Induction, deduction and dialectics
Tim Bone
of both?
Conclusions
Social research, and come to that, any research, is first and foremost
an exercise in the empirical collection of data whether it be a
painstaking trawl through the literature or the accumulation of
information through questionnaires or observations. It is only when
this spadework has been completed that we can begin to analyse how
conclusions about this material are drawn. Induction and deduction are
methods for drawing conclusions and, in many ways we can say that the
attitude of the various different theoretical approaches to social
research towards induction and deduction are characterising features
of those approaches.
Tim May links research and theory in this way: `First, we might
consider a general picture of social life and then research a
particular aspect of it to test the strength of our theories. This is
known as deduction where theorizing comes before research. Research
then functions to produce empirical evidence to test or refute
theories. On the other hand, we might examine a particular aspect of
social life and derive our theories from the resultant data. This is
known as induction.' (May, 1997, p.30).
Different theories tend to preference one of these methods over the
other claiming that, for instance, deduction fails to understand that
our theories are wrong in the first place or are value based and
contain all manner of preconceptions which determine which facts we
look for in the first place. As for induction, if you don't have at
least a semi-theoretucal approach in the first place how could you
possibly participate in scientific discussion or practise.
This confusion about induction and deduction has led to the erroneous
conclusions of Thomas Kuhn and his theory of paradigms. Scepticism
about induction and deduction has led him to deduce that science is
all about the prejudices of scientific communities. This notion had
led to postmodernist ideas that all science is simply rhetoric and
that not only are we unable to say anything objective about the social
world but we are equally so impaired in our knowledge of the natural
world. Karl Popper, on the other hand, is a super-inductionist who
believes that all theories must be falsifiable and therefore inductive
which leads to a ridiculous form of positivism in the natural and
social sciences.
Instead of overcoming the shortcomings of deduction and induction,
social theorists either tend to artificially counterpose them to each
other or throw them out altogether and pretend they don't exist so
that all knowledge is not only relative but non-existent.
`As if it were not the case that deduction = conclusion, and therefore
induction is also a deduction.' (Engels, 1982, p.226).
Dialectics
Engels once again: `These people have got into such a dead-lock over
the opposition between induction and deduction that they reduce all
logical forms of conclusion to these two, and in so doing do not
notice that they (1) unconsciously employ quite different forms of
conclusion under those names, (2) deprive themselves of the whole
wealth of forms of conclusion in so far as it cannot be forced under
these two, and (3) thereby convert both forms, induction and
deduction, into sheer nonsense. (Engels, 1982, p.226).
The problem with induction and deduction is its formalism. Its
metaphysical reliance on the notion of A=A, the law of identity. It
cannot encompass change, motion, process, contradiction. Dialectics,
by contrast, though it most certainly does not outlaw induction and
deduction, transcends this formal methodology and recognises it as a
lower form of logic. So long as something remains constant for a
period of time we can draw formal conclusions about it. For instance,
the solar system appears so timeless and unchanging that we can deduce
all sorts of laws of how it will behave and yet, even a system of such
endurance will, we are now told, eventually spiral in on itself and
come to an end leaving our formal logicians lost for words if there
are any left.
If this is true of the mighty solar system, how much more true is it
of our puny social constructions. Neo-realism, for instance and its
anarchic, never ending system of states.
`But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to all past
ages, viz., the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No
wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all
the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common
forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with
the total disappearance of class antagonisms.' (Marx & Engels, p.34).
So much for the `timeless wisdom of realism'.
Lenin best describes the method of formal logic employed by
neo-realists in social theory: `Human knowledge is not (or does not
follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a
series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this
curve can be transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an
independent, complete, straight line, which then (if one does not see
the wood for the trees) leads into the quagmire, into clerical
obscurantism (where it is anchored by the class interests of the
ruling classes). (Lenin, 1981, p.361).
On the other hand, extreme relativism, which as I have mentioned above
outlaws completely deduction and induction, fails to recognise any
structure in human society and believes that changing minds is
sufficient for changing the world or even an excuse for not bothering.
Lenin again: `NB: The distinction between subjectivism (scepticism,
sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective)
dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is
itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute within
the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only
relative and excludes the absolute.' (Lenin, 1981, p.358).
The above is a good description of liberal cosmopolitanism which
correctly criticises neo-realism for its immutability and closedness
but which then proceeds to throw the baby out with the bathwater in
some vain hope that the prison system of nations which keeps man
enslaved will simply evolve out of existence because they say it will.
This may be a crude caricature of their position but I believe it has
validity. Extreme relativism which denies all possibility of objective
knowledge ends either with extreme cynicism or idiot optimism.
Leon Trotsky described the relationship between dialectics and formal
logic as similar to that between higher and lower mathematics. He
continues: `The Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from
the proposition that `A' is equal to `A'. This postulate is accepted
as an axiom for a multitude of practical human actions and elementary
generalisations. But in reality `A' is not equal to `A'. This is easy
to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens - they are quite
different from each other. But one can object, the question is not of
the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for
equal quantities, for instance a pound of sugar. The objection is
beside the point; in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a
pound of sugar - a more delicate scale always discloses a difference.
Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither
is this true - all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight,
colour, etc. They are never equal to themselves. A sophist will
respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself `at any give moment'.
Aside from the extremely dubious practical value of this `axiom', it
does not withstand theoretical criticism either. How should we really
conceive the word `moment'? If it is an infinitesimal interval of
time, then a pound of sugar is subjected during the course of that
`moment' to inevitable changes. Or is the `moment' a purely
mathematical abstraction, that is, a zero of time? But everything
exists in time; and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of
transformation; time is consequently a fundamental element of
existence. Thus the axiom `A' is equal to `A' signifies that a thing
is equal to itself if it does not change, that is, if it does not
exist.' (Trotsky, 1971, p.63-4).
There is one way in which formal thinking does try to overcome the
limitations imposed upon it by induction and deduction and that is
pragmatism. Pragmatism is found throughout the social and natural
sciences but its solution to the problem of formalism is precisely
what it says it is - pragmatic. Instead of seeing induction and
deduction as valid but transcended forms of logic it recognises the
dialectic either on an equal basis or even as a useful but lower form
of logic. Trotsky: `Logical thinking, formal logical thinking in
general, is constructed on the basis of the deductive method,
proceeding from a more general syllogism through a number of premises
to the necessary conclusion. Such a chain of syllogisms is called a
sorites. It is well known with what ease Anglo-Saxon thought breaks
the chain of syllogisms and, under the influence of purely empirical
data and considerations, arrives at conclusions which have no
connection whatever with the previous logical chain. We see this
especially clearly in the sphere of politics, as well as in other
spheres. Thus the cult of the syllogism is not at all characteristic
of Anglo-Saxon thought. On the contrary, it is possible to say that
this [school of] thought is distinguished by a sovereign-empirical
contempt for the pure syllogism, which did not prevent the English
from making colossal conquests in many spheres of scientific
investigation. If one really thinks this through as one should, then
it is impossible not to arrive at the conclusion that the empirical
disregard for the syllogism is a primitive form of dialectical
thinking; with the aim of purely empirical corrections, the English
save themselves from the formal-logical emptiness of the syllogism,
i.e., to a certain extent they attain that which can more fully, much
better, on a much broader scale, and more systematically be attained
through dialectical thinking.' (Trotsky, 1971, p.400-1).
Conclusions
Social theory is inductive and deductive but its failure to get these
two methods of logic into perspective with one another and the
tendency to continuously preferrence one over the other leads it into
all manner of absurdities. It is saved only to a certain extent by
pragmatism which temporarily leaves formalism behind to start again
before ending up in another absurdity. Only the conscious
transcendence of formal logic through the dialectic which sees
induction and deduction not as absolutes but as useful subsystems of
logic can truly save social theory from its seemingly endless
confusion.
Bibliography
May T. (1997) Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process
(Buckingham: Open University Press).
Lenin V.I. (1981) Lenin Collected Works Vol. 38 (Moscow: Progress
Publishers).
Trotsky L. (1971) In Defence of Marxism (London: New Park Publications
Ltd.).
Engels F. (1982) Dialectics of Nature (Moscow: Progress Publishers).
Marx K. & Engels F. The Communist Manifesto (London: Penguin
Publishers).
Jim F.
>
> Is social research inductive or deductive, or does it involve elements
> of both?
>
> Conclusions
>
> This confusion about induction and deduction has led to the erroneous
> conclusions of Thomas Kuhn and his theory of paradigms. Scepticism
> about induction and deduction has led him to deduce that science is
> all about the prejudices of scientific communities. This notion had
> led to postmodernist ideas that all science is simply rhetoric and
> that not only are we unable to say anything objective about the social
> world but we are equally so impaired in our knowledge of the natural
> world. Karl Popper, on the other hand, is a super-inductionist who
> believes that all theories must be falsifiable and therefore inductive
> which leads to a ridiculous form of positivism in the natural and
> social sciences.
I think the notion that Popper was a super-inductionist would have
been news to him. Popper was notable among other things for his
denial of any sort of principle of induction. He maintained that
Hume's analysis of induction had provided a compelling refutation
of any such principle. Popper instead attempted to develop an
alternative account of how scientific theories are validated on
the basis of falsificationism.
Tim Bone
>Tim Bone wrote:
>>
>> Is social research inductive or deductive, or does it involve elements
>> of both?
>>
>> Conclusions
>
>
>
>>
>> This confusion about induction and deduction has led to the erroneous
>> conclusions of Thomas Kuhn and his theory of paradigms. Scepticism
>> about induction and deduction has led him to deduce that science is
>> all about the prejudices of scientific communities. This notion had
>> led to postmodernist ideas that all science is simply rhetoric and
>> that not only are we unable to say anything objective about the social
>> world but we are equally so impaired in our knowledge of the natural
>> world. Karl Popper, on the other hand, is a super-inductionist who
>> believes that all theories must be falsifiable and therefore inductive
>> which leads to a ridiculous form of positivism in the natural and
>> social sciences.
>
>I think the notion that Popper was a super-inductionist would have
>been news to him. Popper was notable among other things for his
>denial of any sort of principle of induction. He maintained that
>Hume's analysis of induction had provided a compelling refutation
>of any such principle. Popper instead attempted to develop an
>alternative account of how scientific theories are validated on
>the basis of falsificationism.
>
From `The Oxford Companion To Philosophy', the entry on Karl Popper:
`Questions though remain. Is it true that scientists always reject
their theories when faced with counter-evidence, as Popper says they
should? And if the most we can ever do in science is to disprove
theories, how do we know which theories to believe and act on? Popper
says that we ought to act on those theories which have survived severe
testing. His critics, though, find this hard to distinguish from the
induction he officially rejects.'
He may criticise Hume for believing that induction can provide us with
irrefutable truths which it obviously cannot but this only leads him
to conclude that induction is the only valid method for that very
reason i.e. falsifiability. We should act on the notion that all swans
are white until we come across a black one which we must believe will
be the case. He is opposed to abstraction in the good old positivist
way. Empiricism is everything for Popper which, incidentally, is a
conclusion he arrives at deductively.
Tim Bone.
Jim F.
>
> On Tue, 18 Jan 2000 05:36:02 -0500, "Jim F." <deb...@gis.net> wrote:
>
> >Tim Bone wrote:
> >>
> >> of both?
> >>
> >> Conclusions
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >> conclusions of Thomas Kuhn and his theory of paradigms. Scepticism
> >> about induction and deduction has led him to deduce that science is
> >> all about the prejudices of scientific communities. This notion had
> >> led to postmodernist ideas that all science is simply rhetoric and
> >> that not only are we unable to say anything objective about the social
> >> world but we are equally so impaired in our knowledge of the natural
> >> world. Karl Popper, on the other hand, is a super-inductionist who
> >> believes that all theories must be falsifiable and therefore inductive
> >> which leads to a ridiculous form of positivism in the natural and
> >> social sciences.
> >
> >been news to him. Popper was notable among other things for his
> >denial of any sort of principle of induction. He maintained that
> >Hume's analysis of induction had provided a compelling refutation
> >of any such principle. Popper instead attempted to develop an
> >alternative account of how scientific theories are validated on
> >the basis of falsificationism.
> >
> From `The Oxford Companion To Philosophy', the entry on Karl Popper:
> `Questions though remain. Is it true that scientists always reject
> their theories when faced with counter-evidence, as Popper says they
> should? And if the most we can ever do in science is to disprove
> theories, how do we know which theories to believe and act on? Popper
> says that we ought to act on those theories which have survived severe
> testing. His critics, though, find this hard to distinguish from the
> induction he officially rejects.'
I BTW think that it is a valid criticism of Popper. For Popper theories
cannot be verified or confirmed as such but they can be "corroborated"
and as such relied upon as guides to action but wasn't he really letting
induction back in through the back door after kicking it out the
front?
>
> He may criticise Hume for believing that induction can provide us with
> irrefutable truths which it obviously cannot but this only leads him
> to conclude that induction is the only valid method for that very
> reason i.e. falsifiability. We should act on the notion that all swans
> are white until we come across a black one which we must believe will
> be the case. He is opposed to abstraction in the good old positivist
> way. Empiricism is everything for Popper which, incidentally, is a
> conclusion he arrives at deductively.
Popper attempted to substitute what he called the hypothetico-deductive
method for induction. The logical positivists like Carnap, Frank, and
Reichenbach in contrast with Popper did embrace induction but they
attempted to reduce inductive reasoning to formal models based on
mathematical logic and probability theory. I think you are right
to question these formalist approaches to induction and deduction.
Jim F.
>
> Tim Bone.
Stephen R. Diamond
> I think the notion that Popper was a super-inductionist would have
> been news to him. Popper was notable among other things for his
> denial of any sort of principle of induction. He maintained that
> Hume's analysis of induction had provided a compelling refutation
> of any such principle. Popper instead attempted to develop an
> alternative account of how scientific theories are validated on
> the basis of falsificationism.
Whether he was *really* an inductivist can be asked, though. I think
underneath his falsificationism lies inductivism at two level.
First, and most importantly, the "observation statements" that underpin a
theory are frankly inductive.
Second, he must reason that a theory that has survived falsifying tests is
somehow closer to the truth (verisimilitude doctrine). This must mean,
although Popper denies it, that surviving tests verifies a theory (to some
degree).
Stephen R. Diamond
Stephen R. Diamond
> I BTW think that it is a valid criticism of Popper. For Popper theories
> cannot be verified or confirmed as such but they can be "corroborated"
> and as such relied upon as guides to action but wasn't he really letting
> induction back in through the back door after kicking it out the
> front?
Right.
Stephen R. Diamond