GHW Bush Told Saddam To Invade Kuwait To Increase US Oil Profits
Mark S Bilk
Date: 1/1/1991
Newsgroups: alt.conspiracy,talk.politics.mideast,
talk.politics.misc,alt.desert-shield
The _London Observer_ is a respectable mainstream paper
characterized by World Press Review as "liberal." I have
included below two articles from that paper. The gist is
that Bush encouraged Saddam to invade by signalling the US
would not respond. Bush was trying to raise the price of oil.
Why has the US media largely ignored this angle?
_London Observer_ Sunday Oct. 21 1990 Front Page
"Exposed: Washington's role in Saddam's oil plot"
byline Helga Graham
WASHINGTON was deeply involved in President Saddam Hussein's
aggressive and ultimately violent pursuit of higher oil
prices in the months leading to the invasion of Kuwait,
evidence uncovered by _The Observer_ reveals.
One of America's top Middle East experts -- a former
ambassador still used by the Bush Administration for foreign
policy missions -- held a discreet meeting with an Iraqi
Minister in New York in January.
The Minister, one of Saddam's closest associates,
was told that Iraq should engineer higher oil prices to get
out of its dire economic fix. The country was broke after
its war with Iran.
As a result of this meeting, a Washington think tank
then proposed that Iraq push for an oil price of $25 a
barrel, and that it should take the initiative in forcing
the increase on its fellow Opec members. Saddam did
precisely that, and backed his demands by troop movements on
the Kuwaiti border and open threats to the Gulf states.
The US ambassador to Baghdad had already told the
Iraquis: `We don't have an opinion on inter-Arab disputes
such as your border dispute with Kuwait, and [we] have
directed our official spokesman to reiterate this stand.'
Moreover, while Saddam was bullying his neighbours to
disgorge $30 billion `or I will know how to get it', and
was starting army manoeuvres on Kuwait's borders, the US was
abjectly attempting to appease Saddam over his human rights
abuses.
Finally, when clear warning was given by senior
executives at Shell and BP that Saddam was going to invade
Kuwait to take the Rumalia oilfields and offshore islands,
his envoy, Sadoun Hammadi, said with total confidence on a
visit to make threats to Kuwait: `The US will not do anything.'
The evidence suggests that US complicity with Saddam
went far beyond miscalculation of the Iraqui leader's
intentions. Leaked tapes of a meeting between the US
ambassador in Baghdad, April Glaspie, and Saddam just before
the invasion, coupled with evidence of US State Department
officials before the Senate, have built up a picture of
active US support of the Iraqi President.
-30-
--------------------------------------------------------
_London Observer_ Sunday Oct. 21 1990 Page 11
"US oil plot fuelled Saddam"
Special Report byline Helga Graham
THE US Administration actively encouraged President Saddam
Hussein to pursue an aggressive policy of higher oil prices
seven months before the invasion of Kuwait.
According to high-level US sources, it was discreetly
discussed at a New York meeting in January that Iraq should
engineer a big oil price rise in the Organisation of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (Opec).
Leaked transcripts of discussions between US diplomats
and Suddam Hussein in the days around the invasion confirm the
Bush Administration's support for Saddam's attempt, backed by
his army, to kickstart his oil price rise.
The US Administration helped this oil strategy by
instigating a meeting between an American former ambassador,
who is a member of the Foreign Relations Council and still
used by Bush on foreign policy missions, and one of Saddam's
top Ministers and closest associates.
The timing of the US move was significant. In
January, Saddam Hussein was not the regional colossus of
popular legend, but a bankrupt dictator fighting for survival.
Iraq, as a result of the long Gulf War and Saddam's boundless
armaments appetite, was broke.
Oil income of $12-13 billion (L6.1-L6.6 bn) was
insufficient to cover basic needs. Civilian imports will
exceed $11bn this year, of which about $3bn is for food.
Military imports will exceed $7bn and other foreign
expenditure is estimated at about $1bn. So an extra $7bn was
needed to cover current expenditure alone. Iraq's foreign
debt, about $1bn in 1979, had risen to $100bn.
At the same time, Saddam had an army of 700,000 to
demobilise with no jobs to go to and a mutinous officer corps
plotting against him. On 6 January, a military coups only
just failed to kill him.
Politically he was under siege. War weary Iriquis
expected, and had been promised, constitutional and
democratic reforms. But in reality Saddam, who could no more
survive political liberalisation than Nicolae Ceausescu of
Romania, was tightening the screws on his regime. At the turn
of the year, he appointed his son and half brother to head the
security forces and, to concentrate their minds, showed his
secret police videos of Ceausescu's fall.
Although eclipsed by events in Eastern Europe, demands
for democratic reforms were beginning to shake the Middle
East, including the Gulf oil states.
Kuwaitis were agitating for a return to their vigorous
parliament of the 1970s. Yemen, the most populous country in
the Gulf, was assiduously working on a democratic draft.
Jordan was hesitantly liberalising. The Palistinian _Intifada_
was smoldering on.
In these critical circumstances, the former American
ambassador put to the Iraqi Minister a proposition to raise
oil revenues, thereby throwing Saddam a financial and
political lifeline. In January the oil price was $21 a barrel,
but analysts expected that in the second quarter of the year
prices would fall to about $15 (as they did). Saddam could
expect to be in even deeper financial trouble by the summer.
To meet the danger to himself, Saddam was advised to
develop an aggressive oil policy by commissioning a study from
the Washington Centre for Strategic and International Studies,
a foundation with links to Iraq.
Details of the report have been kept secret, but a
reflection of it appears in an interview given by Henry Schuler,
the centre's energy security program director, on 1 March to
the _Arab Oil and Gas Journal_. In the article, called `The
Oil Exporters are Leaving Money on the Table', Schuler
advocates an aggressive oil price policy for Arab oil producers.
He foreshadows precisely the strategy adopted by Saddam.
Asked whether the US presence in the Gulf should be
reinforced to make up for force reduction in central Europe,
Schuler says that the internal stability of the governments in
the region is his `main concern,' but that the US was powerless
in this respect.
How about the relation of this concern to oil? Schuler
responds that Arab oil producers could get $24 or $25 a barrel
without consumers searching for alternative sources. Arabs were
not following their self-interest. Why leave money on the
table for American consumers and government to pick up?
Criticising those who did so could be a popular course, he
observed in what reads like a warning to Gulf governments.
This could be achieved by a change of policy in one or
more of the key exporting Gulf states -- `one with the power to
force all the states of the Gulf to follow suit', Schuler
explains. The easiest way would be by `some change in
leadership'.
In the second quarter of [1990], Opec was already
producing 2.1 million barrels a day more than was needed.
Based on its quota, Kuwait's overproduction at this time was
18 percent of Opec's total estimated excess, while that of
Iraq and Iran, calculated on a similar basis, was 10 percent.
In the third week of June the oil price fell to $13.54 a barrel.
The market could not support a price increase to anything
like $25 at that point and cutting production to the quota would
have raised oil prices by under $2 a barrel, according to one
estimate.
The only solution left, if Iraq was to benefit, was
the deliberate change in policy pressed for by Schuler, under
the leadership of the one producer who could force it on the
others -- Iraq.
Backing from the US for such a bizarre policy seems odd
for a country which does not traditionally favor high oil prices.
But there were other considerations.
Both President George Bush and Secretary of State James
Baker are oil men and the US oil states -- Louisiana, Arizona,
Alaska, and even Texas -- were in dire financial trouble. The
US produces half the oil it consumes, so higher oil prices were
essential as an incentive for continued US production. In 1986,
the US had already acted to raise prices. Then oil prices had
collapsed to $8.90 and production declined.
As Vice-President, Bush travelled to Saudi Arabia to
persuade King Fahd to pressure Opec to raise prices. Fahd
agreed, Opec went back to its quota allowances, and prices rose
to $18.
Saudi Oil Minister Sheikh Yamani, who had favoured lower
prices to obtain an increased market share for Opec, was fired.
Further, there was US unease at becoming overly dependent on
Middle East Oil.
An increase in oil prices was also a means of coping
with security -- not just for Iraq, but in the Gulf generally,
including Saudi Arabia.
The Bush Administration's connivance with Saddam's
attempt to raise oil prices can be tied down more directly.
First, it is significant that when Sadoun Hammadi,
Iraq's Vice Prime Minister began to parade Iraq's new views
on oil prices around the Gulf states in early July, he demanded
Schuler's $25 a barrel. This precise figure also reappears
in two transcripts of US/Iraqi diplomatic exchanges
embarrassingly leaked by Saddam to US TV.
Following the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam is talking to
the US _charge'e d'affaires_ in Baghdad, Joseph Wilson.
Wilson: I think the US situation is dangerous to the world.
Saddam: Why?
Wilson: Because there is unrest in world markets.
Saddam: You did this. _We accepted $25 per barrel._
([The Observer's] italics)
Saddam is saying here that the $25 formula was an
American one supported by Iraq.
Further confirmation of Iraqi/US concurrence on the
oil price appears in the records of Saddam's meeting with the
US ambassador in Baghdad, April Glaspie, after Iraq's
mobilisation against Kuwait in support of its claim for higher
oil prices and money. Confronted by a dangerous military
build-up, Glaspie says: `I have a directive from the President
personally that I should work to expand and deepen relations
with Iraq.' She apologises for the condemnation of Saddam's
regime as a dictatorship by a journalist of the US Information
Agency. Glaspie observes that the US does not want high oil
prices. Saddam agrees, but maintains that $25 is not high.
The US ambassador in effect concurs by rejoining that
there are many Americans from oil states who wish for prices
higher than $25. She adds that she admires his efforts for
reconstruction and understands his need for money.
So far as oil is concerned, `My own estimate after 25
years of service in that area is that your aims should receive
strong support from your brother Arabs.' Glaspie then makes
a crucial remark: `What we don't have an opinion on are
inter-Arab disputes such as your border dispute with Kuwait ...
and James Baker has directed our official spokesman
to reiterate this stand.'
American `neutrality' must have done much to encourage
Saddam, for in the previous months there had been any number of
warnings of the violence of his ambitions -- none of which had
elicited any US reproof.
In February [1990], Saddam used verbal violence to prepare
the ground for the later campaign to raise oil prices. He took
out of mothballs the 1960s anti-imperialist radical Arab
nationalist rhetoric, historically linked to the Arab sense of
injustice at Israeli aggression toward Palestinians and an oil
price deemed unfair to Arabs.
The momentum slowly built up. In February, Saddam
proposed that the US fleet leave the Gulf; later that Arabs
remove their savings to Eastern Europe -- about as damaging to
the US as proposing Arabs transfer their funds to Mars.
In April and May, Israel got a rhetorical drubbing.
At the Baghdad Arab League summit on 28 May, the price
of oil was mentioned for the first time as Saddam accused the
Gulf States of waging economic war on Iraq.
In February, other crucial events occurred. At the Arab
Co-operation Council meeting in Amman, acording to top Arab
sources, Saddam brutally told King Hussein of Jordan _and_
President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to make their friends in the
Gulf disgorge $30 billion; `If they will not give it to me I
will know how to get it'. King Hussein flew to Saudi Arabia
two days later to inform King Fahd.
Around the same time, Iraq started army manoeuvers in
the neutral territory on the Kuwait border. In March, the
Kuwaiti Foreign Minister visiting Baghdad was given a letter
abrogating all border agreements between the two countries.
US-Iraqi complicity in these months went far beyond an
oil price understanding. In February, according to US press
reports at the time, James Baker was attempting to have a
State Department human rights report critical of Saddam's
regime (albeit moderately) suppressed. Huge credits to Iraq
were continued despite congressional sanctions waived
by the President.
Senator Robert Dole, visiting Baghdad two weeks later,
apparently to denounce Iraqi weapons acquisitions, was abjectly
appeasing in private -- Saddam released the transcript of
their conversations. Dole even apologised for a Voice of
America editorial denouncing Saddam's human rights record; the
journalist he said (wrongly) had been dismissed.
-30-
****************************************************************
The Observer is a Sunday newspaper in the Sunday Times
class. It is recognised in the UK as a quality newspaper with
reliable sources. Most of its stuff is usually AP/Reuters and
well researched. The headline could have been a bit better
though. Does look a bit "Shock..Horror..Exclusive!"
****************************************************************
> The Observer is a Sunday newspaper in the Sunday Times class.
> It is recognised in the UK as a quality newspaper with
> reliable sources. Most of its stuff is usually AP/Reuters
> and well researched.
The Sunday Times has deteriorated a great deal in its last
few years under Murdoch, so Dave's statement really needs to
be strengthened; the Observer is the best researched Sunday
paper in the UK, bar none, by quite a long way. It is owned by
Tiny Rowland's Lonrho, a multinational with mining interests
in southern Africa. Its investigative pieces don't usually
come from AP or Reuters; they're done in more depth than the
agencies care to go.
It's called the Observer, not the London Observer; you don't
talk about "New York Time Magazine".
****************************************************************
RKPO26
"Mark S Bilk" <ma...@cosmicpenguin.com> wrote in message
news:6XlD7.267$S4.1...@newsread1.prod.itd.earthlink.net...
Berkley Whacko
lr ollin
By Ranjit Devraj
NEW DELHI - Just as the Gulf War in 1991 was all about oil, the new
conflict in South and Central Asia is no less about access to the
region's abundant petroleum resources, according to Indian analysts.
"US influence and military presence in Afghanistan and the Central Asian
states, not unlike that over the oil-rich Gulf states, would be a major
strategic gain," said V R Raghavan, a strategic analyst and former
general in the Indian army. Raghavan believes that the prospect of a
western military presence in a region extending from Turkey to
Tajikistan
could not have escaped strategists who are now readying a military
campaign aimed at changing the political order in Afghanistan, accused
by
the United States of harboring Osama bin Laden.
Where the "great game" in Afghanistan was once about czars and
commissars
seeking access to the warm water ports of the Persian Gulf, today it is
about laying oil and gas pipelines to the untapped petroleum reserves of
Central Asia. According to testimony before the US House of
Representatives in March 1999 by the conservative think tank Heritage
Foundation, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan together
have 15 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. The same countries also
have proven gas deposits totaling not less than nine trillion cubic
meters. Another study by the Institute for Afghan Studies placed the
total worth of oil and gas reserves in the Central Asian republics at
around US $3 trillion at last year's prices.
Not only can Afghanistan play a role in hosting pipelines connecting
Central Asia to international markets, but the country itself has
significant oil and gas deposits. During the Soviets' decade-long
occupation of Afghanistan, Moscow estimated Afghanistan's proven and
probable natural gas reserves at around five trillion cubic feet and
production reached 275 million cubic feet per day in the mid-1970s. But
sabotage by anti-Soviet mujahideen (freedom fighters) and by rival
groups
in the civil war that followed Soviet withdrawal in 1989 virtually
closed
down gas production and ended deals for the supply of gas to several
European countries.
Major Afghan natural gas fields awaiting exploitation include Jorqaduq,
Khowaja, Gogerdak, and Yatimtaq, all of which are located within 9
kilometers of the town of Sheberghan in northrern Jowzjan province.
Natural gas production and distribution under Afghanistan's Taliban
rulers is the responsibility of the Afghan Gas Enterprise which, in
1999,
began repair of a pipeline to Mazar-i-Sharif city. Afghanistan's proven
and probable oil and condensate reserves were placed at 95 million
barrels by the Soviets. So far, attempts to exploit Afghanistan's
petroleum reserves or take advantage of its unique geographical location
as a crossroads to markets in Europe and South Asia have been thwarted
by
the continuing civil strife.
In 1998, the California-based UNOCAL, which held 46.5 percent stakes in
Central Asia Gas (CentGas), a consortium that planned an ambitious gas
pipeline across Afghanistan, withdrew in frustration after several
fruitless years. The pipeline was to stretch 1,271km from Turkmenistan's
Dauletabad fields to Multan in Pakistan at an estimated cost of $1.9
billion. An additional $600 million would have brought the pipeline to
energy-hungry India.
Energy experts in India, such as R K Pachauri, who heads the Tata Energy
Research Institute (TERI), have long been urging the country's planners
to ensure access to petroleum products from the Central Asian republics,
with which New Delhi has traditionally maintained good relations. Other
partners in CentGas included the Saudi Arabian Delta Oil Company, the
Government of Turkmenistan, Indonesia Petroleum (INPEX), the Japanese
ITOCHU, Korean Hyundai and Pakistan's Crescent Group.
According to observers, one problem is the uncertainty over who the
beneficiaries in Afghanistan would be - the opposition Northern
Alliance,
the Taliban, the Afghan people or indeed, whether any of these would
benefit at all. But the immediate reason for UNOCAL's withdrawal was
undoubtedly the US cruise missile attacks on Osama bin Laden's terrorism
training camps in Afghanistan in August 1998, done in retaliation for
the
bombing of its embassies in Africa. UNOCAL then stated that the project
would have to wait until Afghanistan achieved the "peace and stability
necessary to obtain financing from international agencies and a
government that is recognized by the United States and the United
Nations".
The "coalition against terrorism" that US President George W Bush is
building now is the first opportunity that has any chance of making
UNOCAL's wish come true. If the coalition succeeds, Raghavan said, it
has
the potential of "reconfiguring substantially the energy scenarios for
the 21st century".
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consortium formed to build Central Asia gas pipeline
ASHGABAT, Turkmenistan, Oct. 27, 1997 -- Six international
companies and the Government of
Turkmenistan formed Central Asia Gas Pipeline, Ltd. (CentGas) in
formal signing ceremonies here
Saturday. The group is developing a project to build a 790-mile
(1,271-kilometer) pipeline to link
Turkmenistan's abundant proven natural gas reserves with growing
markets in Pakistan. The group
is also considering an extension of the line to the New Delhi area
in India.
"This is a truly significant step in the development of this
project," said John F. Imle, Jr., president
of Unocal Corporation . Unocal was appointed by the Government of
Turkmenistan to lead the
project development activities and form the gas pipeline consortium.
A Unocal subsidiary will serve
as development manager for CentGas. "The interest shown by major
international companies
underscores both the attractiveness of the proposed pipeline and the
significant economic benefits
it can bring to the region. This project could be the foundation for
a new commerce corridor for the
region -- often referred to as the Silk Road for the 21st century.
The CentGas consortium will initially include the following
companies, either directly or through
affiliates: Unocal Corporation, 46.5 percent; Delta Oil Company
Limited (Saudi Arabia), 15 percent;
the Government of Turkmenistan, 7 percent; Indonesia Petroleum, LTD.
(INPEX) (Japan), 6.5
percent; ITOCHU Oil Exploration Co., Ltd. (CIECO) (Japan), 6.5
percent; Hyundai Engineering &
Construction Co., Ltd. (Korea), 5 percent; and the Crescent Group
(Pakistan), 3.5 percent. RAO
Gazprom (Russia) has indicated an interest in signing the consortium
agreements formalizing a 10
percent share in the project in the near future.
The proposed pipeline will carry natural gas from the Dauletabad
Field, in southeastern
Turkmenistan at a rate of up to 2 billion cubic feet per day (20
billion cubic meters per year). The
Dauletabad Field has independently certified reserves of more then
25 trillion cubic feet (708 billion
cubic meters). The Government of Turkmenistan has guaranteed
deliverability of 25 trillion cubic
feet (708 billion cubic meters) of natural gas exclusively for the
Central Asia Gas Pipeline. Much or
all of this gas is expected to come from the Dauletabad Field.
The inaugural memorandum of understanding between the governments
of Turkmenistan and
Pakistan for the CentGas project was signed in March 1995.
"The formation of the consortium is another major milestone
achieved in accordance with the
requirements of protocols and agreements previously signed with the
Governments of Turkmenistan
and Pakistan," said Marty Miller, Unocal Corporation vice president
responsible for new ventures in
Central Asia and Pakistan.
Miller pointed out that the project still faces significant
economic, political and commercial
challenges, such as finalizing mutually acceptable commercial
agreements and agreements with
transit countries. "This project has exceptionally sound economic
fundamentals, given the presence
of proven gas reserves in Turkmenistan and the market needs of
Pakistan and India. The
Dauletabad Field has produced well over 2 billion cubic feet per day
in the past and is capable of
producing that volume today. With the right development program, the
Field will continue to be able
to produce natural gas at this rate long into the future. No other
import project can provide such
volumes of natural gas to these markets at a lower price."
The proposed natural gas pipeline would stretch from the
Turkmenistan/Afghanistan border in
southeastern Turkmenistan to Multan, Pakistan (790 miles, 1,271
kilometers), with a 400-mile
(640-kilometer) extension to India under consideration. Estimated
cost of the project is US$1.9
billion for the segment to Pakistan and an additional US$600 million
for the extension to India.
This news release contains forward-looking information, including
projections of future business
plans and potential capital expenditures. Actual results could
differ materially from these projections.
CentGas Consortium Members:
Unocal Corporation (U.S.), 46.5 percent
Founded over 100 years ago, Unocal is one of the world's leading
energy resource and project
development companies providing regional integrated energy
solutions. Unocal has reserves of
more than 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas equivalent (1.6
billion barrels of oil equivalent) and
major oil and gas production activities in Asia and the U.S. Gulf of
Mexico.
Delta Oil Company Limited (Saudi Arabia), 15 percent
Delta Oil Company Limited, a private Saudi-owned company, was
founded by its Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Badr M. Al-Aiban. Mr. Al-Aiban
established the original Delta entity in
Saudi Arabia in 1978, and its activities have expanded significantly
since its inception. Today,
Delta and its affiliates comprise a diversified group of companies
involved in the energy industry,
real estate development, food processing and packaging, soft drink
bottling and distribution,
agriculture and manufacturing. The company's operations extend to
Central Asia, South East Asia
and other countries in the Middle East. Delta has developed a number
of strategic alliances in the
oil and gas industry. As a member of the Azerbaijan International
Operating Company (AIOC) and
the North Absheron Operating Company Limited (NAOC), Delta and its
affiliates are involved in
exploring and developing oil fields in Azerbaijan, as well as other
Central Asian countries.
The Government of Turkmenistan, 7 percent
Since declaring its independence from the USSR on October 27, 1991,
Turkmenistan has looked
forward to increasing the economic strength of the new state. The
country has strived to build on its
traditions, values and history to form a political and economic
system capable of increasing the
well-being of its people, and strengthening the sovereignty of
Turkmenistan. The leadership of
Turkmenistan has met the challenge of reform head on, and has
established many channels for swift
economic development. As an independent state, Turkmenistan has much
to offer to the Central
Asian region and the international community. By effectively using
its natural resources, continuing
on a path of economic reform as can be seen in the agricultural
industry, and promoting its
economic potential to attract foreign investment, Turkmenistan can
be assured of decades of
successful economic growth. The government believes that by seeking
international investment,
technological and management support for its country, Turkmenistan
can play a major role as the
economic catalyst for the Central Asian region, and join the world
leaders in the distribution of oil
and gas.
Indonesia Petroleum, LTD. (INPEX) (Japan), 6.5 percent
Indonesia Petroleum, LTD. (INPEX), a Tokyo-based company, has been
engaged in the exploration
and development of petroleum resources, mainly in Indonesia, since
1966 in order to ensure a
continued stable supply of energy resources to Japan. With its core
activity area in Indonesia,
INPEX is expanding its activities in East Asia, Oceania, CIS, the
Middle East and Africa. INPEX
and its subsidiaries are currently producing 280,000 BOEPD equity
oil and gas in Indonesia,
Australia and UAE.
ITOCHU Oil Exploration Co., Ltd. (CIECO) (Japan), 6.5 percent
ITOCHU Oil Exploration Co., Ltd. (CIECO) was formed in 1972 and is
now involved in the
exploration, development and production of hydrocarbons in
Indonesia, U.K. North Sea, Australia,
Pakistan, CIS Countries, Yemen, Oman and Gabon. CIECO is the core
company responsible for all
Hydrocarbon Exploration and Production activities within the
subsidiaries and associates of
ITOCHU Corporation, the largest trading company in Japan. With
maximum utilization to ITOCHU's
worldwide network, CIECO is well placed to continue to expand its
foreign activities in the future.
Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd. (Korea), 5 percent
Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd. was established in
1947, and its major role was
rebuilding Korea's infrastructure. Growing rapidly during the early
1960s, Hyundai built dams,
bridges, buildings and tunnels, as well as industrial plants that
were desperately needed. Since it
launched into the international market in 1968, Hyundai has taken a
place among top global general
contractors, with approximately US$32 billion construction orders
through 1996. As the core
company of Hyundai Business Group, Hyundai has set the pace for the
Hyundai Business Group
which is now a US$87 billion multi-national conglomerate
specializing in engineering and
construction, automobiles, shipbuilding, robotics, electronics,
petrochemicals, aerospace and
trading.
The Crescent Group (Pakistan), 3.5 percent
The Crescent Group, in business for more than 50 years, is the
premier industrial and financial
conglomerate in Pakistan. More than 35 independent companies
operating across Pakistan form
the nucleus of the group and are leaders in textiles, jute, sugar,
engineering, steel, investment
banking, insurance, leasing and software development. The Crescent
Group employs over 15,000
people and contributes to one percent of GNP of the country and over
two percent of market
capitalization of Pakistan.
Strategic alliances have helped position the Crescent Group as a
leader in its core businesses,
such as textile and textile made-ups. Crescent is in partnership
with some of the most well-known
corporations from the United States and Europe.
The Group puts heavy emphasis on keeping its projects
environment-friendly, promotes
education, and spends considerably on the development of human
talent in safe working conditions.
Project Overview
International Pipeline Consortium
Six international companies and the Government of Turkmenistan are
forming an international
pipeline consortium, Central Asia Gas Pipeline, Ltd. (CentGas) to
develop a natural gas pipeline
that will link Turkmenistan's vast natural gas reserves with the
growing markets of Pakistan and
possibly India. This major new source of fuel will supplement
indigenous natural gas supply.
An efficient, clean-burning fuel, natural gas can be economically
and safely transported by
pipeline over long distances, and priced competitively with
alternate fuels.
The Resource
Dauletabad Field is one of the largest gas fields in the world.
DeGolyer & MacNaughton, an
internationally recognized petroleum engineering firm, has
thoroughly evaluated the field's reserves.
These evaluations clearly show that the field's resources are
adequate for project needs, assuming
production rates of roughly 1.5 billion cubic feet of gas per day
(15 billion cubic meters of gas per
year) for 30 years or more. The Government of Turkmenistan has
guaranteed deliverability of 25
trillion cubic feet (709 billion cubic meters) of natural gas
exclusively for this project. Much or all of
this gas is expected to come from the Dauletabad Field.
The Market
Forecasts based on reasonable gas purchase, sales price and other
assumptions show sufficient
demand for the imported gas at prices that support the project's
economic viability. Market analyses
indicate that Pakistan's electric power generation market will be
the main consumer of the imported
gas.
The Route
The 48-inch diameter pipeline will extend 790 miles (1,271
kilometers) from the
Afghanistan-Turkmenistan border, generally follow the
Herat-to-Kandahar Road through
Afghanistan, cross the Pakistan border in the vicinity of Quetta,
and terminate in Multan, Pakistan,
where it will tie into an existing pipeline system. Turkmenistan
will construct a pipeline that will link
with the CentGas line at the border and stretch approximately 105
miles (169 kilometers) to the
Dauletabad Field. A potential 400-mile (644-kilometer) extension
from Multan to New Delhi also is
under consideration. Estimated cost of the project is US$1.9 billion
for the segment to Pakistan,
and an additional US$600 million for the extension to India.
Inter-Government Support
The project enjoys strong support from the governments and
leadership of the three countries
directly involved and has also attracted the interest of other
countries. Turkmenistan and Pakistan
have demonstrated inter-government support through various
memorandums of understanding.
Regional Benefits
The project offers numerous long- and short-term benefits to the
region. It will link plentiful supplies
of clean-burning natural gas with growing regional markets, employ
thousands of local people,
foster regional cooperation, and enhance trade, transportation and
communication. The
development of pipeline-related infrastructure also will create
opportunities for economic growth in
other industries.
In addition to regional advantages, the pipeline offers specific
benefits to the countries involved.
Turkmenistan will reach new markets with its plentiful gas reserves,
while Pakistan gains a reliable
source of clean-burning fuel to drive its economic growth.
Afghanistan will earn extensive economic
benefits from the pipeline, both during construction and over the
life of the project.
SOURCE: Central Asia Gas Pipeline, Ltd.
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