truth pomo etc
Joel and Rachel Wilhelm
Peter R.Spacey <sear...@cix.co.uk> writes
(i) Marxism is still alive;
(ii) Postmodernity isn't meant to be a definitive, everlasting philosophy;
(iii)there's no "absolute, revelational truth" that's accepted without demur
by all christians;
(iv)please explain the denominations in view of "absolute, revelational
truth";
(v)by ridiculing the postmodern belief about texts, you are not doing
yourself, or your own beliefs any favour. The
postmodernist who can read a text such as my post and then claim that it
means something quite other, isn't adhering too
closely to the way. In fact, it's modernism that mishandles texts to prove
something, the postmodernist rarely has or needs to,
prove anything.
(vi)"postmodernism " makes no claim to be "true", that would put it back in
the old world order; Regards, Peter
Joel:
Peter,
i. Marxism is totally discredited and essentially dead (except on college
campuses in the form of radical professors who idolize the 60's).
ii. Good, because it isn't.
iii. Absolute, revelational truth does not need to be accepted by anyone to
be so.
iv. Man's sin-affected reason (the noetic affects of sin) explain most
denominations.
v. I was showing what embracing the pomo view of texts leads to, show me
otherwise. Fish, Derrida and others posit the kind of nonsense I applied to
your post--funny, they expect to be understood when writing, hmmmmm.
Locating meaning in the reader is absurd and nonsensical.
vi. then forget about it.
Joel
Moggin Goldberg
> i. Marxism is totally discredited and essentially dead (except on college
> campuses in the form of radical professors who idolize the 60's).
Either them or you is confused, since the big thing in the
60's was the New Left, while Marxism was very much the Old
Left being left behind. Marxist nostalgia would probably focus
on the 30's in the U.S.
-- Moggin
Peter R.Spacey
i. Marxism is totally discredited and essentially dead (except on college
campuses in the form of radical professors who idolize the 60's).
In the UK (remember us?) folk are trying hard to press for a Marxist agenda. Some of them stood in the recent general
election as "Socialist Alliance" candidates. You could check the www for more info.
ii. Good, because it isn't.
Good because it isn't and is honest about it!
iii. Absolute, revelational truth does not need to be accepted by anyone to
be so.
Not much good to "anyone"? You are talking nonsense Joel and we've heard it all before, sadly. In fact as a christian, I
would have to say that to think of God as having revealed something that doesn't need to be accepted is rather a poor
caricature, revealing more about you than God.
iv. Man's sin-affected reason (the noetic affects of sin) explain most
denominations.
Why "most"? Do you exclude yours? And what's "sin-affected reason" or its opposite? And which are you relying on in
this thread, please?
v. I was showing what embracing the pomo view of texts leads to, show me
otherwise. Fish, Derrida and others posit the kind of nonsense I applied to
...
So what? Would you like me to cite a few writers regarded as "Christian" (capital "C") who at some time or other wrote
"nonsense" (Augustine, Calvin, Luther for starters)? The postmodern view of so-called "texts" is one aspect that intrigues
me the most and helped me to step aside from a 'liberal' pov. And then there's the so-called metanarratives purporting to tell
us all about history from big-bang beginning (or, "creation", in other jargon) to violent end (or,"judgment" in other jargon), and
possibly to renewal/refurbishment (apocalyptic dreams). The postmodern thinker pauses at these and says "well, maybe or
maybe not?" and I know how that rattles folk like yourself who hate indecision :-)
> Locating meaning in the reader is absurd and nonsensical.
The only alternative is for the reader to grasp "the (def.art!) meaning" of the writer however far removed in time and space the
two might be. Clearly, even in 'modern' terms, that's "absurd and nonsensical."
vi. then forget about it.
You haven't given me one cogent argument that might score a hit in my conscience but by showing you have nothing but the
dreary old stock-in-trade of fundamentalism I'm even more convinced, Joel!
Regards anyway, Peter
Michael Dorfman
> v. I was showing what embracing the pomo view of texts leads to, show me
> otherwise. Fish, Derrida and others posit the kind of nonsense I applied to
> your post--funny, they expect to be understood when writing, hmmmmm.
> Locating meaning in the reader is absurd and nonsensical.
The funny part is that Derrida (for example) does *not* posit the kind
of nonsense you suggest, and in fact, explicitly states the opposite.
So, if Derrida complains about being misunderstood (which he does) it
is because he *is* misunderstood.
An example:
"[L]et it be said in passing how surprised I have often
been, how amused or discouraged, depending on my humor, by
the user or abuse of the following argument: Since the
deconstructionist (which is to say, isn't it, the
skeptical-relativist-nihilist!) is supposed to not believe
in truth, stability, or the unity of meaning, in intention
or "meaning-to-say," how can he demand of us now that we
read *him* with pertinence, precision, rigor? How can he
demand that his own text be interpreted correctly? How can
he accuse anyone else of having misunderstood, simplified,
deformed it, etc.? In other words, how can he discuss, and
discuss the reading of what he writes? The answer is simple
enough: This definition of the deconstructionist is *false*
(that's right: false, not true) and feeble; it supposes a
bad (that's right: bad, not good) and feeble reading of
numerous texts, first of all mine, which therefore must
finally be read or reread. Then perhaps it wil be
understood that the value of truth (and all those values
associated with it) is never contested or destroyed in my
writings, but only reinscribed in more powerful, larger,
more stratified contexts. And that within interpretive
contexts (that is, within relations of force that are always
differential-- for example, socio-political-institutional--but
even beyond those determinations) that are relatively stable,
sometimes apparently almost unshakeable, it should be possible to
invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of
consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor, criticism, and
pedagogy."
Michael Dorfman
James Whitehead
Dorfman <michae...@hotmail.com> writes
Its a pity to see Derrida falling into the same old orthodoxy - does he
expect (like all the others from Plato onwards) that his theories once
given public airing will not be taken and used for sorts of things he
did not intend. If so he would be best to shut up - I don't suppose
Hegel was chuffed at what Marx did with his bicycle.....
--
James Whitehead
G*rd*n
| > i. Marxism is totally discredited and essentially dead (except on college
| > campuses in the form of radical professors who idolize the 60's).
"'Dead' is dead."
--
(<><>) /*/
}"{ G*rd*n }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
{ http://www.etaoin.com | latest new material 5/19/01 <-adv't
Moggin Goldberg
[...]
>> if Derrida complains about being misunderstood (which he does) it
>> is because he *is* misunderstood.
>> "[L]et it be said in passing how surprised I have often
James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
> Its a pity to see Derrida falling into the same old orthodoxy - does he
> expect (like all the others from Plato onwards) that his theories once
> given public airing will not be taken and used for sorts of things he
> did not intend.
[...]
Certainly not from what he says here. (Also not from what
he says elsewhere, far as I know.) He expects -- or only
prefers, since he knows much too well -- that his thinking will
be discussed on the basis of what he's said, not what he
hasn't. But that should be just as objectionable to you, since
you're in the habit of criticizing people for ideas they've
never held. Which happens to be exactly what you're doing here.
-- Moggin
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
He can expect what he likes - though this smacks of hypocrisy - i
thought what was not in the text forms part of deconstruction? but
what he says and doesn't say is out of his control with regards how
others will read and interpret his writing. That's not to misquote him -
though I don't see why this should necessarily be "bad" or "wrong". But
what is he saying above seems to boil down to "I and only I am right -
that's right right!" That his methods which propose that "all concepts
hitherto proposed in order to think the articulation of a discourse and
of an historical totality are caught within the metaphysical closure
that I question here" He questions others but we can not question him?
If anything it exposes his wish for the modernist crown of truth in
"rules" RULES? Written by who - not by anyone prior to Derida it would
seem - or anyone after... OK he uses a critique of Levi Strauss - but we
are to give him
>rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of
>>> consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor,
etc...
> But that should be just as objectionable to you, since
>you're in the habit of criticizing people for ideas they've
>never held. Which happens to be exactly what you're doing here.
>
what i'm doing here in the first place is no-such-thing ... i was saying
that ok he writes a book - how that's interpreted is up to us... which i
see as no criticism of either his ideas or ideas that are not his...
--
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg
James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>
>> Certainly not from what he says here. (Also not from what
>> he says elsewhere, far as I know.) He expects -- or only
>> prefers, since he knows much too well -- that his thinking will
>> be discussed on the basis of what he's said, not what he
>> hasn't. But that should be just as objectionable to you, since
>> you're in the habit of criticizing people for ideas they've
>> never held. Which happens to be exactly what you're doing here.
James:
> He can expect what he likes - though this smacks of hypocrisy -
"Hypocrisy" is merely the term with which you smack anyone
you happen to feel needs smacking.
> i thought what was not in the text forms part of deconstruction?
Not what Derrida leaves unsaid: what others falsely claim
he _has_ said.
> but what he says and doesn't say is out of his control with regards how
> others will read and interpret his writing. That's not to misquote him -
> though I don't see why this should necessarily be "bad" or "wrong". But
> what is he saying above seems to boil down to "I and only I am right -
> that's right right!"
Above he never claims to have sole possession of the truth.
Your boiling-technique needs work.
> That his methods which propose that "all concepts
> hitherto proposed in order to think the articulation of a discourse and
> of an historical totality are caught within the metaphysical closure
> that I question here" He questions others but we can not question him?
Ah, yes: unreferenced quotes and off-the-wall paraphrases.
That's the James I recall. If anyone is wondering, "all
concepts..." is in "Intro to the 'Age of Rousseau'" on p. 99 in
the English version of _Grammatology_. No, Derrida isn't
forbidding others from questioning him, either in _Grammatology_
or above.
> If anything it exposes his wish for the modernist crown of truth in
> "rules" RULES?
Why, James: you're conducting an expose! You're
bringing to light Derrida's hidden wish. Unearthing his hidden
desire. Revealing the secret he tried to conceal. Shall we
put a crown of truth on you? You'll need a scepter to complete
the effect. Probably a robe, too.
> Written by who - not by anyone prior to Derida it would
> seem - or anyone after... OK he uses a critique of Levi Strauss - but we
> are to give him
>>> rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of
>>> consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor, criticism, and
>>> pedagogy."
Sure. There's no contradiction. D critiques Levi-Strauss
and you're free to critique Derrida. He simply requests
criticism which is competent, rigorous, informed, etc., instead
of sloppy, ignorant, and unconsidered.
James [re "criticizing people for ideas they've never held"]:
> what i'm doing here in the first place is no-such-thing
[...]
It's precisely what you're doing. You're accusing Derrida
of saying things he's never said. No wonder you're so
offended by his request for competent, rigorous, and good-faith
criticism: that's what you can't supply.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
> "'Dead' is dead."
Love's Martyrs
Oh no more, no more! too late
Sighs are spent; the burning tapers
Of a life as chaste as Fate,
Pure as are unwritten papers,
Are burnt out; no heat, no light
Now remains; 'tis ever night.
Love is dead; let lovers' eyes,
Locked in endless dreams,
The extremes of all extremes,
Ope no more, for now Love dies.
Now Love dies, implying
Love's Martyrs must be ever, ever dying.
John Ford
-- Moggin
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
I was saying to me he appears to be contradicting himself - in spirit if
not in letter - see further below.. as for corporal punishment i'm
against it.
>
>> i thought what was not in the text forms part of deconstruction?
>
> Not what Derrida leaves unsaid: what others falsely claim
>he _has_ said.
>
>> but what he says and doesn't say is out of his control with regards how
>> others will read and interpret his writing. That's not to misquote him -
>> though I don't see why this should necessarily be "bad" or "wrong". But
>> what is he saying above seems to boil down to "I and only I am right -
>> that's right right!"
>
> Above he never claims to have sole possession of the truth.
>Your boiling-technique needs work.
well "all concepts hitherto " makes a start! He seems to imply - again
he is noted for being oblique - a new insight on language - though i
doubt if he says so openly - but does he say there are others - that
share this?
>
>> That his methods which propose that "all concepts
>> hitherto proposed in order to think the articulation of a discourse and
>> of an historical totality are caught within the metaphysical closure
>> that I question here" He questions others but we can not question him?
>
> Ah, yes: unreferenced quotes and off-the-wall paraphrases.
>That's the James I recall. If anyone is wondering, "all
>concepts..." is in "Intro to the 'Age of Rousseau'" on p. 99 in
>the English version of _Grammatology_. No, Derrida isn't
>forbidding others from questioning him, either in _Grammatology_
>or above.
its nicer than that - he's saying how they should question him - he's
saying use my method as that's the only valid one, yet he critiques all
previous thinking - in a very non-rigourous way...
>
>> If anything it exposes his wish for the modernist crown of truth in
>> "rules" RULES?
>
> Why, James: you're conducting an expose! You're
>bringing to light Derrida's hidden wish.
> Unearthing his hidden
>desire. Revealing the secret he tried to conceal. Shall we
>put a crown of truth on you? You'll need a scepter to complete
>the effect. Probably a robe, too.
>
>> Written by who - not by anyone prior to Derida it would
>> seem - or anyone after... OK he uses a critique of Levi Strauss - but we
>> are to give him
>
>>>> rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of
>>>> consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor, criticism, and
>>>> pedagogy."
>
> Sure. There's no contradiction. D critiques Levi-Strauss
>and you're free to critique Derrida. He simply requests
>criticism which is competent, rigorous, informed, etc., instead
>of sloppy, ignorant, and unconsidered.
Why- an unconsidered or ignorant remark cant be true?
>
>James [re "criticizing people for ideas they've never held"]:
>
>> what i'm doing here in the first place is no-such-thing
>
>[...]
>
> It's precisely what you're doing. You're accusing Derrida
>of saying things he's never said. No wonder you're so
>offended by his request for competent, rigorous, and good-faith
>criticism: that's what you can't supply.
If Derrida is saying that there are absolute and correct readings then -
fine- this does not equate with a view that all readings are subjective
and provisional. So maybe he isn't a post-modernist thinker... however
there is the view that he is - caused then by others miss-reading him? -
or his adoption of a certain language and method, differance stuff -
which is fairly sloppy. But we can pass by this and now question rigour
and good-faith can we not?
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
discussion and of consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor, criticism, and
pedagogy."
"I would say the same about method. Deconstruction is not a method and
cannot be transformed into one."
"Deconstruction takes place, it is an event that does not await the
deliberation, consciousness, or organization of a subject, or even of
modernity."
---------------------------------------------------------
Since the deconstructionist (which is to say, isn't it, the skeptical-
relativist-nihilist!) is supposed to not believe in truth, stability, or
the unity of meaning, in intention or "meaning-to-say," how can he
demand of us now that we read *him* with pertinence, precision, rigor?
"What deconstruction is not? everything of course! What is
deconstruction? nothing of course! I do not think, for all these
reasons, that it is a good word [un bon mot]."
"All sentences of the type "deconstruction is X" or "deconstruction is
not X" a priori miss the point, which is to say that they are at least
false."
The last ones a killer!
--
James Whitehead
G*rd*n
James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
| Since the deconstructionist (which is to say, isn't it, the skeptical-
| relativist-nihilist!) is supposed to not believe in truth, stability, or
| the unity of meaning, in intention or "meaning-to-say," how can he
| demand of us now that we read *him* with pertinence, precision, rigor?
I think truth, stability, and unity of meaning are supposed
to be present in their absence. Therefore, we can prefer
those who more energetically seek them, without, of course,
being able to judge them.
James Whitehead
writes
>| ...
>
>James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
>| Since the deconstructionist (which is to say, isn't it, the skeptical-
>| relativist-nihilist!) is supposed to not believe in truth, stability, or
>| the unity of meaning, in intention or "meaning-to-say," how can he
>| demand of us now that we read *him* with pertinence, precision, rigor?
>
>I think truth, stability, and unity of meaning are supposed
>to be present in their absence. Therefore, we can prefer
>those who more energetically seek them, without, of course,
>being able to judge them.
>
I must admit the old self bridles at "present in their absence" i guess
Derrida is aiming at something - some metaphysics of language - some
ontology - is he saying that 'presence' is somehow stable, yet beyond
some simple meaning? yet i think its opened the opportunity for the lack
of truth - the lack of stability, which he is trying to maintain. Do you
mean by prefer - prefer his - now i want to say method - but can't.
Again prefer but not judge - truth but without judgement - is this
nostalgia? It strikes me now that maybe we need to relax our old need of
truth - as in Foucault's histories - is there operating a fiction of
rules? Is it a metaphorical landscape which is produced, its the only
way out of contradiction that i can see. I can then go along with
Derrida's objections, but that doesn't mean that those who do create
subjective - nihilist whatever - based on punk philosophies are wrong.
Is it like comparing two games - both have sets of rules and logic and
events. OK - but then the sense of Derrida's criticism of these "others"
is not quite what we used to think it was. Is he defining/defending the
rules of his game- and not rules per-se?
--
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg
[re Derrida]
>>> He can expect what he likes - though this smacks of hypocrisy -
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>> "Hypocrisy" is merely the term with which you smack anyone
>> you happen to feel needs smacking.
James:
> I was saying to me he appears to be contradicting himself -
You were calling Derrida a hypocrite, which is a word that
you're liable to toss at anyone you feel like attacking.
There's no indication you know what it means, although I recall
explaining it to you before. Hypocrisy isn't just any
contradiction -- it's a contradiction between what one preaches
and what one practices. In this case Derrida is preaching
that criticism ought to be honest, rigorous, educated, etc. So
to prove your charge of hypocrisy, you would have to
demonstrate that his own criticism violates those same criteria.
You could get him on lucidity, since his own writing is
famously obscure, but aside from that, your accusation wouldn't
stick.
[...]
>>> what is he saying above seems to boil down to "I and only I am right -
>>> that's right right!"
Moggin:
>> Above he never claims to have sole possession of the truth.
>> Your boiling-technique needs work.
James:
> well "all concepts hitherto " makes a start!
"All concepts hither to..." was not what you were claiming
to have boiled, and it's not the start to "I and only I am
right" unless it concludes, "...mine have been false." Did you
think of reading to the end of the sentence?
[...]
James:
>>>That his methods which propose that "all concepts
>>>hitherto proposed in order to think the articulation of a discourse
>>>and of an historical totality are caught within the metaphysical
>>>closure that I question here" He questions others but we can not
>>>question him?
Moggin:
>> Ah, yes: unreferenced quotes and off-the-wall paraphrases.
>> That's the James I recall. If anyone is wondering, "all
>> concepts..." is in "Intro to the 'Age of Rousseau'" on p. 99 in
>> the English version of _Grammatology_. No, Derrida isn't
>> forbidding others from questioning him, either in _Grammatology_
>> or above.
James:
> its nicer than that
According to you that's exactly what it is: "He questions
others but we cannot question him." But that's not even
remotely what the sentence which you're supposedly paraphrasing
says.
> - he's saying how they should question him - he's
> saying use my method as that's the only valid one
Nah. You've got the quote Michael offered -- where D asks
to be criticized fairly -- mixed up with the piece of a
sentence you found in _Grammatology_, or more probably stumbled
across somewhere on the web. That would explain why you're
missing the rest of the sentence, and why you have no idea what
it's referring to.
[...]
James:
>>> If anything it exposes his wish for the modernist crown of truth in
>>> "rules" RULES?
Moggin:
>> Why, James: you're conducting an expose! You're
>> bringing to light Derrida's hidden wish. Unearthing his hidden
>> desire. Revealing the secret he tried to conceal. Shall we
>> put a crown of truth on you? You'll need a scepter to complete
>> the effect. Probably a robe, too.
No reply, James? I'd thought that a hypocrisy-hunter like
you would be thrilled to find such a glaring example. I
understand, though: only natural that your interest in hunting
hypocrites dwindles when the hypocricy is yours.
James:
> an unconsidered or ignorant remark cant be true?
Different issue. Point was that the "contradiction" which
you claimed to see was illusory: asking to be criticized
fairly isn't the same thing as refusing to be criticized. (You
always have trouble with distinctions.)
Agreed that ignorant remarks can be truthful. A blind pig
will find an acorn now and then. I think both Derrida and
Michael (if I remember what Michael said) are wrong in claiming
it's unethical to criticize something you haven't read. To
makes guesses isn't an ethical violation of any kind. Although
the record of people trying to criticize Derrida without
having read him is enough to suggest that it's a damnfool thing
to do.
James [re "criticizing people for ideas they've never held"]:
>>> what i'm doing here in the first place is no-such-thing
Moggin:
>> It's precisely what you're doing. You're accusing Derrida
>> of saying things he's never said. No wonder you're so
>> offended by his request for competent, rigorous, and good-faith
>> criticism: that's what you can't supply.
James:
> If Derrida is saying that there are absolute and correct readings then -
> fine- this does not equate with a view that all readings are subjective
> and provisional.
[...]
Neither one. He's asking to be criticized fairly, and you
claim he refuses to be criticized, neatly illustrating his
point about the incompetent, bad-faith criticism which is aimed
his way.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
[re Derrida]
> Again prefer but not judge - truth but without judgement - is this
> nostalgia?
If not nostalgia, hypocrisy -- and if not hypocricy, maybe
modernism. Anyway something bad.
> It strikes me now that maybe we need to relax our old need of truth -
If your need of truth became any more relaxed, it would be
catatonic.
-- Moggin
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
isn't catatonia an invented illness - like witchcraft?
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
>James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
>
>[re Derrida]
>
>>>> He can expect what he likes - though this smacks of hypocrisy -
>
>Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>
>>> "Hypocrisy" is merely the term with which you smack anyone
>>> you happen to feel needs smacking.
>
>James:
>
>> I was saying to me he appears to be contradicting himself -
>
> You were calling Derrida a hypocrite, which is a word that
>you're liable to toss at anyone you feel like attacking.
I'm not attacking big D - (he never replies to my emails anymore) i'm
saying if he maintains this and that then that smacks - sounds like -
but i could be wrong - hypocrisy... i still maintain that he *appears*
to be contradicting himself. And that smacks of hypocrisy - the critic
who used new and unconventional methods (well he doesn't like that word)
gets annoyed when this happens to him - some cheap punk philosophy kids
all start ripping him off. We could move on to talk about how ideas get
changed - who would thought what Marx would do with the dialectic... but
i suspect you want to focus on whether i called him a hypocrite or not..
>There's no indication you know what it means, although I recall
>explaining it to you before. Hypocrisy isn't just any
>contradiction -- it's a contradiction between what one preaches
>and what one practices.
but if your a preacher what you practice is preaching - a philosopher
who says always tell the truth in philosophy who then writes a
philosophy book full of lies - what is he if not a hypocrite in your
definition? So if Derrida says - please use good faith, lucidity,
rigor, criticism, and pedagogy - and then is described by many
commentators as being difficult and obscure his "penchant for
paradoxical formulation, neologism ..." and with what appears certainly
unclear logic - well that smacks (sounds like) hypocrisy... again i
could be wrong.
(Others have also pointed out that his differance seems one-sided. No
writing can claim to have any greater authority than the rest? which is
interesting - see below)
> In this case Derrida is preaching
>that criticism ought to be honest, rigorous, educated, etc. So
>to prove your charge of hypocrisy, you would have to
>demonstrate that his own criticism violates those same criteria.
>You could get him on lucidity, since his own writing is
>famously obscure, but aside from that, your accusation wouldn't
>stick.
well *you've* now said unequivocally he *is* a hypocrite - lucidity /
obscurity - (aside from the murder crippen was innocent!) I still
haven't - does i wonder Derrida see himself as obscure? ... so if anyone
is carelessly tossing i think it might be yourself.
>
>[...]
>
> According to you that's exactly what it is: "He questions
>others but we cannot question him." But that's not even
>remotely what the sentence which you're supposedly paraphrasing
>says.
>
>> - he's saying how they should question him - he's
>> saying use my method as that's the only valid one
>
> Nah. You've got the quote Michael offered -- where D asks
>to be criticized fairly
which *you* now have said was hypocritical...
>-- mixed up with the piece of a
>sentence you found in _Grammatology_, or more probably stumbled
>across somewhere on the web. That would explain why you're
>missing the rest of the sentence, and why you have no idea what
>it's referring to.
well not from the web - but lets move on - i'm not clear regarding his
hypocrisy - but you are - so enough - what is interesting for me is that
Derrida's ideas or concepts - he says they are not! - are taken up by
others and miss-used in Derrida's terms. But isn't that OK - its wrong
probably to say Derrida says "all is subjectivity" - but not to say in
differance language statements appear to become of equal value - and
this is looking like subjectivity.... don't suppose we can talk about
this?
>
>[...]
>
>James:
>
>>>> If anything it exposes his wish for the modernist crown of truth in
>>>> "rules" RULES?
>
>Moggin:
>
>>> Why, James: you're conducting an expose! You're
>>> bringing to light Derrida's hidden wish. Unearthing his hidden
>>> desire. Revealing the secret he tried to conceal. Shall we
>>> put a crown of truth on you? You'll need a scepter to complete
>>> the effect. Probably a robe, too.
>
> No reply, James? I'd thought that a hypocrisy-hunter like
>you would be thrilled to find such a glaring example. I
>understand, though: only natural that your interest in hunting
>hypocrites dwindles when the hypocricy is yours.
Sorry Moggin you've lost me here - i thought the above was a joke, i
began with looking at Michaels quote - which has appeared before - and
which seems to be being used to attack the subjectivity found within
post-modernism. I wanted to say - maybe i did, that if post-modernism
was in part created by Derrida it doesn't follow he has authority over
its methods- or lack there of. We could then see similar such events in
Art and Science... Einstein and Bohr etc..
>
>James:
>
>> an unconsidered or ignorant remark cant be true?
>
> Different issue. Point was that the "contradiction" which
>you claimed to see was illusory: asking to be criticized
>fairly isn't the same thing as refusing to be criticized. (You
>always have trouble with distinctions.)
My question here then is what is fair... to which firstly you show
Derrida's rules of fair criticism demonstrate hypocrisy -(thanks for
that)
but i'm more interested in how these rules can have any authority -
especially in the light of Derrida's own work.
>
> Agreed that ignorant remarks can be truthful. A blind pig
>will find an acorn now and then.
Blindness is irrelevant in pigs finding acorns - they use their noses.
> I think both Derrida and
>Michael (if I remember what Michael said) are wrong in claiming
>it's unethical to criticize something you haven't read. To
>makes guesses isn't an ethical violation of any kind. Although
>the record of people trying to criticize Derrida without
>having read him is enough to suggest that it's a damnfool thing
>to do.
However - when you say read him - what do you mean (james in
anticipation of being told he cant read)
>
>James [re "criticizing people for ideas they've never held"]:
>
>>>> what i'm doing here in the first place is no-such-thing
>
>Moggin:
>
>>> It's precisely what you're doing. You're accusing Derrida
>>> of saying things he's never said. No wonder you're so
>>> offended by his request for competent, rigorous, and good-faith
>>> criticism: that's what you can't supply.
>
>James:
>
>> If Derrida is saying that there are absolute and correct readings then -
>> fine- this does not equate with a view that all readings are subjective
>> and provisional.
>
>[...]
>
> Neither one. He's asking to be criticized fairly, and you
>claim he refuses to be criticized, neatly illustrating his
>point about the incompetent, bad-faith criticism which is aimed
>his way.
>
and defining what fairness is... this is the point - please Mr Derrida
what is fair criticism and why is it fair? I think he is missing
something which both Nietzsche and heidegger saw that "We are attempting
a venture with truth! Perhaps humanity will perish by it!" [from a book]
--
James Whitehead
Michael Dorfman
<jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>I'm not attacking big D - (he never replies to my emails anymore) i'm
>saying if he maintains this and that then that smacks - sounds like -
>but i could be wrong - hypocrisy... i still maintain that he *appears*
>to be contradicting himself. And that smacks of hypocrisy - the critic
>who used new and unconventional methods (well he doesn't like that word)
>gets annoyed when this happens to him - some cheap punk philosophy kids
>all start ripping him off. We could move on to talk about how ideas get
>changed - who would thought what Marx would do with the dialectic... but
>i suspect you want to focus on whether i called him a hypocrite or not..
You're still missing the point, James. Derrida is *not* getting
annoyed because "some cheap punk philosophy kids all start ripping him
off." He is getting annoyed because many people (seemingly you) are
attacking him for holding positions he never held. The piece I pulled
the quote from is called "Toward an Ethics of Discussion"-- Derrida
states that the sine non qua of any Ethics of Discussion would be to
actually read the works one is discussing.
>but if your a preacher what you practice is preaching - a philosopher
>who says always tell the truth in philosophy who then writes a
>philosophy book full of lies - what is he if not a hypocrite in your
>definition? So if Derrida says - please use good faith, lucidity,
>rigor, criticism, and pedagogy - and then is described by many
>commentators as being difficult and obscure his "penchant for
>paradoxical formulation, neologism ..." and with what appears certainly
>unclear logic - well that smacks (sounds like) hypocrisy... again i
>could be wrong.
I'd go with the latter. There is a difference between "difficult"
writing, and writing that is willfully obscure. Similarly, there is a
difference between "unclear logic" and "paradoxical formulation." The
vast majority of Derrida's writings are *extremely* lucid, rigorous
works, and not terribly difficult to read -- with two provisos.
First: that one must be familiar with the works Derrida is writing
about, and Second: that one is prepared to read Derrida as carefully
as he is reading the work in question.
>(Others have also pointed out that his differance seems one-sided. No
>writing can claim to have any greater authority than the rest? which is
>interesting - see below)
Huh? I'd love to see citations of anyone claiming that his
"differance" is (or seems) one-sided. Which side?
Further, the idea that "No writing can claim to have any greater
authority than the rest" is nonsensical, and a position explicitly
rejected by Derrida.
>well *you've* now said unequivocally he *is* a hypocrite - lucidity /
>obscurity - (aside from the murder crippen was innocent!) I still
>haven't - does i wonder Derrida see himself as obscure? ... so if anyone
>is carelessly tossing i think it might be yourself.
He doesn't. He admits, freely, that there were a small handful of
texts (written in the mid 70s) where he experimented with a "playful"
style, which is not within the rigors of standard academic writing.
He specificly excluded these works from being involved in his "Thesis"
presentation.
>well not from the web - but lets move on - i'm not clear regarding his
>hypocrisy - but you are - so enough - what is interesting for me is that
>Derrida's ideas or concepts - he says they are not! - are taken up by
>others and miss-used in Derrida's terms. But isn't that OK - its wrong
>probably to say Derrida says "all is subjectivity" - but not to say in
>differance language statements appear to become of equal value - and
>this is looking like subjectivity.... don't suppose we can talk about
>this?
Sure, let's talk about this.
It is wrong (definitely) to say that Derrida says "all is
subjectivity"
It is equally wrong to say that Derrida says "in differance language
statements appear to become of equal value".
Your turn.
>Sorry Moggin you've lost me here - i thought the above was a joke, i
>began with looking at Michaels quote - which has appeared before - and
>which seems to be being used to attack the subjectivity found within
>post-modernism. I wanted to say - maybe i did, that if post-modernism
>was in part created by Derrida it doesn't follow he has authority over
>its methods- or lack there of. We could then see similar such events in
>Art and Science... Einstein and Bohr etc..
Regarding the hypothesis posed above ("if post-modernism was in part
created by Derrida"), it is best to remember that Derrida has
consistently (and explicitly) rejected the term "post-modernism".
>> I think both Derrida and
>>Michael (if I remember what Michael said) are wrong in claiming
>>it's unethical to criticize something you haven't read. To
>>makes guesses isn't an ethical violation of any kind. Although
>>the record of people trying to criticize Derrida without
>>having read him is enough to suggest that it's a damnfool thing
>>to do.
>
>However - when you say read him - what do you mean (james in
>anticipation of being told he cant read)
First, let me disagree (respectfully) with Moggin's statement-- I
don't think that "making guesses" is an ethical violation in any way,
if labelled as such. But, when was the last time *that* happened?
Now, as to "how to read" Derrida, I'll make the following offer. Why
don't you read one, brief essay by Derrida, and I'll make myself
available to discuss it in as much detail as you wish, here or
privately via e-mail. Do that, and then make whatever statements you
wish about what you find there.
The essay I have in mind is "Signature Event Context", which is found
in two places: in a collection entitled "Margins of Philosophy", and
in a collection entitled "Limited Inc". I suggest this essay for
several reasons: 1) it is directly germane to the topics we've been
discussing (and, in fact, the quote I pulled is from a later section
of "Limited Inc"), and 2) the works that Derrida reads in this essay
are quoted extensively within the essay itself. Further, as I said,
it is brief.
>and defining what fairness is... this is the point - please Mr Derrida
>what is fair criticism and why is it fair? I think he is missing
>something which both Nietzsche and heidegger saw that "We are attempting
>a venture with truth! Perhaps humanity will perish by it!" [from a book]
How about you take up my offer/challenge, and then I'd be happy to
discuss Derrida vs Nietzsche/Heidegger on "truth".
But, in advance of that, do you think that any criticism or a work can
be "fair" if the critic has not read the book? Is it fair for me to
say "The new film 'Pearl Harbor' is a terrible piece of film-making.
Not that I've seen it, mind you, nor even any clips from it, nor read
the script...."
Michael Dorfman
James Whitehead
<michael...@my-deja.com> writes
>On Sat, 23 Jun 2001 10:19:17 +0100, James Whitehead
><jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>>I'm not attacking big D - (he never replies to my emails anymore) i'm
>>saying if he maintains this and that then that smacks - sounds like -
>>but i could be wrong - hypocrisy... i still maintain that he *appears*
>>to be contradicting himself. And that smacks of hypocrisy - the critic
>>who used new and unconventional methods (well he doesn't like that word)
>>gets annoyed when this happens to him - some cheap punk philosophy kids
>>all start ripping him off. We could move on to talk about how ideas get
>>changed - who would thought what Marx would do with the dialectic... but
>>i suspect you want to focus on whether i called him a hypocrite or not..
>
>
>You're still missing the point, James. Derrida is *not* getting
>annoyed because "some cheap punk philosophy kids all start ripping him
>off." He is getting annoyed because many people (seemingly you) are
>attacking him for holding positions he never held.
What position am i saying he has - i'm saying i find some of his
statements "difficult" - i'm attacking myself perhaps! By difficult that
he (does he not?) maintains Deconstruction is not a method. That he
appears to be opposed to method?
> The piece I pulled
>the quote from is called "Toward an Ethics of Discussion"-- Derrida
>states that the sine non qua of any Ethics of Discussion would be to
>actually read the works one is discussing.
I can go along with this - though he is saying here what is ethical -
yes? Is this a theory of ethical criticism? and if it is can it be
deconstructed?
>
>>but if your a preacher what you practice is preaching - a philosopher
>>who says always tell the truth in philosophy who then writes a
>>philosophy book full of lies - what is he if not a hypocrite in your
>>definition? So if Derrida says - please use good faith, lucidity,
>>rigor, criticism, and pedagogy - and then is described by many
>>commentators as being difficult and obscure his "penchant for
>>paradoxical formulation, neologism ..." and with what appears certainly
>>unclear logic - well that smacks (sounds like) hypocrisy... again i
>>could be wrong.
>
>I'd go with the latter. There is a difference between "difficult"
>writing, and writing that is willfully obscure. Similarly, there is a
>difference between "unclear logic" and "paradoxical formulation." The
>vast majority of Derrida's writings are *extremely* lucid, rigorous
>works, and not terribly difficult to read -- with two provisos.
>First: that one must be familiar with the works Derrida is writing
>about, and Second: that one is prepared to read Derrida as carefully
>as he is reading the work in question.
But then i can always be accused of lack of knowledge - or not being
careful enough. Derrida himself thinks Sartre wrong in his understanding
- so what hope has poor ole me! Unless I agree with him.
>
>
>
>>(Others have also pointed out that his differance seems one-sided. No
>>writing can claim to have any greater authority than the rest? which is
>>interesting - see below)
>
>Huh? I'd love to see citations of anyone claiming that his
>"differance" is (or seems) one-sided. Which side?
Lets ask for a definition of it - and what does it say of language?
>
>
>Further, the idea that "No writing can claim to have any greater
>authority than the rest" is nonsensical, and a position explicitly
>rejected by Derrida.
Ok then let him present his authority... and ask what is Derrida's
position...
>
>>well *you've* now said unequivocally he *is* a hypocrite - lucidity /
>>obscurity - (aside from the murder crippen was innocent!) I still
>>haven't - does i wonder Derrida see himself as obscure? ... so if anyone
>>is carelessly tossing i think it might be yourself.
>
>He doesn't. He admits, freely, that there were a small handful of
>texts (written in the mid 70s) where he experimented with a "playful"
>style, which is not within the rigors of standard academic writing.
>He specificly excluded these works from being involved in his "Thesis"
>presentation.
He doesn't think himself obscure - i guessed - as the contradiction
would be obvious - however it doesn't mean he isn't. I wouldn't want to
embark on setting up some criteria for obscurity - but ask - in his
playful texts does he explicitly say this is what he is doing, if not
how do we know when he is not playing and when he is?
>
>>well not from the web - but lets move on - i'm not clear regarding his
>>hypocrisy - but you are - so enough - what is interesting for me is that
>>Derrida's ideas or concepts - he says they are not! - are taken up by
>>others and miss-used in Derrida's terms. But isn't that OK - its wrong
>>probably to say Derrida says "all is subjectivity" - but not to say in
>>differance language statements appear to become of equal value - and
>>this is looking like subjectivity.... don't suppose we can talk about
>>this?
>
>Sure, let's talk about this.
>
>It is wrong (definitely) to say that Derrida says "all is
>subjectivity"
>
>It is equally wrong to say that Derrida says "in differance language
>statements appear to become of equal value".
>
>Your turn.
OK - regardless of what Derrida says is right or wrong - he has
presented a set of ideas - he says he hasn't - never mind - people will
play with these. Derrida criticizes existing theories and methodologies
by using subjective terminology which he claims is not a method. I've
probably got this wrong - but didn't he invent differance and
deconstruction - and say its not a method - and use it to criticise
other methodologies?
>
>>Sorry Moggin you've lost me here - i thought the above was a joke, i
>>began with looking at Michaels quote - which has appeared before - and
>>which seems to be being used to attack the subjectivity found within
>>post-modernism. I wanted to say - maybe i did, that if post-modernism
>>was in part created by Derrida it doesn't follow he has authority over
>>its methods- or lack there of. We could then see similar such events in
>>Art and Science... Einstein and Bohr etc..
>
>Regarding the hypothesis posed above ("if post-modernism was in part
>created by Derrida"), it is best to remember that Derrida has
>consistently (and explicitly) rejected the term "post-modernism".
>
i'm not surprised - like the guy who invented the machine gun thought he
was doing the world a favour. Its often the case that one doesn't want
to accept the consequences of ones actions...
i'll look it up - OK just ordered it from amazon who say 1-2 weeks -
do we discuss it here - maybe some others might like to read it also?
>
>>and defining what fairness is... this is the point - please Mr Derrida
>>what is fair criticism and why is it fair? I think he is missing
>>something which both Nietzsche and heidegger saw that "We are attempting
>>a venture with truth! Perhaps humanity will perish by it!" [from a book]
>
>How about you take up my offer/challenge, and then I'd be happy to
>discuss Derrida vs Nietzsche/Heidegger on "truth".
>
>But, in advance of that, do you think that any criticism or a work can
>be "fair" if the critic has not read the book? Is it fair for me to
>say "The new film 'Pearl Harbor' is a terrible piece of film-making.
>Not that I've seen it, mind you, nor even any clips from it, nor read
>the script...."
Well that would be a difficult question but you slipped in Pearl Harbor
- or is it Harbour - after all Derrida was attacking his critics - has
he read their books? But as for Pearl Harbour i think its context is
sufficient to criticise it - so maybe i think in principle that it is
possible - how else can i think smoking 60 cigarettes a day for 30 years
bad - without doing it first?
So what about everyone reading the essay and then having a chat?
--
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg
> I'm not attacking big D -
You were, at any rate: you were accusing him of hypocrisy.
Guess you've given up on that now.
> (he never replies to my emails anymore) i'm
> saying if he maintains this and that then that smacks - sounds like -
> but i could be wrong - hypocrisy...
So you're not attacking Derrida but you might be attacking
Derrida, although you might not be, after all.
> i still maintain that he *appears*
> to be contradicting himself. And that smacks of hypocrisy -
Ah. So now you think you are attacking him, and attacking
him for being hypocritical. But you still don't grasp the
notion of hypocrisy, which isn't any old contradiction. Like I
said before, it's a contradiction between preaching and
practice. So to prove Derrida a hypocrite, you'll need to show
his own criticism doesn't abide by the standards he asks
others to use in criticizing him. I've granted that he's often
obscure, so all you need to show is that his criticism is
dishonest, unfair, uneducated, unrigorous, and so on. I notice
so far you haven't even tried.
> the critic
> who used new and unconventional methods (well he doesn't like that
> word) gets annoyed when this happens to him -
Not so. His stated complaints are not about anything "new
and unconventional," but about being attacked for saying
things he doesn't say and taking positions that he doesn't hold.
Which is exactly what you're doing here. You're accusing
Derrida of hypocrisy on grounds of a fabrication: his supposed
objection to "new and unconventional methods."
> some cheap punk philosophy kids
> all start ripping him off.
Odd, then, that he doesn't mention either "punk philosophy
kids" or rip-offs in his complaints.
[...]
>>>> If anything it exposes his wish for the modernist crown of truth in
>>>> "rules" RULES?
Moggin:
>>>> Why, James: you're conducting an expose! You're
>>>> bringing to light Derrida's hidden wish. Unearthing his hidden
>>>> desire. Revealing the secret he tried to conceal. Shall we
>>>> put a crown of truth on you? You'll need a scepter to complete
>>>> the effect. Probably a robe, too.
>> No reply, James? I'd thought that a hypocrisy-hunter like
>> you would be thrilled to find such a glaring example. I
>> understand, though: only natural that your interest in hunting
>> hypocrites dwindles when the hypocricy is yours.
James:
> Sorry Moggin you've lost me here
It's simple. You're demonstrating glaring hypocrisy. And
since you're such an avid hypocisy-hunter, you should
naturally be interested in your own case. It's a classic. But
while you've happily invented statements in your attempt to
paint Derrida as a hypocrite, you're willing to ignore your own
hypocrisy here. Meta-hypocrisy, that would be.
> - i thought the above was a joke, i
> began with looking at Michaels quote - which has appeared before - and
> which seems to be being used to attack the subjectivity found within
> post-modernism.
"Which seems to be being used to attack subjectivity"? Do
you mean somebody else is taking Derrida's works and using
them to attack subjectivity? What of it? Or are you trying to
claim -- in your own illiterate way -- that Derrida is
attacking "post-modernism" here? That would be false, since he
simply asks his critics to treat him fairly.
> I wanted to say - maybe i did, that if post-modernism
> was in part created by Derrida it doesn't follow he has authority over
> its methods-
A moot point, since he's never claimed "authority over its
methods," i.e., over post-modernism.
> or lack there of. We could then see similar such events in
> Art and Science... Einstein and Bohr etc..
Ah, yes. The famous incident where Einstein claimed to be
Bohr's father, announcing, "I partly created you, and
therefore I've got authority over your methods. So go upstairs
and clean your room. I mean now!"
James:
>>> an unconsidered or ignorant remark cant be true?
Moggin:
>> Different issue. Point was that the "contradiction" which
>> you claimed to see was illusory: asking to be criticized
>> fairly isn't the same thing as refusing to be criticized. (You
>> always have trouble with distinctions.)
James:
> My question here then is what is fair...
[...]
Your assertion here is that Derrida and-and-out refuses to
be criticized. That's the basis for your claim that he's a
hypocrite: you argue that he criticizes others but rejects the
same in his turn. I agree that would be hypocritical. But
your accusation is based entirely on a falsehood, since Derrida
didn't refuse to be criticized.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
> You're still missing the point, James. Derrida is *not* getting
> annoyed because "some cheap punk philosophy kids all start ripping him
> off." He is getting annoyed because many people (seemingly you) are
> attacking him for holding positions he never held.
Exactly.
> The piece I pulled
> the quote from is called "Toward an Ethics of Discussion"-- Derrida
> states that the sine non qua of any Ethics of Discussion would be to
> actually read the works one is discussing.
Which is a pretty fucking stupid statement to make. There
isn't anything ethical or unethical about reading the works
one is discussing. That's just an ad hominem. What matters is
the reading one gives, not the reading one did.
Moggin:
>>> ... I think both Derrida and
>>> Michael (if I remember what Michael said) are wrong in claiming
>>> it's unethical to criticize something you haven't read. To
>>> makes guesses isn't an ethical violation of any kind. Although
>>> the record of people trying to criticize Derrida without
>>> having read him is enough to suggest that it's a damnfool thing
>>> to do.
Michael:
> First, let me disagree (respectfully) with Moggin's statement-- I
> don't think that "making guesses" is an ethical violation in any way,
> if labelled as such. But, when was the last time *that* happened?
Seems we need to sort out our disagreements. I may easily
be misremembering what you said before, but I thought you
went along with Derrida's notion that reading what you
criticize is an ethical requirement. That's what I'm differing
with.
To discuss _without_ reading is to guess. And what in the
world is unethical about guessing? You say it's o.k. when
labeled as such. That certainly won't do for Derrida. If it's
really the the sine non qua of ethical reading not to make
guesses, merely slapping a label on guesswork could hardly make
it acceptable.
What about this labeling idea of yours, anyway? Should we
ask all readings to be labeled? If we're doing to flag
guesswork, then shouldn't we also use warning tags for readings
produced late at night? Or by people in therapy? Or folks
working under deadline pressure? Or written in a drunken
stupor? Or under the influence of stupid ideas? Or offered by
someone with nothing to say? Clearly we'll need a whole set
of labels, in all different shapes and colors, in order to give
the proper warnings.
-- Moggin
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
>James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
>
>> I'm not attacking big D -
>
> You were, at any rate: you were accusing him of hypocrisy.
>Guess you've given up on that now.
I notice you have snipped your assertion of his hypocrisy, but it still
stands - and is quite clear -
Moggin shows how Derrida is a hypocrite thus:
" Hypocrisy isn't just any contradiction -- it's a contradiction between
what one preaches and what one practices. In this case Derrida is
preaching that criticism ought to be honest, rigorous, educated, etc..
So to prove your charge of hypocrisy, you would have to demonstrate that
his own criticism violates those same criteria. You could get him on
lucidity, since his own writing is famously obscure..."
so yes - i've given up as i do not need to convince you either way - you
must it seems think he is a hypocrite from *your* proof above - or do
you want to go on to contradict yourself?
>
>> (he never replies to my emails anymore) i'm
>> saying if he maintains this and that then that smacks - sounds like -
>> but i could be wrong - hypocrisy...
>
> So you're not attacking Derrida but you might be attacking
>Derrida, although you might not be, after all.
the phrase "smacks of" does not accuse - to say an action smacks of x
does mean that they are x - like to say "your acting just like a big
girls blouse"
>
>> i still maintain that he *appears*
>> to be contradicting himself. And that smacks of hypocrisy -
>
> Ah. So now you think you are attacking him, and attacking
>him for being hypocritical. But you still don't grasp the
>notion of hypocrisy, which isn't any old contradiction. Like I
>said before, it's a contradiction between preaching and
>practice. So to prove Derrida a hypocrite, you'll need to show
>his own criticism doesn't abide by the standards he asks
>others to use in criticizing him. I've granted that he's often
>obscure, so all you need to show is that his criticism is
>dishonest, unfair, uneducated, unrigorous, and so on. I notice
>so far you haven't even tried.
oh - so he has to do all these - why not just one - obscure? But you
said i could get him on obscurity. Would a preacher be OK so long as he
didn't break ALL of the 10 commandments? Imagine the guy fornicating
murdering etc., and then preaching one should obey the commandments -
thinking "just so long as i don't covert the guys ox, i can screw and
murder his wife and be in the clear."
>
>> the critic
>> who used new and unconventional methods (well he doesn't like that
>> word) gets annoyed when this happens to him -
>
> Not so. His stated complaints are not about anything "new
>and unconventional," but about being attacked for saying
>things he doesn't say and taking positions that he doesn't hold.
>Which is exactly what you're doing here. You're accusing
>Derrida of hypocrisy on grounds of a fabrication: his supposed
>objection to "new and unconventional methods."
reading the quote he seems to be defending a position held by
"deconstructionists"
- he doesn't say either that he is one or not. Or does he say what it
is - other than it seems to be based on truth, stability, unity of
meaning, precision and rigour etc.. Now is he a deconstructionist
- i'm not clear on this as he says deconstruction isn't a process.
The "event" of deconstruction caches all concepts within metaphysical
closure... btw "the names of authors or of doctrines have here no
substantial value" If Derrida in Deconstruction reveals something new
about these texts - then was their truth / meaning before this
provisional. He at minimum offers a new - and presumably valid
perspective on them. (Actually he seems to be saying Levi Strauss is
wrong) So why not apply the method to itself - its that process which
questions his list "truth, stability, unity of meaning," as he has
questioned method in Levi-Strauss. - and all concepts hitherto proposed?
Of course Derrida can maintain that he has truth et al. This is where
the relativism arises - one doesn't accuse him of relativism - he is
convinced otherwise - but it can follow from his actions. If previous
stable texts are put in question or altered - then all stable texts seem
questioned.
you still haven't explained how i'm being hypocritical - though done a
good job on Derrida.
>
>> - i thought the above was a joke, i
>> began with looking at Michaels quote - which has appeared before - and
>> which seems to be being used to attack the subjectivity found within
>> post-modernism.
>
> "Which seems to be being used to attack subjectivity"? Do
>you mean somebody else is taking Derrida's works and using
>them to attack subjectivity? What of it? Or are you trying to
>claim -- in your own illiterate way -- that Derrida is
>attacking "post-modernism" here? That would be false, since he
>simply asks his critics to treat him fairly.
He seems to be saying
"the deconstructionist is supposed to not believe in truth, stability,
or the unity of meaning, in intention" is wrong.
Depending how you define who is or is not a the deconstructionist it
might be true - but if a definition runs that truth is required in
deconstruction he has to be always correct. Here lies the contradiction
- the method reveals error or difference of view - but it itself is
always free of this. Why isn't it possible to deconstruct
deconstructionism - is it because it marks some absolute truth.
>
>> I wanted to say - maybe i did, that if post-modernism
>> was in part created by Derrida it doesn't follow he has authority over
>> its methods-
>
> A moot point, since he's never claimed "authority over its
>methods," i.e., over post-modernism.
he seems to be implying something very special for the
deconstructionists.
Moggin:
>
> Your assertion here is that Derrida and-and-out refuses to
>be criticized. That's the basis for your claim that he's a
>hypocrite: you argue that he criticizes others but rejects the
>same in his turn. I agree that would be hypocritical. But
>your accusation is based entirely on a falsehood, since Derrida
>didn't refuse to be criticized.
I do not assert he refuses to be criticised, what i'm trying to point
out is how you get to an idea of relativism and subjectivity from the
critical work of Derrida.
"Then perhaps it will be understood that the value of truth is never
contested or destroyed in my writings, but only reinscribed in more
powerful, larger, more stratified contexts."
Clearly then the truth is altered - is he saying that the former truth
of the text remains? However we have now a different "more powerful
truth" is this true in Of Grammatology's critique of logocentrism? Even
if so it still opens up a potential for yet other re-reinsribed truths.
The hypocrisy issue has been settled by your good self -
"So to prove your charge of hypocrisy, you would have to
demonstrate that his own criticism violates those same criteria.
You could get him on lucidity, since his own writing is
famously obscure"
--
James Whitehead
Michael Dorfman
<mog...@mediaone.net> wrote:
>michael...@my-deja.com (Michael Dorfman):
>
>> You're still missing the point, James. Derrida is *not* getting
>> annoyed because "some cheap punk philosophy kids all start ripping him
>> off." He is getting annoyed because many people (seemingly you) are
>> attacking him for holding positions he never held.
>
> Exactly.
>
>> The piece I pulled
>> the quote from is called "Toward an Ethics of Discussion"-- Derrida
>> states that the sine non qua of any Ethics of Discussion would be to
>> actually read the works one is discussing.
>
> Which is a pretty fucking stupid statement to make. There
>isn't anything ethical or unethical about reading the works
>one is discussing. That's just an ad hominem. What matters is
>the reading one gives, not the reading one did.
I guess this is where you and I disagree. I would argue that it is
irresponsible to "give a reading" if one has not "done a reading"
first. Would it be ethical of me to attack, say, Bush's position on
NATO expansion if I did not know what Bush's position was?
>
>Moggin:
>
>>>> ... I think both Derrida and
>>>> Michael (if I remember what Michael said) are wrong in claiming
>>>> it's unethical to criticize something you haven't read. To
>>>> makes guesses isn't an ethical violation of any kind. Although
>>>> the record of people trying to criticize Derrida without
>>>> having read him is enough to suggest that it's a damnfool thing
>>>> to do.
>
>Michael:
>
>> First, let me disagree (respectfully) with Moggin's statement-- I
>> don't think that "making guesses" is an ethical violation in any way,
>> if labelled as such. But, when was the last time *that* happened?
>
> Seems we need to sort out our disagreements. I may easily
>be misremembering what you said before, but I thought you
>went along with Derrida's notion that reading what you
>criticize is an ethical requirement. That's what I'm differing
>with.
>
> To discuss _without_ reading is to guess. And what in the
>world is unethical about guessing? You say it's o.k. when
>labeled as such. That certainly won't do for Derrida. If it's
>really the the sine non qua of ethical reading not to make
>guesses, merely slapping a label on guesswork could hardly make
>it acceptable.
I'm a bit uncomfortable about the phrase "making guesses"-- do you
mean suggesting hypotheses that are synthesized from the knowledge one
has? Or do you mean just pulling an opinion out of the air, for
example "The works of Dante Gabriel Rosetti are absolute horseshit"
(said by someone who has admittedly not even cracked the binding on a
single one of his works...)
> What about this labeling idea of yours, anyway? Should we
>ask all readings to be labeled? If we're doing to flag
>guesswork, then shouldn't we also use warning tags for readings
>produced late at night? Or by people in therapy? Or folks
>working under deadline pressure? Or written in a drunken
>stupor? Or under the influence of stupid ideas? Or offered by
>someone with nothing to say? Clearly we'll need a whole set
>of labels, in all different shapes and colors, in order to give
>the proper warnings.
The issue here is not one of warning the reader; rather, to prevent
the writer from claiming to hold knowledge (he knows) he does not
know.
cf Derrida's "History of the Lie". To offer a criticism of a work one
has not read is duplicitous (in distinction with most of your other
examples), and thus goes against the core of Derrida's ethics, that
is, the "promise."
Michael Dorfman
Michael Dorfman
<snippage>
> > The piece I pulled
> >the quote from is called "Toward an Ethics of Discussion"-- Derrida
> >states that the sine non qua of any Ethics of Discussion would be to
> >actually read the works one is discussing.
>
> I can go along with this - though he is saying here what is ethical -
> yes? Is this a theory of ethical criticism? and if it is can it be
> deconstructed?
This is, in fact, a prolegomena to a theory of ethical criticism. Can
it be deconstructed? Yes and no. There are two parallel issues here.
One the one hand, Derrida readily acknowledges that his work holds no
special exemption from deconstruction. On the other hand, Derrida
argues that there are things that cannot be deconstructed-- most
notably, "justice".
>
> >
> >>but if your a preacher what you practice is preaching - a philosopher
> >>who says always tell the truth in philosophy who then writes a
> >>philosophy book full of lies - what is he if not a hypocrite in your
> >>definition? So if Derrida says - please use good faith, lucidity,
> >>rigor, criticism, and pedagogy - and then is described by many
> >>commentators as being difficult and obscure his "penchant for
> >>paradoxical formulation, neologism ..." and with what appears certainly
> >>unclear logic - well that smacks (sounds like) hypocrisy... again i
> >>could be wrong.
> >
> >I'd go with the latter. There is a difference between "difficult"
> >writing, and writing that is willfully obscure. Similarly, there is a
> >difference between "unclear logic" and "paradoxical formulation." The
> >vast majority of Derrida's writings are *extremely* lucid, rigorous
> >works, and not terribly difficult to read -- with two provisos.
> >First: that one must be familiar with the works Derrida is writing
> >about, and Second: that one is prepared to read Derrida as carefully
> >as he is reading the work in question.
>
> But then i can always be accused of lack of knowledge - or not being
> careful enough. Derrida himself thinks Sartre wrong in his understanding
> - so what hope has poor ole me! Unless I agree with him.
"Agreeing with him" is not the point--as I said, I (for one) would be
more than happy to hear *any* criticisms you make of any of Derrida's
works, once you've actually read them. As for "lack of knowledge" or
"carelessness", both are possible (and common), but we're not talking
about any super-human efforts required here. As for Sartre, Derrida
argues that Sartre misread Heidegger, not himself. (Personally, I
find Heidegger *much* more difficult to read than Derrida...)
> >Huh? I'd love to see citations of anyone claiming that his
> >"differance" is (or seems) one-sided. Which side?
>
> Lets ask for a definition of it - and what does it say of language?
Perhaps when we are done with "Signature Event Context", we can turn
to the essay "Differance".
> >Further, the idea that "No writing can claim to have any greater
> >authority than the rest" is nonsensical, and a position explicitly
> >rejected by Derrida.
>
> Ok then let him present his authority... and ask what is Derrida's
> position...
Let's ask the question the other way: what would make you think that
Derrida would suggest that all writings have equal authority?
> He doesn't think himself obscure - i guessed - as the contradiction
> would be obvious - however it doesn't mean he isn't. I wouldn't want to
> embark on setting up some criteria for obscurity - but ask - in his
> playful texts does he explicitly say this is what he is doing, if not
> how do we know when he is not playing and when he is?
Regarding Derrida's alleged "obscurity", I can only say that I'd be
very surprised to hear that you found Derrida on Hegel to be more
obscure than Hegel, or Derrida on Husserl to be more obscure than
Husserl, etc.
As for the "playful" works, they are overtly playful in form--
techniques such as dual columns on different subjects on a single
page, or removing blocks of text (of unknown length) in order to
create fragments, or writing a work in 59 brief chapters, each
containing a single (several page long) sentence...
> >>well not from the web - but lets move on - i'm not clear regarding his
> >>hypocrisy - but you are - so enough - what is interesting for me is that
> >>Derrida's ideas or concepts - he says they are not! - are taken up by
> >>others and miss-used in Derrida's terms. But isn't that OK - its wrong
> >>probably to say Derrida says "all is subjectivity" - but not to say in
> >>differance language statements appear to become of equal value - and
> >>this is looking like subjectivity.... don't suppose we can talk about
> >>this?
> >
> >Sure, let's talk about this.
> >
> >It is wrong (definitely) to say that Derrida says "all is
> >subjectivity"
> >
> >It is equally wrong to say that Derrida says "in differance language
> >statements appear to become of equal value".
> >
> >Your turn.
>
> OK - regardless of what Derrida says is right or wrong - he has
> presented a set of ideas - he says he hasn't - never mind - people will
> play with these. Derrida criticizes existing theories and methodologies
> by using subjective terminology which he claims is not a method. I've
> probably got this wrong - but didn't he invent differance and
> deconstruction - and say its not a method - and use it to criticise
> other methodologies?
Derrida *has* presented a set of ideas. He uses these ideas to
criticize other theories and methodologies. He expects others to
criticize him.
He did *not*, however, present the particular idea that you suggest
above, that "in differance language statements appear to become of
equal value."
Would it be fair to criticize Newton for suggesting that apples fall
to the ground due to magnetism?
> >Regarding the hypothesis posed above ("if post-modernism was in part
> >created by Derrida"), it is best to remember that Derrida has
> >consistently (and explicitly) rejected the term "post-modernism".
> >
> i'm not surprised - like the guy who invented the machine gun thought he
> was doing the world a favour. Its often the case that one doesn't want
> to accept the consequences of ones actions...
Ironically enough, Derrida is rather firm on the issue of one
accepting the consequences of one's actions (cf "The Ear of the
Other", where he refuses to abjure Nietzsche of responsibility for the
Nazi misreading of his work).
It may be that those who invented "post-modernism" (in the sense most
commonly used) feel they were inspired by Derrida's work. Derrida
claims that if this is the case, it is based on a peculiar misreading
of his work, and he has attempted repeatedly to clear up the
misreading. Which is, it seems to me, about the best that he can do.
> >The essay I have in mind is "Signature Event Context", which is found
> >in two places: in a collection entitled "Margins of Philosophy", and
> >in a collection entitled "Limited Inc". I suggest this essay for
> >several reasons: 1) it is directly germane to the topics we've been
> >discussing (and, in fact, the quote I pulled is from a later section
> >of "Limited Inc"), and 2) the works that Derrida reads in this essay
> >are quoted extensively within the essay itself. Further, as I said,
> >it is brief.
> >
> i'll look it up - OK just ordered it from amazon who say 1-2 weeks -
>
> do we discuss it here - maybe some others might like to read it also?
>
Sounds fine to me.
> >
> >>and defining what fairness is... this is the point - please Mr Derrida
> >>what is fair criticism and why is it fair? I think he is missing
> >>something which both Nietzsche and heidegger saw that "We are attempting
> >>a venture with truth! Perhaps humanity will perish by it!" [from a book]
> >
> >How about you take up my offer/challenge, and then I'd be happy to
> >discuss Derrida vs Nietzsche/Heidegger on "truth".
> >
> >But, in advance of that, do you think that any criticism or a work can
> >be "fair" if the critic has not read the book? Is it fair for me to
> >say "The new film 'Pearl Harbor' is a terrible piece of film-making.
> >Not that I've seen it, mind you, nor even any clips from it, nor read
> >the script...."
>
> Well that would be a difficult question but you slipped in Pearl Harbor
> - or is it Harbour - after all Derrida was attacking his critics - has
> he read their books?
Yes. He generally quotes liberally from the works he criticizes, even
in interviews.
> But as for Pearl Harbour i think its context is
> sufficient to criticise it - so maybe i think in principle that it is
> possible - how else can i think smoking 60 cigarettes a day for 30 years
> bad - without doing it first?
Hold on to that "context" thought-- it will come in handy, when
combined with "signature" and "event".
As to the cigarette question, contrast my original statement about
"Pearl Harbor" with a new revised version: "Although I have not seen
'Pearl Harbor', the reviews I have read of it lead me to believe that
it is poor filmmaking."
>
> So what about everyone reading the essay and then having a chat?
Sounds fine. Post a message when the book arrives.
Michael Dorfman
G*rd*n
michael...@my-deja.com (Michael Dorfman):
| I guess this is where you and I disagree. I would argue that it is
| irresponsible to "give a reading" if one has not "done a reading"
| first. Would it be ethical of me to attack, say, Bush's position on
| NATO expansion if I did not know what Bush's position was?
And yet since the world is infinite, a complete reading
would take forever; so at some point, whether in politics or
lit-crit, you'd have to break away from reading and do
something, if you were ever going to do anything.
James Whitehead
Dorfman <Michae...@hotmail.com> writes
><snippage>
>
>> > The piece I pulled
>> >the quote from is called "Toward an Ethics of Discussion"-- Derrida
>> >states that the sine non qua of any Ethics of Discussion would be to
>> >actually read the works one is discussing.
>>
>> I can go along with this - though he is saying here what is ethical -
>> yes? Is this a theory of ethical criticism? and if it is can it be
>> deconstructed?
>
>This is, in fact, a prolegomena to a theory of ethical criticism. Can
>it be deconstructed? Yes and no. There are two parallel issues here.
> One the one hand, Derrida readily acknowledges that his work holds no
>special exemption from deconstruction. On the other hand, Derrida
>argues that there are things that cannot be deconstructed-- most
>notably, "justice".
So what sort of condition is justice - regarding language? Why is it
exempt from logocentrism?
>> But then i can always be accused of lack of knowledge - or not being
>> careful enough. Derrida himself thinks Sartre wrong in his understanding
>> - so what hope has poor ole me! Unless I agree with him.
>
>"Agreeing with him" is not the point--as I said, I (for one) would be
>more than happy to hear *any* criticisms you make of any of Derrida's
>works, once you've actually read them. As for "lack of knowledge" or
>"carelessness", both are possible (and common), but we're not talking
>about any super-human efforts required here. As for Sartre, Derrida
>argues that Sartre misread Heidegger, not himself. (Personally, I
>find Heidegger *much* more difficult to read than Derrida...)
Well leaving works aside for the moment i think one criticism i have is
his position - regarding say philosophy - of wanting to be outside it-
to want to have no position at all? Then what does this make his
writings. It seems like he wants to play some game in which the
philosophers are the Indians with bows and arrows and he has a
Winchester. I think i could in principal then even criticise his
writings if this is true, as one could criticise a book which seeks to
pervert the readers sense of truth- without having to read it. However
once within the text i'm faced with the problem of any criticism being
seen as a misunderstanding. Explicitly does he say Levi-Strauss is wrong
in Of Grammatology - or propose some new kind of truth? What does his
criticism consist of - it seems he resists such answers? Is he showing
the error of logocentrism - or saying there are other ways to read the
text. Like i can play many games with it and as long as i'm being
ethical its ok.
>
>> >Huh? I'd love to see citations of anyone claiming that his
>> >"differance" is (or seems) one-sided. Which side?
>>
>> Lets ask for a definition of it - and what does it say of language?
>
>Perhaps when we are done with "Signature Event Context", we can turn
>to the essay "Differance".
>
>> >Further, the idea that "No writing can claim to have any greater
>> >authority than the rest" is nonsensical, and a position explicitly
>> >rejected by Derrida.
This would be my criticism - why he doesn't he see deconstruction at
work everywhere?
>>
>> Ok then let him present his authority... and ask what is Derrida's
>> position...
>
>Let's ask the question the other way: what would make you think that
>Derrida would suggest that all writings have equal authority?
>
I don't think he is saying this - but its possible to generate it by
simply seeing that his procedure changes the meaning of the texts he
critiques.
>> He doesn't think himself obscure - i guessed - as the contradiction
>> would be obvious - however it doesn't mean he isn't. I wouldn't want to
>> embark on setting up some criteria for obscurity - but ask - in his
>> playful texts does he explicitly say this is what he is doing, if not
>> how do we know when he is not playing and when he is?
>
>Regarding Derrida's alleged "obscurity", I can only say that I'd be
>very surprised to hear that you found Derrida on Hegel to be more
>obscure than Hegel, or Derrida on Husserl to be more obscure than
>Husserl, etc.
>
what about Glas?
>As for the "playful" works, they are overtly playful in form--
>techniques such as dual columns on different subjects on a single
>page, or removing blocks of text (of unknown length) in order to
>create fragments, or writing a work in 59 brief chapters, each
>containing a single (several page long) sentence...
>
isn't he breaking down meaning - in these texts?
[...]
>>
>> OK - regardless of what Derrida says is right or wrong - he has
>> presented a set of ideas - he says he hasn't - never mind - people will
>> play with these. Derrida criticizes existing theories and methodologies
>> by using subjective terminology which he claims is not a method. I've
>> probably got this wrong - but didn't he invent differance and
>> deconstruction - and say its not a method - and use it to criticise
>> other methodologies?
>
>Derrida *has* presented a set of ideas. He uses these ideas to
>criticize other theories and methodologies. He expects others to
>criticize him.
>
>He did *not*, however, present the particular idea that you suggest
>above, that "in differance language statements appear to become of
>equal value."
no - its something taken on from what he says -
>
>Would it be fair to criticize Newton for suggesting that apples fall
>to the ground due to magnetism?
>
yes - perfectly fair. What is magnetism?
>
>> >Regarding the hypothesis posed above ("if post-modernism was in part
>> >created by Derrida"), it is best to remember that Derrida has
>> >consistently (and explicitly) rejected the term "post-modernism".
>> >
>> i'm not surprised - like the guy who invented the machine gun thought he
>> was doing the world a favour. Its often the case that one doesn't want
>> to accept the consequences of ones actions...
>
>Ironically enough, Derrida is rather firm on the issue of one
>accepting the consequences of one's actions (cf "The Ear of the
>Other", where he refuses to abjure Nietzsche of responsibility for the
>Nazi misreading of his work).
Then how come he lets himself off? He is clearly starting a ball rolling
is deconstruction...
>
>It may be that those who invented "post-modernism" (in the sense most
>commonly used) feel they were inspired by Derrida's work. Derrida
>claims that if this is the case, it is based on a peculiar misreading
>of his work, and he has attempted repeatedly to clear up the
>misreading. Which is, it seems to me, about the best that he can do.
>
You see if in truth and in good faith i find him removing meaning in
deconstruction he's a big problem.
>
>> >The essay I have in mind is "Signature Event Context", which is found
>> >in two places: in a collection entitled "Margins of Philosophy", and
>> >in a collection entitled "Limited Inc". I suggest this essay for
>> >several reasons: 1) it is directly germane to the topics we've been
>> >discussing (and, in fact, the quote I pulled is from a later section
>> >of "Limited Inc"), and 2) the works that Derrida reads in this essay
>> >are quoted extensively within the essay itself. Further, as I said,
>> >it is brief.
>> >
>> i'll look it up - OK just ordered it from amazon who say 1-2 weeks -
>>
>> do we discuss it here - maybe some others might like to read it also?
>>
>Sounds fine to me.
>> >But, in advance of that, do you think that any criticism or a work can
>> >be "fair" if the critic has not read the book? Is it fair for me to
>> >say "The new film 'Pearl Harbor' is a terrible piece of film-making.
>> >Not that I've seen it, mind you, nor even any clips from it, nor read
>> >the script...."
>>
>> Well that would be a difficult question but you slipped in Pearl Harbor
>> - or is it Harbour - after all Derrida was attacking his critics - has
>> he read their books?
>
>Yes. He generally quotes liberally from the works he criticizes, even
>in interviews.
>
>> But as for Pearl Harbour i think its context is
>> sufficient to criticise it - so maybe i think in principle that it is
>> possible - how else can i think smoking 60 cigarettes a day for 30 years
>> bad - without doing it first?
>
>Hold on to that "context" thought-- it will come in handy, when
>combined with "signature" and "event".
>
>As to the cigarette question, contrast my original statement about
>"Pearl Harbor" with a new revised version: "Although I have not seen
>'Pearl Harbor', the reviews I have read of it lead me to believe that
>it is poor filmmaking."
what about Churchill's my enemy's enemy is my friend. I need know
nothing regarding my enemy's enemy yet support them - it would also
make sense to call an enemy my enemy's - enemy's - enemy and not buy his
books.
--
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg
>>> The piece I pulled
>>> the quote from is called "Toward an Ethics of Discussion"-- Derrida
>>> states that the sine non qua of any Ethics of Discussion would be to
>>> actually read the works one is discussing.
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>> Which is a pretty fucking stupid statement to make. There
>> isn't anything ethical or unethical about reading the works
>> one is discussing. That's just an ad hominem. What matters is
>> the reading one gives, not the reading one did.
Michael:
> I guess this is where you and I disagree. I would argue that it is
> irresponsible to "give a reading" if one has not "done a reading"
> first. Would it be ethical of me to attack, say, Bush's position on
> NATO expansion if I did not know what Bush's position was?
Depends on the contents of your attack. If you attack him
for taking positions which he doesn't hold, you're being
unethical. If you attack him taking for positions that he does
hold, no problem.
Michael:
>>> ... let me disagree (respectfully) with Moggin's statement-- I
>>> don't think that "making guesses" is an ethical violation in any way,
>>> if labelled as such. But, when was the last time *that* happened?
Moggin:
>> Seems we need to sort out our disagreements. I may easily
>> be misremembering what you said before, but I thought you
>> went along with Derrida's notion that reading what you
>> criticize is an ethical requirement. That's what I'm differing
>> with.
>> To discuss _without_ reading is to guess. And what in the
>> world is unethical about guessing? You say it's o.k. when
>> labeled as such. That certainly won't do for Derrida. If it's
>> really the the sine non qua of ethical reading not to make
>> guesses, merely slapping a label on guesswork could hardly make
>> it acceptable.
Michael:
> I'm a bit uncomfortable about the phrase "making guesses"-- do you
> mean suggesting hypotheses that are synthesized from the knowledge one
> has? Or do you mean just pulling an opinion out of the air, for
> example "The works of Dante Gabriel Rosetti are absolute horseshit"
> (said by someone who has admittedly not even cracked the binding on a
> single one of his works...)
I mean just what we're talking about: discussing what one
hasn't read. Derrida calls that unethical, I call it
guesswork and I call him idiotic for claiming it's unethical to
make guesses.
I can guess where the impulse comes from. After all, he's
spent his entire career being attacked for things that he's
never said. (James is offering a helpful illustration right in
this thread.)
But the problem lies in the contents of those attacks, not
in the reading history of the folks who make them. When
Derrida feels he's been misrepresented, should he demand to see
his critics' library records?
Moggin:
>> What about this labeling idea of yours, anyway? Should we
>> ask all readings to be labeled? If we're doing to flag
>> guesswork, then shouldn't we also use warning tags for readings
>> produced late at night? Or by people in therapy? Or folks
>> working under deadline pressure? Or written in a drunken
>> stupor? Or under the influence of stupid ideas? Or offered by
>> someone with nothing to say? Clearly we'll need a whole set
>> of labels, in all different shapes and colors, in order to give
>> the proper warnings.
Michael:
> The issue here is not one of warning the reader; rather, to prevent
> the writer from claiming to hold knowledge (he knows) he does not
> know.
But for the benefit of the reader, no? Why else would you
demand labels? The label isn't telling the writer anything
she didn't already know: it's there to tell the _reader_ about
what the writer doesn't know.
> cf Derrida's "History of the Lie". To offer a criticism of a work one
> has not read is duplicitous (in distinction with most of your other
> examples), and thus goes against the core of Derrida's ethics, that
> is, the "promise."
It's guessing, is what it is, and -- now we're back to the
start -- to call guessing "duplicitous" is stupid as can be.
The proof is in the pudding, not in the cook's curriculum vitae.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
>>> I'm not attacking big D -
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>> You were, at any rate: you were accusing him of hypocrisy.
>> Guess you've given up on that now.
James:
> I notice you have snipped your assertion of his hypocrisy, but it still
> stands - and is quite clear -
[Moggin:]
: You were calling Derrida a hypocrite, which is a word that
: you're liable to toss at anyone you feel like attacking.
: There's no indication you know what it means, although I recall
: explaining it to you before. Hypocrisy isn't just any
: contradiction -- it's a contradiction between what one preaches
: and what one practices. In this case Derrida is preaching
: that criticism ought to be honest, rigorous, educated, etc. So
: to prove your charge of hypocrisy, you would have to
: demonstrate that his own criticism violates those same criteria.
: You could get him on lucidity, since his own writing is
: famously obscure, but aside from that, your accusation wouldn't
: stick.
I notice you're lying. (Which confirms my prediction that
if you any further relaxed your "need of truth" it would
become unconscious.) I cut the words above, but I repeated the
point by saying:
[Moggin:]
: Ah. So now you think you are attacking him, and attacking
: him for being hypocritical. But you still don't grasp the
: notion of hypocrisy, which isn't any old contradiction. Like I
: said before, it's a contradiction between preaching and
: practice. So to prove Derrida a hypocrite, you'll need to show
: his own criticism doesn't abide by the standards he asks
: others to use in criticizing him. I've granted that he's often
: obscure, so all you need to show is that his criticism is
: dishonest, unfair, uneducated, unrigorous, and so on. I notice
: so far you haven't even tried.
That's where we stand. I've happily granted D's obscurity
-- a point you overlooked -- so you merely need to show that
the criticism which he gives of others is dishonest, uneducated,
unrigorous, and so on. Of course you also need to back up
your own claims, e.g. that he refuses to be criticized, that he
rejects "new and unconventional" criticism, that he claims
authority over post-modernism, that he won't let "punk
philosophy kids" use his work, etc. You've supported precisely
none of those accusations.
> Would a preacher be OK so long as he
> didn't break ALL of the 10 commandments?
That would depend on which ones he broke and which ones he
preached. When Jesus quotes from the Decalogue, e.g., he
conspicuously excludes the first four entries: all of the ones
about worshipping Yahweh, beginning with "Thou shalt have no
other gods before me." Romans 13:9 does the same. Which makes
sense to me. Taken as a whole, the Ten Commandments are
vastly overrated, although I admit I'm sympathetic with the 9th
one.
> Imagine the guy fornicating
> murdering etc., and then preaching one should obey the commandments -
> thinking "just so long as i don't covert the guys ox, i can screw and
> murder his wife and be in the clear."
But then if he hasn't murdered anyone -- hasn't even taken
his neighbor's ox, but merely wished that it was his -- you
can hardly say anything against him. A fella who does no worse
than envy his neighbor for having a nicer ox is living an
unobjectionable life, even if he does claim one should obey all
the commandments. If you tried to turn his coveting into a
federal case, then the talk of the town would be about you, not
him. Folks would figure you had a grudge. You'd have to
prove him guilty of murder, or at least thievery, before anyone
would take you seriously.
> reading the quote he seems to be
According to you he's objecting to "new and unconventional
methods" when they're applied to him. But the quote has no
objection to "new and unconventional methods." It doesn't even
address them. That was your fabrication.
[...]
> So why not apply the method to itself -
Only because it's not a method. Other than that, go right
ahead. Nobody is forbidding you from deconstructing
deconstruction. But just to be sporting, see if you can do the
job w/out telling any more lies.
> its that process which
> questions his list "truth, stability, unity of meaning"
Sure. Notice that he doesn't claim they're unquestionable.
[...]
James:
>>>>>> If anything it exposes his wish for the modernist crown of truth in
>>>>>> "rules" RULES?
Moggin:
>>>>>> Why, James: you're conducting an expose! You're
>>>>>> bringing to light Derrida's hidden wish. Unearthing his hidden
>>>>>> desire. Revealing the secret he tried to conceal. Shall we
>>>>>> put a crown of truth on you? You'll need a scepter to complete
>>>>>> the effect. Probably a robe, too.
>>>> No reply, James? I'd thought that a hypocrisy-hunter like
>>>> you would be thrilled to find such a glaring example. I
>>>> understand, though: only natural that your interest in hunting
>>>> hypocrites dwindles when the hypocricy is yours.
James:
>>> Sorry Moggin you've lost me here
Moggin:
>> It's simple. You're demonstrating glaring hypocrisy. And
>> since you're such an avid hypocisy-hunter, you should
>> naturally be interested in your own case. It's a classic. But
>> while you've happily invented statements in your attempt to
>> paint Derrida as a hypocrite, you're willing to ignore your own
>> hypocrisy here. Meta-hypocrisy, that would be.
James:
> you still haven't explained how i'm being hypocritical -
Of course I have. Predictable that your keen hunter's eye
would dim when you're in your own cross-hairs.
> He seems to be saying
> "the deconstructionist is supposed to not believe in truth, stability,
> or the unity of meaning, in intention" is wrong.
He's saying it's right: the deconstructionist is supposed
by many people to not believe in truth, etc. He's also
giving his own picture of deconstruction, which differs in some
ways.
[...]
> Why isn't it possible to deconstruct
> deconstructionism - is it because it marks some absolute truth.
Only according to you -- you're attacking a strawman again.
[...]
Moggin:
>> Your assertion here is that Derrida and-and-out refuses to
>> be criticized. That's the basis for your claim that he's a
>> hypocrite: you argue that he criticizes others but rejects the
>> same in his turn. I agree that would be hypocritical. But
>> your accusation is based entirely on a falsehood, since Derrida
>> didn't refuse to be criticized.
James:
> I do not assert he refuses to be criticised
[...]
Of course you did. I can understand why you would try to
run away from such an asburd statement, but you did sure
enough attack Derrida for refusing to be criticized. According
to you he questions others, while we're not allowed to
question him. But needless to say, D doesn't claim he's beyond
questioning. Your accusation was false.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
> What position am i saying he has -
You're saying Derrida "gets annoyed" when "some cheap punk
philosophy kids all start ripping him off." You're basing
this claim of yours on the quote Michael gave, which, as chance
would have it, says nothing about the annoyance you imagine
Derrida feels about "cheap punk philosophy kids" who borrow his
ideas without asking. He does express his irritation at
being attacked for taking positions that he doesn't hold, which
is precisely what you're doing here.
-- Moggin
Michael Dorfman
<jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In article <aaca6777.01062...@posting.google.com>, Michael
>Dorfman <Michae...@hotmail.com> writes
>><snippage>
>>
>>> > The piece I pulled
>>> >the quote from is called "Toward an Ethics of Discussion"-- Derrida
>>> >states that the sine non qua of any Ethics of Discussion would be to
>>> >actually read the works one is discussing.
>>>
>>> I can go along with this - though he is saying here what is ethical -
>>> yes? Is this a theory of ethical criticism? and if it is can it be
>>> deconstructed?
>>
>>This is, in fact, a prolegomena to a theory of ethical criticism. Can
>>it be deconstructed? Yes and no. There are two parallel issues here.
>> One the one hand, Derrida readily acknowledges that his work holds no
>>special exemption from deconstruction. On the other hand, Derrida
>>argues that there are things that cannot be deconstructed-- most
>>notably, "justice".
>
>So what sort of condition is justice - regarding language? Why is it
>exempt from logocentrism?
>
Well, I'm going to have to be very schematic here, and condense things
quite a bit, but here goes: First, we need to make a distinction
between law and justice. Law (and, more specifically, individual
laws) are attempts at the *application* of justice, which always
remains "to come". If justice is based upon context, and context is
never completely saturated (we'll discuss these points vis-a-vis SEC,
I'm sure), one can never say (with complete certainty) "I am just" or
"This is a just act" (etc.) because some future context might come
along to change things. Since Justice itself is therefore always
deferred, it is not deconstructible. Laws, or acts, however, *are*
deconstructible.
The primary source for this line of thinking is Derrida's "The
Mystical Foundation of Authority", which is in a volume entitled
"Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice" (edited by Drucilla
Cornell), but you can get a taste by reading a conversation Derrida
had at Villanova University, which is available on the web (and forms
the basis for John Caputo's "Deconstruction in a Nutshell".) The web
version is linked to on Peter Krapp's site:
http://www.hydra.umn.edu/derrida/content.html
Warning: it start slow, but picks up speed as it goes.
>>> But then i can always be accused of lack of knowledge - or not being
>>> careful enough. Derrida himself thinks Sartre wrong in his understanding
>>> - so what hope has poor ole me! Unless I agree with him.
>>
>>"Agreeing with him" is not the point--as I said, I (for one) would be
>>more than happy to hear *any* criticisms you make of any of Derrida's
>>works, once you've actually read them. As for "lack of knowledge" or
>>"carelessness", both are possible (and common), but we're not talking
>>about any super-human efforts required here. As for Sartre, Derrida
>>argues that Sartre misread Heidegger, not himself. (Personally, I
>>find Heidegger *much* more difficult to read than Derrida...)
>
>Well leaving works aside for the moment i think one criticism i have is
>his position - regarding say philosophy - of wanting to be outside it-
>to want to have no position at all?
Bzzzzt! Wrong answer. Derrida does not want (or claim) to be "outside
it"-- rather, he shows that there is no "non-metaphysical" point from
which one could attack metaphysics. Derrida has positions, just not
the ones often attributed to him.
>Then what does this make his
>writings. It seems like he wants to play some game in which the
>philosophers are the Indians with bows and arrows and he has a
>Winchester. I think i could in principal then even criticise his
>writings if this is true, as one could criticise a book which seeks to
>pervert the readers sense of truth- without having to read it. However
>once within the text i'm faced with the problem of any criticism being
>seen as a misunderstanding. Explicitly does he say Levi-Strauss is wrong
>in Of Grammatology - or propose some new kind of truth? What does his
>criticism consist of - it seems he resists such answers? Is he showing
>the error of logocentrism - or saying there are other ways to read the
>text. Like i can play many games with it and as long as i'm being
>ethical its ok.
To answer you questions, briefly: Yes, he says Levi-Strauss is wrong
(although not necessarily in those words) yes, he does propose some
new kind of "truth" (again, not necessarily in those words). He
doesn't resist answers in general, just particular answers which are
themselves based upon unquestioned premises.
I've posted this quote to Usenet before, but here is one of Derrida's
more concise statements about "truth" (the "it" in the opening
sentence refers to his own work):
"Finally, it goes without saying that in no case is it a question of a
*discourse against truth* or against science. (This is impossible and
absurd, as is every heated accusation on this subject.) And when one
analyzes systematically the value of truth as *homoiosis* or
*adequatio*, as the certitude of the *cogito* (Descartes,
Husserl), or as a certitude opposed to truth in the horizon of
absolute knowledge (*Phenomenology of the Mind*), or finally as
*aletheia*, unveiling or presence (the Heideggerean repetition), it is
not in order to return naively to a relativist or sceptical
empiricism. [refs to French editions of OG and "Differance" omitted]
I repeat, then, leaving all their disseminating powers to the
proposition and the form of the verb: *we must have* truth."
Summary: Derrida is *not* against truth, nor is he a relativist or
sceptical empiricist. He's just pointing out how certain determined
conceptions of truth (i.e. homoiosis, adequatio, aletheia, etc.) are
flawed, by means of a "systematic analysis"
>
>>
>>> >Huh? I'd love to see citations of anyone claiming that his
>>> >"differance" is (or seems) one-sided. Which side?
>>>
>>> Lets ask for a definition of it - and what does it say of language?
>>
>>Perhaps when we are done with "Signature Event Context", we can turn
>>to the essay "Differance".
>>
>>> >Further, the idea that "No writing can claim to have any greater
>>> >authority than the rest" is nonsensical, and a position explicitly
>>> >rejected by Derrida.
>
>This would be my criticism - why he doesn't he see deconstruction at
>work everywhere?
Huh? He sees deconstruction at work, in a lot of places. But
"everywhere"?
And how does this question ("why doesn't he see deconstruction at work
everywhere?") relate to the previous statement ("No writing can claim
to have any greater authority than the rest")?
>
>>>
>>> Ok then let him present his authority... and ask what is Derrida's
>>> position...
>>
>>Let's ask the question the other way: what would make you think that
>>Derrida would suggest that all writings have equal authority?
>>
>I don't think he is saying this - but its possible to generate it by
>simply seeing that his procedure changes the meaning of the texts he
>critiques.
>
>>> He doesn't think himself obscure - i guessed - as the contradiction
>>> would be obvious - however it doesn't mean he isn't. I wouldn't want to
>>> embark on setting up some criteria for obscurity - but ask - in his
>>> playful texts does he explicitly say this is what he is doing, if not
>>> how do we know when he is not playing and when he is?
>>
>>Regarding Derrida's alleged "obscurity", I can only say that I'd be
>>very surprised to hear that you found Derrida on Hegel to be more
>>obscure than Hegel, or Derrida on Husserl to be more obscure than
>>Husserl, etc.
>>
>what about Glas?
I can't speak to the "Genet" side of Glas, since I haven't read much
Genet (much to my discredit.) The Hegel side, however, is actually a
very close reading of certain symptomatic passages of Hegel, and is a
very tightly structured work. Simon Critchley has a fine article
(originally published in the Bulletin of the British Hegel Society,
later reprinted in several collections) which follows the thread quite
clearly. The only "obscurity", really, is the lack of footnotes
(which is remedied in the English edition by the "Glassary" volume.)
Personally speaking, I find it no more obscure than Hegel (and a bit
more fun, but that's just my opinion.)
>
>>As for the "playful" works, they are overtly playful in form--
>>techniques such as dual columns on different subjects on a single
>>page, or removing blocks of text (of unknown length) in order to
>>create fragments, or writing a work in 59 brief chapters, each
>>containing a single (several page long) sentence...
>>
>isn't he breaking down meaning - in these texts?
Breaking down meaning? What would that be? Note that in these cases
he's explicitly working with/against something specific in the text he
is commenting on-- for example, with Hegel (the thinker most
interested in a unified system) he is non-systematic (i.e.
symptomatic), with Socrates (who left no writings) he offers
fragmentary letters with no signature and no named addressee, etc.
>
>[...]
>
>>>
>>> OK - regardless of what Derrida says is right or wrong - he has
>>> presented a set of ideas - he says he hasn't - never mind - people will
>>> play with these. Derrida criticizes existing theories and methodologies
>>> by using subjective terminology which he claims is not a method. I've
>>> probably got this wrong - but didn't he invent differance and
>>> deconstruction - and say its not a method - and use it to criticise
>>> other methodologies?
>>
>>Derrida *has* presented a set of ideas. He uses these ideas to
>>criticize other theories and methodologies. He expects others to
>>criticize him.
>>
>>He did *not*, however, present the particular idea that you suggest
>>above, that "in differance language statements appear to become of
>>equal value."
>
>no - its something taken on from what he says -
By whom?
>
>>
>>Would it be fair to criticize Newton for suggesting that apples fall
>>to the ground due to magnetism?
>>
>yes - perfectly fair. What is magnetism?
Perfectly fair for me to say "Newton was wrong when he suggested that
apples fall to the ground due to magnetism", when he said no such
thing? I guess we have different conceptions of "fairness."
>>
>>> >Regarding the hypothesis posed above ("if post-modernism was in part
>>> >created by Derrida"), it is best to remember that Derrida has
>>> >consistently (and explicitly) rejected the term "post-modernism".
>>> >
>>> i'm not surprised - like the guy who invented the machine gun thought he
>>> was doing the world a favour. Its often the case that one doesn't want
>>> to accept the consequences of ones actions...
>>
>>Ironically enough, Derrida is rather firm on the issue of one
>>accepting the consequences of one's actions (cf "The Ear of the
>>Other", where he refuses to abjure Nietzsche of responsibility for the
>>Nazi misreading of his work).
>
>Then how come he lets himself off? He is clearly starting a ball rolling
>is deconstruction...
He *doesn't* let himself off, he instead does everything he can to
clear up the misunderstanding. (Which is what one imagines Nietzsche
would have done, had he been alive and well at the time of the Nazi
mis-appropriation)
>
>>
>>It may be that those who invented "post-modernism" (in the sense most
>>commonly used) feel they were inspired by Derrida's work. Derrida
>>claims that if this is the case, it is based on a peculiar misreading
>>of his work, and he has attempted repeatedly to clear up the
>>misreading. Which is, it seems to me, about the best that he can do.
>>
>You see if in truth and in good faith i find him removing meaning in
>deconstruction he's a big problem.
That's right, he would. And if, after reading SEC, you find that "in
truth and in good faith" you find that, I'll be mighty surprised.
On the other hand, "Politics makes for strange bedfellows", and the
enemy of my enemy may *also* be my enemy, and the friend of my friend
may be my enemy, and. one of my friends may be enemies with another of
my friends...well, we can add "The Politics of Friendship" to the list
of citations, too.
Michael Dorfman
Michael Dorfman
>| ...
>
>michael...@my-deja.com (Michael Dorfman):
>| I guess this is where you and I disagree. I would argue that it is
>| irresponsible to "give a reading" if one has not "done a reading"
>| first. Would it be ethical of me to attack, say, Bush's position on
>| NATO expansion if I did not know what Bush's position was?
>
>And yet since the world is infinite, a complete reading
>would take forever; so at some point, whether in politics or
>lit-crit, you'd have to break away from reading and do
>something, if you were ever going to do anything.
I didn't say "complete"-- in fact, it is likely that Bush himself
doesn't even know *completely* what is own position is. (Note: the
germane factor here is the unconscious, not Bush's cluelessness.)
But it is necessary to take the first step, at least.
Michael Dorfman
Michael Dorfman
<mog...@mediaone.net> wrote:
>michael...@my-deja.com (Michael Dorfman):
>
>>>> The piece I pulled
>>>> the quote from is called "Toward an Ethics of Discussion"-- Derrida
>>>> states that the sine non qua of any Ethics of Discussion would be to
>>>> actually read the works one is discussing.
>
>Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>
>>> Which is a pretty fucking stupid statement to make. There
>>> isn't anything ethical or unethical about reading the works
>>> one is discussing. That's just an ad hominem. What matters is
>>> the reading one gives, not the reading one did.
>
>Michael:
>
>> I guess this is where you and I disagree. I would argue that it is
>> irresponsible to "give a reading" if one has not "done a reading"
>> first. Would it be ethical of me to attack, say, Bush's position on
>> NATO expansion if I did not know what Bush's position was?
>
> Depends on the contents of your attack. If you attack him
>for taking positions which he doesn't hold, you're being
>unethical. If you attack him taking for positions that he does
>hold, no problem.
But how would I know if I am purely "guessing", and have made no
attempt to find out what his positions actually are? Am I correct in
assuming that you're basically making an exemption for lucky guesses
that end up being fortuitously true?
Well, let's take one (actual) example: Derrida has quite a bit of fun
at Habermas's expense because Habermas wrote a book which spends two
chapters attacking Derrida, yet never cites Derrida directly-- it
instead only quotes secondary literature (leading someone to waggishly
suggest that Habermas had only seen Derrida in the Culler-ized
version...)
Now, the fact is, that in this particular context (a well-known and
well-respected scholarly, writing a presumably scholarly work) to have
done what Habermas did, without showing any evidence of actually
having engaged with the body of work in question (which he thoroughly
trashed, naturally) seems pretty unethical to me.
But you're saying that if Habermas had said only complimentary things,
this would have been ok?
>
>Moggin:
>
>>> What about this labeling idea of yours, anyway? Should we
>>> ask all readings to be labeled? If we're doing to flag
>>> guesswork, then shouldn't we also use warning tags for readings
>>> produced late at night? Or by people in therapy? Or folks
>>> working under deadline pressure? Or written in a drunken
>>> stupor? Or under the influence of stupid ideas? Or offered by
>>> someone with nothing to say? Clearly we'll need a whole set
>>> of labels, in all different shapes and colors, in order to give
>>> the proper warnings.
>
>Michael:
>
>> The issue here is not one of warning the reader; rather, to prevent
>> the writer from claiming to hold knowledge (he knows) he does not
>> know.
>
> But for the benefit of the reader, no? Why else would you
>demand labels? The label isn't telling the writer anything
>she didn't already know: it's there to tell the _reader_ about
>what the writer doesn't know.
Well, it is keeping the writer from being a liar. If Habermas (for
example) were to have said "I have never read a word of Derrida, but
the secondary literature on him leads me to believe that his work is
unreadable shit", it would have (at least) been honest.
>
>> cf Derrida's "History of the Lie". To offer a criticism of a work one
>> has not read is duplicitous (in distinction with most of your other
>> examples), and thus goes against the core of Derrida's ethics, that
>> is, the "promise."
>
> It's guessing, is what it is, and -- now we're back to the
>start -- to call guessing "duplicitous" is stupid as can be.
>The proof is in the pudding, not in the cook's curriculum vitae.
"Guessing" is not duplicitous if it is admitted to be merely guessing.
To claim to be speaking authoritatively when you know full well that
you are full of shit seems pretty duplicitous to me...
Michael Dorfman
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
>James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
>
>>>> I'm not attacking big D -
>
>Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>
>>> You were, at any rate: you were accusing him of hypocrisy.
>>> Guess you've given up on that now.
>
>James:
>
>> I notice you have snipped your assertion of his hypocrisy, but it still
>> stands - and is quite clear -
>
>[Moggin:]
>
>: You were calling Derrida a hypocrite, which is a word that
>: you're liable to toss at anyone you feel like attacking.
>: There's no indication you know what it means, although I recall
>: explaining it to you before. Hypocrisy isn't just any
>: contradiction -- it's a contradiction between what one preaches
>: and what one practices. In this case Derrida is preaching
>: that criticism ought to be honest, rigorous, educated, etc. So
>: to prove your charge of hypocrisy, you would have to
>: demonstrate that his own criticism violates those same criteria.
>: You could get him on lucidity, since his own writing is
>: famously obscure, but aside from that, your accusation wouldn't
>: stick.
>
> I notice you're lying.
where am i lying?
James:
>I notice you have snipped your assertion of his hypocrisy, but it still
>> stands - and is quite clear -
Moggin:
>I cut the words above,
>(Which confirms my prediction that
>if you any further relaxed your "need of truth" it would
>become unconscious.) I cut the words above, but I repeated the
>point by saying:
>
>[Moggin:]
>
>: Ah. So now you think you are attacking him, and attacking
>: him for being hypocritical. But you still don't grasp the
>: notion of hypocrisy, which isn't any old contradiction. Like I
>: said before, it's a contradiction between preaching and
>: practice. So to prove Derrida a hypocrite, you'll need to show
>: his own criticism doesn't abide by the standards he asks
>: others to use in criticizing him. I've granted that he's often
>: obscure, so all you need to show is that his criticism is
>: dishonest, unfair, uneducated, unrigorous, and so on. I notice
>: so far you haven't even tried.
>
> That's where we stand. I've happily granted D's obscurity
>-- a point you overlooked --
i haven't overlooked it - its still up for debate - you may grant him
obscurity - Michael doesn't - i'm yet to cast my vote - but how we
decide obscurity is perhaps more than a three way vote? I think the
obscurity point also must take into account what he is doing - is he
doing philosophy, literary criticism or something else?
>so you merely need to show that
>the criticism which he gives of others is dishonest, uneducated,
>unrigorous, and so on. Of course you also need to back up
>your own claims, e.g. that he refuses to be criticized, that he
>rejects "new and unconventional" criticism, that he claims
>authority over post-modernism, that he won't let "punk
>philosophy kids" use his work, etc. You've supported precisely
>none of those accusations.
My punks were a slightly more vivid descriptions of his "feeble" and
"bad readers" - what i trying to say is that Derrida makes claims about
other writers - which they would probably not accept - yet gets upset
when the same thing happens to him. Didn't he have a spat with Searle?
amongst others - would Hegel say - Shucks your so right Jacques - what a
fool i and *every other writer* up to you has been... that we foolishly
think the written world a third rate means of expression...
>
>> Would a preacher be OK so long as he
>> didn't break ALL of the 10 commandments?
>
> That would depend on which ones he broke and which ones he
>preached. When Jesus quotes from the Decalogue, e.g., he
>conspicuously excludes the first four entries: all of the ones
>about worshipping Yahweh, beginning with "Thou shalt have no
>other gods before me." Romans 13:9 does the same. Which makes
>sense to me. Taken as a whole, the Ten Commandments are
>vastly overrated, although I admit I'm sympathetic with the 9th
>one.
>
>> Imagine the guy fornicating
>> murdering etc., and then preaching one should obey the commandments -
>> thinking "just so long as i don't covert the guys ox, i can screw and
>> murder his wife and be in the clear."
>
> But then if he hasn't murdered anyone -- hasn't even taken
>his neighbor's ox, but merely wished that it was his -- you
>can hardly say anything against him. A fella who does no worse
>than envy his neighbor for having a nicer ox is living an
>unobjectionable life, even if he does claim one should obey all
>the commandments. If you tried to turn his coveting into a
>federal case, then the talk of the town would be about you, not
>him. Folks would figure you had a grudge. You'd have to
>prove him guilty of murder, or at least thievery, before anyone
>would take you seriously.
So i don't have to keep all 10 - pity you were not around in Sinai a
while ago - you could have saved God some time and Moses a hernia.
>
>> reading the quote he seems to be
>
> According to you he's objecting to "new and unconventional
>methods" when they're applied to him. But the quote has no
>objection to "new and unconventional methods." It doesn't even
>address them. That was your fabrication.
>
Bad reading ... the po-mo critique of theory - method and truth...
>[...]
>
>> So why not apply the method to itself -
>
> Only because it's not a method. Other than that, go right
>ahead. Nobody is forbidding you from deconstructing
>deconstruction. But just to be sporting, see if you can do the
>job w/out telling any more lies.
Well i know Derrida says its not a method - but an event - what takes
place - what is revealed at this event - its not a single truth but
truth only reinscribed in more powerful, larger, more stratified
contexts - a superabundance of meaning and an endless displacement of
meaning - so then why good reading - why not all possible readings at
the point of deconstruction - why not all possible value statements?
>
>> its that process which
>> questions his list "truth, stability, unity of meaning"
>
> Sure. Notice that he doesn't claim they're unquestionable.
then what's he objecting to?
which is free of closure?
>
>[...]
>
>> Why isn't it possible to deconstruct
>> deconstructionism - is it because it marks some absolute truth.
>
> Only according to you -- you're attacking a strawman again.
>
"is it" .... means i'm asking a question - not making a statement.
>[...]
>
>Moggin:
>
>>> Your assertion here is that Derrida and-and-out refuses to
>>> be criticized. That's the basis for your claim that he's a
>>> hypocrite: you argue that he criticizes others but rejects the
>>> same in his turn. I agree that would be hypocritical. But
>>> your accusation is based entirely on a falsehood, since Derrida
>>> didn't refuse to be criticized.
>
>James:
>
>> I do not assert he refuses to be criticised
>
>[...]
>
> Of course you did. I can understand why you would try to
>run away from such an asburd statement, but you did sure
>enough attack Derrida for refusing to be criticized. According
>to you he questions others, while we're not allowed to
>question him. But needless to say, D doesn't claim he's beyond
>questioning. Your accusation was false.
>
he doesn't agree with their methods. (they might not be using any - but
have deconstructed his writing) Isn't he asking for a "correct"
interpretation - but cant it be seen that this is asking for a
metaphysical closure?
Btw the above is a question.
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
--
James Whitehead
G*rd*n
michael...@my-deja.com (Michael Dorfman):
| >| I guess this is where you and I disagree. I would argue that it is
| >| irresponsible to "give a reading" if one has not "done a reading"
| >| first. Would it be ethical of me to attack, say, Bush's position on
| >| NATO expansion if I did not know what Bush's position was?
g...@panix.com (G*rd*n) wrote:
| >And yet since the world is infinite, a complete reading
| >would take forever; so at some point, whether in politics or
| >lit-crit, you'd have to break away from reading and do
| >something, if you were ever going to do anything.
michael...@my-deja.com (Michael Dorfman):
| I didn't say "complete"-- in fact, it is likely that Bush himself
| doesn't even know *completely* what is own position is. (Note: the
| germane factor here is the unconscious, not Bush's cluelessness.)
|
| But it is necessary to take the first step, at least.
That could be a very modest step. A Russian politician, for
instance, might have to engage Bush's position on NATO expansion
very rapidly, before he knew much about it, or lose his job
and his opportunity to behave ethically in a professional
capacity. Likewise I had not read a word of _The_Bell_Curve_
before I began to attack in on the Net, which I thought was
proper in order to break up rapidly forming, mutually-
reinforcing clots of racist discourse; all the material I
needed was supplied by its admirers.
So the ethics of reading are not pure; they're embedded in
circumstances. This is why the reading one gives may be
more important than the reading one does.
Moggin Goldberg
[...]
>>>> What matters is the reading one gives, not the reading one did.
michael...@my-deja.com (Michael Dorfman):
>>> I guess this is where you and I disagree. I would argue that it is
>>> irresponsible to "give a reading" if one has not "done a reading"
>>> first. Would it be ethical of me to attack, say, Bush's position on
>>> NATO expansion if I did not know what Bush's position was?
Moggin:
>> Depends on the contents of your attack. If you attack him
>> for taking positions which he doesn't hold, you're being
>> unethical. If you attack him taking for positions that he does
>> hold, no problem.
Michael:
> But how would I know if I am purely "guessing", and have made no
> attempt to find out what his positions actually are?
You wouldn't. But your question wasn't, "How would I know
Bush's position on NATO expansion?" It was, "Would it be
ethical of me to attack, say, Bush's position on NATO expansion
if I did not know what Bush's position was?" The answer to
that hinges on the contents of your attack. If you attack Bush
for holding positions he doesn't hold, then you're being
unethical, but if you attack him for holding positions which he
does hold, there's no problem.
Excuse me for repeating, but it seems to me that's the key
thing right there. Distorting a person's position is
unethical -- but _not_ distorting a person's position is hardly
an issue. Look at it this way: if you misrepresented Bush
even tho you were well-informed about his foreign policy, could
you say you were being ethical? Of course not. And why?
Because what matters is whether or not you distorted his policy
-- not what reading you've done.
> Am I correct in
> assuming that you're basically making an exemption for lucky guesses
> that end up being fortuitously true?
No, not at all. Good thing you asked. I'm saying there's
nothing unethical about guessing. I'm saying it's stupid as
hell to claim reading the works one is discussing is an ethical
necessity.
Michaeh:
>>> I'm a bit uncomfortable about the phrase "making guesses"-- do you
>>> mean suggesting hypotheses that are synthesized from the knowledge one
>>> has? Or do you mean just pulling an opinion out of the air ... ?
Moggin:
>> I mean just what we're talking about: discussing what one
>> hasn't read. Derrida calls that unethical, I call it
>> guesswork and I call him idiotic for claiming it's unethical to
>> make guesses.
>> I can guess where the impulse comes from. After all, he's
>> spent his entire career being attacked for things that he's
>> never said. (James is offering a helpful illustration right in
>> this thread.)
>> But the problem lies in the contents of those attacks, not
>> in the reading history of the folks who make them. When
>> Derrida feels he's been misrepresented, should he demand to see
>> his critics' library records?
Michael:
> Well, let's take one (actual) example: Derrida has quite a bit of fun
> at Habermas's expense because Habermas wrote a book which spends two
> chapters attacking Derrida, yet never cites Derrida directly-- it
> instead only quotes secondary literature (leading someone to waggishly
> suggest that Habermas had only seen Derrida in the Culler-ized
> version...)
You referring to _The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity_?
> Now, the fact is, that in this particular context (a well-known and
> well-respected scholarly, writing a presumably scholarly work) to have
> done what Habermas did, without showing any evidence of actually
> having engaged with the body of work in question (which he thoroughly
> trashed, naturally) seems pretty unethical to me.
Yeah? How come? Where's the unethical part? So Habermas
gave his two cents. He's entitled, right? You're free to
criticize his opinions or the way he gave them. You can accuse
him of being unethical, even. But it doesn't seem like you
have any good reason to -- certainly none that you've been able
state.
> But you're saying that if Habermas had said only complimentary things,
> this would have been ok?
Huh? No. (Where did you get that from?) I'm saying it's
ethically o.k. even though he was critical. Or rather I'm
saying it's an ethical irrelevancy. If Habermas misrepresented
Derrida -- if his criticism was based on distortions of D's
work -- you've got something to bitch about, ethically speaking.
If not, not.
Michael:
>>> The issue here is not one of warning the reader; rather, to prevent
>>> the writer from claiming to hold knowledge (he knows) he does not
>>> know.
Moggin:
>> But for the benefit of the reader, no? Why else would you
>> demand labels? The label isn't telling the writer anything
>> she didn't already know: it's there to tell the _reader_ about
>> what the writer doesn't know.
Michael:
> Well, it is keeping the writer from being a liar.
Not so. The writing is done, and it may be fully truthful
or a pack of lies. In the first case the label wouldn't be
necessary and in the second case it wouldn't do any good. It's
there to serve _you_: you demand to be informed about the
writer's background. You're insisting that she supply you with
her credentials or wear a badge of shame.
> If Habermas (for
> example) were to have said "I have never read a word of Derrida, but
> the secondary literature on him leads me to believe that his work is
> unreadable shit", it would have (at least) been honest.
You haven't shown any dishonesty on Habermas part. I'm no
fan of his, lord knows -- I think he's usually a boring
windbag. A shame what the Frankfurt School has been reduced to.
But you're making empty accusations.
Michael:
>>> cf Derrida's "History of the Lie". To offer a criticism of a work one
>>> has not read is duplicitous (in distinction with most of your other
>>> examples), and thus goes against the core of Derrida's ethics, that
>>> is, the "promise."
Moggin:
>> It's guessing, is what it is, and -- now we're back to the
>> start -- to call guessing "duplicitous" is stupid as can be.
>> The proof is in the pudding, not in the cook's curriculum vitae.
Michael:
> "Guessing" is not duplicitous if it is admitted to be merely guessing.
You said that -- that's how we got to talking about labels.
You want to extract a confession from the writer at the very
start. That's why I helpfully suggested other things you could
get writers to admit. Writing for money or to get ahead in
one's profession deserves a label. Likewise writing with a bad
cold, writing in an uncomfortable chair, and writing
influenced by dead economists. I'm sure some people would like
to avoid any writing by adulterers -- their books could be
labeled with a scarlet 'A' -- while others would like to attach
a yellow tag to books written by Jews.
> To claim to be speaking authoritatively when you know full well that
> you are full of shit seems pretty duplicitous to me...
It's clear how things seem to you. Less plain that you've
got any good reason for seeing them that way -- especially
since you've found it necessary to turn speaking into "speaking
authoritatively" and add, "... when you know full well that
you are full of shit." That's quite a ways from the unmodified
assertion we were discussing.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
>> That's where we stand. I've happily granted D's obscurity
>> -- a point you overlooked -- so you merely need to show that
>> the criticism which he gives of others is dishonest, uneducated,
>> unrigorous, and so on. Of course you also need to back up
>> your own claims, e.g. that he refuses to be criticized, that he
>> rejects "new and unconventional" criticism, that he claims
>> authority over post-modernism, that he won't let "punk
>> philosophy kids" use his work, etc. You've supported precisely
>> none of those accusations.
James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
[...]
> My punks were a slightly more vivid descriptions of his "feeble" and
> "bad readers" -
Not so. Your punks are "punk philosophy kids" who you say
annoyed Derrida by stealing his work. According to you, he
was complaining about them in the quote that Michael gave. But
oddly enough he doesn't either mention any "punk philosophy
kids" or complain about anyone stealing from him. He's annoyed
by people attacking him for things he hasn't said -- and to
repeat, that's exactly what you're doing here. You've supplied
a perfect illustration of his point.
> what i trying to say is that Derrida makes claims about
> other writers - which they would probably not accept - yet gets upset
> when the same thing happens to him.
Yet another unsupported accusation. You haven't offered a
single case where Derrida is guilty of the kinda
misrepresentation he's complaining about. Until you do, you're
just bullshitting.
[...]
James re the Ten Commandments:
> So i don't have to keep all 10 -
[...]
Depends who you ask. I say there's some very questionable
items on the list. In the Gospels Jesus gives conflicting
replies. At one point he says to obey _all_ of the
commandments, even the very smallest. That would mean not only
all ten, but all six hundred and thirteen. Elsehwere he
rejects various parts of the law, and when asked directly which
commandments to obey he responds with a short list based on
the Decalogue but conspicuously excluding all of the entries on
worshipping Yahweh. Ditto Romans 13:8-9.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
> what position which [Derrida] doesn't hold have i attacked him for?
Plenty. You maintained he "gets annoyed" that "some cheap
punk philosophy kids" have been stealing his work. You said
he questions others while refusing to let himself be questioned.
You said that he refused to let his theories be "used for
sorts of things he did not intend" (a general version of the
bit about punks). You claimed that _he_ claimed to be the only
one with the truth ("What he is saying above seems to boil
down to 'I and only I am right - that's right right!'"), and he
put his ideas above "all concepts hitherto proposed." You
said he demanded everyone use his method on grounds that it was
the only valid one. You claimed he objected to "new and
unconventional methods," specifically when they were applied to
him. You said he desired to stand outside philosophy and he
claimed authority over post-modernism. So far you've backed up
zilch.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
> ... A Russian politician, for
> instance, might have to engage Bush's position on NATO expansion
> very rapidly, before he knew much about it, or lose his job
> and his opportunity to behave ethically in a professional
> capacity. Likewise I had not read a word of _The_Bell_Curve_
> before I began to attack in on the Net, which I thought was
> proper in order to break up rapidly forming, mutually-
> reinforcing clots of racist discourse; all the material I
> needed was supplied by its admirers.
> So the ethics of reading are not pure; they're embedded in
> circumstances. This is why the reading one gives may be
> more important than the reading one does.
Well, that's the practical angle. But if reading what one
discusses really _is_ an ethical sine non qua, as Frère
Jacques claims, then the pressure of circumstances is no excuse
for acting unethically.
My idea is that there's something wrong with the principle.
It's a perfect ad hominem: an attack on the person
substituting for an attack on the person's ideas. Did you make
accurate comments about _The Bell Curve_? Then nobody can
reasonably accuse you of acting unethically, no matter what you
did or didn't read.
Did you distort the contents of _The Bell Curve_? In that
case it doesn't matter if you read every word: you
misrepresented the book nonetheless. Either way, what you said
is what counts -- not what you read.
-- Moggin
Michael Dorfman
So let's consider the hypothetical situation step-by-step.
* I do not know what Bush's position on NATO expansion is.
* I "guess", and randomly make up a position that I will assume he
holds
* I attack him for holding this position.
Now, if I am reading you properly, this would be ethical if my guess
was fortuitously correct, and unethical if my guess was incorrect.
Correct?
>
> Excuse me for repeating, but it seems to me that's the key
>thing right there. Distorting a person's position is
>unethical -- but _not_ distorting a person's position is hardly
>an issue. Look at it this way: if you misrepresented Bush
>even tho you were well-informed about his foreign policy, could
>you say you were being ethical? Of course not. And why?
>Because what matters is whether or not you distorted his policy
>-- not what reading you've done.
To me, there is a useful distinction to be made between 'lying' and
being 'incorrect.' To offer opinions on subjects one knows nothing is
fabrication.
>
>> Am I correct in
>> assuming that you're basically making an exemption for lucky guesses
>> that end up being fortuitously true?
>
> No, not at all. Good thing you asked. I'm saying there's
>nothing unethical about guessing. I'm saying it's stupid as
>hell to claim reading the works one is discussing is an ethical
>necessity.
Well, chalk me up in the "stupid as hell" column. I think that this
notion is pretty close to the heart of Derrida's ethical work in
general, which stems from "the promise"-- that is to say, the implicit
promise to tell the truth that precedes any communication.
That would be the one.
>
>> Now, the fact is, that in this particular context (a well-known and
>> well-respected scholarly, writing a presumably scholarly work) to have
>> done what Habermas did, without showing any evidence of actually
>> having engaged with the body of work in question (which he thoroughly
>> trashed, naturally) seems pretty unethical to me.
>
> Yeah? How come? Where's the unethical part? So Habermas
>gave his two cents. He's entitled, right? You're free to
>criticize his opinions or the way he gave them. You can accuse
>him of being unethical, even. But it doesn't seem like you
>have any good reason to -- certainly none that you've been able
>state.
I thought I had stated them, but I'll repeat: Habermas violated the
"prime directive" of responsible scholarship-- not to speak out of
one's ass. Habermas had not done his homework, plain and simple.
If I read a book review, I'd like to know if the reviewer actually
read the book in question or not.
>
>> If Habermas (for
>> example) were to have said "I have never read a word of Derrida, but
>> the secondary literature on him leads me to believe that his work is
>> unreadable shit", it would have (at least) been honest.
>
> You haven't shown any dishonesty on Habermas part. I'm no
>fan of his, lord knows -- I think he's usually a boring
>windbag. A shame what the Frankfurt School has been reduced to.
>But you're making empty accusations.
I think there is an implied dishonesty-- to use the "book review"
example, to write a review as if one had read the book, when one has
not actually read the book, is to misrepresent oneself.
Is it really? I think the "authoritatively" is strongly implied by
the "labelling of guessing" discussion-- if one does not say
otherwise, we assume that someone offering a critique of something is
(attempting to) speak authoritatively, don't we? Or is that just me?
Similarly, one who is (attempting to) speak authoritatively about a
book one has not read (for example) would certainly know that they are
full of shit, right?
To keep the context clear: The case we've been discussing all along is
about someone attempting to offer a critique of a work they are not
familiar with.
Michael Dorfman
James Whitehead
<michael...@my-deja.com> writes
[...]
>>So what sort of condition is justice - regarding language? Why is it
>>exempt from logocentrism?
>>
>
>Well, I'm going to have to be very schematic here, and condense things
>quite a bit, but here goes: First, we need to make a distinction
>between law and justice. Law (and, more specifically, individual
>laws) are attempts at the *application* of justice, which always
>remains "to come". If justice is based upon context, and context is
>never completely saturated (we'll discuss these points vis-a-vis SEC,
>I'm sure), one can never say (with complete certainty) "I am just" or
>"This is a just act" (etc.) because some future context might come
>along to change things. Since Justice itself is therefore always
>deferred, it is not deconstructible. Laws, or acts, however, *are*
>deconstructible.
so we never know - and can never know - if we are right?
>
>The primary source for this line of thinking is Derrida's "The
>Mystical Foundation of Authority", which is in a volume entitled
>"Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice" (edited by Drucilla
>Cornell), but you can get a taste by reading a conversation Derrida
>had at Villanova University, which is available on the web (and forms
>the basis for John Caputo's "Deconstruction in a Nutshell".) The web
>version is linked to on Peter Krapp's site:
>
>http://www.hydra.umn.edu/derrida/content.html
>
>Warning: it start slow, but picks up speed as it goes.
I couldn't find this - have you an URL for the piece?
>
>>>> But then i can always be accused of lack of knowledge - or not being
>>>> careful enough. Derrida himself thinks Sartre wrong in his understanding
>>>> - so what hope has poor ole me! Unless I agree with him.
>>>
>>>"Agreeing with him" is not the point--as I said, I (for one) would be
>>>more than happy to hear *any* criticisms you make of any of Derrida's
>>>works, once you've actually read them. As for "lack of knowledge" or
>>>"carelessness", both are possible (and common), but we're not talking
>>>about any super-human efforts required here. As for Sartre, Derrida
>>>argues that Sartre misread Heidegger, not himself. (Personally, I
>>>find Heidegger *much* more difficult to read than Derrida...)
>>
>>Well leaving works aside for the moment i think one criticism i have is
>>his position - regarding say philosophy - of wanting to be outside it-
>>to want to have no position at all?
>
>Bzzzzt! Wrong answer. Derrida does not want (or claim) to be "outside
>it"-- rather, he shows that there is no "non-metaphysical" point from
>which one could attack metaphysics. Derrida has positions, just not
>the ones often attributed to him.
I'm worried by non-metaphysical points as i still have traces of
Analytical philosophy in my bloodstream, but I got the idea of Derrida's
desired position from an interview in 'Deconstruction and the other:
Interview with Richard Kearney.' Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers.
Ed. Richard Kearney. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.
'I have attempted more and more systematically to find a non-site, or a
non-philosophical site, from which to question philosophy' This worries
me in that i'm feeling that i'm not reading things quite correctly. Has
the context moved regarding my wrong answer i wonder? and could it move
again if Justice is always deferred.
>
>>Then what does this make his
>>writings. It seems like he wants to play some game in which the
>>philosophers are the Indians with bows and arrows and he has a
>>Winchester. I think i could in principal then even criticise his
>>writings if this is true, as one could criticise a book which seeks to
>>pervert the readers sense of truth- without having to read it. However
>>once within the text i'm faced with the problem of any criticism being
>>seen as a misunderstanding. Explicitly does he say Levi-Strauss is wrong
>>in Of Grammatology - or propose some new kind of truth? What does his
>>criticism consist of - it seems he resists such answers? Is he showing
>>the error of logocentrism - or saying there are other ways to read the
>>text. Like i can play many games with it and as long as i'm being
>>ethical its ok.
>
>To answer you questions, briefly: Yes, he says Levi-Strauss is wrong
>(although not necessarily in those words) yes, he does propose some
>new kind of "truth" (again, not necessarily in those words). He
>doesn't resist answers in general, just particular answers which are
>themselves based upon unquestioned premises.
Yes - my two main problems are first an inner contradiction - by
deferring justice and so truth in some part in the (in my mind) confused
nature of meaning at the point of deconstruction - and the idea of
Logocentrism, the first worry undermines Logocentrism - and Logocentrism
itself is my second problem. I cant accept the idea of the status prior
to Derrida of Texts regarding Language. Again if i see it correctly -
that writing was considered rigorously exterior and inferior to living
speech prior to Of Grammatology? Even in his use of Hegels rejection of
non-phonetic languages seems to me to raise phonetic languages - if
speech is the target it works - but i understood speech itself is
considered subordinate to the mental understanding - in the (incorrect)
logocentrict view, and so a pictogram would by bypass speech and be
closer to the idea and so better than a phonetic language? I then have a
problem with Science - which predominately doesn't use phonetics - it
uses Latin "English" and Mathematics. Logic in my mind has little to do
with speech- And if anything describes the main features of western
modernity - its the role of logic as providing methods for laws access
to truth, and justice.
>
>I've posted this quote to Usenet before, but here is one of Derrida's
>more concise statements about "truth" (the "it" in the opening
>sentence refers to his own work):
>
>"Finally, it goes without saying that in no case is it a question of a
>*discourse against truth* or against science. (This is impossible and
>absurd, as is every heated accusation on this subject.) And when one
>analyzes systematically the value of truth as *homoiosis* or
>*adequatio*, as the certitude of the *cogito* (Descartes,
>Husserl), or as a certitude opposed to truth in the horizon of
>absolute knowledge (*Phenomenology of the Mind*), or finally as
>*aletheia*, unveiling or presence (the Heideggerean repetition), it is
>not in order to return naively to a relativist or sceptical
>empiricism. [refs to French editions of OG and "Differance" omitted]
>I repeat, then, leaving all their disseminating powers to the
>proposition and the form of the verb: *we must have* truth."
>
>Summary: Derrida is *not* against truth, nor is he a relativist or
>sceptical empiricist. He's just pointing out how certain determined
>conceptions of truth (i.e. homoiosis, adequatio, aletheia, etc.) are
>flawed, by means of a "systematic analysis"
Does he say how he guarantees *his* position on this?
>
>>
>>>
>>>> >Huh? I'd love to see citations of anyone claiming that his
>>>> >"differance" is (or seems) one-sided. Which side?
>>>>
>>>> Lets ask for a definition of it - and what does it say of language?
>>>
>>>Perhaps when we are done with "Signature Event Context", we can turn
>>>to the essay "Differance".
>>>
>>>> >Further, the idea that "No writing can claim to have any greater
>>>> >authority than the rest" is nonsensical, and a position explicitly
>>>> >rejected by Derrida.
>>
>>This would be my criticism - why he doesn't he see deconstruction at
>>work everywhere?
>
>Huh? He sees deconstruction at work, in a lot of places. But
>"everywhere"?
well if we find somewhere it isn't we can finally fix meaning?
>
>And how does this question ("why doesn't he see deconstruction at work
>everywhere?") relate to the previous statement ("No writing can claim
>to have any greater authority than the rest")?
I know its part of my confusion given Derrida's position in philosophy,
or lack of position. I know he doesn't want to be a relativist - but it
follows from his work. Now he/you say that's mistaken - but a reply
could be no - i see it there just as you see Logocentrism there in the
works you criticise.
[...]
>>
>>>As for the "playful" works, they are overtly playful in form--
>>>techniques such as dual columns on different subjects on a single
>>>page, or removing blocks of text (of unknown length) in order to
>>>create fragments, or writing a work in 59 brief chapters, each
>>>containing a single (several page long) sentence...
>>>
>>isn't he breaking down meaning - in these texts?
>
>Breaking down meaning? What would that be? Note that in these cases
>he's explicitly working with/against something specific in the text he
>is commenting on-- for example, with Hegel (the thinker most
>interested in a unified system) he is non-systematic (i.e.
>symptomatic), with Socrates (who left no writings) he offers
>fragmentary letters with no signature and no named addressee, etc.
So if he *plays* with Hegel's unified system by being non-systematic do
i play with Derrida's system by being dishonest? Isn't that *his*
method?
Isn't that the (deliberate) mistake his critics (and followers) are
making. Could this account for Habermas method in not studying carefully
the text - is he being "playful"?
>
>>
>>[...]
>>
>>>>
>>>> OK - regardless of what Derrida says is right or wrong - he has
>>>> presented a set of ideas - he says he hasn't - never mind - people will
>>>> play with these. Derrida criticizes existing theories and methodologies
>>>> by using subjective terminology which he claims is not a method. I've
>>>> probably got this wrong - but didn't he invent differance and
>>>> deconstruction - and say its not a method - and use it to criticise
>>>> other methodologies?
>>>
>>>Derrida *has* presented a set of ideas. He uses these ideas to
>>>criticize other theories and methodologies. He expects others to
>>>criticize him.
>>>
>>>He did *not*, however, present the particular idea that you suggest
>>>above, that "in differance language statements appear to become of
>>>equal value."
>>
>>no - its something taken on from what he says -
>
>By whom?
By the people who he addresses in your original quote.
>
>>
>>>
>>>Would it be fair to criticize Newton for suggesting that apples fall
>>>to the ground due to magnetism?
>>>
>>yes - perfectly fair. What is magnetism?
>
>Perfectly fair for me to say "Newton was wrong when he suggested that
>apples fall to the ground due to magnetism", when he said no such
>thing? I guess we have different conceptions of "fairness."
Would it be fair to criticize Newton's theory of Gravitation. I think
so. Does in his theory the apple fall due to it. Are you saying its
unfair to say Newton said Apples fall.... when he said no such thing ...
however one suspects his theory of gravitation applies to apples. The
reason that apples hit the ground is due to Newton's theory of gravity -
he suggested all things behave as such including apples. If i suggest
all dogs wag tails when happy this accounts for rex's specific
behaviour. It would be strange for me to say "all dogs" does not include
rex. (if rex is a dog) So is my All dogs theory suggesting rex's tail
wagging (given a bone) - i think so.
>>
>>Then how come he lets himself off? He is clearly starting a ball rolling
>>is deconstruction...
>
>He *doesn't* let himself off, he instead does everything he can to
>clear up the misunderstanding. (Which is what one imagines Nietzsche
>would have done, had he been alive and well at the time of the Nazi
>mis-appropriation)
debatable - but like Newton - whose theory was right but not completely
right. Has Derrida mis-appropriated the ideas of Hegel?
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
>Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>
>>> That's where we stand. I've happily granted D's obscurity
>>> -- a point you overlooked -- so you merely need to show that
>>> the criticism which he gives of others is dishonest, uneducated,
>>> unrigorous, and so on. Of course you also need to back up
>>> your own claims, e.g. that he refuses to be criticized, that he
>>> rejects "new and unconventional" criticism, that he claims
>>> authority over post-modernism, that he won't let "punk
>>> philosophy kids" use his work, etc. You've supported precisely
>>> none of those accusations.
>
>James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
>
>[...]
>
>> My punks were a slightly more vivid descriptions of his "feeble" and
>> "bad readers" -
>
> Not so. Your punks are "punk philosophy kids" who you say
>annoyed Derrida by stealing his work. According to you, he
>was complaining about them in the quote that Michael gave. But
>oddly enough he doesn't either mention any "punk philosophy
>kids" or complain about anyone stealing from him. He's annoyed
>by people attacking him for things he hasn't said -- and to
>repeat, that's exactly what you're doing here. You've supplied
>a perfect illustration of his point.
What he is saying is that Deconstruction is concerned with truth,
stability, or the unity of meaning... and not the reverse? Complaining
that it had been mis-appropriated?
>> what i trying to say is that Derrida makes claims about
>> other writers - which they would probably not accept - yet gets upset
>> when the same thing happens to him.
>
> Yet another unsupported accusation. You haven't offered a
>single case where Derrida is guilty of the kinda
>misrepresentation he's complaining about. Until you do, you're
>just bullshitting.
I think Logocentrism is one.
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
>James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
>
>> what position which [Derrida] doesn't hold have i attacked him for?
>
> Plenty. You maintained he "gets annoyed" that "some cheap
>punk philosophy kids" have been stealing his work.
I paraphrase the article from Michael - but elsewhere there are
arguments between those who are accused by Derrida of miss-
representation.
> You said
>he questions others while refusing to let himself be questioned.
>You said that he refused to let his theories be "used for
>sorts of things he did not intend" (a general version of the
>bit about punks).
well he seems to say this - isn't he opposed to the relative
interpretations developed from his writings?
> You claimed that _he_ claimed to be the only
>one with the truth ("What he is saying above seems to boil
>down to 'I and only I am right - that's right right!'"), and he
>put his ideas above "all concepts hitherto proposed." You
>said he demanded everyone use his method on grounds that it was
>the only valid one.
The end of the Book and the Beginning of Writing - is he joking?
>You claimed he objected to "new and
>unconventional methods," specifically when they were applied to
>him. You said he desired to stand outside philosophy
'Deconstruction and the other: Interview with Richard Kearney.'
Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers. Ed. Richard Kearney. Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1984. 105-126.
> and he
>claimed authority over post-modernism. So far you've backed up
>zilch.
cheers-
--
James Whitehead
Ned Ludd
news:moggin-6385DA....@bvnntp.nevol.mediaone.net...
James re the Ten Commandments:
> So i don't have to keep all 10 -
Moggin:
> Depends who you ask. I say there's some very questionable
> items on the list. In the Gospels Jesus gives conflicting
> replies. At one point he says to obey _all_ of the
> commandments, even the very smallest. That would mean not only
> all ten, but all six hundred and thirteen. Elsehwere he
> rejects various parts of the law, and when asked directly which
> commandments to obey he responds with a short list based on
> the Decalogue but conspicuously excluding all of the entries on
> worshipping Yahweh. Ditto Romans 13:8-9.
>
And just to real clear on this, there are not now, and never have
been 10 commandments on list of 10 commandments in the bible. In
both places in the old testament where the commandments are listed,
there are 10 "Thou Shalt Nots" and two direct commandments (sabbath
and honoring parents). So, there have always been 12 commandments
on the list of 10 commandments in the bible.
The list is SO uncertain that the Catholics, Jews and Lutherans
have a list of the "ten", in which there are TWO separate numbered
commandments against coveting, and all Protestants (other than
Lutherans) have a different list with only one commandment against
coveting, but a separate numbered commandment against graven images.
This is the result - imo exactly like the forgery of the Trinity
doctrine into John's first letter - of a forgery of two or more
commandments into the list, after it was first created.
Ned
G*rd*n
| > ... A Russian politician, for
| > instance, might have to engage Bush's position on NATO expansion
| > very rapidly, before he knew much about it, or lose his job
| > and his opportunity to behave ethically in a professional
| > capacity. Likewise I had not read a word of _The_Bell_Curve_
| > before I began to attack in on the Net, which I thought was
| > proper in order to break up rapidly forming, mutually-
| > reinforcing clots of racist discourse; all the material I
| > needed was supplied by its admirers.
|
| > So the ethics of reading are not pure; they're embedded in
| > circumstances. This is why the reading one gives may be
| > more important than the reading one does.
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
| Well, that's the practical angle. But if reading what one
| discusses really _is_ an ethical sine non qua, as Frère
| Jacques claims, then the pressure of circumstances is no excuse
| for acting unethically.
|
| My idea is that there's something wrong with the principle.
| It's a perfect ad hominem: an attack on the person
| substituting for an attack on the person's ideas. Did you make
| accurate comments about _The Bell Curve_? Then nobody can
| reasonably accuse you of acting unethically, no matter what you
| did or didn't read.
|
| Did you distort the contents of _The Bell Curve_? In that
| case it doesn't matter if you read every word: you
| misrepresented the book nonetheless. Either way, what you said
| is what counts -- not what you read.
One could tell for sure whether one had distorted the contents
of a book only if one knew the absolutely true contents of
the book. I imagine that all readings are distortions, and
there is not even a guarantee that a lengthy reading is less
distorting than a superficial one, assuming there is this
unique thing to be distorted. All we can have or give in the
way of truth seems to be the intention of sincerity -- the
rest is the divine _noli_me_tangere_.
James Whitehead
>> The piece I pulled
>>the quote from is called "Toward an Ethics of Discussion"-- Derrida
>>states that the sine non qua of any Ethics of Discussion would be to
>>actually read the works one is discussing.
>
>I can go along with this - though he is saying here what is ethical -
>yes? Is this a theory of ethical criticism? and if it is can it be
>deconstructed?
James somewhat puzzled after re-reading the quote:
Why does Derrida say "it *supposes* a bad reading" not it *is* a bad
reading, doesn't this mean that the argument assumes/posits that bad
readings generate lack of truth - and doesn't he then say that this
argument is wrong. So does it follow (in his logic) that a good reading
generates a lack of truth, stability etc. as its (the arguments)
opposite?
--
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg
> One could tell for sure whether one had distorted the contents
> of a book only if one knew the absolutely true contents of
> the book. I imagine that all readings are distortions, and
> there is not even a guarantee that a lengthy reading is less
> distorting than a superficial one, assuming there is this
> unique thing to be distorted. All we can have or give in the
> way of truth seems to be the intention of sincerity -- the
> rest is the divine _noli_me_tangere_.
Ah, yes: God's protest at being worshipped as a tangerine.
Cf. Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1.11.4.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
>> ... Your question wasn't, "How would I know
>> Bush's position on NATO expansion?" It was, "Would it be
>> ethical of me to attack, say, Bush's position on NATO expansion
>> if I did not know what Bush's position was?" The answer to
>> that hinges on the contents of your attack. If you attack Bush
>> for holding positions he doesn't hold, then you're being
>> unethical, but if you attack him for holding positions which he
>> does hold, there's no problem.
michael...@my-deja.com (Michael Dorfman):
> So let's consider the hypothetical situation step-by-step.
> * I do not know what Bush's position on NATO expansion is.
> * I "guess", and randomly make up a position that I will assume he
> holds.
Needn't be a random guess. Could be an educated one, or a
guess of any other kind.
> * I attack him for holding this position.
Right.
> Now, if I am reading you properly, this would be ethical if my guess
> was fortuitously correct, and unethical if my guess was incorrect.
> Correct?
Not really, no, since you're shifting the emphasis back to
your personal history: the knowledge you did or didn't
possess, the means you used to reach your conclusion. I'm sure
your biographers would be very interested, but that's
precisely what I'm saying is irrelevant. My point is simple as
can be: accurate criticism is not unethical.
Moggin:
>> Excuse me for repeating, but it seems to me that's the key
>> thing right there. Distorting a person's position is
>> unethical -- but _not_ distorting a person's position is hardly
>> an issue. Look at it this way: if you misrepresented Bush
>> even tho you were well-informed about his foreign policy, could
>> you say you were being ethical? Of course not. And why?
>> Because what matters is whether or not you distorted his policy
>> -- not what reading you've done.
Michael:
> To me, there is a useful distinction to be made between 'lying' and
> being 'incorrect.'
Agreed. But the premise here is that you're well-informed
about Bush's foreign policy and you distort his position
nonetheless, opposite the case above, where you were uninformed
but you represented him accurately. You claimed that was
unethical, since you weren't acquainted with his foreign policy
statements. But as I said, you wouldn't argue that it was
ethical of you to distort his position when you _did_ know what
it was. In that case you realize what matters is what you
said, not what you read. So why won't you apply that principle
consistently?
[...]
Michael:
>>> Am I correct in
>>> assuming that you're basically making an exemption for lucky guesses
>>> that end up being fortuitously true?
Moggin:
>> No, not at all. Good thing you asked. I'm saying there's
>> nothing unethical about guessing. I'm saying it's stupid as
>> hell to claim reading the works one is discussing is an ethical
>> necessity.
Michael:
> Well, chalk me up in the "stupid as hell" column. I think that this
> notion is pretty close to the heart of Derrida's ethical work in
> general, which stems from "the promise"-- that is to say, the implicit
> promise to tell the truth that precedes any communication.
Do you have anything to say in support of the notion aside
from "Derrida agrees"?
Michael:
>>> Now, the fact is, that in this particular context (a well-known and
>>> well-respected scholarly, writing a presumably scholarly work) to have
>>> done what Habermas did, without showing any evidence of actually
>>> having engaged with the body of work in question (which he thoroughly
>>> trashed, naturally) seems pretty unethical to me.
Moggin:
>> Yeah? How come? Where's the unethical part? So Habermas
>> gave his two cents. He's entitled, right? You're free to
>> criticize his opinions or the way he gave them. You can accuse
>> him of being unethical, even. But it doesn't seem like you
>> have any good reason to -- certainly none that you've been able
>> state.
Michael:
> I thought I had stated them, but I'll repeat: Habermas violated the
> "prime directive" of responsible scholarship-- not to speak out of
> one's ass.
Yeah, you did say that -- right there above. Then I asked
if you had any good reason for saying so. So far you've
offered, "Derrida says so, too," which is what's usually called
an argument from authority.
> Habermas had not done his homework, plain and simple.
Ah, so you've got the ethics of a schoolmarm. And nothing
to say in their defense.
Michael:
>>> But you're saying that if Habermas had said only complimentary things,
>>> this would have been ok?
Moggin:
>> Huh? No. (Where did you get that from?) I'm saying it's
>> ethically o.k. even though he was critical. Or rather I'm
>> saying it's an ethical irrelevancy. If Habermas misrepresented
>> Derrida -- if his criticism was based on distortions of D's
>> work -- you've got something to bitch about, ethically speaking.
>> If not, not.
I'd have appreciated a reply here. If Habermas or anybody
else misrepresents Derrida, D has got something to complain
about, regardless of whether or not that somebody has taken the
trouble to read him. But if Habermas or somebody else has
_not_ distorted what Derrida says, then Derrida has got nothing
to complain about -- regardless of whether or not that
somebody has bothered to read him. What matters is the content
of the criticism -- not the credentials of the person
delivering it. To question a person's criticism by questioning
the person is ad hominem exemplified.
[...]
Michael:
>>> If Habermas (for
>>> example) were to have said "I have never read a word of Derrida, but
>>> the secondary literature on him leads me to believe that his work is
>>> unreadable shit", it would have (at least) been honest.
Moggin:
>> You haven't shown any dishonesty on Habermas part. I'm no
>> fan of his, lord knows -- I think he's usually a boring
>> windbag. A shame what the Frankfurt School has been reduced to.
>> But you're making empty accusations.
Michael:
> I think there is an implied dishonesty-- to use the "book review"
> example, to write a review as if one had read the book, when one has
> not actually read the book, is to misrepresent oneself.
Is that the best you can do? The only dishonesty that you
can find lies in something that this supposedly duplicitous
person -- somebody you claim has violated a fundamental ethical
principle -- didn't even say?
[...]
Michael:
>>> To claim to be speaking authoritatively when you know full well that
>>> you are full of shit seems pretty duplicitous to me...
Moggin:
>> It's clear how things seem to you. Less plain that you've
>> got any good reason for seeing them that way -- especially
>> since you've found it necessary to turn speaking into "speaking
>> authoritatively" and add, "... when you know full well that
>> you are full of shit." That's quite a ways from the unmodified
>> assertion we were discussing.
Michael:
> Is it really?
[...]
Yes. Miles and miles. We began with the unqualified idea
that "to actually read the works one is discussing" is an
ethical necessity. Now it appears you've limited the principle
to certain cases where you "claim to be speaking
authoritatively" although you "know full well that you are full
of shit."
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
>>> My punks were a slightly more vivid descriptions of his "feeble" and
>>> "bad readers" -
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>> Not so. Your punks are "punk philosophy kids" who you say
>> annoyed Derrida by stealing his work. According to you, he
>> was complaining about them in the quote that Michael gave. But
>> oddly enough he doesn't either mention any "punk philosophy
>> kids" or complain about anyone stealing from him. He's annoyed
>> by people attacking him for things he hasn't said -- and to
>> repeat, that's exactly what you're doing here. You've supplied
>> a perfect illustration of his point.
James:
> What he is saying is that Deconstruction is concerned with truth,
> stability, or the unity of meaning... and not the reverse? Complaining
> that it had been mis-appropriated?
No. No complaints about misappropriation, only complaints
about misrepresentations. Like yours.
James:
>>> what i trying to say is that Derrida makes claims about
>>> other writers - which they would probably not accept - yet gets upset
>>> when the same thing happens to him.
Moggin:
>> Yet another unsupported accusation. You haven't offered a
>> single case where Derrida is guilty of the kinda
>> misrepresentation he's complaining about. Until you do, you're
>> just bullshitting.
James:
> I think Logocentrism is one.
Vide supra.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
>>> what position which [Derrida] doesn't hold have i attacked him for?
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>> Plenty. You maintained he "gets annoyed" that "some cheap
>> punk philosophy kids" have been stealing his work. You said
>> he questions others while refusing to let himself be questioned.
>> You said that he refused to let his theories be "used for
>> sorts of things he did not intend" (a general version of the
>> bit about punks). You claimed that _he_ claimed to be the only
>> one with the truth ("What he is saying above seems to boil
>> down to 'I and only I am right - that's right right!'"), and he
>> put his ideas above "all concepts hitherto proposed." You
>> said he demanded everyone use his method on grounds that it was
>> the only valid one. You claimed he objected to "new and
>> unconventional methods," specifically when they were applied to
>> him. You said he desired to stand outside philosophy and he
>> claimed authority over post-modernism. So far you've backed up
>> zilch.
James [re "cheap punk philosophy kids"]:
> I paraphrase the article from Michael -
The hell you do. You claim Derrida is irritated by "cheap
punk philosophy kids" who rip off his ideas. But in the
quote Michael offered, he never mentions "cheap punk philosophy
kids" or accuses anyone of stealing from him.
[...]
James [re standing outside philosophy]:
> 'Deconstruction and the other: Interview with Richard Kearney.'
> Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers. Ed. Richard Kearney. Manchester:
> Manchester University Press, 1984. 105-126.
D asks, "From what site or non-site can philosophy as such
appear to itself as other than itself, so it can interrogate
in an original manner?" No claim to stand somewhere beyond
philosophy or even a stated wish to escape its bounds -- merely
a question about how philosophy can view itself differently
and question itself in a meaningful way. Note he prefaces that
question by saying, "The search for a non-philosophical site
does not bespeak an anti-philosophical attitude," and that when
he speaks distinctly about something "irreducible to
philosophy" the possibility of a site has vanished, replaced by
only "a non-site or alterity."
-- Moggin
Michael Dorfman
<mog...@mediaone.net> wrote:
>Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>
>>> ... Your question wasn't, "How would I know
>>> Bush's position on NATO expansion?" It was, "Would it be
>>> ethical of me to attack, say, Bush's position on NATO expansion
>>> if I did not know what Bush's position was?" The answer to
>>> that hinges on the contents of your attack. If you attack Bush
>>> for holding positions he doesn't hold, then you're being
>>> unethical, but if you attack him for holding positions which he
>>> does hold, there's no problem.
>
>michael...@my-deja.com (Michael Dorfman):
>
>> So let's consider the hypothetical situation step-by-step.
>> * I do not know what Bush's position on NATO expansion is.
>> * I "guess", and randomly make up a position that I will assume he
>> holds.
>
> Needn't be a random guess. Could be an educated one, or a
>guess of any other kind.
Cf below.
>
>> * I attack him for holding this position.
>
> Right.
>
>> Now, if I am reading you properly, this would be ethical if my guess
>> was fortuitously correct, and unethical if my guess was incorrect.
>> Correct?
>
> Not really, no, since you're shifting the emphasis back to
>your personal history: the knowledge you did or didn't
>possess, the means you used to reach your conclusion. I'm sure
>your biographers would be very interested, but that's
>precisely what I'm saying is irrelevant. My point is simple as
>can be: accurate criticism is not unethical.
And my point is precisely the opposite: criticism that is only
fortuitously accurate is not really accurate at all. If this is an
"educated" guess, the question becomes one of the nature of that
education.
I suspect that you are not approving of people just shooting off their
mouths with nothing to back it up (although I could be wrong)-- if
this is the case, our disagreement comes down largely to "what is
sufficient evidence?" In the case of a (serious) discussion of an
author (or his works), I think that actually reading the works is
required. Obviously, you set the bar somewhat lower, and think that
an "informed" guess (based, presumably, on hearsay of one kind or
another) is sufficient.
Is this an accurate representation of where we stand?
>
>Moggin:
>
>>> Excuse me for repeating, but it seems to me that's the key
>>> thing right there. Distorting a person's position is
>>> unethical -- but _not_ distorting a person's position is hardly
>>> an issue. Look at it this way: if you misrepresented Bush
>>> even tho you were well-informed about his foreign policy, could
>>> you say you were being ethical? Of course not. And why?
>>> Because what matters is whether or not you distorted his policy
>>> -- not what reading you've done.
>
>Michael:
>
>> To me, there is a useful distinction to be made between 'lying' and
>> being 'incorrect.'
>
> Agreed. But the premise here is that you're well-informed
>about Bush's foreign policy and you distort his position
>nonetheless, opposite the case above, where you were uninformed
>but you represented him accurately. You claimed that was
>unethical, since you weren't acquainted with his foreign policy
>statements. But as I said, you wouldn't argue that it was
>ethical of you to distort his position when you _did_ know what
>it was. In that case you realize what matters is what you
>said, not what you read. So why won't you apply that principle
>consistently?
Where I am coming from here is Levinas's distinction between the
Saying and the Said-- that there is an ethical relationship
structurally inherent in communication (the Saying) which is operative
regardless of the content of the communication (the Said). What this
means in practice is that every communication is prefaced by an
implicit promise to tell the truth. I'm suggesting that (knowingly)
speaking outside of one's body of knowledge is *at the level of the
Saying* unethical, regardless of the content of the Said. (Of course,
if the Said is a distortion, that would be unethical, too.)
So:
Case 1: I know the position, but misrepresent it.
Me: Unethical You: Unethical
Case 2: I don't know the position, and the one I posit ends up being a
distortion.
Me: Unethical You: Unethical
Case 3: I know the position, and represent it correctly.
Me: Ethical You: Ethical
Case 4: I don't know the position, and the one I posit ends up being
accurate.
Me: Unethical You Ethical.
Right?
>
>[...]
>
>Michael:
>
>>>> Am I correct in
>>>> assuming that you're basically making an exemption for lucky guesses
>>>> that end up being fortuitously true?
>
>Moggin:
>
>>> No, not at all. Good thing you asked. I'm saying there's
>>> nothing unethical about guessing. I'm saying it's stupid as
>>> hell to claim reading the works one is discussing is an ethical
>>> necessity.
>
>Michael:
>
>> Well, chalk me up in the "stupid as hell" column. I think that this
>> notion is pretty close to the heart of Derrida's ethical work in
>> general, which stems from "the promise"-- that is to say, the implicit
>> promise to tell the truth that precedes any communication.
>
> Do you have anything to say in support of the notion aside
>from "Derrida agrees"?
I was kind of hoping that a reference to an existing body of work
would save me from having to recapitulate it here schematically. I
was wrong, so I did so above.
>
>Michael:
>
>>>> Now, the fact is, that in this particular context (a well-known and
>>>> well-respected scholarly, writing a presumably scholarly work) to have
>>>> done what Habermas did, without showing any evidence of actually
>>>> having engaged with the body of work in question (which he thoroughly
>>>> trashed, naturally) seems pretty unethical to me.
>
>Moggin:
>
>>> Yeah? How come? Where's the unethical part? So Habermas
>>> gave his two cents. He's entitled, right? You're free to
>>> criticize his opinions or the way he gave them. You can accuse
>>> him of being unethical, even. But it doesn't seem like you
>>> have any good reason to -- certainly none that you've been able
>>> state.
>
>Michael:
>
>> I thought I had stated them, but I'll repeat: Habermas violated the
>> "prime directive" of responsible scholarship-- not to speak out of
>> one's ass.
>
> Yeah, you did say that -- right there above. Then I asked
>if you had any good reason for saying so. So far you've
>offered, "Derrida says so, too," which is what's usually called
>an argument from authority.
cf above.
>
>> Habermas had not done his homework, plain and simple.
>
> Ah, so you've got the ethics of a schoolmarm. And nothing
>to say in their defense.
On the first count: guilty as charged. On the second count, I've
offered remediation.
>
>Michael:
>
>>>> But you're saying that if Habermas had said only complimentary things,
>>>> this would have been ok?
>
>Moggin:
>
>>> Huh? No. (Where did you get that from?) I'm saying it's
>>> ethically o.k. even though he was critical. Or rather I'm
>>> saying it's an ethical irrelevancy. If Habermas misrepresented
>>> Derrida -- if his criticism was based on distortions of D's
>>> work -- you've got something to bitch about, ethically speaking.
>>> If not, not.
>
> I'd have appreciated a reply here. If Habermas or anybody
>else misrepresents Derrida, D has got something to complain
>about, regardless of whether or not that somebody has taken the
>trouble to read him. But if Habermas or somebody else has
>_not_ distorted what Derrida says, then Derrida has got nothing
>to complain about -- regardless of whether or not that
>somebody has bothered to read him. What matters is the content
>of the criticism -- not the credentials of the person
>delivering it. To question a person's criticism by questioning
>the person is ad hominem exemplified.
Habermas *did* misrepresent Derrida, so that's problem #1. Problem #2
is that Habermas didn't even make a genuine effort to get it straight.
That's the one that's in dispute. It's not a matter of "credentials",
it a matter of (schoolmarmishly) doing one's homework. Or, put
another way, of good faith.
>
>[...]
>
>Michael:
>
>>>> If Habermas (for
>>>> example) were to have said "I have never read a word of Derrida, but
>>>> the secondary literature on him leads me to believe that his work is
>>>> unreadable shit", it would have (at least) been honest.
>
>Moggin:
>
>>> You haven't shown any dishonesty on Habermas part. I'm no
>>> fan of his, lord knows -- I think he's usually a boring
>>> windbag. A shame what the Frankfurt School has been reduced to.
>>> But you're making empty accusations.
>
>Michael:
>
>> I think there is an implied dishonesty-- to use the "book review"
>> example, to write a review as if one had read the book, when one has
>> not actually read the book, is to misrepresent oneself.
>
> Is that the best you can do? The only dishonesty that you
>can find lies in something that this supposedly duplicitous
>person -- somebody you claim has violated a fundamental ethical
>principle -- didn't even say?
Yep. Pretty sorry state of affairs, huh? But a lie of omission is
what we've got, which is still bad faith.
>
>[...]
>
>Michael:
>
>>>> To claim to be speaking authoritatively when you know full well that
>>>> you are full of shit seems pretty duplicitous to me...
>
>Moggin:
>
>>> It's clear how things seem to you. Less plain that you've
>>> got any good reason for seeing them that way -- especially
>>> since you've found it necessary to turn speaking into "speaking
>>> authoritatively" and add, "... when you know full well that
>>> you are full of shit." That's quite a ways from the unmodified
>>> assertion we were discussing.
>
>Michael:
>
>> Is it really?
>
>[...]
>
> Yes. Miles and miles. We began with the unqualified idea
>that "to actually read the works one is discussing" is an
>ethical necessity. Now it appears you've limited the principle
>to certain cases where you "claim to be speaking
>authoritatively" although you "know full well that you are full
>of shit."
Context, my friend, context. Did you really think that Derrida (or I)
meant that one ought not even mention the title of a book one had not
read? Hint: Derrida has written about Socrates.
Should we say "make a good faith effort to know what one is talking
about" instead, to form the more general case? And leave "to actually
read the works one is discussing" to the academic context from which
it has been taken?
Michael Dorfman
Michael Dorfman
<jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In article <3b372a15....@news.online.no>, Michael Dorfman
><michael...@my-deja.com> writes
>
>[...]
>
>>>So what sort of condition is justice - regarding language? Why is it
>>>exempt from logocentrism?
>>>
>>
>>Well, I'm going to have to be very schematic here, and condense things
>>quite a bit, but here goes: First, we need to make a distinction
>>between law and justice. Law (and, more specifically, individual
>>laws) are attempts at the *application* of justice, which always
>>remains "to come". If justice is based upon context, and context is
>>never completely saturated (we'll discuss these points vis-a-vis SEC,
>>I'm sure), one can never say (with complete certainty) "I am just" or
>>"This is a just act" (etc.) because some future context might come
>>along to change things. Since Justice itself is therefore always
>>deferred, it is not deconstructible. Laws, or acts, however, *are*
>>deconstructible.
>
>so we never know - and can never know - if we are right?
Bingo. We do the best we can, of course, but without the arrogance of
presumed certitude.
>
>>
>>The primary source for this line of thinking is Derrida's "The
>>Mystical Foundation of Authority", which is in a volume entitled
>>"Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice" (edited by Drucilla
>>Cornell), but you can get a taste by reading a conversation Derrida
>>had at Villanova University, which is available on the web (and forms
>>the basis for John Caputo's "Deconstruction in a Nutshell".) The web
>>version is linked to on Peter Krapp's site:
>>
>>http://www.hydra.umn.edu/derrida/content.html
>>
>>Warning: it start slow, but picks up speed as it goes.
>
>I couldn't find this - have you an URL for the piece?
http://www.hydra.umn.edu/derrida/vill1.html is the first page, but the
passages I was referring to is on page 4.
I don't have the Kearney interview in front of me at the moment (which
is a good one, btw) but if I recall correctly, the context leans a bit
on the "attempt" in the statement above. This attempt usually
consists of rigorously following a philosophical tradition (or notion)
to its limit, and seeing what remains unquestioned on the other side.
That's right, with one important qualification: *in a specific
philosophical tradition*. Derrida is not suggesting that everybody,
everywhere, in everyday life, views (or viewed) writing as exterior
and inferior to speech-- his claim is more limited than that. Rather,
that in a certain philosophical tradition (which we can loosely call
"Western Metaphysics", and which runs, roughly, from Plato to
Heidegger) this assumption is often explicit, and (almost) always
implicit. Check out the first few sentences of Aristotle's De
Interpretatione for the locus classicus:
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/interpretation.1.1.html
> Even in his use of Hegels rejection of
>non-phonetic languages seems to me to raise phonetic languages - if
>speech is the target it works - but i understood speech itself is
>considered subordinate to the mental understanding - in the (incorrect)
>logocentrict view, and so a pictogram would by bypass speech and be
>closer to the idea and so better than a phonetic language? I then have a
>problem with Science - which predominately doesn't use phonetics - it
>uses Latin "English" and Mathematics. Logic in my mind has little to do
>with speech- And if anything describes the main features of western
>modernity - its the role of logic as providing methods for laws access
>to truth, and justice.
Derrida is not really interested in Speech vs Writing, honest to god,
especially in the way they are commonly used. He's got other, bigger
fish to fry. The whole speech/writing opposition is just one trope
*within a certain set of philosophical texts* that proxies for the
interior/exterior opposition, that is to say, the nature of presence.
>
>>
>>I've posted this quote to Usenet before, but here is one of Derrida's
>>more concise statements about "truth" (the "it" in the opening
>>sentence refers to his own work):
>>
>>"Finally, it goes without saying that in no case is it a question of a
>>*discourse against truth* or against science. (This is impossible and
>>absurd, as is every heated accusation on this subject.) And when one
>>analyzes systematically the value of truth as *homoiosis* or
>>*adequatio*, as the certitude of the *cogito* (Descartes,
>>Husserl), or as a certitude opposed to truth in the horizon of
>>absolute knowledge (*Phenomenology of the Mind*), or finally as
>>*aletheia*, unveiling or presence (the Heideggerean repetition), it is
>>not in order to return naively to a relativist or sceptical
>>empiricism. [refs to French editions of OG and "Differance" omitted]
>>I repeat, then, leaving all their disseminating powers to the
>>proposition and the form of the verb: *we must have* truth."
>>
>>Summary: Derrida is *not* against truth, nor is he a relativist or
>>sceptical empiricist. He's just pointing out how certain determined
>>conceptions of truth (i.e. homoiosis, adequatio, aletheia, etc.) are
>>flawed, by means of a "systematic analysis"
>
>Does he say how he guarantees *his* position on this?
Guarantees? Nope. Not even a limited money-back warranty.
>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> >Huh? I'd love to see citations of anyone claiming that his
>>>>> >"differance" is (or seems) one-sided. Which side?
>>>>>
>>>>> Lets ask for a definition of it - and what does it say of language?
>>>>
>>>>Perhaps when we are done with "Signature Event Context", we can turn
>>>>to the essay "Differance".
>>>>
>>>>> >Further, the idea that "No writing can claim to have any greater
>>>>> >authority than the rest" is nonsensical, and a position explicitly
>>>>> >rejected by Derrida.
>>>
>>>This would be my criticism - why he doesn't he see deconstruction at
>>>work everywhere?
>>
>>Huh? He sees deconstruction at work, in a lot of places. But
>>"everywhere"?
>
>well if we find somewhere it isn't we can finally fix meaning?
Are you saying you don't really get what deconstruction is? If that's
the case, let go of the term for a while-- it is really not important.
>>
>>And how does this question ("why doesn't he see deconstruction at work
>>everywhere?") relate to the previous statement ("No writing can claim
>>to have any greater authority than the rest")?
>
>I know its part of my confusion given Derrida's position in philosophy,
>or lack of position. I know he doesn't want to be a relativist - but it
>follows from his work. Now he/you say that's mistaken - but a reply
>could be no - i see it there just as you see Logocentrism there in the
>works you criticise.
It doesn't follow from his work, really. You say you can see it
there-- I say, "look harder."
Intepretations are not fixed, there is no one definitive
interpretation-- but that does not mean that all interpretations are
equal. The author's intentionality (as received) is not the final
word on the meaning of a text, but neither should it be ignored.
>
>[...]
>
>>>
>>>>As for the "playful" works, they are overtly playful in form--
>>>>techniques such as dual columns on different subjects on a single
>>>>page, or removing blocks of text (of unknown length) in order to
>>>>create fragments, or writing a work in 59 brief chapters, each
>>>>containing a single (several page long) sentence...
>>>>
>>>isn't he breaking down meaning - in these texts?
>>
>>Breaking down meaning? What would that be? Note that in these cases
>>he's explicitly working with/against something specific in the text he
>>is commenting on-- for example, with Hegel (the thinker most
>>interested in a unified system) he is non-systematic (i.e.
>>symptomatic), with Socrates (who left no writings) he offers
>>fragmentary letters with no signature and no named addressee, etc.
>
>So if he *plays* with Hegel's unified system by being non-systematic do
>i play with Derrida's system by being dishonest? Isn't that *his*
>method?
False parallel. First, Derrida doesn't have "a method", but that's
beside the point.
Just because Hegel tried to be systematic doesn't mean we have to take
him at his word-- we can point out the places where he failed to be
systematic. Just because Derrida tries to be honest doesn't mean we
have to take him at *his* word-- we can point out any lapses in
honesty, if we find him. To do so wouldn't require being dishonest
ourselves, nor would it actually permit it.
>Isn't that the (deliberate) mistake his critics (and followers) are
>making. Could this account for Habermas method in not studying carefully
>the text - is he being "playful"?
If so, he's playing with fire. Derrida does not deliberately misread
texts. In the times when he appears to be reading a text against its
authors intentions, he's actually showing how the text conflicts with
the intentions stated within the text itself--showing how it doesn't
do what it claims (or sets out) to do.
>
>>
>>>
>>>[...]
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> OK - regardless of what Derrida says is right or wrong - he has
>>>>> presented a set of ideas - he says he hasn't - never mind - people will
>>>>> play with these. Derrida criticizes existing theories and methodologies
>>>>> by using subjective terminology which he claims is not a method. I've
>>>>> probably got this wrong - but didn't he invent differance and
>>>>> deconstruction - and say its not a method - and use it to criticise
>>>>> other methodologies?
>>>>
>>>>Derrida *has* presented a set of ideas. He uses these ideas to
>>>>criticize other theories and methodologies. He expects others to
>>>>criticize him.
>>>>
>>>>He did *not*, however, present the particular idea that you suggest
>>>>above, that "in differance language statements appear to become of
>>>>equal value."
>>>
>>>no - its something taken on from what he says -
>>
>>By whom?
>
>By the people who he addresses in your original quote.
True. And these people (he says) are misrepresenting his work, and
have likely never actually read it. Unfortunately, it seems that many
of them are journalists and popularizers.
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>Would it be fair to criticize Newton for suggesting that apples fall
>>>>to the ground due to magnetism?
>>>>
>>>yes - perfectly fair. What is magnetism?
>>
>>Perfectly fair for me to say "Newton was wrong when he suggested that
>>apples fall to the ground due to magnetism", when he said no such
>>thing? I guess we have different conceptions of "fairness."
>
>Would it be fair to criticize Newton's theory of Gravitation. I think
>so. Does in his theory the apple fall due to it. Are you saying its
>unfair to say Newton said Apples fall.... when he said no such thing ...
>however one suspects his theory of gravitation applies to apples. The
>reason that apples hit the ground is due to Newton's theory of gravity -
>he suggested all things behave as such including apples.
Right. But, to the best of my knowledge, Newton never said a word
about *magnetism* in this context. So, if I say "Newton was wrong
when he suggested that apples fall to the ground due to magnetism"
I am misrepresenting his position.
Do you really not see this?
> If i suggest
>all dogs wag tails when happy this accounts for rex's specific
>behaviour. It would be strange for me to say "all dogs" does not include
>rex. (if rex is a dog) So is my All dogs theory suggesting rex's tail
>wagging (given a bone) - i think so.
Non sequitor. See above.
>
>
>>>
>>>Then how come he lets himself off? He is clearly starting a ball rolling
>>>is deconstruction...
>>
>>He *doesn't* let himself off, he instead does everything he can to
>>clear up the misunderstanding. (Which is what one imagines Nietzsche
>>would have done, had he been alive and well at the time of the Nazi
>>mis-appropriation)
>
>debatable - but like Newton - whose theory was right but not completely
>right. Has Derrida mis-appropriated the ideas of Hegel?
I don't really think so, but if you want to make that case, go for it.
Derrida criticizes Hegel, to be sure, but I wouldn't call that
"mis-appropriation". Would you?
Michael Dorfman
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
>My point is simple as
>can be: accurate criticism is not unethical.
In all circumstances?
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
>James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
>
>>>> My punks were a slightly more vivid descriptions of his "feeble" and
>>>> "bad readers" -
>
>Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>
>>> Not so. Your punks are "punk philosophy kids" who you say
>>> annoyed Derrida by stealing his work. According to you, he
>>> was complaining about them in the quote that Michael gave. But
>>> oddly enough he doesn't either mention any "punk philosophy
>>> kids" or complain about anyone stealing from him. He's annoyed
>>> by people attacking him for things he hasn't said -- and to
>>> repeat, that's exactly what you're doing here. You've supplied
>>> a perfect illustration of his point.
>
>James:
>
>> What he is saying is that Deconstruction is concerned with truth,
>> stability, or the unity of meaning... and not the reverse? Complaining
>> that it had been mis-appropriated?
>
> No. No complaints about misappropriation, only complaints
>about misrepresentations. Like yours.
Fine - lets look at misrepresentation - "Derrida a founder of post-
modernity"?
>
>James:
>
>>>> what i trying to say is that Derrida makes claims about
>>>> other writers - which they would probably not accept - yet gets upset
>>>> when the same thing happens to him.
>
>Moggin:
>
>>> Yet another unsupported accusation. You haven't offered a
>>> single case where Derrida is guilty of the kinda
>>> misrepresentation he's complaining about. Until you do, you're
>>> just bullshitting.
>
>James:
>
>> I think Logocentrism is one.
>
> Vide supra.
Sorry can't see anything?
Back to the plot-
"the user or abuse of the following argument: "......
where is Derrida getting this from - who are these people - is he
representing them accurately - " rules of competence, criteria of
discussion " Mr D - please?
Small point should it be abuser? it makes a difference (sic)
--
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg
>>> Now, if I am reading you properly, this would be ethical if my guess
>>> was fortuitously correct, and unethical if my guess was incorrect.
>>> Correct?
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>> Not really, no, since you're shifting the emphasis back to
>> your personal history: the knowledge you did or didn't
>> possess, the means you used to reach your conclusion. I'm sure
>> your biographers would be very interested, but that's
>> precisely what I'm saying is irrelevant. My point is simple as
>> can be: accurate criticism is not unethical.
Michael:
> And my point is precisely the opposite: criticism that is only
> fortuitously accurate is not really accurate at all.
The accuracy needn't be fortuituous. Guesses come in many
shapes and colors, including random and educated. Are you
confining your point to the random kind? If so, you've added a
big qualification to your argument. Probably not what you
meant to do, since it would require you to let Habermas off the
hook.
Anyway, why do you say "criticism that is only
fortuitously accurate is not really accurate at all"? A pretty
odd thing to toss out w/out explanation. You seem to be
claiming that accurate criciticism magically becomes inaccurate
when you disapprove of the way it was produced.
Far as I can tell, you've fallen into a classic ad hominem.
You claim to be criticizing a person's thinking -- in this
case a conclusion she reaches -- but your criticism is actually
directed at the person.
> If this is an
> "educated" guess, the question becomes one of the nature of that
> education.
Not so. The question is whether the criticism is accurate
and valid. When you try and change the subject from the
validity of the criticism to the critic's education, then
you're doing what you deny: demanding her credentials. You're
playing the inquisitor, as I expected.
> I suspect that you are not approving of people just shooting off their
> mouths with nothing to back it up (although I could be wrong)--
That kind of thing can really piss me off, but at the same
time, I like a good rant. Comes down to cases, so let me
offer an example. You've probably seen Chomsky's remarks about
"the Paris school." He's shooting his mouth off, and he
doesn't even try to back up what he says. (Or is that the same
thing?) He even admits that he hasn't read much of the work
he's criticizing. But I was glad to learn his opinion. I also
thought he was entertaining.
On the other hand, Chomsky's comments have led to a series
of claims that he somehow "refuted post-modernism" or put
Derrida in his place. False, of course: spouting off ain't no
refutation. But the problem lies in the exaggerated claims
made for Chomsky's remarks. The solution is to examine them on
their merits, showing that Chomsky said less than what's
claimed for him -- not to attack Chomsky for failing to do more
homework.
> this is the case, our disagreement comes down largely to "what is
> sufficient evidence?" In the case of a (serious) discussion of an
> author (or his works), I think that actually reading the works is
> required. Obviously, you set the bar somewhat lower, and think that
> an "informed" guess (based, presumably, on hearsay of one kind or
> another) is sufficient.
> Is this an accurate representation of where we stand?
No, I think it's a misunderstanding. I'm not setting bars
at all, since I have no interest in barring anybody from
talking. We don't differ about where to put the bar, but about
whether there should be one.
My point about educated guesses was not that they ought to
be accepted, while random guesses shouldn't, but only that
guesses come in various kinds: random, educated, and otherwise.
Now, about evidence. My suggestion is that in criticizing
someone's discussion of a given work, you focus on the
evidence before you -- meaning the contents of their discussion
-- not their reading history.
You don't seem to be discussing evidence at all, since you
slip back to setting personal requirements. Maybe you're
suggesting that without "actually reading the works," one would
be unable to support one's claims.
Could happen, sure. But as I said before, the proof is in
the pudding, not in the cook's library records. If the
reading was missing certain necessary evidence, then you'd have
a basis for criticism -- if not, not.
Yet instead of addressing the merits or demerits -- as the
case may be -- of the interpretation, you're attacking the
person who's offered it. You're neither reading _nor_ guessing.
You're gossiping.
[...]
That deletion included your summary of Levinas. I saved a
copy for reference, but if you look again I think you'll be
able to see that you merely restated your position w/out adding
any support, aside from a couple of majuscules.
Moggin:
>> ... If Habermas or anybody
>> else misrepresents Derrida, D has got something to complain
>> about, regardless of whether or not that somebody has taken the
>> trouble to read him. But if Habermas or somebody else has
>> _not_ distorted what Derrida says, then Derrida has got nothing
>> to complain about -- regardless of whether or not that
>> somebody has bothered to read him. What matters is the content
>> of the criticism -- not the credentials of the person
>> delivering it. To question a person's criticism by questioning
>> the person is ad hominem exemplified.
Michael:
> Habermas *did* misrepresent Derrida, so that's problem #1.
That's no problem. It's a solution, since it supplies you
with a basis for your criticism -- a much more solid basis
than your speculations about Habermas' working methods. My own
opinion is that the Derrida Habermas discusses in "Beyond a
Temporalized Philosophy of Origins" -- god, what a crappy title!
-- is pretty interesting. True, he's attacking a Derrida I
don't know, and a caricature of the one I do. But his comments
are odd enough to be worth reading.
> Problem #2
> is that Habermas didn't even make a genuine effort to get it straight.
> That's the one that's in dispute. It's not a matter of "credentials",
> it a matter of (schoolmarmishly) doing one's homework. Or, put
> another way, of good faith.
Or to put it another way, of credentials. If Habermas had
handed in his homework signed, dated, and notarized, you
couldn't complain. But Habermas' good faith makes no matter in
regard to the value of his remarks. If he misprepresents
Derrida in good faith, that good faith won't make his criticism
any more accurate. And if he offers valid comments in bad
faith, that bad faith won't make his criticism any less telling.
Michael:
>>> I think there is an implied dishonesty-- to use the "book review"
>>> example, to write a review as if one had read the book, when one has
>>> not actually read the book, is to misrepresent oneself.
Moggin:
>> Is that the best you can do? The only dishonesty that you
>> can find lies in something that this supposedly duplicitous
>> person -- somebody you claim has violated a fundamental ethical
>> principle -- didn't even say?
Michael:
> Yep. Pretty sorry state of affairs, huh? But a lie of omission is
> what we've got, which is still bad faith.
No, we don't have even a lie of omission -- all we have is
your idea you were silently lied to and your admission you
assume people are talking authoritatively. To think we started
out with an ethical sine non qua: a cause for homework
nondoers and assorted other miscreants to despair! Well, these
things happen. Think of Ozymandias.
Michael:
> Context, my friend, context. Did you really think that Derrida (or I)
> meant that one ought not even mention the title of a book one had not
> read? Hint: Derrida has written about Socrates.
What? Not only don't I think that (I think), I'm not even
sure what I'm supposed to be really thinking. Or not. Hold
on while I try to sort this out. You think that I really think
-- or you doubt I really could think -- that you or D mean
that one shouldn't even mention the title, etc. No, not what I
think. Dunno where you got that from.
I think we began with the notion that actually reading the
works one is discussing is an ethical necessity. (That was
Derrida's claim, although you gave your assent.) And I believe
you've narrowed the idea considerably in the course of this
discussion, for example by limiting it to cases where one talks
authoritatively but knows one is wrong.
> Should we say "make a good faith effort to know what one is talking
> about" instead, to form the more general case? And leave "to actually
> read the works one is discussing" to the academic context from which
> it has been taken?
I'm happy with "actually reading." It applies outside the
groves as well as within and it gives us a well-defined
criterion by comparison to "good faith effort," which will lead
straight to a swamp.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
>>>>> My punks were a slightly more vivid descriptions of his "feeble" and
>>>>> "bad readers" -
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>>>> Not so. Your punks are "punk philosophy kids" who you say
>>>> annoyed Derrida by stealing his work. According to you, he
>>>> was complaining about them in the quote that Michael gave. But
>>>> oddly enough he doesn't either mention any "punk philosophy
>>>> kids" or complain about anyone stealing from him. He's annoyed
>>>> by people attacking him for things he hasn't said -- and to
>>>> repeat, that's exactly what you're doing here. You've supplied
>>>> a perfect illustration of his point.
James:
>>> What he is saying is that Deconstruction is concerned with truth,
>>> stability, or the unity of meaning... and not the reverse? Complaining
>>> that it had been mis-appropriated?
Moggin:
>> No. No complaints about misappropriation, only complaints
>> about misrepresentations. Like yours.
James:
> Fine - lets look at misrepresentation ...
We have been.
-- Moggin
Michael Dorfman
<mog...@mediaone.net> wrote:
>michael...@my-deja.com (Michael Dorfman):
>
>>>> Now, if I am reading you properly, this would be ethical if my guess
>>>> was fortuitously correct, and unethical if my guess was incorrect.
>>>> Correct?
>
>Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>
>>> Not really, no, since you're shifting the emphasis back to
>>> your personal history: the knowledge you did or didn't
>>> possess, the means you used to reach your conclusion. I'm sure
>>> your biographers would be very interested, but that's
>>> precisely what I'm saying is irrelevant. My point is simple as
>>> can be: accurate criticism is not unethical.
>
>Michael:
>
>> And my point is precisely the opposite: criticism that is only
>> fortuitously accurate is not really accurate at all.
>
> The accuracy needn't be fortuituous. Guesses come in many
>shapes and colors, including random and educated. Are you
>confining your point to the random kind? If so, you've added a
>big qualification to your argument. Probably not what you
>meant to do, since it would require you to let Habermas off the
>hook.
Let's attempt to reset the hook, then. Behind all of the "guessing",
what seems to be at stake here is the degree to which the speaker is
sufficiently informed about the subject he is speaking about, and more
precisely, what is considered "sufficient". In my opinion, this
varies from context to context, but when it comes to academic
discourse (such as Habermas's), Habermas fails the test.
> Anyway, why do you say "criticism that is only
>fortuitously accurate is not really accurate at all"? A pretty
>odd thing to toss out w/out explanation. You seem to be
>claiming that accurate criciticism magically becomes inaccurate
>when you disapprove of the way it was produced.
That's just when I am saying (in the case of the "random guess" here--
I am explicitly ruling out the "educated guess" in this scenario.)
Let's take teh case of lying as an example. Suppose you ask me a
question ("Where's Bob?") and I answer truthfully ("He's on vacation
in Greece.") Does my statement become a lie if Bob has unbeknownst to
me gone to Italy instead? Or take the reverse case-- suppose I lie,
saying "Bob's in Italy", believing him to be in Greece. Does my act
of lying suddenly become truth-telling because I fortuitously answered
"correctly"? The content of the statement may be factual, but the
act of communication ("the Saying") is still "lying". So, to bring it
back to the point in question: if someone, while in the process of
randomly spraying words inadvertanly makes a statement that turns out
to be factual, I still wouldn't consider the act of criticism
"accurate."
>
> Far as I can tell, you've fallen into a classic ad hominem.
>You claim to be criticizing a person's thinking -- in this
>case a conclusion she reaches -- but your criticism is actually
>directed at the person.
>
>> If this is an
>> "educated" guess, the question becomes one of the nature of that
>> education.
>
> Not so. The question is whether the criticism is accurate
>and valid. When you try and change the subject from the
>validity of the criticism to the critic's education, then
>you're doing what you deny: demanding her credentials. You're
>playing the inquisitor, as I expected.
If I go to the doctor for a physical, I want him to at least examine
me before declaring me healthy. His merely calling me healthy (even
if I happen to be healthy) does *not* constitute an adequate
examination, even if the end result is correct. Process counts for
something.
>
>> I suspect that you are not approving of people just shooting off their
>> mouths with nothing to back it up (although I could be wrong)--
>
> That kind of thing can really piss me off, but at the same
>time, I like a good rant. Comes down to cases, so let me
>offer an example. You've probably seen Chomsky's remarks about
>"the Paris school." He's shooting his mouth off, and he
>doesn't even try to back up what he says. (Or is that the same
>thing?) He even admits that he hasn't read much of the work
>he's criticizing. But I was glad to learn his opinion. I also
>thought he was entertaining.
>
> On the other hand, Chomsky's comments have led to a series
>of claims that he somehow "refuted post-modernism" or put
>Derrida in his place. False, of course: spouting off ain't no
>refutation. But the problem lies in the exaggerated claims
>made for Chomsky's remarks. The solution is to examine them on
>their merits, showing that Chomsky said less than what's
>claimed for him -- not to attack Chomsky for failing to do more
>homework.
While searching the Google/Deja archives for the Chomsky rant in order
to verify my recollections, I came across the following quote, from
you (or another Moggin-- perhaps I'm arguing with the wrong person
here.)
"Chomsky uses the term "gibberish" in order to dismiss "the
Paris school" without giving its work any serious consideration --
he even encourages others to do the same."
Which is, of course, my point exactly. This notion of "serious
consideration" (well put, Moggin, whichever Moggin) is exactly what
has been at stake here.
>
>> this is the case, our disagreement comes down largely to "what is
>> sufficient evidence?" In the case of a (serious) discussion of an
>> author (or his works), I think that actually reading the works is
>> required. Obviously, you set the bar somewhat lower, and think that
>> an "informed" guess (based, presumably, on hearsay of one kind or
>> another) is sufficient.
>
>> Is this an accurate representation of where we stand?
>
> No, I think it's a misunderstanding. I'm not setting bars
>at all, since I have no interest in barring anybody from
>talking. We don't differ about where to put the bar, but about
>whether there should be one.
>
> My point about educated guesses was not that they ought to
>be accepted, while random guesses shouldn't, but only that
>guesses come in various kinds: random, educated, and otherwise.
>
> Now, about evidence. My suggestion is that in criticizing
>someone's discussion of a given work, you focus on the
>evidence before you -- meaning the contents of their discussion
>-- not their reading history.
And I'm just expecting them to focus on the evidence before them. If I
have evidence that they have not been giving their evidence "serious
consideration", there's little point in proceeding.
>
> You don't seem to be discussing evidence at all, since you
>slip back to setting personal requirements. Maybe you're
>suggesting that without "actually reading the works," one would
>be unable to support one's claims.
Exactly. (In this context).
>
> Could happen, sure. But as I said before, the proof is in
>the pudding, not in the cook's library records. If the
>reading was missing certain necessary evidence, then you'd have
>a basis for criticism -- if not, not.
>
> Yet instead of addressing the merits or demerits -- as the
>case may be -- of the interpretation, you're attacking the
>person who's offered it. You're neither reading _nor_ guessing.
>You're gossiping.
No, I'm speaking of an ethical imperative, a duty which falls upon the
speaker (in this case) to give "serious consideration" to the matter
he discusses.
>
>[...]
>
> That deletion included your summary of Levinas. I saved a
>copy for reference, but if you look again I think you'll be
>able to see that you merely restated your position w/out adding
>any support, aside from a couple of majuscules.
I'm a bit lost as to your idea of "support"-- when I referred to a
body of work (which I believed you were familiar with), you suggested
that I was "arguing from authority." When I then summarized the main
points of the argument I was referring to, you suggest that I am
"merely restating."
We're talking about ethics here-- or at least, we were when we began.
The ethical imperative that I endorsed did not come out of a vacuum--
quite the contrary. I've given what I consider to be adequate
indications of where an interested reader (which likely does not
include you) could go to see the argument fleshed out. That's about
all the "support" I can give right now.
No, what I am saying is twofold-- Not only did Habermas get Derrida
wrong, he didn't even try to get him right.
>
>Michael:
>
>>>> I think there is an implied dishonesty-- to use the "book review"
>>>> example, to write a review as if one had read the book, when one has
>>>> not actually read the book, is to misrepresent oneself.
>
>Moggin:
>
>>> Is that the best you can do? The only dishonesty that you
>>> can find lies in something that this supposedly duplicitous
>>> person -- somebody you claim has violated a fundamental ethical
>>> principle -- didn't even say?
>
>Michael:
>
>> Yep. Pretty sorry state of affairs, huh? But a lie of omission is
>> what we've got, which is still bad faith.
>
> No, we don't have even a lie of omission -- all we have is
>your idea you were silently lied to and your admission you
>assume people are talking authoritatively. To think we started
>out with an ethical sine non qua: a cause for homework
>nondoers and assorted other miscreants to despair! Well, these
>things happen. Think of Ozymandias.
These things certainly do happen, and the fact that they can happen is
a necessity. That necessary possibility is the opening for the
ethical imperative.
>
>Michael:
>
>> Context, my friend, context. Did you really think that Derrida (or I)
>> meant that one ought not even mention the title of a book one had not
>> read? Hint: Derrida has written about Socrates.
>
> What? Not only don't I think that (I think), I'm not even
>sure what I'm supposed to be really thinking. Or not. Hold
>on while I try to sort this out. You think that I really think
>-- or you doubt I really could think -- that you or D mean
>that one shouldn't even mention the title, etc. No, not what I
>think. Dunno where you got that from.
>
> I think we began with the notion that actually reading the
>works one is discussing is an ethical necessity. (That was
>Derrida's claim, although you gave your assent.) And I believe
>you've narrowed the idea considerably in the course of this
>discussion, for example by limiting it to cases where one talks
>authoritatively but knows one is wrong.
Which is (in my reading) what Derrida was saying in the first place.
>
>> Should we say "make a good faith effort to know what one is talking
>> about" instead, to form the more general case? And leave "to actually
>> read the works one is discussing" to the academic context from which
>> it has been taken?
>
> I'm happy with "actually reading." It applies outside the
>groves as well as within and it gives us a well-defined
>criterion by comparison to "good faith effort," which will lead
>straight to a swamp.
Michael Dorfman
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
>Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>
>>>>> so punks are "punk philosophy kids" who
>>>>> annoyed Derrida by stealing his work. he
>>>>> was complaining about them in the quote that Michael gave.
>>>>> he does mention "punk philosophy
>>>>> kids" He's annoyed
>>>>> by people attacking him for things he has said -- and to
>>>>> repeat, that's exactly what you're doing here. You've supplied
>>>>> a perfect illustration of his point.
James:
Gosh thanks >-- Moggin
--
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg
>>> And my point is precisely the opposite: criticism that is only
>>> fortuitously accurate is not really accurate at all.
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>> The accuracy needn't be fortuituous. Guesses come in many
>> shapes and colors, including random and educated. Are you
>> confining your point to the random kind? If so, you've added a
>> big qualification to your argument. Probably not what you
>> meant to do, since it would require you to let Habermas off the
>> hook.
Michael:
> Let's attempt to reset the hook, then.
I'm wondering why that's necessary. I mean, we're already
agreed Habermas distorts Derrida's thinking. So as I said
before, you've got a solid basis on which to criticize his work.
Your speculations about his reading history are flimsy by
comparison. Instead of showing that he gets Derrida wrong, you
gossip about his reading habits.
> Behind all of the "guessing",
> what seems to be at stake here is the degree to which the speaker is
> sufficiently informed about the subject he is speaking about, and more
> precisely, what is considered "sufficient".
The same misunderstanding, again and again -- the same one
I just tried to clear up. Funny how that would be. As tho
your misreading was required by your position. Once again, you
are the only one here -- that is, between the two of us --
setting a bar for speech. I'm not arguing about _where_ to put
the bar, I'm simply not barring anyone.
> In my opinion, this
> varies from context to context, but when it comes to academic
> discourse (such as Habermas's), Habermas fails the test.
Speculation. You don't know what info Habermas did or did
not have when he wrote his essays on Derrida. All you're
offering is a guess based on what he said, since you noticed he
didn't really come to grips with Derrida's work: _that's_
the test he failed, in your opinion. (And mine, although I say
the results were interesting, nonetheless.) So there's no
need to go rummaging thru his bookshelves, searching for a copy
of _Grammatology_ and then -- if you find one -- trying to
figure out precisely how far he read. The inquisition can stay
home.
Moggin:
>> Anyway, why do you say "criticism that is only
>> fortuitously accurate is not really accurate at all"? A pretty
>> odd thing to toss out w/out explanation. You seem to be
>> contending that accurate criticism magically becomes inaccurate
>> when you disapprove of the way it was produced.
Michael:
> That's just when I am saying (in the case of the "random guess" here--
> I am explicitly ruling out the "educated guess" in this scenario.)
That's what takes Habermas out of your range of fire. You
don't deny he was familiar with secondary sources, like
Culler's explications. So you can't stick his guesses -- given
he's guessing -- in the random category.
> Let's take teh case of lying as an example. Suppose you ask me a
> question ("Where's Bob?") and I answer truthfully ("He's on vacation
> in Greece.") Does my statement become a lie if Bob has unbeknownst to
> me gone to Italy instead?
It's a falsehood. If I go to Greece looking for Bob, then
I won't find him.
> Or take the reverse case-- suppose I lie,
> saying "Bob's in Italy", believing him to be in Greece. Does my act
> of lying suddenly become truth-telling because I fortuitously answered
> "correctly"?
You did give the correct answer: no need for scare-quotes.
If I go to Italy, Bob will be there.
> The content of the statement may be factual, but the
> act of communication ("the Saying") is still "lying". So, to bring it
> back to the point in question: if someone, while in the process of
> randomly spraying words inadvertanly makes a statement that turns out
> to be factual, I still wouldn't consider the act of criticism
> "accurate."
So you're referring merely to "the act of criticism." Not
to the criticism which results. Fine. Then you're not
disputing me, or even addressing my point, even tho you claimed
to be saying "exactly the opposite." You're retreating to
your customary speculations about the critic's biography, while
steadfastly ignoring the critic's work. Which is to say
you've made the fallacy of ad hominem into your basic principle.
[...]
Michael:
>>> I suspect that you are not approving of people just shooting off their
>>> mouths with nothing to back it up (although I could be wrong)--
Moggin:
>> That kind of thing can really piss me off, but at the same
>> time, I like a good rant. Comes down to cases, so let me
>> offer an example. You've probably seen Chomsky's remarks about
>> "the Paris school." He's shooting his mouth off, and he
>> doesn't even try to back up what he says. (Or is that the same
>> thing?) He even admits that he hasn't read much of the work
>> he's criticizing. But I was glad to learn his opinion. I also
>> thought he was entertaining.
>> On the other hand, Chomsky's comments have led to a series
>> of claims that he somehow "refuted post-modernism" or put
>> Derrida in his place. False, of course: spouting off ain't no
>> refutation. But the problem lies in the exaggerated claims
>> made for Chomsky's remarks. The solution is to examine them on
>> their merits, showing that Chomsky said less than what's
>> claimed for him -- not to attack Chomsky for failing to do more
>> homework.
Michael:
> While searching the Google/Deja archives for the Chomsky rant in order
> to verify my recollections, I came across the following quote, from
> you (or another Moggin-- perhaps I'm arguing with the wrong person
> here.)
C'est moi. I'm the guy you've quoted. Only Moggin around
so far as I know.
[Moggin:]
> "Chomsky uses the term "gibberish" in order to dismiss "the
> Paris school" without giving its work any serious consideration --
> he even encourages others to do the same."
> Which is, of course, my point exactly.
That is, of course, not remotely your point. But I'm glad
you liked it enough to borrow.
> This notion of "serious
> consideration" (well put, Moggin, whichever Moggin) is exactly what
> has been at stake here.
Not so. We've been arguing about the idea that "to
actually read the works one is discussing" is the "sine qua non
of any Ethics of Discussion." But if that's gone by the
wayside, I won't complain. I was arguing against it, after all.
Onward to to "serious consideration." If you're supplying
that as a new candidate for an ethical necessity, I still
disagree. Chomsky's remarks aren't unethical. He's giving his
two cents. Since when is that a sin?
Chomsky even meets your demand for labeling, since he says
in so many words that he hasn't read much of the work he's
attacking. He says it slightingly, but he says it all the same.
[...]
Moggin:
>> Now, about evidence. My suggestion is that in criticizing
>> someone's discussion of a given work, you focus on the
>> evidence before you -- meaning the contents of their discussion
>> -- not their reading history.
Michael:
> And I'm just expecting them to focus on the evidence before them.
Which is exactly what you refuse to do. I'd hate to throw
around the term "hyocrisy" the way James does, but I can't
help thinking it may fit here. You expect them to focus on the
evidence, but you won't do the same. Instead of concerning
yourself with the contents of their criticism, you're indulging
in speculation about what they've read.
> If I
> have evidence that they have not been giving their evidence "serious
> consideration", there's little point in proceeding.
O.k, so don't proceed. You won't get any argument from me.
Moggin:
>> You don't seem to be discussing evidence at all, since you
>> slip back to setting personal requirements. Maybe you're
>> suggesting that without "actually reading the works," one would
>> be unable to support one's claims.
>> Could happen, sure. But as I said before, the proof is in
>> the pudding, not in the cook's library records. If the
>> reading was missing certain necessary evidence, then you'd have
>> a basis for criticism -- if not, not.
>> Yet instead of addressing the merits or demerits -- as the
>> case may be -- of the interpretation, you're attacking the
>> person who's offered it. You're neither reading _nor_ guessing.
>> You're gossiping.
Michael:
> No, I'm speaking of an ethical imperative, a duty which falls upon the
> speaker (in this case) to give "serious consideration" to the matter
> he discusses.
No. You're speculating about the speaker's reading habits.
You can dress up your back-fence chatter with high-sounding
talk about "ethical imperatives," but it's still gossip, is all
it is.
To be clear, I oughta say I'm not objecting to speculation.
Or to gossip. They just make a poor basis for an "ethical
sine qua non" and a poor replacement for criticism addressed to
the text.
[...]
Moggin:
>> Habermas' good faith makes no matter in
>> regard to the value of his remarks. If he misprepresents
>> Derrida in good faith, that good faith won't make his criticism
>> any more accurate. And if he offers valid comments in bad
>> faith, that bad faith won't make his criticism any less telling.
Michael:
> No, what I am saying is twofold-- Not only did Habermas get Derrida
> wrong, he didn't even try to get him right.
Or so you imagine. You may imagine correctly. But like I
said, Habermas' hypothetical bad faith wouldn't invalidate
accurate criticism which he gave any more than his hypothetical
good faith would validate bullshit.
Michael:
>>> ... A lie of omission is what we've got, which is still
>>> bad faith.
Moggin:
>> No, we don't have even a lie of omission -- all we have is
>> your idea you were silently lied to and your admission you
>> assume people are talking authoritatively. To think we started
>> out with an ethical sine non qua: a cause for homework
>> nondoers and assorted other miscreants to despair! Well, these
>> things happen. Think of Ozymandias.
Michael:
> These things certainly do happen, and the fact that they can happen is
> a necessity. That necessary possibility is the opening for the
> ethical imperative.
[...]
But the ethical imperative in question wound up --
necessarily or not -- as a sunken, shattered visage whose frown
and wrinkled lip and sneer of cold command lie buried in the
sand. If you believe that gives you a new opening, then I'd be
interested to see where you go.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
> >Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
> >
> >>>>> so punks are "punk philosophy kids" who
> >>>>> annoyed Derrida by stealing his work. he
> >>>>> was complaining about them in the quote that Michael gave.
> >>>>> he does mention "punk philosophy
> >>>>> kids" He's annoyed
> >>>>> by people attacking him for things he has said -- and to
> >>>>> repeat, that's exactly what you're doing here. You've supplied
> >>>>> a perfect illustration of his point.
So now you're reduced to forgery, eh, James? By
coincedence, one of the fundies over in the religion newsgroups
has been doing the same thing, although he hasn't gotten
around to me yet. (Not exactly the same, since you re-arranged
my words, while he inserts new ones.) For the record --
Michael just quoted from one of my who-knows-how-many-years-old
posts -- here's what I wrote:
> ... Your punks are "punk philosophy kids" who you say
> annoyed Derrida by stealing his work. According to you, he
> was complaining about them in the quote that Michael gave. But
> oddly enough he doesn't either mention any "punk philosophy
> kids" or complain about anyone stealing from him. He's annoyed
> by people attacking him for things he hasn't said -- and to
> repeat, that's exactly what you're doing here. You've supplied
> a perfect illustration of his point.
-- Moggin
James Whitehead
<michael...@my-deja.com> writes
>>[...]
>>>Well, I'm going to have to be very schematic here, and condense things
>>>quite a bit, but here goes: First, we need to make a distinction
>>>between law and justice. Law (and, more specifically, individual
>>>laws) are attempts at the *application* of justice, which always
>>>remains "to come". If justice is based upon context, and context is
>>>never completely saturated (we'll discuss these points vis-a-vis SEC,
>>>I'm sure), one can never say (with complete certainty) "I am just" or
>>>"This is a just act" (etc.) because some future context might come
>>>along to change things. Since Justice itself is therefore always
>>>deferred, it is not deconstructible. Laws, or acts, however, *are*
>>>deconstructible.
>>
>>so we never know - and can never know - if we are right?
>
>Bingo. We do the best we can, of course, but without the arrogance of
>presumed certitude.
My only problem with this it creates the idea of absolute certitude - as
a consequence of deciding one can never know - its not a point that
justice or absolute certitude is something out there - just out of reach
- is it. The justice to come - is like waiting for Godot. You/and or
Derrida don't really think there is a deferred justice do you? It looks
like "deferred justice" is another metaphysical unicorn on the lose.
Looking back on the original quote - Derrida claims that "the user"s
definition is false. Is this some absolute - or are there contexts in
which it could be true i wonder?
(on re-reading the quote there appears now a great deal of confusion -
if i remove any assumptions about his intent that is -
i did post this but it perhaps was lost somewhere -
Why does Derrida say "it supposes a bad reading" not it is a bad
reading, doesn't this mean that the argument assumes that bad readings
generate lack of truth - and doesn't he then say that this argument is
wrong. So does it follow that a good reading as generating a lack of
truth, stability etc. as its opposite - and right?
also
(which is to say, isn't it, the skeptical-relativist-nihilist!)
is this saying the "user" or is it an aside by Derrida?)
and could we clear up abuse or abuser - and how the or is working -
presumably Derrida is abusing the argument?
[..]
>>I'm worried by non-metaphysical points as i still have traces of
>>Analytical philosophy in my bloodstream, but I got the idea of Derrida's
>>desired position from an interview in 'Deconstruction and the other:
>>Interview with Richard Kearney.' Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers.
>>Ed. Richard Kearney. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.
>>'I have attempted more and more systematically to find a non-site, or a
>>non-philosophical site, from which to question philosophy' This worries
>>me in that i'm feeling that i'm not reading things quite correctly. Has
>>the context moved regarding my wrong answer i wonder? and could it move
>>again if Justice is always deferred.
>
>I don't have the Kearney interview in front of me at the moment (which
>is a good one, btw) but if I recall correctly, the context leans a bit
>on the "attempt" in the statement above. This attempt usually
>consists of rigorously following a philosophical tradition (or notion)
>to its limit, and seeing what remains unquestioned on the other side.
Humm "the other side" now what does that mean i wonder?
If he's just taking pot shots at these few then OK - but i seem to feel
it was philosophy in general - and more - meanings and definitions in
general- do philosophers think and write differently? In Of Grammatology
"The names of authors or of doctrines have here no substantial value...
not for identifying in them the origin, cause... these texts are the
simple effects of structure... as I think that all concepts hitherto
proposed in order to think the articulation of a discourse and of an
historical totality are caught within the metaphysical closure i
question here.."
>
>> Even in his use of Hegels rejection of
>>non-phonetic languages seems to me to raise phonetic languages - if
>>speech is the target it works - but i understood speech itself is
>>considered subordinate to the mental understanding - in the (incorrect)
>>logocentrict view, and so a pictogram would by bypass speech and be
>>closer to the idea and so better than a phonetic language? I then have a
>>problem with Science - which predominately doesn't use phonetics - it
>>uses Latin "English" and Mathematics. Logic in my mind has little to do
>>with speech- And if anything describes the main features of western
>>modernity - its the role of logic as providing methods for laws access
>>to truth, and justice.
>
>Derrida is not really interested in Speech vs Writing, honest to god,
>especially in the way they are commonly used. He's got other, bigger
>fish to fry. The whole speech/writing opposition is just one trope
>*within a certain set of philosophical texts* that proxies for the
>interior/exterior opposition, that is to say, the nature of presence.
this presence is the "idea"? is that a larger fish?
>
>>
>>>
>>>I've posted this quote to Usenet before, but here is one of Derrida's
>>>more concise statements about "truth" (the "it" in the opening
>>>sentence refers to his own work):
>>>
>>>"Finally, it goes without saying that in no case is it a question of a
>>>*discourse against truth* or against science. (This is impossible and
>>>absurd, as is every heated accusation on this subject.) And when one
>>>analyzes systematically the value of truth as *homoiosis* or
>>>*adequatio*, as the certitude of the *cogito* (Descartes,
>>>Husserl), or as a certitude opposed to truth in the horizon of
>>>absolute knowledge (*Phenomenology of the Mind*), or finally as
>>>*aletheia*, unveiling or presence (the Heideggerean repetition), it is
>>>not in order to return naively to a relativist or sceptical
>>>empiricism. [refs to French editions of OG and "Differance" omitted]
>>>I repeat, then, leaving all their disseminating powers to the
>>>proposition and the form of the verb: *we must have* truth."
>>>
>>>Summary: Derrida is *not* against truth, nor is he a relativist or
>>>sceptical empiricist. He's just pointing out how certain determined
>>>conceptions of truth (i.e. homoiosis, adequatio, aletheia, etc.) are
>>>flawed, by means of a "systematic analysis"
>>
>>Does he say how he guarantees *his* position on this?
>
>Guarantees? Nope. Not even a limited money-back warranty.
>
What we have then are types of truth - and provisionally all types under
the threat of analysis failure. The need in metaphysics is always to be
"outside" the framework - which is what he wants isn't it?
[...]
>
>Are you saying you don't really get what deconstruction is? If that's
>the case, let go of the term for a while-- it is really not important.
No i don't think i do - i find the use of contradictions about it
puzzling. The best i can do is imagine it like the consequence of
removing the skin from a sausage - what once was had a determined
structure becomes something quite different, yet has its original shape
still as one of any number of possibilities.
>
>
>>>
>>>And how does this question ("why doesn't he see deconstruction at work
>>>everywhere?") relate to the previous statement ("No writing can claim
>>>to have any greater authority than the rest")?
>>
>>I know its part of my confusion given Derrida's position in philosophy,
>>or lack of position. I know he doesn't want to be a relativist - but it
>>follows from his work. Now he/you say that's mistaken - but a reply
>>could be no - i see it there just as you see Logocentrism there in the
>>works you criticise.
>
>It doesn't follow from his work, really. You say you can see it
>there-- I say, "look harder."
well the harder i look the more i see.
>
>Intepretations are not fixed, there is no one definitive
>interpretation-- but that does not mean that all interpretations are
>equal. The author's intentionality (as received) is not the final
>word on the meaning of a text, but neither should it be ignored.
what should be ignored - and who says what - now we questioned the
intent. Does the sausage have to have some form? Or can it remain a
meaningless lump?
>>[...]
>>
>>>>
>>>>>As for the "playful" works, they are overtly playful in form--
>>>>>techniques such as dual columns on different subjects on a single
>>>>>page, or removing blocks of text (of unknown length) in order to
>>>>>create fragments, or writing a work in 59 brief chapters, each
>>>>>containing a single (several page long) sentence...
>>>>>
>>>>isn't he breaking down meaning - in these texts?
>>>
>>>Breaking down meaning? What would that be? Note that in these cases
>>>he's explicitly working with/against something specific in the text he
>>>is commenting on-- for example, with Hegel (the thinker most
>>>interested in a unified system) he is non-systematic (i.e.
>>>symptomatic), with Socrates (who left no writings) he offers
>>>fragmentary letters with no signature and no named addressee, etc.
>>
>>So if he *plays* with Hegel's unified system by being non-systematic do
>>i play with Derrida's system by being dishonest? Isn't that *his*
>>method?
>
>False parallel. First, Derrida doesn't have "a method", but that's
>beside the point.
Well not having a method is a method - i can accept deconstruction as an
event - but he seems to require good faith, truth etc. to get there -
that looks like a method. (In his playful texts - is the smile of
Derrida some kind of presence?)
>
>Just because Hegel tried to be systematic doesn't mean we have to take
>him at his word-- we can point out the places where he failed to be
>systematic. Just because Derrida tries to be honest doesn't mean we
>have to take him at *his* word-- we can point out any lapses in
>honesty, if we find him. To do so wouldn't require being dishonest
>ourselves, nor would it actually permit it.
But why not - your saying Derrida opposes Hegels system and method by a
deliberate lack of system and method - not by use of counter systems and
methodologies, why not then criticise Derrida's instance on truth by
wilful misrepresentation and untruthfulness. However going back to his
original quote you gave - he does not (i think) accuse his critics of
deliberately doing this. But in terms of frying fish - isn't "THE TRUTH"
a whopper?
>
>>Isn't that the (deliberate) mistake his critics (and followers) are
>>making. Could this account for Habermas method in not studying carefully
>>the text - is he being "playful"?
>
>If so, he's playing with fire. Derrida does not deliberately misread
>texts. In the times when he appears to be reading a text against its
>authors intentions, he's actually showing how the text conflicts with
>the intentions stated within the text itself--showing how it doesn't
>do what it claims (or sets out) to do.
Yes I've tried this on the quote - certainly I've lost any coherent
meaning in it.. but I think he is doing something more than this - as
he's an idea as to why the conflicts are there - he demonstrates a
theory. Now a question is where is this theory?
>>>By whom?
>>
>>By the people who he addresses in your original quote.
>
>True. And these people (he says) are misrepresenting his work, and
>have likely never actually read it. Unfortunately, it seems that many
>of them are journalists and popularizers.
Well he doesn't give any idea of particulars - how do you arrive at
journalists and popularizers? There is quite a bit here which is
important (for me) ignoring the journalists and popularizers for the
moment - what if someone reads him and in honesty sees that this
essentially leads to relativism how -within their context- are they
misrepresenting him. You did post to alt.postomodern - not
alt.journalists... as if (i'm imagining a presence here perhaps) you
were saying we - or some of us - had got it wrong.
>>>>>
>>>>>Would it be fair to criticize Newton for suggesting that apples fall
>>>>>to the ground due to magnetism?
>>>>>
>>>>yes - perfectly fair. What is magnetism?
>>>
>>>Perfectly fair for me to say "Newton was wrong when he suggested that
>>>apples fall to the ground due to magnetism", when he said no such
>>>thing? I guess we have different conceptions of "fairness."
>>
>>Would it be fair to criticize Newton's theory of Gravitation. I think
>>so. Does in his theory the apple fall due to it. Are you saying its
>>unfair to say Newton said Apples fall.... when he said no such thing ...
>>however one suspects his theory of gravitation applies to apples. The
>>reason that apples hit the ground is due to Newton's theory of gravity -
>>he suggested all things behave as such including apples.
>
>Right. But, to the best of my knowledge, Newton never said a word
>about *magnetism* in this context. So, if I say "Newton was wrong
>when he suggested that apples fall to the ground due to magnetism"
>I am misrepresenting his position.
>
>Do you really not see this?
I think we are stuck here - probably over the word suggest - but i don't
think i'm misrepresenting him when i use his equations to describe the
apple or a spaceship. So if i construct a post-modern theory of language
i might well have based it on Derrida's practice.
>
>
>> If i suggest
>>all dogs wag tails when happy this accounts for rex's specific
>>behaviour. It would be strange for me to say "all dogs" does not include
>>rex. (if rex is a dog) So is my All dogs theory suggesting rex's tail
>>wagging (given a bone) - i think so.
>
>Non sequitor. See above.
>>
>>
>>>>
>>>>Then how come he lets himself off? He is clearly starting a ball rolling
>>>>is deconstruction...
>>>
>>>He *doesn't* let himself off, he instead does everything he can to
>>>clear up the misunderstanding. (Which is what one imagines Nietzsche
>>>would have done, had he been alive and well at the time of the Nazi
>>>mis-appropriation)
>>
>>debatable - but like Newton - whose theory was right but not completely
>>right. Has Derrida mis-appropriated the ideas of Hegel?
>
>I don't really think so, but if you want to make that case, go for it.
>Derrida criticizes Hegel, to be sure, but I wouldn't call that
>"mis-appropriation". Would you?
No - or would i call post-modern relativism a misrepresenting or a
misappropriation of Derrida. In particular in the visual arts i'm aware
of such things being quite common. "That's not what i meant" seems in
Derrida's terms not enough.
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
and here is what i wrote
>>Fine - lets look at misrepresentation - "Derrida a founder of post-
>>modernity"?
Not for one minute was the above a forgery - or as much as
+---------------------+
! $10000 !
! !
+---------------------+
I understand that snipping is helpful - if perhaps done ethically on
text that has been around for awhile - my little snipping above was
trying to make the point - seems i did. oh - and no rearranging just the
delete key - you know the one!
I went on to say -
"the user or abuse of the following argument: "......
where is Derrida getting this from - who are these people - is he
representing them accurately - " rules of competence, criteria of
discussion " Mr D - please?
Small point should it be abuser? it makes a difference
That also went missing. Again I think bad practice as it was its first
appearance.
The case of forgery i submit would in both our cases would not stick -
as altering the texts was not an act of deceit or trickery, in my case
to point out something you did - what seemed to me more like
prevarication than forgery.
--
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg
>> And these people (he says) are misrepresenting his work, and
>> have likely never actually read it. Unfortunately, it seems that many
>> of them are journalists and popularizers.
James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
> Well he doesn't give any idea of particulars - how do you arrive at
> journalists and popularizers?
He probably got there by reading, since Derrida explicitly
includes "the press" in his complaints. He also gives a
partial list of the journalists he's complaining about. All in
the same piece Michael quoted from.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
> and here is what i wrote
>>>Fine - lets look at misrepresentation - "Derrida a founder of post-
>>>modernity"?
> Not for one minute was the above a forgery -
[...]
Did somebody say it was? Looks to me as tho you've quoted
your own words accurately. Congrats.
-- Moggin
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
well no he doesn't here - he talks about an argument and a definition -
no mention of the press or popularizes - i thought we are supposed to
take what is given and not some assumed presence. Maybe the quote has
cut the reference - but that's not my problem - i'm responding to the
given text - which seems loaded with ambiguity. In broader terms however
i'm not familiar with the press - theorizing or even defining argument -
it amuses me why Derrida (if he does) think the press getting something
right is to be expected. But as it seems context is important - as well
as close reading - the quote here is in a newsgroup which concerns post-
modernity.... if its just a complaint about the press then this perhaps
is not the place to make it. If the point is the press seldom gets
anything right then i've no real argument, I would assume the sports
pages get the results right but then i don't read them.
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
>James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
>
>> and here is what i wrote
>
>>>>Fine - lets look at misrepresentation - "Derrida a founder of post-
>>>>modernity"?
>
>> Not for one minute was the above a forgery -
>
>[...]
>
> Did somebody say it was?
yes you did
"So now you're reduced to forgery, eh, James?"
here is the whole thing - maybe your newsreader is faulty
>> >Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>> >
>> >>>>> so punks are "punk philosophy kids" who
>> >>>>> annoyed Derrida by stealing his work. he
>> >>>>> was complaining about them in the quote that Michael gave.
>> >>>>> he does mention "punk philosophy
>> >>>>> kids" He's annoyed
>> >>>>> by people attacking him for things he has said -- and to
>> >>>>> repeat, that's exactly what you're doing here. You've supplied
>> >>>>> a perfect illustration of his point.
>
> So now you're reduced to forgery, eh, James? By
>coincedence, one of the fundies over in the religion newsgroups
>has been doing the same thing, although he hasn't gotten
>around to me yet. (Not exactly the same, since you re-arranged
>my words, while he inserts new ones.) For the record --
>Michael just quoted from one of my who-knows-how-many-years-old
>posts -- here's what I wrote:
>
I'm assuming its Moggin Goldberg above who uses the word forgery...
are you saying the "so punks ... " is not a forgery? Im sure it was me
who altered the meaning by cutting - to reply to your same trick -and
you who said it was a forgery? maybe your fooling around now with
meaning and authorship. In fact your whole reply seems strange as how do
religious fundies, Michael's quote in another thread and your who-knows-
how-many-years-old-posts fit, then re-posting something from last week?
I would still like to talk about the implications of Derrida's
Deconstruction - maybe you are - maybe it leads to complete
meaninglessness - is that what your saying - by showing? So your whole
ploy on the other exchange with Michael is a relativistic demonstration
of how any consensus as to truth is impossible?
--
James Whitehead
Michael Dorfman
<jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In article <moggin-2E1698....@bvnntp.nevol.mediaone.net>,
>Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
>>michael...@my-deja.com (Michael Dorfman):
>>
>>>> And these people (he says) are misrepresenting his work, and
>>>> have likely never actually read it. Unfortunately, it seems that many
>>>> of them are journalists and popularizers.
>>
>>James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
>>
>>> Well he doesn't give any idea of particulars - how do you arrive at
>>> journalists and popularizers?
>>
>> He probably got there by reading, since Derrida explicitly
>>includes "the press" in his complaints. He also gives a
>>partial list of the journalists he's complaining about. All in
>>the same piece Michael quoted from.
>
>well no he doesn't here - he talks about an argument and a definition -
>no mention of the press or popularizes
James, which part of "the same piece Michael quoted from" didn't you
get? Are you really reading that carelessly here?
Just to point out the obvious: the "quote" that I posted was taken
from a piece entitled "Towards an Ethics of Discussion", and the
passages that Moggin refer to are within that piece, although
(clearly) not in the quote itself.
>- i thought we are supposed to
>take what is given and not some assumed presence. Maybe the quote has
>cut the reference - but that's not my problem - i'm responding to the
>given text - which seems loaded with ambiguity.
The "given text" in this case, amounts to little more than a sentence
lifted from a larger work, and many of the alleged "ambiguities" can
be easily cleared up from context. Which is to say, the context of
the larger piece.
> In broader terms however
>i'm not familiar with the press - theorizing or even defining argument -
>it amuses me why Derrida (if he does) think the press getting something
>right is to be expected.
It is not that "the press getting something right" is expected by
Derrida, but rather, assumed by many readers. I thought Derrida's
line of thought was clear enough, but just to spell it out: The people
Derrida refers to in the quote (those, for example, who think that
Derrida is a skeptical-relativist-nihilist) have by and large not read
Derrida's works, and are basing their assumptions on a popular
characterization of Derrida which is often found in the press. The
misrepresentations multiply.
>But as it seems context is important - as well
>as close reading - the quote here is in a newsgroup which concerns post-
>modernity.... if its just a complaint about the press then this perhaps
>is not the place to make it. If the point is the press seldom gets
>anything right then i've no real argument, I would assume the sports
>pages get the results right but then i don't read them.
Are you suggesting that there is no analogy to be drawn between Usenet
posts (which are, after all, publications of a sort) and the press?
I had planned on responding to your longer post to me, but to be
honest, I'm not sure it is worth the bother. I had assumed, perhaps
naively, that you were operating here in good faith, and making a
reasonable effort-- but the lack of care evident in your readings (and
the corresponding lack of reading evident in your responses) makes me
think otherwise.
Questions like
>Why does Derrida say "it supposes a bad reading" not it is a bad
>reading, doesn't this mean that the argument assumes that bad readings
>generate lack of truth - and doesn't he then say that this argument is
>wrong. So does it follow that a good reading as generating a lack of
>truth, stability etc. as its opposite - and right?
>
>also
>(which is to say, isn't it, the skeptical-relativist-nihilist!)
>is this saying the "user" or is it an aside by Derrida?)
are so elementary as to make me wonder if you've even *tried* to
understand the quote. Shall we take it phrase by phrase?
"[L]et it be said in passing how surprised I have often
been, how amused or discouraged, depending on my humor, by
the use or abuse of the following argument:"
Paraphrase: Derrida has been heard the following argument surprisingly
many times. Sometimes he is amused by it, sometimes discouraged.
"Since the deconstructionist (which is to say, isn't it, the
skeptical-relativist-nihilist!) is supposed to not believe
in truth, stability, or the unity of meaning, in intention
or "meaning-to-say," how can he demand of us now that we
read *him* with pertinence, precision, rigor? How can he
demand that his own text be interpreted correctly? How can
he accuse anyone else of having misunderstood, simplified,
deformed it, etc.? In other words, how can he discuss, and
discuss the reading of what he writes? "
Paraphrase: (Note: this is the argument Derrida hears. This is the
opinion of his critic.) Since you are a "deconstructionist" (and
therefore a skeptical-relativist-nihilists) and do not believe in
"meaning" or "truth" or the author's intentions, how can you demand
that your own texts be read carefully, or interpreted correctly? How
can you accuse anyone of ever misreading you?
"The answer is simple enough: This definition of the deconstructionist
is *false*(that's right: false, not true) and feeble; it supposes a
bad (that's right: bad, not good) and feeble reading of
numerous texts, first of all mine, which therefore must
finally be read or reread."
Paraphrase: the argument offered by the critic is *false*. It is
based on an incorrect reading of Derrida's texs. In other words,
Derrida is *not* a skeptical-relativist-nihilist, he does not disavow
"meaning", "truth", or "the author's intentions."
"Then perhaps it wil be understood that the value of truth (and all
those values associated with it) is never contested or destroyed in my
writings, but only reinscribed in more powerful, larger,
more stratified contexts. "
Paraphrase: Derrida does not contest or destroy the value of truth,
but rather, reinscribes it in a different context.
"And that within interpretive contexts (that is, within relations of
force that are always differential-- for example,
socio-political-institutional--but even beyond those determinations)
that are relatively stable, sometimes apparently almost unshakeable,
it should be possible to invoke rules of competence, criteria of
discussion and of consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor, criticism,
and pedagogy"
Paraphrase: although it is possible to create many different
interpretations of a given text, the dominant interpretation(s) are
generally stable. One can (and should be able to) invoke rules of
competence, good faith, rigor, etc.
Now, my question to you, James: Are you reading this with rigor? With
good faith? With basic competence?
Michael Dorfman
Michael Dorfman
I feel that one ought to give "serious consideration" to the work one
is criticizing (which means, practically speaking, to read it.)
You don't find this to be an ethical imperative.
How about we just leave it at that?
Michael Dorfman
Moggin Goldberg
> Summary:
> I feel that one ought to give "serious consideration" to the work one
> is criticizing (which means, practically speaking, to read it.)
> You don't find this to be an ethical imperative.
> How about we just leave it at that?
Can't leave it there for two reasons. It's not the notion
we were arguing about, namely that "the sine non qua of any
Ethics of Discussion would be to actually read the works one is
discussing." (What page is that on, by the way? I've been
leafing back and forth w/out seeing it.) And you're right that
I differ w/the above. Sure, practically speaking, reading a
given work is helpful in seriously considering it -- often even
a necessity. But to say that you're ethically required to
seriously consider any work which you happen to criticize seems
baseless, as I said in regard to Chomsky's comments on the
Paris school. Nothing unethical about supplying your two cents.
Or even your sawbuck.
There can be a practical problem, of course: somebody may
come along and ask you to support what you said. Seems as
though Chomsky (I'll stick with him as an example) foresaw that
difficulty, since he refused in advance, saying even before
anyone asked that he had no intention of backing up his remarks.
But y'know, I can think of a good reason for dropping this
subject: it distracts from far more interesting questions
about misreading. Ones that concern people who _have_ read the
relevant texts, yet still misconstrue them. Those folks
aren't always critics. In fact friendly readers can do as much
harm as enemies, even more. "_Sometimes_, _certain_ bitter and
compulsive enemies of deconstruction stand in more certain
and vital relationship, even if not theorized, to what is in
effect at stake in it than do certain avowed deconstructionists."
Frère Jacques, _Limited Inc_ 140.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
>>>> And these people (he says) are misrepresenting his work, and
>>>> have likely never actually read it. Unfortunately, it seems that
>>>> many of them are journalists and popularizers.
James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
>>> Well he doesn't give any idea of particulars - how do you arrive at
>>> journalists and popularizers?
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>> He probably got there by reading, since Derrida explicitly
>> includes "the press" in his complaints. He also gives a
>> partial list of the journalists he's complaining about. All in
>> the same piece Michael quoted from.
James:
> well no he doesn't here -
Well, yes: he does. _Limited, Inc_, "Afterword," 153-154.
> he talks about an argument and a definition -
> no mention of the press or popularizes -
Explicit mention of the press, and even the names of three
or four journalists.
> i thought we are supposed to
> take what is given and not some assumed presence. Maybe the quote has
> cut the reference - but that's not my problem -
Your problem is that you're illiterate. I didn't say that
it was in the quote -- I said it was in the piece Michael
quoted from, also called "Toward an Ethic of Discussion," found
where I just told you.
> i'm responding to the
> given text - which seems loaded with ambiguity.
[...]
You're asking "How do you arrive at journalists and
popularizers?" I'm not sure where Michael got the popularizers.
But he got the journalists by reading the piece that we've
been talking about -- same one he quoted. That's the answer to
your question.
-- Moggin
Moggin Goldberg
>>>>>Fine - lets look at misrepresentation - "Derrida a founder of post-
>>>>>modernity"? Not for one minute was the above a forgery -
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>> Did somebody say it was? Looks to me as tho you've quoted
>> your own words accurately. Congrats.
James:
> yes you did
No I didn't.
> "So now you're reduced to forgery, eh, James?"
> here is the whole thing - maybe your newsreader is faulty
[...]
No -- only your own reading skills. I never suggested the
above was a forgery. I pointed out that you had forged my
words -- not yours. You quoted yourself accurately. But maybe
that was an oversight you'll correct in the future.
-- Moggin
Andrea Lapin
Michael Dorfman wrote:
> I thought I had stated them, but I'll repeat: Habermas violated the
> "prime directive" of responsible scholarship-- not to speak out of
> one's ass.
Were that directive indeed prime, Routledge would have been out of business
years ago.
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
statement directly above - ( i was referring to my cut up of your quote
and saying it was not a forgery - which you claim it to be i thought)
so here (i'll quote it now in case you cant see it - "Vide supra") you
refer back to my statement "I think Logocentrism is one"
>Moggin:
>
>>> Yet another unsupported accusation. You haven't offered a
>>> single case where Derrida is guilty of the kinda
>>> misrepresentation he's complaining about. Until you do, you're
>>> just bullshitting.
>
>James:
>
>> I think Logocentrism is one.
>
> Vide supra.
Is that right?
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
<michael...@my-deja.com> writes
>On Sat, 30 Jun 2001 07:54:15 +0100, James Whitehead
><jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>>In article <moggin-2E1698....@bvnntp.nevol.mediaone.net>,
>>Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
>>>michael...@my-deja.com (Michael Dorfman):
>>>
>>>>> And these people (he says) are misrepresenting his work, and
>>>>> have likely never actually read it. Unfortunately, it seems that many
>>>>> of them are journalists and popularizers.
>>>
>>>James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
>>>
>>>> Well he doesn't give any idea of particulars - how do you arrive at
>>>> journalists and popularizers?
>>>
>>> He probably got there by reading, since Derrida explicitly
>>>includes "the press" in his complaints. He also gives a
>>>partial list of the journalists he's complaining about. All in
>>>the same piece Michael quoted from.
>>
>>well no he doesn't here - he talks about an argument and a definition -
>>no mention of the press or popularizes
>
>James, which part of "the same piece Michael quoted from" didn't you
>get? Are you really reading that carelessly here?
see below... (last chunk)
>
>Just to point out the obvious: the "quote" that I posted was taken
>from a piece entitled "Towards an Ethics of Discussion", and the
>passages that Moggin refer to are within that piece, although
>(clearly) not in the quote itself.
Ok so why did you post the quote - was it an attack on journalism or on
certain post-modern thought - (of the " skeptical-relativist-nihilist!"
kind?)
My point is (was) suppose a person who is a po-mo-skeptical-relativist-
nihilist claims that her/his position derives from Derrida's writing.
Does *this* misrepresent his (Ds) work. Of course from Derrida's point
it might - but be relative about this for awhile - from the P-M-S-R-N's
view it needs not. Anymore than Jackson Pollock misrepresents
Braque.... or Marx Hegel .... (maybe)
Can i say here you - and Moggin - still seem haunted by ghost of Plato -
that justice exists but is deferred etc. It struck me when you were
discussing where Bob was in Europe - as if there was some ABSOLUTE truth
as to where he was - if only we could find it. His position is however
*relative*. Strange how we resort to Physics in discussion of truth.
This nagging thought that he must be definitely factually somewhere is
the ghost - i did think Derrida was helping us rid our thinking of such
metaphysical apparitions - but only it seems to replace the ghost of
Christmas past with the ghost of Christmas future.
In good faith - and trying to be polite - effort - well i have other
things to do but - as i said i ordered the book - i'm re-reading Of
Grammatology and some other books *on* Derrida - i've even bought a
"popularist" book - which i can't say misrepresents him, and spent many
hours in reply - ( and the last one you will not bother to address).
On the subject of lack of reading ... good faith ... competence ...
and illiteracy (Moggin) if these account for my view of Derrida then so
be it - however if one checks other sources- (all critics of Derrida)
are they all similarly to be condemned?
>
>Questions like
>
>>Why does Derrida say "it supposes a bad reading" not it is a bad
>>reading, doesn't this mean that the argument assumes that bad readings
>>generate lack of truth - and doesn't he then say that this argument is
>>wrong. So does it follow that a good reading as generating a lack of
>>truth, stability etc. as its opposite - and right?
>>
>>also
>>(which is to say, isn't it, the skeptical-relativist-nihilist!)
>>is this saying the "user" or is it an aside by Derrida?)
>
>are so elementary as to make me wonder if you've even *tried* to
>understand the quote. Shall we take it phrase by phrase?
First i understood the quote as simply Derrida saying he is not a
skeptical-relativist-nihilist - or that sort of thing is unfair re -
deconstruction - this was my superficial reading...
but his ideas once in the public domain have lives of their own ... the
sort of thing which Derrida was aware of regarding thought ... e.g.
Nietzche.
I then noticed some ambiguities -
Rigour - yes i think so - you skip my little logical problem - yes i
think i know what he means - but why cant we play his game. Game i. in
his terms using good faith rigour - game ii. using his method (whatever
- his collection of terms and approaches looks like method) in
discussing other works - Searle?..... Isn't the little logical problem
the kind of Marginal Note that Derrida is so concerned about - and not
some paraphrase based on knowing the authors intent. This is one of my
points. The other is the basis for the rules in the first place. And
this is the consequence of criticising what was thought true (especially
by looking not at the presence of metaphysics but at margins).
Competence - well lets make up some test?
Sorry Michael but i don't think Derrida can have his position outside
philosophy - the one he *wants* - he wants to be outside the glasshouse
and throwing stones (for good & true reason maybe - or as a professional
philosopher).
I write this with good faith and a wish to learn if you think i'm just
not up to it - well that is a pity.
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
create the "Universal Library"- using modern technology books are
created which have between 10 and 2,000 pages each printed with random
letters and spaces (the page size and number of pages is arbitrary -
only if we allow infinite numbers of pages and characters do we have
practical problems.) Now we visit the library and pick out a volume -
looking at the last page we see-
SiyuxszvgyunxmijjxzvujjxmorgyunsxyuinxYUIOräumyur;xIjjxlzvssyuxyusxzu
xzvbyurxijjxyuiouyuxwzvsxzvnayuryuxyuiounxnijjyuioxkönnyun xijjxgyubyuxm
yuinyuxYUIOräumyuxzvlsxYUIOräumyuxunaxlzvssyuxayunxLyusyur
xumxzuxyunyuioayuckyun xobxyusxzvllyusxinxazvnnxaiyusyumxkzvnnxnüyuiozli
jjxzuxayunyunxprüfyunxgibyuio xaiyuxsinaxwzvjjx" x
In another-
Sie sagen mich auch morgens ein Träumer; Ich lasse es zu, aber ich tue
was andere tun nicht können, ich gebe meine Träume als Träume und lasse
den Leser, um zu entdecken, ob es alles in dann diesem kann nützlich zu
denen prüfen gibt, die sind wach ",
And then
"You will say I too am a dreamer; I admit it, but I do what others fail
to do, I give my dreams as dreams, and leave the reader to discover
whether there is anything in then that may prove useful to those who are
awake"
The billionaire achieved such wealth by writing the perfect PC operating
system. Using a computer to write a random strings of binary code he
happened on testing one such run to find the perfect O.S. It was
completely bug free!
Simpler - A computer program guesses the number that the player thinks.
Imagine the player thinks 7 , the program's first guess is 3, (wrong (a
bad reading)), then 6 (close - a better reading) then 7 - bingo -
correct - (a correct reading).
3 6 7 and 7 is somehow correct - in itself by reference to what?
('The Universal Library' K Lasswitz 'The Library of Babel' J L Borges)
"Frege says: Every well-formed sentence must make sense; and I say:
every possible sentence is well-formed, and if it does not make sense
that can only come from our not having given any meaning to certain of
the parts. Even when we believe we have done so. "
L Wittgenstein 3rd " September 1914
"The habit of formulating in the material mode of speech causes, in the
first place , to deceive ourselves about the objects of our own
investigations it is wise to make sure of their (philosophical
problems) freedom from ambiguity by translating them into the formal
mode.
Translatability into the formal mode of speech constitutes the
touchstone for all philosophical sentences"
R. Carnap "The Logical Syntax of Language" 1937
"Cum ipsi appellabant rem aliquam, et cum secundum - When they named
some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I
grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they
meant to point it out - (Augustine, Confessions) - That (Augustine's)
philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of
the way language functions. But one can also say it is the idea of a
language more primitive than ours"
Wittgenstein 1949
--
James Whitehead
Michael Dorfman
<jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk> wrote:
Neither.
I was responding to "Joel and Rachel Wilhelm", who wrote:
"v. I was showing what embracing the pomo view of texts leads to,
show me otherwise. Fish, Derrida and others posit the kind of
nonsense I applied to your post--funny, they expect to be understood
when writing, hmmmmm. Locating meaning in the reader is absurd and
nonsensical."
In other words, Joel and Rachel were making the same argument that
amuses or discourages Derrida.
I'd hardly call Joel and Rachel's argument to be an adequate
representation of "post-modern thought", and that's what the point is
in much of your remarks below-- you seem to suppose that there *are*
people who are "po-mo-skeptical-relativist-nihilsts". Could you
produce an example of one? A citation would do.
>
>My point is (was) suppose a person who is a po-mo-skeptical-relativist-
>nihilist claims that her/his position derives from Derrida's writing.
>Does *this* misrepresent his (Ds) work. Of course from Derrida's point
>it might - but be relative about this for awhile - from the P-M-S-R-N's
>view it needs not. Anymore than Jackson Pollock misrepresents
>Braque.... or Marx Hegel .... (maybe)
Cf above. Who is claiming to be a P-M-S-R-N?
>
>Can i say here you - and Moggin - still seem haunted by ghost of Plato -
>that justice exists but is deferred etc. It struck me when you were
>discussing where Bob was in Europe - as if there was some ABSOLUTE truth
>as to where he was - if only we could find it. His position is however
>*relative*. Strange how we resort to Physics in discussion of truth.
In what sense do you mean "relative"? Relative to what? Is Bob, in
your conception, not in a place?
>This nagging thought that he must be definitely factually somewhere is
>the ghost - i did think Derrida was helping us rid our thinking of such
>metaphysical apparitions - but only it seems to replace the ghost of
>Christmas past with the ghost of Christmas future.
"Rid our thinking of such metaphysical apparitions?" Au contraire,
mon frere. Derrida is actually more interested in showing how those
revenants always return, despite our best efforts to rid ourselves of
them. This is one of the major themes of "Specters of Marx". I can't
speak for Moggin, but I (for one) am definitely haunted by the ghost
of Plato. And so is Derrida:
"The difference between our modes of thought does not mean that I or
other 'modern' thinkers have gone beyond Plato, in the sense of having
succeeding in exhausting all that is contained in his texts....I
believe that all of the great philosophical texts-- of Plato,
Parmenides, Hegel or Heidegger, for example-- are still *before* us.
The future of the great philosophies remains obscure and enigmatic,
still to be disclosed. Up to now, we have merely scratched the
surface." (Kearney Interview, p113)
Perhaps you might consider replacing some of the other reading with a
careful reading of the Kearney interview, which you seemed to have
ready-to-hand. I think you'll find that many of the questions (and
misapprehensions) that have plagued this discussion have been
addressed there in very clear terms.
>
>On the subject of lack of reading ... good faith ... competence ...
>and illiteracy (Moggin) if these account for my view of Derrida then so
>be it - however if one checks other sources- (all critics of Derrida)
>are they all similarly to be condemned?
If they fit the same criteria. Many do.
>
>>
>>Questions like
>>
>>>Why does Derrida say "it supposes a bad reading" not it is a bad
>>>reading, doesn't this mean that the argument assumes that bad readings
>>>generate lack of truth - and doesn't he then say that this argument is
>>>wrong. So does it follow that a good reading as generating a lack of
>>>truth, stability etc. as its opposite - and right?
>>>
>>>also
>>>(which is to say, isn't it, the skeptical-relativist-nihilist!)
>>>is this saying the "user" or is it an aside by Derrida?)
>>
>>are so elementary as to make me wonder if you've even *tried* to
>>understand the quote. Shall we take it phrase by phrase?
>
>First i understood the quote as simply Derrida saying he is not a
>skeptical-relativist-nihilist - or that sort of thing is unfair re -
>deconstruction - this was my superficial reading...
>
>but his ideas once in the public domain have lives of their own ... the
>sort of thing which Derrida was aware of regarding thought ... e.g.
>Nietzche.
Notice the easy slippage to "his ideas." What you seem to have
meant, of course, was "this odd misrepresentation of his ideas".
Which, as Derrida points out, is not a naive or random
misrepresentation, but one that discloses certain "political and
institutional interests." (Kearney Interview, p 124)
I'm not sure I see the "logical problem". In fact, the only problem I
see is a temporal problem. If you wish to turn Derrida on himself,
the necessary order of events would be:
1) read Derrida
2) deduce from this reading of Derrida what you call Derrida's
"method" of reading others
3) apply this "method" to a reading of Derrida.
Unfortunately for your project, you're still stuck on #1. (If you are
still wondering why deconstruction is not a method, see the Kearney
Interview, p 124).
>
>Competence - well lets make up some test?
>
"Paraphrase" seems to be a good starting point. In fact, Derrida
suggests as much in "Of Grammatology". Since you're already reading
this, check out the section entitled "The Exorbitant. Question of
Method"
>Sorry Michael but i don't think Derrida can have his position outside
>philosophy - the one he *wants* - he wants to be outside the glasshouse
>and throwing stones (for good & true reason maybe - or as a professional
>philosopher).
"[W]e must remember that if we are indeed *inside* metaphysics, we are
not inside it as we might be *inside* a box or a milieu. We are still
*in* metaphysics in the special sense that we are *in* a determinate
language. Consequently, the idea that we might be able to get outside
of metaphysics has always struck me as naive....In brief, the whose
rapport between the inside and the outside of metaphysics is
inseparable from the question of the finitude and reserve of
metaphysics as language. But the idea of the finitude and exhaustion
of metaphysics does not mean that we are incarcerated in it as
prisoners or victims of some unhappy fatality. It is simply that our
belonging to, and inherence in, the language of metaphysics is
something that can only be rigourously and adequately thought about
from *another* topos or space where our problematic rapport with the
boundary of metaphysics can be seen in a more radical light. Hence my
attempts to discouver the non-place or *non-lieu* which would be the
'other' of philosophy. This is the task of deconstruction."
(Kearney interview, p-111-112)
>I write this with good faith and a wish to learn if you think i'm just
>not up to it - well that is a pity.
It would be a pity, indeed. I look forward to seeing some evidence
that you are, in fact, up to it.
Michael Dorfman
James Whitehead
<michael...@my-deja.com> writes
[..]
>>>Just to point out the obvious: the "quote" that I posted was taken
>>>from a piece entitled "Towards an Ethics of Discussion", and the
>>>passages that Moggin refer to are within that piece, although
>>>(clearly) not in the quote itself.
>>
>>Ok so why did you post the quote - was it an attack on journalism or on
>>certain post-modern thought - (of the " skeptical-relativist-nihilist!"
>>kind?)
>
>Neither.
>
>I was responding to "Joel and Rachel Wilhelm", who wrote:
>
>"v. I was showing what embracing the pomo view of texts leads to,
>show me otherwise. Fish, Derrida and others posit the kind of
>nonsense I applied to your post--funny, they expect to be understood
>when writing, hmmmmm. Locating meaning in the reader is absurd and
>nonsensical."
>
>In other words, Joel and Rachel were making the same argument that
>amuses or discourages Derrida.
>
>I'd hardly call Joel and Rachel's argument to be an adequate
>representation of "post-modern thought", and that's what the point is
>in much of your remarks below-- you seem to suppose that there *are*
>people who are "po-mo-skeptical-relativist-nihilsts". Could you
>produce an example of one? A citation would do.
So the 'skeptical-relativst-nihilist' is a fiction? And signifies
nothing? Sure you were "correcting" Joel - and in particular the quote
was within a section which was discussing Searle - (and *not* the
journalists named - to which moggin referred - this appears in quite a
different context in relation to a question regarding de Man's writings
and deniability - which Derrida defends by accusing (it seems) the
American press of hypocrisy) and continues " ... and that proves that
all the positive values to which i have just referred are contextual,
essentially limited, unstable, and endangered. And therefore that the
essential and irreducible possibility of misunderstanding or of
infelicity must be taken into account in the description of those values
said to be positive" [what are these positive values please Michael-
"the value of truth( and all those values associated with it)"? Was it
*fair* not to offer this also for Joel and others (wasn't moggin being
naughty in the way he attributed the quote as a response to certain
named journalists - which it seems it might not be?) Have you (in this
quote) fully and honestly represented Derrida's position!
>
>>
>>My point is (was) suppose a person who is a po-mo-skeptical-relativist-
>>nihilist claims that her/his position derives from Derrida's writing.
>>Does *this* misrepresent his (Ds) work. Of course from Derrida's point
>>it might - but be relative about this for awhile - from the P-M-S-R-N's
>>view it needs not. Anymore than Jackson Pollock misrepresents
>>Braque.... or Marx Hegel .... (maybe)
>
>Cf above. Who is claiming to be a P-M-S-R-N?
I said *suppose* .... do you think now - given more of the text that
this could not - or should not take place in regards of Derrida (i
think) saying it/(could) will?
>
>>
>>Can i say here you - and Moggin - still seem haunted by ghost of Plato -
>>that justice exists but is deferred etc. It struck me when you were
>>discussing where Bob was in Europe - as if there was some ABSOLUTE truth
>>as to where he was - if only we could find it. His position is however
>>*relative*. Strange how we resort to Physics in discussion of truth.
>
>In what sense do you mean "relative"? Relative to what? Is Bob, in
>your conception, not in a place?
My placing of Bob is relative - if Bob visits the British Isles - is he
in Northern Ireland or visiting the six counties?
>
>>This nagging thought that he must be definitely factually somewhere is
>>the ghost - i did think Derrida was helping us rid our thinking of such
>>metaphysical apparitions - but only it seems to replace the ghost of
>>Christmas past with the ghost of Christmas future.
>
>"Rid our thinking of such metaphysical apparitions?" Au contraire,
>mon frere. Derrida is actually more interested in showing how those
>revenants always return, despite our best efforts to rid ourselves of
>them. This is one of the major themes of "Specters of Marx". I can't
>speak for Moggin, but I (for one) am definitely haunted by the ghost
>of Plato. And so is Derrida:
>
>"The difference between our modes of thought does not mean that I or
>other 'modern' thinkers have gone beyond Plato, in the sense of having
>succeeding in exhausting all that is contained in his texts....I
>believe that all of the great philosophical texts-- of Plato,
>Parmenides, Hegel or Heidegger, for example-- are still *before* us.
>The future of the great philosophies remains obscure and enigmatic,
>still to be disclosed. Up to now, we have merely scratched the
>surface." (Kearney Interview, p113)
Yes he seems to want as many spooks as possible past - present and
future. But its surely more than scratching the surface - as the act of
scratching produces yet more surfaces....
>>
>>In good faith - and trying to be polite - effort - well i have other
>>things to do but - as i said i ordered the book - i'm re-reading Of
>>Grammatology and some other books *on* Derrida - i've even bought a
>>"popularist" book - which i can't say misrepresents him, and spent many
>>hours in reply - ( and the last one you will not bother to address).
>
>Perhaps you might consider replacing some of the other reading with a
>careful reading of the Kearney interview, which you seemed to have
>ready-to-hand. I think you'll find that many of the questions (and
>misapprehensions) that have plagued this discussion have been
>addressed there in very clear terms.
This plague - is it the Virus to which Derrida compares
himself/Deconstruction - and is he looking/believing in *a* cure - i
think not. Isn't he/it the pharmakon?
>
>>
>>On the subject of lack of reading ... good faith ... competence ...
>>and illiteracy (Moggin) if these account for my view of Derrida then so
>>be it - however if one checks other sources- (all critics of Derrida)
>>are they all similarly to be condemned?
>
>If they fit the same criteria. Many do.
give me the criteria - once again these may be determined - but the
problem - (as Derrida says!) is not indeterminacy but undecidability.
Now i would forgive a naive conflation of the two... (i can see no limit
to the process of scratching...)
>>>Questions like
>>>
>>>>Why does Derrida say "it supposes a bad reading" not it is a bad
>>>>reading, doesn't this mean that the argument assumes that bad readings
>>>>generate lack of truth - and doesn't he then say that this argument is
>>>>wrong. So does it follow that a good reading as generating a lack of
>>>>truth, stability etc. as its opposite - and right?
>>>>
>>>>also
>>>>(which is to say, isn't it, the skeptical-relativist-nihilist!)
>>>>is this saying the "user" or is it an aside by Derrida?)
>>>
>>>are so elementary as to make me wonder if you've even *tried* to
>>>understand the quote. Shall we take it phrase by phrase?
>>
>>First i understood the quote as simply Derrida saying he is not a
>>skeptical-relativist-nihilist - or that sort of thing is unfair re -
>>deconstruction - this was my superficial reading...
>>
>>but his ideas once in the public domain have lives of their own ... the
>>sort of thing which Derrida was aware of regarding thought ... e.g.
>>Nietzche.
>
>Notice the easy slippage to "his ideas." What you seem to have
>meant, of course, was "this odd misrepresentation of his ideas".
>Which, as Derrida points out, is not a naive or random
>misrepresentation, but one that discloses certain "political and
>institutional interests." (Kearney Interview, p 124)
I actually see *his ideas* and *the misrepresentations*
as separate... but Derrida's interpretations of these misrepresentations
are yet more slippages then?
I'm not interested in turning Derrida on himself, and i did in respect
not call Deconstruction a method - i'm aware of several quotes- though
it seems in one he does not rule it out of becoming a method altogether.
Would you say it was a programme?
>
>Unfortunately for your project, you're still stuck on #1. (If you are
>still wondering why deconstruction is not a method, see the Kearney
>Interview, p 124).
if you regard being "wary of methods" as a method then it might just be
one - though - surely - even "no holds bared" is a rule...
"all the lexical signification's ... which seem at one moment to lend
themselves to this definition (of Deconstruction) .. are also
deconstructable"
>
>>I write this with good faith and a wish to learn if you think i'm just
>>not up to it - well that is a pity.
>
>It would be a pity, indeed. I look forward to seeing some evidence
>that you are, in fact, up to it.
From what position are you attempting any judgement? Are you already
making a choice and closing off the argument?
--
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg
> wasn't moggin being
> naughty in the way he attributed the quote as a response to certain
> named journalists - which it seems it might not be?
You write as well as you read, and that ain't good. Since
you mention it, tho, I never said the quote Michael offered
was "a response to certain named journalists." You asked where
the journalists came from, and I told you.
-- Moggin
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
You didn't tell me where the journalists came from it seems
> He probably got there by reading, since Derrida explicitly
>includes "the press" in his complaints.
you offered a theory... which is based on something 9 pages further
on...
> He also gives a
>partial list of the journalists he's complaining about. All in
>the same piece Michael quoted from.
Whether Michael mistakenly got the *journalists* from the remarks about
de Man is for him to tell us, but now here we see moggin's conflation -
'He's complaining' - now our thread was concerning the complaint of
Derrida re certain definitions of deconstruction - but this
*complaining* is nothing to do with it - so why attribute these names to
the original complaint?
--
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg
> You didn't tell me where the journalists came from it seems
Seems I did. Seems I even gave you the number of the page
where you could find them.
> you offered a theory... which is based on something 9 pages further
> on...
I told you where Derrida refers to journalism in the piece
that Michael quoted from, thereby answering your question
about where he found the journalists. Unfortunately, you found
that impossible to comprehend.
> Whether Michael mistakenly got the *journalists* from the remarks about
> de Man is for him to tell us
No mistake: Derrida does sure enough refer to journalists
in his remarks on de Man. Even names some.
> but now here we see moggin's conflation -
You and the mouse in your pocket, you mean? Let the mouse
have a turn already.
> 'He's complaining' - now our thread was concerning the complaint of
> Derrida re certain definitions of deconstruction - but this
> *complaining* is nothing to do with it -
[...]
Has everything to do with it: Derrida complains the press
misrepresents deconstruction.
-- Moggin
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
>James Whitehead <jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk>:
>
>> You didn't tell me where the journalists came from it seems
>
> Seems I did. Seems I even gave you the number of the page
>where you could find them.
Ok so now your saying you knew for certain where Michael got the
Journalists from - before you said "probably" - are you changing this
position now to definitely? Are you attributing the journalists on page
153/4 to the quote on page 146? Ah! - I see by the last sentence you
do? I was pointing out that the attribution of Journalists is not
related to the *original* quote which missed placing its context re -
Searle - and missed "all the positive values to which I have just
referred are contextual, essentially limited, unstable...." If you want
to say that the quote Michael made was Derrida attacking the Journalists
- a kind of aside in the discussion of Searle - then fine - post it to
the press complaints newsgroup.
>
>> you offered a theory... which is based on something 9 pages further
>> on...
>
> I told you where Derrida refers to journalism in the piece
>that Michael quoted from, thereby answering your question
>about where he found the journalists. Unfortunately, you found
>that impossible to comprehend.
The journalists being the target of the original quote? - now it seems
you agree with the reasons (reading) you gave for Michael's attribution
- so my criticism is aimed at both of you in that case (assuming your
correct regarding Michael) That the context of the quote is not related
to the latter discussion of deniability and de Man. Its specifically in
a very long discussion of Searle - who is not a journalist but a
philosopher. Why Michael and now yourself wish to move the target to the
journalists several pages on is puzzling. As is Michael's remittance of
the last part of this section ... "all the positive values to which I
have just referred are contextual, essentially limited, unstable...." -
puzzling as it seems to destabilize the original absolutist sounding
"BAD" and "FALSE" quotes.
>
>> Whether Michael mistakenly got the *journalists* from the remarks about
>> de Man is for him to tell us
>
> No mistake: Derrida does sure enough refer to journalists
>in his remarks on de Man. Even names some.
yes - but the original quote is not about de Man and his alleged
collaboration with the Nazis.
>
>> but now here we see moggin's conflation -
>
> You and the mouse in your pocket, you mean? Let the mouse
>have a turn already.
>
>> 'He's complaining' - now our thread was concerning the complaint of
>> Derrida re certain definitions of deconstruction - but this
>> *complaining* is nothing to do with it -
>
>[...]
>
> Has everything to do with it: Derrida complains the press
>misrepresents deconstruction.
>
Is that what your saying - the original quote is concerned with? I
thought Derrida was saying that Searle had it wrong... "that Searle, for
example , as I have already demonstrated was not on the "right track"...
(this appears directly after the original quote) - and Searle is not (as
far as i know ) a Journalist or a Popularizer or examples of these, but
a (n example of a) professional philosopher.
--
James Whitehead
Michael Dorfman
That's what I am saying. I do not know of anyone who claims to be,
themselves, a "skeptical-relativist-nihilist," nor do I expect to find
one-- as Husserl pointed out long ago, skepticism is a self-refuting
position. Those who claim that their "opponents" are
skeptical-relativist-nihilists are misrepresenting those they are
attacking. In other words, Joel and Rachel's attack on Derrida fails
to find its target.
> And signifies nothing?
It signifies quite a great deal, actually-- it is a straw-man argument
that masks some other agenda.
> Sure you were "correcting" Joel - and in particular the quote
> was within a section which was discussing Searle - (and *not* the
> journalists named - to which moggin referred - this appears in quite a
> different context in relation to a question regarding de Man's writings
> and deniability - which Derrida defends by accusing (it seems) the
> American press of hypocrisy)
Do I take it that you now have "Limited Inc" ready-to-hand? Does this
mean that you are interested in beginning a close reading of
"Signature Event Context"?
The quote that I posted is taken (as you undoubtedly know) from an
interview of sorts, in which Derrida responded to questions from
Gerald Graff. There are a small number of questions, and Derrida's
responses are quite lengthy. The quote that I posted is indeed taken
from a question which is nominally about Searle, but I don't think
Derrida's entire response is limited to Searle. It seems to me that
the quote that I posted refers to *anyone* making the argument that
Derrida outlines, whether it be Searle, a journalist, or Joel and
Rachel.
> and continues " ... and that proves that
> all the positive values to which i have just referred are contextual,
> essentially limited, unstable, and endangered. And therefore that the
> essential and irreducible possibility of misunderstanding or of
> infelicity must be taken into account in the description of those values
> said to be positive"
This is, of course, the thesis of "Signature Event Context", which I
am hoping we can discuss with some rigor. Anticipating a bit, I'd
argue that although the *necessary possibility* of misunderstanding is
irreducible to communication and be taken into account, this "taking
into account" takes the form of *attempting to not misunderstand.*
> [what are these positive values please Michael-
> "the value of truth( and all those values associated with it)"? Was it
> *fair* not to offer this also for Joel and others
I think so. Do you find it unfair? Do you think that the quote that
you have produced strengthens Joel and Rachel's position, even
slightly?
>(wasn't moggin being
> naughty in the way he attributed the quote as a response to certain
> named journalists - which it seems it might not be?)
How does it seem not to be? When Derrida speaks of the "many times"
he has heard this argument, is he not signalling that this particular
argument (and his response to it) is not limited in any way to Searle?
I'd say that not only was Moggin not being "naughty", he was being a
careful and astute reader.
> Have you (in this
> quote) fully and honestly represented Derrida's position!
"Honestly"? I'd like to think so. "Fully"? As fully as appropriate
for the context, I'd think.
>
> >
> >>
> >>My point is (was) suppose a person who is a po-mo-skeptical-relativist-
> >>nihilist claims that her/his position derives from Derrida's writing.
> >>Does *this* misrepresent his (Ds) work. Of course from Derrida's point
> >>it might - but be relative about this for awhile - from the P-M-S-R-N's
> >>view it needs not. Anymore than Jackson Pollock misrepresents
> >>Braque.... or Marx Hegel .... (maybe)
> >
> >Cf above. Who is claiming to be a P-M-S-R-N?
>
> I said *suppose* .... do you think now - given more of the text that
> this could not - or should not take place in regards of Derrida (i
> think) saying it/(could) will?
OK, "supposing", then. Suppose that there were a person who claimed
to be a P-M-S-R-N. Their position would be self-refuting, and any
claims they made regarding their intellectual heritage would be
suspect, as all of their statements would be meaningless.
>
> >
> >>
> >>Can i say here you - and Moggin - still seem haunted by ghost of Plato -
> >>that justice exists but is deferred etc. It struck me when you were
> >>discussing where Bob was in Europe - as if there was some ABSOLUTE truth
> >>as to where he was - if only we could find it. His position is however
> >>*relative*. Strange how we resort to Physics in discussion of truth.
> >
> >In what sense do you mean "relative"? Relative to what? Is Bob, in
> >your conception, not in a place?
>
> My placing of Bob is relative - if Bob visits the British Isles - is he
> in Northern Ireland or visiting the six counties?
Your placing of Bob may be relative (to the Equator and the Greenwich
Meridian, for example) but that has no bearing on the discussion
Moggin and I were having about the difference between truth-telling
and lying (on the one hand) and the truth/falsehood of a proposition.
In other words, I was arguing that the truth/falsehood of a
proposition is relative (to use your word) to the factuality of its
referent, where the act of truth-telling/lying is relative to the
speaker's knowledge.
In other words, whichever tree you think you are barking up seems to
be the wrong one.
No, this "plague" which metaphorically appeared in my characterization
of this discussion referred neither to Derrida nor deconstruction, but
rather to a lack of careful reading.
Are you even reading what you are responding to? Have you made even
the slightest effort to understand the arguments being made?
I'd rather avoid the parlor game of defining it, altogether. Derrida
has outlined (as I previously cited) the reason why "his collection of
terms and approaches" does not "look like method."
>
> >
> >Unfortunately for your project, you're still stuck on #1. (If you are
> >still wondering why deconstruction is not a method, see the Kearney
> >Interview, p 124).
>
> if you regard being "wary of methods" as a method then it might just be
> one - though - surely - even "no holds bared" is a rule...
If you think that being wary of methods constitutes a method, I think
you need to re-examine your conception of method.
From what position? From the one I am in now-- finding myself
somewhat exasperated as I attempt to continue.
Michael Dorfman
G*rd*n
michae...@hotmail.com (Michael Dorfman):
| That's what I am saying. I do not know of anyone who claims to be,
| themselves, a "skeptical-relativist-nihilist," nor do I expect to find
| one-- as Husserl pointed out long ago, skepticism is a self-refuting
| position. ...
It is "taking" or "holding a position" -- a particularly
military metaphor denoting an operation around some sort of
fixed emplacement -- which refutes, or at least contradicts,
the spirit of skepticism, relativism, or nihilism. The s-r-ns
should disdain "positions". To continue the metaphor, their
proper role would be that of the guerrilla warrior who strikes
and runs away, or even more the peasant who burns his crops
and silently moves into the woods without even engaging the
position-takers in a temporary battle.
--
(<><>) /*/
}"{ G*rd*n }"{ g...@panix.com }"{
{ http://www.etaoin.com | latest new material 5/19/01 <-adv't
Moggin Goldberg
>>> You didn't tell me where the journalists came from it seems
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>> Seems I did. Seems I even gave you the number of the page
>> where you could find them.
James:
> Ok so now your saying you knew for certain where Michael got the
> Journalists from - before you said "probably" - are you changing this
> position now to definitely? Are you attributing the journalists on page
> 153/4 to the quote on page 146? Ah! - I see by the last sentence you
> do? I was pointing out that the attribution of Journalists is not
> related to the *original* quote which missed placing its context re -
> Searle - and missed "all the positive values to which I have just
> referred are contextual, essentially limited, unstable...." If you want
> to say that the quote Michael made was Derrida attacking the Journalists
> - a kind of aside in the discussion of Searle - then fine - post it to
> the press complaints newsgroup.
Seems to me it's on-topic here. Derrida is discussing the
misrepresentation of deconstruction.
Moggin:
>> I told you where Derrida refers to journalism in the piece
>> that Michael quoted from, thereby answering your question
>> about where he found the journalists. Unfortunately, you found
>> that impossible to comprehend.
James:
> The journalists being the target of the original quote? - now it seems
> you agree with the reasons (reading) you gave for Michael's attribution
> - so my criticism is aimed at both of you in that case (assuming your
> correct regarding Michael) That the context of the quote is not related
> to the latter discussion of deniability and de Man. Its specifically in
> a very long discussion of Searle - who is not a journalist but a
> philosopher. Why Michael and now yourself wish to move the target to the
> journalists several pages on is puzzling.
Same issue: the misrepresentation of deconstruction. You
must be easily puzzled.
> As is Michael's remittance of
> the last part of this section ... "all the positive values to which I
> have just referred are contextual, essentially limited, unstable...." -
> puzzling as it seems to destabilize the original absolutist sounding
> "BAD" and "FALSE" quotes.
Doesn't it, tho?
James:
>>> Whether Michael mistakenly got the *journalists* from the remarks
>>> about de Man is for him to tell us
Moggin:
>> No mistake: Derrida does sure enough refer to journalists
>>in his remarks on de Man. Even names some.
James:
> yes - but the original quote is not about de Man and his alleged
> collaboration with the Nazis.
The quote Michael orginally posted is about
misrepresentations of deconstruction. So are Derrida's remarks
about the discussion of de Man in the press.
James:
>>> 'He's complaining' - now our thread was concerning the complaint of
>>> Derrida re certain definitions of deconstruction - but this
>>> *complaining* is nothing to do with it -
Moggin:
>> Has everything to do with it: Derrida complains the press
>> misrepresents deconstruction.
James:
> Is that what your saying - the original quote is concerned with? I
> thought Derrida was saying that Searle had it wrong...
No, you believed he was going after "cheap punk philosophy
kids" for stealing his work.
> "that Searle, for
> example , as I have already demonstrated was not on the "right track"...
> (this appears directly after the original quote) - and Searle is not (as
> far as i know ) a Journalist or a Popularizer or examples of these, but
> a (n example of a) professional philosopher.
Searle is a professional philosopher, I agree, but Derrida
is not offering Searle as an example of a professional
philosopher: he's offering Searle as someone "not on the right
track" in his understanding of deconstruction. He also
offers three or four more examples from the world of journalism.
-- Moggin
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
The quote comes from a specific answer to a specific question -and is
not about misrepresentation but about undecidability and indeterminacy -
and power relations - undecidability it appears being part of
deconstruction. Derrida doesn't find indeterminacy however - you still
maintain that its also an answer to a question which hasn't yet been
asked!
I don't for a minute suppose you would want to discuss the difference in
consequences between undecidability and indeterminacy? If this is a
feature of Deconstruction i don't see what all the fuss is about, except
the need to keep the "guard rails" - else the punks will bring the whole
enterprise crashing down - which is what happened. I would like to know
how undecidability can not - does not generate indeterminacy. I would
then like to go on to look at the axioms of Justice and Truth - and how
they escape logcentricism. (end of wish list)
--
James Whitehead
James Whitehead
Dorfman <michae...@hotmail.com> writes
[..]
>> So the 'skeptical-relativst-nihilist' is a fiction?
>
>That's what I am saying. I do not know of anyone who claims to be,
>themselves, a "skeptical-relativist-nihilist," nor do I expect to find
>one-- as Husserl pointed out long ago, skepticism is a self-refuting
>position. Those who claim that their "opponents" are
>skeptical-relativist-nihilists are misrepresenting those they are
>attacking. In other words, Joel and Rachel's attack on Derrida fails
>to find its target.
The phrase is Derrida's - this is what is interesting.
>
>> And signifies nothing?
>
>It signifies quite a great deal, actually-- it is a straw-man argument
>that masks some other agenda.
What agenda? I don't follow your metaphor above at all...
>
>> Sure you were "correcting" Joel - and in particular the quote
>> was within a section which was discussing Searle - (and *not* the
>> journalists named - to which moggin referred - this appears in quite a
>> different context in relation to a question regarding de Man's writings
>> and deniability - which Derrida defends by accusing (it seems) the
>> American press of hypocrisy)
>
>Do I take it that you now have "Limited Inc" ready-to-hand? Does this
>mean that you are interested in beginning a close reading of
>"Signature Event Context"?
Well yes - i've read it through once - but now i'm stuck with the
Kearney interview and the chapter in of Grammatology, i have however
begun to make some notes regarding sec- in particular the significance
of Condillac and his ideas regarding language. How would these fit with
a non empiricist view - Leibniz, Spinoza, or someone sceptical of
causality - Hume?
>
>The quote that I posted is taken (as you undoubtedly know) from an
>interview of sorts, in which Derrida responded to questions from
>Gerald Graff. There are a small number of questions, and Derrida's
>responses are quite lengthy. The quote that I posted is indeed taken
>from a question which is nominally about Searle, but I don't think
>Derrida's entire response is limited to Searle. It seems to me that
>the quote that I posted refers to *anyone* making the argument that
>Derrida outlines, whether it be Searle, a journalist, or Joel and
>Rachel.
I think you could have made this clear.. that is the "it seems to me" -
else it could be taken as Derrida's position.
>
>> and continues " ... and that proves that
>> all the positive values to which i have just referred are contextual,
>> essentially limited, unstable, and endangered. And therefore that the
>> essential and irreducible possibility of misunderstanding or of
>> infelicity must be taken into account in the description of those values
>> said to be positive"
>
>This is, of course, the thesis of "Signature Event Context", which I
>am hoping we can discuss with some rigor. Anticipating a bit, I'd
>argue that although the *necessary possibility* of misunderstanding is
>irreducible to communication and be taken into account, this "taking
>into account" takes the form of *attempting to not misunderstand.*
Yes - i'm getting familiar with that kind of sentiment - but i'm afraid
i'm still to be convinced. If what you say is true my question is how to
stop a slide into scepticism and indeterminacy. From the practitioners
view obviously it mustn't - would it be correct in seeing the position
as essentially un-stable - yet attempting correctness? And doesn't this
follow that choice - is the arbiter?
>
>> [what are these positive values please Michael-
>> "the value of truth( and all those values associated with it)"? Was it
>> *fair* not to offer this also for Joel and others
>
>I think so. Do you find it unfair? Do you think that the quote that
>you have produced strengthens Joel and Rachel's position, even
>slightly?
Well i never was defending Joel and Rachel's position - but yes it does
- it seems obvious. My position though is not theirs - i see the
consequences of Deconstruction - though its not intentional - ultimately
nihilistic. This is one of many consequences...
>
>>(wasn't moggin being
>> naughty in the way he attributed the quote as a response to certain
>> named journalists - which it seems it might not be?)
>
>How does it seem not to be? When Derrida speaks of the "many times"
>he has heard this argument, is he not signalling that this particular
>argument (and his response to it) is not limited in any way to Searle?
> I'd say that not only was Moggin not being "naughty", he was being a
>careful and astute reader.
The importance here for me is the context- a philosophical debate - not
a newspaper article, and an answer to a specific question - and not an
answer to a question yet to be asked. I feel you want to defend Derrida
from the labels thrown by Joel, and quite rightly so, Derrida is
obviously not a sceptic, what i want to know is how a sceptical view is
ruled out as a consequence of deconstruction. Its this "ruling out"
which appears like the reappearance of the old axioms of logcentricism.
OK so they can re-appear - as ghosts- but now they seem ironic, and why
immune to the disease?
>
>
>> Have you (in this
>> quote) fully and honestly represented Derrida's position!
>
>"Honestly"? I'd like to think so. "Fully"? As fully as appropriate
>for the context, I'd think.
OK - then i'll say now - i don't think you have - you ignored Searle -
the context - and trimmed out the more relativist end to the passage.
Why - if not to present a false picture of certainty regarding
deconstruction? (from the best of motives i'm sure)
>
>>
>> >
>> >>
>> >>My point is (was) suppose a person who is a po-mo-skeptical-relativist-
>> >>nihilist claims that her/his position derives from Derrida's writing.
>> >>Does *this* misrepresent his (Ds) work. Of course from Derrida's point
>> >>it might - but be relative about this for awhile - from the P-M-S-R-N's
>> >>view it needs not. Anymore than Jackson Pollock misrepresents
>> >>Braque.... or Marx Hegel .... (maybe)
>> >
>> >Cf above. Who is claiming to be a P-M-S-R-N?
>>
>> I said *suppose* .... do you think now - given more of the text that
>> this could not - or should not take place in regards of Derrida (i
>> think) saying it/(could) will?
>
>OK, "supposing", then. Suppose that there were a person who claimed
>to be a P-M-S-R-N. Their position would be self-refuting, and any
>claims they made regarding their intellectual heritage would be
>suspect, as all of their statements would be meaningless.
Why - only if the P-M-S-R-N position holds generally - i think here we
are close to something quite interesting. As I said earlier - something
anticipated by Nietzsche and Heidegger. If P-M-S-R-N position is self
refuting - again it bares comparison with a great deal of post-modern
culture.
[..]
>
>> >In what sense do you mean "relative"? Relative to what? Is Bob, in
>> >your conception, not in a place?
>>
>> My placing of Bob is relative - if Bob visits the British Isles - is he
>> in Northern Ireland or visiting the six counties?
>
>Your placing of Bob may be relative (to the Equator and the Greenwich
>Meridian, for example) but that has no bearing on the discussion
>Moggin and I were having about the difference between truth-telling
>and lying (on the one hand) and the truth/falsehood of a proposition.
>In other words, I was arguing that the truth/falsehood of a
>proposition is relative (to use your word) to the factuality of its
>referent, where the act of truth-telling/lying is relative to the
>speaker's knowledge.
You failed to agree on this - i thought - this reminded me of the
Justified-True-Belief Argument in epistemology... You seemed to be
saying that one must believe what one says is true and that it must be
true, which is strange - and moggin that belief is not required for
truth - which is also strange. - isn't it? I found that exchange
interesting as it exposed these two positions - both seemingly not quite
satisfactory?
>
>In other words, whichever tree you think you are barking up seems to
>be the wrong one.
This supposes your up a tree? Which is something established by the
barking then!
[..]
>> >Perhaps you might consider replacing some of the other reading with a
>> >careful reading of the Kearney interview, which you seemed to have
>> >ready-to-hand. I think you'll find that many of the questions (and
>> >misapprehensions) that have plagued this discussion have been
>> >addressed there in very clear terms.
>>
>> This plague - is it the Virus to which Derrida compares
>> himself/Deconstruction - and is he looking/believing in *a* cure - i
>> think not. Isn't he/it the pharmakon?
>
>No, this "plague" which metaphorically appeared in my characterization
>of this discussion referred neither to Derrida nor deconstruction, but
>rather to a lack of careful reading.
>
Yes - this is the stick i keep getting beaten with. Is it possible that
a careful reading could establish an outcome from deconstruction not
acceptable to either you, moggin or Derrida. And could one challenge
even the need of (the sacrament of deconstruction) "careful reading"
itself (I bet fred might?) - by careful reading? (To the extent that we
become pragmatic?)
[..]
>> >Notice the easy slippage to "his ideas." What you seem to have
>> >meant, of course, was "this odd misrepresentation of his ideas".
>> >Which, as Derrida points out, is not a naive or random
>> >misrepresentation, but one that discloses certain "political and
>> >institutional interests." (Kearney Interview, p 124)
>>
>> I actually see *his ideas* and *the misrepresentations*
>> as separate... but Derrida's interpretations of these misrepresentations
>> are yet more slippages then?
>
>Are you even reading what you are responding to? Have you made even
>the slightest effort to understand the arguments being made?
I'm spending hours - but maybe i'm not up to it. What i say seems to
make sense - i quoted the idea of instability - which you said was the
thesis of sec? So i got this right? Now i see the question - 'given
instability how do i know i'm right then?' - and anticipate the reply -
your being silly or your not reading properly? Am I?
[..]
>>
>> I'm not interested in turning Derrida on himself, and i did in respect
>> not call Deconstruction a method - i'm aware of several quotes- though
>> it seems in one he does not rule it out of becoming a method altogether.
>> Would you say it was a programme?
>
>I'd rather avoid the parlor game of defining it, altogether. Derrida
>has outlined (as I previously cited) the reason why "his collection of
>terms and approaches" does not "look like method."
Why do you want to avoid this game - isn't it because in itself its not
possible- actually is possible-but not stable.
"all the lexical signification's ... which seem at one moment to lend
themselves to this definition (of Deconstruction) .. are also
deconstructable"
If so the thesis is contradictory - it maintains (for certain) that one
cannot maintain certainty? why isn't it victim to this - how does
Derrida stop that consequence? Or does he want to? Or if its not *for
certain* then its provisional. I guess provisional is the answer. OK? So
we have a kind of limit - on certainty and truth - of course this allows
us to continue reading etc. but never with the chance of anything other
that a provisional position.
But I've made the same mistake again - a provisional theory *is* a
certainty - and i can't have that....
Derrida doesn't go as far as saying no rules - he says be wary of method
- but yes "there are no rules" is a rule. The great metaphysical
detective suspects everything - even the rule that he must suspect
everything... Nothing new here though - as with Godel - its still
possible to do maths - but something fundamental appears to have
occurred. Humpty Dumpty has had a great fall.
>> >Unfortunately for your project, you're still stuck on #1. (If you are
>> >still wondering why deconstruction is not a method, see the Kearney
>> >Interview, p 124).
>>
>> if you regard being "wary of methods" as a method then it might just be
>> one - though - surely - even "no holds bared" is a rule...
>
>If you think that being wary of methods constitutes a method, I think
>you need to re-examine your conception of method.
Why? there is a feeling of infinite regress here - but i find this
located in the topic - obviously one tries to escape this if one is
trying to be optimistic...
[..]
>> >
>> >>I write this with good faith and a wish to learn if you think i'm just
>> >>not up to it - well that is a pity.
>> >
>> >It would be a pity, indeed. I look forward to seeing some evidence
>> >that you are, in fact, up to it.
>>
>> From what position are you attempting any judgement? Are you already
>> making a choice and closing off the argument?
>
>From what position? From the one I am in now-- finding myself
>somewhat exasperated as I attempt to continue.
>
Isn't undecideability an exasperating thing?
--
James Whitehead
Michael Dorfman
<jl...@jliat.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>In article <5d37ff37.01071...@posting.google.com>, Michael
>Dorfman <michae...@hotmail.com> writes
>
>[..]
>
>>> So the 'skeptical-relativst-nihilist' is a fiction?
>>
>>That's what I am saying. I do not know of anyone who claims to be,
>>themselves, a "skeptical-relativist-nihilist," nor do I expect to find
>>one-- as Husserl pointed out long ago, skepticism is a self-refuting
>>position. Those who claim that their "opponents" are
>>skeptical-relativist-nihilists are misrepresenting those they are
>>attacking. In other words, Joel and Rachel's attack on Derrida fails
>>to find its target.
>
>The phrase is Derrida's - this is what is interesting.
The phrase is Derrida's, but he's paraphrasing those attacking him.
Although Joel and Rachel did not use the phrase, it seemed to me that
it matched their intent.
(Note that (despite many misrepresentations to the contrary) Derrida's
notion of communication does *not* ignore the author's intent, insofar
as we can deduce it.)
>
>>
>>> And signifies nothing?
>>
>>It signifies quite a great deal, actually-- it is a straw-man argument
>>that masks some other agenda.
>
>What agenda? I don't follow your metaphor above at all...
>
Those (like Joel and Rachel) who attack something they do not
understand (or, less charitably, attack something they knowingly
misrepresent) generally have some reason for doing so, usually tied to
some ideology which is believed to be diametrically opposed to the one
being attacked. (That the one being attacked is a fictional construct
only serves to confuse the issue.)
>>
>>> Sure you were "correcting" Joel - and in particular the quote
>>> was within a section which was discussing Searle - (and *not* the
>>> journalists named - to which moggin referred - this appears in quite a
>>> different context in relation to a question regarding de Man's writings
>>> and deniability - which Derrida defends by accusing (it seems) the
>>> American press of hypocrisy)
>>
>>Do I take it that you now have "Limited Inc" ready-to-hand? Does this
>>mean that you are interested in beginning a close reading of
>>"Signature Event Context"?
>
>Well yes - i've read it through once - but now i'm stuck with the
>Kearney interview and the chapter in of Grammatology, i have however
>begun to make some notes regarding sec- in particular the significance
>of Condillac and his ideas regarding language. How would these fit with
>a non empiricist view - Leibniz, Spinoza, or someone sceptical of
>causality - Hume?
A non-empiricist view of language? Explain.
How to stop it in practice? That's easy; we examine the context as
fully as possible, and ask follow-up questions when we can.
> From the practitioners
>view obviously it mustn't - would it be correct in seeing the position
>as essentially un-stable - yet attempting correctness?
Yes. (Unstable in essence, yet generally quite stable in practice.)
> And doesn't this
>follow that choice - is the arbiter?
No, this doesn't follow. "Choice" is a concept that is particulary
questioned by Derrida. Here is an excerpt from an Interview with a
Literary journal-- I am including the questions this time. It is a
bit long, but is on topic.
Q: It might be argued that deconstruction inevitably leads to
pluralist interpretation and ultimately to the view that any
interpretation is as good as any other. Do you believe this and how
do you select some interpretations as being better than others?
JD: I am not a pluralist and I would never say that every
interpretation is equal but *I* do not select. The interpretations
select themselves. I am a Nietzschean in that sense. You know that
Nietzsche insisted on the fact that the principle of differentiation
was in itself selective. The eternal return of the same was not
repetition, it was a selection of more powerful forces. So I would
not say that some interpretations are truer than others. I would say
that some are more powerful than others. The hierarchy is between
forces and not between true and false. There are interpretations
which account for more meaning and this is the criterion.
Q: You would reject, then, the view that meaning is any response
whatever to a sign? That meaning is determined by the person who
reads the sign?
JD: Yes, of course. Meaning is determined by a system of forces which
is not personal. It does not depend on the subjective identity but on
the field of different forces, the conflict of forces, which produce
interpretations.
Q: You would, therefore, reject the theory of authorial intention as
determinate of meaning?
JD: Yes. I would not say that there is no interest in referring to
the intentional purpose. There are authors, there are
intentionalities, there are conscious purposes. We must analyse them,
take them seriously. But the effects of what we caul author's
intentions are dependent on something which is not the individual
intention, which is not intentional.
Q:There is a pragmatic aspect to this question of intentionality. It
has been suggested that it is only in the field of literary theory
that reader-based theories of interpretation are taken seriously, that
all other fields of discourse accept author-based intention.
Reader-based theories of interpretation tend, therefore, according to
this view to partition off literary speculation from the rest of
experience and thus to trivialise literary speculation. What are your
views on this?
JD: I do not accept this opposition between reader-based and
author-based meaning. It comes from a misunderstanding of
deconstruction, one which sees deconstruction as free interpretation
based only on the fantasies of the reader. No one is free to read as
he or she wants. The reader does not interpret freely, taking into
account only his own reading, excluding the author, the historical
period in which the text appeared and so on.
Q: So you would not consider yourself an anti-historicist?
JD: Not at all. I think that one cannot read without trying to
reconstruct the historical context but history is not the last word,
the final key, of reading. Without being anti-historicist, I am
suspicious of the traditional concepts of history, the Hegelian and
Marxist concepts."
>
>>
>>> [what are these positive values please Michael-
>>> "the value of truth( and all those values associated with it)"? Was it
>>> *fair* not to offer this also for Joel and others
>>
>>I think so. Do you find it unfair? Do you think that the quote that
>>you have produced strengthens Joel and Rachel's position, even
>>slightly?
>
>Well i never was defending Joel and Rachel's position - but yes it does
>- it seems obvious. My position though is not theirs - i see the
>consequences of Deconstruction - though its not intentional - ultimately
>nihilistic. This is one of many consequences...
I'd like to think that your view that deconstruction leads inevitably
to nihilism is based upon an incomplete understanding of
deconstruction. Would you care to outline what it is in
deconstruction that leads to nihilism?
>
>>
>>>(wasn't moggin being
>>> naughty in the way he attributed the quote as a response to certain
>>> named journalists - which it seems it might not be?)
>>
>>How does it seem not to be? When Derrida speaks of the "many times"
>>he has heard this argument, is he not signalling that this particular
>>argument (and his response to it) is not limited in any way to Searle?
>> I'd say that not only was Moggin not being "naughty", he was being a
>>careful and astute reader.
>
>The importance here for me is the context- a philosophical debate - not
>a newspaper article, and an answer to a specific question - and not an
>answer to a question yet to be asked. I feel you want to defend Derrida
>from the labels thrown by Joel, and quite rightly so, Derrida is
>obviously not a sceptic, what i want to know is how a sceptical view is
>ruled out as a consequence of deconstruction.
In the same way it is "ruled out" by other non-skeptical philosophies.
That skepticism cannot be refuted on its own terms is well-known, but
can be ruled out by "reframing the question". For an informative look
at this issue (which crosses the Continental/Analytic divide) see
Simon Glendinning's "On Being With Others: Heidegger - Derrida -
Wittgenstein"
> Its this "ruling out"
>which appears like the reappearance of the old axioms of logcentricism.
>OK so they can re-appear - as ghosts- but now they seem ironic, and why
>immune to the disease?
I don't know if the threat of skepticism ever disappears-- the threat
remains constant, it seems to me.
>
>>
>>
>>> Have you (in this
>>> quote) fully and honestly represented Derrida's position!
>>
>>"Honestly"? I'd like to think so. "Fully"? As fully as appropriate
>>for the context, I'd think.
>
>OK - then i'll say now - i don't think you have - you ignored Searle -
>the context
...which was, of course, not relevant to the context of the discussion
at that point, since Joel and Rachel were not discussing Searle, and
the quote did not apply specifically (or even primarily) to Searle,
but only by way of example....
>- and trimmed out the more relativist end to the passage.
Hardly "more relativist". To suggest that misunderstanding is a
structural possibility in communication is not relativist, as far as I
can see.
>Why - if not to present a false picture of certainty regarding
>deconstruction? (from the best of motives i'm sure)
I don't wish (regardless of motive) to present a false picture of
deconstruction. Quite the opposite...
>
>>
>>>
>>> >
>>> >>
>>> >>My point is (was) suppose a person who is a po-mo-skeptical-relativist-
>>> >>nihilist claims that her/his position derives from Derrida's writing.
>>> >>Does *this* misrepresent his (Ds) work. Of course from Derrida's point
>>> >>it might - but be relative about this for awhile - from the P-M-S-R-N's
>>> >>view it needs not. Anymore than Jackson Pollock misrepresents
>>> >>Braque.... or Marx Hegel .... (maybe)
>>> >
>>> >Cf above. Who is claiming to be a P-M-S-R-N?
>>>
>>> I said *suppose* .... do you think now - given more of the text that
>>> this could not - or should not take place in regards of Derrida (i
>>> think) saying it/(could) will?
>>
>>OK, "supposing", then. Suppose that there were a person who claimed
>>to be a P-M-S-R-N. Their position would be self-refuting, and any
>>claims they made regarding their intellectual heritage would be
>>suspect, as all of their statements would be meaningless.
>
>Why - only if the P-M-S-R-N position holds generally - i think here we
>are close to something quite interesting. As I said earlier - something
>anticipated by Nietzsche and Heidegger. If P-M-S-R-N position is self
>refuting - again it bares comparison with a great deal of post-modern
>culture.
Which "postmodern culture" would that be? Could you name names? Who
do you think is self-refuting?
>
>[..]
>
>>
>>> >In what sense do you mean "relative"? Relative to what? Is Bob, in
>>> >your conception, not in a place?
>>>
>>> My placing of Bob is relative - if Bob visits the British Isles - is he
>>> in Northern Ireland or visiting the six counties?
>>
>>Your placing of Bob may be relative (to the Equator and the Greenwich
>>Meridian, for example) but that has no bearing on the discussion
>>Moggin and I were having about the difference between truth-telling
>>and lying (on the one hand) and the truth/falsehood of a proposition.
>>In other words, I was arguing that the truth/falsehood of a
>>proposition is relative (to use your word) to the factuality of its
>>referent, where the act of truth-telling/lying is relative to the
>>speaker's knowledge.
>
>You failed to agree on this -
That's right.
> i thought - this reminded me of the
>Justified-True-Belief Argument in epistemology... You seemed to be
>saying that one must believe what one says is true and that it must be
>true, which is strange
Actually, I said that for a statement to be a lie, one must believe
that the statement is not true. If one believes that it is true, and
it is (accidentally) false, the act was not lying.
>- and moggin that belief is not required for
>truth - which is also strange. - isn't it? I found that exchange
>interesting as it exposed these two positions - both seemingly not quite
>satisfactory?
Not quite satisfactory to you?
>
>>
>>In other words, whichever tree you think you are barking up seems to
>>be the wrong one.
>
>This supposes your up a tree? Which is something established by the
>barking then!
>
>[..]
>
>>> >Perhaps you might consider replacing some of the other reading with a
>>> >careful reading of the Kearney interview, which you seemed to have
>>> >ready-to-hand. I think you'll find that many of the questions (and
>>> >misapprehensions) that have plagued this discussion have been
>>> >addressed there in very clear terms.
>>>
>>> This plague - is it the Virus to which Derrida compares
>>> himself/Deconstruction - and is he looking/believing in *a* cure - i
>>> think not. Isn't he/it the pharmakon?
>>
>>No, this "plague" which metaphorically appeared in my characterization
>>of this discussion referred neither to Derrida nor deconstruction, but
>>rather to a lack of careful reading.
>>
>
>Yes - this is the stick i keep getting beaten with. Is it possible that
>a careful reading could establish an outcome from deconstruction not
>acceptable to either you, moggin or Derrida.
Possible? Yes. Likely? You be the judge...
>And could one challenge
>even the need of (the sacrament of deconstruction) "careful reading"
>itself (I bet fred might?) - by careful reading? (To the extent that we
>become pragmatic?)
I don't think one could, convincingly. Go ahead and try, if you care
to, and we can see how it would work. At heart, Derrida's thought is
all about respecting alterity, which implies "careful reading"
(broadly construed), so no amount of careful reading would call this
injunction into question. Not all axioms can be turned upon
themselves.
>
>[..]
>
>>> >Notice the easy slippage to "his ideas." What you seem to have
>>> >meant, of course, was "this odd misrepresentation of his ideas".
>>> >Which, as Derrida points out, is not a naive or random
>>> >misrepresentation, but one that discloses certain "political and
>>> >institutional interests." (Kearney Interview, p 124)
>>>
>>> I actually see *his ideas* and *the misrepresentations*
>>> as separate... but Derrida's interpretations of these misrepresentations
>>> are yet more slippages then?
>>
>>Are you even reading what you are responding to? Have you made even
>>the slightest effort to understand the arguments being made?
>
>I'm spending hours - but maybe i'm not up to it. What i say seems to
>make sense - i quoted the idea of instability - which you said was the
>thesis of sec? So i got this right? Now i see the question - 'given
>instability how do i know i'm right then?' - and anticipate the reply -
>your being silly or your not reading properly? Am I?
We're still making a leap from "instability" to "relativism", from the
fact that misreading is always possible to the conclusion that it is
impossible to discern good readings from bad.
>
>[..]
>
>>>
>>> I'm not interested in turning Derrida on himself, and i did in respect
>>> not call Deconstruction a method - i'm aware of several quotes- though
>>> it seems in one he does not rule it out of becoming a method altogether.
>>> Would you say it was a programme?
>>
>>I'd rather avoid the parlor game of defining it, altogether. Derrida
>>has outlined (as I previously cited) the reason why "his collection of
>>terms and approaches" does not "look like method."
>
>Why do you want to avoid this game - isn't it because in itself its not
>possible- actually is possible-but not stable.
>
> "all the lexical signification's ... which seem at one moment to lend
> themselves to this definition (of Deconstruction) .. are also
> deconstructable"
>
>If so the thesis is contradictory - it maintains (for certain) that one
>cannot maintain certainty? why isn't it victim to this - how does
>Derrida stop that consequence? Or does he want to? Or if its not *for
>certain* then its provisional. I guess provisional is the answer. OK? So
>we have a kind of limit - on certainty and truth - of course this allows
>us to continue reading etc. but never with the chance of anything other
>that a provisional position.
Bing! It looks like e have a winner, folks.....
>But I've made the same mistake again - a provisional theory *is* a
>certainty - and i can't have that....
Oh, so close. In what way is a *provisional* theory a *certainty*?
>Derrida doesn't go as far as saying no rules - he says be wary of method
>- but yes "there are no rules" is a rule. The great metaphysical
>detective suspects everything - even the rule that he must suspect
>everything... Nothing new here though - as with Godel - its still
>possible to do maths - but something fundamental appears to have
>occurred. Humpty Dumpty has had a great fall.
Derrida has explicitly (in "Dissemination") drawn an analogy between
his notion of undecidability and Gödel's. And, as you can imagine,
just as it is still possible to do math after Gödel, it is still
possible to read and philosophize after Derrida. But in both cases as
certain naive (encyclopedic) optimism has been dashed. And, in
Derrida's case, at least, there is a profound ethical dimension opened
(although much of this is built upon Levinas's reading of Husserl).
>
>>> >Unfortunately for your project, you're still stuck on #1. (If you are
>>> >still wondering why deconstruction is not a method, see the Kearney
>>> >Interview, p 124).
>>>
>>> if you regard being "wary of methods" as a method then it might just be
>>> one - though - surely - even "no holds bared" is a rule...
>>
>>If you think that being wary of methods constitutes a method, I think
>>you need to re-examine your conception of method.
>
>Why? there is a feeling of infinite regress here - but i find this
>located in the topic - obviously one tries to escape this if one is
>trying to be optimistic...
Let's try to look at this by analogy, shall we? Rather than discuss
the problem of "method", let's look at the difference between a
"decision" and a "calculation" (according to Derrida.) A calculation
will always provide a known result. For example, if I were to offer
you a choice between a £5 note and a £50 note, you could easily
calculate which is the best option (assuming your goal is to maximize
your assets). A decision, on the other hand, implies a moment of
undecidability: for example, if I were to offer you a choice between a
£50 note and a stock option to buy one share of Microsoft at $100 in
July of 2008.
The undecidability in the decision is irreducible-- if one could be
*certain* of the outcome, it would no longer be a decision.
Similarly, there is an irreducible undecidability in the act of
reading as performed by Derrida (which includes, among other things, a
response to the injunctions regarding reading contained within the
text read and an appeal to a context which is never complete and is
always changeable) and it therefore cannot be reduced to a "method"
which can be reproduced.
Clear enough?
>
>[..]
>
>>> >
>>> >>I write this with good faith and a wish to learn if you think i'm just
>>> >>not up to it - well that is a pity.
>>> >
>>> >It would be a pity, indeed. I look forward to seeing some evidence
>>> >that you are, in fact, up to it.
>>>
>>> From what position are you attempting any judgement? Are you already
>>> making a choice and closing off the argument?
>>
>>From what position? From the one I am in now-- finding myself
>>somewhat exasperated as I attempt to continue.
>>
>
>Isn't undecideability an exasperating thing?
Sometimes.
But I must admit that I felt that this last post was encouraging.
Michael Dorfman
Moggin Goldberg
>>> "that Searle, for
>>> example , as I have already demonstrated was not on the "right
>>> track"...(this appears directly after the original quote) - and
>>> Searle is not (as far as i know ) a Journalist or a Popularizer or
>>> examples of these, but a (n example of a) professional philosopher.
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>:
>> Searle is a professional philosopher, I agree, but Derrida
>> is not offering Searle as an example of a professional
>> philosopher: he's offering Searle as someone "not on the right
>> track" in his understanding of deconstruction. He also
>> offers three or four more examples from the world of journalism.
James:
> The quote comes from a specific answer to a specific question -and is
> not about misrepresentation but about undecidability and indeterminacy -
> and power relations -
[...]
No, Derrida's answer does address, among other things, the
misrepresentation of deconstruction. He rejects what he
considers to be a caricature of "the deconstructionist," offers
Searle as an example of someone "not on the right track" in
his understanding of deconstruction, etc. Same in his reply to
the question about de Man, where Derrida comments on
inaccurate portrayals of deconstruction by the press. He talks
about misrepresentation in both cases.
-- Moggin
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
sure - he *talks* in both cases - but as you say above in the first case
its with regard to Searle - and not journalists - which is in the last
question/answer.
--
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg
>>> The quote comes from a specific answer to a specific question -and is
>>> not about misrepresentation but about undecidability and
>>> indeterminacy - and power relations -
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net>
>> No, Derrida's answer does address, among other things, the
>> misrepresentation of deconstruction. He rejects what he
>> considers to be a caricature of "the deconstructionist," offers
>> Searle as an example of someone "not on the right track" in
>> his understanding of deconstruction, etc. Same in his reply to
>> the question about de Man, where Derrida comments on
>> inaccurate portrayals of deconstruction by the press. He talks
>> about misrepresentation in both cases.
James:
> sure - he *talks* in both cases - but as you say above in the first case
> its with regard to Searle - and not journalists - which is in the last
> question/answer.
Derrida remarks on the misrepresentation of deconstruction
in both cases, contrary to your claim above.
-- Moggin
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg <mog...@mediaone.net> writes
- the small print always gets me - !
(the two examples are however different - one relates to 'show trials'
etc. - the other to the shifting nature of deconstruction itself - in
which the assertives of the complaint are themselves undermined -= un
stable in themselves, whereas one presumes derrida thinks the attacks on
de-man by the press are just wrong?...)
--
James Whitehead
Moggin Goldberg
> - the small print always gets me - !
Or anyway the print. Maybe reading in longhand would help.
> (the two examples are however different - one relates to 'show trials'
> etc. - the other to the shifting nature of deconstruction itself - in
> which the assertives of the complaint are themselves undermined -= un
> stable in themselves, whereas one presumes derrida thinks the attacks on
> de-man by the press are just wrong?...)
In both cases Derrida claims the attacks on deconstruction
are aimed at caricatures.
-- Moggin