andrew Bernstein
Three points:
A negative dialectic is a dialectic all the same. Marx used Hegelian
dialectics as well, but inverting the structure. Adorno might have written
studd which would have put off Hegel had he been alive to read any of it,
but he used the same structure all the same.
Adorno organized ideas into systems just like every other conventional
philosopher before him. That he critiqued this practice as the essence of
untruth is besides the point. Such systemic unities were still deamed
possible and very real, in spite of Adorno's characterization therof as
ideological constructs.
(The whole notion of "ideology" as "false consciousness" or as an
"interpelator" or as a function of "hegemony" is contrary to the essence of
postmodernism in that it involves a systemic discursive formation. Try
getting Foucault to agree with that. Foucault's comments vis-a-vis the
Frankfurt school were merely an admission that anyone could have come to
the same conclusions he did from the Frankfurt Scool's perspectives and
from their usage of traditional philosophy)
Yes, I really meant Allan Bloom. No, I never even bothered reading
Harold Bloom--I couldn't care less about literary criticism at the moment.
In "The Closing of the American Mind" Bloom consistantly assaults every
contemporary trend in philosophy wholesale from their roots to their
present incarnations: Nietzsche, Herbert Marcuse, Heidegger, John Dewey,
you name it, Bloom leaves no turn unstoned. Foundationalism and respect for
tradition are one thing, but implying the films of Woody Allen are
exemplars of nazi philosophy seems more than a little odd to me.
I have read in term papers, and occasioned to hear in discussions,
people refer to Allan Bloom as a postmodernist. I suppose people who cannot
sleep in Chicago probably know this is because the man is spinning in his
grave every time this happens. Bloom might be identifying a collapse in the
centrality of culture, but he sure as hell isn't advocating it; he swears a
return to the good ol'ways will save us all by planting us in a happy
never-never land of liberal educations with high standards, HIS high
standards at that.
In many ways, this is just the thing Adorno did. He identified a
fragmentary culture, for sure. But he viewed it from the distance as being
part of a composite whole, the so-called "culture industry". Check his
essay co-written with Horkheimer on that topic. They clearly identify,
dialectically I might add, a massive popular culture juggernaut which is
opposed to their treasured old European culture. Adorno favours the latter
while rejecting the former. How modern of him: modernism being the beleif
that there is a truth and there is a possibility for order and social
cohesion through reason. That he identifies the absence of this at the
moment only belies his modernity every time he insists it is possible;
posmodernists, OTOH, say it is an illusion.
I know it's fun to play with words and to identify similarities and
concessions, I do it all the time. Ask any reasonably up-to-date
philosophy, sociology, or communications professor, however, and you'll
hear Adorno put in his proper place, and it ain't gonna be a postmodern
one.
Puss in Boots
ha...@total.net (Andrew Bernstein):
> A negative dialectic is a dialectic all the same. Marx used Hegelian
> dialectics as well, but inverting the structure. Adorno might have written
> studd which would have put off Hegel had he been alive to read any of it,
> but he used the same structure all the same.
Uses the same structure? I don't see it. I'd agree that Adorno
is a dialectical thinker (a brilliant one, in my opinion) -- but
borrowing your example, to say that Adorno is working "from a plainly
Hegelian standpoint" simply because he uses dialectics is like
"calling Russell and Whitehead 'Spinozan' simply because they, like
Spinoza, used mathematics!"
> Adorno organized ideas into systems just like every other conventional
> philosopher before him.
Actually, he doesn't; this is the kind of thing that made me ask
if you had actually read Adorno, since it only takes a glance at a
book like _Minima Moralia_ or _Negative Dialectics_ to see what's the
case. Adorno is as an aphoristic philosopher, somewhat like
Nietzsche, rather than a systematic philosopher on the model of Hegel.
> That he critiqued this practice as the essence of
> untruth is besides the point.
It goes hand in hand with his anti-systematic practice. I don't
agree that it would be beside the point, even if your description
was correct -- but I doubt it's time to be heading into deeper waters.
> Such systemic unities were still deamed
> possible and very real, in spite of Adorno's characterization therof as
> ideological constructs.
> (The whole notion of "ideology" as "false consciousness" or as an
> "interpelator" or as a function of "hegemony" is contrary to the essence of
> postmodernism in that it involves a systemic discursive formation. Try
> getting Foucault to agree with that.
Of course Foucault would agree -- his work consists in good part
of mapping those formations. Incidentally, isn't "the essense of
postmodernism" contrary to "the essense of postmodernism"? Or do you
see it differently?
> Foucault's comments vis-a-vis the
> Frankfurt school were merely an admission that anyone could have come to
> the same conclusions he did from the Frankfurt Scool's perspectives and
> from their usage of traditional philosophy)
Um, no. Didn't you read them? Here's some excerpts from what I
quoted before: "...the Frankfurt School had tried ahead of time to
assert things that I too had been working for years to sustain." "As
far as I'm concerned, I think that the Frankfurt School set of
problems are still being worked on." "Perhaps if I had known these
works earlier on, I would have saved useful time, surely: I wouldn't
have needed to write some things and I would have avoided certain
errors." Etc.
> Yes, I really meant Allan Bloom. [...]
Thanks.
> In many ways, this is just the thing Adorno did. He identified a
> fragmentary culture, for sure. But he viewed it from the distance as being
> part of a composite whole, the so-called "culture industry". Check his
> essay co-written with Horkheimer on that topic. They clearly identify,
> dialectically I might add, a massive popular culture juggernaut which is
> opposed to their treasured old European culture. Adorno favours the latter
> while rejecting the former.
No, that's much too sweeping -- Adorno gives his favor to Kafka,
Beckett, and Schoenberg, as I mentioned before. And if treasuring
"old European culture" is enough to bar Adorno from the land of post-
modernism, you'll have to deny Barthes and Derrida visas, too.
> How modern of him: modernism being the beleif
> that there is a truth and there is a possibility for order and social
> cohesion through reason.
No, that's not modernism. (I did a song-and-dance at the start
of my last post in the faint hope of avoiding this confusion.) And
it isn't Adorno, who wrote, "Enlightenment is as totalitarian as any
system" (_Dialectic of Enlightenment_ 24). Sounds much more like
you're talking about Habermas, to me. Tell you what -- let's switch
"Adorno" with "Habermas," and then we can agree.
> That he identifies the absence of this at the
> moment only belies his modernity every time he insists it is possible;
> posmodernists, OTOH, say it is an illusion.
You can't mean "belie," can you? Anyway, he doesn't -- he makes
plain that "the prime cause of the retreat from enlightenment" as a
source of freedom lies not in any historical contingency, "but in the
Enlightenment itelf" (_Dialectic of Enlightenment_ viii-ix).
> I know it's fun to play with words and to identify similarities and
> concessions, I do it all the time.
You're in a poor position to claim I'm merely playing with words,
seeing as how you left all of them out of your reply.
> Ask any reasonably up-to-date
> philosophy, sociology, or communications professor, however, and you'll
> hear Adorno put in his proper place, and it ain't gonna be a postmodern
> one.
Ah, so _that's_ how to learn the truth -- you go ask a professor!
(A "reasonably up-to-date" one, natch.) Well, why didn't you _say_
so? We could have saved ourselves the trouble of reading and thinking.
Oh, but that's right -- you have.
-- Moggin
Andy Lowry
On Wed, 17 Sep 1997, Andrew Bernstein wrote:
> while rejecting the former. How modern of him: modernism being the beleif
> that there is a truth and there is a possibility for order and social
> cohesion through reason.
I see that Moggin has already inscribed 3 question marks beside this, but
let's make it plain that inquiring minds want to know: can you kindly
name 3 "modernists" who believed this? I can only suppose that you're
talking "modernity," & particularly the Descartes-Marx segment of same.
Eagerly awaiting a reply,
-- Andy Lowry
I know neither science nor art, but am a philosopher.--Heraclides Ponticus
Giles Peaker
- ha...@total.net (Andrew Bernstein):
-
- > A negative dialectic is a dialectic all the same. Marx used Hegelian
- > dialectics as well, but inverting the structure. Adorno might have written
- > studd which would have put off Hegel had he been alive to read any of it,
- > but he used the same structure all the same.
-
- Uses the same structure? I don't see it. I'd agree that Adorno
- is a dialectical thinker (a brilliant one, in my opinion) -- but
- borrowing your example, to say that Adorno is working "from a plainly
- Hegelian standpoint" simply because he uses dialectics is like
- "calling Russell and Whitehead 'Spinozan' simply because they, like
- Spinoza, used mathematics!"
-
- > Adorno organized ideas into systems just like every other conventional
- > philosopher before him.
-
- Actually, he doesn't; this is the kind of thing that made me ask
- if you had actually read Adorno, since it only takes a glance at a
- book like _Minima Moralia_ or _Negative Dialectics_ to see what's the
- case. Adorno is as an aphoristic philosopher, somewhat like
- Nietzsche, rather than a systematic philosopher on the model of Hegel.
-
- > That he critiqued this practice as the essence of
- > untruth is besides the point.
-
- It goes hand in hand with his anti-systematic practice. I don't
- agree that it would be beside the point, even if your description
- was correct -- but I doubt it's time to be heading into deeper waters.
-
- > Such systemic unities were still deamed
- > possible and very real, in spite of Adorno's characterization therof as
- > ideological constructs.
-
- > (The whole notion of "ideology" as "false consciousness" or as an
- > "interpelator" or as a function of "hegemony" is contrary to the essence of
- > postmodernism in that it involves a systemic discursive formation. Try
- > getting Foucault to agree with that.
-
- Of course Foucault would agree -- his work consists in good part
- of mapping those formations. Incidentally, isn't "the essense of
- postmodernism" contrary to "the essense of postmodernism"? Or do you
- see it differently?
-
- > Foucault's comments vis-a-vis the
- > Frankfurt school were merely an admission that anyone could have come to
- > the same conclusions he did from the Frankfurt Scool's perspectives and
- > from their usage of traditional philosophy)
-
- Um, no. Didn't you read them? Here's some excerpts from what I
- quoted before: "...the Frankfurt School had tried ahead of time to
- assert things that I too had been working for years to sustain." "As
- far as I'm concerned, I think that the Frankfurt School set of
- problems are still being worked on." "Perhaps if I had known these
- works earlier on, I would have saved useful time, surely: I wouldn't
- have needed to write some things and I would have avoided certain
- errors." Etc.
-
- > Yes, I really meant Allan Bloom. [...]
-
- Thanks.
-
- > In many ways, this is just the thing Adorno did. He identified a
- > fragmentary culture, for sure. But he viewed it from the distance as being
- > part of a composite whole, the so-called "culture industry". Check his
- > essay co-written with Horkheimer on that topic. They clearly identify,
- > dialectically I might add, a massive popular culture juggernaut which is
- > opposed to their treasured old European culture. Adorno favours the latter
- > while rejecting the former.
-
- No, that's much too sweeping -- Adorno gives his favor to Kafka,
- Beckett, and Schoenberg, as I mentioned before. And if treasuring
- "old European culture" is enough to bar Adorno from the land of post-
- modernism, you'll have to deny Barthes and Derrida visas, too.
-
- > How modern of him: modernism being the beleif
- > that there is a truth and there is a possibility for order and social
- > cohesion through reason.
-
- No, that's not modernism. (I did a song-and-dance at the start
- of my last post in the faint hope of avoiding this confusion.) And
- it isn't Adorno, who wrote, "Enlightenment is as totalitarian as any
- system" (_Dialectic of Enlightenment_ 24). Sounds much more like
- you're talking about Habermas, to me. Tell you what -- let's switch
- "Adorno" with "Habermas," and then we can agree.
-
- > That he identifies the absence of this at the
- > moment only belies his modernity every time he insists it is possible;
- > posmodernists, OTOH, say it is an illusion.
-
- You can't mean "belie," can you? Anyway, he doesn't -- he makes
- plain that "the prime cause of the retreat from enlightenment" as a
- source of freedom lies not in any historical contingency, "but in the
- Enlightenment itelf" (_Dialectic of Enlightenment_ viii-ix).
-
- > I know it's fun to play with words and to identify similarities and
- > concessions, I do it all the time.
-
- You're in a poor position to claim I'm merely playing with words,
- seeing as how you left all of them out of your reply.
-
- > Ask any reasonably up-to-date
- > philosophy, sociology, or communications professor, however, and you'll
- > hear Adorno put in his proper place, and it ain't gonna be a postmodern
- > one.
-
- Ah, so _that's_ how to learn the truth -- you go ask a professor!
- (A "reasonably up-to-date" one, natch.) Well, why didn't you _say_
- so? We could have saved ourselves the trouble of reading and thinking.
- Oh, but that's right -- you have.
-
- -- Moggin
Is there such a thing as Śreasonably up-to-dateą? Iąd love to hear Adorno
put in his proper place, but I fear that neither of you did. Iąm not going
to either, because I havenąt got a clue what such a place would be -
although I have suspicions as to where it is near. I shall instead just put
him in a place with windows.
A quick and violent precis of the above:
x- Adorno was an Hegelian totaliser (therefore modern).
y- Oh no he wasnąt, he produced a critique of dominatory rationality and
was a philosopher in fragment and aphorism (therefore like Nietszche and
also anticipatory).
Pish and tush. A false opposition. My contentious opening statement (as
these seem to be de rigeur) is: The concept of totality is vital for
Adorno, which is why he was a philosopher in and of the fragment, aphorism
and essay form.
To begin at the end, I want to glance at the Śauthentic work of artą as a
case in point. I shall brutally paraphrase in an entirely illegimate
manner. The work of art is a model of freedom - the free and spontaneous
accordance of the independent parts in the whole; a self-generated rule
which harmoniously unites particular and universal etc. etc.. But in
modernity, the only authentic work of art is that which is Śdissonantą, not
harmonious, (Schoenberg...). This is so through the social organisation of
modernity, in which difference is all but erased under the spread of an
administered society and reified thought (Iąll come back to this and the
Dialectic of Enlightenment below) To be harmonious, or to have the
appearance of harmony, in such a situation is to give up the free
accordance of the parts etc. in favour of a prestablished identity - an
imposed form whose harmony is only that of the regimented familar. The only
way in which the authentic work can Śsurviveą is through the (deliberate)
refusal of harmony. But at the same time this cannot simply be Śnoiseą, or
the dissolution of art (nor what might be called the assertion of the
incommensurable particulars). Dissonance can also not be Śpreplannedą but
must emerge in the interior concerns of the work itself. For this, there
many reasons, but two are that 1. ŚNoiseą is the return of reified, or
identity thinking via the back door (the particular is what it is and
nothing else). 2. Dissonance can only be understood in relation to harmony.
In part this is dissonance as a determinate refusal of (pre)existing
harmony, and, vitally, because it is only through such a refusal that the
promise of true harmony can be kept alive. The artwork, then, cannot give
up on the promise of its concept, even if the only way to maintain that
promise is to consistently negate the possibility of the promise being
actualised (now).
This is a dialectic of diminishing possibilities, as any dissonance can be
systematised (hence Adornoąs disapproval of Schoenbergąs 12 tone and
serialism in general). Indeed, Śtodayąs dissonance is tomorrowąs harmonyą.
The history of authentic modern(ist) art is therefore one of an ever more
impossible task, to retain the promise of harmony (and one might add, a
non-dominatory totality) through determinate negation in dissonance. Thus
the work teetering on the brink of its own dissolution and failure. (Joyce,
Beckett etc.. Or, for me rather than Adorno; Cezanne, Braque, Jackson
Pollock, Newman, perhaps Judd, and currently Gerhard Richter). There is
obviously much more than this at stake in the work of art, but to Śprecisą
Adorno can, in the end, only be to repeat it word for word (thatąs
mediation for you), and his books are out there.
As with art, so with philosophy (indeed, in an elegant and deliberate
reversal of Hegel, Adorno suggests that philosophy must give way to art in
the task of offering a faint promise of truth). The fragment, the aphorism,
the immanent critique which works through the very modes and concepts of
its object; are all in some ways, the incomplete. Attempts at thought which
refuses to hold its object under a concept, even as it does so. But this is
the only way to sustain the promise of truth, which is also the promise of
totality. It is because such thought attempts to touch historical
possibility as well as the brute Śwhat isą that it is truest (not true) to
a concept of totality - the mediated whole.
Hmm, a tad over rhetorical? Let me try another way. ŚThe whole is the
falseą (which can also be translated as Śthe whole is the untrueą, perhaps
more accurately) refers to the whole of Śwhat isą - a world in which
ideology and experienced reality are virtually the same thing, and in which
reified thought no longer finds anything to challenge it in its object. In
a combination of memory and utopian hope (not projection), Adorno calls
this whole Śuntrueą - such a comment can only be made from the position of
a promise of a true whole: łThe only philosophy which can be responsibly
practiced in the face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things
as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption˛ (Minima
Moralia). It is impossible, of course, to actually see from there, łbecause
it presupposes a standpoint removed, even though by a hairąs breadth, from
the scope of existence˛, but it is the attempt which is vital.
Hegel seems to occupy a similar place to Beethoven or Bach for Adorno. At
one historical moment, it was possible for the titanic attempt to fuse
subject and world, expression and objective material, to take place.
Neither, of course, suceeded, but the enormity of the attempt, and the ever
more drastic details of the failure are, in many ways, still the boundaries
that remain. ł[The question never raised:] What the present means in the
face of Hegel; whether perhaps the reason one imagines one has attained
since Hegeląs absolute reason has not in fact long since regressed behind
the latter and accomodated to what merely exists.˛ (Adorno, Hegel: Three
Studies).
ŚAnticipationą? Maybe, although to associate this with Foucault reading the
Frankfurt School could also just mean that Foucault was belated. It hardly
matters if Foucault thought they were 'ahead of time', unless this was a
judgement on the viability of political action based on their critique, in
which case he was in error but can be forgiven. In any case, Foucault is
reading the Frankfurters as a critique of enlightenment, and perhaps
missing the dialectical basis. (I say perhaps - Iąll need to think about
this). The reading of the Odyssey that begins the Dialectic of
Enlightenment (neither Adorno nor Horkheimer made any claim to philological
accuracy) indicates that enlightenment rationality is both a vital
liberation - from nature, from myth, from non-differentiation - and a
remythologisation, the enslavement to Śidentityą. This section is, I
strongly suspect allegorical, and I would argue that the claim is not
comparable to the increasingly common and meaningless Śthe history of
western metaphysics since Xą. In subsequent parts of the D of E and
elsewhere, the inseparability of philosophy, like all thought, from the
social is indicated. Reified modernity is the triumph of the mythical in
enlightenment, but to mount a critique, one can have no other recourse than
enlightment - the negative, negatory, emancipatory moment which was, for
Adorno, the accomplishment of Hegel - even if Hegel refused to Śfulfillą
it. Reified thought and capital, near total reification and monopoly
capital, are united. Only a radically changed social can release thought
and the world. If I remember my readings of Foucault accurately, somehow
this doesnąt chime.
Not necessarily apropos of Foucault (except perhaps the earlier works on
madness), but Adorno was as stern a critic of the fetishisation of
difference and particularity as he was of identity thinking. In addition,
and separately, the relation of Adorno to Nietzsche is complex and
mediated. Adornoąs critique of Nietszche is as stringent as his use of him.
Also, as an afterthought, if you want an Śanticipationą, how about (F.)
Schlegel and Novalis? A good 150 years before. I offer this despite not
being sure what is being Śanticipatedą. Post-structuralism? Anyone care to
venture a definition?
Anyway, it turns out that you were both right (and both wrong, although I
suspect Andrew Bernstein is more wrong).
All shall have prizes.
Love
Giles
Puss in Boots
gpe...@derby.ac.uk (Giles Peaker):
[...]
> A quick and violent precis of the above:
> x- Adorno was an Hegelian totaliser (therefore modern).
> y- Oh no he wasnąt, he produced a critique of dominatory rationality and
> was a philosopher in fragment and aphorism (therefore like Nietszche and
> also anticipatory).
> Pish and tush. A false opposition. My contentious opening statement (as
> these seem to be de rigeur) is: The concept of totality is vital for
> Adorno, which is why he was a philosopher in and of the fragment, aphorism
> and essay form.
I hate to ruin such a good opportunity for contentiousness -- but
given what you go on to say below, I entirely agree with you (aside
from "push and tush"); and what's more, I think you agree with me, too.
(Always a dangerous statement, but I'll chance it.)
[...]
> As with art, so with philosophy (indeed, in an elegant and deliberate
> reversal of Hegel, Adorno suggests that philosophy must give way to art in
> the task of offering a faint promise of truth). The fragment, the aphorism,
> the immanent critique which works through the very modes and concepts of
> its object; are all in some ways, the incomplete. Attempts at thought which
> refuses to hold its object under a concept, even as it does so. But this is
> the only way to sustain the promise of truth, which is also the promise of
> totality. It is because such thought attempts to touch historical
> possibility as well as the brute Śwhat isą that it is truest (not true) to
> a concept of totality - the mediated whole.
Just so. In a sentence, "The metacritical turn against a _prima
philosophia_ is at the same time a turn against the finiteness of a
philosophy that prates about infinity without respecting it" ("Infinity,"
_Negative Dialectics_).
> Hmm, a tad over rhetorical? Let me try another way. ŚThe whole is the
> falseą (which can also be translated as Śthe whole is the untrueą, perhaps
> more accurately) refers to the whole of Śwhat isą - a world in which
> ideology and experienced reality are virtually the same thing, and in which
> reified thought no longer finds anything to challenge it in its object. In
> a combination of memory and utopian hope (not projection), Adorno calls
> this whole Śuntrueą - such a comment can only be made from the position of
> a promise of a true whole: łThe only philosophy which can be responsibly
> practiced in the face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things
> as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption˛ (Minima
> Moralia). It is impossible, of course, to actually see from there, łbecause
> it presupposes a standpoint removed, even though by a hairąs breadth, from
> the scope of existence˛, but it is the attempt which is vital.
Exactly -- much like the relation of Barthes' mythologist to the
Promised Land.
[...]
> ŚAnticipationą? Maybe, although to associate this with Foucault reading
> the Frankfurt School could also just mean that Foucault was belated.
Again, I fully agree -- "anticipatory" implies Adorno was just a
precursor to Derrida, Barthes, or Foucault, when one could just as
easily look at it the other way around, and say that the Paris School
marked the delayed arrival of the Frankfurt School in France. (Cue
MJ: "Well, why not just call them both the Frankfurt School, then?")
[...]
> Also, as an afterthought, if you want an Śanticipationą, how about (F.)
> Schlegel and Novalis? A good 150 years before.
Or Blake. Or the usual suspect, Nietzsche.
>I offer this despite not being sure what is being Śanticipatedą.
>Post-structuralism? Anyone care to venture a definition?
Post-modernism. Andrew: "Adorno is definately not postmodern."
-- Moggin