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The 'orderly' expulsion of ethnic Germans; post WW2
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A Moose in Love
Nov 12, 2012, 10:16:08 AM11/12/12
to
Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
genocide.?
http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
{
From the introduction:
.
Immediately after the Second World War, the victorious Allies carried
out the largest forced population transfer – and perhaps the greatest
single movement of peoples – in human history. With the assistance of
the British, Soviet, and U.S. governments, millions of German-speaking
civilians living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the parts of eastern
Germany assigned to Poland were driven out of their homes and
deposited amid the ruins of the Reich, to fend for themselves as best
they could. Millions more, who had fled the advancing Red Army in the
final months of the war, were prevented from returning to their places
of origin, and became lifelong exiles….altogether, the expulsion
operation permanently displaced at least 12 million people, and
perhaps as many as 14 million. Most of these were women and children
under the age of sixteen….estimates of 500,000 deaths at the lower end
of the spectrum, and as many as 1.5 million at the higher, are
consistent with the evidence as it exists at present.
In this book, Douglas compiles – apparently for the first time in
English – a thorough study of one of the least discussed tragedies of
the Second World War, and certainly of the immediate post-war period –
that of the forced expulsion of Germans from their homelands
throughout central Europe.
On the most optimistic interpretation…the expulsions were an immense
man-made catastrophe….
That this tragedy remains relatively unknown, even in the highest
academic circles, is given evidence by the following anecdote provided
by the author:
It is, then, entirely understandable why so many of my splendid and
learned colleagues on the Colgate faculty should have expressed their
confusion to me after reading in the newspapers in October 2009 that
the president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, had demanded that
the other members of the European Union legally indemnify his country
against compensation claims by ethnic German expellees, as the price
of his country’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. None had been
aware that anything had occurred after the war in respect of which the
Czech Republic might require to be indemnified.
Douglas gives some reasons why he believes that this episode has
received so little attention:
For Germans, it invites debate about the war-time record of ethnic
German minorities living in the subject countries.
For the citizens of expelling countries, it draws unwanted attention
and casts a doubtful light on carefully crafted war-related
narratives.
For citizens of the U.S. and Britain, it draws light to the complicity
of their leaders in one of the largest episodes of human rights abuse
in history.
Douglas does not add in this context, but elsewhere sheds light on,
another possible reason for the relative silence. It is not
considered appropriate to show any sympathy toward Germans as regards
the Second World War, and especially if it might be juxtaposed to the
Holocaust – therefore even the study of such episodes might result in
unwanted professional risks. This conclusion is suggested given his
need to apologize in advance for the possibility that he might be
accused of holding such a position:
It is appropriate at the outset to state explicitly that no
legitimate comparison can be drawn between the postwar expulsions and
the appalling record of German offenses against the Jews and other
innocent victims between 1939 and 1945. The extent of Nazi
criminality and barbarity in central and eastern Europe is on a scale
and of a degree that is almost impossible to overstate.
Douglas begins this book by with a focus on the Munich Conference of
1938, and the actions taken thereafter by Edvard Beneš. When reading
this, I wondered about the relevance of Munich to this narrative –
these expulsions took place seven years and more after the conference:
what is the possible connection? As Douglas will demonstrate, the
expulsions were not devised at the last moment, in the chaos of the
last days of Berlin, but had been discussed and contemplated by many
of the actors – including in the U.S. and Britain –almost from the
beginning of the war.
The result of the Munich Conference, as is well-known, was the Nazi
annexation of the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland, the portion of
Czechoslovakia bordering Germany and populated primarily by ethnic
Germans.
The Sudetenland issue dates to the end of the First World War, and it
represents one of the many failures of the Paris Peace Conference
after that war:
The German deputies of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in the Imperial
Council (Reichsrat) referred to the Fourteen Points of U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson and the right proposed therein to self-determination,
and attempted to negotiate the union of the German-speaking
territories with the new Republic of German Austria, which itself
aimed at joining Weimar Germany.
However Sudetenland remained in a newly created Czechoslovakia, a
multi-ethnic state of several nations: Czechs, Germans, Slovaks,
Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians.
At the Paris Conference (technically Versailles dealt with Germany),
Beneš lobbied long and hard to keep these ethnically German
territories within Czech territory. Many diplomats from the West at
the conference expressed reservations even at that time, yet Beneš was
successful – even more than many of his countrymen had dared to
imagine. Unfortunately, his victory sowed the seed of opportunity for
confrontation:
Adolf Hitler had never ceased to highlight the incompatibility of
territorial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles with the aims for
which the Allies had professed to fight the Great War. The existence
of Czechoslovakia in its current form, he insisted, was unanswerable
proof of the victors’ hypocrisy.
Douglas sheds some light (for me at least) regarding Munich. While
the term “Munich” as regarding the 1938 conference is today used as a
term of derision, at the time it was hailed in all quarters of the
West – not only for averting war, but also for correcting one of the
well-recognized wrongs committed in Paris nineteen years earlier:
…as the London Times put it, the transfer of territory to Germany had
been “both necessary and fundamentally just.”
Édouard Daladier, the prime minister, did not believe that most French
citizens would understand why, as the law professor and commentator
Joseph Barthélemy put it, there must be a general European war “to
maintain three million Germans under Czech sovereignty.”
As for Great Britain, “appeasers” and anti-appeasers” alike agreed
that the Sudeten Germans’ claim to determine their own allegiance was
justified….Even Winston Churchill told Hubert Ripka, one of Benes’s
closest associates, in the summer of 1938 that if he had been prime
minister he would have acted as Neville Chamberlain had done….
Lord Halifax, the British foreign secretary, declared in the House of
Lords that even if negotiations at Munich had broken down and a war
had resulted, “no body of statesmen drawing the boundaries of a new
Czechoslovakia would have redrawn them as they were left by the Treaty
of Versailles.”
Gallup polls revealed popular majorities in Britain and France, and a
still larger one in the United States, in favor of the Munich Pact.
The court historians seem to have done a thorough job of burying this
part of the story.
Beneš, after Munich, departed for the United States. In May 1939,
Beneš was able to privately meet with Roosevelt. What he heard from
the president certainly must have been a welcome view: as far as the
U.S. Administration was concerned, “Munich does not exist.”
Separately, the other members of “the Big Three” indicated that they
no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
Beginning in September 1941, Beneš felt confident enough about his
position that he began floating trial balloons regarding the
possibility of large population transfers after the war. “Germans,
good and bad, European-minded and Nazi-minded, must learn…that war
does not pay.” There was “no way other than the way of suffering of
educating a social and political community and there never was any
other way.”
As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
statements, Beneš felt safe to go further. In a January 1942 article,
he declared:
“National minorities…are always – and in Central Europe especially – a
real thorn in the side of individual nations. This is especially true
if they are German minorities.” Before speaking of minority rights,
it was necessary to “define the rights of majorities and the
obligations of minorities.”
He questioned, in light of wartime experiences, whether it was
necessary or desirable for minorities to continue in existence. Then
he used Hitler’s actions to justify the massive population transfers
that would be required throughout Central Europe if his visions were
to become reality:
Hitler himself has transferred German minorities from the Baltic and
from Bessarabia. Germany, therefore, cannot a priori regard it as an
injury to her if other states adopt the same methods with regard to
German minorities….It will be necessary after this war to carry out a
transfer of populations on a very much larger scale than after the
last war.
Hitler did it, so it must be OK.
This discussion was not occurring solely in the mind of the man
acting as the Czechoslovak leader in exile. Eden learned that Stalin
was also considering such transfers as early as December 1941
regarding the Germans from lands that would be given to Poland after
the war. The British Foreign Office, in 1942, suggested that large-
scale transfers were “a feasible method of dealing with the European
minorities problem.”
It is interesting that these discussions were occurring even as early
as 1939 – and certainly before United States official entry into the
war. From this time until the war’s conclusion, the leaders of the
Allied powers met on several occasions. Their underlings met daily.
Was there any push-back by the U.S. or Great Britain against Russia on
this issue? Anything that suggests that the two Anglo leaders
considered such massive population transfers as a horrendous and
certain to be calamitous undertaking? While they had some leverage
over Stalin, did they at least try to utilize this leverage on behalf
of the minorities in question? Douglas offers no evidence to this
effect, and instead offers much evidence to the contrary – willing
partners were present in both England and the U.S.
Poland eventually followed in the tracks first laid by
Czechoslovakia. Certainly at the beginning of the war, Poland’s focus
was to regain all territories lost. As it became clear that the
Russians would keep what was taken in the east, Poland looked to the
west and inevitably to the expulsion of Germans in East Prussia.
Rumors began to circulate that the British government was now falling
in to support such forced expulsions. The Sudeten German leader in
exile, Wenzel Jaksch, decided the best course was to remain dignified
and consistent in his positions in support of his community. The line
he had to walk was too thin – on the one hand, to not give the
slightest hint that he was a support to the Nazis, on the other to
properly place his claims for recognition of national Germans in
Czechoslovakia.
The line was so thin that it need not have existed. Once the war
began, the position of Central-European Germans outside of Germany was
tenuous at best. To stay neutral only gave the appearance of giving
aid to the other side. Overt acts of what is called patriotism in
America would be necessary to even give some hope of being allowed to
remain in their homes after the war. Yet this would require taking
the fight against their national brothers.
That the line was so thin and that the fate of these Central European
Germans was virtually sealed before the war began does not explain the
robustness by which the Allies approvingly discussed the issue of
forced transfers. The comments range from the casual (as if the
entire task was equivalent to moving a few families from one city to
the neighboring city) to the callous:
Herbert Hoover…called for consideration of what he described as “the
heroic remedy of transfer of population” as a means of preventing
future European conflict.”
Sumner Welles [recent collaborator with FDR on foreign affairs]…was
coming around to the idea that “we should avail ourselves of this
moment of world upheaval to effect transfers of population where these
are necessary to prevent new conflicts, and thus enable peoples to
live under the government they desire, free from racial
discriminations.”
…the Oxford historian, A.J.P. Taylor declared that the Czechoslovak
state could only be resurrected using the same “ruthlessness” and
inflicting “as much suffering” as the Germans had employed in
destroying it.
In the House of Lords, Robert Vansittart [second cousin of Lawrence
of Arabia]…applauded Stalin’s robust indifference to questions of
guilt or innocence, when driving the Soviet Union’s German-speaking
population from their homes in 1941, as a model for the Allies to
follow. “He was a thousand times right; five hundred thousand times
right….I say these [deportees] were not Hitlerite Germans. They had a
quarter of a century’s training in the doctrines of
Communism….Nevertheless they were held to be Germans and unreliable.”
Even Lord Robert Cecil [cousin of Arthur Balfour], president of the
League of Nations Union and an impassioned defender of the rights of
minorities between the wars, now agreed that the Sudetendeutsche at
least would “have to be removed,” and that their fate should be of no
concern to anyone but the Czechoslovak government.
These are not words of concern for those to face the forced
relocation to come. These are not words that demonstrate a concern to
separate the guilty from the innocent. These are words that
demonstrate, in some cases, a pleasure in the pain that will be
inflicted – loss of property, loss of dignity, loss of life. These
are words that justify the coming actions using Hitler as the
yardstick of acceptable behavior.
Others did speak in opposition, or at least demonstrated some
concern. These concerns were not based on party or economic lines.
For example, while leaders in the Labour Party expressed understanding
of the necessity for the forced expulsions, the journal Socialist
Commentary called attention to…
…the incongruity of trying to preserve in aspic the often artificially
defined European frontiers of 1939, the product of centuries of
dynastic squabbling and historical accident, for all time….It would
have been more fitting…”to bring justice and freedom to the national
minorities wherever they chose to live, and not to continue the odious
Nazi method of shifting people about like cattle.”
The London-based Economist warned…
That punishment of Germans after the war “must fall on those who are
guilty in a moral and not in a racial sense. The Nazis have made
racial scapegoats; the Allies must not fall into exactly the same
error.”
In a paper published in 1943, Allan Fisher and David Mitrany offered
the following critique:
To claim that this practice was now justified because of the Nazi
government’s previous recourse to it, they argued, seemed a curious
way of reeducating the German people “at a time when they are being
urged to abjure Hitler and all his works.”
They went further, suggesting that this racial purity could only be
maintained by hermetically sealing the borders:
…if it is to achieve the ends for which it is advocated the policy of
transfer must have as its corollary a continuous policy of
segregation. Migration or any free movement of people would have to
be prohibited lest it should lead to the gradual creation of new
unwanted and irritating minorities.
Discrimination must beget further discrimination if its ends are to
be maintained. Further, discrimination teaches discrimination –
exacerbating the so-called original problems and conflicts in the
first place. (As an aside, the European experiment began shortly after
the war- including the free travel of people from all nations in the
participating community. There is something sadly ironic, if not
curious, about this. As if the message from the state is: you cannot
travel freely, unless we say you can travel freely – on our terms.)
Given what little opposition there was to this decision in the West,
it was clear the direction the post-war settlements would take. This
decision placed the Germans in Czechoslovakia in a terrible position –
a Catch-22. To support Beneš and the Czechoslovak government in exile
would mean expulsion after the war, and to support Hitler and the
Nazis would also mean expulsion after the war. There was nowhere for
these three million to turn that offered any hope.
These decisions were all taken and settled by 1943. These were not
ad-hoc decisions taken during the chaos of the end of the war. In
1943, the U.S. especially still had tremendous leverage over Stalin if
Roosevelt chose to use it. Certainly, Stalin might have broken any
deal – but there is no indication that a deal on behalf of these
minorities was even attempted. Many of these Germans were innocent of
complicity with the Nazis. Evan the Slovaks, who had fought alongside
the Germans for five years – invading both Poland and the USSR –
before rebelling against the Nazis in 1944, were afforded a more
secure future after the war than the countless Germans outside of
Germany who tried to lay low, especially women and children.
Thus, the decisions for the expulsion were taken – in some quarters
of the West supported enthusiastically, while in others at least
tolerated. All Germans were to receive punishment – guilty by
accident of birth as opposed to guilty by deed.
It is certainly an efficient way to finalize the issue. Racism often
is. It is also one of the most unfair. Millions in Central Europe
were soon to be on the receiving end of this efficient solution.
Douglas goes on to explain the detailed planning put in place by the
Allies in anticipation of the forced expulsions. This didn’t take him
long. In a nutshell, there was no planning. Given that the decisions
were finalized not later than 1943, this seems inexcusable.
Among the most remarkable aspects of the expulsion was the deliberate
refusal of those who carried it out either to seek to learn the
lessons of those previous examples [Armenians in Turkey, Germans in
Alsace, previous relocations by Hitler and Stalin] or to make any
preparations, of however rudimentary a character, for an enterprise
whose disruption to the normal life of central Europe was second only
to that caused by the war itself.
For the purpose of war, entire populations of the warring countries
were mobilized. Every department of the state was set on war
footing. For the expulsions, virtually nothing. So many unanswered
(and unasked) questions, so little attention.
In November 1943, the British government took a study on the detailed
practical aspects of the coming expulsions and transfer –a full year
or more after the decision was taken by the Allies on this course. It
was the only such detailed study taken by any of the countries
involved.
The timing is critical: at a time when the United States and Britain
had not yet opened a western front, as the Russians were desperate for
them to do – D-Day was still to come – there was an opportunity for
leverage on Stalin regarding the questions of borders and
populations. At Tehran, Roosevelt instead demonstrated his sympathy
for Stalin’s geopolitical aims in Europe, and Churchill followed with
his infamous “three matchsticks” performance (using the matchsticks to
demonstrate and propose the shifting of both the east and west borders
of Poland to the west). Stalin was delighted.
I do not pretend to believe that, had Britain and the United States
secured some concessions from Stalin at Tehran, Stalin would have
stuck to his word once hostilities ended (raising again the question
of why the west would ally with such an actor). The point is that no
attempt was even made to come to a humane answer. In fact Churchill –
who was treated insultingly by Stalin at the beginning of Tehran, and
therefore perhaps looking to get back in his good graces – is the one
who brought the matchsticks!
There were some who felt (or hoped) that the fate of those in central
Europe would already be settled by the end of the war, thus relieving
Britain of any responsibility in the issue. The rapid advance of the
Red Army would be the motive force behind this hope – the Germans in
their path would either be killed or flee toward Germany. Others
rightly saw that this “Pilate-like stance” might not be possible, as
the British government would certainly carry responsibility for the
policy decision.
Still others gave consideration to even more sinister possibilities.
One Sir Orme Sargent of the Foreign Office suggested that “the future
of these people is much less likely to attract attention and give rise
to political agitation if they disappear into Siberia.” This and
other similar suggestions were soon dismissed, thankfully.
This committee report, a result of the November 1943 study,
identified the numerous difficulties presented by this unprecedented
endeavor. Despite the many significant issues raised, in hindsight
the report understated the enormity of the task and the potential
consequences. Even at this, the report proved far too gloomy for the
politicians who commissioned it.
When members of the Armistice and Post-War Committee met to discuss
it in July 1944, the general response was one of disbelief and anger.
Disbelief and anger are often responses when the consequences of
decisions already made are too uncomfortable to be faced. Uneducated
objections to the report were raised. When these objections were
addressed with detailed responses, the conclusions were ignored.
Clement Attlee (recently voted the greatest British Prime Minister of
the 20th century), who chaired this committee, went even further. He
was a prime proponent of the idea that all Germans, regardless of
guilt, must be made to feel the weight of punishment for their so-
called “national” crime. He would advocate punishment as far as
possible, only limiting the punishment to avoid bringing “serious
embarrassment or injury to ourselves…everything that brings home to
the Germans the completeness and irrevocability of their defeat is
worthwhile in the end.”
Presumably, any horror brought upon the German deportees – many women
and children – would be acceptable to Attlee as long as these horrors
did not reflect too poorly on the British government.
With Attlee as committee chair, needless to say considerations of the
expulsion were given little further attention. If punishment was to
be handed out to all, the less consideration given to details the
better. With no sponsor in the cabinet, the report went no further,
and was not discussed again after January 1945. With this, it seems
the British government washed their hands of the fate of Germans in
post-war central Europe, other than to be involved (as would the U.S.)
in the coming implementation of the expulsions and transfers.
While many leaders and public figures were almost nonchalant about
the situation, some spoke out strongly against this policy. George
Orwell demonstrated more awareness of the logistical difficulties and
human costs than many of the politicians:
This is equivalent to transplanting the entire population of
Australia, or the combined populations of Scotland and Ireland.
He raised questions of the logistics and transportation; he
questioned the numbers that would die during the process. He called
the expulsions an “enormous crime.”
As an aside, the populations involved were approximately equivalent
to the current population of any one of Illinois, Pennsylvania, or
Ohio. Imagine moving just the residents of Chicago to Wisconsin in a
matter of a few months – after having bombed much of the housing and
infrastructure of every major city in that state.
Republican senators in the United States demanded to know when the
Atlantic Charter of 1941 had been abrogated. Among other objectives,
this Charter held that territorial changes would accord with the
freely expressed will of the people. Every aspect of the expulsions –
not only regarding the Germans, but the Poles from eastern Poland –
would fly in the face of this objective.
All such objections were ignored. Churchill and Roosevelt were
determined, above all else, to maintain alliance with the Soviets.
Roosevelt had visions of the future United Nations, and this
organization would be meaningless without Soviet participation –
Roosevelt either acting purposely blind or quite ignorant about the
nature of Stalin and the communists.
By this time, and certainly by the time of Potsdam in July 1945, all
that was left for the Western Allies was to find a way to rationalize
to themselves the decisions taken – or those they failed to take – in
regard to the minority problem in central Europe. It was at Potsdam
where the Allies agreed formally to an “orderly and humane” expulsion,
if for no other reason than a cynical attempt to save face. Just a
few miles away from the location where the conference was held,
overloaded trains were disgorging themselves of the dead and dying
transported from the east. Suddenly, when it was far too late to make
any difference, statements were made by western leaders in support of
the German minorities, directly opposite to the positions taken even a
year earlier, seemingly to provide cover for the tragedy unfolding
before them.
Douglas describes the so-called “wild expulsions,” those taken before
the west became directly involved, and the subsequent “organized
expulsions” – taken after the western allied powers were formally
engaged in the process. The treatment of the Germans in the two cases
was rather similar. He describes the camps, temporary housing
intended for a stay of a day or two that sometimes served the
occupants for years, lack of dwellings in Germany, lack of food, the
theft of property in the former home, the rapes, the beatings. He
describes the packed trains – overstuffed and underfed – sometimes
taking a month to make a journey of only a few hundred miles, standing
still more often than moving. He describes the bodies frozen to death
on the trains in the middle of the winter, with the Allies so anxious
to begin their work despite the additional burdens brought on by the
harsh climate.
He attributes many of these crimes to official channels. In fact, it
was rarely the case that the majority populations spontaneously rose
up against their German neighbors – counter to the claims of leaders
in the east and to the expectations (or self-rationalizations) of
leaders in the west. It was primarily state actors committing the
worst atrocities against the expellees. It was not majority neighbor
pouncing on his minority neighbor – unless the majority neighbor was
afforded sanction and protection by the state via the badge.
It was western leaders agreeing to the methods and timing, involved
at every railway station, agreeing to the terms, and looking the other
way when terms were not met.
Such treatment did not go unnoticed – and many locals raised
objections to the treatment of the Germans – “a mixture of
exasperation and alarm” as is represented here by one Prague resident:
Devil take the Germans! During the war, they decimated our nation
and now, because of them, along comes a fresh scandal….
Let nobody fall back on the excuse that the Germans have done the
same things. Either we are qualified to stand as their judges, in
which case we cannot conduct ourselves as they do, or we are no
different from them, and give up the right to judge them.
At the end of 1947, Johannes Kostka, a German prisoner of war in a
British camp in Egypt, wrote to the U.S. Office of Military Government
in Frankfurt. He expressed his anxiety about his wife Gertrud, still
in Poland. He had recently received a letter from his wife. In it,
she described the despair and depravations that befell her after the
war – their baby daughter had already died in 1944 in the chaos of the
advancing Red Army. She described four years of agony and pain,
including being raped. She became pregnant as a result of this
abuse. She explains to her husband that she will now take her life.
There is nothing left for her.
Johannes asks the U.S. officials for assistance – please ask the
Polish government to expedite her expulsion. As expellees from Poland
were to go to the British zone of Germany, the letter was forwarded to
the British. In the end, neither the U.S. nor the British involved
themselves in her case.
The Kostka case encapsulates the official Western response to the
manifest failure of the expulsion project to live up to the “orderly
and humane” standards stipulated by the Potsdam Agreement. As in
almost every other instance in which the question of ameliorating the
sufferings of the expellees arose, the first and overriding
consideration was the national interests of the Western powers. The
second was a fatalistic prediction that any such action was bound
either to fail or to have a positively harmful effect…. Lastly,
although the expulsions were taking place in accordance with the
expressed policy of the Anglo-Americans and required their willing
participation and collaboration, the Western democracies disavowed any
responsibility for the suffering that resulted….
Individuals and various non-governmental organizations attempted to
at least mitigate the sufferings of the expellees. In this, they flew
into the teeth of Western resistance:
The greatest obstacle in their path was the victorious Allies’
insistence that the Volksdeutsche be excluded from any form of
international protection or assistance.
Nor was there any agency, national or international, to which
Volksdeutsche subjected to inhumane treatment might appeal…the women
and children who made up most of the expellee population occupied a
legal status far lower than that of members of the SS, who…were
protected by the Geneva Convention.
Again, some spoke out. In a letter to the Times, Bertrand Russell
compared the actions of the victorious Allies to those of the Nazi
defendants then currently on trial:
…Are mass deportations crimes when committed by our enemies during war
and justifiable measures of social adjustment when carried out by our
allies in times of peace? It is more humane to turn out old women and
children to die at a distance than to asphyxiate Jews in gas
chambers?...Are the future laws of war to justify the killing of enemy
nationals after enemy resistance has ceased?
There were those in the west who attempted to place the entire blame
of the unfolding tragedy on the Soviets. The Soviets certainly earned
their share of the blame. However, Britain and the United States
ignored this issue for three years or more before the events. When
they had time for planning and leverage to reach some agreements, they
did nothing – in fact they encouraged Stalin and his minions in their
quest for cleansing.
They rejected the experts who had studied the issue. They rejoiced
that all Germans would be made to know suffering and pain, receiving a
proper re-education. They cared not about distinctions of innocence
and guilt. Again, from Douglas:
They had encouraged their allies to carry out, and promised their
cooperation in accomplishing, deeds for which they would later
prosecute their enemies as war crimes….When making the choices they
did, they went in with their eyes open.
I have previously listed reason why it is impossible to refer to
World War Two as “the good war.” While absolutely not the worst
chapter in the book of western involvement in this war, this chapter
should not be ignored.
}
the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
genocide.?
http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
{
From the introduction:
.
Immediately after the Second World War, the victorious Allies carried
out the largest forced population transfer – and perhaps the greatest
single movement of peoples – in human history. With the assistance of
the British, Soviet, and U.S. governments, millions of German-speaking
civilians living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the parts of eastern
Germany assigned to Poland were driven out of their homes and
deposited amid the ruins of the Reich, to fend for themselves as best
they could. Millions more, who had fled the advancing Red Army in the
final months of the war, were prevented from returning to their places
of origin, and became lifelong exiles….altogether, the expulsion
operation permanently displaced at least 12 million people, and
perhaps as many as 14 million. Most of these were women and children
under the age of sixteen….estimates of 500,000 deaths at the lower end
of the spectrum, and as many as 1.5 million at the higher, are
consistent with the evidence as it exists at present.
In this book, Douglas compiles – apparently for the first time in
English – a thorough study of one of the least discussed tragedies of
the Second World War, and certainly of the immediate post-war period –
that of the forced expulsion of Germans from their homelands
throughout central Europe.
On the most optimistic interpretation…the expulsions were an immense
man-made catastrophe….
That this tragedy remains relatively unknown, even in the highest
academic circles, is given evidence by the following anecdote provided
by the author:
It is, then, entirely understandable why so many of my splendid and
learned colleagues on the Colgate faculty should have expressed their
confusion to me after reading in the newspapers in October 2009 that
the president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, had demanded that
the other members of the European Union legally indemnify his country
against compensation claims by ethnic German expellees, as the price
of his country’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. None had been
aware that anything had occurred after the war in respect of which the
Czech Republic might require to be indemnified.
Douglas gives some reasons why he believes that this episode has
received so little attention:
For Germans, it invites debate about the war-time record of ethnic
German minorities living in the subject countries.
For the citizens of expelling countries, it draws unwanted attention
and casts a doubtful light on carefully crafted war-related
narratives.
For citizens of the U.S. and Britain, it draws light to the complicity
of their leaders in one of the largest episodes of human rights abuse
in history.
Douglas does not add in this context, but elsewhere sheds light on,
another possible reason for the relative silence. It is not
considered appropriate to show any sympathy toward Germans as regards
the Second World War, and especially if it might be juxtaposed to the
Holocaust – therefore even the study of such episodes might result in
unwanted professional risks. This conclusion is suggested given his
need to apologize in advance for the possibility that he might be
accused of holding such a position:
It is appropriate at the outset to state explicitly that no
legitimate comparison can be drawn between the postwar expulsions and
the appalling record of German offenses against the Jews and other
innocent victims between 1939 and 1945. The extent of Nazi
criminality and barbarity in central and eastern Europe is on a scale
and of a degree that is almost impossible to overstate.
Douglas begins this book by with a focus on the Munich Conference of
1938, and the actions taken thereafter by Edvard Beneš. When reading
this, I wondered about the relevance of Munich to this narrative –
these expulsions took place seven years and more after the conference:
what is the possible connection? As Douglas will demonstrate, the
expulsions were not devised at the last moment, in the chaos of the
last days of Berlin, but had been discussed and contemplated by many
of the actors – including in the U.S. and Britain –almost from the
beginning of the war.
The result of the Munich Conference, as is well-known, was the Nazi
annexation of the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland, the portion of
Czechoslovakia bordering Germany and populated primarily by ethnic
Germans.
The Sudetenland issue dates to the end of the First World War, and it
represents one of the many failures of the Paris Peace Conference
after that war:
The German deputies of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in the Imperial
Council (Reichsrat) referred to the Fourteen Points of U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson and the right proposed therein to self-determination,
and attempted to negotiate the union of the German-speaking
territories with the new Republic of German Austria, which itself
aimed at joining Weimar Germany.
However Sudetenland remained in a newly created Czechoslovakia, a
multi-ethnic state of several nations: Czechs, Germans, Slovaks,
Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians.
At the Paris Conference (technically Versailles dealt with Germany),
Beneš lobbied long and hard to keep these ethnically German
territories within Czech territory. Many diplomats from the West at
the conference expressed reservations even at that time, yet Beneš was
successful – even more than many of his countrymen had dared to
imagine. Unfortunately, his victory sowed the seed of opportunity for
confrontation:
Adolf Hitler had never ceased to highlight the incompatibility of
territorial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles with the aims for
which the Allies had professed to fight the Great War. The existence
of Czechoslovakia in its current form, he insisted, was unanswerable
proof of the victors’ hypocrisy.
Douglas sheds some light (for me at least) regarding Munich. While
the term “Munich” as regarding the 1938 conference is today used as a
term of derision, at the time it was hailed in all quarters of the
West – not only for averting war, but also for correcting one of the
well-recognized wrongs committed in Paris nineteen years earlier:
…as the London Times put it, the transfer of territory to Germany had
been “both necessary and fundamentally just.”
Édouard Daladier, the prime minister, did not believe that most French
citizens would understand why, as the law professor and commentator
Joseph Barthélemy put it, there must be a general European war “to
maintain three million Germans under Czech sovereignty.”
As for Great Britain, “appeasers” and anti-appeasers” alike agreed
that the Sudeten Germans’ claim to determine their own allegiance was
justified….Even Winston Churchill told Hubert Ripka, one of Benes’s
closest associates, in the summer of 1938 that if he had been prime
minister he would have acted as Neville Chamberlain had done….
Lord Halifax, the British foreign secretary, declared in the House of
Lords that even if negotiations at Munich had broken down and a war
had resulted, “no body of statesmen drawing the boundaries of a new
Czechoslovakia would have redrawn them as they were left by the Treaty
of Versailles.”
Gallup polls revealed popular majorities in Britain and France, and a
still larger one in the United States, in favor of the Munich Pact.
The court historians seem to have done a thorough job of burying this
part of the story.
Beneš, after Munich, departed for the United States. In May 1939,
Beneš was able to privately meet with Roosevelt. What he heard from
the president certainly must have been a welcome view: as far as the
U.S. Administration was concerned, “Munich does not exist.”
Separately, the other members of “the Big Three” indicated that they
no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
Beginning in September 1941, Beneš felt confident enough about his
position that he began floating trial balloons regarding the
possibility of large population transfers after the war. “Germans,
good and bad, European-minded and Nazi-minded, must learn…that war
does not pay.” There was “no way other than the way of suffering of
educating a social and political community and there never was any
other way.”
As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
statements, Beneš felt safe to go further. In a January 1942 article,
he declared:
“National minorities…are always – and in Central Europe especially – a
real thorn in the side of individual nations. This is especially true
if they are German minorities.” Before speaking of minority rights,
it was necessary to “define the rights of majorities and the
obligations of minorities.”
He questioned, in light of wartime experiences, whether it was
necessary or desirable for minorities to continue in existence. Then
he used Hitler’s actions to justify the massive population transfers
that would be required throughout Central Europe if his visions were
to become reality:
Hitler himself has transferred German minorities from the Baltic and
from Bessarabia. Germany, therefore, cannot a priori regard it as an
injury to her if other states adopt the same methods with regard to
German minorities….It will be necessary after this war to carry out a
transfer of populations on a very much larger scale than after the
last war.
Hitler did it, so it must be OK.
This discussion was not occurring solely in the mind of the man
acting as the Czechoslovak leader in exile. Eden learned that Stalin
was also considering such transfers as early as December 1941
regarding the Germans from lands that would be given to Poland after
the war. The British Foreign Office, in 1942, suggested that large-
scale transfers were “a feasible method of dealing with the European
minorities problem.”
It is interesting that these discussions were occurring even as early
as 1939 – and certainly before United States official entry into the
war. From this time until the war’s conclusion, the leaders of the
Allied powers met on several occasions. Their underlings met daily.
Was there any push-back by the U.S. or Great Britain against Russia on
this issue? Anything that suggests that the two Anglo leaders
considered such massive population transfers as a horrendous and
certain to be calamitous undertaking? While they had some leverage
over Stalin, did they at least try to utilize this leverage on behalf
of the minorities in question? Douglas offers no evidence to this
effect, and instead offers much evidence to the contrary – willing
partners were present in both England and the U.S.
Poland eventually followed in the tracks first laid by
Czechoslovakia. Certainly at the beginning of the war, Poland’s focus
was to regain all territories lost. As it became clear that the
Russians would keep what was taken in the east, Poland looked to the
west and inevitably to the expulsion of Germans in East Prussia.
Rumors began to circulate that the British government was now falling
in to support such forced expulsions. The Sudeten German leader in
exile, Wenzel Jaksch, decided the best course was to remain dignified
and consistent in his positions in support of his community. The line
he had to walk was too thin – on the one hand, to not give the
slightest hint that he was a support to the Nazis, on the other to
properly place his claims for recognition of national Germans in
Czechoslovakia.
The line was so thin that it need not have existed. Once the war
began, the position of Central-European Germans outside of Germany was
tenuous at best. To stay neutral only gave the appearance of giving
aid to the other side. Overt acts of what is called patriotism in
America would be necessary to even give some hope of being allowed to
remain in their homes after the war. Yet this would require taking
the fight against their national brothers.
That the line was so thin and that the fate of these Central European
Germans was virtually sealed before the war began does not explain the
robustness by which the Allies approvingly discussed the issue of
forced transfers. The comments range from the casual (as if the
entire task was equivalent to moving a few families from one city to
the neighboring city) to the callous:
Herbert Hoover…called for consideration of what he described as “the
heroic remedy of transfer of population” as a means of preventing
future European conflict.”
Sumner Welles [recent collaborator with FDR on foreign affairs]…was
coming around to the idea that “we should avail ourselves of this
moment of world upheaval to effect transfers of population where these
are necessary to prevent new conflicts, and thus enable peoples to
live under the government they desire, free from racial
discriminations.”
…the Oxford historian, A.J.P. Taylor declared that the Czechoslovak
state could only be resurrected using the same “ruthlessness” and
inflicting “as much suffering” as the Germans had employed in
destroying it.
In the House of Lords, Robert Vansittart [second cousin of Lawrence
of Arabia]…applauded Stalin’s robust indifference to questions of
guilt or innocence, when driving the Soviet Union’s German-speaking
population from their homes in 1941, as a model for the Allies to
follow. “He was a thousand times right; five hundred thousand times
right….I say these [deportees] were not Hitlerite Germans. They had a
quarter of a century’s training in the doctrines of
Communism….Nevertheless they were held to be Germans and unreliable.”
Even Lord Robert Cecil [cousin of Arthur Balfour], president of the
League of Nations Union and an impassioned defender of the rights of
minorities between the wars, now agreed that the Sudetendeutsche at
least would “have to be removed,” and that their fate should be of no
concern to anyone but the Czechoslovak government.
These are not words of concern for those to face the forced
relocation to come. These are not words that demonstrate a concern to
separate the guilty from the innocent. These are words that
demonstrate, in some cases, a pleasure in the pain that will be
inflicted – loss of property, loss of dignity, loss of life. These
are words that justify the coming actions using Hitler as the
yardstick of acceptable behavior.
Others did speak in opposition, or at least demonstrated some
concern. These concerns were not based on party or economic lines.
For example, while leaders in the Labour Party expressed understanding
of the necessity for the forced expulsions, the journal Socialist
Commentary called attention to…
…the incongruity of trying to preserve in aspic the often artificially
defined European frontiers of 1939, the product of centuries of
dynastic squabbling and historical accident, for all time….It would
have been more fitting…”to bring justice and freedom to the national
minorities wherever they chose to live, and not to continue the odious
Nazi method of shifting people about like cattle.”
The London-based Economist warned…
That punishment of Germans after the war “must fall on those who are
guilty in a moral and not in a racial sense. The Nazis have made
racial scapegoats; the Allies must not fall into exactly the same
error.”
In a paper published in 1943, Allan Fisher and David Mitrany offered
the following critique:
To claim that this practice was now justified because of the Nazi
government’s previous recourse to it, they argued, seemed a curious
way of reeducating the German people “at a time when they are being
urged to abjure Hitler and all his works.”
They went further, suggesting that this racial purity could only be
maintained by hermetically sealing the borders:
…if it is to achieve the ends for which it is advocated the policy of
transfer must have as its corollary a continuous policy of
segregation. Migration or any free movement of people would have to
be prohibited lest it should lead to the gradual creation of new
unwanted and irritating minorities.
Discrimination must beget further discrimination if its ends are to
be maintained. Further, discrimination teaches discrimination –
exacerbating the so-called original problems and conflicts in the
first place. (As an aside, the European experiment began shortly after
the war- including the free travel of people from all nations in the
participating community. There is something sadly ironic, if not
curious, about this. As if the message from the state is: you cannot
travel freely, unless we say you can travel freely – on our terms.)
Given what little opposition there was to this decision in the West,
it was clear the direction the post-war settlements would take. This
decision placed the Germans in Czechoslovakia in a terrible position –
a Catch-22. To support Beneš and the Czechoslovak government in exile
would mean expulsion after the war, and to support Hitler and the
Nazis would also mean expulsion after the war. There was nowhere for
these three million to turn that offered any hope.
These decisions were all taken and settled by 1943. These were not
ad-hoc decisions taken during the chaos of the end of the war. In
1943, the U.S. especially still had tremendous leverage over Stalin if
Roosevelt chose to use it. Certainly, Stalin might have broken any
deal – but there is no indication that a deal on behalf of these
minorities was even attempted. Many of these Germans were innocent of
complicity with the Nazis. Evan the Slovaks, who had fought alongside
the Germans for five years – invading both Poland and the USSR –
before rebelling against the Nazis in 1944, were afforded a more
secure future after the war than the countless Germans outside of
Germany who tried to lay low, especially women and children.
Thus, the decisions for the expulsion were taken – in some quarters
of the West supported enthusiastically, while in others at least
tolerated. All Germans were to receive punishment – guilty by
accident of birth as opposed to guilty by deed.
It is certainly an efficient way to finalize the issue. Racism often
is. It is also one of the most unfair. Millions in Central Europe
were soon to be on the receiving end of this efficient solution.
Douglas goes on to explain the detailed planning put in place by the
Allies in anticipation of the forced expulsions. This didn’t take him
long. In a nutshell, there was no planning. Given that the decisions
were finalized not later than 1943, this seems inexcusable.
Among the most remarkable aspects of the expulsion was the deliberate
refusal of those who carried it out either to seek to learn the
lessons of those previous examples [Armenians in Turkey, Germans in
Alsace, previous relocations by Hitler and Stalin] or to make any
preparations, of however rudimentary a character, for an enterprise
whose disruption to the normal life of central Europe was second only
to that caused by the war itself.
For the purpose of war, entire populations of the warring countries
were mobilized. Every department of the state was set on war
footing. For the expulsions, virtually nothing. So many unanswered
(and unasked) questions, so little attention.
In November 1943, the British government took a study on the detailed
practical aspects of the coming expulsions and transfer –a full year
or more after the decision was taken by the Allies on this course. It
was the only such detailed study taken by any of the countries
involved.
The timing is critical: at a time when the United States and Britain
had not yet opened a western front, as the Russians were desperate for
them to do – D-Day was still to come – there was an opportunity for
leverage on Stalin regarding the questions of borders and
populations. At Tehran, Roosevelt instead demonstrated his sympathy
for Stalin’s geopolitical aims in Europe, and Churchill followed with
his infamous “three matchsticks” performance (using the matchsticks to
demonstrate and propose the shifting of both the east and west borders
of Poland to the west). Stalin was delighted.
I do not pretend to believe that, had Britain and the United States
secured some concessions from Stalin at Tehran, Stalin would have
stuck to his word once hostilities ended (raising again the question
of why the west would ally with such an actor). The point is that no
attempt was even made to come to a humane answer. In fact Churchill –
who was treated insultingly by Stalin at the beginning of Tehran, and
therefore perhaps looking to get back in his good graces – is the one
who brought the matchsticks!
There were some who felt (or hoped) that the fate of those in central
Europe would already be settled by the end of the war, thus relieving
Britain of any responsibility in the issue. The rapid advance of the
Red Army would be the motive force behind this hope – the Germans in
their path would either be killed or flee toward Germany. Others
rightly saw that this “Pilate-like stance” might not be possible, as
the British government would certainly carry responsibility for the
policy decision.
Still others gave consideration to even more sinister possibilities.
One Sir Orme Sargent of the Foreign Office suggested that “the future
of these people is much less likely to attract attention and give rise
to political agitation if they disappear into Siberia.” This and
other similar suggestions were soon dismissed, thankfully.
This committee report, a result of the November 1943 study,
identified the numerous difficulties presented by this unprecedented
endeavor. Despite the many significant issues raised, in hindsight
the report understated the enormity of the task and the potential
consequences. Even at this, the report proved far too gloomy for the
politicians who commissioned it.
When members of the Armistice and Post-War Committee met to discuss
it in July 1944, the general response was one of disbelief and anger.
Disbelief and anger are often responses when the consequences of
decisions already made are too uncomfortable to be faced. Uneducated
objections to the report were raised. When these objections were
addressed with detailed responses, the conclusions were ignored.
Clement Attlee (recently voted the greatest British Prime Minister of
the 20th century), who chaired this committee, went even further. He
was a prime proponent of the idea that all Germans, regardless of
guilt, must be made to feel the weight of punishment for their so-
called “national” crime. He would advocate punishment as far as
possible, only limiting the punishment to avoid bringing “serious
embarrassment or injury to ourselves…everything that brings home to
the Germans the completeness and irrevocability of their defeat is
worthwhile in the end.”
Presumably, any horror brought upon the German deportees – many women
and children – would be acceptable to Attlee as long as these horrors
did not reflect too poorly on the British government.
With Attlee as committee chair, needless to say considerations of the
expulsion were given little further attention. If punishment was to
be handed out to all, the less consideration given to details the
better. With no sponsor in the cabinet, the report went no further,
and was not discussed again after January 1945. With this, it seems
the British government washed their hands of the fate of Germans in
post-war central Europe, other than to be involved (as would the U.S.)
in the coming implementation of the expulsions and transfers.
While many leaders and public figures were almost nonchalant about
the situation, some spoke out strongly against this policy. George
Orwell demonstrated more awareness of the logistical difficulties and
human costs than many of the politicians:
This is equivalent to transplanting the entire population of
Australia, or the combined populations of Scotland and Ireland.
He raised questions of the logistics and transportation; he
questioned the numbers that would die during the process. He called
the expulsions an “enormous crime.”
As an aside, the populations involved were approximately equivalent
to the current population of any one of Illinois, Pennsylvania, or
Ohio. Imagine moving just the residents of Chicago to Wisconsin in a
matter of a few months – after having bombed much of the housing and
infrastructure of every major city in that state.
Republican senators in the United States demanded to know when the
Atlantic Charter of 1941 had been abrogated. Among other objectives,
this Charter held that territorial changes would accord with the
freely expressed will of the people. Every aspect of the expulsions –
not only regarding the Germans, but the Poles from eastern Poland –
would fly in the face of this objective.
All such objections were ignored. Churchill and Roosevelt were
determined, above all else, to maintain alliance with the Soviets.
Roosevelt had visions of the future United Nations, and this
organization would be meaningless without Soviet participation –
Roosevelt either acting purposely blind or quite ignorant about the
nature of Stalin and the communists.
By this time, and certainly by the time of Potsdam in July 1945, all
that was left for the Western Allies was to find a way to rationalize
to themselves the decisions taken – or those they failed to take – in
regard to the minority problem in central Europe. It was at Potsdam
where the Allies agreed formally to an “orderly and humane” expulsion,
if for no other reason than a cynical attempt to save face. Just a
few miles away from the location where the conference was held,
overloaded trains were disgorging themselves of the dead and dying
transported from the east. Suddenly, when it was far too late to make
any difference, statements were made by western leaders in support of
the German minorities, directly opposite to the positions taken even a
year earlier, seemingly to provide cover for the tragedy unfolding
before them.
Douglas describes the so-called “wild expulsions,” those taken before
the west became directly involved, and the subsequent “organized
expulsions” – taken after the western allied powers were formally
engaged in the process. The treatment of the Germans in the two cases
was rather similar. He describes the camps, temporary housing
intended for a stay of a day or two that sometimes served the
occupants for years, lack of dwellings in Germany, lack of food, the
theft of property in the former home, the rapes, the beatings. He
describes the packed trains – overstuffed and underfed – sometimes
taking a month to make a journey of only a few hundred miles, standing
still more often than moving. He describes the bodies frozen to death
on the trains in the middle of the winter, with the Allies so anxious
to begin their work despite the additional burdens brought on by the
harsh climate.
He attributes many of these crimes to official channels. In fact, it
was rarely the case that the majority populations spontaneously rose
up against their German neighbors – counter to the claims of leaders
in the east and to the expectations (or self-rationalizations) of
leaders in the west. It was primarily state actors committing the
worst atrocities against the expellees. It was not majority neighbor
pouncing on his minority neighbor – unless the majority neighbor was
afforded sanction and protection by the state via the badge.
It was western leaders agreeing to the methods and timing, involved
at every railway station, agreeing to the terms, and looking the other
way when terms were not met.
Such treatment did not go unnoticed – and many locals raised
objections to the treatment of the Germans – “a mixture of
exasperation and alarm” as is represented here by one Prague resident:
Devil take the Germans! During the war, they decimated our nation
and now, because of them, along comes a fresh scandal….
Let nobody fall back on the excuse that the Germans have done the
same things. Either we are qualified to stand as their judges, in
which case we cannot conduct ourselves as they do, or we are no
different from them, and give up the right to judge them.
At the end of 1947, Johannes Kostka, a German prisoner of war in a
British camp in Egypt, wrote to the U.S. Office of Military Government
in Frankfurt. He expressed his anxiety about his wife Gertrud, still
in Poland. He had recently received a letter from his wife. In it,
she described the despair and depravations that befell her after the
war – their baby daughter had already died in 1944 in the chaos of the
advancing Red Army. She described four years of agony and pain,
including being raped. She became pregnant as a result of this
abuse. She explains to her husband that she will now take her life.
There is nothing left for her.
Johannes asks the U.S. officials for assistance – please ask the
Polish government to expedite her expulsion. As expellees from Poland
were to go to the British zone of Germany, the letter was forwarded to
the British. In the end, neither the U.S. nor the British involved
themselves in her case.
The Kostka case encapsulates the official Western response to the
manifest failure of the expulsion project to live up to the “orderly
and humane” standards stipulated by the Potsdam Agreement. As in
almost every other instance in which the question of ameliorating the
sufferings of the expellees arose, the first and overriding
consideration was the national interests of the Western powers. The
second was a fatalistic prediction that any such action was bound
either to fail or to have a positively harmful effect…. Lastly,
although the expulsions were taking place in accordance with the
expressed policy of the Anglo-Americans and required their willing
participation and collaboration, the Western democracies disavowed any
responsibility for the suffering that resulted….
Individuals and various non-governmental organizations attempted to
at least mitigate the sufferings of the expellees. In this, they flew
into the teeth of Western resistance:
The greatest obstacle in their path was the victorious Allies’
insistence that the Volksdeutsche be excluded from any form of
international protection or assistance.
Nor was there any agency, national or international, to which
Volksdeutsche subjected to inhumane treatment might appeal…the women
and children who made up most of the expellee population occupied a
legal status far lower than that of members of the SS, who…were
protected by the Geneva Convention.
Again, some spoke out. In a letter to the Times, Bertrand Russell
compared the actions of the victorious Allies to those of the Nazi
defendants then currently on trial:
…Are mass deportations crimes when committed by our enemies during war
and justifiable measures of social adjustment when carried out by our
allies in times of peace? It is more humane to turn out old women and
children to die at a distance than to asphyxiate Jews in gas
chambers?...Are the future laws of war to justify the killing of enemy
nationals after enemy resistance has ceased?
There were those in the west who attempted to place the entire blame
of the unfolding tragedy on the Soviets. The Soviets certainly earned
their share of the blame. However, Britain and the United States
ignored this issue for three years or more before the events. When
they had time for planning and leverage to reach some agreements, they
did nothing – in fact they encouraged Stalin and his minions in their
quest for cleansing.
They rejected the experts who had studied the issue. They rejoiced
that all Germans would be made to know suffering and pain, receiving a
proper re-education. They cared not about distinctions of innocence
and guilt. Again, from Douglas:
They had encouraged their allies to carry out, and promised their
cooperation in accomplishing, deeds for which they would later
prosecute their enemies as war crimes….When making the choices they
did, they went in with their eyes open.
I have previously listed reason why it is impossible to refer to
World War Two as “the good war.” While absolutely not the worst
chapter in the book of western involvement in this war, this chapter
should not be ignored.
}
The Peeler
Nov 12, 2012, 10:22:21 AM11/12/12
to
On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 07:16:08 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love with Nazi Scum
wrote:
<FLUSH yet another huge load of moose droppings>
So, Germans got a small dose of what they had done to others. Got a problem
with it, Nazi-cock sucker?
wrote:
<FLUSH yet another huge load of moose droppings>
So, Germans got a small dose of what they had done to others. Got a problem
with it, Nazi-cock sucker?
Auric Hellman
Nov 12, 2012, 11:34:30 AM11/12/12
to
during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
suffered by ethnic Germans. The author is to be commended.
--
Dr. Auric D. Hellman
adhellman@volcanomail
NEMO
Nov 12, 2012, 11:37:20 AM11/12/12
to
Nazis just hanging around (from the end of a rope!)
Jew - baiting Neo - Nazis are just garbage & shit/turds!
Execution of German General Anton Dostler - Video Dailymotion
► 1:59► 1:59
www.dailymotion.com/video/x446zm_execution-of-g...20 Jan 2008 - 2 min
Upload a Video ... Execution of German General Anton Dostler ...
wwii,
german, execution, nazi, general ...
The hanging of Rudolf Hoess at Auschwitz - YouTube
► 1:24► 1:24
www.youtube.com/watch?v=O3C4njP5J2o7 Sep 2008 - 1 min - Uploaded by
alanheath
You need Adobe Flash Player to watch this video. ... The site of the
execution of Rudolf Höss quite close to ...
by Alan Heath - More by Alan Heath
NAZI SPIES AND MURDERERS ARE EXECUTED BY U.S. [ETC ...
►►
archive.org/details/gov.archives.arc.390922 Apr 2012
You are using our new video/audio player! ... Part 1 shows the
execution in Germany by firing squad and ...
More videos for nazis executed by hanging video »
NEMO
Nov 12, 2012, 12:09:54 PM11/12/12
to
So, arsehole A Moose in Love, you Swabian scumbucklet, did the Germans
compensate the Czechs for the murder/slaughter of Lidice?
You ethnic - Germans turned in & robbed your neighbours like common
criminals!
You're scum!
Greg Carr
Nov 12, 2012, 12:47:43 PM11/12/12
to
suicide like your heroes.
David Johnston
Nov 12, 2012, 1:20:35 PM11/12/12
to
On 11/12/2012 8:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>
> Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
> genocide.?
> http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
> {
> From the introduction:
> .
> Immediately after the Second World War, the victorious Allies carried
> out the largest forced population transfer – and perhaps the greatest
> single movement of peoples – in human history. With the assistance of
> the British, Soviet, and U.S. governments, millions of German-speaking
> civilians living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the parts of eastern
> Germany assigned to Poland
I see no reason why the Russians would have need British and American
> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>
> Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
> genocide.?
> http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
> {
> From the introduction:
> .
> Immediately after the Second World War, the victorious Allies carried
> out the largest forced population transfer – and perhaps the greatest
> single movement of peoples – in human history. With the assistance of
> the British, Soviet, and U.S. governments, millions of German-speaking
> civilians living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the parts of eastern
> Germany assigned to Poland
help for that.
were driven out of their homes and
> deposited amid the ruins of the Reich, to fend for themselves as best
> they could. Millions more, who had fled the advancing Red Army in the
> final months of the war, were prevented from returning to their places
> of origin,
Barry Bruyea
Nov 12, 2012, 2:19:36 PM11/12/12
to
On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 07:16:08 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
<parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
To quote in Biblical terms, "You reap what you sew."
Barry Bruyea
Nov 12, 2012, 2:22:21 PM11/12/12
to
a philosophical phrase, it's a crock of shit. This reminds of that
old saw about the man who pleads guilty of killing his parents and
then throws himself on the mercy of the court because he is now and
orphan.
A Moose in Love
Nov 12, 2012, 2:31:50 PM11/12/12
to
On Nov 12, 12:47 pm, Greg Carr <gregpc...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>
> >> this, I wondered about the relevance of Munich to this narrative
> >> these expulsions took place seven years and more after the conference:
> >> what is the possible connection? As Douglas will demonstrate, the
> >> expulsions were not devised at the last moment, in the chaos of the
> >> last days of Berlin, but had been discussed and contemplated by many
> >> of the actors including in the U.S. and Britain almost from the
> >> beginning of the war.
>
> >> The result of the Munich Conference, as is well-known, was the Nazi
> >> annexation of the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland, the portion of
> >> Czechoslovakia bordering Germany and populated primarily by ethnic
> >> Germans.
>
> >> The Sudetenland issue dates to the end of the First World War, and it
> >> represents one of the many failures of the Paris Peace Conference
> >> after that war:
>
> >> The German deputies of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in the Imperial
> >> Council (Reichsrat) referred to the Fourteen Points of U.S. President
> >> Woodrow Wilson and the right proposed therein to self-determination,
> >> and attempted to negotiate the union of the German-speaking
> >> territories with the new Republic of German Austria, which itself
> >> aimed at joining Weimar Germany.
>
> >> However Sudetenland remained in a newly created Czechoslovakia, a
> >> multi-ethnic state of several nations: Czechs, Germans, Slovaks,
> >> Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians.
>
> >> At the Paris Conference (technically Versailles dealt with Germany),
> >> Bene lobbied long and hard to keep these ethnically German
> >> these expulsions took place seven years and more after the conference:
> >> what is the possible connection? As Douglas will demonstrate, the
> >> expulsions were not devised at the last moment, in the chaos of the
> >> last days of Berlin, but had been discussed and contemplated by many
> >> of the actors including in the U.S. and Britain almost from the
> >> beginning of the war.
>
> >> The result of the Munich Conference, as is well-known, was the Nazi
> >> annexation of the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland, the portion of
> >> Czechoslovakia bordering Germany and populated primarily by ethnic
> >> Germans.
>
> >> The Sudetenland issue dates to the end of the First World War, and it
> >> represents one of the many failures of the Paris Peace Conference
> >> after that war:
>
> >> The German deputies of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in the Imperial
> >> Council (Reichsrat) referred to the Fourteen Points of U.S. President
> >> Woodrow Wilson and the right proposed therein to self-determination,
> >> and attempted to negotiate the union of the German-speaking
> >> territories with the new Republic of German Austria, which itself
> >> aimed at joining Weimar Germany.
>
> >> However Sudetenland remained in a newly created Czechoslovakia, a
> >> multi-ethnic state of several nations: Czechs, Germans, Slovaks,
> >> Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians.
>
> >> At the Paris Conference (technically Versailles dealt with Germany),
> >> territories within Czech territory. Many diplomats from the West at
> >> the conference expressed reservations even at that time, yet Bene was
> >> successful even more than many of his countrymen had dared to
> >> imagine. Unfortunately, his victory sowed the seed of opportunity for
> >> confrontation:
>
> >> Adolf Hitler had never ceased to highlight the incompatibility of
> >> territorial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles with the aims for
> >> which the Allies had professed to fight the Great War. The existence
> >> of Czechoslovakia in its current form, he insisted, was unanswerable
> >> proof of the victors hypocrisy.
>
> >> Douglas sheds some light (for me at least) regarding Munich. While
> >> the term Munich as regarding the 1938 conference is today used as a
> >> term of derision, at the time it was hailed in all quarters of the
> >> West not only for averting war, but also for correcting one of the
> >> well-recognized wrongs committed in Paris nineteen years earlier:
>
> >> as the London Times put it, the transfer of territory to Germany had
> >> been both necessary and fundamentally just.
>
> >> imagine. Unfortunately, his victory sowed the seed of opportunity for
> >> confrontation:
>
> >> Adolf Hitler had never ceased to highlight the incompatibility of
> >> territorial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles with the aims for
> >> which the Allies had professed to fight the Great War. The existence
> >> of Czechoslovakia in its current form, he insisted, was unanswerable
> >> proof of the victors hypocrisy.
>
> >> Douglas sheds some light (for me at least) regarding Munich. While
> >> the term Munich as regarding the 1938 conference is today used as a
> >> term of derision, at the time it was hailed in all quarters of the
> >> West not only for averting war, but also for correcting one of the
> >> well-recognized wrongs committed in Paris nineteen years earlier:
>
> >> as the London Times put it, the transfer of territory to Germany had
> >> been both necessary and fundamentally just.
>
> >> douard Daladier, the prime minister, did not believe that most French
> >> citizens would understand why, as the law professor and commentator
> >> Joseph Barth lemy put it, there must be a general European war to
> >> citizens would understand why, as the law professor and commentator
> >> maintain three million Germans under Czech sovereignty.
>
> >> As for Great Britain, appeasers and anti-appeasers alike agreed
> >> that the Sudeten Germans claim to determine their own allegiance was
> >> justified .Even Winston Churchill told Hubert Ripka, one of Benes s
> >> closest associates, in the summer of 1938 that if he had been prime
> >> minister he would have acted as Neville Chamberlain had done .
>
> >> Lord Halifax, the British foreign secretary, declared in the House of
> >> Lords that even if negotiations at Munich had broken down and a war
> >> had resulted, no body of statesmen drawing the boundaries of a new
> >> Czechoslovakia would have redrawn them as they were left by the Treaty
> >> of Versailles.
>
> >> Gallup polls revealed popular majorities in Britain and France, and a
> >> still larger one in the United States, in favor of the Munich Pact.
>
> >> The court historians seem to have done a thorough job of burying this
> >> part of the story.
>
> >> Bene , after Munich, departed for the United States. In May 1939,
>
> >> As for Great Britain, appeasers and anti-appeasers alike agreed
> >> that the Sudeten Germans claim to determine their own allegiance was
> >> justified .Even Winston Churchill told Hubert Ripka, one of Benes s
> >> closest associates, in the summer of 1938 that if he had been prime
> >> minister he would have acted as Neville Chamberlain had done .
>
> >> Lord Halifax, the British foreign secretary, declared in the House of
> >> Lords that even if negotiations at Munich had broken down and a war
> >> had resulted, no body of statesmen drawing the boundaries of a new
> >> Czechoslovakia would have redrawn them as they were left by the Treaty
> >> of Versailles.
>
> >> Gallup polls revealed popular majorities in Britain and France, and a
> >> still larger one in the United States, in favor of the Munich Pact.
>
> >> The court historians seem to have done a thorough job of burying this
> >> part of the story.
>
> >> Bene was able to privately meet with Roosevelt. What he heard from
> >> the president certainly must have been a welcome view: as far as the
> >> U.S. Administration was concerned, Munich does not exist.
> >> Separately, the other members of the Big Three indicated that they
> >> no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
>
> >> Beginning in September 1941, Bene felt confident enough about his
> >> U.S. Administration was concerned, Munich does not exist.
> >> Separately, the other members of the Big Three indicated that they
> >> no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
>
> >> position that he began floating trial balloons regarding the
> >> possibility of large population transfers after the war. Germans,
> >> good and bad, European-minded and Nazi-minded, must learn that war
> >> does not pay. There was no way other than the way of suffering of
> >> educating a social and political community and there never was any
> >> other way.
>
> >> As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
> >> statements, Bene felt safe to go further. In a January 1942 article,
> >> possibility of large population transfers after the war. Germans,
> >> good and bad, European-minded and Nazi-minded, must learn that war
> >> does not pay. There was no way other than the way of suffering of
> >> educating a social and political community and there never was any
> >> other way.
>
> >> As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
i don't think you're really interested into 'what really happened'
though.
A Moose in Love
Nov 12, 2012, 2:37:36 PM11/12/12
to
On Nov 12, 2:22 pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>
expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
M.I.Wakefield
Nov 12, 2012, 2:42:25 PM11/12/12
to
"A Moose in Love" wrote in message
news:6fcfbc8a-99a5-4159...@r5g2000yqo.googlegroups.com...
> What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
> expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
After the German Army was asked to leave, the civilians who supported them
were asked to leave as well.
I don't see why you're surprised.
news:6fcfbc8a-99a5-4159...@r5g2000yqo.googlegroups.com...
> What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
> expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
were asked to leave as well.
I don't see why you're surprised.
Dave Smith
Nov 12, 2012, 3:07:28 PM11/12/12
to
of militants are holed up in a compound, usually with the consent and
support of the residents. When coalition forces hit it with artillery,
air strike or drones people start whining that innocent civilians were
killed.
A Moose in Love
Nov 12, 2012, 3:58:08 PM11/12/12
to
On Nov 12, 2:42 pm, "M.I.Wakefield" <n...@present.com> wrote:
> "A Moose in Love" wrote in messagenews:6fcfbc8a-99a5-4159...@r5g2000yqo.googlegroups.com...
That's not it at all. You should visit the library once in a while
and read up on the 'real' situation. Start by reading 'After The
Reich'.
> "A Moose in Love" wrote in messagenews:6fcfbc8a-99a5-4159...@r5g2000yqo.googlegroups.com...
and read up on the 'real' situation. Start by reading 'After The
Reich'.
A Moose in Love
Nov 12, 2012, 3:59:22 PM11/12/12
to
can't really blame you for being on the matrix. You're mediocre.
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 4:52:36 PM11/12/12
to
SPAMMED TO NON-RELEVANT NEWSGROUPS - AND CUT
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 4:53:04 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 8:34 AM, Auric Hellman wrote:
> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>>>
> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>>>
>> I have previously listed reason why it is impossible to refer to
>
>
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 4:53:20 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 8:37 AM, NEMO wrote:
>
>
>
>
> More videos for nazis executed by hanging video »
>
>
>
>
>
> More videos for nazis executed by hanging video »
>
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 4:54:01 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 9:47 AM, Greg Carr wrote:
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
> <adhe...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>
>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
time in
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
> <adhe...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>
>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 4:54:13 PM11/12/12
to
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 4:54:46 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 11:22 AM, Barry Bruyea wrote:
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
> <adhe...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>
>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
> <adhe...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>
>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 4:55:18 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 11:37 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
> On Nov 12, 2:22 pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>>
>> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
> On Nov 12, 2:22 pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>>
>> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 4:55:41 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 11:42 AM, M.I.Wakefield wrote:
> "A Moose in Love" wrote in message
> news:6fcfbc8a-99a5-4159...@r5g2000yqo.googlegroups.com...
> "A Moose in Love" wrote in message
> news:6fcfbc8a-99a5-4159...@r5g2000yqo.googlegroups.com...
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 4:55:53 PM11/12/12
to
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 4:56:28 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 12:59 PM, A Moose in Love wrote:
> On Nov 12, 3:07 pm, Dave Smith <adavid.sm...@sympatico.ca> wrote:
>> On 12/11/2012 2:42 PM, M.I.Wakefield wrote:
>>
>>> "A Moose in Love" wrote in message
>>> news:6fcfbc8a-99a5-4159...@r5g2000yqo.googlegroups.com...
>>
>>>> What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
>>>> expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
>>
>>> After the German Army was asked to leave, the civilians who supported
>>> them were asked to leave as well.
>>
>>> I don't see why you're surprised.
>>
>> That is sort of like the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A bunch
>> of militants are holed up in a compound, usually with the consent and
>> support of the residents. When coalition forces hit it with artillery,
>> air strike or drones people start whining that innocent civilians were
>> killed.
> On Nov 12, 3:07 pm, Dave Smith <adavid.sm...@sympatico.ca> wrote:
>> On 12/11/2012 2:42 PM, M.I.Wakefield wrote:
>>
>>> "A Moose in Love" wrote in message
>>> news:6fcfbc8a-99a5-4159...@r5g2000yqo.googlegroups.com...
>>
>>>> What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
>>>> expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
>>
>>> After the German Army was asked to leave, the civilians who supported
>>> them were asked to leave as well.
>>
>>> I don't see why you're surprised.
>>
>> That is sort of like the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A bunch
>> of militants are holed up in a compound, usually with the consent and
>> support of the residents. When coalition forces hit it with artillery,
>> air strike or drones people start whining that innocent civilians were
>> killed.
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 4:56:41 PM11/12/12
to
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 4:57:21 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 9:09 AM, NEMO wrote:
>
> You're scum!
>
> You're scum!
CUNTICA
Nov 12, 2012, 5:00:39 PM11/12/12
to
Arsehole/asswipe A Moose in Love, isn't that your middle name, "You're
mediocre."?
mediocre."?
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 5:02:59 PM11/12/12
to
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 5:03:50 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 10:20 AM, David Johnston wrote:
> On 11/12/2012 8:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>>
>> Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
>> genocide.?
>> http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
>> {
>> From the introduction:
>> .
>> Immediately after the Second World War, the victorious Allies carried
>> out the largest forced population transfer – and perhaps the greatest
>> single movement of peoples – in human history. With the assistance of
>> the British, Soviet, and U.S. governments, millions of German-speaking
>> civilians living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the parts of eastern
>> Germany assigned to Poland
> On 11/12/2012 8:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>>
>> Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
>> genocide.?
>> http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
>> {
>> From the introduction:
>> .
>> Immediately after the Second World War, the victorious Allies carried
>> out the largest forced population transfer – and perhaps the greatest
>> single movement of peoples – in human history. With the assistance of
>> the British, Soviet, and U.S. governments, millions of German-speaking
>> civilians living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the parts of eastern
>> Germany assigned to Poland
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 5:04:14 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 11:19 AM, Barry Bruyea wrote:
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 07:16:08 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
> <parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> To quote in Biblical terms, "You reap what you sew."
>
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 07:16:08 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
> <parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> To quote in Biblical terms, "You reap what you sew."
>
ConsЯcons
Nov 12, 2012, 5:40:54 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 10:20 AM, David Johnston wrote:
ConsЯcons
Nov 12, 2012, 5:48:06 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 8:34 AM, Auric Hellman wrote:
> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>>
>> Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
>> genocide.?
>> http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
>> {
>> From the introduction:
>> .
>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>>
>> Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
>> genocide.?
>> http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
>> {
>> From the introduction:
>> .
>> Immediately after the Second World War, the victorious Allies carried
>> out the largest forced population transfer – and perhaps the greatest
>> out the largest forced population transfer – and perhaps the greatest
>> single movement of peoples – in human history. With the assistance of
>> the British, Soviet, and U.S. governments, millions of German-speaking
>> civilians living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the parts of eastern
>> the British, Soviet, and U.S. governments, millions of German-speaking
>> civilians living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the parts of eastern
>> this, I wondered about the relevance of Munich to this narrative –
>> these expulsions took place seven years and more after the conference:
>> what is the possible connection? As Douglas will demonstrate, the
>> expulsions were not devised at the last moment, in the chaos of the
>> last days of Berlin, but had been discussed and contemplated by many
>> of the actors – including in the U.S. and Britain –almost from the
>> beginning of the war.
>>
>> The result of the Munich Conference, as is well-known, was the Nazi
>> annexation of the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland, the portion of
>> Czechoslovakia bordering Germany and populated primarily by ethnic
>> Germans.
>>
>> The Sudetenland issue dates to the end of the First World War, and it
>> represents one of the many failures of the Paris Peace Conference
>> after that war:
>>
>> The German deputies of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in the Imperial
>> Council (Reichsrat) referred to the Fourteen Points of U.S. President
>> Woodrow Wilson and the right proposed therein to self-determination,
>> and attempted to negotiate the union of the German-speaking
>> territories with the new Republic of German Austria, which itself
>> aimed at joining Weimar Germany.
>>
>> However Sudetenland remained in a newly created Czechoslovakia, a
>> multi-ethnic state of several nations: Czechs, Germans, Slovaks,
>> Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians.
>>
>> At the Paris Conference (technically Versailles dealt with Germany),
>> Beneš lobbied long and hard to keep these ethnically German
>> these expulsions took place seven years and more after the conference:
>> what is the possible connection? As Douglas will demonstrate, the
>> expulsions were not devised at the last moment, in the chaos of the
>> last days of Berlin, but had been discussed and contemplated by many
>> of the actors – including in the U.S. and Britain –almost from the
>> beginning of the war.
>>
>> The result of the Munich Conference, as is well-known, was the Nazi
>> annexation of the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland, the portion of
>> Czechoslovakia bordering Germany and populated primarily by ethnic
>> Germans.
>>
>> The Sudetenland issue dates to the end of the First World War, and it
>> represents one of the many failures of the Paris Peace Conference
>> after that war:
>>
>> The German deputies of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in the Imperial
>> Council (Reichsrat) referred to the Fourteen Points of U.S. President
>> Woodrow Wilson and the right proposed therein to self-determination,
>> and attempted to negotiate the union of the German-speaking
>> territories with the new Republic of German Austria, which itself
>> aimed at joining Weimar Germany.
>>
>> However Sudetenland remained in a newly created Czechoslovakia, a
>> multi-ethnic state of several nations: Czechs, Germans, Slovaks,
>> Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians.
>>
>> At the Paris Conference (technically Versailles dealt with Germany),
>> territories within Czech territory. Many diplomats from the West at
>> the conference expressed reservations even at that time, yet Beneš was
>> successful – even more than many of his countrymen had dared to
>> imagine. Unfortunately, his victory sowed the seed of opportunity for
>> confrontation:
>>
>> Adolf Hitler had never ceased to highlight the incompatibility of
>> territorial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles with the aims for
>> which the Allies had professed to fight the Great War. The existence
>> of Czechoslovakia in its current form, he insisted, was unanswerable
>> proof of the victors’ hypocrisy.
>>
>> Douglas sheds some light (for me at least) regarding Munich. While
>> the term “Munich” as regarding the 1938 conference is today used as a
>> term of derision, at the time it was hailed in all quarters of the
>> West – not only for averting war, but also for correcting one of the
>> well-recognized wrongs committed in Paris nineteen years earlier:
>>
>> …as the London Times put it, the transfer of territory to Germany had
>> been “both necessary and fundamentally just.”
>> imagine. Unfortunately, his victory sowed the seed of opportunity for
>> confrontation:
>>
>> Adolf Hitler had never ceased to highlight the incompatibility of
>> territorial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles with the aims for
>> which the Allies had professed to fight the Great War. The existence
>> of Czechoslovakia in its current form, he insisted, was unanswerable
>> proof of the victors’ hypocrisy.
>>
>> Douglas sheds some light (for me at least) regarding Munich. While
>> the term “Munich” as regarding the 1938 conference is today used as a
>> term of derision, at the time it was hailed in all quarters of the
>> West – not only for averting war, but also for correcting one of the
>> well-recognized wrongs committed in Paris nineteen years earlier:
>>
>> …as the London Times put it, the transfer of territory to Germany had
>>
>> Édouard Daladier, the prime minister, did not believe that most French
>> citizens would understand why, as the law professor and commentator
>> Joseph Barthélemy put it, there must be a general European war “to
>> maintain three million Germans under Czech sovereignty.”
>>
>> As for Great Britain, “appeasers” and anti-appeasers” alike agreed
>> that the Sudeten Germans’ claim to determine their own allegiance was
>> justified….Even Winston Churchill told Hubert Ripka, one of Benes’s
>> closest associates, in the summer of 1938 that if he had been prime
>> minister he would have acted as Neville Chamberlain had done….
>>
>> Lord Halifax, the British foreign secretary, declared in the House of
>> Lords that even if negotiations at Munich had broken down and a war
>> had resulted, “no body of statesmen drawing the boundaries of a new
>> Czechoslovakia would have redrawn them as they were left by the Treaty
>> of Versailles.”
>>
>> Gallup polls revealed popular majorities in Britain and France, and a
>> still larger one in the United States, in favor of the Munich Pact.
>>
>> The court historians seem to have done a thorough job of burying this
>> part of the story.
>>
>> Beneš, after Munich, departed for the United States. In May 1939,
>>
>> As for Great Britain, “appeasers” and anti-appeasers” alike agreed
>> that the Sudeten Germans’ claim to determine their own allegiance was
>> justified….Even Winston Churchill told Hubert Ripka, one of Benes’s
>> closest associates, in the summer of 1938 that if he had been prime
>> minister he would have acted as Neville Chamberlain had done….
>>
>> Lord Halifax, the British foreign secretary, declared in the House of
>> Lords that even if negotiations at Munich had broken down and a war
>> had resulted, “no body of statesmen drawing the boundaries of a new
>> Czechoslovakia would have redrawn them as they were left by the Treaty
>> of Versailles.”
>>
>> Gallup polls revealed popular majorities in Britain and France, and a
>> still larger one in the United States, in favor of the Munich Pact.
>>
>> The court historians seem to have done a thorough job of burying this
>> part of the story.
>>
>> Beneš was able to privately meet with Roosevelt. What he heard from
>> the president certainly must have been a welcome view: as far as the
>> U.S. Administration was concerned, “Munich does not exist.”
>> Separately, the other members of “the Big Three” indicated that they
>> no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
>>
>> Beginning in September 1941, Beneš felt confident enough about his
>> U.S. Administration was concerned, “Munich does not exist.”
>> Separately, the other members of “the Big Three” indicated that they
>> no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
>>
>> position that he began floating trial balloons regarding the
>> possibility of large population transfers after the war. “Germans,
>> good and bad, European-minded and Nazi-minded, must learn…that war
>> does not pay.” There was “no way other than the way of suffering of
>> educating a social and political community and there never was any
>> other way.”
>>
>>
>>
>> As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
>> statements, Beneš felt safe to go further. In a January 1942 article,
>> possibility of large population transfers after the war. “Germans,
>> good and bad, European-minded and Nazi-minded, must learn…that war
>> does not pay.” There was “no way other than the way of suffering of
>> educating a social and political community and there never was any
>> other way.”
>>
>>
>>
>> As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
ConsЯcons
Nov 12, 2012, 5:48:30 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 9:47 AM, Greg Carr wrote:
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
Dave Smith
Nov 12, 2012, 6:29:58 PM11/12/12
to
no longer swimmng in the shallow end of the gene poll where the neo
nazis thrive.
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 6:56:10 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 3:29 PM, Dave Smith wrote:
>>>> I don't see why you're surprised.
>>>> I don't see why you're surprised.
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 6:58:48 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 11:37 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
> On Nov 12, 2:22 pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>>
>> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>>
>>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>
>>>>> There were those in the west who attempted to place the entire blame
>>>> of the unfolding tragedy on the Soviets. The Soviets certainly earned
>>>> their share of the blame. However, Britain and the United States
>>>> ignored this issue for three years or more before the events. When
>>>> they had time for planning and leverage to reach some agreements, they
>>>> did nothing – in fact they encouraged Stalin and his minions in their
>>>> quest for cleansing.
>>
>
>>
>>>>> There were those in the west who attempted to place the entire blame
>>>> of the unfolding tragedy on the Soviets. The Soviets certainly earned
>>>> their share of the blame. However, Britain and the United States
>>>> ignored this issue for three years or more before the events. When
>>>> they had time for planning and leverage to reach some agreements, they
>>>> did nothing – in fact they encouraged Stalin and his minions in their
>>>> quest for cleansing.
>>
>
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 6:59:11 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 11:42 AM, M.I.Wakefield wrote:
>> What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
>> expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
>> expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 6:59:33 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 12:07 PM, Dave Smith wrote:
>> After the German Army was asked to leave, the civilians who supported
>> them were asked to leave as well.
>> them were asked to leave as well.
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 7:00:01 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 12:59 PM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>>> What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
>>>> expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
>>>> What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
>>>> expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 7:00:28 PM11/12/12
to
SpambustR
Nov 12, 2012, 7:00:49 PM11/12/12
to
On 12/11/2012 12:58 PM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>> After the German Army was asked to leave, the civilians who supported them
>> were asked to leave as well.
>>
>> After the German Army was asked to leave, the civilians who supported them
>> were asked to leave as well.
>>
>> I don't see why you're surprised.
ConsЯcons
Nov 12, 2012, 7:01:54 PM11/12/12
to
Barry Bruyea
Nov 13, 2012, 6:10:37 AM11/13/12
to
On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
<parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>On Nov 12, 2:22 pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>>
>> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
<parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>On Nov 12, 2:22 pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>>
>> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>> >> There were those in the west who attempted to place the entire blame
>> >> of the unfolding tragedy on the Soviets. The Soviets certainly earned
>> >> their share of the blame. However, Britain and the United States
>> >> ignored this issue for three years or more before the events. When
>> >> they had time for planning and leverage to reach some agreements, they
>> >> did nothing – in fact they encouraged Stalin and his minions in their
>> >> quest for cleansing.
>>
>> >> of the unfolding tragedy on the Soviets. The Soviets certainly earned
>> >> their share of the blame. However, Britain and the United States
>> >> ignored this issue for three years or more before the events. When
>> >> they had time for planning and leverage to reach some agreements, they
>> >> did nothing – in fact they encouraged Stalin and his minions in their
>> >> quest for cleansing.
>>
>> >> They rejected the experts who had studied the issue. They rejoiced
>> >> that all Germans would be made to know suffering and pain, receiving a
>> >> proper re-education. They cared not about distinctions of innocence
>> >> and guilt. Again, from Douglas:
>>
>> >> They had encouraged their allies to carry out, and promised their
>> >> cooperation in accomplishing, deeds for which they would later
>> >> prosecute their enemies as war crimes….When making the choices they
>> >> did, they went in with their eyes open.
>>
>> >> I have previously listed reason why it is impossible to refer to
>> >> World War Two as “the good war.” While absolutely not the worst
>> >> chapter in the book of western involvement in this war, this chapter
>> >> should not be ignored.
>> >> }
>>
>> >> that all Germans would be made to know suffering and pain, receiving a
>> >> proper re-education. They cared not about distinctions of innocence
>> >> and guilt. Again, from Douglas:
>>
>> >> They had encouraged their allies to carry out, and promised their
>> >> cooperation in accomplishing, deeds for which they would later
>> >> prosecute their enemies as war crimes….When making the choices they
>> >> did, they went in with their eyes open.
>>
>> >> I have previously listed reason why it is impossible to refer to
>> >> World War Two as “the good war.” While absolutely not the worst
>> >> chapter in the book of western involvement in this war, this chapter
>> >> should not be ignored.
>> >> }
>>
>> >No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
>> >during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
>> >suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
>> >suffered by ethnic Germans. The author is to be commended.
>>
>> Commended for the pathetic attempt to show Germans as victims. To coin
>> >during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
>> >suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
>> >suffered by ethnic Germans. The author is to be commended.
>>
>> a philosophical phrase, it's a crock of shit. This reminds of that
>> old saw about the man who pleads guilty of killing his parents and
>> then throws himself on the mercy of the court because he is now and
>> orphan.
>
>What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
>expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
You haven't told me what the downside was. There is a lesson, here;
>What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
>expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
don't start wars, you idiot.
Harold Burton
Nov 13, 2012, 6:39:09 AM11/13/12
to
In article <0vi2a81v3je40js69...@4ax.com>,
Much like current day attempts to show Palestinians as victims.
snicker
snicker
Harold Burton
Nov 13, 2012, 6:40:04 AM11/13/12
to
In article <mia4a85847o03upiq...@4ax.com>,
> >> >> 1938, and the actions taken thereafter by Edvard Bene‰. When reading
> >> >> Bene‰, after Munich, departed for the United States. In May 1939,
> >> >> Bene‰ was able to privately meet with Roosevelt. What he heard from
> >> >> a Catch-22. To support Bene‰ and the Czechoslovak government in exile
Someone explain that to the Palestinians and their present-day
apologists.
snicker
> >> >> this, I wondered about the relevance of Munich to this narrative –
> >> >> these expulsions took place seven years and more after the conference:
> >> >> what is the possible connection? As Douglas will demonstrate, the
> >> >> expulsions were not devised at the last moment, in the chaos of the
> >> >> last days of Berlin, but had been discussed and contemplated by many
> >> >> of the actors – including in the U.S. and Britain –almost from the
> >> >> beginning of the war.
> >>
> >> >> The result of the Munich Conference, as is well-known, was the Nazi
> >> >> annexation of the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland, the portion of
> >> >> Czechoslovakia bordering Germany and populated primarily by ethnic
> >> >> Germans.
> >>
> >> >> The Sudetenland issue dates to the end of the First World War, and it
> >> >> represents one of the many failures of the Paris Peace Conference
> >> >> after that war:
> >>
> >> >> The German deputies of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in the Imperial
> >> >> Council (Reichsrat) referred to the Fourteen Points of U.S. President
> >> >> Woodrow Wilson and the right proposed therein to self-determination,
> >> >> and attempted to negotiate the union of the German-speaking
> >> >> territories with the new Republic of German Austria, which itself
> >> >> aimed at joining Weimar Germany.
> >>
> >> >> However Sudetenland remained in a newly created Czechoslovakia, a
> >> >> multi-ethnic state of several nations: Czechs, Germans, Slovaks,
> >> >> Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians.
> >>
> >> >> At the Paris Conference (technically Versailles dealt with Germany),
> >> >> Bene‰ lobbied long and hard to keep these ethnically German
> >> >> these expulsions took place seven years and more after the conference:
> >> >> what is the possible connection? As Douglas will demonstrate, the
> >> >> expulsions were not devised at the last moment, in the chaos of the
> >> >> last days of Berlin, but had been discussed and contemplated by many
> >> >> of the actors – including in the U.S. and Britain –almost from the
> >> >> beginning of the war.
> >>
> >> >> The result of the Munich Conference, as is well-known, was the Nazi
> >> >> annexation of the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland, the portion of
> >> >> Czechoslovakia bordering Germany and populated primarily by ethnic
> >> >> Germans.
> >>
> >> >> The Sudetenland issue dates to the end of the First World War, and it
> >> >> represents one of the many failures of the Paris Peace Conference
> >> >> after that war:
> >>
> >> >> The German deputies of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in the Imperial
> >> >> Council (Reichsrat) referred to the Fourteen Points of U.S. President
> >> >> Woodrow Wilson and the right proposed therein to self-determination,
> >> >> and attempted to negotiate the union of the German-speaking
> >> >> territories with the new Republic of German Austria, which itself
> >> >> aimed at joining Weimar Germany.
> >>
> >> >> However Sudetenland remained in a newly created Czechoslovakia, a
> >> >> multi-ethnic state of several nations: Czechs, Germans, Slovaks,
> >> >> Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians.
> >>
> >> >> At the Paris Conference (technically Versailles dealt with Germany),
> >> >> territories within Czech territory. Many diplomats from the West at
> >> >> the conference expressed reservations even at that time, yet Bene‰ was
> >> >> Bene‰ was able to privately meet with Roosevelt. What he heard from
> >> >> the president certainly must have been a welcome view: as far as the
> >> >> U.S. Administration was concerned, “Munich does not exist.”
> >> >> Separately, the other members of “the Big Three” indicated that they
> >> >> no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
> >>
> >> >> Beginning in September 1941, Bene‰ felt confident enough about his
> >> >> U.S. Administration was concerned, “Munich does not exist.”
> >> >> Separately, the other members of “the Big Three” indicated that they
> >> >> no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
> >>
> >> >> position that he began floating trial balloons regarding the
> >> >> possibility of large population transfers after the war. “Germans,
> >> >> good and bad, European-minded and Nazi-minded, must learn…that war
> >> >> does not pay.” There was “no way other than the way of suffering of
> >> >> educating a social and political community and there never was any
> >> >> other way.”
> >>
> >> >> As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
> >> >> statements, Bene‰ felt safe to go further. In a January 1942 article,
> >> >> possibility of large population transfers after the war. “Germans,
> >> >> good and bad, European-minded and Nazi-minded, must learn…that war
> >> >> does not pay.” There was “no way other than the way of suffering of
> >> >> educating a social and political community and there never was any
> >> >> other way.”
> >>
> >> >> As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
apologists.
snicker
A Moose in Love
Nov 13, 2012, 7:28:05 AM11/13/12
to
On Nov 13, 6:10 am, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>
for the beginning of WW2 is not so black and white)
Anyway, please note that the vast majority of ethnic Germans were not
responsible for starting WW2, they were not Jew hating Nazis, they
were not murderers, looters etc. Idiot.
Harold Burton
Nov 13, 2012, 7:47:11 AM11/13/12
to
In article
<4fb8ab96-3ea7-4ea9...@4g2000yql.googlegroups.com>,
> > >> >> 1938, and the actions taken thereafter by Edvard Bene‰. When reading
> > >> >> Bene‰ lobbied long and hard to keep these ethnically German
> > >> >> Bene‰, after Munich, departed for the United States. In May 1939,
> > >> >> Bene‰ was able to privately meet with Roosevelt. What he heard from
> > >> >> a Catch-22. To support Bene‰ and the Czechoslovak government in
Idiots like Barry believe in guilt by association.
Then there's the inconvenient fact that the Nazis had the support of
less than half the German population.
<4fb8ab96-3ea7-4ea9...@4g2000yql.googlegroups.com>,
> > >> >> territories within Czech territory. Many diplomats from the West at
> > >> >> the conference expressed reservations even at that time, yet Bene‰
> > >> >> Bene‰ was able to privately meet with Roosevelt. What he heard from
> > >> >> the president certainly must have been a welcome view: as far as the
> > >> >> U.S. Administration was concerned, “Munich does not exist.”
> > >> >> Separately, the other members of “the Big Three” indicated that they
> > >> >> no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
> >
> > >> >> Beginning in September 1941, Bene‰ felt confident enough about his
> > >> >> U.S. Administration was concerned, “Munich does not exist.”
> > >> >> Separately, the other members of “the Big Three” indicated that they
> > >> >> no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
> >
> > >> >> position that he began floating trial balloons regarding the
> > >> >> possibility of large population transfers after the war. “Germans,
> > >> >> good and bad, European-minded and Nazi-minded, must learn…that war
> > >> >> does not pay.” There was “no way other than the way of suffering of
> > >> >> educating a social and political community and there never was any
> > >> >> other way.”
> >
> > >> >> As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
> > >> >> statements, Bene‰ felt safe to go further. In a January 1942
> > >> >> possibility of large population transfers after the war. “Germans,
> > >> >> good and bad, European-minded and Nazi-minded, must learn…that war
> > >> >> does not pay.” There was “no way other than the way of suffering of
> > >> >> educating a social and political community and there never was any
> > >> >> other way.”
> >
> > >> >> As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
Then there's the inconvenient fact that the Nazis had the support of
less than half the German population.
Dave Smith
Nov 13, 2012, 9:16:03 AM11/13/12
to
On 13/11/2012 7:28 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>
> Let's just pretend that Germany started WW2.
Let's pretend that the Earth revolves around the sun.
>
> Let's just pretend that Germany started WW2.
> (in reality the reason
> for the beginning of WW2 is not so black and white)
expand into neighbouring territory. They had made a big push back in
1918 and they were defeated. They reluctantly signed a treaty to end the
war, a treaty that involved paying reparations... similar to what they
had done to France a few decades earlier, not militarizing the
Rhineland and setting remapping borders. Apparently the German people
were unconvinced that they had been defeated in WWI. The Nazis used that
as a rallying point and relied on the arrogance of the German people who
to too proud to admit that they had been defeated in the war, but too
weak to fight against the Nazi thugs.
> Anyway, please note that the vast majority of ethnic Germans were not
> responsible for starting WW2, they were not Jew hating Nazis, they
> were not murderers, looters etc. Idiot.
the war? It was the Nazis? The fact is that the Nazis became the
overwhelming political party and they had massive support. They may not
all have been Jew haters, but the Nazis started hassling the Jews in
the early 1930s and no one in Germany stopped them. They had camps to
send them to, used them as slave labourers and no one stopped them. You
had to have been able to smell what was going on in the camps, but they
chose not to know. They may not all have been Jew hating Nazis, but
they managed to kill millions of Jews, Gypsies and others.
I will grant you that anti Semitism was not limited to Germany. It was
quite common across Europe, and when Germans invaded and occupied other
countries they had not problems finding locals to do their dirty work
for them. The fact remains that it was Germany who built the camps,
provided the transportation and equipment and gave the orders.
Yet, the Nazis were allowed to rise to power. The
Dhu on Gate
Nov 13, 2012, 11:08:56 AM11/13/12
to
On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman wrote:
>
> No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
> during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
> suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
> suffered by ethnic Germans. The author is to be commended.
>
>
It is difficult to put the cost of human tragedy on scales and come up
>
> No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
> during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
> suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
> suffered by ethnic Germans. The author is to be commended.
>
>
with useful comparisons. However the destruction of the ethnic Germans
it one of Europe's greater tragedies, as it was a functional genocide
of those cultures and a major deprivation to their neighbors. It was
I spose a completion of the NAZI plan for Germans. It is also an odd
irony that the only significant remaining traditions from Germany's
diaspora are Yiddish. NAZI leadership destroyed all the rest.
I saw a (Russian) study showing ongoing economic hardship in areas that
were deprived of their German/Yiddish minorities.
Dhu
--
Ne obliviscaris, vix ea nostro voco.
Barry Bruyea
Nov 13, 2012, 11:18:04 AM11/13/12
to
On Tue, 13 Nov 2012 06:40:04 -0500, Harold Burton
<hal.i....@hotmail.com> wrote:
>In article <mia4a85847o03upiq...@4ax.com>,
> Barry Bruyea <damnthet...@duck.com> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>> <parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
<hal.i....@hotmail.com> wrote:
>In article <mia4a85847o03upiq...@4ax.com>,
> Barry Bruyea <damnthet...@duck.com> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>> <parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> >On Nov 12, 2:22Â pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>> >> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>> >>
>> >> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>> >> >On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>> >> >> Book review: Â Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>> >> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>> >>
>> >> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>> >> >On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>> >> >> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>> >>
>> >> >> Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
>> >> >> genocide.?
>> >> >>http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
>> >> >> {
>> >> >> Â From the introduction:
>> >>
>> >> >> Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
>> >> >> genocide.?
>> >> >>http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
>> >> >> {
>> >> >> .
>> >> >> Â Immediately after the Second World War, the victorious Allies carried
>> >> >> out the largest forced population transfer – and perhaps the greatest
>> >> >> single movement of peoples – in human history.  With the assistance of
>> >> >> the British, Soviet, and U.S. governments, millions of German-speaking
>> >> >> civilians living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the parts of eastern
>> >> >> Germany assigned to Poland were driven out of their homes and
>> >> >> deposited amid the ruins of the Reich, to fend for themselves as best
>> >> >> they could. Â Millions more, who had fled the advancing Red Army in the
>> >> >> civilians living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the parts of eastern
>> >> >> Germany assigned to Poland were driven out of their homes and
>> >> >> deposited amid the ruins of the Reich, to fend for themselves as best
>> >> >> final months of the war, were prevented from returning to their places
>> >> >> of origin, and became lifelong exiles….altogether, the expulsion
>> >> >> operation permanently displaced at least 12 million people, and
>> >> >> perhaps as many as 14 million. Â Most of these were women and children
>> >> >> under the age of sixteen….estimates of 500,000 deaths at the lower end
>> >> >> of the spectrum, and as many as 1.5 million at the higher, are
>> >> >> consistent with the evidence as it exists at present.
>> >>
>> >> >>  In this book, Douglas compiles – apparently for the first time in
>> >> >> consistent with the evidence as it exists at present.
>> >>
>> >> >> English – a thorough study of one of the least discussed tragedies of
>> >> >> the Second World War, and certainly of the immediate post-war period –
>> >> >> that of the forced expulsion of Germans from their homelands
>> >> >> throughout central Europe.
>> >>
>> >> >>  On the most optimistic interpretation…the expulsions were an immense
>> >> >> throughout central Europe.
>> >>
>> >> >> man-made catastrophe….
>> >>
>> >> >> Â That this tragedy remains relatively unknown, even in the highest
>> >> >> academic circles, is given evidence by the following anecdote provided
>> >> >> by the author:
>> >>
>> >> >> Â It is, then, entirely understandable why so many of my splendid and
>> >> >> by the author:
>> >>
>> >> >> learned colleagues on the Colgate faculty should have expressed their
>> >> >> confusion to me after reading in the newspapers in October 2009 that
>> >> >> the president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, had demanded that
>> >> >> the other members of the European Union legally indemnify his country
>> >> >> against compensation claims by ethnic German expellees, as the price
>> >> >> of his country’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.  None had been
>> >> >> confusion to me after reading in the newspapers in October 2009 that
>> >> >> the president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, had demanded that
>> >> >> the other members of the European Union legally indemnify his country
>> >> >> against compensation claims by ethnic German expellees, as the price
>> >> >> aware that anything had occurred after the war in respect of which the
>> >> >> Czech Republic might require to be indemnified.
>> >>
>> >> >> Douglas gives some reasons why he believes that this episode has
>> >> >> received so little attention:
>> >> >> For Germans, it invites debate about the war-time record of ethnic
>> >> >> German minorities living in the subject countries.
>> >> >> For the citizens of expelling countries, it draws unwanted attention
>> >> >> and casts a doubtful light on carefully crafted war-related
>> >> >> narratives.
>> >> >> For citizens of the U.S. and Britain, it draws light to the complicity
>> >> >> of their leaders in one of the largest episodes of human rights abuse
>> >> >> in history.
>> >> >> Â Douglas does not add in this context, but elsewhere sheds light on,
>> >> >> Czech Republic might require to be indemnified.
>> >>
>> >> >> Douglas gives some reasons why he believes that this episode has
>> >> >> received so little attention:
>> >> >> For Germans, it invites debate about the war-time record of ethnic
>> >> >> German minorities living in the subject countries.
>> >> >> For the citizens of expelling countries, it draws unwanted attention
>> >> >> and casts a doubtful light on carefully crafted war-related
>> >> >> narratives.
>> >> >> For citizens of the U.S. and Britain, it draws light to the complicity
>> >> >> of their leaders in one of the largest episodes of human rights abuse
>> >> >> in history.
>> >> >> another possible reason for the relative silence. Â It is not
>> >> >> considered appropriate to show any sympathy toward Germans as regards
>> >> >> the Second World War, and especially if it might be juxtaposed to the
>> >> >> Holocaust – therefore even the study of such episodes might result in
>> >> >> the Second World War, and especially if it might be juxtaposed to the
>> >> >> unwanted professional risks. Â This conclusion is suggested given his
>> >> >> need to apologize in advance for the possibility that he might be
>> >> >> accused of holding such a position:
>> >>
>> >> >> Â It is appropriate at the outset to state explicitly that no
>> >> >> accused of holding such a position:
>> >>
>> >> >> legitimate comparison can be drawn between the postwar expulsions and
>> >> >> the appalling record of German offenses against the Jews and other
>> >> >> innocent victims between 1939 and 1945. Â The extent of Nazi
>> >> >> the appalling record of German offenses against the Jews and other
>> >> >> criminality and barbarity in central and eastern Europe is on a scale
>> >> >> and of a degree that is almost impossible to overstate.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Douglas begins this book by with a focus on the Munich Conference of
>> >> >> and of a degree that is almost impossible to overstate.
>> >>
>> >> >> 1938, and the actions taken thereafter by Edvard Bene‰.  When reading
>> >> >> this, I wondered about the relevance of Munich to this narrative –
>> >> >> these expulsions took place seven years and more after the conference:
>> >> >> what is the possible connection? Â As Douglas will demonstrate, the
>> >> >> expulsions were not devised at the last moment, in the chaos of the
>> >> >> last days of Berlin, but had been discussed and contemplated by many
>> >> >> of the actors – including in the U.S. and Britain –almost from the
>> >> >> last days of Berlin, but had been discussed and contemplated by many
>> >> >> beginning of the war.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â The result of the Munich Conference, as is well-known, was the Nazi
>> >> >> annexation of the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland, the portion of
>> >> >> Czechoslovakia bordering Germany and populated primarily by ethnic
>> >> >> Germans.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â The Sudetenland issue dates to the end of the First World War, and it
>> >> >> Czechoslovakia bordering Germany and populated primarily by ethnic
>> >> >> Germans.
>> >>
>> >> >> represents one of the many failures of the Paris Peace Conference
>> >> >> after that war:
>> >>
>> >> >> Â The German deputies of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in the Imperial
>> >> >> after that war:
>> >>
>> >> >> Council (Reichsrat) referred to the Fourteen Points of U.S. President
>> >> >> Woodrow Wilson and the right proposed therein to self-determination,
>> >> >> and attempted to negotiate the union of the German-speaking
>> >> >> territories with the new Republic of German Austria, which itself
>> >> >> aimed at joining Weimar Germany.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â However Sudetenland remained in a newly created Czechoslovakia, a
>> >> >> Woodrow Wilson and the right proposed therein to self-determination,
>> >> >> and attempted to negotiate the union of the German-speaking
>> >> >> territories with the new Republic of German Austria, which itself
>> >> >> aimed at joining Weimar Germany.
>> >>
>> >> >> multi-ethnic state of several nations: Czechs, Germans, Slovaks,
>> >> >> Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â At the Paris Conference (technically Versailles dealt with Germany),
>> >> >> Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians.
>> >>
>> >> >> Bene‰ lobbied long and hard to keep these ethnically German
>> >> >> territories within Czech territory. Â Many diplomats from the West at
>> >> >> the conference expressed reservations even at that time, yet Bene‰ was
>> >> >> successful – even more than many of his countrymen had dared to
>> >> >> imagine. Â Unfortunately, his victory sowed the seed of opportunity for
>> >> >> confrontation:
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Adolf Hitler had never ceased to highlight the incompatibility of
>> >> >> territorial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles with the aims for
>> >> >> which the Allies had professed to fight the Great War. Â The existence
>> >> >> of Czechoslovakia in its current form, he insisted, was unanswerable
>> >> >> proof of the victors’ hypocrisy.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Douglas sheds some light (for me at least) regarding Munich. Â While
>> >> >> the term “Munich†as regarding the 1938 conference is today used as a
>> >> >> term of derision, at the time it was hailed in all quarters of the
>> >> >> West – not only for averting war, but also for correcting one of the
>> >> >> well-recognized wrongs committed in Paris nineteen years earlier:
>> >>
>> >> >> …as the London Times put it, the transfer of territory to Germany had
>> >>
>> >> >> been “both necessary and fundamentally just.â€
>> >>
>> >> >> Édouard Daladier, the prime minister, did not believe that most French
>> >> >> citizens would understand why, as the law professor and commentator
>> >> >> Joseph Barthélemy put it, there must be a general European war “to
>> >> >> maintain three million Germans under Czech sovereignty.â€
>> >>
>> >> >>  As for Great Britain, “appeasers†and anti-appeasers†alike agreed
>> >> >> that the Sudeten Germans’ claim to determine their own allegiance was
>> >> >> justified….Even Winston Churchill told Hubert Ripka, one of Benes’s
>> >> >> closest associates, in the summer of 1938 that if he had been prime
>> >> >> minister he would have acted as Neville Chamberlain had done….
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Lord Halifax, the British foreign secretary, declared in the House of
>> >> >> Lords that even if negotiations at Munich had broken down and a war
>> >> >> had resulted, “no body of statesmen drawing the boundaries of a new
>> >> >> Czechoslovakia would have redrawn them as they were left by the Treaty
>> >> >> of Versailles.â€
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Gallup polls revealed popular majorities in Britain and France, and a
>> >> >> still larger one in the United States, in favor of the Munich Pact.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â The court historians seem to have done a thorough job of burying this
>> >>
>> >> >> part of the story.
>> >>
>> >> >>  Bene‰, after Munich, departed for the United States.  In May 1939,
>> >> >> Bene‰ was able to privately meet with Roosevelt.  What he heard from
>> >> >> the president certainly must have been a welcome view: Â as far as the
>> >> >> U.S. Administration was concerned, “Munich does not exist.â€
>> >> >> Separately, the other members of “the Big Three†indicated that they
>> >> >> no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
>> >>
>> >> >>  Beginning in September 1941, Bene‰ felt confident enough about his
>> >>
>> >> >> position that he began floating trial balloons regarding the
>> >> >> possibility of large population transfers after the war.  “Germans,
>> >> >> good and bad, European-minded and Nazi-minded, must learn…that war
>> >> >> does not pay.† There was “no way other than the way of suffering of
>> >> >> educating a social and political community and there never was any
>> >> >> other way.â€
>> >>
>> >> >> As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
>> >> >> statements, Bene‰ felt safe to go further.  In a January 1942 article,
>> >> >> As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
>> >> >> he declared:
>> >>
>> >> >> “National minorities…are always – and in Central Europe especially – a
>> >> >> real thorn in the side of individual nations. Â This is especially true
>> >> >> if they are German minorities.† Before speaking of minority rights,
>> >> >> it was necessary to “define the rights of majorities and the
>> >> >> obligations of minorities.â€
>> >>
>> >> >> Â He questioned, in light of wartime experiences, whether it was
>> >> >> necessary or desirable for minorities to continue in existence. Â Then
>> >> >> he used Hitler’s actions to justify the massive population transfers
>> >> >> that would be required throughout Central Europe if his visions were
>> >> >> to become reality:
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Hitler himself has transferred German minorities from the Baltic and
>> >> >> to become reality:
>> >>
>> >> >> from Bessarabia. Â Germany, therefore, cannot a priori regard it as an
>> >> >> injury to her if other states adopt the same methods with regard to
>> >> >> German minorities….It will be necessary after this war to carry out a
>> >> >> transfer of populations on a very much larger scale than after the
>> >> >> last war.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Hitler did it, so it must be OK.
>> >> >> last war.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> >> Â This discussion was not occurring solely in the mind of the man
>> >> >> acting as the Czechoslovak leader in exile. Â Eden learned that Stalin
>> >> >> was also considering such transfers as early as December 1941
>> >> >> regarding the Germans from lands that would be given to Poland after
>> >> >> the war. Â The British Foreign Office, in 1942, suggested that large-
>> >> >> regarding the Germans from lands that would be given to Poland after
>> >> >> scale transfers were “a feasible method of dealing with the European
>> >> >> minorities problem.â€
>> >>
>> >> >> Â It is interesting that these discussions were occurring even as early
>> >> >> as 1939 – and certainly before United States official entry into the
>> >> >> war.  From this time until the war’s conclusion, the leaders of the
>> >> >> Allied powers met on several occasions. Â Their underlings met daily.
>> >> >> Was there any push-back by the U.S. or Great Britain against Russia on
>> >> >> this issue? Â Anything that suggests that the two Anglo leaders
>> >> >> considered such massive population transfers as a horrendous and
>> >> >> certain to be calamitous undertaking? Â While they had some leverage
>> >> >> over Stalin, did they at least try to utilize this leverage on behalf
>> >> >> of the minorities in question? Â Douglas offers no evidence to this
>> >> >> effect, and instead offers much evidence to the contrary – willing
>> >> >> partners were present in both England and the U.S.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Poland eventually followed in the tracks first laid by
>> >>
>> >> >> Czechoslovakia.  Certainly at the beginning of the war, Poland’s focus
>> >> >> was to regain all territories lost. Â As it became clear that the
>> >> >> Russians would keep what was taken in the east, Poland looked to the
>> >> >> west and inevitably to the expulsion of Germans in East Prussia.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Rumors began to circulate that the British government was now falling
>> >> >> west and inevitably to the expulsion of Germans in East Prussia.
>> >>
>> >> >> in to support such forced expulsions. Â The Sudeten German leader in
>> >> >> exile, Wenzel Jaksch, decided the best course was to remain dignified
>> >> >> and consistent in his positions in support of his community. Â The line
>> >> >> he had to walk was too thin – on the one hand, to not give the
>> >> >> slightest hint that he was a support to the Nazis, on the other to
>> >> >> properly place his claims for recognition of national Germans in
>> >> >> Czechoslovakia.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â The line was so thin that it need not have existed. Â Once the war
>> >> >> properly place his claims for recognition of national Germans in
>> >> >> Czechoslovakia.
>> >>
>> >> >> began, the position of Central-European Germans outside of Germany was
>> >> >> tenuous at best. Â To stay neutral only gave the appearance of giving
>> >> >> aid to the other side. Â Overt acts of what is called patriotism in
>> >> >> America would be necessary to even give some hope of being allowed to
>> >> >> remain in their homes after the war. Â Yet this would require taking
>> >> >> the fight against their national brothers.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â That the line was so thin and that the fate of these Central European
>> >>
>> >> >> Germans was virtually sealed before the war began does not explain the
>> >> >> robustness by which the Allies approvingly discussed the issue of
>> >> >> forced transfers. Â The comments range from the casual (as if the
>> >> >> robustness by which the Allies approvingly discussed the issue of
>> >> >> entire task was equivalent to moving a few families from one city to
>> >> >> the neighboring city) to the callous:
>> >>
>> >> >>  Herbert Hoover…called for consideration of what he described as “the
>> >> >> the neighboring city) to the callous:
>> >>
>> >> >> heroic remedy of transfer of population†as a means of preventing
>> >> >> future European conflict.â€
>> >>
>> >> >>  Sumner Welles [recent collaborator with FDR on foreign affairs]…was
>> >> >> coming around to the idea that “we should avail ourselves of this
>> >> >> moment of world upheaval to effect transfers of population where these
>> >> >> are necessary to prevent new conflicts, and thus enable peoples to
>> >> >> live under the government they desire, free from racial
>> >> >> discriminations.â€
>> >> >> are necessary to prevent new conflicts, and thus enable peoples to
>> >> >> live under the government they desire, free from racial
>> >>
>> >> >> …the Oxford historian, A.J.P. Taylor declared that the Czechoslovak
>> >> >> state could only be resurrected using the same “ruthlessness†and
>> >> >> inflicting “as much suffering†as the Germans had employed in
>> >> >> destroying it.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â In the House of Lords, Robert Vansittart [second cousin of Lawrence
>> >> >> of Arabia]…applauded Stalin’s robust indifference to questions of
>> >> >> guilt or innocence, when driving the Soviet Union’s German-speaking
>> >> >> population from their homes in 1941, as a model for the Allies to
>> >> >> follow.  “He was a thousand times right; five hundred thousand times
>> >> >> right….I say these [deportees] were not Hitlerite Germans.  They had a
>> >> >> quarter of a century’s training in the doctrines of
>> >> >> Communism….Nevertheless they were held to be Germans and unreliable.â€
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Even Lord Robert Cecil [cousin of Arthur Balfour], president of the
>> >> >> League of Nations Union and an impassioned defender of the rights of
>> >> >> minorities between the wars, now agreed that the Sudetendeutsche at
>> >> >> least would “have to be removed,†and that their fate should be of no
>> >> >> minorities between the wars, now agreed that the Sudetendeutsche at
>> >> >> concern to anyone but the Czechoslovak government.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â These are not words of concern for those to face the forced
>> >>
>> >> >> relocation to come. Â These are not words that demonstrate a concern to
>> >> >> separate the guilty from the innocent. Â These are words that
>> >> >> demonstrate, in some cases, a pleasure in the pain that will be
>> >> >> inflicted – loss of property, loss of dignity, loss of life.  These
>> >> >> are words that justify the coming actions using Hitler as the
>> >> >> yardstick of acceptable behavior.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Others did speak in opposition, or at least demonstrated some
>> >> >> yardstick of acceptable behavior.
>> >>
>> >> >> concern. Â These concerns were not based on party or economic lines.
>> >> >> For example, while leaders in the Labour Party expressed understanding
>> >> >> of the necessity for the forced expulsions, the journal Socialist
>> >> >> Commentary called attention to…
>> >> >> of the necessity for the forced expulsions, the journal Socialist
>> >>
>> >> >> …the incongruity of trying to preserve in aspic the often artificially
>> >> >> defined European frontiers of 1939, the product of centuries of
>> >> >> dynastic squabbling and historical accident, for all time….It would
>> >> >> have been more fitting…†to bring justice and freedom to the national
>> >> >> minorities wherever they chose to live, and not to continue the odious
>> >> >> Nazi method of shifting people about like cattle.â€
>> >>
>> >> >>  The London-based Economist warned…
>> >>
>> >> >>  That punishment of Germans after the war “must fall on those who are
>> >> >> guilty in a moral and not in a racial sense. Â The Nazis have made
>> >> >> racial scapegoats; the Allies must not fall into exactly the same
>> >> >> error.â€
>> >>
>> >> >> Â In a paper published in 1943, Allan Fisher and David Mitrany offered
>> >> >> the following critique:
>> >>
>> >> >> Â To claim that this practice was now justified because of the Nazi
>> >> >> government’s previous recourse to it, they argued, seemed a curious
>> >> >> way of reeducating the German people “at a time when they are being
>> >> >> urged to abjure Hitler and all his works.â€
>> >>
>> >> >> Â They went further, suggesting that this racial purity could only be
>> >> >> maintained by hermetically sealing the borders:
>> >>
>> >> >> …if it is to achieve the ends for which it is advocated the policy of
>> >>
>> >> >> transfer must have as its corollary a continuous policy of
>> >> >> segregation. Â Migration or any free movement of people would have to
>> >> >> be prohibited lest it should lead to the gradual creation of new
>> >> >> unwanted and irritating minorities.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Discrimination must beget further discrimination if its ends are to
>> >> >> unwanted and irritating minorities.
>> >>
>> >> >> be maintained.  Further, discrimination teaches discrimination –
>> >> >> exacerbating the so-called original problems and conflicts in the
>> >> >> first place. (As an aside, the European experiment began shortly after
>> >> >> the war- including the free travel of people from all nations in the
>> >> >> participating community. Â There is something sadly ironic, if not
>> >> >> first place. (As an aside, the European experiment began shortly after
>> >> >> the war- including the free travel of people from all nations in the
>> >> >> curious, about this. Â As if the message from the state is: you cannot
>> >> >> travel freely, unless we say you can travel freely – on our terms.)
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Given what little opposition there was to this decision in the West,
>> >> >> it was clear the direction the post-war settlements would take. Â This
>> >> >> decision placed the Germans in Czechoslovakia in a terrible position –
>> >> >> a Catch-22.  To support Bene‰ and the Czechoslovak government in exile
>> >> >> would mean expulsion after the war, and to support Hitler and the
>> >> >> Nazis would also mean expulsion after the war. Â There was nowhere for
>> >> >> these three million to turn that offered any hope.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â These decisions were all taken and settled by 1943. Â These were not
>> >>
>> >> >> ad-hoc decisions taken during the chaos of the end of the war. Â In
>> >> >> 1943, the U.S. especially still had tremendous leverage over Stalin if
>> >> >> Roosevelt chose to use it. Â Certainly, Stalin might have broken any
>> >> >> deal – but there is no indication that a deal on behalf of these
>> >> >> minorities was even attempted. Â Many of these Germans were innocent of
>> >> >> complicity with the Nazis. Â Evan the Slovaks, who had fought alongside
>> >> >> the Germans for five years – invading both Poland and the USSR –
>> >> >> before rebelling against the Nazis in 1944, were afforded a more
>> >> >> secure future after the war than the countless Germans outside of
>> >> >> Germany who tried to lay low, especially women and children.
>> >>
>> >> >>  Thus, the decisions for the expulsion were taken – in some quarters
>> >> >> secure future after the war than the countless Germans outside of
>> >> >> Germany who tried to lay low, especially women and children.
>> >>
>> >> >> of the West supported enthusiastically, while in others at least
>> >> >> tolerated.  All Germans were to receive punishment – guilty by
>> >> >> accident of birth as opposed to guilty by deed.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â It is certainly an efficient way to finalize the issue. Â Racism often
>> >>
>> >> >> is. Â It is also one of the most unfair. Â Millions in Central Europe
>> >> >> were soon to be on the receiving end of this efficient solution.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Douglas goes on to explain the detailed planning put in place by the
>> >>
>> >> >> Allies in anticipation of the forced expulsions.  This didn’t take him
>> >> >> long. Â In a nutshell, there was no planning. Â Given that the decisions
>> >> >> were finalized not later than 1943, this seems inexcusable.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Among the most remarkable aspects of the expulsion was the deliberate
>> >>
>> >> >> refusal of those who carried it out either to seek to learn the
>> >> >> lessons of those previous examples [Armenians in Turkey, Germans in
>> >> >> Alsace, previous relocations by Hitler and Stalin] or to make any
>> >> >> preparations, of however rudimentary a character, for an enterprise
>> >> >> whose disruption to the normal life of central Europe was second only
>> >> >> to that caused by the war itself.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â For the purpose of war, entire populations of the warring countries
>> >> >> lessons of those previous examples [Armenians in Turkey, Germans in
>> >> >> Alsace, previous relocations by Hitler and Stalin] or to make any
>> >> >> preparations, of however rudimentary a character, for an enterprise
>> >> >> whose disruption to the normal life of central Europe was second only
>> >> >> to that caused by the war itself.
>> >>
>> >> >> were mobilized. Â Every department of the state was set on war
>> >> >> footing. Â For the expulsions, virtually nothing. Â So many unanswered
>> >> >> (and unasked) questions, so little attention.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â In November 1943, the British government took a study on the detailed
>> >>
>> >> >> practical aspects of the coming expulsions and transfer –a full year
>> >> >> or more after the decision was taken by the Allies on this course. Â It
>> >> >> was the only such detailed study taken by any of the countries
>> >> >> involved.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â The timing is critical: at a time when the United States and Britain
>> >> >> involved.
>> >>
>> >> >> had not yet opened a western front, as the Russians were desperate for
>> >> >> them to do – D-Day was still to come – there was an opportunity for
>> >> >> leverage on Stalin regarding the questions of borders and
>> >> >> populations. Â At Tehran, Roosevelt instead demonstrated his sympathy
>> >> >> for Stalin’s geopolitical aims in Europe, and Churchill followed with
>> >> >> his infamous “three matchsticks†performance (using the matchsticks to
>> >> >> demonstrate and propose the shifting of both the east and west borders
>> >> >> of Poland to the west). Â Stalin was delighted.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â I do not pretend to believe that, had Britain and the United States
>> >> >> secured some concessions from Stalin at Tehran, Stalin would have
>> >> >> stuck to his word once hostilities ended (raising again the question
>> >> >> of why the west would ally with such an actor). Â The point is that no
>> >> >> stuck to his word once hostilities ended (raising again the question
>> >> >> attempt was even made to come to a humane answer.  In fact Churchill –
>> >> >> who was treated insultingly by Stalin at the beginning of Tehran, and
>> >> >> therefore perhaps looking to get back in his good graces – is the one
>> >> >> who brought the matchsticks!
>> >>
>> >> >> Â There were some who felt (or hoped) that the fate of those in central
>> >> >> Europe would already be settled by the end of the war, thus relieving
>> >> >> Britain of any responsibility in the issue. Â The rapid advance of the
>> >> >> Red Army would be the motive force behind this hope – the Germans in
>> >> >> their path would either be killed or flee toward Germany. Â Others
>> >> >> rightly saw that this “Pilate-like stance†might not be possible, as
>> >> >> the British government would certainly carry responsibility for the
>> >> >> policy decision.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Still others gave consideration to even more sinister possibilities.
>> >> >> policy decision.
>> >>
>> >> >> One Sir Orme Sargent of the Foreign Office suggested that “the future
>> >> >> of these people is much less likely to attract attention and give rise
>> >> >> to political agitation if they disappear into Siberia.† This and
>> >> >> other similar suggestions were soon dismissed, thankfully.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â This committee report, a result of the November 1943 study,
>> >>
>> >> >> identified the numerous difficulties presented by this unprecedented
>> >> >> endeavor. Â Despite the many significant issues raised, in hindsight
>> >> >> the report understated the enormity of the task and the potential
>> >> >> consequences. Â Even at this, the report proved far too gloomy for the
>> >> >> politicians who commissioned it.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â When members of the Armistice and Post-War Committee met to discuss
>> >> >> it in July 1944, the general response was one of disbelief and anger.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Disbelief and anger are often responses when the consequences of
>> >>
>> >> >> decisions already made are too uncomfortable to be faced. Â Uneducated
>> >> >> objections to the report were raised. Â When these objections were
>> >> >> addressed with detailed responses, the conclusions were ignored.
>> >> >> Clement Attlee (recently voted the greatest British Prime Minister of
>> >> >> the 20th century), who chaired this committee, went even further. Â He
>> >> >> Clement Attlee (recently voted the greatest British Prime Minister of
>> >> >> was a prime proponent of the idea that all Germans, regardless of
>> >> >> guilt, must be made to feel the weight of punishment for their so-
>> >> >> called “national†crime.  He would advocate punishment as far as
>> >> >> guilt, must be made to feel the weight of punishment for their so-
>> >> >> possible, only limiting the punishment to avoid bringing “serious
>> >> >> embarrassment or injury to ourselves…everything that brings home to
>> >> >> the Germans the completeness and irrevocability of their defeat is
>> >> >> worthwhile in the end.â€
>> >>
>> >> >>  Presumably, any horror brought upon the German deportees – many women
>> >> >> and children – would be acceptable to Attlee as long as these horrors
>> >> >> did not reflect too poorly on the British government.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â With Attlee as committee chair, needless to say considerations of the
>> >>
>> >> >> expulsion were given little further attention. Â If punishment was to
>> >> >> be handed out to all, the less consideration given to details the
>> >> >> better. Â With no sponsor in the cabinet, the report went no further,
>> >> >> and was not discussed again after January 1945. Â With this, it seems
>> >> >> the British government washed their hands of the fate of Germans in
>> >> >> post-war central Europe, other than to be involved (as would the U.S.)
>> >> >> in the coming implementation of the expulsions and transfers.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â While many leaders and public figures were almost nonchalant about
>> >> >> post-war central Europe, other than to be involved (as would the U.S.)
>> >> >> in the coming implementation of the expulsions and transfers.
>> >>
>> >> >> the situation, some spoke out strongly against this policy. Â George
>> >> >> Orwell demonstrated more awareness of the logistical difficulties and
>> >> >> human costs than many of the politicians:
>> >>
>> >> >> Â This is equivalent to transplanting the entire population of
>> >> >> human costs than many of the politicians:
>> >>
>> >> >> Australia, or the combined populations of Scotland and Ireland.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â He raised questions of the logistics and transportation; he
>> >>
>> >> >> questioned the numbers that would die during the process. Â He called
>> >> >> the expulsions an “enormous crime.â€
>> >>
>> >> >> Â As an aside, the populations involved were approximately equivalent
>> >> >> to the current population of any one of Illinois, Pennsylvania, or
>> >> >> Ohio. Â Imagine moving just the residents of Chicago to Wisconsin in a
>> >> >> matter of a few months – after having bombed much of the housing and
>> >> >> infrastructure of every major city in that state.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Republican senators in the United States demanded to know when the
>> >>
>> >> >> Atlantic Charter of 1941 had been abrogated. Â Among other objectives,
>> >> >> this Charter held that territorial changes would accord with the
>> >> >> freely expressed will of the people.  Every aspect of the expulsions –
>> >> >> not only regarding the Germans, but the Poles from eastern Poland –
>> >> >> would fly in the face of this objective.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â All such objections were ignored. Â Churchill and Roosevelt were
>> >>
>> >> >> determined, above all else, to maintain alliance with the Soviets.
>> >> >> Roosevelt had visions of the future United Nations, and this
>> >> >> organization would be meaningless without Soviet participation –
>> >> >> Roosevelt had visions of the future United Nations, and this
>> >> >> Roosevelt either acting purposely blind or quite ignorant about the
>> >> >> nature of Stalin and the communists.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â By this time, and certainly by the time of Potsdam in July 1945, all
>> >> >> nature of Stalin and the communists.
>> >>
>> >> >> that was left for the Western Allies was to find a way to rationalize
>> >> >> to themselves the decisions taken – or those they failed to take – in
>> >> >> regard to the minority problem in central Europe. Â It was at Potsdam
>> >> >> where the Allies agreed formally to an “orderly and humane†expulsion,
>> >> >> if for no other reason than a cynical attempt to save face. Â Just a
>> >> >> few miles away from the location where the conference was held,
>> >> >> overloaded trains were disgorging themselves of the dead and dying
>> >> >> transported from the east. Â Suddenly, when it was far too late to make
>> >> >> overloaded trains were disgorging themselves of the dead and dying
>> >> >> any difference, statements were made by western leaders in support of
>> >> >> the German minorities, directly opposite to the positions taken even a
>> >> >> year earlier, seemingly to provide cover for the tragedy unfolding
>> >> >> before them.
>> >>
>> >> >>  Douglas describes the so-called “wild expulsions,†those taken before
>> >> >> the German minorities, directly opposite to the positions taken even a
>> >> >> year earlier, seemingly to provide cover for the tragedy unfolding
>> >> >> before them.
>> >>
>> >> >> the west became directly involved, and the subsequent “organized
>> >> >> expulsions†– taken after the western allied powers were formally
>> >> >> engaged in the process. Â The treatment of the Germans in the two cases
>> >> >> was rather similar. Â He describes the camps, temporary housing
>> >> >> intended for a stay of a day or two that sometimes served the
>> >> >> occupants for years, lack of dwellings in Germany, lack of food, the
>> >> >> theft of property in the former home, the rapes, the beatings. He
>> >> >> describes the packed trains – overstuffed and underfed – sometimes
>> >> >> occupants for years, lack of dwellings in Germany, lack of food, the
>> >> >> theft of property in the former home, the rapes, the beatings. He
>> >> >> taking a month to make a journey of only a few hundred miles, standing
>> >> >> still more often than moving. Â He describes the bodies frozen to death
>> >> >> on the trains in the middle of the winter, with the Allies so anxious
>> >> >> to begin their work despite the additional burdens brought on by the
>> >> >> harsh climate.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â He attributes many of these crimes to official channels. Â In fact, it
>> >> >> to begin their work despite the additional burdens brought on by the
>> >> >> harsh climate.
>> >>
>> >> >> was rarely the case that the majority populations spontaneously rose
>> >> >> up against their German neighbors – counter to the claims of leaders
>> >> >> in the east and to the expectations (or self-rationalizations) of
>> >> >> leaders in the west. Â It was primarily state actors committing the
>> >> >> worst atrocities against the expellees. Â It was not majority neighbor
>> >> >> pouncing on his minority neighbor – unless the majority neighbor was
>> >> >> afforded sanction and protection by the state via the badge.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â It was western leaders agreeing to the methods and timing, involved
>> >>
>> >> >> at every railway station, agreeing to the terms, and looking the other
>> >> >> way when terms were not met.
>> >>
>> >> >>  Such treatment did not go unnoticed – and many locals raised
>> >> >> way when terms were not met.
>> >>
>> >> >> objections to the treatment of the Germans – “a mixture of
>> >> >> exasperation and alarm†as is represented here by one Prague resident:
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Devil take the Germans! Â During the war, they decimated our nation
>> >> >> and now, because of them, along comes a fresh scandal….
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Let nobody fall back on the excuse that the Germans have done the
>> >> >> same things. Â Either we are qualified to stand as their judges, in
>> >> >> which case we cannot conduct ourselves as they do, or we are no
>> >> >> different from them, and give up the right to judge them.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â At the end of 1947, Johannes Kostka, a German prisoner of war in a
>> >> >> different from them, and give up the right to judge them.
>> >>
>> >> >> British camp in Egypt, wrote to the U.S. Office of Military Government
>> >> >> in Frankfurt. Â He expressed his anxiety about his wife Gertrud, still
>> >> >> in Poland. Â He had recently received a letter from his wife. Â In it,
>> >> >> she described the despair and depravations that befell her after the
>> >> >> war – their baby daughter had already died in 1944 in the chaos of the
>> >> >> advancing Red Army. Â She described four years of agony and pain,
>> >> >> including being raped. Â She became pregnant as a result of this
>> >> >> abuse. Â She explains to her husband that she will now take her life.
>> >> >> There is nothing left for her.
>> >>
>> >> >>  Johannes asks the U.S. officials for assistance – please ask the
>> >>
>> >> >> Polish government to expedite her expulsion. Â As expellees from Poland
>> >> >> were to go to the British zone of Germany, the letter was forwarded to
>> >> >> the British. Â In the end, neither the U.S. nor the British involved
>> >> >> themselves in her case.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â The Kostka case encapsulates the official Western response to the
>> >> >> manifest failure of the expulsion project to live up to the “orderly
>> >> >> and humane†standards stipulated by the Potsdam Agreement.  As in
>> >> >> almost every other instance in which the question of ameliorating the
>> >> >> sufferings of the expellees arose, the first and overriding
>> >> >> consideration was the national interests of the Western powers. Â The
>> >> >> sufferings of the expellees arose, the first and overriding
>> >> >> second was a fatalistic prediction that any such action was bound
>> >> >> either to fail or to have a positively harmful effect….  Lastly,
>> >> >> although the expulsions were taking place in accordance with the
>> >> >> expressed policy of the Anglo-Americans and required their willing
>> >> >> participation and collaboration, the Western democracies disavowed any
>> >> >> responsibility for the suffering that resulted….
>> >> >> expressed policy of the Anglo-Americans and required their willing
>> >> >> participation and collaboration, the Western democracies disavowed any
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Individuals and various non-governmental organizations attempted to
>> >> >> at least mitigate the sufferings of the expellees. Â In this, they flew
>> >> >> into the teeth of Western resistance:
>> >>
>> >> >>  The greatest obstacle in their path was the victorious Allies’
>> >>
>> >> >> insistence that the Volksdeutsche be excluded from any form of
>> >> >> international protection or assistance.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Nor was there any agency, national or international, to which
>> >> >> international protection or assistance.
>> >>
>> >> >> Volksdeutsche subjected to inhumane treatment might appeal…the women
>> >> >> and children who made up most of the expellee population occupied a
>> >> >> legal status far lower than that of members of the SS, who…were
>> >> >> protected by the Geneva Convention.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â Again, some spoke out. Â In a letter to the Times, Bertrand Russell
>> >>
>> >> >> compared the actions of the victorious Allies to those of the Nazi
>> >> >> defendants then currently on trial:
>> >>
>> >> >> …Are mass deportations crimes when committed by our enemies during war
>> >> >> defendants then currently on trial:
>> >>
>> >> >> and justifiable measures of social adjustment when carried out by our
>> >> >> allies in times of peace? Â It is more humane to turn out old women and
>> >> >> children to die at a distance than to asphyxiate Jews in gas
>> >> >> chambers?...Are the future laws of war to justify the killing of enemy
>> >> >> nationals after enemy resistance has ceased?
>> >>
>> >> >> Â There were those in the west who attempted to place the entire blame
>> >> >> chambers?...Are the future laws of war to justify the killing of enemy
>> >> >> nationals after enemy resistance has ceased?
>> >>
>> >> >> of the unfolding tragedy on the Soviets. Â The Soviets certainly earned
>> >> >> their share of the blame. Â However, Britain and the United States
>> >> >> ignored this issue for three years or more before the events. Â When
>> >> >> they had time for planning and leverage to reach some agreements, they
>> >> >> did nothing – in fact they encouraged Stalin and his minions in their
>> >> >> quest for cleansing.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â They rejected the experts who had studied the issue. Â They rejoiced
>> >> >> that all Germans would be made to know suffering and pain, receiving a
>> >> >> proper re-education. Â They cared not about distinctions of innocence
>> >> >> and guilt. Â Again, from Douglas:
>> >>
>> >> >> Â They had encouraged their allies to carry out, and promised their
>> >> >> cooperation in accomplishing, deeds for which they would later
>> >> >> prosecute their enemies as war crimes….When making the choices they
>> >> >> did, they went in with their eyes open.
>> >>
>> >> >> Â I have previously listed reason why it is impossible to refer to
>> >>
>> >> >> World War Two as “the good war.† While absolutely not the worst
>> >> >> chapter in the book of western involvement in this war, this chapter
>> >> >> should not be ignored.
>> >> >> }
>> >>
>> >> >No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
>> >> >during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
>> >> >suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
>> >> >suffered  by ethnic Germans. The author is to be commended.
>> >> >> should not be ignored.
>> >> >> }
>> >>
>> >> >No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
>> >> >during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
>> >> >suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
>> >>
>> >> Commended for the pathetic attempt to show Germans as victims. To coin
>> >> a philosophical phrase, it's a crock of shit. Â This reminds of that
>> >> Commended for the pathetic attempt to show Germans as victims. To coin
>> >> old saw about the man who pleads guilty of killing his parents and
>> >> then throws himself on the mercy of the court because he is now and
>> >> orphan.
>> >
>> >What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
>> >expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
>>
>>
>> You haven't told me what the downside was. There is a lesson, here;
>> don't start wars, you idiot.
>
>Someone explain that to the Palestinians and their present-day
>apologists.
>
>
>
>snicker
Show me a post where I defended or apologized for Palestinians.
>> >> then throws himself on the mercy of the court because he is now and
>> >> orphan.
>> >
>> >What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
>> >expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
>>
>>
>> You haven't told me what the downside was. There is a lesson, here;
>> don't start wars, you idiot.
>
>Someone explain that to the Palestinians and their present-day
>apologists.
>
>
>
>snicker
Barry Bruyea
Nov 13, 2012, 11:19:18 AM11/13/12
to
the reality of the Nazis and the multitude of Germans who supported
him. People like you.
Padraigh ProAmerica
Nov 13, 2012, 11:15:24 AM11/13/12
to
They weren;t the only ones to suffer.
Look up "Operation Keelhaul".
--
"Again and again we have owed peace to the fact we were prepared for
war."--
Theodore Roosevelt
Look up "Operation Keelhaul".
--
"Again and again we have owed peace to the fact we were prepared for
war."--
Theodore Roosevelt
Padraigh ProAmerica
Nov 13, 2012, 11:24:01 AM11/13/12
to
Time-Life Books put out an impressive multi-volume history of WWII drawn
from their archives and current writings.
I would suggest you go through one of the last volumes, "Aftermath:
Europe". The dislocation of peoples was incredible and took many years
to straighten out- and not just Germans.
from their archives and current writings.
I would suggest you go through one of the last volumes, "Aftermath:
Europe". The dislocation of peoples was incredible and took many years
to straighten out- and not just Germans.
SpambustR
Nov 13, 2012, 3:19:00 PM11/13/12
to
SpambustR
Nov 13, 2012, 3:19:29 PM11/13/12
to
On 13/11/2012 3:39 AM, Harold Burton wrote:
> In article <0vi2a81v3je40js69...@4ax.com>,
> Barry Bruyea <damnthet...@duck.com> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>> <adhe...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>>>> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>>
> In article <0vi2a81v3je40js69...@4ax.com>,
> Barry Bruyea <damnthet...@duck.com> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>> <adhe...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>>>> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>>
SpambustR
Nov 13, 2012, 3:19:59 PM11/13/12
to
On 13/11/2012 3:40 AM, Harold Burton wrote:
> In article <mia4a85847o03upiq...@4ax.com>,
> Barry Bruyea <damnthet...@duck.com> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>> <parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
> In article <mia4a85847o03upiq...@4ax.com>,
> Barry Bruyea <damnthet...@duck.com> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>> <parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Nov 12, 2:22Â pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>>>>
>>>> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>>>>> Book review: Â Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>>>>
>>>> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>>>>> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>
>
SpambustR
Nov 13, 2012, 3:20:15 PM11/13/12
to
SpambustR
Nov 13, 2012, 3:20:38 PM11/13/12
to
On 13/11/2012 4:28 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
> On Nov 13, 6:10 am, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>
> On Nov 13, 6:10 am, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>
> Let's just pretend that Germany started WW2. (in reality the reason
> for the beginning of WW2 is not so black and white)
> Anyway, please note that the vast majority of ethnic Germans were not
> responsible for starting WW2, they were not Jew hating Nazis, they
> were not murderers, looters etc. Idiot.
>
> for the beginning of WW2 is not so black and white)
> Anyway, please note that the vast majority of ethnic Germans were not
> responsible for starting WW2, they were not Jew hating Nazis, they
> were not murderers, looters etc. Idiot.
>
SpambustR
Nov 13, 2012, 3:21:05 PM11/13/12
to
On 13/11/2012 4:47 AM, Harold Burton wrote:
> In article
> <4fb8ab96-3ea7-4ea9...@4g2000yql.googlegroups.com>,
> A Moose in Love <parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> In article
> <4fb8ab96-3ea7-4ea9...@4g2000yql.googlegroups.com>,
> A Moose in Love <parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Nov 13, 6:10Â am, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>>>
>>> <parkstreetboo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>>>
>>> <parkstreetboo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> On Nov 12, 2:22Â pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>>>
>>>>> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>>>>>> Book review: Â Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>>>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>>>
>>>>> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>>>>>> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>
>
SpambustR
Nov 13, 2012, 3:21:32 PM11/13/12
to
On 13/11/2012 6:16 AM, Dave Smith wrote:
>> Anyway, please note that the vast majority of ethnic Germans were not
>> responsible for starting WW2, they were not Jew hating Nazis, they
>> were not murderers, looters etc. Idiot.
>> Anyway, please note that the vast majority of ethnic Germans were not
>> responsible for starting WW2, they were not Jew hating Nazis, they
>> were not murderers, looters etc. Idiot.
SpambustR
Nov 13, 2012, 3:22:06 PM11/13/12
to
On 13/11/2012 8:19 AM, Barry Bruyea wrote:
> On Tue, 13 Nov 2012 04:28:05 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
> <parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Nov 13, 6:10 am, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>>>
>>> <parkstreetboo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> On Nov 12, 2:22 pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>>>
>>>>> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>>>>>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>>>>>>> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>>>
>>>>>>> Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
>>>>>>> genocide.?
>>>>>>> http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
> On Tue, 13 Nov 2012 04:28:05 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
> <parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Nov 13, 6:10 am, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>>>
>>> <parkstreetboo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> On Nov 12, 2:22 pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>>>
>>>>> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>>>>>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>>>>>>> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>>>
>>>>>>> Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
>>>>>>> genocide.?
>>>>>>> http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
> the Second World War, and certainly of the immediate post-war period –
>
>
SpambustR
Nov 13, 2012, 3:22:25 PM11/13/12
to
On 13/11/2012 8:08 AM, Dhu on Gate wrote:
>> No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
>> during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
>> suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
>> suffered by ethnic Germans. The author is to be commended.
>
>> No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
>> during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
>> suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
>> suffered by ethnic Germans. The author is to be commended.
>
SpambustR
Nov 13, 2012, 3:22:38 PM11/13/12
to
On 13/11/2012 11:51 AM, Roy wrote:
>
> You can paste complete books on this but it is not going to result in any
> change whatsoever. If you are trying to make US feeling guilty...forget it.
> What was done was done...get over it. Your side lost...thank gawd.
> Now be a good fellow and accept that fact and forget your dream of a
> NAZI run world...it aint-a-gonna happen.
> On Monday, November 12, 2012 8:16:12 AM UTC-7, A Moose in Love wrote:
>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>>
>> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>>
> <some deleted material>
>> Book review: Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after
>>
>> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>>
>
> You can paste complete books on this but it is not going to result in any
> change whatsoever. If you are trying to make US feeling guilty...forget it.
> What was done was done...get over it. Your side lost...thank gawd.
> Now be a good fellow and accept that fact and forget your dream of a
> NAZI run world...it aint-a-gonna happen.
NEMO
Nov 13, 2012, 4:19:16 PM11/13/12
to
''Germans are retarded'' ........... (What more needs to be said?)
Germans are retarded - YouTube
► 0:21► 0:21
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fmv--OfI4iQ24 Sep 2010 - 21 sec - Uploaded by
metrogatesjohn
Germans are retarded ... You need Adobe Flash Player to watch this
video. ...Nazi-Germans want incests ...
Dhu on Gate
Nov 13, 2012, 6:30:35 PM11/13/12
to
On Tue, 13 Nov 2012 12:22:25 -0800, SpambustR wrote:
> On 13/11/2012 8:08 AM, Dhu on Gate wrote:
>>> No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
>>> during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
>>> suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
>>> suffered by ethnic Germans. The author is to be commended.
>>
On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman wrote:
>
> No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
> during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
> suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
> suffered by ethnic Germans. The author is to be commended.
>
>
> On 13/11/2012 8:08 AM, Dhu on Gate wrote:
>>> No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
>>> during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
>>> suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
>>> suffered by ethnic Germans. The author is to be commended.
>>
On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman wrote:
>
> No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
> during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
> suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
> suffered by ethnic Germans. The author is to be commended.
>
>
Harold Burton
Nov 13, 2012, 10:39:08 PM11/13/12
to
In article <2ks4a8hp5c05chln1...@4ax.com>,
> >> >> >> .
> >> >> >> ε Immediately after the Second World War, the victorious Allies
> >> >> >> carried
> >> >> >> out the largest forced population transfer âέ“ and perhaps the
> >> >> >> greatest
> >> >> >> single movement of peoples âέ“ in human history. ε With the
> >> >> >> children
> >> >> >> under the age of sixteenâέ¦.estimates of 500,000 deaths at the lower
> >> >> >> in
> >> >> >> English âέ“ a thorough study of one of the least discussed tragedies
> >> >> >> immense
> >> >> >> man-made catastrophe….
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε That this tragedy remains relatively unknown, even in the highest
> >> >> >> on,
> >> >> >> another possible reason for the relative silence. ε It is not
> >> >> >> in
> >> >> >> unwanted professional risks. ε This conclusion is suggested given
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> 1938, and the actions taken thereafter by Edvard BeneâέΓ. ε When
> >> >> >> reading
> >> >> >> this, I wondered about the relevance of Munich to this narrative âέ“
> >> >> >> Germany),
> >> >> >> BeneâέΓ lobbied long and hard to keep these ethnically German
> >> >> >> territories within Czech territory. ε Many diplomats from the West
> >> >> >> at
> >> >> >> the conference expressed reservations even at that time, yet BeneâέΓ
> >> >> >> was
> >> >> >> successful âέ“ even more than many of his countrymen had dared to
> >> >> >> imagine. ε Unfortunately, his victory sowed the seed of opportunity
> >> >> >> for
> >> >> >> confrontation:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Adolf Hitler had never ceased to highlight the incompatibility of
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Douglas sheds some light (for me at least) regarding Munich.
> >> >> >> ε While
> >> >> >> the term âέœMunichâέù as regarding the 1938 conference is today used
> >> >> >> had
> >> >> >> been “both necessary and fundamentally just.â€ù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> Χδdouard Daladier, the prime minister, did not believe that most
> >> >> >> âέœto
> >> >> >> maintain three million Germans under Czech sovereignty.âέù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε As for Great Britain, âέœappeasersâέù and anti-appeasersâέù alike
> >> >> >> agreed
> >> >> >> that the Sudeten GermansâέΣ claim to determine their own allegiance
> >> >> >> was
> >> >> >> justifiedâέ¦.Even Winston Churchill told Hubert Ripka, one of
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Gallup polls revealed popular majorities in Britain and France,
> >> >> >> 1939,
> >> >> >> BeneâέΓ was able to privately meet with Roosevelt. ε What he heard
> >> >> >> from
> >> >> >> the president certainly must have been a welcome view: ε as far as
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> U.S. Administration was concerned, âέœMunich does not exist.âέù
> >> >> >> Separately, the other members of âέœthe Big Threeâέù indicated that
> >> >> >> good and bad, European-minded and Nazi-minded, must learnâέ¦that war
> >> >> >> does not pay.â€ù ε There was âέœno way other than the way of
> >> >> >> article,
> >> >> >> he declared:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> âέœNational minoritiesâέ¦are always – and in Central Europe
> >> >> >> especially – a
> >> >> >> real thorn in the side of individual nations. ε This is especially
> >> >> >> true
> >> >> >> if they are German minorities.âέù ε Before speaking of minority
> >> >> >> rights,
> >> >> >> it was necessary to âέœdefine the rights of majorities and the
> >> >> >> obligations of minorities.âέù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε He questioned, in light of wartime experiences, whether it was
> >> >> >> he used HitlerâέΣs actions to justify the massive population
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> from Bessarabia. ε Germany, therefore, cannot a priori regard it as
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε This discussion was not occurring solely in the mind of the man
> >> >> >> acting as the Czechoslovak leader in exile. ε Eden learned that
> >> >> >> large-
> >> >> >> scale transfers were âέœa feasible method of dealing with the
> >> >> >> European
> >> >> >> minorities problem.âέù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε It is interesting that these discussions were occurring even as
> >> >> >> early
> >> >> >> as 1939 âέ“ and certainly before United States official entry into
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> war. ε From this time until the warâέΣs conclusion, the leaders of
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> Allied powers met on several occasions. ε Their underlings met
> >> >> >> effect, and instead offers much evidence to the contrary âέ“ willing
> >> >> >> Czechoslovakia. ε Certainly at the beginning of the war, PolandâέΣs
> >> >> >> focus
> >> >> >> was to regain all territories lost. ε As it became clear that the
> >> >> >> falling
> >> >> >> in to support such forced expulsions. ε The Sudeten German leader in
> >> >> >> line
> >> >> >> he had to walk was too thin âέ“ on the one hand, to not give the
> >> >> >> giving
> >> >> >> aid to the other side. ε Overt acts of what is called patriotism in
> >> >> >> “the
> >> >> >> heroic remedy of transfer of populationâ€ù as a means of preventing
> >> >> >> future European conflict.âέù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Sumner Welles [recent collaborator with FDR on foreign
> >> >> >> affairs]âέ¦was
> >> >>
> >> >> >> âέ¦the Oxford historian, A.J.P. Taylor declared that the
> >> >> >> Czechoslovak
> >> >> >> state could only be resurrected using the same “ruthlessnessâ€ù
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> inflicting âέœas much sufferingâέù as the Germans had employed in
> >> >> >> destroying it.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε In the House of Lords, Robert Vansittart [second cousin of
> >> >> >> Lawrence
> >> >> >> of Arabia]âέ¦applauded Stalin’s robust indifference to questions
> >> >> >> times
> >> >> >> rightâέ¦.I say these [deportees] were not Hitlerite Germans. ε They
> >> >> >> had a
> >> >> >> quarter of a centuryâέΣs training in the doctrines of
> >> >> >> Communismâέ¦.Nevertheless they were held to be Germans and
> >> >> >> unreliable.â€ù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Even Lord Robert Cecil [cousin of Arthur Balfour], president of
> >> >> >> relocation to come. ε These are not words that demonstrate a concern
> >> >> >> to
> >> >> >> separate the guilty from the innocent. ε These are words that
> >> >> >> ε These
> >> >> >> concern. ε These concerns were not based on party or economic lines.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε The London-based Economist warnedâέ¦
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε That punishment of Germans after the war âέœmust fall on those
> >> >> >> who are
> >> >> >> guilty in a moral and not in a racial sense. ε The Nazis have made
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε In a paper published in 1943, Allan Fisher and David Mitrany
> >> >> >> offered
> >> >> >> the following critique:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε To claim that this practice was now justified because of the Nazi
> >> >> >> governmentâέΣs previous recourse to it, they argued, seemed a
> >> >> >> curious
> >> >> >> way of reeducating the German people âέœat a time when they are
> >> >> >> being
> >> >> >> urged to abjure Hitler and all his works.âέù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε They went further, suggesting that this racial purity could only
> >> >> >> to
> >> >> >> be maintained. ε Further, discrimination teaches discrimination âέ“
> >> >> >> curious, about this. ε As if the message from the state is: you
> >> >> >> cannot
> >> >> >> travel freely, unless we say you can travel freely âέ“ on our
> >> >> >> terms.)
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Given what little opposition there was to this decision in the
> >> >> >> a Catch-22. ε To support BeneâέΓ and the Czechoslovak government in
> >> >> >> not
> >> >> >> ad-hoc decisions taken during the chaos of the end of the war. ε In
> >> >> >> deal âέ“ but there is no indication that a deal on behalf of these
> >> >> >> minorities was even attempted. ε Many of these Germans were innocent
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> complicity with the Nazis. ε Evan the Slovaks, who had fought
> >> >> >> alongside
> >> >> >> the Germans for five years âέ“ invading both Poland and the USSR âέ“
> >> >> >> often
> >> >> >> is. ε It is also one of the most unfair. ε Millions in Central
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> Allies in anticipation of the forced expulsions. ε This didnâέΣt
> >> >> >> take him
> >> >> >> long. ε In a nutshell, there was no planning. ε Given that the
> >> >> >> countries
> >> >> >> were mobilized. ε Every department of the state was set on war
> >> >> >> footing. ε For the expulsions, virtually nothing. ε So many
> >> >> >> detailed
> >> >> >> practical aspects of the coming expulsions and transfer âέ“a full
> >> >> >> sympathy
> >> >> >> for StalinâέΣs geopolitical aims in Europe, and Churchill followed
> >> >> >> with
> >> >> >> his infamous âέœthree matchsticksâέù performance (using the
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε I do not pretend to believe that, had Britain and the United
> >> >> >> no
> >> >> >> attempt was even made to come to a humane answer. ε In fact
> >> >> >> Churchill âέ“
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> Red Army would be the motive force behind this hope âέ“ the Germans
> >> >> >> in
> >> >> >> their path would either be killed or flee toward Germany. ε Others
> >> >> >> rightly saw that this âέœPilate-like stanceâέù might not be
> >> >> >> possibilities.
> >> >> >> One Sir Orme Sargent of the Foreign Office suggested that âέœthe
> >> >> >> objections to the report were raised. ε When these objections were
> >> >> >> as
> >> >> >> possible, only limiting the punishment to avoid bringing âέœserious
> >> >> >> embarrassment or injury to ourselvesâέ¦everything that brings home
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Presumably, any horror brought upon the German deportees âέ“ many
> >> >> >> women
> >> >> >> and children âέ“ would be acceptable to Attlee as long as these
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> expulsion were given little further attention. ε If punishment was
> >> >> >> further,
> >> >> >> and was not discussed again after January 1945. ε With this, it
> >> >> >> about
> >> >> >> the situation, some spoke out strongly against this policy. ε George
> >> >> >> questioned the numbers that would die during the process. ε He
> >> >> >> called
> >> >> >> the expulsions an âέœenormous crime.âέù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε As an aside, the populations involved were approximately
> >> >> >> a
> >> >> >> matter of a few months âέ“ after having bombed much of the housing
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> Atlantic Charter of 1941 had been abrogated. ε Among other
> >> >> >> expulsions âέ“
> >> >> >> âέ“ in
> >> >> >> regard to the minority problem in central Europe. ε It was at
> >> >> >> Potsdam
> >> >> >> where the Allies agreed formally to an âέœorderly and humaneâέù
> >> >> >> expulsion,
> >> >> >> if for no other reason than a cynical attempt to save face. ε Just a
> >> >> >> taken before
> >> >> >> the west became directly involved, and the subsequent âέœorganized
> >> >> >> expulsionsâέù âέ“ taken after the western allied powers were
> >> >> >> formally
> >> >> >> engaged in the process. ε The treatment of the Germans in the two
> >> >> >> cases
> >> >> >> was rather similar. ε He describes the camps, temporary housing
> >> >> >> worst atrocities against the expellees. ε It was not majority
> >> >> >> neighbor
> >> >> >> pouncing on his minority neighbor âέ“ unless the majority neighbor
> >> >> >> objections to the treatment of the Germans âέ“ âέœa mixture of
> >> >> >> exasperation and alarmâέù as is represented here by one Prague
> >> >> >> resident:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Devil take the Germans! ε During the war, they decimated our
> >> >> >> nation
> >> >> >> and now, because of them, along comes a fresh scandalâέ¦.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Let nobody fall back on the excuse that the Germans have done the
> >> >> >> same things. ε Either we are qualified to stand as their judges, in
> >> >> >> still
> >> >> >> in Poland. ε He had recently received a letter from his wife. ε In
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> advancing Red Army. ε She described four years of agony and pain,
> >> >> >> including being raped. ε She became pregnant as a result of this
> >> >> >> abuse. ε She explains to her husband that she will now take her
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> Polish government to expedite her expulsion. ε As expellees from
> >> >> >> themselves in her case.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε The Kostka case encapsulates the official Western response to the
> >> >> >> and humaneâέù standards stipulated by the Potsdam Agreement. ε As in
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Individuals and various non-governmental organizations attempted
> >> >> >> to
> >> >> >> at least mitigate the sufferings of the expellees. ε In this, they
> >> >> >> Volksdeutsche subjected to inhumane treatment might appealâέ¦the
> >> >> >> blame
> >> >> >> of the unfolding tragedy on the Soviets. ε The Soviets certainly
> >> >> >> earned
> >> >> >> their share of the blame. ε However, Britain and the United States
> >> >> >> ignored this issue for three years or more before the events. ε When
> >> >> >> their
> >> >> >> quest for cleansing.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε They rejected the experts who had studied the issue. ε They
> >> >> >> innocence
> >> >> >> and guilt. ε Again, from Douglas:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε They had encouraged their allies to carry out, and promised their
> >> >> >> World War Two as âέœthe good war.âέù ε While absolutely not the
snicker
Barry Bruyea <damnthet...@duck.com> wrote:
> On Tue, 13 Nov 2012 06:40:04 -0500, Harold Burton
> <hal.i....@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> >In article <mia4a85847o03upiq...@4ax.com>,
> > Barry Bruyea <damnthet...@duck.com> wrote:
> >
> >> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
> >> <parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> >On Nov 12, 2:22ε pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
> >> >> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
> >> >>
> >> >> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
> >> >> >On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
> >> >> >> Book review: ε Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans
> On Tue, 13 Nov 2012 06:40:04 -0500, Harold Burton
> <hal.i....@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> >In article <mia4a85847o03upiq...@4ax.com>,
> > Barry Bruyea <damnthet...@duck.com> wrote:
> >
> >> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
> >> <parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> >On Nov 12, 2:22ε pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
> >> >> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
> >> >>
> >> >> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
> >> >> >On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
> >> >> >> after
> >> >> >> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
> >> >>
> >> >> >> Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
> >> >> >> genocide.?
> >> >> >>http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
> >> >> >> {
> >> >> >> ε From the introduction:
> >> >> >> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
> >> >>
> >> >> >> Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
> >> >> >> genocide.?
> >> >> >>http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
> >> >> >> {
> >> >> >> .
> >> >> >> ε Immediately after the Second World War, the victorious Allies
> >> >> >> carried
> >> >> >> out the largest forced population transfer âέ“ and perhaps the
> >> >> >> greatest
> >> >> >> single movement of peoples âέ“ in human history. ε With the
> >> >> >> assistance of
> >> >> >> the British, Soviet, and U.S. governments, millions of
> >> >> >> German-speaking
> >> >> >> civilians living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the parts of
> >> >> >> eastern
> >> >> >> Germany assigned to Poland were driven out of their homes and
> >> >> >> deposited amid the ruins of the Reich, to fend for themselves as
> >> >> >> best
> >> >> >> they could. ε Millions more, who had fled the advancing Red Army in
> >> >> >> the British, Soviet, and U.S. governments, millions of
> >> >> >> German-speaking
> >> >> >> civilians living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the parts of
> >> >> >> eastern
> >> >> >> Germany assigned to Poland were driven out of their homes and
> >> >> >> deposited amid the ruins of the Reich, to fend for themselves as
> >> >> >> best
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> final months of the war, were prevented from returning to their
> >> >> >> places
> >> >> >> of origin, and became lifelong exilesâέ¦.altogether, the expulsion
> >> >> >> final months of the war, were prevented from returning to their
> >> >> >> places
> >> >> >> operation permanently displaced at least 12 million people, and
> >> >> >> perhaps as many as 14 million. ε Most of these were women and
> >> >> >> children
> >> >> >> under the age of sixteenâέ¦.estimates of 500,000 deaths at the lower
> >> >> >> end
> >> >> >> of the spectrum, and as many as 1.5 million at the higher, are
> >> >> >> consistent with the evidence as it exists at present.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε In this book, Douglas compiles âέ“ apparently for the first time
> >> >> >> of the spectrum, and as many as 1.5 million at the higher, are
> >> >> >> consistent with the evidence as it exists at present.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> in
> >> >> >> English âέ“ a thorough study of one of the least discussed tragedies
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> the Second World War, and certainly of the immediate post-war period
> >> >> >> âέ“
> >> >> >> the Second World War, and certainly of the immediate post-war period
> >> >> >> that of the forced expulsion of Germans from their homelands
> >> >> >> throughout central Europe.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε On the most optimistic interpretationâέ¦the expulsions were an
> >> >> >> throughout central Europe.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> immense
> >> >> >> man-made catastrophe….
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε That this tragedy remains relatively unknown, even in the highest
> >> >> >> academic circles, is given evidence by the following anecdote
> >> >> >> provided
> >> >> >> by the author:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε It is, then, entirely understandable why so many of my splendid
> >> >> >> provided
> >> >> >> by the author:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> learned colleagues on the Colgate faculty should have expressed
> >> >> >> their
> >> >> >> confusion to me after reading in the newspapers in October 2009 that
> >> >> >> the president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, had demanded that
> >> >> >> the other members of the European Union legally indemnify his
> >> >> >> country
> >> >> >> against compensation claims by ethnic German expellees, as the price
> >> >> >> of his countryâέΣs ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. ε None had
> >> >> >> learned colleagues on the Colgate faculty should have expressed
> >> >> >> their
> >> >> >> confusion to me after reading in the newspapers in October 2009 that
> >> >> >> the president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, had demanded that
> >> >> >> the other members of the European Union legally indemnify his
> >> >> >> country
> >> >> >> against compensation claims by ethnic German expellees, as the price
> >> >> >> been
> >> >> >> aware that anything had occurred after the war in respect of which
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> Czech Republic might require to be indemnified.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> Douglas gives some reasons why he believes that this episode has
> >> >> >> received so little attention:
> >> >> >> For Germans, it invites debate about the war-time record of ethnic
> >> >> >> German minorities living in the subject countries.
> >> >> >> For the citizens of expelling countries, it draws unwanted attention
> >> >> >> and casts a doubtful light on carefully crafted war-related
> >> >> >> narratives.
> >> >> >> For citizens of the U.S. and Britain, it draws light to the
> >> >> >> complicity
> >> >> >> of their leaders in one of the largest episodes of human rights
> >> >> >> abuse
> >> >> >> in history.
> >> >> >> ε Douglas does not add in this context, but elsewhere sheds light
> >> >> >> aware that anything had occurred after the war in respect of which
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> Czech Republic might require to be indemnified.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> Douglas gives some reasons why he believes that this episode has
> >> >> >> received so little attention:
> >> >> >> For Germans, it invites debate about the war-time record of ethnic
> >> >> >> German minorities living in the subject countries.
> >> >> >> For the citizens of expelling countries, it draws unwanted attention
> >> >> >> and casts a doubtful light on carefully crafted war-related
> >> >> >> narratives.
> >> >> >> For citizens of the U.S. and Britain, it draws light to the
> >> >> >> complicity
> >> >> >> of their leaders in one of the largest episodes of human rights
> >> >> >> abuse
> >> >> >> in history.
> >> >> >> on,
> >> >> >> another possible reason for the relative silence. ε It is not
> >> >> >> considered appropriate to show any sympathy toward Germans as
> >> >> >> regards
> >> >> >> the Second World War, and especially if it might be juxtaposed to
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> Holocaust âέ“ therefore even the study of such episodes might result
> >> >> >> regards
> >> >> >> the Second World War, and especially if it might be juxtaposed to
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> in
> >> >> >> unwanted professional risks. ε This conclusion is suggested given
> >> >> >> his
> >> >> >> need to apologize in advance for the possibility that he might be
> >> >> >> accused of holding such a position:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε It is appropriate at the outset to state explicitly that no
> >> >> >> need to apologize in advance for the possibility that he might be
> >> >> >> accused of holding such a position:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> legitimate comparison can be drawn between the postwar expulsions
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> the appalling record of German offenses against the Jews and other
> >> >> >> innocent victims between 1939 and 1945. ε The extent of Nazi
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> the appalling record of German offenses against the Jews and other
> >> >> >> criminality and barbarity in central and eastern Europe is on a
> >> >> >> scale
> >> >> >> and of a degree that is almost impossible to overstate.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Douglas begins this book by with a focus on the Munich Conference
> >> >> >> scale
> >> >> >> and of a degree that is almost impossible to overstate.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> 1938, and the actions taken thereafter by Edvard BeneâέΓ. ε When
> >> >> >> reading
> >> >> >> this, I wondered about the relevance of Munich to this narrative âέ“
> >> >> >> these expulsions took place seven years and more after the
> >> >> >> conference:
> >> >> >> what is the possible connection? ε As Douglas will demonstrate, the
> >> >> >> conference:
> >> >> >> expulsions were not devised at the last moment, in the chaos of the
> >> >> >> last days of Berlin, but had been discussed and contemplated by many
> >> >> >> of the actors âέ“ including in the U.S. and Britain âέ“almost from
> >> >> >> last days of Berlin, but had been discussed and contemplated by many
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> beginning of the war.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε The result of the Munich Conference, as is well-known, was the
> >> >> >> beginning of the war.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> Nazi
> >> >> >> annexation of the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland, the portion of
> >> >> >> Czechoslovakia bordering Germany and populated primarily by ethnic
> >> >> >> Germans.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε The Sudetenland issue dates to the end of the First World War,
> >> >> >> annexation of the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland, the portion of
> >> >> >> Czechoslovakia bordering Germany and populated primarily by ethnic
> >> >> >> Germans.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> and it
> >> >> >> represents one of the many failures of the Paris Peace Conference
> >> >> >> after that war:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε The German deputies of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in the
> >> >> >> represents one of the many failures of the Paris Peace Conference
> >> >> >> after that war:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> Imperial
> >> >> >> Council (Reichsrat) referred to the Fourteen Points of U.S.
> >> >> >> President
> >> >> >> Woodrow Wilson and the right proposed therein to self-determination,
> >> >> >> and attempted to negotiate the union of the German-speaking
> >> >> >> territories with the new Republic of German Austria, which itself
> >> >> >> aimed at joining Weimar Germany.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε However Sudetenland remained in a newly created Czechoslovakia, a
> >> >> >> Council (Reichsrat) referred to the Fourteen Points of U.S.
> >> >> >> President
> >> >> >> Woodrow Wilson and the right proposed therein to self-determination,
> >> >> >> and attempted to negotiate the union of the German-speaking
> >> >> >> territories with the new Republic of German Austria, which itself
> >> >> >> aimed at joining Weimar Germany.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> multi-ethnic state of several nations: Czechs, Germans, Slovaks,
> >> >> >> Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε At the Paris Conference (technically Versailles dealt with
> >> >> >> Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> Germany),
> >> >> >> BeneâέΓ lobbied long and hard to keep these ethnically German
> >> >> >> territories within Czech territory. ε Many diplomats from the West
> >> >> >> at
> >> >> >> the conference expressed reservations even at that time, yet BeneâέΓ
> >> >> >> was
> >> >> >> successful âέ“ even more than many of his countrymen had dared to
> >> >> >> imagine. ε Unfortunately, his victory sowed the seed of opportunity
> >> >> >> for
> >> >> >> confrontation:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Adolf Hitler had never ceased to highlight the incompatibility of
> >> >> >> territorial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles with the aims for
> >> >> >> which the Allies had professed to fight the Great War. ε The
> >> >> >> existence
> >> >> >> of Czechoslovakia in its current form, he insisted, was unanswerable
> >> >> >> proof of the victorsâέΣ hypocrisy.
> >> >> >> of Czechoslovakia in its current form, he insisted, was unanswerable
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Douglas sheds some light (for me at least) regarding Munich.
> >> >> >> ε While
> >> >> >> the term âέœMunichâέù as regarding the 1938 conference is today used
> >> >> >> as a
> >> >> >> term of derision, at the time it was hailed in all quarters of the
> >> >> >> West âέ“ not only for averting war, but also for correcting one of
> >> >> >> term of derision, at the time it was hailed in all quarters of the
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> well-recognized wrongs committed in Paris nineteen years earlier:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> âέ¦as the London Times put it, the transfer of territory to Germany
> >> >> >> well-recognized wrongs committed in Paris nineteen years earlier:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> had
> >> >> >> been “both necessary and fundamentally just.â€ù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> Χδdouard Daladier, the prime minister, did not believe that most
> >> >> >> French
> >> >> >> citizens would understand why, as the law professor and commentator
> >> >> >> Joseph BarthΧ©lemy put it, there must be a general European war
> >> >> >> citizens would understand why, as the law professor and commentator
> >> >> >> âέœto
> >> >> >> maintain three million Germans under Czech sovereignty.âέù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε As for Great Britain, âέœappeasersâέù and anti-appeasersâέù alike
> >> >> >> agreed
> >> >> >> that the Sudeten GermansâέΣ claim to determine their own allegiance
> >> >> >> was
> >> >> >> justifiedâέ¦.Even Winston Churchill told Hubert Ripka, one of
> >> >> >> Benes’s
> >> >> >> closest associates, in the summer of 1938 that if he had been prime
> >> >> >> minister he would have acted as Neville Chamberlain had done….
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Lord Halifax, the British foreign secretary, declared in the
> >> >> >> closest associates, in the summer of 1938 that if he had been prime
> >> >> >> minister he would have acted as Neville Chamberlain had done….
> >> >>
> >> >> >> House of
> >> >> >> Lords that even if negotiations at Munich had broken down and a war
> >> >> >> had resulted, âέœno body of statesmen drawing the boundaries of a
> >> >> >> Lords that even if negotiations at Munich had broken down and a war
> >> >> >> new
> >> >> >> Czechoslovakia would have redrawn them as they were left by the
> >> >> >> Treaty
> >> >> >> of Versailles.âέù
> >> >> >> Czechoslovakia would have redrawn them as they were left by the
> >> >> >> Treaty
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Gallup polls revealed popular majorities in Britain and France,
> >> >> >> and a
> >> >> >> still larger one in the United States, in favor of the Munich Pact.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε The court historians seem to have done a thorough job of burying
> >> >> >> still larger one in the United States, in favor of the Munich Pact.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> this
> >> >> >> part of the story.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε BeneâέΓ, after Munich, departed for the United States. ε In May
> >> >> >> part of the story.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> 1939,
> >> >> >> BeneâέΓ was able to privately meet with Roosevelt. ε What he heard
> >> >> >> from
> >> >> >> the president certainly must have been a welcome view: ε as far as
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> U.S. Administration was concerned, âέœMunich does not exist.âέù
> >> >> >> Separately, the other members of âέœthe Big Threeâέù indicated that
> >> >> >> they
> >> >> >> no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Beginning in September 1941, BeneâέΓ felt confident enough about
> >> >> >> no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> his
> >> >> >> position that he began floating trial balloons regarding the
> >> >> >> possibility of large population transfers after the war.
> >> >> >> ε âέœGermans,
> >> >> >> position that he began floating trial balloons regarding the
> >> >> >> possibility of large population transfers after the war.
> >> >> >> good and bad, European-minded and Nazi-minded, must learnâέ¦that war
> >> >> >> does not pay.â€ù ε There was âέœno way other than the way of
> >> >> >> suffering of
> >> >> >> educating a social and political community and there never was any
> >> >> >> other way.âέù
> >> >> >> educating a social and political community and there never was any
> >> >>
> >> >> >> As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
> >> >> >> statements, BeneâέΓ felt safe to go further. ε In a January 1942
> >> >> >> As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
> >> >> >> article,
> >> >> >> he declared:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> âέœNational minoritiesâέ¦are always – and in Central Europe
> >> >> >> especially – a
> >> >> >> real thorn in the side of individual nations. ε This is especially
> >> >> >> true
> >> >> >> if they are German minorities.âέù ε Before speaking of minority
> >> >> >> rights,
> >> >> >> it was necessary to âέœdefine the rights of majorities and the
> >> >> >> obligations of minorities.âέù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε He questioned, in light of wartime experiences, whether it was
> >> >> >> necessary or desirable for minorities to continue in existence.
> >> >> >> ε Then
> >> >> >> he used HitlerâέΣs actions to justify the massive population
> >> >> >> transfers
> >> >> >> that would be required throughout Central Europe if his visions were
> >> >> >> to become reality:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Hitler himself has transferred German minorities from the Baltic
> >> >> >> that would be required throughout Central Europe if his visions were
> >> >> >> to become reality:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> from Bessarabia. ε Germany, therefore, cannot a priori regard it as
> >> >> >> an
> >> >> >> injury to her if other states adopt the same methods with regard to
> >> >> >> German minoritiesâέ¦.It will be necessary after this war to carry
> >> >> >> injury to her if other states adopt the same methods with regard to
> >> >> >> out a
> >> >> >> transfer of populations on a very much larger scale than after the
> >> >> >> last war.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Hitler did it, so it must be OK.
> >> >> >> transfer of populations on a very much larger scale than after the
> >> >> >> last war.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε This discussion was not occurring solely in the mind of the man
> >> >> >> acting as the Czechoslovak leader in exile. ε Eden learned that
> >> >> >> Stalin
> >> >> >> was also considering such transfers as early as December 1941
> >> >> >> regarding the Germans from lands that would be given to Poland after
> >> >> >> the war. ε The British Foreign Office, in 1942, suggested that
> >> >> >> was also considering such transfers as early as December 1941
> >> >> >> regarding the Germans from lands that would be given to Poland after
> >> >> >> large-
> >> >> >> scale transfers were âέœa feasible method of dealing with the
> >> >> >> European
> >> >> >> minorities problem.âέù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε It is interesting that these discussions were occurring even as
> >> >> >> early
> >> >> >> as 1939 âέ“ and certainly before United States official entry into
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> war. ε From this time until the warâέΣs conclusion, the leaders of
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> Allied powers met on several occasions. ε Their underlings met
> >> >> >> daily.
> >> >> >> Was there any push-back by the U.S. or Great Britain against Russia
> >> >> >> on
> >> >> >> this issue? ε Anything that suggests that the two Anglo leaders
> >> >> >> Was there any push-back by the U.S. or Great Britain against Russia
> >> >> >> on
> >> >> >> considered such massive population transfers as a horrendous and
> >> >> >> certain to be calamitous undertaking? ε While they had some leverage
> >> >> >> over Stalin, did they at least try to utilize this leverage on
> >> >> >> behalf
> >> >> >> of the minorities in question? ε Douglas offers no evidence to this
> >> >> >> behalf
> >> >> >> effect, and instead offers much evidence to the contrary âέ“ willing
> >> >> >> partners were present in both England and the U.S.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Poland eventually followed in the tracks first laid by
> >> >>
> >> >> >> Czechoslovakia. ε Certainly at the beginning of the war, PolandâέΣs
> >> >> >> focus
> >> >> >> was to regain all territories lost. ε As it became clear that the
> >> >> >> Russians would keep what was taken in the east, Poland looked to the
> >> >> >> west and inevitably to the expulsion of Germans in East Prussia.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Rumors began to circulate that the British government was now
> >> >> >> west and inevitably to the expulsion of Germans in East Prussia.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> falling
> >> >> >> in to support such forced expulsions. ε The Sudeten German leader in
> >> >> >> exile, Wenzel Jaksch, decided the best course was to remain
> >> >> >> dignified
> >> >> >> and consistent in his positions in support of his community. ε The
> >> >> >> dignified
> >> >> >> line
> >> >> >> he had to walk was too thin âέ“ on the one hand, to not give the
> >> >> >> slightest hint that he was a support to the Nazis, on the other to
> >> >> >> properly place his claims for recognition of national Germans in
> >> >> >> Czechoslovakia.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε The line was so thin that it need not have existed. ε Once the
> >> >> >> properly place his claims for recognition of national Germans in
> >> >> >> Czechoslovakia.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> war
> >> >> >> began, the position of Central-European Germans outside of Germany
> >> >> >> was
> >> >> >> tenuous at best. ε To stay neutral only gave the appearance of
> >> >> >> began, the position of Central-European Germans outside of Germany
> >> >> >> was
> >> >> >> giving
> >> >> >> aid to the other side. ε Overt acts of what is called patriotism in
> >> >> >> America would be necessary to even give some hope of being allowed
> >> >> >> to
> >> >> >> remain in their homes after the war. ε Yet this would require taking
> >> >> >> to
> >> >> >> the fight against their national brothers.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε That the line was so thin and that the fate of these Central
> >> >>
> >> >> >> European
> >> >> >> Germans was virtually sealed before the war began does not explain
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> robustness by which the Allies approvingly discussed the issue of
> >> >> >> forced transfers. ε The comments range from the casual (as if the
> >> >> >> Germans was virtually sealed before the war began does not explain
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> robustness by which the Allies approvingly discussed the issue of
> >> >> >> entire task was equivalent to moving a few families from one city to
> >> >> >> the neighboring city) to the callous:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Herbert Hooverâέ¦called for consideration of what he described as
> >> >> >> the neighboring city) to the callous:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> “the
> >> >> >> heroic remedy of transfer of populationâ€ù as a means of preventing
> >> >> >> future European conflict.âέù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Sumner Welles [recent collaborator with FDR on foreign
> >> >> >> affairs]âέ¦was
> >> >> >> coming around to the idea that “we should avail ourselves of this
> >> >> >> moment of world upheaval to effect transfers of population where
> >> >> >> these
> >> >> >> are necessary to prevent new conflicts, and thus enable peoples to
> >> >> >> live under the government they desire, free from racial
> >> >> >> discriminations.â€ù
> >> >> >> moment of world upheaval to effect transfers of population where
> >> >> >> these
> >> >> >> are necessary to prevent new conflicts, and thus enable peoples to
> >> >> >> live under the government they desire, free from racial
> >> >>
> >> >> >> âέ¦the Oxford historian, A.J.P. Taylor declared that the
> >> >> >> Czechoslovak
> >> >> >> state could only be resurrected using the same “ruthlessnessâ€ù
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> inflicting âέœas much sufferingâέù as the Germans had employed in
> >> >> >> destroying it.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε In the House of Lords, Robert Vansittart [second cousin of
> >> >> >> Lawrence
> >> >> >> of Arabia]âέ¦applauded Stalin’s robust indifference to questions
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> guilt or innocence, when driving the Soviet Union’s
> >> >> >> German-speaking
> >> >> >> population from their homes in 1941, as a model for the Allies to
> >> >> >> follow. ε âέœHe was a thousand times right; five hundred thousand
> >> >> >> guilt or innocence, when driving the Soviet Union’s
> >> >> >> German-speaking
> >> >> >> population from their homes in 1941, as a model for the Allies to
> >> >> >> times
> >> >> >> rightâέ¦.I say these [deportees] were not Hitlerite Germans. ε They
> >> >> >> had a
> >> >> >> quarter of a centuryâέΣs training in the doctrines of
> >> >> >> Communismâέ¦.Nevertheless they were held to be Germans and
> >> >> >> unreliable.â€ù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Even Lord Robert Cecil [cousin of Arthur Balfour], president of
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> League of Nations Union and an impassioned defender of the rights of
> >> >> >> minorities between the wars, now agreed that the Sudetendeutsche at
> >> >> >> least would âέœhave to be removed,âέù and that their fate should be
> >> >> >> League of Nations Union and an impassioned defender of the rights of
> >> >> >> minorities between the wars, now agreed that the Sudetendeutsche at
> >> >> >> of no
> >> >> >> concern to anyone but the Czechoslovak government.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε These are not words of concern for those to face the forced
> >> >> >> concern to anyone but the Czechoslovak government.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> relocation to come. ε These are not words that demonstrate a concern
> >> >> >> to
> >> >> >> separate the guilty from the innocent. ε These are words that
> >> >> >> demonstrate, in some cases, a pleasure in the pain that will be
> >> >> >> inflicted âέ“ loss of property, loss of dignity, loss of life.
> >> >> >> ε These
> >> >> >> are words that justify the coming actions using Hitler as the
> >> >> >> yardstick of acceptable behavior.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Others did speak in opposition, or at least demonstrated some
> >> >> >> yardstick of acceptable behavior.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> concern. ε These concerns were not based on party or economic lines.
> >> >> >> For example, while leaders in the Labour Party expressed
> >> >> >> understanding
> >> >> >> of the necessity for the forced expulsions, the journal Socialist
> >> >> >> Commentary called attention toâέ¦
> >> >> >> understanding
> >> >> >> of the necessity for the forced expulsions, the journal Socialist
> >> >>
> >> >> >> …the incongruity of trying to preserve in aspic the often
> >> >> >> artificially
> >> >> >> defined European frontiers of 1939, the product of centuries of
> >> >> >> dynastic squabbling and historical accident, for all time….It
> >> >> >> would
> >> >> >> have been more fittingɉ۝to bring justice and freedom to the
> >> >> >> …the incongruity of trying to preserve in aspic the often
> >> >> >> artificially
> >> >> >> defined European frontiers of 1939, the product of centuries of
> >> >> >> dynastic squabbling and historical accident, for all time….It
> >> >> >> would
> >> >> >> national
> >> >> >> minorities wherever they chose to live, and not to continue the
> >> >> >> odious
> >> >> >> Nazi method of shifting people about like cattle.âέù
> >> >> >> minorities wherever they chose to live, and not to continue the
> >> >> >> odious
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε The London-based Economist warnedâέ¦
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε That punishment of Germans after the war âέœmust fall on those
> >> >> >> who are
> >> >> >> guilty in a moral and not in a racial sense. ε The Nazis have made
> >> >> >> racial scapegoats; the Allies must not fall into exactly the same
> >> >> >> error.âέù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε In a paper published in 1943, Allan Fisher and David Mitrany
> >> >> >> offered
> >> >> >> the following critique:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε To claim that this practice was now justified because of the Nazi
> >> >> >> governmentâέΣs previous recourse to it, they argued, seemed a
> >> >> >> curious
> >> >> >> way of reeducating the German people âέœat a time when they are
> >> >> >> being
> >> >> >> urged to abjure Hitler and all his works.âέù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε They went further, suggesting that this racial purity could only
> >> >> >> be
> >> >> >> maintained by hermetically sealing the borders:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> âέ¦if it is to achieve the ends for which it is advocated the policy
> >> >> >> maintained by hermetically sealing the borders:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> transfer must have as its corollary a continuous policy of
> >> >> >> segregation. ε Migration or any free movement of people would have
> >> >> >> transfer must have as its corollary a continuous policy of
> >> >> >> to
> >> >> >> be prohibited lest it should lead to the gradual creation of new
> >> >> >> unwanted and irritating minorities.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Discrimination must beget further discrimination if its ends are
> >> >> >> be prohibited lest it should lead to the gradual creation of new
> >> >> >> unwanted and irritating minorities.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> to
> >> >> >> be maintained. ε Further, discrimination teaches discrimination âέ“
> >> >> >> exacerbating the so-called original problems and conflicts in the
> >> >> >> first place. (As an aside, the European experiment began shortly
> >> >> >> after
> >> >> >> the war- including the free travel of people from all nations in the
> >> >> >> participating community. ε There is something sadly ironic, if not
> >> >> >> first place. (As an aside, the European experiment began shortly
> >> >> >> after
> >> >> >> the war- including the free travel of people from all nations in the
> >> >> >> curious, about this. ε As if the message from the state is: you
> >> >> >> cannot
> >> >> >> travel freely, unless we say you can travel freely âέ“ on our
> >> >> >> terms.)
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Given what little opposition there was to this decision in the
> >> >> >> West,
> >> >> >> it was clear the direction the post-war settlements would take.
> >> >> >> ε This
> >> >> >> it was clear the direction the post-war settlements would take.
> >> >> >> decision placed the Germans in Czechoslovakia in a terrible position
> >> >> >> âέ“
> >> >> >> a Catch-22. ε To support BeneâέΓ and the Czechoslovak government in
> >> >> >> exile
> >> >> >> would mean expulsion after the war, and to support Hitler and the
> >> >> >> Nazis would also mean expulsion after the war. ε There was nowhere
> >> >> >> would mean expulsion after the war, and to support Hitler and the
> >> >> >> for
> >> >> >> these three million to turn that offered any hope.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε These decisions were all taken and settled by 1943. ε These were
> >> >> >> these three million to turn that offered any hope.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> not
> >> >> >> ad-hoc decisions taken during the chaos of the end of the war. ε In
> >> >> >> 1943, the U.S. especially still had tremendous leverage over Stalin
> >> >> >> if
> >> >> >> Roosevelt chose to use it. ε Certainly, Stalin might have broken any
> >> >> >> if
> >> >> >> deal âέ“ but there is no indication that a deal on behalf of these
> >> >> >> minorities was even attempted. ε Many of these Germans were innocent
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> complicity with the Nazis. ε Evan the Slovaks, who had fought
> >> >> >> alongside
> >> >> >> the Germans for five years âέ“ invading both Poland and the USSR âέ“
> >> >> >> before rebelling against the Nazis in 1944, were afforded a more
> >> >> >> secure future after the war than the countless Germans outside of
> >> >> >> Germany who tried to lay low, especially women and children.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Thus, the decisions for the expulsion were taken âέ“ in some
> >> >> >> secure future after the war than the countless Germans outside of
> >> >> >> Germany who tried to lay low, especially women and children.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> quarters
> >> >> >> of the West supported enthusiastically, while in others at least
> >> >> >> tolerated. ε All Germans were to receive punishment âέ“ guilty by
> >> >> >> of the West supported enthusiastically, while in others at least
> >> >> >> accident of birth as opposed to guilty by deed.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε It is certainly an efficient way to finalize the issue. ε Racism
> >> >>
> >> >> >> often
> >> >> >> is. ε It is also one of the most unfair. ε Millions in Central
> >> >> >> Europe
> >> >> >> were soon to be on the receiving end of this efficient solution.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Douglas goes on to explain the detailed planning put in place by
> >> >> >> were soon to be on the receiving end of this efficient solution.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> Allies in anticipation of the forced expulsions. ε This didnâέΣt
> >> >> >> take him
> >> >> >> long. ε In a nutshell, there was no planning. ε Given that the
> >> >> >> decisions
> >> >> >> were finalized not later than 1943, this seems inexcusable.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Among the most remarkable aspects of the expulsion was the
> >> >> >> were finalized not later than 1943, this seems inexcusable.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> deliberate
> >> >> >> refusal of those who carried it out either to seek to learn the
> >> >> >> lessons of those previous examples [Armenians in Turkey, Germans in
> >> >> >> Alsace, previous relocations by Hitler and Stalin] or to make any
> >> >> >> preparations, of however rudimentary a character, for an enterprise
> >> >> >> whose disruption to the normal life of central Europe was second
> >> >> >> only
> >> >> >> to that caused by the war itself.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε For the purpose of war, entire populations of the warring
> >> >> >> refusal of those who carried it out either to seek to learn the
> >> >> >> lessons of those previous examples [Armenians in Turkey, Germans in
> >> >> >> Alsace, previous relocations by Hitler and Stalin] or to make any
> >> >> >> preparations, of however rudimentary a character, for an enterprise
> >> >> >> whose disruption to the normal life of central Europe was second
> >> >> >> only
> >> >> >> to that caused by the war itself.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> countries
> >> >> >> were mobilized. ε Every department of the state was set on war
> >> >> >> footing. ε For the expulsions, virtually nothing. ε So many
> >> >> >> unanswered
> >> >> >> (and unasked) questions, so little attention.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε In November 1943, the British government took a study on the
> >> >> >> (and unasked) questions, so little attention.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> detailed
> >> >> >> practical aspects of the coming expulsions and transfer âέ“a full
> >> >> >> year
> >> >> >> or more after the decision was taken by the Allies on this course.
> >> >> >> ε It
> >> >> >> or more after the decision was taken by the Allies on this course.
> >> >> >> was the only such detailed study taken by any of the countries
> >> >> >> involved.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε The timing is critical: at a time when the United States and
> >> >> >> involved.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> Britain
> >> >> >> had not yet opened a western front, as the Russians were desperate
> >> >> >> for
> >> >> >> them to do âέ“ D-Day was still to come âέ“ there was an opportunity
> >> >> >> had not yet opened a western front, as the Russians were desperate
> >> >> >> for
> >> >> >> for
> >> >> >> leverage on Stalin regarding the questions of borders and
> >> >> >> populations. ε At Tehran, Roosevelt instead demonstrated his
> >> >> >> leverage on Stalin regarding the questions of borders and
> >> >> >> sympathy
> >> >> >> for StalinâέΣs geopolitical aims in Europe, and Churchill followed
> >> >> >> with
> >> >> >> his infamous âέœthree matchsticksâέù performance (using the
> >> >> >> matchsticks to
> >> >> >> demonstrate and propose the shifting of both the east and west
> >> >> >> borders
> >> >> >> of Poland to the west). ε Stalin was delighted.
> >> >> >> demonstrate and propose the shifting of both the east and west
> >> >> >> borders
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε I do not pretend to believe that, had Britain and the United
> >> >> >> States
> >> >> >> secured some concessions from Stalin at Tehran, Stalin would have
> >> >> >> stuck to his word once hostilities ended (raising again the question
> >> >> >> of why the west would ally with such an actor). ε The point is that
> >> >> >> secured some concessions from Stalin at Tehran, Stalin would have
> >> >> >> stuck to his word once hostilities ended (raising again the question
> >> >> >> no
> >> >> >> attempt was even made to come to a humane answer. ε In fact
> >> >> >> Churchill âέ“
> >> >> >> who was treated insultingly by Stalin at the beginning of Tehran,
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> therefore perhaps looking to get back in his good graces âέ“ is the
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> one
> >> >> >> who brought the matchsticks!
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε There were some who felt (or hoped) that the fate of those in
> >> >> >> who brought the matchsticks!
> >> >>
> >> >> >> central
> >> >> >> Europe would already be settled by the end of the war, thus
> >> >> >> relieving
> >> >> >> Britain of any responsibility in the issue. ε The rapid advance of
> >> >> >> Europe would already be settled by the end of the war, thus
> >> >> >> relieving
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> Red Army would be the motive force behind this hope âέ“ the Germans
> >> >> >> in
> >> >> >> their path would either be killed or flee toward Germany. ε Others
> >> >> >> rightly saw that this âέœPilate-like stanceâέù might not be
> >> >> >> possible, as
> >> >> >> the British government would certainly carry responsibility for the
> >> >> >> policy decision.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Still others gave consideration to even more sinister
> >> >> >> the British government would certainly carry responsibility for the
> >> >> >> policy decision.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> possibilities.
> >> >> >> One Sir Orme Sargent of the Foreign Office suggested that âέœthe
> >> >> >> future
> >> >> >> of these people is much less likely to attract attention and give
> >> >> >> rise
> >> >> >> to political agitation if they disappear into Siberia.âέù ε This and
> >> >> >> of these people is much less likely to attract attention and give
> >> >> >> rise
> >> >> >> other similar suggestions were soon dismissed, thankfully.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε This committee report, a result of the November 1943 study,
> >> >>
> >> >> >> identified the numerous difficulties presented by this unprecedented
> >> >> >> endeavor. ε Despite the many significant issues raised, in hindsight
> >> >> >> the report understated the enormity of the task and the potential
> >> >> >> consequences. ε Even at this, the report proved far too gloomy for
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> politicians who commissioned it.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε When members of the Armistice and Post-War Committee met to
> >> >> >> politicians who commissioned it.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> discuss
> >> >> >> it in July 1944, the general response was one of disbelief and
> >> >> >> anger.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Disbelief and anger are often responses when the consequences of
> >> >> >> it in July 1944, the general response was one of disbelief and
> >> >> >> anger.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> decisions already made are too uncomfortable to be faced.
> >> >> >> ε Uneducated
> >> >> >> objections to the report were raised. ε When these objections were
> >> >> >> addressed with detailed responses, the conclusions were ignored.
> >> >> >> Clement Attlee (recently voted the greatest British Prime Minister
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> the 20th century), who chaired this committee, went even further.
> >> >> >> ε He
> >> >> >> Clement Attlee (recently voted the greatest British Prime Minister
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> the 20th century), who chaired this committee, went even further.
> >> >> >> was a prime proponent of the idea that all Germans, regardless of
> >> >> >> guilt, must be made to feel the weight of punishment for their so-
> >> >> >> called âέœnationalâέù crime. ε He would advocate punishment as far
> >> >> >> guilt, must be made to feel the weight of punishment for their so-
> >> >> >> as
> >> >> >> possible, only limiting the punishment to avoid bringing âέœserious
> >> >> >> embarrassment or injury to ourselvesâέ¦everything that brings home
> >> >> >> to
> >> >> >> the Germans the completeness and irrevocability of their defeat is
> >> >> >> worthwhile in the end.â€ù
> >> >> >> the Germans the completeness and irrevocability of their defeat is
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Presumably, any horror brought upon the German deportees âέ“ many
> >> >> >> women
> >> >> >> and children âέ“ would be acceptable to Attlee as long as these
> >> >> >> horrors
> >> >> >> did not reflect too poorly on the British government.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε With Attlee as committee chair, needless to say considerations of
> >> >> >> did not reflect too poorly on the British government.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> expulsion were given little further attention. ε If punishment was
> >> >> >> to
> >> >> >> be handed out to all, the less consideration given to details the
> >> >> >> better. ε With no sponsor in the cabinet, the report went no
> >> >> >> be handed out to all, the less consideration given to details the
> >> >> >> further,
> >> >> >> and was not discussed again after January 1945. ε With this, it
> >> >> >> seems
> >> >> >> the British government washed their hands of the fate of Germans in
> >> >> >> post-war central Europe, other than to be involved (as would the
> >> >> >> U.S.)
> >> >> >> in the coming implementation of the expulsions and transfers.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε While many leaders and public figures were almost nonchalant
> >> >> >> the British government washed their hands of the fate of Germans in
> >> >> >> post-war central Europe, other than to be involved (as would the
> >> >> >> U.S.)
> >> >> >> in the coming implementation of the expulsions and transfers.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> about
> >> >> >> the situation, some spoke out strongly against this policy. ε George
> >> >> >> Orwell demonstrated more awareness of the logistical difficulties
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> human costs than many of the politicians:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε This is equivalent to transplanting the entire population of
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> human costs than many of the politicians:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> Australia, or the combined populations of Scotland and Ireland.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε He raised questions of the logistics and transportation; he
> >> >>
> >> >> >> questioned the numbers that would die during the process. ε He
> >> >> >> called
> >> >> >> the expulsions an âέœenormous crime.âέù
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε As an aside, the populations involved were approximately
> >> >> >> equivalent
> >> >> >> to the current population of any one of Illinois, Pennsylvania, or
> >> >> >> Ohio. ε Imagine moving just the residents of Chicago to Wisconsin in
> >> >> >> to the current population of any one of Illinois, Pennsylvania, or
> >> >> >> a
> >> >> >> matter of a few months âέ“ after having bombed much of the housing
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> infrastructure of every major city in that state.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Republican senators in the United States demanded to know when
> >> >> >> infrastructure of every major city in that state.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> Atlantic Charter of 1941 had been abrogated. ε Among other
> >> >> >> objectives,
> >> >> >> this Charter held that territorial changes would accord with the
> >> >> >> freely expressed will of the people. ε Every aspect of the
> >> >> >> this Charter held that territorial changes would accord with the
> >> >> >> expulsions âέ“
> >> >> >> not only regarding the Germans, but the Poles from eastern Poland
> >> >> >> âέ“
> >> >> >> would fly in the face of this objective.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε All such objections were ignored. ε Churchill and Roosevelt were
> >> >>
> >> >> >> determined, above all else, to maintain alliance with the Soviets.
> >> >> >> Roosevelt had visions of the future United Nations, and this
> >> >> >> organization would be meaningless without Soviet participation âέ“
> >> >> >> Roosevelt had visions of the future United Nations, and this
> >> >> >> Roosevelt either acting purposely blind or quite ignorant about the
> >> >> >> nature of Stalin and the communists.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε By this time, and certainly by the time of Potsdam in July 1945,
> >> >> >> nature of Stalin and the communists.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> all
> >> >> >> that was left for the Western Allies was to find a way to
> >> >> >> rationalize
> >> >> >> to themselves the decisions taken âέ“ or those they failed to take
> >> >> >> that was left for the Western Allies was to find a way to
> >> >> >> rationalize
> >> >> >> âέ“ in
> >> >> >> regard to the minority problem in central Europe. ε It was at
> >> >> >> Potsdam
> >> >> >> where the Allies agreed formally to an âέœorderly and humaneâέù
> >> >> >> expulsion,
> >> >> >> if for no other reason than a cynical attempt to save face. ε Just a
> >> >> >> few miles away from the location where the conference was held,
> >> >> >> overloaded trains were disgorging themselves of the dead and dying
> >> >> >> transported from the east. ε Suddenly, when it was far too late to
> >> >> >> overloaded trains were disgorging themselves of the dead and dying
> >> >> >> make
> >> >> >> any difference, statements were made by western leaders in support
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> the German minorities, directly opposite to the positions taken even
> >> >> >> a
> >> >> >> year earlier, seemingly to provide cover for the tragedy unfolding
> >> >> >> before them.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Douglas describes the so-called âέœwild expulsions,âέù those
> >> >> >> any difference, statements were made by western leaders in support
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> the German minorities, directly opposite to the positions taken even
> >> >> >> a
> >> >> >> year earlier, seemingly to provide cover for the tragedy unfolding
> >> >> >> before them.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> taken before
> >> >> >> the west became directly involved, and the subsequent âέœorganized
> >> >> >> expulsionsâέù âέ“ taken after the western allied powers were
> >> >> >> formally
> >> >> >> engaged in the process. ε The treatment of the Germans in the two
> >> >> >> cases
> >> >> >> was rather similar. ε He describes the camps, temporary housing
> >> >> >> intended for a stay of a day or two that sometimes served the
> >> >> >> occupants for years, lack of dwellings in Germany, lack of food, the
> >> >> >> theft of property in the former home, the rapes, the beatings. He
> >> >> >> describes the packed trains âέ“ overstuffed and underfed âέ“
> >> >> >> occupants for years, lack of dwellings in Germany, lack of food, the
> >> >> >> theft of property in the former home, the rapes, the beatings. He
> >> >> >> sometimes
> >> >> >> taking a month to make a journey of only a few hundred miles,
> >> >> >> standing
> >> >> >> still more often than moving. ε He describes the bodies frozen to
> >> >> >> taking a month to make a journey of only a few hundred miles,
> >> >> >> standing
> >> >> >> death
> >> >> >> on the trains in the middle of the winter, with the Allies so
> >> >> >> anxious
> >> >> >> to begin their work despite the additional burdens brought on by the
> >> >> >> harsh climate.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε He attributes many of these crimes to official channels. ε In
> >> >> >> on the trains in the middle of the winter, with the Allies so
> >> >> >> anxious
> >> >> >> to begin their work despite the additional burdens brought on by the
> >> >> >> harsh climate.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> fact, it
> >> >> >> was rarely the case that the majority populations spontaneously rose
> >> >> >> up against their German neighbors âέ“ counter to the claims of
> >> >> >> was rarely the case that the majority populations spontaneously rose
> >> >> >> leaders
> >> >> >> in the east and to the expectations (or self-rationalizations) of
> >> >> >> leaders in the west. ε It was primarily state actors committing the
> >> >> >> in the east and to the expectations (or self-rationalizations) of
> >> >> >> worst atrocities against the expellees. ε It was not majority
> >> >> >> neighbor
> >> >> >> pouncing on his minority neighbor âέ“ unless the majority neighbor
> >> >> >> was
> >> >> >> afforded sanction and protection by the state via the badge.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε It was western leaders agreeing to the methods and timing,
> >> >> >> afforded sanction and protection by the state via the badge.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> involved
> >> >> >> at every railway station, agreeing to the terms, and looking the
> >> >> >> other
> >> >> >> way when terms were not met.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Such treatment did not go unnoticed âέ“ and many locals raised
> >> >> >> at every railway station, agreeing to the terms, and looking the
> >> >> >> other
> >> >> >> way when terms were not met.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> objections to the treatment of the Germans âέ“ âέœa mixture of
> >> >> >> exasperation and alarmâέù as is represented here by one Prague
> >> >> >> resident:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Devil take the Germans! ε During the war, they decimated our
> >> >> >> nation
> >> >> >> and now, because of them, along comes a fresh scandalâέ¦.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Let nobody fall back on the excuse that the Germans have done the
> >> >> >> same things. ε Either we are qualified to stand as their judges, in
> >> >> >> which case we cannot conduct ourselves as they do, or we are no
> >> >> >> different from them, and give up the right to judge them.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε At the end of 1947, Johannes Kostka, a German prisoner of war in
> >> >> >> different from them, and give up the right to judge them.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> a
> >> >> >> British camp in Egypt, wrote to the U.S. Office of Military
> >> >> >> Government
> >> >> >> in Frankfurt. ε He expressed his anxiety about his wife Gertrud,
> >> >> >> British camp in Egypt, wrote to the U.S. Office of Military
> >> >> >> Government
> >> >> >> still
> >> >> >> in Poland. ε He had recently received a letter from his wife. ε In
> >> >> >> it,
> >> >> >> she described the despair and depravations that befell her after the
> >> >> >> war âέ“ their baby daughter had already died in 1944 in the chaos of
> >> >> >> she described the despair and depravations that befell her after the
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> advancing Red Army. ε She described four years of agony and pain,
> >> >> >> including being raped. ε She became pregnant as a result of this
> >> >> >> abuse. ε She explains to her husband that she will now take her
> >> >> >> life.
> >> >> >> There is nothing left for her.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Johannes asks the U.S. officials for assistance âέ“ please ask
> >> >> >> There is nothing left for her.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> Polish government to expedite her expulsion. ε As expellees from
> >> >> >> Poland
> >> >> >> were to go to the British zone of Germany, the letter was forwarded
> >> >> >> to
> >> >> >> the British. ε In the end, neither the U.S. nor the British involved
> >> >> >> were to go to the British zone of Germany, the letter was forwarded
> >> >> >> to
> >> >> >> themselves in her case.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε The Kostka case encapsulates the official Western response to the
> >> >> >> manifest failure of the expulsion project to live up to the
> >> >> >> âέœorderly
> >> >> >> and humaneâέù standards stipulated by the Potsdam Agreement. ε As in
> >> >> >> almost every other instance in which the question of ameliorating
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> sufferings of the expellees arose, the first and overriding
> >> >> >> consideration was the national interests of the Western powers.
> >> >> >> ε The
> >> >> >> the
> >> >> >> sufferings of the expellees arose, the first and overriding
> >> >> >> consideration was the national interests of the Western powers.
> >> >> >> second was a fatalistic prediction that any such action was bound
> >> >> >> either to fail or to have a positively harmful effectâέ¦. ε Lastly,
> >> >> >> although the expulsions were taking place in accordance with the
> >> >> >> expressed policy of the Anglo-Americans and required their willing
> >> >> >> participation and collaboration, the Western democracies disavowed
> >> >> >> any
> >> >> >> responsibility for the suffering that resultedâέ¦.
> >> >> >> expressed policy of the Anglo-Americans and required their willing
> >> >> >> participation and collaboration, the Western democracies disavowed
> >> >> >> any
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Individuals and various non-governmental organizations attempted
> >> >> >> to
> >> >> >> at least mitigate the sufferings of the expellees. ε In this, they
> >> >> >> flew
> >> >> >> into the teeth of Western resistance:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε The greatest obstacle in their path was the victorious AlliesâέΣ
> >> >> >> into the teeth of Western resistance:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> insistence that the Volksdeutsche be excluded from any form of
> >> >> >> international protection or assistance.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Nor was there any agency, national or international, to which
> >> >> >> international protection or assistance.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> Volksdeutsche subjected to inhumane treatment might appealâέ¦the
> >> >> >> women
> >> >> >> and children who made up most of the expellee population occupied a
> >> >> >> legal status far lower than that of members of the SS, who…were
> >> >> >> protected by the Geneva Convention.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε Again, some spoke out. ε In a letter to the Times, Bertrand
> >> >> >> and children who made up most of the expellee population occupied a
> >> >> >> legal status far lower than that of members of the SS, who…were
> >> >> >> protected by the Geneva Convention.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> Russell
> >> >> >> compared the actions of the victorious Allies to those of the Nazi
> >> >> >> defendants then currently on trial:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> âέ¦Are mass deportations crimes when committed by our enemies during
> >> >> >> compared the actions of the victorious Allies to those of the Nazi
> >> >> >> defendants then currently on trial:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> war
> >> >> >> and justifiable measures of social adjustment when carried out by
> >> >> >> our
> >> >> >> allies in times of peace? ε It is more humane to turn out old women
> >> >> >> and justifiable measures of social adjustment when carried out by
> >> >> >> our
> >> >> >> and
> >> >> >> children to die at a distance than to asphyxiate Jews in gas
> >> >> >> chambers?...Are the future laws of war to justify the killing of
> >> >> >> enemy
> >> >> >> nationals after enemy resistance has ceased?
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε There were those in the west who attempted to place the entire
> >> >> >> children to die at a distance than to asphyxiate Jews in gas
> >> >> >> chambers?...Are the future laws of war to justify the killing of
> >> >> >> enemy
> >> >> >> nationals after enemy resistance has ceased?
> >> >>
> >> >> >> blame
> >> >> >> of the unfolding tragedy on the Soviets. ε The Soviets certainly
> >> >> >> earned
> >> >> >> their share of the blame. ε However, Britain and the United States
> >> >> >> ignored this issue for three years or more before the events. ε When
> >> >> >> they had time for planning and leverage to reach some agreements,
> >> >> >> they
> >> >> >> did nothing âέ“ in fact they encouraged Stalin and his minions in
> >> >> >> they
> >> >> >> their
> >> >> >> quest for cleansing.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε They rejected the experts who had studied the issue. ε They
> >> >> >> rejoiced
> >> >> >> that all Germans would be made to know suffering and pain, receiving
> >> >> >> a
> >> >> >> proper re-education. ε They cared not about distinctions of
> >> >> >> that all Germans would be made to know suffering and pain, receiving
> >> >> >> a
> >> >> >> innocence
> >> >> >> and guilt. ε Again, from Douglas:
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε They had encouraged their allies to carry out, and promised their
> >> >> >> cooperation in accomplishing, deeds for which they would later
> >> >> >> prosecute their enemies as war crimesâέ¦.When making the choices
> >> >> >> they
> >> >> >> did, they went in with their eyes open.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> ε I have previously listed reason why it is impossible to refer to
> >> >> >> did, they went in with their eyes open.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> World War Two as âέœthe good war.âέù ε While absolutely not the
> >> >> >> worst
> >> >> >> chapter in the book of western involvement in this war, this chapter
> >> >> >> should not be ignored.
> >> >> >> }
> >> >>
> >> >> >No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
> >> >> >during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
> >> >> >suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
> >> >> >suffered ε by ethnic Germans. The author is to be commended.
> >> >> >> chapter in the book of western involvement in this war, this chapter
> >> >> >> should not be ignored.
> >> >> >> }
> >> >>
> >> >> >No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
> >> >> >during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
> >> >> >suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
> >> >>
> >> >> Commended for the pathetic attempt to show Germans as victims. To coin
> >> >> a philosophical phrase, it's a crock of shit. ε This reminds of that
> >> >> Commended for the pathetic attempt to show Germans as victims. To coin
> >> >> old saw about the man who pleads guilty of killing his parents and
> >> >> then throws himself on the mercy of the court because he is now and
> >> >> orphan.
> >> >
> >> >What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
> >> >expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
> >>
> >>
> >> You haven't told me what the downside was. There is a lesson, here;
> >> don't start wars, you idiot.
> >
> >Someone explain that to the Palestinians and their present-day
> >apologists.
> >
> >
> >
> >snicker
>
> Show me a post where I defended or apologized for Palestinians.
Show me a post where I claimed you did.
> >> >> then throws himself on the mercy of the court because he is now and
> >> >> orphan.
> >> >
> >> >What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
> >> >expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
> >>
> >>
> >> You haven't told me what the downside was. There is a lesson, here;
> >> don't start wars, you idiot.
> >
> >Someone explain that to the Palestinians and their present-day
> >apologists.
> >
> >
> >
> >snicker
>
> Show me a post where I defended or apologized for Palestinians.
snicker
SpambustЯ
Nov 14, 2012, 12:47:41 AM11/14/12
to
On 13/11/2012 7:39 PM, Harold Burton wrote:
> In article <2ks4a8hp5c05chln1...@4ax.com>,
> Barry Bruyea <damnthet...@duck.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 13 Nov 2012 06:40:04 -0500, Harold Burton
>> <hal.i....@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> In article <mia4a85847o03upiq...@4ax.com>,
>>> Barry Bruyea <damnthet...@duck.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>>>> <parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Nov 12, 2:22ε pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>>>>>>
>>>>>> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>>>>>>> Book review: ε Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans
> In article <2ks4a8hp5c05chln1...@4ax.com>,
> Barry Bruyea <damnthet...@duck.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 13 Nov 2012 06:40:04 -0500, Harold Burton
>> <hal.i....@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> In article <mia4a85847o03upiq...@4ax.com>,
>>> Barry Bruyea <damnthet...@duck.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 11:37:36 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>>>> <parkstre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Nov 12, 2:22ε pm, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 08:34:30 -0800, Auric Hellman
>>>>>>
>>>>>> <adhell...@volcanomail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>> On 11/12/2012 7:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>>>>>>>> after
>>>>>>>> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
>>>>>>>> genocide.?
>>>>>>>> http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
>>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>>> ε From the introduction:
>>>>>>>> the Second World War, by R.M. Douglas
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Who gets arrested for plotting/overseeing this nonsensical attempted
>>>>>>>> genocide.?
>>>>>>>> http://lewrockwell.com/rep3/german-expulsions-after-ww2.html
>>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>>> .
>>>>>>>> ε Immediately after the Second World War, the victorious Allies
>>>>>>>> carried
>>>>>>>> out the largest forced population transfer âΓ and perhaps the
>>>>>>>> greatest
>>>>>>>> single movement of peoples âΓ in human history. ε With the
>>>>>>>> assistance of
>>>>>>>> the British, Soviet, and U.S. governments, millions of
>>>>>>>> German-speaking
>>>>>>>> civilians living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the parts of
>>>>>>>> eastern
>>>>>>>> Germany assigned to Poland were driven out of their homes and
>>>>>>>> deposited amid the ruins of the Reich, to fend for themselves as
>>>>>>>> best
>>>>>>>> they could. ε Millions more, who had fled the advancing Red Army in
>>>>>>>> the British, Soviet, and U.S. governments, millions of
>>>>>>>> German-speaking
>>>>>>>> civilians living in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the parts of
>>>>>>>> eastern
>>>>>>>> Germany assigned to Poland were driven out of their homes and
>>>>>>>> deposited amid the ruins of the Reich, to fend for themselves as
>>>>>>>> best
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> final months of the war, were prevented from returning to their
>>>>>>>> places
>>>>>>>> of origin, and became lifelong exilesâΦ.altogether, the expulsion
>>>>>>>> final months of the war, were prevented from returning to their
>>>>>>>> places
>>>>>>>> operation permanently displaced at least 12 million people, and
>>>>>>>> perhaps as many as 14 million. ε Most of these were women and
>>>>>>>> children
>>>>>>>> under the age of sixteenâΦ.estimates of 500,000 deaths at the lower
>>>>>>>> end
>>>>>>>> of the spectrum, and as many as 1.5 million at the higher, are
>>>>>>>> consistent with the evidence as it exists at present.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε In this book, Douglas compiles âΓ apparently for the first time
>>>>>>>> of the spectrum, and as many as 1.5 million at the higher, are
>>>>>>>> consistent with the evidence as it exists at present.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> English âΓ a thorough study of one of the least discussed tragedies
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> the Second World War, and certainly of the immediate post-war period
>>>>>>>> âΓ
>>>>>>>> the Second World War, and certainly of the immediate post-war period
>>>>>>>> that of the forced expulsion of Germans from their homelands
>>>>>>>> throughout central Europe.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε On the most optimistic interpretationâΦthe expulsions were an
>>>>>>>> throughout central Europe.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> immense
>>>>>>>> man-made catastrophe….
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε That this tragedy remains relatively unknown, even in the highest
>>>>>>>> academic circles, is given evidence by the following anecdote
>>>>>>>> provided
>>>>>>>> by the author:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε It is, then, entirely understandable why so many of my splendid
>>>>>>>> provided
>>>>>>>> by the author:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> learned colleagues on the Colgate faculty should have expressed
>>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>>> confusion to me after reading in the newspapers in October 2009 that
>>>>>>>> the president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, had demanded that
>>>>>>>> the other members of the European Union legally indemnify his
>>>>>>>> country
>>>>>>>> against compensation claims by ethnic German expellees, as the price
>>>>>>>> of his countryâÎΣs ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. ε None had
>>>>>>>> learned colleagues on the Colgate faculty should have expressed
>>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>>> confusion to me after reading in the newspapers in October 2009 that
>>>>>>>> the president of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, had demanded that
>>>>>>>> the other members of the European Union legally indemnify his
>>>>>>>> country
>>>>>>>> against compensation claims by ethnic German expellees, as the price
>>>>>>>> been
>>>>>>>> aware that anything had occurred after the war in respect of which
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> Czech Republic might require to be indemnified.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Douglas gives some reasons why he believes that this episode has
>>>>>>>> received so little attention:
>>>>>>>> For Germans, it invites debate about the war-time record of ethnic
>>>>>>>> German minorities living in the subject countries.
>>>>>>>> For the citizens of expelling countries, it draws unwanted attention
>>>>>>>> and casts a doubtful light on carefully crafted war-related
>>>>>>>> narratives.
>>>>>>>> For citizens of the U.S. and Britain, it draws light to the
>>>>>>>> complicity
>>>>>>>> of their leaders in one of the largest episodes of human rights
>>>>>>>> abuse
>>>>>>>> in history.
>>>>>>>> ε Douglas does not add in this context, but elsewhere sheds light
>>>>>>>> aware that anything had occurred after the war in respect of which
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> Czech Republic might require to be indemnified.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Douglas gives some reasons why he believes that this episode has
>>>>>>>> received so little attention:
>>>>>>>> For Germans, it invites debate about the war-time record of ethnic
>>>>>>>> German minorities living in the subject countries.
>>>>>>>> For the citizens of expelling countries, it draws unwanted attention
>>>>>>>> and casts a doubtful light on carefully crafted war-related
>>>>>>>> narratives.
>>>>>>>> For citizens of the U.S. and Britain, it draws light to the
>>>>>>>> complicity
>>>>>>>> of their leaders in one of the largest episodes of human rights
>>>>>>>> abuse
>>>>>>>> in history.
>>>>>>>> on,
>>>>>>>> another possible reason for the relative silence. ε It is not
>>>>>>>> considered appropriate to show any sympathy toward Germans as
>>>>>>>> regards
>>>>>>>> the Second World War, and especially if it might be juxtaposed to
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> Holocaust âΓ therefore even the study of such episodes might result
>>>>>>>> regards
>>>>>>>> the Second World War, and especially if it might be juxtaposed to
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> unwanted professional risks. ε This conclusion is suggested given
>>>>>>>> his
>>>>>>>> need to apologize in advance for the possibility that he might be
>>>>>>>> accused of holding such a position:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε It is appropriate at the outset to state explicitly that no
>>>>>>>> need to apologize in advance for the possibility that he might be
>>>>>>>> accused of holding such a position:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> legitimate comparison can be drawn between the postwar expulsions
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> the appalling record of German offenses against the Jews and other
>>>>>>>> innocent victims between 1939 and 1945. ε The extent of Nazi
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> the appalling record of German offenses against the Jews and other
>>>>>>>> criminality and barbarity in central and eastern Europe is on a
>>>>>>>> scale
>>>>>>>> and of a degree that is almost impossible to overstate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Douglas begins this book by with a focus on the Munich Conference
>>>>>>>> scale
>>>>>>>> and of a degree that is almost impossible to overstate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> 1938, and the actions taken thereafter by Edvard BeneâÎΓ. ε When
>>>>>>>> reading
>>>>>>>> this, I wondered about the relevance of Munich to this narrative âΓ
>>>>>>>> these expulsions took place seven years and more after the
>>>>>>>> conference:
>>>>>>>> what is the possible connection? ε As Douglas will demonstrate, the
>>>>>>>> conference:
>>>>>>>> expulsions were not devised at the last moment, in the chaos of the
>>>>>>>> last days of Berlin, but had been discussed and contemplated by many
>>>>>>>> of the actors âΓ including in the U.S. and Britain âΓalmost from
>>>>>>>> last days of Berlin, but had been discussed and contemplated by many
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> beginning of the war.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε The result of the Munich Conference, as is well-known, was the
>>>>>>>> beginning of the war.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Nazi
>>>>>>>> annexation of the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland, the portion of
>>>>>>>> Czechoslovakia bordering Germany and populated primarily by ethnic
>>>>>>>> Germans.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε The Sudetenland issue dates to the end of the First World War,
>>>>>>>> annexation of the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland, the portion of
>>>>>>>> Czechoslovakia bordering Germany and populated primarily by ethnic
>>>>>>>> Germans.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> and it
>>>>>>>> represents one of the many failures of the Paris Peace Conference
>>>>>>>> after that war:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε The German deputies of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in the
>>>>>>>> represents one of the many failures of the Paris Peace Conference
>>>>>>>> after that war:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Imperial
>>>>>>>> Council (Reichsrat) referred to the Fourteen Points of U.S.
>>>>>>>> President
>>>>>>>> Woodrow Wilson and the right proposed therein to self-determination,
>>>>>>>> and attempted to negotiate the union of the German-speaking
>>>>>>>> territories with the new Republic of German Austria, which itself
>>>>>>>> aimed at joining Weimar Germany.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε However Sudetenland remained in a newly created Czechoslovakia, a
>>>>>>>> Council (Reichsrat) referred to the Fourteen Points of U.S.
>>>>>>>> President
>>>>>>>> Woodrow Wilson and the right proposed therein to self-determination,
>>>>>>>> and attempted to negotiate the union of the German-speaking
>>>>>>>> territories with the new Republic of German Austria, which itself
>>>>>>>> aimed at joining Weimar Germany.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> multi-ethnic state of several nations: Czechs, Germans, Slovaks,
>>>>>>>> Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε At the Paris Conference (technically Versailles dealt with
>>>>>>>> Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Germany),
>>>>>>>> BeneâÎΓ lobbied long and hard to keep these ethnically German
>>>>>>>> territories within Czech territory. ε Many diplomats from the West
>>>>>>>> at
>>>>>>>> the conference expressed reservations even at that time, yet BeneâÎΓ
>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>> successful âΓ even more than many of his countrymen had dared to
>>>>>>>> imagine. ε Unfortunately, his victory sowed the seed of opportunity
>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>> confrontation:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Adolf Hitler had never ceased to highlight the incompatibility of
>>>>>>>> territorial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles with the aims for
>>>>>>>> which the Allies had professed to fight the Great War. ε The
>>>>>>>> existence
>>>>>>>> of Czechoslovakia in its current form, he insisted, was unanswerable
>>>>>>>> proof of the victorsâÎΣ hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>> of Czechoslovakia in its current form, he insisted, was unanswerable
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Douglas sheds some light (for me at least) regarding Munich.
>>>>>>>> ε While
>>>>>>>> the term âÎÅ“MunichâÎù as regarding the 1938 conference is today used
>>>>>>>> as a
>>>>>>>> term of derision, at the time it was hailed in all quarters of the
>>>>>>>> West âΓ not only for averting war, but also for correcting one of
>>>>>>>> term of derision, at the time it was hailed in all quarters of the
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> well-recognized wrongs committed in Paris nineteen years earlier:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> âΦas the London Times put it, the transfer of territory to Germany
>>>>>>>> well-recognized wrongs committed in Paris nineteen years earlier:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> had
>>>>>>>> been “both necessary and fundamentally just.â€ù
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Χδdouard Daladier, the prime minister, did not believe that most
>>>>>>>> French
>>>>>>>> citizens would understand why, as the law professor and commentator
>>>>>>>> Joseph BarthΧ©lemy put it, there must be a general European war
>>>>>>>> citizens would understand why, as the law professor and commentator
>>>>>>>> âÎÅ“to
>>>>>>>> maintain three million Germans under Czech sovereignty.âÎù
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε As for Great Britain, âÎÅ“appeasersâÎù and anti-appeasersâÎù alike
>>>>>>>> agreed
>>>>>>>> that the Sudeten GermansâÎΣ claim to determine their own allegiance
>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>> justifiedâΦ.Even Winston Churchill told Hubert Ripka, one of
>>>>>>>> Benes’s
>>>>>>>> closest associates, in the summer of 1938 that if he had been prime
>>>>>>>> minister he would have acted as Neville Chamberlain had done….
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Lord Halifax, the British foreign secretary, declared in the
>>>>>>>> House of
>>>>>>>> Lords that even if negotiations at Munich had broken down and a war
>>>>>>>> had resulted, âÎÅ“no body of statesmen drawing the boundaries of a
>>>>>>>> Lords that even if negotiations at Munich had broken down and a war
>>>>>>>> new
>>>>>>>> Czechoslovakia would have redrawn them as they were left by the
>>>>>>>> Treaty
>>>>>>>> of Versailles.âÎù
>>>>>>>> Czechoslovakia would have redrawn them as they were left by the
>>>>>>>> Treaty
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Gallup polls revealed popular majorities in Britain and France,
>>>>>>>> and a
>>>>>>>> still larger one in the United States, in favor of the Munich Pact.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε The court historians seem to have done a thorough job of burying
>>>>>>>> still larger one in the United States, in favor of the Munich Pact.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>> part of the story.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε BeneâÎΓ, after Munich, departed for the United States. ε In May
>>>>>>>> part of the story.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 1939,
>>>>>>>> BeneâÎΓ was able to privately meet with Roosevelt. ε What he heard
>>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>>> the president certainly must have been a welcome view: ε as far as
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> U.S. Administration was concerned, âÎÅ“Munich does not exist.âÎù
>>>>>>>> Separately, the other members of âÎÅ“the Big ThreeâÎù indicated that
>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>> no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Beginning in September 1941, BeneâÎΓ felt confident enough about
>>>>>>>> no longer felt bound by the terms of Munich.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> his
>>>>>>>> position that he began floating trial balloons regarding the
>>>>>>>> possibility of large population transfers after the war.
>>>>>>>> ε âÎÅ“Germans,
>>>>>>>> position that he began floating trial balloons regarding the
>>>>>>>> possibility of large population transfers after the war.
>>>>>>>> good and bad, European-minded and Nazi-minded, must learnâΦthat war
>>>>>>>> does not pay.â€ù ε There was âÎÅ“no way other than the way of
>>>>>>>> suffering of
>>>>>>>> educating a social and political community and there never was any
>>>>>>>> other way.âÎù
>>>>>>>> educating a social and political community and there never was any
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
>>>>>>>> statements, BeneâÎΓ felt safe to go further. ε In a January 1942
>>>>>>>> As he had no significant push-back from the Allies regarding these
>>>>>>>> article,
>>>>>>>> he declared:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> âÎÅ“National minoritiesâΦare always – and in Central Europe
>>>>>>>> especially – a
>>>>>>>> real thorn in the side of individual nations. ε This is especially
>>>>>>>> true
>>>>>>>> if they are German minorities.âÎù ε Before speaking of minority
>>>>>>>> rights,
>>>>>>>> it was necessary to âÎÅ“define the rights of majorities and the
>>>>>>>> obligations of minorities.âÎù
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε He questioned, in light of wartime experiences, whether it was
>>>>>>>> necessary or desirable for minorities to continue in existence.
>>>>>>>> ε Then
>>>>>>>> he used HitlerâÎΣs actions to justify the massive population
>>>>>>>> transfers
>>>>>>>> that would be required throughout Central Europe if his visions were
>>>>>>>> to become reality:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Hitler himself has transferred German minorities from the Baltic
>>>>>>>> that would be required throughout Central Europe if his visions were
>>>>>>>> to become reality:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> from Bessarabia. ε Germany, therefore, cannot a priori regard it as
>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>> injury to her if other states adopt the same methods with regard to
>>>>>>>> German minoritiesâΦ.It will be necessary after this war to carry
>>>>>>>> injury to her if other states adopt the same methods with regard to
>>>>>>>> out a
>>>>>>>> transfer of populations on a very much larger scale than after the
>>>>>>>> last war.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Hitler did it, so it must be OK.
>>>>>>>> transfer of populations on a very much larger scale than after the
>>>>>>>> last war.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε This discussion was not occurring solely in the mind of the man
>>>>>>>> acting as the Czechoslovak leader in exile. ε Eden learned that
>>>>>>>> Stalin
>>>>>>>> was also considering such transfers as early as December 1941
>>>>>>>> regarding the Germans from lands that would be given to Poland after
>>>>>>>> the war. ε The British Foreign Office, in 1942, suggested that
>>>>>>>> was also considering such transfers as early as December 1941
>>>>>>>> regarding the Germans from lands that would be given to Poland after
>>>>>>>> large-
>>>>>>>> scale transfers were âÎÅ“a feasible method of dealing with the
>>>>>>>> European
>>>>>>>> minorities problem.âÎù
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε It is interesting that these discussions were occurring even as
>>>>>>>> early
>>>>>>>> as 1939 âΓ and certainly before United States official entry into
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> war. ε From this time until the warâÎΣs conclusion, the leaders of
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> Allied powers met on several occasions. ε Their underlings met
>>>>>>>> daily.
>>>>>>>> Was there any push-back by the U.S. or Great Britain against Russia
>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>> this issue? ε Anything that suggests that the two Anglo leaders
>>>>>>>> Was there any push-back by the U.S. or Great Britain against Russia
>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>> considered such massive population transfers as a horrendous and
>>>>>>>> certain to be calamitous undertaking? ε While they had some leverage
>>>>>>>> over Stalin, did they at least try to utilize this leverage on
>>>>>>>> behalf
>>>>>>>> of the minorities in question? ε Douglas offers no evidence to this
>>>>>>>> behalf
>>>>>>>> effect, and instead offers much evidence to the contrary âΓ willing
>>>>>>>> partners were present in both England and the U.S.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Poland eventually followed in the tracks first laid by
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Czechoslovakia. ε Certainly at the beginning of the war, PolandâÎΣs
>>>>>>>> focus
>>>>>>>> was to regain all territories lost. ε As it became clear that the
>>>>>>>> Russians would keep what was taken in the east, Poland looked to the
>>>>>>>> west and inevitably to the expulsion of Germans in East Prussia.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Rumors began to circulate that the British government was now
>>>>>>>> west and inevitably to the expulsion of Germans in East Prussia.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> falling
>>>>>>>> in to support such forced expulsions. ε The Sudeten German leader in
>>>>>>>> exile, Wenzel Jaksch, decided the best course was to remain
>>>>>>>> dignified
>>>>>>>> and consistent in his positions in support of his community. ε The
>>>>>>>> dignified
>>>>>>>> line
>>>>>>>> he had to walk was too thin âΓ on the one hand, to not give the
>>>>>>>> slightest hint that he was a support to the Nazis, on the other to
>>>>>>>> properly place his claims for recognition of national Germans in
>>>>>>>> Czechoslovakia.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε The line was so thin that it need not have existed. ε Once the
>>>>>>>> properly place his claims for recognition of national Germans in
>>>>>>>> Czechoslovakia.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> war
>>>>>>>> began, the position of Central-European Germans outside of Germany
>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>> tenuous at best. ε To stay neutral only gave the appearance of
>>>>>>>> began, the position of Central-European Germans outside of Germany
>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>> giving
>>>>>>>> aid to the other side. ε Overt acts of what is called patriotism in
>>>>>>>> America would be necessary to even give some hope of being allowed
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> remain in their homes after the war. ε Yet this would require taking
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> the fight against their national brothers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε That the line was so thin and that the fate of these Central
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> European
>>>>>>>> Germans was virtually sealed before the war began does not explain
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> robustness by which the Allies approvingly discussed the issue of
>>>>>>>> forced transfers. ε The comments range from the casual (as if the
>>>>>>>> Germans was virtually sealed before the war began does not explain
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> robustness by which the Allies approvingly discussed the issue of
>>>>>>>> entire task was equivalent to moving a few families from one city to
>>>>>>>> the neighboring city) to the callous:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Herbert HooverâΦcalled for consideration of what he described as
>>>>>>>> the neighboring city) to the callous:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> “the
>>>>>>>> heroic remedy of transfer of populationâ€ù as a means of preventing
>>>>>>>> future European conflict.âÎù
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Sumner Welles [recent collaborator with FDR on foreign
>>>>>>>> affairs]âΦwas
>>>>>>>> coming around to the idea that “we should avail ourselves of this
>>>>>>>> moment of world upheaval to effect transfers of population where
>>>>>>>> these
>>>>>>>> are necessary to prevent new conflicts, and thus enable peoples to
>>>>>>>> live under the government they desire, free from racial
>>>>>>>> discriminations.â€ù
>>>>>>>> these
>>>>>>>> are necessary to prevent new conflicts, and thus enable peoples to
>>>>>>>> live under the government they desire, free from racial
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> âΦthe Oxford historian, A.J.P. Taylor declared that the
>>>>>>>> Czechoslovak
>>>>>>>> state could only be resurrected using the same “ruthlessnessâ€ù
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> inflicting âÎÅ“as much sufferingâÎù as the Germans had employed in
>>>>>>>> destroying it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε In the House of Lords, Robert Vansittart [second cousin of
>>>>>>>> Lawrence
>>>>>>>> of Arabia]âΦapplauded Stalin’s robust indifference to questions
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> guilt or innocence, when driving the Soviet Union’s
>>>>>>>> German-speaking
>>>>>>>> population from their homes in 1941, as a model for the Allies to
>>>>>>>> follow. ε âÎÅ“He was a thousand times right; five hundred thousand
>>>>>>>> population from their homes in 1941, as a model for the Allies to
>>>>>>>> times
>>>>>>>> rightâΦ.I say these [deportees] were not Hitlerite Germans. ε They
>>>>>>>> had a
>>>>>>>> quarter of a centuryâÎΣs training in the doctrines of
>>>>>>>> CommunismâΦ.Nevertheless they were held to be Germans and
>>>>>>>> unreliable.â€ù
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Even Lord Robert Cecil [cousin of Arthur Balfour], president of
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> League of Nations Union and an impassioned defender of the rights of
>>>>>>>> minorities between the wars, now agreed that the Sudetendeutsche at
>>>>>>>> least would âÎÅ“have to be removed,âÎù and that their fate should be
>>>>>>>> League of Nations Union and an impassioned defender of the rights of
>>>>>>>> minorities between the wars, now agreed that the Sudetendeutsche at
>>>>>>>> of no
>>>>>>>> concern to anyone but the Czechoslovak government.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε These are not words of concern for those to face the forced
>>>>>>>> concern to anyone but the Czechoslovak government.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> relocation to come. ε These are not words that demonstrate a concern
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> separate the guilty from the innocent. ε These are words that
>>>>>>>> demonstrate, in some cases, a pleasure in the pain that will be
>>>>>>>> inflicted âΓ loss of property, loss of dignity, loss of life.
>>>>>>>> ε These
>>>>>>>> are words that justify the coming actions using Hitler as the
>>>>>>>> yardstick of acceptable behavior.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Others did speak in opposition, or at least demonstrated some
>>>>>>>> yardstick of acceptable behavior.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> concern. ε These concerns were not based on party or economic lines.
>>>>>>>> For example, while leaders in the Labour Party expressed
>>>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>>> of the necessity for the forced expulsions, the journal Socialist
>>>>>>>> Commentary called attention toâΦ
>>>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>>> of the necessity for the forced expulsions, the journal Socialist
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> …the incongruity of trying to preserve in aspic the often
>>>>>>>> artificially
>>>>>>>> defined European frontiers of 1939, the product of centuries of
>>>>>>>> dynastic squabbling and historical accident, for all time….It
>>>>>>>> defined European frontiers of 1939, the product of centuries of
>>>>>>>> would
>>>>>>>> have been more fittingɉ۝to bring justice and freedom to the
>>>>>>>> national
>>>>>>>> minorities wherever they chose to live, and not to continue the
>>>>>>>> odious
>>>>>>>> Nazi method of shifting people about like cattle.âÎù
>>>>>>>> minorities wherever they chose to live, and not to continue the
>>>>>>>> odious
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε The London-based Economist warnedâΦ
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε That punishment of Germans after the war âÎÅ“must fall on those
>>>>>>>> who are
>>>>>>>> guilty in a moral and not in a racial sense. ε The Nazis have made
>>>>>>>> racial scapegoats; the Allies must not fall into exactly the same
>>>>>>>> error.âÎù
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε In a paper published in 1943, Allan Fisher and David Mitrany
>>>>>>>> offered
>>>>>>>> the following critique:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε To claim that this practice was now justified because of the Nazi
>>>>>>>> governmentâÎΣs previous recourse to it, they argued, seemed a
>>>>>>>> curious
>>>>>>>> way of reeducating the German people âÎÅ“at a time when they are
>>>>>>>> being
>>>>>>>> urged to abjure Hitler and all his works.âÎù
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε They went further, suggesting that this racial purity could only
>>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>>> maintained by hermetically sealing the borders:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> âΦif it is to achieve the ends for which it is advocated the policy
>>>>>>>> maintained by hermetically sealing the borders:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> transfer must have as its corollary a continuous policy of
>>>>>>>> segregation. ε Migration or any free movement of people would have
>>>>>>>> transfer must have as its corollary a continuous policy of
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> be prohibited lest it should lead to the gradual creation of new
>>>>>>>> unwanted and irritating minorities.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Discrimination must beget further discrimination if its ends are
>>>>>>>> be prohibited lest it should lead to the gradual creation of new
>>>>>>>> unwanted and irritating minorities.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> be maintained. ε Further, discrimination teaches discrimination âΓ
>>>>>>>> exacerbating the so-called original problems and conflicts in the
>>>>>>>> first place. (As an aside, the European experiment began shortly
>>>>>>>> after
>>>>>>>> the war- including the free travel of people from all nations in the
>>>>>>>> participating community. ε There is something sadly ironic, if not
>>>>>>>> first place. (As an aside, the European experiment began shortly
>>>>>>>> after
>>>>>>>> the war- including the free travel of people from all nations in the
>>>>>>>> curious, about this. ε As if the message from the state is: you
>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>> travel freely, unless we say you can travel freely âΓ on our
>>>>>>>> terms.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Given what little opposition there was to this decision in the
>>>>>>>> West,
>>>>>>>> it was clear the direction the post-war settlements would take.
>>>>>>>> ε This
>>>>>>>> it was clear the direction the post-war settlements would take.
>>>>>>>> decision placed the Germans in Czechoslovakia in a terrible position
>>>>>>>> âΓ
>>>>>>>> a Catch-22. ε To support BeneâÎΓ and the Czechoslovak government in
>>>>>>>> exile
>>>>>>>> would mean expulsion after the war, and to support Hitler and the
>>>>>>>> Nazis would also mean expulsion after the war. ε There was nowhere
>>>>>>>> would mean expulsion after the war, and to support Hitler and the
>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>> these three million to turn that offered any hope.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε These decisions were all taken and settled by 1943. ε These were
>>>>>>>> these three million to turn that offered any hope.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>> ad-hoc decisions taken during the chaos of the end of the war. ε In
>>>>>>>> 1943, the U.S. especially still had tremendous leverage over Stalin
>>>>>>>> if
>>>>>>>> Roosevelt chose to use it. ε Certainly, Stalin might have broken any
>>>>>>>> if
>>>>>>>> deal âΓ but there is no indication that a deal on behalf of these
>>>>>>>> minorities was even attempted. ε Many of these Germans were innocent
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> complicity with the Nazis. ε Evan the Slovaks, who had fought
>>>>>>>> alongside
>>>>>>>> the Germans for five years âΓ invading both Poland and the USSR âΓ
>>>>>>>> before rebelling against the Nazis in 1944, were afforded a more
>>>>>>>> secure future after the war than the countless Germans outside of
>>>>>>>> Germany who tried to lay low, especially women and children.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Thus, the decisions for the expulsion were taken âΓ in some
>>>>>>>> secure future after the war than the countless Germans outside of
>>>>>>>> Germany who tried to lay low, especially women and children.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> quarters
>>>>>>>> of the West supported enthusiastically, while in others at least
>>>>>>>> tolerated. ε All Germans were to receive punishment âΓ guilty by
>>>>>>>> of the West supported enthusiastically, while in others at least
>>>>>>>> accident of birth as opposed to guilty by deed.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε It is certainly an efficient way to finalize the issue. ε Racism
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> often
>>>>>>>> is. ε It is also one of the most unfair. ε Millions in Central
>>>>>>>> Europe
>>>>>>>> were soon to be on the receiving end of this efficient solution.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Douglas goes on to explain the detailed planning put in place by
>>>>>>>> were soon to be on the receiving end of this efficient solution.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> Allies in anticipation of the forced expulsions. ε This didnâÎΣt
>>>>>>>> take him
>>>>>>>> long. ε In a nutshell, there was no planning. ε Given that the
>>>>>>>> decisions
>>>>>>>> were finalized not later than 1943, this seems inexcusable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Among the most remarkable aspects of the expulsion was the
>>>>>>>> were finalized not later than 1943, this seems inexcusable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> deliberate
>>>>>>>> refusal of those who carried it out either to seek to learn the
>>>>>>>> lessons of those previous examples [Armenians in Turkey, Germans in
>>>>>>>> Alsace, previous relocations by Hitler and Stalin] or to make any
>>>>>>>> preparations, of however rudimentary a character, for an enterprise
>>>>>>>> whose disruption to the normal life of central Europe was second
>>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>>> to that caused by the war itself.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε For the purpose of war, entire populations of the warring
>>>>>>>> refusal of those who carried it out either to seek to learn the
>>>>>>>> lessons of those previous examples [Armenians in Turkey, Germans in
>>>>>>>> Alsace, previous relocations by Hitler and Stalin] or to make any
>>>>>>>> preparations, of however rudimentary a character, for an enterprise
>>>>>>>> whose disruption to the normal life of central Europe was second
>>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>>> to that caused by the war itself.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> countries
>>>>>>>> were mobilized. ε Every department of the state was set on war
>>>>>>>> footing. ε For the expulsions, virtually nothing. ε So many
>>>>>>>> unanswered
>>>>>>>> (and unasked) questions, so little attention.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε In November 1943, the British government took a study on the
>>>>>>>> (and unasked) questions, so little attention.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> detailed
>>>>>>>> practical aspects of the coming expulsions and transfer âΓa full
>>>>>>>> year
>>>>>>>> or more after the decision was taken by the Allies on this course.
>>>>>>>> ε It
>>>>>>>> or more after the decision was taken by the Allies on this course.
>>>>>>>> was the only such detailed study taken by any of the countries
>>>>>>>> involved.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε The timing is critical: at a time when the United States and
>>>>>>>> involved.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Britain
>>>>>>>> had not yet opened a western front, as the Russians were desperate
>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>> them to do âΓ D-Day was still to come âΓ there was an opportunity
>>>>>>>> had not yet opened a western front, as the Russians were desperate
>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>> leverage on Stalin regarding the questions of borders and
>>>>>>>> populations. ε At Tehran, Roosevelt instead demonstrated his
>>>>>>>> leverage on Stalin regarding the questions of borders and
>>>>>>>> sympathy
>>>>>>>> for StalinâÎΣs geopolitical aims in Europe, and Churchill followed
>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>> his infamous âÎÅ“three matchsticksâÎù performance (using the
>>>>>>>> matchsticks to
>>>>>>>> demonstrate and propose the shifting of both the east and west
>>>>>>>> borders
>>>>>>>> of Poland to the west). ε Stalin was delighted.
>>>>>>>> demonstrate and propose the shifting of both the east and west
>>>>>>>> borders
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε I do not pretend to believe that, had Britain and the United
>>>>>>>> States
>>>>>>>> secured some concessions from Stalin at Tehran, Stalin would have
>>>>>>>> stuck to his word once hostilities ended (raising again the question
>>>>>>>> of why the west would ally with such an actor). ε The point is that
>>>>>>>> secured some concessions from Stalin at Tehran, Stalin would have
>>>>>>>> stuck to his word once hostilities ended (raising again the question
>>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>> attempt was even made to come to a humane answer. ε In fact
>>>>>>>> Churchill âΓ
>>>>>>>> who was treated insultingly by Stalin at the beginning of Tehran,
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> therefore perhaps looking to get back in his good graces âΓ is the
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> one
>>>>>>>> who brought the matchsticks!
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε There were some who felt (or hoped) that the fate of those in
>>>>>>>> who brought the matchsticks!
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> central
>>>>>>>> Europe would already be settled by the end of the war, thus
>>>>>>>> relieving
>>>>>>>> Britain of any responsibility in the issue. ε The rapid advance of
>>>>>>>> Europe would already be settled by the end of the war, thus
>>>>>>>> relieving
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> Red Army would be the motive force behind this hope âΓ the Germans
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> their path would either be killed or flee toward Germany. ε Others
>>>>>>>> rightly saw that this âÎÅ“Pilate-like stanceâÎù might not be
>>>>>>>> possible, as
>>>>>>>> the British government would certainly carry responsibility for the
>>>>>>>> policy decision.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Still others gave consideration to even more sinister
>>>>>>>> the British government would certainly carry responsibility for the
>>>>>>>> policy decision.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> possibilities.
>>>>>>>> One Sir Orme Sargent of the Foreign Office suggested that âÎÅ“the
>>>>>>>> future
>>>>>>>> of these people is much less likely to attract attention and give
>>>>>>>> rise
>>>>>>>> to political agitation if they disappear into Siberia.âÎù ε This and
>>>>>>>> of these people is much less likely to attract attention and give
>>>>>>>> rise
>>>>>>>> other similar suggestions were soon dismissed, thankfully.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε This committee report, a result of the November 1943 study,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> identified the numerous difficulties presented by this unprecedented
>>>>>>>> endeavor. ε Despite the many significant issues raised, in hindsight
>>>>>>>> the report understated the enormity of the task and the potential
>>>>>>>> consequences. ε Even at this, the report proved far too gloomy for
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> politicians who commissioned it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε When members of the Armistice and Post-War Committee met to
>>>>>>>> politicians who commissioned it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> discuss
>>>>>>>> it in July 1944, the general response was one of disbelief and
>>>>>>>> anger.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Disbelief and anger are often responses when the consequences of
>>>>>>>> it in July 1944, the general response was one of disbelief and
>>>>>>>> anger.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> decisions already made are too uncomfortable to be faced.
>>>>>>>> ε Uneducated
>>>>>>>> objections to the report were raised. ε When these objections were
>>>>>>>> addressed with detailed responses, the conclusions were ignored.
>>>>>>>> Clement Attlee (recently voted the greatest British Prime Minister
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> the 20th century), who chaired this committee, went even further.
>>>>>>>> ε He
>>>>>>>> Clement Attlee (recently voted the greatest British Prime Minister
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> the 20th century), who chaired this committee, went even further.
>>>>>>>> was a prime proponent of the idea that all Germans, regardless of
>>>>>>>> guilt, must be made to feel the weight of punishment for their so-
>>>>>>>> called âÎÅ“nationalâÎù crime. ε He would advocate punishment as far
>>>>>>>> guilt, must be made to feel the weight of punishment for their so-
>>>>>>>> as
>>>>>>>> possible, only limiting the punishment to avoid bringing âÎÅ“serious
>>>>>>>> embarrassment or injury to ourselvesâΦeverything that brings home
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> the Germans the completeness and irrevocability of their defeat is
>>>>>>>> worthwhile in the end.â€ù
>>>>>>>> the Germans the completeness and irrevocability of their defeat is
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Presumably, any horror brought upon the German deportees âΓ many
>>>>>>>> women
>>>>>>>> and children âΓ would be acceptable to Attlee as long as these
>>>>>>>> horrors
>>>>>>>> did not reflect too poorly on the British government.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε With Attlee as committee chair, needless to say considerations of
>>>>>>>> did not reflect too poorly on the British government.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> expulsion were given little further attention. ε If punishment was
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> be handed out to all, the less consideration given to details the
>>>>>>>> better. ε With no sponsor in the cabinet, the report went no
>>>>>>>> be handed out to all, the less consideration given to details the
>>>>>>>> further,
>>>>>>>> and was not discussed again after January 1945. ε With this, it
>>>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>> the British government washed their hands of the fate of Germans in
>>>>>>>> post-war central Europe, other than to be involved (as would the
>>>>>>>> U.S.)
>>>>>>>> in the coming implementation of the expulsions and transfers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε While many leaders and public figures were almost nonchalant
>>>>>>>> the British government washed their hands of the fate of Germans in
>>>>>>>> post-war central Europe, other than to be involved (as would the
>>>>>>>> U.S.)
>>>>>>>> in the coming implementation of the expulsions and transfers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>> the situation, some spoke out strongly against this policy. ε George
>>>>>>>> Orwell demonstrated more awareness of the logistical difficulties
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> human costs than many of the politicians:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε This is equivalent to transplanting the entire population of
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> human costs than many of the politicians:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Australia, or the combined populations of Scotland and Ireland.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε He raised questions of the logistics and transportation; he
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> questioned the numbers that would die during the process. ε He
>>>>>>>> called
>>>>>>>> the expulsions an âÎÅ“enormous crime.âÎù
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε As an aside, the populations involved were approximately
>>>>>>>> equivalent
>>>>>>>> to the current population of any one of Illinois, Pennsylvania, or
>>>>>>>> Ohio. ε Imagine moving just the residents of Chicago to Wisconsin in
>>>>>>>> to the current population of any one of Illinois, Pennsylvania, or
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> matter of a few months âΓ after having bombed much of the housing
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> infrastructure of every major city in that state.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Republican senators in the United States demanded to know when
>>>>>>>> infrastructure of every major city in that state.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> Atlantic Charter of 1941 had been abrogated. ε Among other
>>>>>>>> objectives,
>>>>>>>> this Charter held that territorial changes would accord with the
>>>>>>>> freely expressed will of the people. ε Every aspect of the
>>>>>>>> this Charter held that territorial changes would accord with the
>>>>>>>> expulsions âΓ
>>>>>>>> not only regarding the Germans, but the Poles from eastern Poland
>>>>>>>> âΓ
>>>>>>>> would fly in the face of this objective.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε All such objections were ignored. ε Churchill and Roosevelt were
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> determined, above all else, to maintain alliance with the Soviets.
>>>>>>>> Roosevelt had visions of the future United Nations, and this
>>>>>>>> organization would be meaningless without Soviet participation âΓ
>>>>>>>> Roosevelt had visions of the future United Nations, and this
>>>>>>>> Roosevelt either acting purposely blind or quite ignorant about the
>>>>>>>> nature of Stalin and the communists.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε By this time, and certainly by the time of Potsdam in July 1945,
>>>>>>>> nature of Stalin and the communists.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>> that was left for the Western Allies was to find a way to
>>>>>>>> rationalize
>>>>>>>> to themselves the decisions taken âΓ or those they failed to take
>>>>>>>> that was left for the Western Allies was to find a way to
>>>>>>>> rationalize
>>>>>>>> âΓ in
>>>>>>>> regard to the minority problem in central Europe. ε It was at
>>>>>>>> Potsdam
>>>>>>>> where the Allies agreed formally to an âÎÅ“orderly and humaneâÎù
>>>>>>>> expulsion,
>>>>>>>> if for no other reason than a cynical attempt to save face. ε Just a
>>>>>>>> few miles away from the location where the conference was held,
>>>>>>>> overloaded trains were disgorging themselves of the dead and dying
>>>>>>>> transported from the east. ε Suddenly, when it was far too late to
>>>>>>>> overloaded trains were disgorging themselves of the dead and dying
>>>>>>>> make
>>>>>>>> any difference, statements were made by western leaders in support
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> the German minorities, directly opposite to the positions taken even
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> year earlier, seemingly to provide cover for the tragedy unfolding
>>>>>>>> before them.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Douglas describes the so-called âÎÅ“wild expulsions,âÎù those
>>>>>>>> any difference, statements were made by western leaders in support
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> the German minorities, directly opposite to the positions taken even
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> year earlier, seemingly to provide cover for the tragedy unfolding
>>>>>>>> before them.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> taken before
>>>>>>>> the west became directly involved, and the subsequent âÎÅ“organized
>>>>>>>> expulsionsâÎù âΓ taken after the western allied powers were
>>>>>>>> formally
>>>>>>>> engaged in the process. ε The treatment of the Germans in the two
>>>>>>>> cases
>>>>>>>> was rather similar. ε He describes the camps, temporary housing
>>>>>>>> intended for a stay of a day or two that sometimes served the
>>>>>>>> occupants for years, lack of dwellings in Germany, lack of food, the
>>>>>>>> theft of property in the former home, the rapes, the beatings. He
>>>>>>>> describes the packed trains âΓ overstuffed and underfed âΓ
>>>>>>>> occupants for years, lack of dwellings in Germany, lack of food, the
>>>>>>>> theft of property in the former home, the rapes, the beatings. He
>>>>>>>> sometimes
>>>>>>>> taking a month to make a journey of only a few hundred miles,
>>>>>>>> standing
>>>>>>>> still more often than moving. ε He describes the bodies frozen to
>>>>>>>> taking a month to make a journey of only a few hundred miles,
>>>>>>>> standing
>>>>>>>> death
>>>>>>>> on the trains in the middle of the winter, with the Allies so
>>>>>>>> anxious
>>>>>>>> to begin their work despite the additional burdens brought on by the
>>>>>>>> harsh climate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε He attributes many of these crimes to official channels. ε In
>>>>>>>> on the trains in the middle of the winter, with the Allies so
>>>>>>>> anxious
>>>>>>>> to begin their work despite the additional burdens brought on by the
>>>>>>>> harsh climate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> fact, it
>>>>>>>> was rarely the case that the majority populations spontaneously rose
>>>>>>>> up against their German neighbors âΓ counter to the claims of
>>>>>>>> was rarely the case that the majority populations spontaneously rose
>>>>>>>> leaders
>>>>>>>> in the east and to the expectations (or self-rationalizations) of
>>>>>>>> leaders in the west. ε It was primarily state actors committing the
>>>>>>>> in the east and to the expectations (or self-rationalizations) of
>>>>>>>> worst atrocities against the expellees. ε It was not majority
>>>>>>>> neighbor
>>>>>>>> pouncing on his minority neighbor âΓ unless the majority neighbor
>>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>>> afforded sanction and protection by the state via the badge.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε It was western leaders agreeing to the methods and timing,
>>>>>>>> afforded sanction and protection by the state via the badge.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> involved
>>>>>>>> at every railway station, agreeing to the terms, and looking the
>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>> way when terms were not met.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Such treatment did not go unnoticed âΓ and many locals raised
>>>>>>>> at every railway station, agreeing to the terms, and looking the
>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>> way when terms were not met.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> objections to the treatment of the Germans âΓ âÎÅ“a mixture of
>>>>>>>> exasperation and alarmâÎù as is represented here by one Prague
>>>>>>>> resident:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Devil take the Germans! ε During the war, they decimated our
>>>>>>>> nation
>>>>>>>> and now, because of them, along comes a fresh scandalâΦ.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Let nobody fall back on the excuse that the Germans have done the
>>>>>>>> same things. ε Either we are qualified to stand as their judges, in
>>>>>>>> which case we cannot conduct ourselves as they do, or we are no
>>>>>>>> different from them, and give up the right to judge them.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε At the end of 1947, Johannes Kostka, a German prisoner of war in
>>>>>>>> different from them, and give up the right to judge them.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> British camp in Egypt, wrote to the U.S. Office of Military
>>>>>>>> Government
>>>>>>>> in Frankfurt. ε He expressed his anxiety about his wife Gertrud,
>>>>>>>> British camp in Egypt, wrote to the U.S. Office of Military
>>>>>>>> Government
>>>>>>>> still
>>>>>>>> in Poland. ε He had recently received a letter from his wife. ε In
>>>>>>>> it,
>>>>>>>> she described the despair and depravations that befell her after the
>>>>>>>> war âΓ their baby daughter had already died in 1944 in the chaos of
>>>>>>>> she described the despair and depravations that befell her after the
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> advancing Red Army. ε She described four years of agony and pain,
>>>>>>>> including being raped. ε She became pregnant as a result of this
>>>>>>>> abuse. ε She explains to her husband that she will now take her
>>>>>>>> life.
>>>>>>>> There is nothing left for her.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Johannes asks the U.S. officials for assistance âΓ please ask
>>>>>>>> There is nothing left for her.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> Polish government to expedite her expulsion. ε As expellees from
>>>>>>>> Poland
>>>>>>>> were to go to the British zone of Germany, the letter was forwarded
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> the British. ε In the end, neither the U.S. nor the British involved
>>>>>>>> were to go to the British zone of Germany, the letter was forwarded
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> themselves in her case.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε The Kostka case encapsulates the official Western response to the
>>>>>>>> manifest failure of the expulsion project to live up to the
>>>>>>>> âÎÅ“orderly
>>>>>>>> and humaneâÎù standards stipulated by the Potsdam Agreement. ε As in
>>>>>>>> almost every other instance in which the question of ameliorating
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> sufferings of the expellees arose, the first and overriding
>>>>>>>> consideration was the national interests of the Western powers.
>>>>>>>> ε The
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> sufferings of the expellees arose, the first and overriding
>>>>>>>> consideration was the national interests of the Western powers.
>>>>>>>> second was a fatalistic prediction that any such action was bound
>>>>>>>> either to fail or to have a positively harmful effectâΦ. ε Lastly,
>>>>>>>> although the expulsions were taking place in accordance with the
>>>>>>>> expressed policy of the Anglo-Americans and required their willing
>>>>>>>> participation and collaboration, the Western democracies disavowed
>>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>>> responsibility for the suffering that resultedâΦ.
>>>>>>>> expressed policy of the Anglo-Americans and required their willing
>>>>>>>> participation and collaboration, the Western democracies disavowed
>>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Individuals and various non-governmental organizations attempted
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> at least mitigate the sufferings of the expellees. ε In this, they
>>>>>>>> flew
>>>>>>>> into the teeth of Western resistance:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε The greatest obstacle in their path was the victorious AlliesâÎΣ
>>>>>>>> into the teeth of Western resistance:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> insistence that the Volksdeutsche be excluded from any form of
>>>>>>>> international protection or assistance.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Nor was there any agency, national or international, to which
>>>>>>>> international protection or assistance.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Volksdeutsche subjected to inhumane treatment might appealâΦthe
>>>>>>>> women
>>>>>>>> and children who made up most of the expellee population occupied a
>>>>>>>> legal status far lower than that of members of the SS, who…were
>>>>>>>> and children who made up most of the expellee population occupied a
>>>>>>>> protected by the Geneva Convention.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε Again, some spoke out. ε In a letter to the Times, Bertrand
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Russell
>>>>>>>> compared the actions of the victorious Allies to those of the Nazi
>>>>>>>> defendants then currently on trial:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> âΦAre mass deportations crimes when committed by our enemies during
>>>>>>>> compared the actions of the victorious Allies to those of the Nazi
>>>>>>>> defendants then currently on trial:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> war
>>>>>>>> and justifiable measures of social adjustment when carried out by
>>>>>>>> our
>>>>>>>> allies in times of peace? ε It is more humane to turn out old women
>>>>>>>> and justifiable measures of social adjustment when carried out by
>>>>>>>> our
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> children to die at a distance than to asphyxiate Jews in gas
>>>>>>>> chambers?...Are the future laws of war to justify the killing of
>>>>>>>> enemy
>>>>>>>> nationals after enemy resistance has ceased?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε There were those in the west who attempted to place the entire
>>>>>>>> children to die at a distance than to asphyxiate Jews in gas
>>>>>>>> chambers?...Are the future laws of war to justify the killing of
>>>>>>>> enemy
>>>>>>>> nationals after enemy resistance has ceased?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> blame
>>>>>>>> of the unfolding tragedy on the Soviets. ε The Soviets certainly
>>>>>>>> earned
>>>>>>>> their share of the blame. ε However, Britain and the United States
>>>>>>>> ignored this issue for three years or more before the events. ε When
>>>>>>>> they had time for planning and leverage to reach some agreements,
>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>> did nothing âΓ in fact they encouraged Stalin and his minions in
>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>>> quest for cleansing.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε They rejected the experts who had studied the issue. ε They
>>>>>>>> rejoiced
>>>>>>>> that all Germans would be made to know suffering and pain, receiving
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> proper re-education. ε They cared not about distinctions of
>>>>>>>> that all Germans would be made to know suffering and pain, receiving
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> innocence
>>>>>>>> and guilt. ε Again, from Douglas:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε They had encouraged their allies to carry out, and promised their
>>>>>>>> cooperation in accomplishing, deeds for which they would later
>>>>>>>> prosecute their enemies as war crimesâΦ.When making the choices
>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>> did, they went in with their eyes open.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ε I have previously listed reason why it is impossible to refer to
>>>>>>>> did, they went in with their eyes open.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> World War Two as âÎÅ“the good war.âÎù ε While absolutely not the
>>>>>>>> worst
>>>>>>>> chapter in the book of western involvement in this war, this chapter
>>>>>>>> should not be ignored.
>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
>>>>>>> during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
>>>>>>> suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
>>>>>>> suffered ε by ethnic Germans. The author is to be commended.
>>>>>>>> chapter in the book of western involvement in this war, this chapter
>>>>>>>> should not be ignored.
>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No people suffered as greatly or in larger numbers than the Germans
>>>>>>> during the aftermath of WWII. Russians, Poles, jews, and Catholics did
>>>>>>> suffer immensely during the war but pale in comparison to thee tragedy
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Commended for the pathetic attempt to show Germans as victims. To coin
>>>>>> a philosophical phrase, it's a crock of shit. ε This reminds of that
>>>>>> Commended for the pathetic attempt to show Germans as victims. To coin
>>>>>> old saw about the man who pleads guilty of killing his parents and
>>>>>> then throws himself on the mercy of the court because he is now and
>>>>>> orphan.
>>>>>
>>>>> What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
>>>>> expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You haven't told me what the downside was. There is a lesson, here;
>>>> don't start wars, you idiot.
>>>
>>> Someone explain that to the Palestinians and their present-day
>>> apologists.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> snicker
>>
>> Show me a post where I defended or apologized for Palestinians.
>
>
> Show me a post where I claimed you did.
>
>
> snicker
>
>>>>>> then throws himself on the mercy of the court because he is now and
>>>>>> orphan.
>>>>>
>>>>> What exactly is a crock of shit? Are you saying that Germans weren't
>>>>> expelled from their homes; murdered; tortured?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You haven't told me what the downside was. There is a lesson, here;
>>>> don't start wars, you idiot.
>>>
>>> Someone explain that to the Palestinians and their present-day
>>> apologists.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> snicker
>>
>> Show me a post where I defended or apologized for Palestinians.
>
>
> Show me a post where I claimed you did.
>
>
> snicker
>
brian lamb
Nov 14, 2012, 1:44:30 AM11/14/12
to
Adolf Hitler – Dumb Junkie: " injected three to four times daily with
amphetamines, methamphetamine, cocaine, steroids, morphine, and
barbiturates"! (Hmm, sounds like ol' Walter Hampton!)
Adolf Hitler – Evil Genius or Dumb Junkie?
Were World War II and the Holocaust fueled by substance abuse?
Speculation that the Fuehrer was a psychopath had already circulated
for years when OSS (the precursor of the CIA) commissioned a Harvard
psychologist to produce a forensic psychoanalytical (Freudian) study
of Hitler’s mental state in 1943.
The dossier was declassified two decades letter and published as A
Psychological Analysis of Adolf Hitler. Minus the techno-babble and
obscure medical terminology, the scholars concluded, “He’s nuts.”
But there may be a more convincing explanation for Hitler’s
extermination of 11 million people. Documented evidence from one
eyewitness does a persuasive job explaining the otherwise
inexplicable.
Unlike the OSS psychologisst who analyzed Hitler but never met their
"patient," Hitler’s drug-intake was confided to the diary of his
personal physician, Dr. Theodor Morell.
The physician, a syphologist, can’t be dismissed as an apologist for
his only patient because Morell, like Pepys three centuries earlier,
never intended his journal to be published.
According to Morell's diary, he injected the patient three to four
times daily with amphetamines, methamphetamine, cocaine, steroids,
morphine, and barbiturates (the family of drugs that killed Marilyn
Monroe and Judy Garland).
Rightly considered a quack by Hitler's jealous SS physicians, Morell
also injected Hitler with Bulgarian peasant feces, calf placentas,
and
bull's testicles. Morell told his patient he was only giving him
harmless vitamins.
Hitler became so dependent on the doctor's regular injections, he
kept
him by his side around the clock. Eva Braun's comic-horrific home
movies of the Fueher relaxing in mufti at his Alpine villa show a
short, unkempt man who never leaves Hitler's elbow in almost every
one
of Braun's 8 mm movies at Berchtesgaden. (Morell reportedly never
bathed, and Hitler's guests and cronies commented on his eye-watering
body odor.)
Hitler's SS physicians correctly urged the dictator to dismiss
Morell.
Hitler dismissed the SS men instead.
Neurochemistry, in particular the effects of drugs on the brain,
offers a more compelling argument than a forensic analysis of the
perpetrator’s upbringing.
Yes, Stalin, Hitler, and Saddam Hussein all had loving, smothering
mothers and alcoholic, abusive fathers – the usual Freudian culprits,
but most adult survivors of worse childhood trauma, among them Oprah
Winfrey (a multiple child-rape victim) and actor Michael Caine
(imprisoned in a closet by foster parents), don’t grow up to become
genocidal murderers.
The common effects or signs of substance abuse offer a better filter
through which to understand why psychopaths commit their crime.
Sociopaths are born and made. Substance abuse can turn a healthy
person into a psychopath.
A psychopath who also happens to be the absolute ruler of a nation
has
the opportunity to magnify his behavior because of the ill-effects of
substance abuse.
Anyone who has observed an amphetamine or methamphetamine user
“crash,” i.e., withdraw from the drug while it leaves his system,
also
notices a 180-degree turn in drug user's behavior as he transitions
from the garrulous life of the party while the drug floods his brain
with pleasure-inducing chemicals to an enraged, often violent death
of
the party.
This Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde transformation is familiar to every meth
abuser as well as innocent friends and bystanders forced to cohabit
the chemical hell of what psychopharmacologists call “withdrawal
syndrome.”
Hitler's volcanic temper tantrums, although some were rehearesed and
purely theater to intimidate a foreign diplomat, could have been
caused by his withdrawal from regular injections of methamphetamine.
Testeroid causes "roid rage" and Hitler was the Mr. Olympia of such
rage.
Some historians believe that military blunders cost Hitler the war
and
reflect the behavior of a drug-addled fool, not a mad genius.
The rise and fall of the Third Reich resemble the trajectory of a
very, very bad drug trip.
The initial, euphoric rush generated by "uppers" parallels the speed
of the Nazi Blitzkrieg (literally "lightning war") also got a big
boost from pharmaceuticals.
Hitler launched World War II on September 1, 1939, with the invasion
of Poland. Between April and December 1939, German troops consumed 29
million tablets of the amphetamine pervitine.
It wasn’t a coincidence that a month after Poland’s invasion, the
country surrendered.
Eventually pervitine fell out of favor when German soldiers quickly
became addicted to the drug and developed a tolerance that required
increasing doses that caused them to lose focus and concentration. A
soldier FUI (fighting under the influence) is soon a dead soldier.
Many other factors — fuel and manpower shortages, overextended supply
lines, the Russian winter, the diversion of trains to carry Jews to
death camps instead of troops to the Eastern and Western fronts —
contributed to Germany’s defeat.
The Third Reich’s decline paralleled, coincidentally or not, an
increase in Hitler’s drug consumption. The “crash” of his self-
proclaimed Thousand-Year Reich that mercifully lasted only lasted 12
completes the analogy between the progression of the war and a really
ugly drug experience.
At so many critical junctures when the war still could have gone
either way, Hitler made fatal, strategic mistakes that support the
claim that he was stoned out of his mind 24/7.
Some historians and psychologists believe Hitler was guilty of WWUI,
Waging War Under the Influence.
One example of the possible effects pharmaceuticals had on the
outcome
of World War II: When the Allies landed in Normandy, Hitler’s
generals
wanted to rush troops there in order to shove the invaders back into
the English Channel before it became impossible to dislodge them.
The Third Reich operated on the Fuehrerprinzip, a rule that no
decision, no matter how trivial, could be made without the consent of
the Fuehrer.
D-Day began at 6:30 a.m. local time, but Hitler rarely rose before
noon because he suffered from insomnia caused by amphetamines. His
doctor treated his patient’s sleeplessness with morphine, a chemical
cousin of heroin. The powerful narcotic left the patient with a
hangover that kept him in bed until lunchtime.
Hitler’s terrified servants as well as high-ranking military advisors
operated under inviolable orders that the Fuehrer’s sleep was not to
be interrupted for any reason. Drowsiness made the warlord
indecisive,
and after he awoke at noon, it took another four hours before he
ordered a counterattack.
By then it was too late to dislodge the Allies.
The Wehrmacht now had to fight a two-front war against the Soviets in
the east and the U.S. and Britain in the west because the Fuehrer
slept in on D-Day.
Evil is an unsatisfying concept that lays blame but fails to explain.
Mental illness also seems insufficient as the sole source of Hitler’s
enormities.
It’s impossible to say which came first, madness or substance abuse.
But like Robert Frost’s prediction of how the world will end “with
fire or ice, either will suffice.”
amphetamines, methamphetamine, cocaine, steroids, morphine, and
barbiturates"! (Hmm, sounds like ol' Walter Hampton!)
Adolf Hitler – Evil Genius or Dumb Junkie?
Were World War II and the Holocaust fueled by substance abuse?
Speculation that the Fuehrer was a psychopath had already circulated
for years when OSS (the precursor of the CIA) commissioned a Harvard
psychologist to produce a forensic psychoanalytical (Freudian) study
of Hitler’s mental state in 1943.
The dossier was declassified two decades letter and published as A
Psychological Analysis of Adolf Hitler. Minus the techno-babble and
obscure medical terminology, the scholars concluded, “He’s nuts.”
But there may be a more convincing explanation for Hitler’s
extermination of 11 million people. Documented evidence from one
eyewitness does a persuasive job explaining the otherwise
inexplicable.
Unlike the OSS psychologisst who analyzed Hitler but never met their
"patient," Hitler’s drug-intake was confided to the diary of his
personal physician, Dr. Theodor Morell.
The physician, a syphologist, can’t be dismissed as an apologist for
his only patient because Morell, like Pepys three centuries earlier,
never intended his journal to be published.
According to Morell's diary, he injected the patient three to four
times daily with amphetamines, methamphetamine, cocaine, steroids,
morphine, and barbiturates (the family of drugs that killed Marilyn
Monroe and Judy Garland).
Rightly considered a quack by Hitler's jealous SS physicians, Morell
also injected Hitler with Bulgarian peasant feces, calf placentas,
and
bull's testicles. Morell told his patient he was only giving him
harmless vitamins.
Hitler became so dependent on the doctor's regular injections, he
kept
him by his side around the clock. Eva Braun's comic-horrific home
movies of the Fueher relaxing in mufti at his Alpine villa show a
short, unkempt man who never leaves Hitler's elbow in almost every
one
of Braun's 8 mm movies at Berchtesgaden. (Morell reportedly never
bathed, and Hitler's guests and cronies commented on his eye-watering
body odor.)
Hitler's SS physicians correctly urged the dictator to dismiss
Morell.
Hitler dismissed the SS men instead.
Neurochemistry, in particular the effects of drugs on the brain,
offers a more compelling argument than a forensic analysis of the
perpetrator’s upbringing.
Yes, Stalin, Hitler, and Saddam Hussein all had loving, smothering
mothers and alcoholic, abusive fathers – the usual Freudian culprits,
but most adult survivors of worse childhood trauma, among them Oprah
Winfrey (a multiple child-rape victim) and actor Michael Caine
(imprisoned in a closet by foster parents), don’t grow up to become
genocidal murderers.
The common effects or signs of substance abuse offer a better filter
through which to understand why psychopaths commit their crime.
Sociopaths are born and made. Substance abuse can turn a healthy
person into a psychopath.
A psychopath who also happens to be the absolute ruler of a nation
has
the opportunity to magnify his behavior because of the ill-effects of
substance abuse.
Anyone who has observed an amphetamine or methamphetamine user
“crash,” i.e., withdraw from the drug while it leaves his system,
also
notices a 180-degree turn in drug user's behavior as he transitions
from the garrulous life of the party while the drug floods his brain
with pleasure-inducing chemicals to an enraged, often violent death
of
the party.
This Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde transformation is familiar to every meth
abuser as well as innocent friends and bystanders forced to cohabit
the chemical hell of what psychopharmacologists call “withdrawal
syndrome.”
Hitler's volcanic temper tantrums, although some were rehearesed and
purely theater to intimidate a foreign diplomat, could have been
caused by his withdrawal from regular injections of methamphetamine.
Testeroid causes "roid rage" and Hitler was the Mr. Olympia of such
rage.
Some historians believe that military blunders cost Hitler the war
and
reflect the behavior of a drug-addled fool, not a mad genius.
The rise and fall of the Third Reich resemble the trajectory of a
very, very bad drug trip.
The initial, euphoric rush generated by "uppers" parallels the speed
of the Nazi Blitzkrieg (literally "lightning war") also got a big
boost from pharmaceuticals.
Hitler launched World War II on September 1, 1939, with the invasion
of Poland. Between April and December 1939, German troops consumed 29
million tablets of the amphetamine pervitine.
It wasn’t a coincidence that a month after Poland’s invasion, the
country surrendered.
Eventually pervitine fell out of favor when German soldiers quickly
became addicted to the drug and developed a tolerance that required
increasing doses that caused them to lose focus and concentration. A
soldier FUI (fighting under the influence) is soon a dead soldier.
Many other factors — fuel and manpower shortages, overextended supply
lines, the Russian winter, the diversion of trains to carry Jews to
death camps instead of troops to the Eastern and Western fronts —
contributed to Germany’s defeat.
The Third Reich’s decline paralleled, coincidentally or not, an
increase in Hitler’s drug consumption. The “crash” of his self-
proclaimed Thousand-Year Reich that mercifully lasted only lasted 12
completes the analogy between the progression of the war and a really
ugly drug experience.
At so many critical junctures when the war still could have gone
either way, Hitler made fatal, strategic mistakes that support the
claim that he was stoned out of his mind 24/7.
Some historians and psychologists believe Hitler was guilty of WWUI,
Waging War Under the Influence.
One example of the possible effects pharmaceuticals had on the
outcome
of World War II: When the Allies landed in Normandy, Hitler’s
generals
wanted to rush troops there in order to shove the invaders back into
the English Channel before it became impossible to dislodge them.
The Third Reich operated on the Fuehrerprinzip, a rule that no
decision, no matter how trivial, could be made without the consent of
the Fuehrer.
D-Day began at 6:30 a.m. local time, but Hitler rarely rose before
noon because he suffered from insomnia caused by amphetamines. His
doctor treated his patient’s sleeplessness with morphine, a chemical
cousin of heroin. The powerful narcotic left the patient with a
hangover that kept him in bed until lunchtime.
Hitler’s terrified servants as well as high-ranking military advisors
operated under inviolable orders that the Fuehrer’s sleep was not to
be interrupted for any reason. Drowsiness made the warlord
indecisive,
and after he awoke at noon, it took another four hours before he
ordered a counterattack.
By then it was too late to dislodge the Allies.
The Wehrmacht now had to fight a two-front war against the Soviets in
the east and the U.S. and Britain in the west because the Fuehrer
slept in on D-Day.
Evil is an unsatisfying concept that lays blame but fails to explain.
Mental illness also seems insufficient as the sole source of Hitler’s
enormities.
It’s impossible to say which came first, madness or substance abuse.
But like Robert Frost’s prediction of how the world will end “with
fire or ice, either will suffice.”
SpambustЯ
Nov 14, 2012, 1:51:53 AM11/14/12
to
On 13/11/2012 10:44 PM, brian lamb wrote:
> Adolf Hitler – Dumb Junkie: " injected three to four times daily with
>
> Adolf Hitler – Dumb Junkie: " injected three to four times daily with
>
CUNTICA
Nov 14, 2012, 2:04:33 AM11/14/12
to
A Moose in Love
Nov 15, 2012, 4:19:00 PM11/15/12
to
homeless after hostilities had ceased.
A Moose in Love
Nov 15, 2012, 4:27:04 PM11/15/12
to
On Nov 13, 11:19 am, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
> On Tue, 13 Nov 2012 04:28:05 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>
>
> On Tue, 13 Nov 2012 04:28:05 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love
>
>
> >Let's just pretend that Germany started WW2. (in reality the reason
> >for the beginning of WW2 is not so black and white)
> >Anyway, please note that the vast majority of ethnic Germans were not
> >responsible for starting WW2, they were not Jew hating Nazis, they
> >were not murderers, looters etc. Idiot.
>
> We don't have to pretend who started the war. Most of us deal with
> the reality of the Nazis and the multitude of Germans who supported
> him. People like you.
So now I'm the Nazi again. Good grief.
> >for the beginning of WW2 is not so black and white)
> >Anyway, please note that the vast majority of ethnic Germans were not
> >responsible for starting WW2, they were not Jew hating Nazis, they
> >were not murderers, looters etc. Idiot.
>
> We don't have to pretend who started the war. Most of us deal with
> the reality of the Nazis and the multitude of Germans who supported
> him. People like you.
M.I.Wakefield
Nov 15, 2012, 4:38:10 PM11/15/12
to
"A Moose in Love" wrote in message
news:659fef5c-e244-49a9...@v3g2000yqb.googlegroups.com...
> So now I'm the Nazi again.
Still. The word you were looking for was "still".
news:659fef5c-e244-49a9...@v3g2000yqb.googlegroups.com...
> So now I'm the Nazi again.
Padraigh ProAmerica
Nov 15, 2012, 4:32:13 PM11/15/12
to
Re: The 'orderly' expulsion of ethnic Germans; post WW2
Group: alt.politics Date: Thu, Nov 15, 2012, 1:19pm (EST-3) From:
parkstre...@gmail.com (A Moose in Love)
Yep. Conditions in the Soviet Zone of Occupation were pretty bad;
Soviet troops were noted for their brutality.
The Peeler
Nov 15, 2012, 5:16:29 PM11/15/12
to
Harold Burton
Nov 15, 2012, 5:32:38 PM11/15/12
to
In article <gms4a8dgtf257mnuo...@4ax.com>,
German Election, 1930: Nazis - 18%
German Election, July,1932: Nazis - 37%
German Election, November, 1932: Nazis - 33%
Note that Nazi popularity is waning.
In January of 1932 Hitler was appointed Chancellor.
"In early February, the Nazis "unleashed a campaign of violence and
terror that dwarfed anything seen so far." Storm troopers began
attacking trade union and Communist Party (KPD) offices and the homes of
left-wingers. In the second half of February, the violence was extended
to the Social Democrats, with gangs of brownshirts breaking up Social
Democrat meetings and beating up their speakers and audiences. Issues of
Social Democratic newspapers were banned. Twenty newspapers of the
Centre Party, a party of Catholic Germans, were banned in mid-February
for criticizing the new government. Government officials known to be
Centre Party supporters were dismissed from their offices, and
stormtroopers violently attacked party meetings in Westphalia."
And despite all that in the March 1933 elections the Nazis got only 44%
of the vote.
The Nazis never had even a simple majority of Germans supporting them.
Leftards, batshit crazy and dogshit stupid, every single last one of you.
Barry Bruyea <damnthet...@duck.com> wrote:
> We don't have to pretend who started the war. Most of us deal with
> the reality of the Nazis and the multitude of Germans who supported
> him. People like you.
What "multitude of Germans who supported him (Hitler)"?
> We don't have to pretend who started the war. Most of us deal with
> the reality of the Nazis and the multitude of Germans who supported
> him. People like you.
German Election, 1930: Nazis - 18%
German Election, July,1932: Nazis - 37%
German Election, November, 1932: Nazis - 33%
Note that Nazi popularity is waning.
In January of 1932 Hitler was appointed Chancellor.
"In early February, the Nazis "unleashed a campaign of violence and
terror that dwarfed anything seen so far." Storm troopers began
attacking trade union and Communist Party (KPD) offices and the homes of
left-wingers. In the second half of February, the violence was extended
to the Social Democrats, with gangs of brownshirts breaking up Social
Democrat meetings and beating up their speakers and audiences. Issues of
Social Democratic newspapers were banned. Twenty newspapers of the
Centre Party, a party of Catholic Germans, were banned in mid-February
for criticizing the new government. Government officials known to be
Centre Party supporters were dismissed from their offices, and
stormtroopers violently attacked party meetings in Westphalia."
And despite all that in the March 1933 elections the Nazis got only 44%
of the vote.
The Nazis never had even a simple majority of Germans supporting them.
Leftards, batshit crazy and dogshit stupid, every single last one of you.
Harold Burton
Nov 15, 2012, 5:33:03 PM11/15/12
to
A Moose in Love
Nov 15, 2012, 7:09:18 PM11/15/12
to
On Nov 15, 4:38 pm, "M.I.Wakefield" <n...@present.com> wrote:
> "A Moose in Love" wrote in messagenews:659fef5c-e244-49a9...@v3g2000yqb.googlegroups.com...
their property, sending them to camps? no. never. so get on your
broom, fly to the moon, act like a loon, while whistlin' a tune ya
dumb fuck.
> "A Moose in Love" wrote in messagenews:659fef5c-e244-49a9...@v3g2000yqb.googlegroups.com...
>
> > So now I'm the Nazi again.
>
> Still. The word you were looking for was "still".
prove it. have i advocated taking jews from their homes, seizing
> > So now I'm the Nazi again.
>
> Still. The word you were looking for was "still".
their property, sending them to camps? no. never. so get on your
broom, fly to the moon, act like a loon, while whistlin' a tune ya
dumb fuck.
David Johnston
Nov 15, 2012, 8:38:31 PM11/15/12
to
On 11/15/2012 2:19 PM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>
> My argument is that innocent people were murdered/terrorized/made
> homeless after hostilities had ceased.
>
And?
>
> My argument is that innocent people were murdered/terrorized/made
> homeless after hostilities had ceased.
>
Harold Burton
Nov 15, 2012, 9:03:54 PM11/15/12
to
In article <k845em$iid$5...@dont-email.me>,
Not much different from Lidice. But Lidice gets lots of people worked
up.
Why the difference.
snicker
up.
Why the difference.
snicker
Harold Burton
Nov 15, 2012, 9:06:09 PM11/15/12
to
In article
<f36688fe-1fd2-407e...@o8g2000yqh.googlegroups.com>,
Leftards and other idiots have only 4 responses to usenet posts:
1. Racist!
2. Fascist/Nazi!
3. It's all Reagan's/Bushšs fault!
4. Liar!
In the idiot Wakefield's case the wheel landed on "2"
Snicker
<f36688fe-1fd2-407e...@o8g2000yqh.googlegroups.com>,
1. Racist!
2. Fascist/Nazi!
3. It's all Reagan's/Bushšs fault!
4. Liar!
In the idiot Wakefield's case the wheel landed on "2"
Snicker
Mariam Thea Harrington
Nov 15, 2012, 6:29:28 PM11/15/12
to
Real name I. M. Wakefield. A reality-challenged Canadian homosexual
and flaming asshat.
M. I. Wakefield
124 Market St
Thunder Bay, ON P7A8A4
(807) 767-2236
[][][][][][]
The DemocRAT Hall Of Shame http://www.democrathallofshame.com/ asks
"Why do you always LIE?"
[Courtesy of Buster Norris]
On Fri, 22 Jul 2011 12:48:31 -0400, "M.I. Wakefield"
<bed...@sympatico.ca> wrote:
>The actual facts are that the best unemployment rate recorded under Bush was
>4.2% in February, 2001 ... things were never as good as the month after he
>took over from Clinton.
>And what did W. hand over to Obama? An unemployment rate of 8.2%
LIAR!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Jan 2009 - 7.8%
Jun 2011 - 9.2%
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost
Mind your own business, Canadian fuckslop.
Posted from:
The DemocRATs Hall of Shame!
http://www.democrathallofshame.com/
and flaming asshat.
M. I. Wakefield
124 Market St
Thunder Bay, ON P7A8A4
(807) 767-2236
[][][][][][]
The DemocRAT Hall Of Shame http://www.democrathallofshame.com/ asks
"Why do you always LIE?"
[Courtesy of Buster Norris]
On Fri, 22 Jul 2011 12:48:31 -0400, "M.I. Wakefield"
<bed...@sympatico.ca> wrote:
>The actual facts are that the best unemployment rate recorded under Bush was
>4.2% in February, 2001 ... things were never as good as the month after he
>took over from Clinton.
>And what did W. hand over to Obama? An unemployment rate of 8.2%
LIAR!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Jan 2009 - 7.8%
Jun 2011 - 9.2%
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost
Mind your own business, Canadian fuckslop.
Posted from:
The DemocRATs Hall of Shame!
http://www.democrathallofshame.com/
NEMO
Nov 15, 2012, 9:53:20 PM11/15/12
to
''Leftards and other idiots have only 4 responses to usenet posts:''
So, Snicker, it seems that your kneejerk responses are much
different .....
Wouldn't that make you a ''rightard''?
So, Snicker, it seems that your kneejerk responses are much
different .....
Wouldn't that make you a ''rightard''?
Chelsey Christian Arenas
Nov 15, 2012, 7:01:34 PM11/15/12
to
Another Canadian Asshat. Canadian Socialists ignore how shitty their
country is [flushing 200,000,000,000 liters of raw sewage directly
into natural waterways and the Pacific Ocean every year -
http://environment.about.com/od/waterpollution/a/canadasewage.htm ]
and try to spread their Euro-socialist failed ideas by constantly
commenting on America and American politics. Please note that when you
reply to a Canadian Asshat you encourage them to continue criticizing
America while ignoring their own failed country.
[][][][][][]
The DemocRAT Hall Of Shame http://www.democrathallofshame.com/ asks
"Why do you always LIE?"
[Courtesy of Buster Norris]
On Fri, 21 Sep 2012 16:15:56 -0600, David Johnston <Da...@block.net>
wrote:
>On 9/21/2012 3:58 PM, Seneca wrote:
>The WH and the Democrats much preferred to put
>> the blame on a six-month old movie trailer satirizing Mohammad
>No they didn't.
LIAR!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
“This is a fairly volatile situation and it is in response not to
United States policy, not to obviously the administration, not to the
American people,” White House spokesman Jay Carney said Friday. “It
is in response to a video, a film that we have judged to be
reprehensible and disgusting. That in no way justifies any violent
reaction to it, but this is not a case of protests directed at the
United States writ large or at U.S. policy. This is in response to a
video that is offensive to Muslims.”
http://washingtonexaminer.com/with-obama-policy-crumbling-white-house-blames-movie-for-mideast-unrest/article/2508085
President Barack Obama said Thursday that extremists used an
anti-Islam video as an excuse to assault U.S. interests overseas,
including an attack on the U.S. Consulate in Libya that killed the
U.S. ambassador and three other Americans.
http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2012/09/obama_blames_extremists_for_at.html
country is [flushing 200,000,000,000 liters of raw sewage directly
into natural waterways and the Pacific Ocean every year -
http://environment.about.com/od/waterpollution/a/canadasewage.htm ]
and try to spread their Euro-socialist failed ideas by constantly
commenting on America and American politics. Please note that when you
reply to a Canadian Asshat you encourage them to continue criticizing
America while ignoring their own failed country.
[][][][][][]
The DemocRAT Hall Of Shame http://www.democrathallofshame.com/ asks
"Why do you always LIE?"
[Courtesy of Buster Norris]
wrote:
>On 9/21/2012 3:58 PM, Seneca wrote:
>The WH and the Democrats much preferred to put
>> the blame on a six-month old movie trailer satirizing Mohammad
>No they didn't.
LIAR!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
“This is a fairly volatile situation and it is in response not to
United States policy, not to obviously the administration, not to the
American people,” White House spokesman Jay Carney said Friday. “It
is in response to a video, a film that we have judged to be
reprehensible and disgusting. That in no way justifies any violent
reaction to it, but this is not a case of protests directed at the
United States writ large or at U.S. policy. This is in response to a
video that is offensive to Muslims.”
http://washingtonexaminer.com/with-obama-policy-crumbling-white-house-blames-movie-for-mideast-unrest/article/2508085
President Barack Obama said Thursday that extremists used an
anti-Islam video as an excuse to assault U.S. interests overseas,
including an attack on the U.S. Consulate in Libya that killed the
U.S. ambassador and three other Americans.
http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2012/09/obama_blames_extremists_for_at.html
Dave Smith
Nov 15, 2012, 11:15:19 PM11/15/12
to
On 15/11/2012 4:19 PM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>> I will grant you that anti Semitism was not limited to Germany. It was
>> quite common across Europe, and when Germans invaded and occupied other
>> countries they had not problems finding locals to do their dirty work
>> for them. The fact remains that it was Germany who built the camps,
>> provided the transportation and equipment and gave the orders.
>>
>> Yet, the Nazis were allowed to rise to power. The
>
> My argument is that innocent people were murdered/terrorized/made
> homeless after hostilities had ceased.
>
There may have been some innocent people who were victimized. Let's
>> I will grant you that anti Semitism was not limited to Germany. It was
>> quite common across Europe, and when Germans invaded and occupied other
>> countries they had not problems finding locals to do their dirty work
>> for them. The fact remains that it was Germany who built the camps,
>> provided the transportation and equipment and gave the orders.
>>
>> Yet, the Nazis were allowed to rise to power. The
>
> My argument is that innocent people were murdered/terrorized/made
> homeless after hostilities had ceased.
>
look at numbers.... How many innocent Germans were victimized compared
after hostilities ended compared to the number of innocent Germans who
were victimized during the Nazi rise to power, during the Nazi regime.
How about the number of people who were victimized by Germans or under
German direction during the war?
The Peeler
Nov 16, 2012, 6:05:17 AM11/16/12
to
On Thu, 15 Nov 2012 21:06:09 -0500, Harlot Burton wrote:
>> prove it. have i advocated taking jews from their homes, seizing
>> their property, sending them to camps? no. never. so get on your
>> broom, fly to the moon, act like a loon, while whistlin' a tune ya
>> dumb fuck.
>
> Leftards and other idiots have only 4 responses to usenet posts:
>
> 1. Racist!
> 2. Fascist/Nazi!
> 3. It's all Reagan's/Bush�s fault!
>> prove it. have i advocated taking jews from their homes, seizing
>> their property, sending them to camps? no. never. so get on your
>> broom, fly to the moon, act like a loon, while whistlin' a tune ya
>> dumb fuck.
>
> Leftards and other idiots have only 4 responses to usenet posts:
>
> 1. Racist!
> 2. Fascist/Nazi!
> 4. Liar!
>
> In the idiot Wakefield's case the wheel landed on "2"
>
> Snicker
Sorry, Harlot Burton, but your sort has been detected TOO often to be plain
>
> In the idiot Wakefield's case the wheel landed on "2"
>
> Snicker
LIARS and NAZIS! You twisted hypocritical creeps won't have your way here!
The Peeler
Nov 16, 2012, 6:08:04 AM11/16/12
to
On Thu, 15 Nov 2012 17:32:38 -0500, Harlot Burton wrote:
> What "multitude of Germans who supported him (Hitler)"?
>
> German Election, 1930: Nazis - 18%
> German Election, July,1932: Nazis - 37%
> German Election, November, 1932: Nazis - 33%
>
> Note that Nazi popularity is waning.
>
> In January of 1932 Hitler was appointed Chancellor.
>
> "In early February, the Nazis "unleashed a campaign of violence and
> terror that dwarfed anything seen so far." Storm troopers began
> attacking trade union and Communist Party (KPD) offices and the homes of
> left-wingers. In the second half of February, the violence was extended
> to the Social Democrats, with gangs of brownshirts breaking up Social
> Democrat meetings and beating up their speakers and audiences. Issues of
> Social Democratic newspapers were banned. Twenty newspapers of the
> Centre Party, a party of Catholic Germans, were banned in mid-February
> for criticizing the new government. Government officials known to be
> Centre Party supporters were dismissed from their offices, and
> stormtroopers violently attacked party meetings in Westphalia."
>
> And despite all that in the March 1933 elections the Nazis got only 44%
> of the vote.
>
> The Nazis never had even a simple majority of Germans supporting them.
>
> Leftards, batshit crazy and dogshit stupid, every single last one of you.
Those were votes BEFORE 1933, Harlot Burton! Hitler wouldn't have become
> What "multitude of Germans who supported him (Hitler)"?
>
> German Election, 1930: Nazis - 18%
> German Election, July,1932: Nazis - 37%
> German Election, November, 1932: Nazis - 33%
>
> Note that Nazi popularity is waning.
>
> In January of 1932 Hitler was appointed Chancellor.
>
> "In early February, the Nazis "unleashed a campaign of violence and
> terror that dwarfed anything seen so far." Storm troopers began
> attacking trade union and Communist Party (KPD) offices and the homes of
> left-wingers. In the second half of February, the violence was extended
> to the Social Democrats, with gangs of brownshirts breaking up Social
> Democrat meetings and beating up their speakers and audiences. Issues of
> Social Democratic newspapers were banned. Twenty newspapers of the
> Centre Party, a party of Catholic Germans, were banned in mid-February
> for criticizing the new government. Government officials known to be
> Centre Party supporters were dismissed from their offices, and
> stormtroopers violently attacked party meetings in Westphalia."
>
> And despite all that in the March 1933 elections the Nazis got only 44%
> of the vote.
>
> The Nazis never had even a simple majority of Germans supporting them.
>
> Leftards, batshit crazy and dogshit stupid, every single last one of you.
chancellor if he hadn't been the head of the STRONGEST party.
AFTER the Nazis took over and started with their propaganda and their very
successful "Gleichschaltung" (bringing into line of the population) they
regularly had the support in "Reichtagswahlen" and "Volksabstimmungen" of
about 90% of the population (e.g. in the vote to exit the League of Nations
or in the vote that confirmed that Hitler would be president and leader in
one person,etc.).
The huge majority of the German population had been successfully
"gleichgeschaltet". Initial military and economic successes and personal
advantages for "superior Aryans" further helped to increase the support for
the Nazis by the MAJORITY of the population. The German youth, the military
and workers all pledged to follow their Führer. And they did so, fervently
and fanatically, until the end!
The screeching hysterical masses, the ecstatic women that adored their
leader, the fanatisized audience that screeched in unison that they are
willing to fight a "total war", the fascist mass rallies and ridiculous
semi-religious Nazi-cult happenings (often at night) with hundreds of
thousands of fanatic participants (all documented in footage), and, last
but not least, an indoctrinated loyal fanatisized huge military machine,
cannot be the result of the support by only a minority of the population!
The behaviour and the convictions of many Germans, even decades after the
war, showed that the nazification of Germany had been very successful, and
that the denazification of the German people by the Allies was an important
and odious task that, partly, still seems not to have been finished, as,
e.g. the Nazi minds of Nazi trolls on these groups regularly show.
The Peeler
Nov 16, 2012, 6:13:37 AM11/16/12
to
On Thu, 15 Nov 2012 16:09:18 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love with Nazi Scum
wrote:
>>> So now I'm the Nazi again.
>>
>> Still. The word you were looking for was "still".
>
> prove it. have i advocated taking jews from their homes, seizing
> their property, sending them to camps? no. never. so get on your
> broom, fly to the moon, act like a loon, while whistlin' a tune ya
> dumb fuck.
You are simply the HYPOCRITICAL sort of a neo-Nazi, Moose in Love with Nazi
Scum: you SUPPORT and side with any anti-Semitic swine, foremost the Dutch
Nazi pig, on these groups! You NEVER take exception to even the vilest
forms of anti-Semitism on these groups, but you regularly SYMPATHIZE with
Nazi ideology and Hitler's and the Nazis' actions. You are more disgusting
than those Nazis that are at least straightforward about their rabid
anti-Semitism.
wrote:
>>> So now I'm the Nazi again.
>>
>> Still. The word you were looking for was "still".
>
> prove it. have i advocated taking jews from their homes, seizing
> their property, sending them to camps? no. never. so get on your
> broom, fly to the moon, act like a loon, while whistlin' a tune ya
> dumb fuck.
Scum: you SUPPORT and side with any anti-Semitic swine, foremost the Dutch
Nazi pig, on these groups! You NEVER take exception to even the vilest
forms of anti-Semitism on these groups, but you regularly SYMPATHIZE with
Nazi ideology and Hitler's and the Nazis' actions. You are more disgusting
than those Nazis that are at least straightforward about their rabid
anti-Semitism.
A Moose in Love
Nov 16, 2012, 8:16:29 AM11/16/12
to
On Nov 15, 11:15 pm, Dave Smith <adavid.sm...@sympatico.ca> wrote:
> On 15/11/2012 4:19 PM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>
> >> I will grant you that anti Semitism was not limited to Germany. It was
> >> quite common across Europe, and when Germans invaded and occupied other
> >> countries they had not problems finding locals to do their dirty work
> >> for them. The fact remains that it was Germany who built the camps,
> >> provided the transportation and equipment and gave the orders.
>
> >> Yet, the Nazis were allowed to rise to power. The
>
> > My argument is that innocent people were murdered/terrorized/made
> > homeless after hostilities had ceased.
>
> There may have been some innocent people who were victimized. Let's
> look at numbers.... How many innocent Germans were victimized
there is no 'may' about it.
> On 15/11/2012 4:19 PM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>
> >> I will grant you that anti Semitism was not limited to Germany. It was
> >> quite common across Europe, and when Germans invaded and occupied other
> >> countries they had not problems finding locals to do their dirty work
> >> for them. The fact remains that it was Germany who built the camps,
> >> provided the transportation and equipment and gave the orders.
>
> >> Yet, the Nazis were allowed to rise to power. The
>
> > My argument is that innocent people were murdered/terrorized/made
> > homeless after hostilities had ceased.
>
> There may have been some innocent people who were victimized. Let's
> look at numbers.... How many innocent Germans were victimized
>compared
> after hostilities ended compared to the number of innocent Germans who
> were victimized during the Nazi rise to power, during the Nazi regime.
> How about the number of people who were victimized by Germans or >under
> German direction during the war?
people being victimized because of their ethnic background. You are a
collectivist. What you are doing is putting ALL Germans into one
group. Now since some Germans victimized other people, you think it's
OK to murder other Germans who were innocent. And we are talking
millions of Germans who were victimized by the Allies after
hostilities ceased. Not ten thousand, not one hundred thousand.
Read 'After the Reich'.
The Peeler
Nov 16, 2012, 8:53:41 AM11/16/12
to
On Fri, 16 Nov 2012 05:16:29 -0800 (PST), A Moose in Love with Nazi Scum
wrote:
>> There may have been some innocent �people who were victimized. Let's
>> look at numbers.... How many innocent Germans were victimized
>
> there is no 'may' about it.
>
>>compared
>> after hostilities ended compared to the number of innocent Germans who
>> were victimized during the Nazi rise to power, during the Nazi regime.
>> How about the number of people who were victimized by Germans or >under
>> German direction during the war?
>
> ? This thread is not about German victims. It is about innocent
> people being victimized because of their ethnic background. You are a
> collectivist. What you are doing is putting ALL Germans into one
> group. Now since some Germans victimized other people, you think it's
> OK to murder other Germans who were innocent. And we are talking
> millions of Germans who were victimized by the Allies after
> hostilities ceased. Not ten thousand, not one hundred thousand.
> Read 'After the Reich'.
Awww, the INJUSTICE: only "some" Germans "victimized" other people, but "the
Allies" "murdered" "millions" of innocent Germans! What a disgusting
hypocritical Nazi pig you really are, Moose in Love with Nazi Scum!
wrote:
>> There may have been some innocent �people who were victimized. Let's
>> look at numbers.... How many innocent Germans were victimized
>
> there is no 'may' about it.
>
>>compared
>> after hostilities ended compared to the number of innocent Germans who
>> were victimized during the Nazi rise to power, during the Nazi regime.
>> How about the number of people who were victimized by Germans or >under
>> German direction during the war?
>
> ? This thread is not about German victims. It is about innocent
> people being victimized because of their ethnic background. You are a
> collectivist. What you are doing is putting ALL Germans into one
> group. Now since some Germans victimized other people, you think it's
> OK to murder other Germans who were innocent. And we are talking
> millions of Germans who were victimized by the Allies after
> hostilities ceased. Not ten thousand, not one hundred thousand.
> Read 'After the Reich'.
Allies" "murdered" "millions" of innocent Germans! What a disgusting
hypocritical Nazi pig you really are, Moose in Love with Nazi Scum!
Kixi
Nov 16, 2012, 10:52:27 AM11/16/12
to
On Nov 13, 11:51 am, Roy <wila...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> You can paste complete books on this but it is not going to result in any
> change whatsoever. If you are trying to make US feeling guilty...forget it.
> What was done was done...get over it. Your side lost...thank gawd.
> Now be a good fellow and accept that fact and forget your dream of a
> NAZI run world...it aint-a-gonna happen.
Decades later there are millions of Europeans who wished the Germans
had won.
There is growing popularity in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy, for
national socialism - the very policies employed by the Nazis to drag
Germany from the depths of the depression to full employment - when
America continued to suffer under bankster capitalism.
The jewsmedia are already whipping up fear of this growing political
trend in southern Europe ... just as they did in the 1930s and
1940s ... and caused WWII to get back in control as the banksters
again imposing unbearable hardship on the people..
>
> You can paste complete books on this but it is not going to result in any
> change whatsoever. If you are trying to make US feeling guilty...forget it.
> What was done was done...get over it. Your side lost...thank gawd.
> Now be a good fellow and accept that fact and forget your dream of a
> NAZI run world...it aint-a-gonna happen.
Decades later there are millions of Europeans who wished the Germans
had won.
There is growing popularity in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy, for
national socialism - the very policies employed by the Nazis to drag
Germany from the depths of the depression to full employment - when
America continued to suffer under bankster capitalism.
The jewsmedia are already whipping up fear of this growing political
trend in southern Europe ... just as they did in the 1930s and
1940s ... and caused WWII to get back in control as the banksters
again imposing unbearable hardship on the people..
Kixi
Nov 16, 2012, 10:55:58 AM11/16/12
to
On Nov 13, 10:44 pm, brian lamb <brianlambsbig...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> Adolf Hitler – Dumb Junkie: " injected three to four times daily with
> amphetamines, methamphetamine, cocaine, steroids, morphine, and
> barbiturates"! (Hmm, sounds like ol' Walter Hampton!)
>
> Adolf Hitler – Evil Genius or Dumb Junkie?
>
> Were World War II and the Holocaust fueled by substance abuse?
Sure enough! Here comes the Holohoax again.
> Adolf Hitler – Dumb Junkie: " injected three to four times daily with
> amphetamines, methamphetamine, cocaine, steroids, morphine, and
> barbiturates"! (Hmm, sounds like ol' Walter Hampton!)
>
> Adolf Hitler – Evil Genius or Dumb Junkie?
>
> Were World War II and the Holocaust fueled by substance abuse?
Kixi
Nov 16, 2012, 11:12:46 AM11/16/12
to
On Nov 13, 8:19 am, Barry Bruyea <damnthetorped...@duck.com> wrote:
> We don't have to pretend who started the war. Most of us deal with
> the reality of the Nazis and the multitude of Germans who supported
> We don't have to pretend who started the war. Most of us deal with
> him. People like you.
That's a common slogan from the Israel lobbies taking points - eighty
years of anti Hitler anti National Socialism propaganda to perpetuate
the Holohoax.
World jewry started the world war with their declaration of war on
Germany in March 1933.
http://www.jewsagainstzionism.com/zionism/jewishwar.cfm
The jews got Britain and France to declare war on Germany years later
by setting up the agreement to go to war if Poland was attacked -
knowing that Germany wanted to rescue ethnic Germans trapped in
Poland. That escalated a bilateral dispute to a European war.
The Jews then recruited Winston Churchill by paying off his debts in
return for spreading the war beyond Europe so that they could break
the will of the German people.
That's the real history of who was responsible for WWII. Barry Bruyea
is dutifully spreading slogans .... for the Zionist cause.
SaPeIsMa
Nov 16, 2012, 11:18:22 AM11/16/12
to
"Kixi" <Kixi...@Hotmail.ca> wrote in message
news:eecad2ba-41e9-4172...@r5g2000yqo.googlegroups.com...
On Nov 13, 11:51 am, Roy <wila...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> You can paste complete books on this but it is not going to result in any
> change whatsoever. If you are trying to make US feeling guilty...forget
> it.
> What was done was done...get over it. Your side lost...thank gawd.
> Now be a good fellow and accept that fact and forget your dream of a
> NAZI run world...it aint-a-gonna happen.
#
>
> You can paste complete books on this but it is not going to result in any
> change whatsoever. If you are trying to make US feeling guilty...forget
> it.
> What was done was done...get over it. Your side lost...thank gawd.
> Now be a good fellow and accept that fact and forget your dream of a
> NAZI run world...it aint-a-gonna happen.
# Decades later there are millions of Europeans who wished the Germans
# had won.
#
Well, yes, but you have to remember that 50% of the population falls into
the lower half of the
intelligence curve
#
# There is growing popularity in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy, for
# national socialism - the very policies employed by the Nazis to drag
# Germany from the depths of the depression to full employment - when
# America continued to suffer under bankster capitalism.
#
See above..
Too bad that idiots like you ignore the 2nd part of that German National
Socialism history
WWII and the holocaust, which was not just limited to Jews
# The jewsmedia are already whipping up fear of this growing political
# trend in southern Europe ... just as they did in the 1930s and
# 1940s ... and caused WWII to get back in control as the banksters
# again imposing unbearable hardship on the people..
<yawn>
Stupid useful idiots exist in every generation
You are a fine example
Kixi
Nov 16, 2012, 12:09:38 PM11/16/12
to
On Nov 15, 2:33 pm, Harold Burton <hal.i.bur...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> What "multitude of Germans who supported him (Hitler)"?
>
> German Election, 1930: Nazis - 18%
> German Election, July,1932: Nazis - 37%
> German Election, November, 1932: Nazis - 33%
>
> Note that Nazi popularity is waning.
.... that's the Jew imposed version. Let's quote some real history:
>
> What "multitude of Germans who supported him (Hitler)"?
>
> German Election, 1930: Nazis - 18%
> German Election, July,1932: Nazis - 37%
> German Election, November, 1932: Nazis - 33%
>
> Note that Nazi popularity is waning.
-------------------------------------------------
Hitler announced his plan to allow Germany and Austria to vote on
April 10 [1938] to confirm the Anschluss. The election campaign took
him the length and breadth of both countries. On the seventh he had
turned the first spade’s depth of a new autobahn system in Austria.
His surgeon Hanskarl von Hasselbach later wrote: ‘The people lined
both sides of the roads for mile after mile, wild with indescribable
rejoicing. Many of the public wept openly at the sight of Hitler.’
After speaking from the balcony of Vienna’s city hall on April 9, he
took the overnight train to Berlin. As they passed through Leipzig he
remarked to Goebbels that he was working on a plan to ship all of
Europe’s Jews off to the Indian Ocean island of Madagascar. True, the
island concerned was a French dominion, but an hour later he explained
that one day he was going to settle France’s hash too – ‘His life’s
burning ambition,’ Goebbels perceived. Both men voted at a booth on
the Berlin railroad station concourse. The question on the ballot
paper was: ‘Do you accept Adolf Hitler as our Führer, and do you thus
accept the reunification of Austria with the German Reich as effected
on March 13, 1938. The result staggered even Hitler. Of 49,493,028
entitled to vote, 49,279,104 had done so; and of these 48,751,857
adults (99.08 percent) had stated their support of Hitler’s action.
This was an unanimity of almost embarrassing dimensions.
Hitler’s War by David Irving, p. 84
--------------------------------------------------
The Jews don’t want you to read Irving’s history and they run a
campaign to destroy him. However, this book is available as a free
download at his web site http://www.fpp.co.uk/online/index.html
Dave Smith
Nov 16, 2012, 1:37:06 PM11/16/12
to
On 16/11/2012 8:16 AM, A Moose in Love wrote:
>
> ? This thread is not about German victims. It is about innocent
> people being victimized because of their ethnic background. You are a
> collectivist. What you are doing is putting ALL Germans into one
> group. Now since some Germans victimized other people, you think it's
> OK to murder other Germans who were innocent. And we are talking
> millions of Germans who were victimized by the Allies after
> hostilities ceased. Not ten thousand, not one hundred thousand.
I never said that is was OK to murder other Germans who were innocent. I
>
> ? This thread is not about German victims. It is about innocent
> people being victimized because of their ethnic background. You are a
> collectivist. What you are doing is putting ALL Germans into one
> group. Now since some Germans victimized other people, you think it's
> OK to murder other Germans who were innocent. And we are talking
> millions of Germans who were victimized by the Allies after
> hostilities ceased. Not ten thousand, not one hundred thousand.
just cant muster much sympathy for Germans who lived through that era
and allowed the Nazis to rise to power. Heck, we hear enough about how
all of the Nazis must have been killed or committed suicide, since so
few of the Germans left at the end of the war would admit to have been
Nazis. Given that the Germans, not just Nazi party members, were
rounding up Jew, Gypsies, the mentally ill and the mentally retarded
and sending them off to their doom, millions of innocent victims, I
just find it difficult to feel sympathy for those Germans who were left
to face the aftermath.
> Read 'After the Reich'.
Dave Smith
Nov 16, 2012, 1:39:00 PM11/16/12
to
On 16/11/2012 8:53 AM, The Peeler wrote:
>> ? This thread is not about German victims. It is about innocent
>> people being victimized because of their ethnic background. You are a
>> collectivist. What you are doing is putting ALL Germans into one
>> group. Now since some Germans victimized other people, you think it's
>> OK to murder other Germans who were innocent. And we are talking
>> millions of Germans who were victimized by the Allies after
>> hostilities ceased. Not ten thousand, not one hundred thousand.
>> Read 'After the Reich'.
>
> Awww, the INJUSTICE: only "some" Germans "victimized" other people, but "the
> Allies" "murdered" "millions" of innocent Germans! What a disgusting
> hypocritical Nazi pig you really are, Moose in Love with Nazi Scum!
Yep. Like a man I knew who had been a Luftwaffe pilot who had crashed in
>> ? This thread is not about German victims. It is about innocent
>> people being victimized because of their ethnic background. You are a
>> collectivist. What you are doing is putting ALL Germans into one
>> group. Now since some Germans victimized other people, you think it's
>> OK to murder other Germans who were innocent. And we are talking
>> millions of Germans who were victimized by the Allies after
>> hostilities ceased. Not ten thousand, not one hundred thousand.
>> Read 'After the Reich'.
>
> Awww, the INJUSTICE: only "some" Germans "victimized" other people, but "the
> Allies" "murdered" "millions" of innocent Germans! What a disgusting
> hypocritical Nazi pig you really are, Moose in Love with Nazi Scum!
England and spent most of the war in Canada as a POW. He complained
about the camp having guard towers with machine guns. He thought that
was illegal.
David Johnston
Nov 16, 2012, 1:41:52 PM11/16/12
to
plainolamerican
Nov 16, 2012, 1:45:57 PM11/16/12
to
On Nov 16, 10:18 am, "SaPeIsMa" <SaPeI...@Hotmail.com> wrote:
> "Kixi" <Kixi_...@Hotmail.ca> wrote in message
the holocaust
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which holocaust?
> "Kixi" <Kixi_...@Hotmail.ca> wrote in message
---
which holocaust?
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