RED CHINA "Unwilling" To Allow US Super Computer Inspections
sof...@us.net
US/Chinese negotiations over the inspection and verification of
US super computer exports to the PRC have broken down. Softwar
has obtained an email to Bill Reinsch, US Director of the Bureau
of Export Administration (BXA), where US negotiators detail a
failed meeting with Chinese government officials held on January
20, 1998. The subject of the meeting was the before and after
inspections of super computers sold to China. US officials want
to verify these computers are not being used for nuclear weapons
research. Chinese representatives rejected US efforts and were
described as "unwilling" to discuss any verification
inspections.
In 1993, Bill Clinton decided to loosen export restrictions on
super computers sold to China. However, some of the US super
computer exports were diverted by the communist government into
military research on nuclear weapons development. Last year,
BXA head Bill Reinsch testified before the Senate that there
were at least 47 super computers sold to China and perhaps
"dozens more". Congress reacted by passing stricter regulations
on super computer exports to China, requiring end use
inspections to verify the intended user was not military.
In January 1998, US Commerce Officials tried to negotiate with
their Chinese counter parts to arrange the inspections.
Instead, Chinese officials snubbed the US negotiators by playing
diplomatic games. At one point Chinese officials attempted to
engage US negotiators in an argument over a "signed" versus
"unsigned" 1983 Sino-US trade agreement, and were "unwilling" to
discuss any super computer inspections.
The US was represented by Hoyt Zia, top legal counsel for the
Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) and a self described
"close friend" of former DNC fund-raiser/Lippo banker John Huang.
Zia was sent to Beijing in early January 1998 to meet Liu Hu,
Chinese Director General of the Department of Science and
Technology at MOFTEC (Ministry of Foreign Technology and
Economic Co-operation). However, Director General Hu was "sick"
and a lower level minister, Zhou Ruojun, Division Director in
the Department of Science and Technology at MOFTEC, was sent to
the meeting.
Despite the Chinese claim Director General Hu was sick, US
officials openly speculated on whether Hu's illness may have
been faked as a "diplomatic" event. "Liu Hu's absence from
these discussions was unexpected and unfortunate," states the
document. "AmEmbassy Beijing officials believe that he may
genuinely be sick -- the flu is going around Beijing and he
'usually' cancels his meetings further in advance when he has a
'diplomatic' illness."
Moreover, US government requests to inspect the super computers
sold to communist China quickly fell on deaf ears. As soon as
Commerce's Zia brought up the question of "pre" (before sale)
license inspections for super computers, Chinese negotiator Zhou
handed the US delegation a protest letter from Director General
Hu. US negotiators wrote "Zhou noted (as does Liu Hu's letter)
that the language cited in the December 19 (1997) (US) letter to
Liu Hu concerning end-use check cooperation was inappropriate
because the 'letter was unsigned'". US negotiators were then
forced to move to another topic "rather than engage in a
fruitless discussion of the US-side's 'understanding' of the
'intent' of the signed exchange of letters".
When US negotiators brought up "post" (after) sale checks of
super US computers sold to China, Director Zhou stated that she
was "not in a position to talk too much about this". PRC
officials rejected US requests to inspect the computers and were
"unwilling to discuss this issue any further".
The People's Republic of China has no intention of co-operating
with any verification effort, before or after the sale. The
Clinton administration cannot verify the exact location of these
systems in China. This would appear to present a problem for
those who wish to export high speed computers to red China.
Yet, the Clinton administration recently approved the sale of
another super computer to the PRC. In December of 1997 the
Commerce Department gave Digital Corp. (DEC) a green light to
sell a super computer to China even though red Chinese officials
denied US inspectors access to verify the intended user site was
not a PLA army base. The official Clinton punishment for not
co-operating with nuclear proliferation inspections is to force
the red Chinese to buy the US computer anyway!
----------------------------------------------------------------
To: BILL REINSCH@BXA@BXA1,AMANDA DeBUSK@BXA@BXA1
R. ROGER MAJAK@BXA@BXA1
Cc: FRANK DELIBERTI@BXA@BXA1,WILLIAM SKIDMORE@BXA@BXA1
Hoyt Zia@BXA@BXA1,STEPHEN LEACY@BXA@BXA1
MIKE HOFFMAN@BXA@BXA1,JIM LEWIS@BXA@BXA1
EILEEN ALBANESE@BXA@BXA1,HARK MENEFEE@BXA@BXA1
THOMAS ANDRUKONIS@BXA@BXA1,HATTHEW BORHAN@BXA@BXA1
Mark Bayuk@USFCSBeijingeDoC
Bcc:
From: Intern One@USFCSBeijing@DoC
Subject: Export Control Discussions at MOFTEC
Date: Tuesday, January 20, 1998 13:48:51 CST
Attach:
Certify: N
Forwarded by:
SUMMARY: US export control delegation's meeting with MOFTEC on
Monday, January 19, 1997 went as expected -- progress regarding
the export control seminar agreed to at the October 1997 JCCT,
but only limited engagement on end-use check issues, not all of
it positive. More work on advancing end-use check issues will
need to be done by CS-Beijing and possibly during proposed visit
by MOFTEC Vice-Minister to Washington in conjunction with the
US-China export control seminar in April 1997. END SUMMARY
OVERVIEW
1. On Tuesday afternoon, the Commerce-led interagency export
control delegation visited MOFTEC and met with Zhou Ruojun,
Division Director in the Department of Science and Technology at
MOFTEC and Li Xie, an official in her division. The US side
consisted of Commerce representatives Hoyt Zia, Commerce Chief
Counsel for Export Administration (delegation head), Stephen
Leacy, Senior International Advisor at Export Enforcement and
Mike Hoffmann, Director of BXA's Western Regional Office. Thomas
Maertens, Deputy Director of PM's Office of Arms Control and
Export Control Policy represented the Department of State.
Present from the American Embassy were Senior Commercial Officer
Alan Turley, BXA Attache Mark Bayuk and Tim Neely from the
Embassy's Economic Section.
2. Zhou began the meeting by apologizing for the absence of Liu
Hu, Director General of the Department of Science and Technology
at MOFTEC. According to Zhou, Liu Hu had a cold and was unable
to participate in the discussions.
3. Zia began the substantive discussions by stating that the
delegation was in Beijing as a follow-on to Secretary Daley's
visit to Beijing for the October 1997 US Commerce
Department-MOFTEC annual session of the Joint Commission on
Commerce and Trade. Zia said that at the JCCT, Commerce
Assistant Secretaries DeBusk (Enforcement) and Majak (Licensing)
discussed a number of issues, including a US-China export
control seminar, revitalizing our pre-license check program in
China and initiating a post shipment verification program here.
Zia said that all remain priority items for BXA and Commerce and
are reflected in the November 19 and December 21, 1997 letters
that A/S DeBusk and Majak jointly sent to Liu Hu. (Note: the
first letter concerned the export control seminar and the second
related to end-use checks issues and problems.)
4. At the beginning of the discussions on end-use checks, Zhou
handed Zia a letter from Liu Hu to A/S DeBusk and Majak written
in Chinese. After the meeting, SCO Turtey provided delegation an
informal oral translation and stated that he would have his
staff provide one in writing. Issues raised in the letter were
discussed by Zhou during the meeting (see below.)
EXPORT CONTROL SEMINAR
5. Zhou stated that MOFTEC has begun preparations for the
seminar according to the US draft agenda (sent as an attachment
to the DeBusk/Majak November 1997 letter.) She said that
although the target date for the seminar in Washington was early
April 1998, the exact timing and participants would require the
approval of the State Council. Zhou explained that this was
necessary because, with the participation in the seminar by
Commerce Under Secretary Reinsch, MOFTEC would therefore send a
Vice Minister. Zhou stated that in addition to MOFTEC, she
expected that China would also send representatives from MFA and
possibly the Atomic Energy Agency. She agreed to the outline of
the US proposed agenda, stating that the Chinese side would
present an introduction of its export control policy and
enforcement system as well as introduce the work in export
controls China has done in the last several years. Zhou asked if
it would be possible for the Chinese side to have meetings with
US industry representatives either before of after the seminar
to learn how industry works with the US government on developing
export controls.
PRE-LICENSE CHECKS
6. On end-use checks, Zhou took a harder line. Zia began the
discussion on pre-license checks (PLCs) by recalling the
DeBusk-Liu Hu discussions during the October 1997 JCCT. Zia
noted that, as stated in the December 19 DeBusk/Majak letter,
BXA was still trying to find a mechanism to reinstate PLCs to
help further the strategic trade interests of both countries. At
this point, Zhou gave Zia a letter from Liu Hu to take back to
DeBusk/Majak. She then discussed issues raised in the letter,
which she said had also been discussed during the October 1997
JCCT. Her major concerns related to the inconsistent nature of
the pre-license checks requested of MOFTEC over the last several
years and the fact that there is no formal agreement between the
two governments on conducting these checks. On the latter point
she noted (as does Liu Hu's letter) that the language cited in
the December 19 letter to Liu Hu concerning end-use check
cooperation was inappropriate because the "letter was unsigned."
[Note: The December 19 DeBusk/Majak letter contains the sentence
"We wish to remind you of our understanding in the November 1983
US-China exchange of letters and paragraph 6 of the implementing
"Letter of Understanding." Embassy (and BXA) have copies of the
signed November 1983 exchange of letters, but our copy of the
implementing letter is unsigned.
7. Rather than engage in a fruitless discussion of the US-side's
"understanding" of the "intent" of the signed exchange of
letters, Zia moved on to a discussion of what would be the
mechanism to revitalize pre-license checks (PLCs) in China. Zhou
stated that over the years China had taken a "flexible response"
to US- requested PLCs but that this had led to uneven results
from the Chinese perspective. She complained that on occasion
MOFTEC, at US request, would schedule a PLC only to have the US
later cancel the request and not conduct the PLC. She also
complained that on other occasions, after a PLC was conducted,
the US had still denied the license, wondering "does the PLC
have a positive result in the promotion of trade." She stated
that Liu Hu had discussed these problems during the JCCT and
that China was still looking to the US for a "positive reaction"
in return for more "flexibility" on the Chinese side regarding
PLCs.
8. Zia noted that the President's recent decision regarding
peaceful nuclear cooperation with China was in fact such a
positive development. In spite of additional discussion, Zhou
would not elaborate on what she meant by more positive reaction.
She did note that the offer made by DeBusk at the JCCT to
provide more transparency regarding the US interagency process,
including at the upcoming seminar, would be helpful.
9. Zia responded that while the US is always willing to hear of
problems in our procedures so we can improve them, that the
"practical reality" is that we need end-use checks as a
"confidence building measure" and that this would be helpful to
making progress in US-Sino trade relations and important to the
Administration's attempts to strengthen our relationship. In
spite of several attempts by Zia to draw Zhou out on what the
Chinese side believed necessary regarding PLCs, no further
substantive response was received from Zhou.
POST SHIPMENT VERIFICATIONS
10. Zia then explained the NDAA requirements for post shipment
verifications (PSVs) on high performance computers exported to
China and asked Zhou how we could implement this procedure. Zhou
initially stated that she was "not in a position to talk too
much about this." After further prodding by Zia, Zhou stated
that her understanding was that "Chinese importers and US
exporters already had agreements on on-site inspection
activities between them." She was unwilling to discuss this issue
any further.
OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS
11. The export control seminar seems on track. Zhou agreed to
provide additional details (including fixing a date and
tentative participating agencies) to CS-Beijing in early
February, ahead of any required formal State Council approval.
BXA will need to decide whether it can meet China's desire for
meetings with US industry officials either before or after the
scheduled seminar.
12. CS-Beijing agreed to continue to press MOFTEC on both PLCs
(i.e., to try and understand what the Chinese side needs to
reinstitute the procedure) and post shipment verifications
(i.e., to see on what basis these can be established.) The
upcoming visit by MOFTEC's Vice Minister may also present BXA an
opportunity to raise these issues "above" Liu Hu's head.
13. Liu Hu's absence from these discussions was unexpected and
unfortunate. AmEmbassy Beijing officials believe that he may
genuinely be sick -- the flu is going around Beijing and he
"usually" cancels his meetings further in advance when he has a
"diplomatic" illness. A well-placed AmEmbassy official has heard
that Liu Hu may soon leave his position, perhaps to be posted to
Hong Kong. AmEmbassy will continue to follow this potential
development very closely and report to Washington when anything
substantive is learned.
This message was drafted by the visiting export control
delegation and cleared by CS-Beijing prior to transmission.
----------------------------------------------------------------
1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775
Charles R. Smith
SOFTWAR
http://www.us.net/softwar
sof...@us.net
Pcyphered SIGNATURE:
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F38AB2D6DD710AAB
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SOFTWAR EMAIL NEWSLETTER *** 05/04/1998
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DeadCosmonautJim
We have no soveriegn right to inspect Chinese-owned merchandise. China
inspects its own stuff and we inspect ours. We don't let people from
around the world inspect our super computers why are we so great and holy
that we have the right to inspect theirs? People here have a major
disorder/disillusionment that America is running under a mandate from
heaven. We have no right to do anything to another country unless they
take actions against us or our allies.
sof...@us.net wrote in article <6ikpu1$al8$1...@news.us.net>...
John Savard
"DeadCosmonautJim" <DeadCosm...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>We have no soveriegn right to inspect Chinese-owned merchandise. China
>inspects its own stuff and we inspect ours. We don't let people from
>around the world inspect our super computers why are we so great and holy
>that we have the right to inspect theirs? People here have a major
>disorder/disillusionment that America is running under a mandate from
>heaven. We have no right to do anything to another country unless they
>take actions against us or our allies.
The question is not one of us inspecting supercomputers that China
owns, having built in factories in China.
Yes, the Chinese govenment bought and paid for these computers from
the U.S.. But these computers, better than those they could make
themselves, or buy from most other countries, were sold to them only
after they signed an agreement not to use them for military purposes.
So this isn't a question of arrogance - we aren't claiming a right to
monitor the use of these computers that comes from our own
imagination, but rather it comes from agreements they made in order to
buy these computers.
Of course, the whole reason the U.S. government allowed these sales in
the first place - they would have been nuts to really believe that
Beijing would be sincere in holding up its end of the bargain - is
because China could have bought supercomputers almost as good from
Japan instead.
Even Japan is a signatory to COCOM and the Wassenar Agreements, so in
that case they would be the ones asking to inspect the computers they
have sold to China. How the politics of that would have played is
another matter.
Precisely because America isn't in a position to boss around other
countries, doing the obvious thing - not selling China any more
computers unless it behaves - may only result in more sales for Japan.
Which, more than any computer companies having "friends" in the White
House, may be enough to explain much of this mess.
John Savard
Patricia Gibbons
John Savard wrote:
>
> "DeadCosmonautJim" <DeadCosm...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>
> >We have no soveriegn right to inspect Chinese-owned merchandise. China
> >inspects its own stuff and we inspect ours. We don't let people from
> >around the world inspect our super computers why are we so great and holy
> >that we have the right to inspect theirs? People here have a major
> >disorder/disillusionment that America is running under a mandate from
> >heaven. We have no right to do anything to another country unless they
> >take actions against us or our allies.
>
> owns, having built in factories in China.
>
> Yes, the Chinese govenment bought and paid for these computers from
> the U.S.. But these computers, better than those they could make
> themselves, or buy from most other countries, were sold to them only
> after they signed an agreement not to use them for military purposes.
>
> John Savard
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Patricia replies:
One clause in such an agreement should also have been
permission
for later on-site inpection after purchase and delivery by the
Chinese. Once agreed-to as part of a contract, it would be
perfectly reasonable, after the fact, for an inspection team
to request and be granted a visit. Of course it would be
unlikely
in my estimation that China would allow such a visit once they
have possession of the computer equipment..
- --
Patricia E. Gibbons
City of San Jose - ITD/communications
Mobile Radio shop supervisor
My Public Key is available at:
<http://pgp5.ai.mit.edu/pks-commands.html>
Key ID: 0xEDECB44F
This key is RSA, NOT Diffie-Hellman !!
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Version: 4.5
Comment: My key: <http://pgp5.ai.mit.edu/pks-commands.html>
iQCVAwUBNU/FjcDUh3vt7LRPAQF2uAQAjZljmpSJyXcd8cllNIqwo6rJHKmH4LAM
EofreXQ875lv3xUy9US0OiJox5oDm7HhkSUIyJZs5AwJr9I4vU0sWNe5z5f1/dcW
Y/gAblbloTXo3Tt9VnBeFCA2ozljFTQxXcw6/qqQsD5cG1CcsXSqfN35Xph0KiZ+
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Walt Horning
Bottom line:
Bill Clinton is a traitor.
He should be impeached, indicted, tried, convicted and put in front of
a firing squad, LEGALLY!!!! Remember this is the draft-dodging traitor
of the 60's.
Thant Tessman
"DeadCosmonautJim" <DeadCosm...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> We have no soveriegn right to inspect Chinese-owned
> merchandise. [...] We have no right to do anything to
> another country unless they take actions against us or our
> allies.
John Savard wrote:
> The question is not one of us inspecting supercomputers that
> China owns, having built in factories in China. [...]
DeadCosmonautJim is right. It is arrogant to think that we (or, more
accurately, the U.S. government) has the right to control China's
weapons development. Yes, China's a fucked up place with a fucked up
government, and fucked up governments are dangerous governments, but the
solution is to open up trade, not shut it down. The more trade there
is, the better off the Chinese people become. And in general, the
better off the citezenry are in a country, the less shit they put up
with from their government.
The crime is not that China bought supercomputers to do weapons
development, but that China paid for the privelege of buying those
supercomputers via donations to the DNC.
-thant
sof...@us.net
Thant Tessman <th...@bogus.acm.org> wrote:
>"DeadCosmonautJim" <DeadCosm...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>> We have no soveriegn right to inspect Chinese-owned
>> merchandise. [...] We have no right to do anything to
>> another country unless they take actions against us or our
>> allies.
>John Savard wrote:
>> The question is not one of us inspecting supercomputers that
>> China owns, having built in factories in China. [...]
>DeadCosmonautJim is right. It is arrogant to think that we (or, more
>accurately, the U.S. government) has the right to control China's
>weapons development. Yes, China's a fucked up place with a fucked up
>government, and fucked up governments are dangerous governments, but the
>solution is to open up trade, not shut it down. The more trade there
>is, the better off the Chinese people become. And in general, the
>better off the citezenry are in a country, the less shit they put up
>with from their government.
>The crime is not that China bought supercomputers to do weapons
>development, but that China paid for the privelege of buying those
>supercomputers via donations to the DNC.
>-thant
Please note - the quote below is in ref. to the supers sold to
Russia but the same thing applies to China. It is against the
law to sell super computers for nuclear weapons research
unless you have a license.
<--->
Civilian customers in Russia are permitted to buy some
high-performance computers without a license. But US laws bar
the sale of any computer, regardless of capacity, to a nuclear
weapons installation in Russia without federal approval.
The United States is insisting that Russia return any computers
acquired illicitly for Arzamas-16 and a second nuclear design
center. Russian officials, for their part, are warning that the
test ban treaty might not be ratified by parliament.
source: Richmond Times Dispatch, page A4, Oct. 27, 1997
1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775
Charles R. Smith
SOFTWAR
http://www.us.net/softwar
Pcyphered SIGNATURE:
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0EDD58A0E4F22D1D
John Savard
Thant Tessman <th...@bogus.acm.org> wrote:
>DeadCosmonautJim is right. It is arrogant to think that we (or, more
>accurately, the U.S. government) has the right to control China's
>weapons development.
I'm sorry, but I don't find it at all arrogant not to want a dangerous
government to point improved nuclear weapons at me...
while I'm waiting for its people to overthrow it.
Which may take time, considering the difficulty of the task.
Illustrated during one June day in 1989...
The United States has the right to control the export activities of
its citizens in the interest of the safety of its people. I suspect
your argument is based on Libertarianism, which contains postulates
additional to those on which democracy rests.
John Savard
Thant Tessman
John Savard wrote:
> The United States has the right to control the export activities of
> its citizens in the interest of the safety of its people. [...]
You mean like encryption software?
I don't have a problem with the U.S. government restricting the sale of
weapons to anyone who has shown criminal tendencies. But we're not
talking about weapons, we're talking about computers.
Besides, I think it's more constructive to worry about the fact that not
only does the U.S. government permit weapons sales to politically
influential foreign governments, but it acutally subsidizes those sales,
(e.g. to Egypt and Israel) with tax dollars.
-thant
Walt Horning
Amazing!
Fight software encryption, but hand the Chinese missile technology on
a silver plate!!!
Just one more reason Clinton is a scumbag.
Victor A. Wagner, Jr.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Anyone who thinks that computers are not weapons (or make some weapons
possible) needs to re-think reality.
Do NOT construe this to mean I support export controls on cryptography.
I do NOT support such.
- --
Victor A. Wagner, Jr.
Candidate for Congress; 47th District, California
Secretary, Orange County Libertarian Party Central Committee
PGP RSA fingerprint = 4D20 EBF6 0101 B069 3817 8DBF C846 E47A
PGP D-H fingerprint = 98BC 65E3 1A19 43EC 3908 65B9 F755 E6F4 63BB 9D93
The five most dangerous words in the English language:
"There oughta be a law"
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John Savard
>> The United States has the right to control the export activities of
>> its citizens in the interest of the safety of its people. [...]
>You mean like encryption software?
No, I have other reasons for believing export controls on encryption
software to be very harmful and wrong-headed. Especially on source
code, although I don't favor controls on executables either.
Restricting the export of advanced computers, however, does not do
harm to the economy disporportionate to the benefit genuinely obtained
for national security.
John Savard
Walter T Rejuney
The U.S. is afraid that if other countries develop computers which are
superior to our own they will then be able to create encryption schemes
which we cannot break. Currently the CIA and NSA are able to read
virtually everything which is "encrypted" by other countries - including
our allies. They would like to keep it that way.
Michael Zarlenga
John Savard (jsa...@tenMAPSONeerf.edmonton.ab.ca) wrote:
: No, I have other reasons for believing export controls on encryption
: software to be very harmful and wrong-headed. Especially on source
: code, although I don't favor controls on executables either.
You must either be a drug dealer or a child molester if you
want to be able to use strong encryption software.
You obviously have something to hide.
(I'm parrotting the Clinton admin's ludicrous poisition on
American citizens having access to strong encyrption)
--
-- Mike Zarlenga
finger zarl...@conan.ids.net for PGP public key
Are you an organ donor?
You may want to visit http://www.organkeeper.com
Donald R. McGregor
In article <35573F8F...@Unforgettable.com>,
Walter T Rejuney <Blue...@Unforgettable.com> wrote:
>The U.S. is afraid that if other countries develop computers which are
>superior to our own they will then be able to create encryption schemes
>which we cannot break. Currently the CIA and NSA are able to read
>virtually everything which is "encrypted" by other countries - including
>our allies. They would like to keep it that way.
You don't need fancy computers to do strong encryption. Just a few
relativly simple programs.
The US doesn't want widespread enryption because it would interfere
with their ability to troll for interesting cleartext traffic. Nation
states should have quite secure algorithms for encryption.
--
Don McGregor | Practice random and senseless acts.
mcg...@mbay.net |
Thant Tessman
John Savard:
> The United States has the right to control the export activities
> of its citizens in the interest of the safety of its people.
> [...]
I ask:
> You mean like encryption software?
John Savard:
> No, I have other reasons for believing export controls on
> encryption software to be very harmful and wrong-headed.
> Especially on source code, although I don't favor controls
> on executables either.
>
> Restricting the export of advanced computers, however, does
> not do harm to the economy disporportionate to the benefit
> genuinely obtained for national security.
Who gets to decide what constitutes disproportionate harm to the
economy? Who gets to decide what constitutes a genuine national
security benefit?
What if Chinese weapons developers simply rent time on someone else's
supercomputers? Should that be illegal?
-thant
MasterLock
>What if Chinese weapons developers simply rent time on someone else's
>supercomputers? Should that be illegal?
>
>-thant
So.......
Kids are going to do drugs, so we should provide them with clean needles.
Kids are going to have sex, so we should give them condoms and tell them
they are safe.
The Chinese would have gotten this technology anyway, so lets save them the
trouble and give it to them.
I'm starting to see a pattern here. Let's just help everyone out. No mater
how destructive it is.
John Savard
Walter T Rejuney <Blue...@Unforgettable.com> wrote:
>The U.S. is afraid that if other countries develop computers which are
>superior to our own they will then be able to create encryption schemes
>which we cannot break. Currently the CIA and NSA are able to read
>virtually everything which is "encrypted" by other countries - including
>our allies. They would like to keep it that way.
A computer putting stuff in code has a big advantage over the computer
trying to crack the code.
While using a computer like a Commodore-64 might be pushing it a bit,
codes the NSA can't crack are well within Chinese technological
competence. But perhaps additional goodies - freedom from operator
betrayal, suitability to adverse environments, high data rates - are
out of their reach.
This is why there are claims the NSA has resorted to other means of
keeping itself in business.
John Savard
Thant Tessman
I asked:
> What if Chinese weapons developers simply rent time on someone else's
> supercomputers? Should that be illegal?
MasterLock wrote:
> So.......
> Kids are going to do drugs, so we should provide them with
> clean needles. Kids are going to have sex, so we should give
> them condoms and tell them they are safe. [...]
I'm just trying to find out how people try to justify outlawing
non-criminal activity in the name of fighting criminal activity.
More specifically, I'm trying to figure out what John Savard and others
think the difference is between the free exchange of encryption
technology and the free exchange of computer technology. What if the
computers the Chinese weapons developers use are never even brought into
China? What if they merely use encryption technology to ship computer
data to and from someone else's computers?
Wanting to allow the free exchange of information and wanting to keep
dangerous information out of the hands of dangerous people are both
reasonable opinions to have. But they do contradict each other. Of
course the use of force is justified in response to force or the threat
of force. What's harder to justify is the `preemptive' use of force.
And I for one don't have a blind faith in the omniscient benevolence of
government authority to make the right choices for everybody else on a
case-by-case basis, even if it is a `democracy.'
And what makes these questions even harder is people's tendency to think
that moral imperatives (kids shouldn't drink alcohol) make for good laws
(the world would be a better place if alcohol were illegal).
-thant
John Savard
Thant Tessman <th...@bogus.acm.org> wrote:
>Of
>course the use of force is justified in response to force or the threat
>of force. What's harder to justify is the `preemptive' use of force.
Fortunately, we aren't simply suspicious of the Chinese government. It
has, in the past, used force unjustly (i.e. in Tienanmen Square, in
Tibet) and so were we to choose to use force against it, we would not
be acting on the basis of a mere suspicion.
Invading Nazi Germany because we didn't like what we saw in _Mein
Kampf_ would have been questionable. Doing so after it became apparent
that the government was complicit in the Kristallnacht, however, poses
no _moral_ problems. The fact that people usually do not take upon
themselves the risks and burdens of war except when forced to in their
own defence offers agressors a considerable amount of breathing room.
>And what makes these questions even harder is people's tendency to think
>that moral imperatives (kids shouldn't drink alcohol) make for good laws
>(the world would be a better place if alcohol were illegal).
Well, a woman whose husband only beats her when he comes home drunk
may be forgiven for thinking a ban on alcohol would improve her
situation.
Does "kids drinking alcohol" have consequences for uninvolved third
parties? Is there a social consensus about kids and alcohol, such that
a drinking age will support the child-rearing efforts of most parents?
There is a case to be made for the idea that the government should
only outlaw attempts to injure other people, and not ban merely risky
actions. But in a society with polluted air and fast cars, the idea
that the government can enact speed limits, require drivers to be
completely sober (an "impaired" driver is not drunk, but merely is
somewhat less likely to react in time should he have what would
otherwise be a close call for an accident) does not seem unpopular;
rather, the opposite is acknowledged as impractical.
Libertarianism, while it approximates a situation in our past, can be
every bit as utopian as socialism when taken to extremes or in
unfavorable circumstances.
John Savard
Thant Tessman
John Savard wrote:
> [...]
>
> Well, a woman whose husband only beats her when he comes home
> drunk may be forgiven for thinking a ban on alcohol would
> improve her situation.
So would robbing a bank. And she might even be forgiven for robbing a
bank in her current situation. But that doesn't mean that we should
institutionalize your "right" to rob a bank if your husband beats you
when he's drunk. It is the beating that makes the husband a criminal,
not the fact that he was drunk.
The point isn't as relevant as I thought it was because SOFTWAR (I
think) pointed out that the sale of super computers to China for
civilian uses is not restricted. But it doesn't take a libertarian to
spot a little bit of hypocricy in your original position.
Of course what we should be more concerned with here is Clinton's
hypocricy.
> Does "kids drinking alcohol" have consequences for uninvolved
> third parties? Is there a social consensus about kids and
> alcohol, such that a drinking age will support the child-
> rearing efforts of most parents?
It's off topic, but you missed the point of my analogy. Back during
Prohibition, children were used as curriers to deliver alcohol the same
way children are used to deliver drugs now. And they were usually
drunk.
It is not unlibertarian to advocate `preemptive' restrictions on the
behavior of people who aren't ready or able or willing to be responsible
for their own actions, including most notably children. My point
(directed at MasterLock's sarcastic remark about "clean needles for
kids") was that naive attempts to embody moral imperatives into law very
often result in unintended consequences.
> There is a case to be made for the idea that the government
> should only outlaw attempts to injure other people, and not
> ban merely risky actions. But in a society with polluted air
> and fast cars [...]
This is even more off topic, but if you want to start passing laws based
on risk factors, the ugly truth is that you'd have to start by making it
illegal to be a black male teenager. I don't consider this an option.
Unfortunately there are people who do.
Besides, what makes you think that the owners and customers of private
roads aren't concerned with safety? The owner of a private road has
every right to decide what kinds of behaviors are allowed or not allowed
just as the owners of an amusement park do.
The real reason that so much of the U.S.'s "public" resources have been
directed toward the building and maintenance of public roads is not
because of any imagined flaw in free-market economics, but because the
politically influential auto industry wanted to hide the true cost of
the ownership of cars.
-thant
--
Thant Tessman
th...@shoreline-studios.com
www.shoreline-studios.com
MasterLock
>I'm just trying to find out how people try to justify outlawing
>non-criminal activity in the name of fighting criminal activity.
Well, there is nothing legally wrong with it, but I question the sanity of
anyone who wants to sell potential weapon technology to a country that
already threatened to 'nuke' us and currently has nuclear arms pointed at
us.
Walter T Rejuney
Maybe they are given missle technology. I seriously doubt that they are
given the "best" missle technology. There are parallels. We are quite
willing to sell F-4 Phantom jets to another country. We don't sell them
B2 bombers. Both are "modern" jets - but one is clearly superior to the
other.
John Savard
Thant Tessman <th...@shoreline-studios.com> wrote:
>This is even more off topic, but if you want to start passing laws based
>on risk factors, the ugly truth is that you'd have to start by making it
>illegal to be a black male teenager. I don't consider this an option.
>Unfortunately there are people who do.
>Besides, what makes you think that the owners and customers of private
>roads aren't concerned with safety? The owner of a private road has
>every right to decide what kinds of behaviors are allowed or not allowed
>just as the owners of an amusement park do.
>The real reason that so much of the U.S.'s "public" resources have been
>directed toward the building and maintenance of public roads is not
>because of any imagined flaw in free-market economics, but because the
>politically influential auto industry wanted to hide the true cost of
>the ownership of cars.
Private roads.
Why not have private neighborhoods?
And, since private neighborhood owners are concerned with safety, they
might have the right not to allow black male teenagers in.
I don't want to engage in low blows, but while laissez-faire
capitalism and libertarianism have good points that can be brought
forth in their defense, calling them socially progressive is pushing
it.
Why the government can't own something that is a natural monopoly
(the surface of the Earth is only two-dimensional, which makes it hard
for multiple road systems to compete) and act towards what it owns on
behalf of the public as a private owner would gets baffling.
In any case, the justification for taxation comes out of the tragedy
of the commons. If they needed to hold a bake sale for a new
battleship ... Pearl Harbor would be the rule, not the exception.
The principal producers of wealth are men, and after food and shelter,
their principal expense is competing with other men for mates.
Taxation avoids altering relative rank order in this competition,
allowing a greater amount of money to be spent for genuinely
productive purposes instead of to cancel out the results of other
people's expenditures.
John Savard
Thant Tessman
John Savard wrote:
> And, since private neighborhood owners are concerned with
> safety, they might have the right not to allow black male
> teenagers in. [...]
Nothing like a knee-jerk response to distract from the subject.
If you want to talk about the tragedy of the commons, or government
versus free-market allocation of inherently limited resources (which
basically means everything), or social injustice, then e-mail me.
(Remove "bogus" from the address.)
But what I wanna know is how you decide what constitutes a national
security threat? What makes your opinion worth taking more seriously
than, say, Clinton's?
-thant
MasterLock
Walter T Rejuney wrote in message <3559897F...@Unforgettable.com>...
>Maybe they are given missle technology. I seriously doubt that they are
>given the "best" missle technology. There are parallels. We are quite
>willing to sell F-4 Phantom jets to another country. We don't sell them
>B2 bombers. Both are "modern" jets - but one is clearly superior to the
>other.
But the real question is why would you sell even a slingshot to someone who
has threatened to use it against you?
Jim Glass
In article <355A2D...@bogus.acm.org>, th...@bogus.acm.org says...
I'll give you a hint. When the U.S Ambassador goes to the leaders of
China to protest warlike moves toward Taiwan...and they politely
inquire how fond the U.S. is of Los Angeles...THAT makes them a
national security threat.
Jim Glass
Living on the Edge in Los Angeles