Foundations of Modernism and Post Modernism
mp4...@albnyvms.bitnet
Kant's primary contribution to post-modernist thougth comes
in his rejection of constructs other than synthetic (self defined)
knowledge. This seems to be part of the post-modernist theology
and one ought to look at sources and proofs for same. Much
of Derrida's verbiage owes its arguments and parameters of reason
to Critique of pure reason.
Re: Hegel
Not wishing to wade into a morass (Hegel is like the bible, almost
anyone can draw almost anything out it some where (I speak here of
"Hegel" as a noun denoting the written material left by a particular
author, the usage is fairly common in philosophical circles and\
among academics studying same eg in Plato we find...)). Hegel
asserts his own inntuitive basis for the progression of history and
the meaning of the forces which drive and assert existance and\
action. Many modernist and pre modernist philosophers and writers
are essentially hegelian in outlook (specifically Marx,Rand,Schoenberg
Freud) especially in the definition of the will and the meaning
of the dialetical nature of historical struggle (eg existance and
history arise out of competing anti-thetical forces. These forces
and their embodiment define what happens and the very act of
existance is a result of each principle asserting its existance).
Post Modernism has leaned more heavily on the mystical self-referential\
nature of hegelian philosophy, but is still primarily hegelian in
its out look on the following issues:
1. The historical dialectic.
The very statement that "texts" are extensions of the socio
existance of their progeniture, as well as the marxist orientation\
of materialism (removed strangely enough from the very basis that
he argued for its validity, as the scientific means towards socialism -
but then for post modernism truth rests in repeated socialized assertion
rather than in iterative progression of symbology) means
that the view of literature etc. embodies hegelian dialectic.
(Yes the above paragraph is dense... it has to be.)
2. The Foundation of the State
Replace "God" with the vague (and unchallenged) assertions of
genetic-culturalism and the sense of self uniqueness (borrowed from\
Rousseau who used the sense of self uniqueness to replace god in
his own theology and though he did not have a concept of "genetic"
basis for culture instead had a very clear concept of a particular
group of people expressing themselves through one collective will.)
and one gets a very good approximation of the nature of governance
under a postmodernist view point.
Stirling Newberry
Post Script:
In the arguement over PosMod vs Modernism. I regard post modernism
as part of modernism - that is the mechanisms by which individuals function\
in a postmodernist fashion are essentially congruent to their modernist
equivelants.
Jason Lamport
>
>2. The Foundation of the State
> Replace "God" with the vague (and unchallenged) assertions of
>genetic-culturalism and the sense of self uniqueness (borrowed from\
>Rousseau who used the sense of self uniqueness to replace god in
>his own theology and though he did not have a concept of "genetic"
>basis for culture instead had a very clear concept of a particular
>group of people expressing themselves through one collective will.)
>and one gets a very good approximation of the nature of governance
>under a postmodernist view point.
>
>Stirling Newberry
>
>Post Script:
>In the arguement over PosMod vs Modernism. I regard post modernism
>as part of modernism - that is the mechanisms by which individuals
function\
>in a postmodernist fashion are essentially congruent to their modernist
>equivelants.
If I understand you correctly here, you are saying that postmodernism is
somehow based on that whole romantic construction which has lately been
christened "bourgeois individualism", namely the _fiction_ (to refer to it
as most "postmodernists" would) that a human being has some central,
unitary "will" which is expressed in his or her actions. As just about
everyone writing about the phenomenon of postmodernism has noticed, a
conspicuous tendency in postmodernism has been precisely the _rejection_
of this "fiction". This is one of the most significant differences
between the modern and the postmodern: modernity believed in
_individuals_, postmodernity doesn't. At this point, at least, I see no
"congruity" between the two models (the modern and the postmodern).
-jason
(no, I don't have a cute .sig file. and I NEVER use smileys.)
James Alexander Chokey
I think that you are blurring together some terms that might more
accurately and more usefully be kept distinct-- most notably, "modernism"
and "modernity." This blurring is not unique to you, of course; it is
is endemic to all discourse by those who consider themselves to be
postmodernists and by others who have attempted to define postmodernism--
including the poster you are responding to.
In much literature on postmodernism, the terms "modernity" and
"modernism" function interchangeably. This results, IMHO, in a great
confusion and oversimplification of the the intellectual history of the
past three centuries. Usually, when postmodernists (or those writing about
postmodernism) use either "modernity" or "modernism" they are really talking
about the Enlightenment and the subsequent enshrinement of Enlightenment
philosophy. Or, to be more specific, they are talking about a caricature of
the Enlightenment-- one that emphasizes only the universalist and totalizing
dimensions of Enlightenment thought (dimensions that *are* there, to be sure)
and ignores completely the pluralistic, limit-acknowledging dimensions of the
Enlightenment (such as its emphasis on tolerance of difference, its abhorrence
of metaphysics, and its awareness of the profound limits that exist on human
reason and knowledge.)
So far this is still fine and well. Everyone needs their straw
man and postmodernism's straw man is the totalizing and universalizing side
of the Enlightenment. The problem, however, is that most postmodern discourse
doesn't say that its criticizing or revolting against this aspect of the
"Enlightenment project." Instead, it claims to be criticizing "modernity,"
by which they mean all forms of cultural/intellectual production since the
Enlightenment (with the exception of those recent forms which are called
"postmodern") as if all art, science, philosophy, etc., since the Enlightenment
have been one monolithic whole that has passively accepted the totalizing
dimension of Enlightenment thought without challenge or criticism. Romanticism
(which you lump in as part and parcel of modernity/modernism) was, of course,
a profound reaction *against* the Enlightenment. And the transformation in
art and throught at the end of the 19th and beginning of the early 20th
century that is usually classified as "modernism" (in this camp, we can
include folks like James, Sorel, Freud, and Weber in philosophy/social thought
and folks like Monet, Picasso, Klimt, Schoenberg, Joyce, Mann, etc. in the
arts) was a profound reaction against the positivistic and aesthetic norms
that had dominated the 19th century. This period of "modernism" saw the
rise of a self-concious awareness of the fictional nature of philosophy
and science (a la Sorel and Weber), the rise the notion that the "individual
self" was itself a divided entity that was the result of certain process of
developement or construction (a la Freud), a realization that thought and
perception is necessarily perspectivist and fragmented (Picasso and Braque),
and a desire to draw attention to the play that can take place with
conventional forms of genre and the use of language (Joyce, Eliot, etc.)
Sure, there was a lot in this "modernism" that, from a postmodern perspective,
does contain within it some of the univeralist elments of the Enlightenment--
the elements that postmodernists characterize as belonging to "modernity."
Most obvious, perhaps, is Freud's belief that his psycho-analytic theories
accurately described the development of all people and all culture at all
times. On the other hand, if one looks at modernism from the perspective of
the Enlightenment-- or even from the perspective or Romanticism-- it looks
like a radical shift away from totalizing, universaling approaches.
It is on this point that I agree with theorists like Habermas and David
Harvey who argue that many postmodernists delude themselves into thinking that
their rejection of Enlightenment universalism is so radically new. Into
this model of totalizing universalism which they simply call "modernity,"
they blur the category of "modernism," a category out of which they drain
all of the doubt, all of the self-concious fictionalism, and all of the
focus on pluralism and play, repainting it to make it look as if it were just
yet another rehashing of discourse of modernity that began with the Enlighten-
ment. Whereas the characterization of totalizing universalism is not entirely
unfair disccusing the Enlightenment itself, it does seem to me to be a gross
misrepresentation to claim the intellectual and artistic movements of
"modernism" were totalizing in anything even resembling the same degree. (The
sole modernist figure who gets spared this whitewashing is Nietzsche; because
of the near-impossibility of characterizing Nietzche as a universalist or
of denying their intellectual debt to him, postmodernists have tended to
deny that Nietzche can be considered a particular radical modernist like
Freud, Sorel, Picasso, etc. and insisted on regarding him instead as the first
"postmodern" thinker.
In short, I do think postmodernism does lack a great historical
perspective in that it fails to realize that the notion of modernity that
it rejects has not held an unquestioned sway over thought and culture
since it arose in the Enlightenment-- and especially not in the turn-of
the century developments that is generally called "modernism."
-- Jim C.
==========================================================================
| James A. Chokey jch...@leland.stanford.edu |
| |
| "I liked him personally. It's just that I couldn't make sense of |
| him. It's as if he was from another species, or something." |
| -- Noam Chomsky, describing Michel Foucault. |
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kevin sawad brooks
jason, i don't want to become boring with this, but it seems that we are
rarefying `modernity` and `postmodernity` and possibly even confusing them
with modernism and post-modernism. it seems to me that there are elements
in so-called modernism that dismember individuality and authority just as
there are others (or the same ones) that construct these figures.
there're similar structures at work in `post-modernism.` with respect to
contemporary readings of `romanticism` or any other past-ism, it should
be noted that such -ism is `always already,` as derrida and heidegger would
say, mediated by the present-ism.
in any case, this is why it seems to me that the `post-` perspective has
a tendency to become `ahistorical,` but in the worst sense of the word,
despite the fact that many of its proponents always argue on the side of
history. reading a past- from within a post- will lead one to forget that
one is actually reading (within) the post-. thus, the past- will become a
straw horse in many cases.
kevin brooks
ksbr...@midway.uchicago.edu
--
"This is a signature?"
Alan Rosiene (Humanities)
So I gather, JC, that you subscribe to Habermas' notion of modernity as
an "incomplete project"? Doesn't this also put you squarely on the side
of Kant as opposed to Hegel? Doesn't this also presuppose a continuous
history of Marxisms that Baudrillard (rather persuasively) denies? And
finally, despite the artists you invoke, doesn't your subscription to
Habermasian notions implicate you in the reduction of aesthetics to a
mere supplement to/for cognitive-moral reasoning?
I'm figurin' you'll deny 'em all, but I'm wonderin' just how.
Alan
James Alexander Chokey
>Sorry to exclude my referent, but James Chokey's post was a bit lengthy.
>
>So I gather, JC, that you subscribe to Habermas' notion of modernity as
>an "incomplete project"?
Well, since you're so curious . . . no, I don't. I don't feel
that it is particularly useful to think about modernity as a kind of
"project" at all.
>Doesn't this also put you squarely on the side
>of Kant as opposed to Hegel?
That's a pretty vague question. Would you care to elaborate just
what elements in Kant and in Hegel you are refering to and why you think
my article puts me "squarely" on the side of one or the other?
>Doesn't this also presuppose a continuous
>history of Marxisms that Baudrillard (rather persuasively) denies?
Although I have not read the Baudrillard you are referring to, I
see ways in which what I said in my post presupposes "a continuous
history of Marxisms." Could you please explain why you think it does?
>And
>finally, despite the artists you invoke, doesn't your subscription to
>Habermasian notions implicate you in the reduction of aesthetics to a
>mere supplement to/for cognitive-moral reasoning?
Neither Habermas (nor any philosopher for that matter) is a "package
deal." One is not forced with the choice of either "subscribing"
wholeheartedly to all of Habermas's ideas or rejecting them entirely.
The fact that I agree with his assertion that many self-described
"postmodernists" lack a historical understanding of the philosophical
developments that they call "modernity," does not mean that I agree with
everything else he's ever said-- or even with everything he says in
_The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity_.
I also don't agree with your characterization of Habermas's valuation
of aesthetics. I am willing to concede that Habermas does give cognitive
reasoning precedence over aesthetic concerns when philosophical-scientific
discourse is at issue. (Actually that's not something that even needs to be
"conceded"-- it's Habermas's main point in one of the Discurses in PDoM!)
This is not the case he makes when discussing literary or other artistic
creations; although he does not emake the argument explicity (to my
recollection, although I might be wrong), he does imply that, in aesthetic
discourse, the aesthetic takes precedence over the cognitive.
>I'm figurin' you'll deny 'em all, but I'm wonderin' just how.
I'm hopin' you found my response satisfyin' and amusin'.
James Alexander Chokey
>
> Although I have not read the Baudrillard you are referring to, I
>see ways in which what I said in my post presupposes "a continuous
>history of Marxisms." Could you please explain why you think it does?
Whoops! That should read "I see no ways in which . . . "!!