REPOST - CLINTON'S East Wind - Missile Tech To PRC
sof...@us.net
April 4, 1998
Grand Jury Probes 2 Firms' Ties to China Missile Program
By JEFF GERTH with RAYMOND BONNER
WASHINGTON -- A federal grand jury is investigating whether two U.S.
companies illegally gave China space expertise that significantly
advanced Beijing's ballistic missile program, according to Clinton
administration officials.
But the officials said the criminal inquiry was dealt a serious blow two
months ago when President Clinton quietly approved the export to China of
similar know-how by one of the companies under investigation.
The decision was opposed by Justice Department officials, who argued that
it would be much more difficult to prosecute the companies if the
government gave its blessing to the deal, the officials said.
Under investigation, the officials said, are Loral Space & Communications
of New York and Hughes Electronics, a Los Angeles-based subsidiary of
General Motors Corp. The companies denied wrongdoing, but declined to
discuss the investigation.
Loral has numerous business deals with China and close ties to the White
House. Its chairman and chief executive officer, Bernard Schwartz, was
the largest personal contributor to the Democratic National Committee last
year.
Loral's vice president for government relations, Thomas Ross, said
Schwartz had not spoken about the matter with Clinton or any other
administration official.
The federal inquiry stems from a 1996 incident in which a Chinese rocket
carrying aloft a satellite built by Loral exploded shortly after liftoff.
The two companies participated in an independent review of the failure,
and reported to the Chinese on what went wrong.
Those exchanges, officials believe, may have gone beyond the sharing of
information the companies had been permitted, giving the Chinese crucial
assistance in improving the guidance systems of their rockets. The
technology needed to put a commercial satellite in orbit is similar to
that which guides a long-range missile nuclear missile to its target.
In February, with the investigation of this incident well under way,
Clinton gave Loral permission to launch another satellite on a Chinese
rocket and provide the Chinese with the same expertise that is at issue
in the criminal case, officials said.
A senior official said the administration recognized the sensitivity of
the decision, but approved the launch because the investigation had
reached no conclusions and because Loral had properly handled subsequent
launches. The administration, he said, could still take administrative
action against the companies if they were found to have violated export
laws in their earlier dealings with the Chinese.
White House spokesman Mike McCurry said the launch President Clinton
approved in February "will not contribute to Chinese military
capabilities" because Loral, the company involved, has agreed to
"stringent safeguards" to prevent unauthorized transfer of technology.
Emery Wilson, public relations manager for Hughes Space & Communications,
a division of Hughes Electronics, said the company had not been notified
of any federal criminal investigation.
"In response to a letter from the State Department," Wilson said, "we
conducted a thorough review and concluded that no Hughes employee had
engaged in the unauthorized export of controlled technology or equipment."
The administration has been hoping to reach a broader agreement with
Beijing that would make it much easier to launch U.S. satellites on
China's rockets. Clinton is scheduled to visit China this summer in the
first presidential trip to the country since the suppression of the
pro-democracy movement in the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident.
There are huge commercial interests at stake. A host of companies, from
cellular telephone networks to international television conglomerates,
are waiting in line for low-cost satellites to be sent into orbit. An
important bottleneck facing the companies is a shortage of rocket systems
available to launch satellites.
China is eager to offer its low-cost but not-always reliable services.
For U.S. companies, there is a significant complication. All U.S.
satellites sent into orbit by China's rockets require presidential
approval, a waiver of the sanctions imposed after the Tiananmen massacre
in 1989. Congress must be told of each waiver.
Thus far, Presidents Bush and Clinton have issued 11 waivers for satellite
launches.
The policy under consideration by the Clinton administration would end the
case-by-case waivers and would treat future launches of U.S. satellites
like any other export of sensitive technology, which require government
licenses.
Critics in Congress argue that Clinton is putting commercial interests
ahead of national security. They caution that China has yet to prove it
will abide by previous pledges it has made not to share missile
technology with countries like Iran.
Few nations can deliver intercontinental ballistic missiles. China has
lagged because, among other reasons, it lacks the guidance technology,
also used in satellite launches, that allows multiple warheads to be sent
from a single missile.
Clinton signed the waiver to allow the Loral satellite launch by China on
Feb. 18. The waiver states states that the deal is "in the national
interest."
"We are more engaged with China," said McCurry. "One area of that
engagement has been commercial satellite technology which we perceive to
be in our interests as well as that of China's."
But law enforcement officials argued against the waiver, saying the
license approval jeopardized their investigation because it sanctioned the
export of essentially the same guidance expertise involved in the
possibly illegal transfer two years ago, administration officials say.
Administration officials said the inquiry is focused on the events
following the Feb. 15, 1996, explosion of a Chinese rocket carrying a
Loral satellite seconds after liftoff at the Xichang Satellite Launch
Center in Sichuan Province in southern China.
After the explosion, the Chinese asked two U.S. companies to help conduct
an independent study of what went wrong. The team was led by Loral and
included two experts from Hughes, according to Hughes.
According to administration officials, the American experts provided
crucial data and information to the Chinese to prevent future accidents.
Later, Loral gave a copy of its written report on the incident to the
State Department, which licenses the export of defense-related items,
including technical assistance.
Government officials immediately began to assess whether there had been a
security breach. Last year, a criminal inquiry was begun by the U.S.
Customs Service and the Department of Justice, officials said.
Under federal export rules, U.S. companies are supposed to take careful
precautions to safeguard classified technology when their satellites are
launched by Chinese rockets.
Satellites are shipped to China in sealed containers, and only U.S.
officials can mount them the nose cones of the launch rockets. The
Commerce Department approves the export of the satellite. But the more
sensitive support activities must be approved by the State Department.
That process is meant to ensure tight controls over the testing, repair
and maintenance of the satellite so that the Chinese can not learn related
classified information.
The State Department license issued several years ago for the Loral
satellite was silent on the issue of what role, if any, the U.S. experts
could play in an analysis of a failed launch.
After U.S. companies participated in more than one study of failed Chinese
launches, the federal government changed its regulations and now requires
companies to obtain a separate license to participate in any accident
review, according to an administration official.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I wrote this 12/17/97 -
Benard Schwartz runs a little space company called Loral. One
day, Mr. Schwartz took a ride with Commerce Secretary Ron Brown
on a trade trip to China in 1994. Mr. Schwartz would wrap up a
multi-billion dollar deal to supply satellites to China and get
approval to export the advanced space hardware all while flying
on the taxpayers dollar. Of course, just by co-incidence Mr.
Schwartz also donated $100,000 to the DNC just before and
another $100,000 after the trade mission to China. In fact,
according to Federal Election Commission records, Mr. Schwartz
has personally donated over a million dollars to the DNC since
Bill Clinton came to power in 1993. This does not include the
thousands of dollars in cash listed as also being donated by
Loral executives to Democratic Representatives in California and
Ohio nor the nearly half million dollars in soft money supplied
by Loral PACs. Yet, hidden beneath the donations to the DNC is
something far more dangerous to America than making sure that
Beijing gets MTV from space. The money, technology and
expertise is also being converted directly by China into nuclear
weapons.
For example, the Loral deals involve selling whole satellites or
leasing spots for space launch on China's "Long March" rocket.
Loral is one of many who have paid China millions of dollars to
launch satellites on the asian "low cost" rocket. Yet, the Long
March can hardly claim to be an civilian space truck such as the
US Space Shuttle or the European Ariaine rocket. For example,
the Long March has an awful track record of destroying itself or
putting it's payloads into the wrong orbits. Recently, in
August of 1996 a Long March put a Hughes TV satellite called
Chinasat-7 into the wrong orbit. The satellite was declared a
total loss and the insurance company reimbursed the Chinese
government. In November 1995 a Long March damaged a Lockheed
satellite while trying to put it into orbit. In December of
1995 a Long March blew up, destroying another Hughes built
satellite. In March of 1992, a Long March burned on the launch
pad, poisoning several Chinese engineers. In fact, in February
1996, a Long March veered off course and crashed into a village,
killing 56 people.
The Long March, however, has served China well in another
capacity. First, it has placed all their military satellites
into orbit. Furthermore, a nuclear tipped version is in active
service with the Chinese Second Artillery Corps. This Long
March is capable of striking anywhere on the globe with a 5
megaton nuclear warhead the size of a car.
Another spin off from the Long March is a short range missile,
called "East Wind" or Dong Feng type 15. It was the DF-15 that
dropped warheads off the coast of Taiwan in February 1996,
causing an international crisis. The DF-15 uses advanced solid
rocket technology such as the solid rocket boosters on the US
space shuttle. The DF-15 is based on similar boosters developed
and used on the Long March for satellite missions. The DF-15
has about the same range as the Iraqi SCUD missile. However,
the DF-15, unlike the SCUD, is fast, accurate and easy to
launch. It does not have to be fueled with liquid propellants
and has an advanced internal guidance system which can put a
conventional, nuclear or chemical warhead within yards of it's
intended target from 300 miles away. In fact, according to
defense sources the DF-15s shot at Taiwan in 1996 had
maneuvering, stealthy, warheads. These advanced features would
enable the DF-15 to avoid US defense missiles such as the
Patriot or the Standard missiles that protect the US Navy.
More ominous, is the new DF-41. This missile is the Chinese
equal to the US Minuteman. It is a three stage, solid rocket,
equipped not with one but up to five nuclear warheads. It too
can reach America. However, unlike the older, liquid fueled
Long March derivative, the DF-41 is a mobile missile like the
SCUD. It can be erected and launched from a from a mobile
launcher/erector in minutes. The whole unit is about the size
of a semi-truck and can strike five targets anywhere on Earth.
Defense officials are worried about the DF-41 because recent
construction of missile manufacturing facilities indicate a
large number of them may be produced. One official openly
speculated that China could equip herself with 1,000 nuclear
tipped missiles by the end of the next decade.
Other than financing Chinese missile technology Loral has sold
entire satellite systems from the ground up to China. APSTAR, a
company 75% owned by the Chinese government, has sole ownership
of Loral satellites and operates them via control facilities in
Hong Kong. These satellites provide communication, navigation
and direct TV broadcasting directly to Asia. In some cases,
such as the pay per view TV services, China is obtaining hard,
cold, cash from customers around the globe. Other services such
as satellite navigation, can be used both by the Chinese airline
industry to land safely and by the Chinese air force to bomb
accurately. The satellite sales have enabled the Chinese to
begin producing their own satellites, this time for the Chinese
military.
1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775
Charles R. Smith
SOFTWAR
http://www.us.net/softwar
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zu...@ix.netcom.com
In article <6hapkf$42p$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
sof...@us.net wrote:
>
> April 4, 1998
Excerpts of copyrighted NY Times article included for criticism purposes:
> Grand Jury Probes 2 Firms' Ties to China Missile Program
>
> By JEFF GERTH with RAYMOND BONNER
>
> WASHINGTON -- A federal grand jury is investigating whether two U.S.
> companies illegally gave China space expertise that significantly
> advanced Beijing's ballistic missile program, according to Clinton
> administration officials.
[snip]
> The federal inquiry stems from a 1996 incident in which a Chinese rocket
> carrying aloft a satellite built by Loral exploded shortly after liftoff.
> The two companies participated in an independent review of the failure,
> and reported to the Chinese on what went wrong.
>
> Those exchanges, officials believe, may have gone beyond the sharing of
> information the companies had been permitted, giving the Chinese crucial
> assistance in improving the guidance systems of their rockets. . . .
Huh? The investigation of an _explosion_ shortly after takeoff is going
to help their _guidance_ systems?
> . . . The
> technology needed to put a commercial satellite in orbit is similar to
> that which guides a long-range missile nuclear missile to its target.
Yep. They both have lots of components with resistors, transistors,
etc. . . Fancy that. Otherwise, the technology to guide an ICBM
accurately to its destination on _one_ pass in the absence of significant
ground control interaction and independent measures of positioning
accuracy is _not_ the same as what is needed to accurately place a orbital
satellite in a predetermined orbit. Gross failure in positioning
of an orbit will make a satellite useless, but such gross failures
are mainly the result of equipment failures, and not inaccuracies
in the guidance system. The fine tuning on satellite orbits is
usually done through control thrusters in an iterative fashion,
and though precision adjustments initiated from ground stations.
ICBM accuracy, on the other hand, has to be achieved immediately,
and without any ground control.
[snip]
> There are huge commercial interests at stake. A host of companies, from
> cellular telephone networks to international television conglomerates,
> are waiting in line for low-cost satellites to be sent into orbit. An
> important bottleneck facing the companies is a shortage of rocket systems
> available to launch satellites.
Indeed. The LEOS satellites are projected to have to have 3-5
year lifespans, and with a need for hundreds of them, an ambitious
launch schedule is needed. If you want to point fingers, maybe
you could ask why U.S. companies haven't filled in the slack for
commercial launch capability.
[snip]
> Thus far, Presidents Bush and Clinton have issued 11 waivers for satellite
> launches.
[snip]
> Few nations can deliver intercontinental ballistic missiles. China has
> lagged because, among other reasons, it lacks the guidance technology,
> also used in satellite launches, that allows multiple warheads to be sent
> from a single missile.
This "guidance technology" is in the delivery system, i.e. the Chinese
missile, and not in the payload. But once again, the technology for
placing satellites in orbit is in many ways fundamentally different
from that needed for one-pass accuracy.
[snip]
> Administration officials said the inquiry is focused on the events
> following the Feb. 15, 1996, explosion of a Chinese rocket carrying a
> Loral satellite seconds after liftoff at the Xichang Satellite Launch
> Center in Sichuan Province in southern China.
>
> After the explosion, the Chinese asked two U.S. companies to help conduct
> an independent study of what went wrong. The team was led by Loral and
> included two experts from Hughes, according to Hughes.
The damn thing exploded. What does that have to do with guidance
technology?
> According to administration officials, the American experts provided
> crucial data and information to the Chinese to prevent future accidents.
> Later, Loral gave a copy of its written report on the incident to the
> State Department, which licenses the export of defense-related items,
> including technical assistance.
>
> Government officials immediately began to assess whether there had been a
> security breach. Last year, a criminal inquiry was begun by the U.S.
> Customs Service and the Department of Justice, officials said.
>
> Under federal export rules, U.S. companies are supposed to take careful
> precautions to safeguard classified technology when their satellites are
> launched by Chinese rockets.
I fail to see why "classified technology" would have anything to
do with this missile explosion. Maybe we have "classified
technology" that causes enemy liquid fuel systems to malfunction,
that LORAL inadvertently put on the Chinese missile. Will someone
please enlighten me?
[snip]
> After U.S. companies participated in more than one study of failed Chinese
> launches, the federal government changed its regulations and now requires
> companies to obtain a separate license to participate in any accident
> review, according to an administration official.
And what say the Republicans who are so terrified of government
regulations and paperwork?
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> I wrote this 12/17/97 -
>
> Benard Schwartz runs a little space company called Loral. One
> day, Mr. Schwartz took a ride with Commerce Secretary Ron Brown
> on a trade trip to China in 1994. Mr. Schwartz would wrap up a
> multi-billion dollar deal to supply satellites to China and get
> approval to export the advanced space hardware all while flying
> on the taxpayers dollar.
Most of these satellites are being put up _by_ China for business
concerns elsewhere.
[snip]
> . . . Yet, hidden beneath the donations to the DNC is
> something far more dangerous to America than making sure that
> Beijing gets MTV from space. The money, technology and
> expertise is also being converted directly by China into nuclear
> weapons.
I beg your pardon? And how does this become conversion "directly
... into nuclear weapons"?
[snip]
> Another spin off from the Long March is a short range missile,
> called "East Wind" or Dong Feng type 15. It was the DF-15 that
> dropped warheads off the coast of Taiwan in February 1996,
> causing an international crisis. The DF-15 uses advanced solid
> rocket technology such as the solid rocket boosters on the US
> space shuttle. The DF-15 is based on similar boosters developed
> and used on the Long March for satellite missions. The DF-15
> has about the same range as the Iraqi SCUD missile. However,
> the DF-15, unlike the SCUD, is fast, accurate and easy to
> launch. It does not have to be fueled with liquid propellants
> and has an advanced internal guidance system which can put a
> conventional, nuclear or chemical warhead within yards of it's
> intended target from 300 miles away. In fact, according to
> defense sources the DF-15s shot at Taiwan in 1996 had
> maneuvering, stealthy, warheads. These advanced features would
> enable the DF-15 to avoid US defense missiles such as the
> Patriot or the Standard missiles that protect the US Navy.
So what the hay does this have to do with U.S. technology?
Were they "cloaking" the LORAL satellites? Giving them
manoeuvering capability so they can come down on Mr. Smith's
house when their orbits decay and they reenter the atmosphere?
[snip]
> Other than financing Chinese missile technology Loral has sold
> entire satellite systems from the ground up to China. APSTAR, a
> company 75% owned by the Chinese government, has sole ownership
> of Loral satellites and operates them via control facilities in
> Hong Kong. These satellites provide communication, navigation
> and direct TV broadcasting directly to Asia. In some cases,
> such as the pay per view TV services, China is obtaining hard,
> cold, cash from customers around the globe. . . .
So that people in Asia can receive the finest in Western Culture?
> . . . Other services such
> as satellite navigation, can be used both by the Chinese airline
> industry to land safely and by the Chinese air force to bomb
> accurately.
Why bother. The U.S. GPS signals are already available to anyone
with a GPS receiver. Ask Hertz Rent-A-Car.
[snip]
> 1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775
>
> Charles R. Smith
> SOFTWAR
> http://www.us.net/softwar
What fascinates me is that this story keeps getting repeated by
various RWFers as LORAL giving guidance technology to the Chinese for
their ICBMs. I can't discern anything of the like from the
actual Gerth story, and I think even _he_ was a big off the
mark on what he was saying. Why is that? Are these people
truly clueless, or is there a method to their madness in distorting
this story far beyond its actual signiificance?
Cheers,
-- Arne Langsetmo
Thomas L. Billings
> In article <6hapkf$42p$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
> sof...@us.net wrote:
> > April 4, 1998
> Excerpts of copyrighted NY Times article included for criticism purposes:
<snipped large parts out of the field not covered by s.s.p.>
>
> > The federal inquiry stems from a 1996 incident in which a Chinese rocket
> > carrying aloft a satellite built by Loral exploded shortly after liftoff.
> > The two companies participated in an independent review of the failure,
> > and reported to the Chinese on what went wrong.
> > Those exchanges, officials believe, may have gone beyond the sharing of
> > information the companies had been permitted, giving the Chinese crucial
> > assistance in improving the guidance systems of their rockets. . . .
> Huh? The investigation of an _explosion_ shortly after takeoff is going
> to help their _guidance_ systems?
> > After the explosion, the Chinese asked two U.S. companies to help conduct
> > an independent study of what went wrong. The team was led by Loral and
> > included two experts from Hughes, according to Hughes.
> The damn thing exploded. What does that have to do with guidance
> technology?
A lot, in many cases.
A launch vehicle's structure is highly stressed
when being boosted through the lower atmosphere.
It must be built light enough to allow a worthwhile
payload to be carried to orbit, and yet withstand
stresses from both outside (aerodynamic forces) and
inside (propellant sloshing, inertial forces of structure
and payload, etc.) and other non-linear phenomena
on the vehicle. In addition, some payloads have
constraints as to the accellerations they can withstand,
as well as the axis of motion on which they can be
accellerated. All of these forces interact with the
controls of the guidance system.
All of them must be taken into account when programming
the guidance system, or one of them will overstress the
structure, and that will make it fail. At this point, with
a vehicle like Long March, which uses liquid propellants
that ignite on contact (i.e., they're a "hypergolic" combination)
you will most often see an explosion or propellant spill, or
both. The latter is worse in a populated area, in some ways,
since these propellants are _very_ toxic to humans and other
living things. That caused casualties in this case, which are
still given different numbers by different groups. This
possibility is one more reason why the US launches it's
hypergolic propellant launch vehicles from its' coastal launch
facilities.
There was a dispute between the Chinese company
selling the Long March for commercial use, and Loral
and Hughes as to who had given the wrong accelleration
specifications for the guidance system. IIRC, the satellites
also used hypergolic propellants, and if the guidance
programmers were given improper specs by Hughes
and Loral, then the disaster was their fault. Then they, or
their insurance copany pays someone beaucoup bucks. To
prove their asertion that their own specs were right, these
2 companies may have had to say more about advanced
guidance theory than US regulators are happy with, or
possibly more than the law really allows.
> > . . . Yet, hidden beneath the donations to the DNC is
> > something far more dangerous to America than making sure that
> > Beijing gets MTV from space. The money, technology and
> > expertise is also being converted directly by China into nuclear
> > weapons.
> I beg your pardon? And how does this become conversion "directly
> ... into nuclear weapons"?
It doesn't. Don't be surprised. Many Journalists look at
spaceflight as at least half magical. Any relation at all
is looked at as a direct one, which they wouldn't know if
it bit them. Getting one of them to quote me correctly
(on the _very_ few occasions when they do at all) is something
that gives a feeling of great satiation.
> What fascinates me is that this story keeps getting repeated by
> various RWFers as LORAL giving guidance technology to the Chinese for
> their ICBMs. I can't discern anything of the like from the
> actual Gerth story, and I think even _he_ was a big off the
> mark on what he was saying. Why is that? Are these people
> truly clueless, or is there a method to their madness in distorting
> this story far beyond its actual signiificance?
This a wonderful (they think) way to bash Clinton's
administration, since many voters have shown they
_will_ not respond to the sexual escapades now common.
It is the lack of Clinton regulation which is being pointed
out here, by those quoting the article, and "extending" the
implications it contains about Slick Willy's honesty, and
that of the Democrats in general. I doubt it will have
much effect here in the US.
Regards,
Tom Billings
--
Institute for Teleoperated Space Development
it...@teleport.com(Tom Billings)
ITSD's web site is at, http://www.teleport.com/~itsd1/index.html
zu...@ix.netcom.com
In article <itsd1-25049...@pdx41-a48-14.teleport.com>,
Maybe so. But I still fail to see what such constraints
imposed by a civilian satellite do to help the Chinese
WRT the launching of military payload with different
characteristics. Could it be that _we_ got the best of
this; a peek at the technological sophistication of
the Chinese launch vehicle technology?
> All of them must be taken into account when programming
> the guidance system, or one of them will overstress the
> structure, and that will make it fail.[snip]
So now _we_ know a bit more about what the launch
capability of the Long march missile is, don't we?
It's nice of them to do test flights for us with a
known payload and flight envelope parameters. ;-)
> There was a dispute between the Chinese company
> selling the Long March for commercial use, and Loral
> and Hughes as to who had given the wrong accelleration
> specifications for the guidance system. . . .
Hmmm. Was the CIA or DIA involved in any of this? Ooops.
Hsshh. The Chinese may be listening to this NG. . .
> . . . IIRC, the satellites
> also used hypergolic propellants, . . .
They tend to do that. Most reliable way of ensuring your
thrusters work when you want them to, and don't explode
from fuel buildup and delayed ignition. But unless the
hypergolics went off prematurely or there was a leak, this
wouldn't have been a consideration. But that wouldn't
have involved guidance technology. . .
> . . . and if the guidance
> programmers were given improper specs by Hughes
> and Loral, then the disaster was their fault. Then they, or
> their insurance copany pays someone beaucoup bucks. To
> prove their asertion that their own specs were right, these
> 2 companies may have had to say more about advanced
> guidance theory than US regulators are happy with, or
> possibly more than the law really allows.
I dunno. "Advanced guidance theory"? Seems a bit far-fetched
to say that we told them anything here that they didn't
know already, or couldn't figure out themselves, theory-wise.
But no need to explain if I'm wrong (who knows who is listening).
Just tell me so.
> > > . . . Yet, hidden beneath the donations to the DNC is
> > > something far more dangerous to America than making sure that
> > > Beijing gets MTV from space. The money, technology and
> > > expertise is also being converted directly by China into nuclear
> > > weapons.
>
> > I beg your pardon? And how does this become conversion "directly
> > ... into nuclear weapons"?
>
> It doesn't. Don't be surprised. Many Journalists look at
> spaceflight as at least half magical. Any relation at all
> is looked at as a direct one, which they wouldn't know if
> it bit them. Getting one of them to quote me correctly
> (on the _very_ few occasions when they do at all) is something
> that gives a feeling of great satiation.
"Journalists" with a capital "J"? Yes, I'd be honoured if
a Journalist quoted me. ;-) But didn't I say something
in my post about Gerth's apparent naivete concerning
technological issues? Oh yeah, right below.
> > What fascinates me is that this story keeps getting repeated by
> > various RWFers as LORAL giving guidance technology to the Chinese for
> > their ICBMs. I can't discern anything of the like from the
> > actual Gerth story, and I think even _he_ was a big off the
> > mark on what he was saying. Why is that? Are these people
> > truly clueless, or is there a method to their madness in distorting
> > this story far beyond its actual signiificance?
>
> This a wonderful (they think) way to bash Clinton's
> administration, since many voters have shown they
> _will_ not respond to the sexual escapades now common.
Yeah, that's what I figure.
> It is the lack of Clinton regulation which is being pointed
> out here, by those quoting the article, and "extending" the
> implications it contains about Slick Willy's honesty, and
> that of the Democrats in general. I doubt it will have
> much effect here in the US.
>
> Regards,
>
> Tom Billings
Thanks for your learned comments.
sof...@us.net
it...@teleport.com (Thomas L. Billings) wrote:
>In article <6htp2j$i5o$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>, zu...@ix.netcom.com wrote:
>> In article <6hapkf$42p$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
>> sof...@us.net wrote:
>> > April 4, 1998
>> Excerpts of copyrighted NY Times article included for criticism purposes:
><snipped large parts out of the field not covered by s.s.p.>
>> > . . . Yet, hidden beneath the donations to the DNC is
>> > something far more dangerous to America than making sure that
>> > Beijing gets MTV from space. The money, technology and
>> > expertise is also being converted directly by China into nuclear
>> > weapons.
>> I beg your pardon? And how does this become conversion "directly
>> ... into nuclear weapons"?
>It doesn't. Don't be surprised. Many Journalists look at
>spaceflight as at least half magical. Any relation at all
>is looked at as a direct one, which they wouldn't know if
>it bit them. Getting one of them to quote me correctly
>(on the _very_ few occasions when they do at all) is something
>that gives a feeling of great satiation.
For someone who CLAIMs to know so much about space flight you seem to know
very little about reality. You have missed the transfer of the encrypted
uplink/downlink systems that were given to China by Loral. This item alone
allows for automated ascent control using ground based computers. Secure
computer communications are a vital part of any advanced missile - ESPECIALLY
- nuclear tipped ICBM's. Mr. Reinsch (BXA Head) admitted the LORAL transfer
and it's importance in modern weapons C4. Thus, the reason why such systems
ARE still part of the US Munitions List.
AND, you seem to have missed the use of US built super computers for nuclear
weapons (payload) design, and flight trajectory. The DF-15 warheads that the
PRC dropped off the Taiwan coast in 1996 were both MARVed (Manueverable
Reentry Vehicle) and coated with stealth (radar absorbing) materials. This
represents a TWO generation leap in PRC deployed military technology.
Previous warheads were little more than a steel shell.
I see NO value in selling missile technology to a nation that threatened to
nuke LA no more than 24 months ago.
1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775
Charles R. Smith
SOFTWAR
http://www.us.net/softwar
zu...@ix.netcom.com
In article <6hvc67$4ok$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
>
> >> In article <6hapkf$42p$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
> >> sof...@us.net wrote:
>
> >> > April 4, 1998
>
> >> Excerpts of copyrighted NY Times article included for criticism purposes:
>
> ><snipped large parts out of the field not covered by s.s.p.>
>
> >> > something far more dangerous to America than making sure that
> >> > Beijing gets MTV from space. The money, technology and
> >> > expertise is also being converted directly by China into nuclear
> >> > weapons.
>
> >> I beg your pardon? And how does this become conversion "directly
> >> ... into nuclear weapons"?
>
> >It doesn't. Don't be surprised. Many Journalists look at
> >spaceflight as at least half magical. Any relation at all
> >is looked at as a direct one, which they wouldn't know if
> >it bit them. Getting one of them to quote me correctly
> >(on the _very_ few occasions when they do at all) is something
> >that gives a feeling of great satiation.
>
> very little about reality. You have missed the transfer of the encrypted
Oh, you mean the Motorola cell phones? ROFL!!! No, seriously,
give us some specifics here, Mr. Smith.
> . . . This item alone
> allows for automated ascent control using ground based computers.
> Secure computer communications are a vital part of any advanced
> missile - ESPECIALLY - nuclear tipped ICBM's. Mr. Reinsch (BXA Head)
> admitted the LORAL transfer and it's importance in modern weapons C4.
> Thus, the reason why such systems ARE still part of the US Munitions
> List.
>
> AND, you seem to have missed the use of US built super computers for
> nuclear weapons (payload) design, and flight trajectory.
Hell, I'm using a "supercomputer" pretty much like the SGI stuff right
now to send you this e-mail. You're a hoot, Mr. Smith.
> . . . The DF-15 warheads that the
> PRC dropped off the Taiwan coast in 1996 were both MARVed (Manueverable
> Reentry Vehicle) and coated with stealth (radar absorbing) materials. This
> represents a TWO generation leap in PRC deployed military technology.
> Previous warheads were little more than a steel shell.
I guess you missed the post where I suggested that they got the
MARV technology from the little wings that LORAL put on the
LEOS satellites so that they can be aimed at the houses of free-thinkers
like yourself, Mr. Smith, in case they don't burn up on re-entry. . .
"SOFTWAR". Hmmmf. More like "softpate". Cheers,
sof...@us.net
zu...@ix.netcom.com wrote:
>In article <6hvc67$4ok$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
> sof...@us.net wrote:
>>
>> it...@teleport.com (Thomas L. Billings) wrote:
>>
>> >In article <6htp2j$i5o$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>, zu...@ix.netcom.com wrote:
>>
>> >> In article <6hapkf$42p$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
>> >> sof...@us.net wrote:
>>
>> >> > April 4, 1998
>>
>> >> Excerpts of copyrighted NY Times article included for criticism
purposes:
>>
>> ><snipped large parts out of the field not covered by s.s.p.>
>>
>> >> > . . . Yet, hidden beneath the donations to the DNC is
>> >> > something far more dangerous to America than making sure that
>> >> > Beijing gets MTV from space. The money, technology and
>> >> > expertise is also being converted directly by China into nuclear
>> >> > weapons.
>>
>> >> I beg your pardon? And how does this become conversion "directly
>> >> ... into nuclear weapons"?
>>
>> >It doesn't. Don't be surprised. Many Journalists look at
>> >spaceflight as at least half magical. Any relation at all
>> >is looked at as a direct one, which they wouldn't know if
>> >it bit them. Getting one of them to quote me correctly
>> >(on the _very_ few occasions when they do at all) is something
>> >that gives a feeling of great satiation.
>>
>> For someone who CLAIMs to know so much about space flight you seem to know
>> very little about reality. You have missed the transfer of the encrypted
>> uplink/downlink systems that were given to China by Loral. . . .
>Oh, you mean the Motorola cell phones? ROFL!!! No, seriously,
>give us some specifics here, Mr. Smith.
William Reinsch the Undersecretary for the Bureau of Export
Administration from the US Commerce Dept. made an appearance
today at a forum held in DC on Key Recovery encryption.
SOFTWAR:
"Mr. Reinsch, explain to me why it is a threat to national security if I
were to say post a software program for PCs to the Internet where
apparently it is not a threat for the administration to approve the
export of strong encryption for the use of ballistic missiles by the
People's Republic of China, specifically LORAL?"
Mr. Reinsch:
"The LORAL export was not one in which the Department of Commerce
was involved. The license was granted by the State Department. But
I think it is incorrect to imply that the information you refer to was
transfered with the approval of the US government."
>> . . . This item alone
>> allows for automated ascent control using ground based computers.
>> Secure computer communications are a vital part of any advanced
>> missile - ESPECIALLY - nuclear tipped ICBM's. Mr. Reinsch (BXA Head)
>> admitted the LORAL transfer and it's importance in modern weapons C4.
>> Thus, the reason why such systems ARE still part of the US Munitions
>> List.
>>
>> AND, you seem to have missed the use of US built super computers for
>> nuclear weapons (payload) design, and flight trajectory.
>Hell, I'm using a "supercomputer" pretty much like the SGI stuff right
>now to send you this e-mail. You're a hoot, Mr. Smith.
I am delighted that you take this so lightly. Of course, pointing nuclear
weapons at someone else sorta ruins the whole point. I thank you for helping
China and Russia develop better bombs. Your efforts for world peace are most
impressive.
Did your dad sell Chevy bumpers to Japan in Nov. 1941 or did you sell shock
batons to the South African government in 1970?
AND I doubt that you are using a $7 million dollar machine to spin email. I,
on the other hand, am armed with FACTS ... Try reading the GAO report on the
export of US super computers for nuclear weapons research. FYI - here is a
snip.
"MINATOM told one of the companies that sold them a computer
without a license that the computer would be used for modeling
of earth water pollution caused by radioactive substances.
However, MINATOM officials have stated that the computers will
be used to maintain the Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles and
the Minister of Atomic Energy indicated that the computer
would be used to confirm the reliability of Russia's nuclear
arsenal and ensure its proper working order under the terms of
the CTBT."
- (Testimony, 04/15/97, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-128).
1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775
Charles R. Smith
SOFTWAR
http://www.us.net/softwar
sof...@us.net
In article <6hvmf4$o0k$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
zu...@ix.netcom.com wrote:
>
> In article <6hvc67$4ok$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
> sof...@us.net wrote:
> >
> > it...@teleport.com (Thomas L. Billings) wrote:
> >
> >
> > >> In article <6hapkf$42p$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
> > >> sof...@us.net wrote:
> >
> > >> > April 4, 1998
> >
> > >> Excerpts of copyrighted NY Times article included for criticism
purposes:
> >
> > ><snipped large parts out of the field not covered by s.s.p.>
> >
> > >> > something far more dangerous to America than making sure that
> > >> > Beijing gets MTV from space. The money, technology and
> > >> > expertise is also being converted directly by China into nuclear
> > >> > weapons.
> >
> > >> I beg your pardon? And how does this become conversion "directly
> > >> ... into nuclear weapons"?
> >
> > >It doesn't. Don't be surprised. Many Journalists look at
> > >spaceflight as at least half magical. Any relation at all
> > >is looked at as a direct one, which they wouldn't know if
> > >it bit them. Getting one of them to quote me correctly
> > >(on the _very_ few occasions when they do at all) is something
> > >that gives a feeling of great satiation.
> >
> > very little about reality. You have missed the transfer of the encrypted
> > uplink/downlink systems that were given to China by Loral. . . .
>
> Oh, you mean the Motorola cell phones? ROFL!!! No, seriously,
> give us some specifics here, Mr. Smith.
Please note - Motorola letter below requesting encrypted control systems for
Iridium satellite be sold to China. Motorola has confirmed that the sale has
taken place and that Motorola "broke no laws".
MOTOROLA
FAX COVER SHEET
1350 I STREET N.W.
SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
OFFICE Number: 202-371-6900
FAX Number: 202-842-3578
To: Sue Eckert 482-3911
Charlotte Kuepper 301-688-8183
Julie Kavanaugh 647-4232
George Tenet 456-9340
Ron Lee 301-688-4546
From: Richard Barth
Motorola - Washington, DC
Re: See attached
You should receive 6 pages including this cover sheet. If you do not receive
all the
pages, please contact Shannon Ibey on 202 371-6919.
================================================================
Check appropriate POPI classification of information being sent:
Motorola General Business Information __X__
Motorola Internal Use Only _____
Motorola Confidential Proprietary _____
Pages: 6 (including cover sheet)
March 22, 1995
Note for Julie Kavanaugh
Charlotte Knepper
Please forgive the informality of this note, but I want to move the process
along here and not stand on formalities. As you can see for the attached,
Motorola has been trying to clarify the policy regarding sales to China of
telecom systems containing encryption for several months now. We currently
have about $100 million worth of two way radio business tied up by the lack of
a waiver for China and face losing a market of about $500 million in GSM
infrastructure sales alone over the next five years if we cannot sell systems
that GCHQ in the UK has already approved last summer for export from Europe.
On top of that are hundreds of millions worth of cellular phone sales that
could be lost.
You requested a brief summary of why Motorola was requesting broad waiver
authority. First, such a waiver would not reduce NSA's oversight over all
encryption containing exports to China. Current controls remain, only the need
to notify Congress of each sale is removed.
Second, we only request a level playing field. This does not now exist when
our key competition, Erisson, Siemens, Alcatel, etc., are able to sell two way
radios, cellular and PCS systems to China and we are denied that ability by
current US policy.
Third, as you well know, this technology is not standing still. While we NOW
are only at risk of losing perhaps a billion worth of sales, the future
systems that may be announced in a month or a year or more may require going
back for a new waiver. Why waste all that time applying for waivers for that
which is in the US Government's best interest.
Finally, while we now are not yet applying for licenses for encrypted systems
forsatellite system positioning, we may within months be applying for such
licenses for our Iridium systems.
The bottom line is that getting a waiver through the system today, as we
requested on November 23, 1994, for "all commercial cellular, PCS (personal
communications systems) and other telecommunications systemhardware and
software," is realistic and appropriate for today's markets and those in the
immediate future. However, we are getting quite anxious about getting this
waiver through asap because of the risk of lost business, so if this request
for the broadest possible waiver will further slow down the process, I urge
you to get in writing to the State Department asap language that seeks a
waiver for "cellular, PCS and two way radio systems," as recently agreed. Then
we can start all over again for the additional waiver coverage...
Thanks and please call me if there are any further data I can provide.
Rich Barth
Assistant Director, International Trade Relations
cc: Sue Eckert
George Tenet
Ron Lee
sof...@us.net
zu...@ix.netcom.com wrote:
>In article <6hvc67$4ok$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
> sof...@us.net wrote:
>>
>> it...@teleport.com (Thomas L. Billings) wrote:
>>
>> >In article <6htp2j$i5o$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>, zu...@ix.netcom.com wrote:
>>
>> >> In article <6hapkf$42p$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
>> >> sof...@us.net wrote:
>>
>> >> > April 4, 1998
>>
>> >> Excerpts of copyrighted NY Times article included for criticism purposes:
>>
>> ><snipped large parts out of the field not covered by s.s.p.>
>>
>> >> > . . . Yet, hidden beneath the donations to the DNC is
>> >> > something far more dangerous to America than making sure that
>> >> > Beijing gets MTV from space. The money, technology and
>> >> > expertise is also being converted directly by China into nuclear
>> >> > weapons.
>>
>> >> I beg your pardon? And how does this become conversion "directly
>> >> ... into nuclear weapons"?
>>
>> >It doesn't. Don't be surprised. Many Journalists look at
>> >spaceflight as at least half magical. Any relation at all
>> >is looked at as a direct one, which they wouldn't know if
>> >it bit them. Getting one of them to quote me correctly
>> >(on the _very_ few occasions when they do at all) is something
>> >that gives a feeling of great satiation.
>>
>> For someone who CLAIMs to know so much about space flight you seem to know
>> very little about reality. You have missed the transfer of the encrypted
>> uplink/downlink systems that were given to China by Loral. . . .
>Oh, you mean the Motorola cell phones? ROFL!!! No, seriously,
>give us some specifics here, Mr. Smith.
William Reinsch the Undersecretary for the Bureau of Export
- (Testimony, 04/15/97, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-128).
1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775
Charles R. Smith
SOFTWAR
http://www.us.net/softwar
Michael Martin-Smith
In article <6htp2j$i5o$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>, zu...@ix.netcom.com writes
Surely the answer to all this is not to exclude use of Chinese rockets,
but to undercut them! "Let 100 flowers bloom" - especially in the
private launch market.
sof...@us.net
In article <CjSjqLAQ...@demon.co.uk>,
That would be a very nice idea except... The current administration has
favored using FOREIGN space launchers over domestic development. One example
that comes to mind (other than Great Wall Industries Long March) is the aging
Russian PROTON launcher. LKE is an international venture formed in early 1993
for the worldwide sale of Russian Proton commercial launch vehicles and
satellite integration services. The venture includes Lockheed Commercial Space
Company, Khrunichev Space Center and NPO Energia.
1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775
Charles R. Smith
SOFTWAR
http://www.us.net/softwar
zu...@ix.netcom.com
In article <CjSjqLAQ...@demon.co.uk>,
Michael Martin-Smith <mar...@miff.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>
> In article <6htp2j$i5o$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>, zu...@ix.netcom.com writes
> Surely the answer to all this is not to exclude use of Chinese rockets,
> but to undercut them! "Let 100 flowers bloom" - especially in the
> private launch market.
Which, if you check the other posts I had made on this topic, I
had alluded to. I had said that we can hardly blame the Chinese
if our own industry hasn't got it on the ball enough for us
to be able to economically or practically use domestic launch
capacity. . . .
zu...@ix.netcom.com
In article <6i1jjr$kb3$1...@news.us.net>, sof...@us.net wrote:
> zu...@ix.netcom.com wrote:
> >In article <6hvc67$4ok$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
> > sof...@us.net wrote:
[snip]
> >> For someone who CLAIMs to know so much about space flight you
> >> seem to know very little about reality. You have missed the
> >> transfer of the encrypted uplink/downlink systems that were
> >> given to China by Loral. . . .
>
> >Oh, you mean the Motorola cell phones? ROFL!!! No, seriously,
> >give us some specifics here, Mr. Smith.
>
> William Reinsch the Undersecretary for the Bureau of Export
> Administration from the US Commerce Dept. made an appearance
> today at a forum held in DC on Key Recovery encryption.
>
> SOFTWAR:
> "Mr. Reinsch, explain to me why it is a threat to national security if I
> were to say post a software program for PCs to the Internet where
> apparently it is not a threat for the administration to approve the
> export of strong encryption for the use of ballistic missiles by the
> People's Republic of China, specifically LORAL?"
>
> Mr. Reinsch:
> "The LORAL export was not one in which the Department of Commerce
> was involved. The license was granted by the State Department. But
> I think it is incorrect to imply that the information you refer to was
> transfered with the approval of the US government."
Despite your phrasing of the question in a leading way, Mr. Reinsch
didn't acknowledge here export of strong encryptation to the PRC.
What _was_ the LORAL deal about? In _what_ way did it involve
"strong encryptation"? I want specifics.
> >> . . . This item alone
> >> allows for automated ascent control using ground based computers.
> >> Secure computer communications are a vital part of any advanced
> >> missile - ESPECIALLY - nuclear tipped ICBM's. Mr. Reinsch (BXA Head)
> >> admitted the LORAL transfer and it's importance in modern weapons C4.
> >> Thus, the reason why such systems ARE still part of the US Munitions
> >> List.
Excuse me, but ICBMs have on-board guidance systems so that they
_won't_ need communications while in flight. In an high
EMP environment, you _can't_ rely on such communications for
basic mission capabilities.
> >> AND, you seem to have missed the use of US built super computers for
> >> nuclear weapons (payload) design, and flight trajectory.
>
> >Hell, I'm using a "supercomputer" pretty much like the SGI stuff right
> >now to send you this e-mail. You're a hoot, Mr. Smith.
>
> I am delighted that you take this so lightly. Of course, pointing
> nuclear weapons at someone else sorta ruins the whole point. I thank
> you for helping China and Russia develop better bombs. Your efforts for
> world peace are most impressive.
I'm just saying that you're a _real_ paranoid, with little grounding
in the realities of modern electronics technology.
[snip ad hominem]
> AND I doubt that you are using a $7 million dollar machine to spin
> email.
No, but I can use a $100K one to do so, one that beats the pants
off those SGI machines in horsepower. You can buy a lot more
with a lot less with a couple of years time. . . . The point,
which you failed to address, is that so-called "super-computer"
technology is being fast outmoded by your your everyday PC.
AFAIK, the latest "supercomputer" being bought by the DoD
is just a huge bunch of Pentiums hooked together. Crays
are dinosaurs now. . . At one point, the largest known prime
number was found by a person that had hooked up a bunch of
PCs in his home.
> I, on the other hand, am armed with FACTS ... Try reading the
> GAO report on the export of US super computers for nuclear weapons
> research. FYI - here is a snip.
>
> "MINATOM told one of the companies that sold them a computer
> without a license that the computer would be used for modeling
> of earth water pollution caused by radioactive substances.
> However, MINATOM officials have stated that the computers will
> be used to maintain the Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles and
> the Minister of Atomic Energy indicated that the computer
> would be used to confirm the reliability of Russia's nuclear
> arsenal and ensure its proper working order under the terms of
> the CTBT."
>
> - (Testimony, 04/15/97, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-128).
Yeah, so fr***ing what. . . They can _buy_ these types of
computers from just about anybody nowadays. And if they use
them instead of blowing up actual test bombs, I'm all for it.
I note that you are all in a snit about India blowing up a
few bombs, according to you _because_ they couldn't get
computers to model them. Make up your mind.
[snip sig]
zu...@ix.netcom.com
In article <6i1npm$3c8$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>, sof...@us.net wrote:
> In article <6hvmf4$o0k$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
> zu...@ix.netcom.com wrote:
[snip]
> > Oh, you mean the Motorola cell phones? ROFL!!! No, seriously,
> > give us some specifics here, Mr. Smith.
>
> Please note - Motorola letter below requesting encrypted control systems
> for Iridium satellite be sold to China. Motorola has confirmed that the
> sale has taken place and that Motorola "broke no laws".
Thanks for the specifics. I see nothing here in the least alarming.
No, the letter requests the approval of selling Iridium systems to
China. BFD. Iridium phones are just cell phones. Pretty much
the same as you can go buy in a Radio Shack. As the Motorola
people point out, Siemens, Alcatel, and Ericsson are all trying
their best to get cell phones into China. It's a huge market.
This was _my_ point in an old post on this topic.
> Third, as you well know, this technology is not standing still. While
> we NOW are only at risk of losing perhaps a billion worth of sales, the
> future systems that may be announced in a month or a year or more may
> require going back for a new waiver. Why waste all that time applying
> for waivers for that which is in the US Government's best interest.
>
> Finally, while we now are not yet applying for licenses for encrypted
> systems for satellite system positioning, we may within months be
> applying for such licenses for our Iridium systems.
It doesn't say secure encryptation. From what I can determine here,
they want some form of encryptation on the uplink so that hackers
can't go muck with the satellites. Which seems to me to be an
entirely reasonable idea. No big deal. But, as you
may well be aware, "strong encryptation" is _already_ available
to anyone with a Web Browser. The NSA's policies in this respect
are a joke. They're trying to close the barn door after all the
cows have long since gone, partied all night, and took a round the
world cruise.
I _also_ point out that a while back, some of the cell phone
encryptation was shown to be (perhaps intentionally though
NSA prodding) made so weak that it is susceptible to breaking
by ordinary theives or other people with not a whole lot
of resources, and also some folks in Berkeley recently announced
that they had recovered keys for the IS41-C protocol with
just a home PC.
I _also_ point out that all one has to do to make encryptation
stronger is to use a larger key size, or multiply encrypt it.
Nothing magical about that. It's so simple anyone can do it.
Even you.
THe NSA secretly pushed for the 56 bit DES system a number of
years ago (when Bobby Inman was running the NSA), just so
they (they though) could break the keys easily, but no one
else could. Well, technology marched on, and very quickly
the DES became breakable by just about _anyone_, but because
it was a "standard", many commercial systems nowadays are
quite insecure. They could _easily_ have allowed a 64 bit key
at the time, and given it just a bit more useful life, but the
NSA _had_ to have their way at that time, _not thinking of
the legitimate needs of citizens_. Quite a flap about it
at the time in electronics/cryptography circles.
> The bottom line is that getting a waiver through the system today, as
> we requested on November 23, 1994, for "all commercial cellular, PCS
> (personal communications systems) and other telecommunications
> system hardware and software," is realistic and appropriate for today's
> markets and those in the immediate future. However, we are getting quite
> anxious about getting this waiver through asap because of the risk of
> lost business, so if this request for the broadest possible waiver will
> further slow down the process, I urge you to get in writing to the State
> Department asap language that seeks a waiver for "cellular, PCS and two
> way radio systems," as recently agreed. Then we can start all over again
> for the additional waiver coverage...
This seems eminently reasonable, given the current availability of
such equipment.
> Thanks and please call me if there are any further data I can provide.
>
> Rich Barth
> Assistant Director, International Trade Relations
>
> cc: Sue Eckert
> George Tenet
> Ron Lee
I thought so, and this document proves it. Your (and Limbaugh's
and Hyde's) flap about "encryptation technology" being sold for
missiles is a whole huge steaming load of flapdoodle.
You are truly clueless. Or a dissembling schemer pursuing
hoped-for political ends. You are toast.
sof...@us.net
In article <6jdi7p$4do$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
zu...@ix.netcom.com wrote:
>
>zu...@ix.netcom.com wrote:
>
> In article <355489...@inxpress.net>,
> j...@inxpress.net wrote:
> >
> [snip]
>
> > 05/08/98 By Charles R. Smith
> >
> > RON BROWN - ARMS DEALER - Weapons For Red China
> >
> > In 1994 Bernard Schwartz, CEO of Loral Aerospace, went to
> > China with Commerce Secretary Ron Brown. Bernard Schwartz, by co-
> > incidence, also donated just over a million dollars to the DNC.
> > When Mr. Schwartz flew to China he hoped to make a sale or two,
> > perhaps to offset the large DNC donation checks he had just
> > written. His company, Loral, makes some pretty high tech
> > equipment, so the China - low-tech - market had great appeal. For
> > example, Loral manufactures satellites, radars, global navigation
> > and world wide secure communications systems. All the fine things
> > a "wannabe" super-power would desire.
> >
> > In 1994, just prior to traveling with Brown, Mr. Schwartz
> > had his LORAL staff prepare a shopping list for the Chinese and
> > Ron Brown. This list, complete with very big pictures, would make
> > LORAL's large ticket items easier to understand and digest at Ron
> > Brown's (executive) level. However, the same list would also make
> > anyone familiar with military equipment go bananas.
> >
> > On that day Ron Brown stopped being Secretary of Commerce
> > and started his new career as an international arms dealer. The
> > items LORAL carried to the meeting with Ron Brown resemble a
> > JANE'S Defense catalog of high tech weapons. Some of the Loral
> > suggested "red" ticket items up for sale included "Airborne
> > Reconnaissance Cameras, Weapon Delivery, Target Acquisition,
> > Missile Guidance, Shipboard Target Acquisition, Radar Warning,
> > Missile Warning, RF Jamming, IR Jamming..." and so on.
> >
> > Please note - Anything that starts with "weapon", "missile"
> > or "target acquisition" does NOT qualify as a civilian
> > application.
> >
> > The result of the 1994 China trade trip?
> >
> > Today, China is using Loral satellites to perform all
> > weather bombing using a "western" based navigation system in
> > their modified Russia SU-27 FLANKER jet fighters. These
> > navigation aids were originally sold to China under the condition
> > they would be used on "civilian" airliners.
>
That's nice but you DON'T own GPS satellites. Aviation
Week & Space Technology noted the "western" satellite
nav system installed in the Chinese F-10 (Su-27) was
LORAL's APSTAR. We sold them the satellite and the
system on the grounds they would use it only for
civilian purposes. Not as accurate as GPS but more than
sufficient to drop bombs with.
> My fr***ing Hertz rental car can have a GPS. You can buy
> the receivers at Radio Shack. Sheesh. And _what_ LORAL
> satellites are you _talking_ about?
>
> > . . . Of course, now that
> > the satellites are under PRC control, their civilian operation
> > has been shifted slightly. The SU-27s are made in Russia (soon to
> > be copied by license in China) and they are not going to complain
> > about the navigation gear being tuned to Schwartz's satellites.
>
> The LORAL satellites I know of are LEOS telecommunications
> satellites. What are you _talking_ about?
>
NOT all LORAL satellites are LEOS - APSTAR is a GEO
and please note the ASIASAT series is not LEO either.
> > Thus, the next bombs to fall in anger from a PLA warplane will
> > come courtesy (and with great accuracy) via the USA.
>
> Horsepuckey.
>
> > Another US, high-tech, upgrade for the benefit of China's
> > Generals and Commissars is their new secure military
> > communication system. China is now using US built secure encoding
> > systems to protect their military satellite and global
> > communications. . . .
>
> Bulltwaddly. All they got was SONET and ATM stuff. Big deal.
> And the "encrypted systems", AFAIK, are PCS cellular phones.
> Which _aren't_ securely erncrypted. Some folks at Berkeley
> managed to get the keys to the encrypted part of the equipment
> using home PCs.
That's nice now see if you pass your info to Korea, and the
Dali Lama.
>
> > . . . This 21st century system is a decades leap
> > forward for the Chinese, who previously depended on former Soviet
> > built analog scramblers to protect their highest military orders.
>
> ROFLMAO. You folks are so confused here, it's pathetic. . .
GO CALL THE GAO FULL OF IT!
I did not write the GAO report ... I did not put together the
details of a C4 system sold by Presidential orders to China.
GO READ the GAO report.
>
> > The great leap forward for the PRC did not come at the end of
> > years of costly R&D followed by careful deployment. Instead, the
> > Princes in Beijing can now issue nuclear launch code orders using
> > C4 (Command, Control, Communications, and Computers) systems that
> > rival the best in the free west. Basically, this is because their
> > system was built in the free west.
>
> They could buy SONET from anyone else. The reason this stuff
> was lowered in export classifications is that it is _readily_
> available anyways.
>
> > So who is responsible for this? A dead Ron Brown? A very
> > much richer Bernard Schwartz?
>
> Who's responsible for this outrageous distortion of the facts.
> Some clueless paranoids? Or some people out to cofuse the
> issues and make political hay?
Call me all the names you want. I did not write this.
I am just the piano player. The GAO put together much
the same thing (eg... below). So go call them names too.
>
> > We have Bill Clinton to thank for arming the Chinese this
> > time around. Bill Clinton personally tasked Bernard Schwartz on a
> > "PRESIDENTIAL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MISSION" for Red China.
> > Schwartz actually carried papers of authorization from his friend
> > Bill with him to China. Thus, it comes as no surprise that once
> > in China, Schwartz met with Shen Rong-Jun, Vice Minister for
> > COSTIND (Commission of Science, Technology, & Industry for
> > National Defense). I do not know if Rong-Jun is related to Wang
> > Jun, the Chinese arms dealer who paid his way into the White
> > House at about the same time. However, I do know that COSTIND is
> > an arm of the People's Liberation Army; note the ND stands for
> > "National Defense". In the end, Rong-Jun and Wang Jun were really
> > working for the same boss... The People's Liberation Army.
> >
All FOIA'd materials were ON Bernard Schwartz in ref. to any
exports to China or trade trips. The Commerce Dept. has elected
to with hold 22 pages for unspecified reasons as well.
1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775
Charles R. Smith
SOFTWAR
http://www.us.net/softwar
sof...@us.net
sof...@us.net
Snip from a recent post -
Additional proof of who authorized the military exports to China comes not
from a SOFTWAR FOIA but from a recently published GAO report on US weapons
exports to China. http://www.gao.gov The GAO published testimony from May 7,
1998. NSIAD-98-171, which states "According to State (Department) officials,
since 1990, 11 Presidential waivers have been issued removing export
restrictions on 21 satellite projects. Presidential waivers were also granted
to permit the export of encryption equipment controlled on the Munitions
List".
> > >> . . . This item alone
> > >> allows for automated ascent control using ground based computers.
> > >> Secure computer communications are a vital part of any advanced
> > >> missile - ESPECIALLY - nuclear tipped ICBM's. Mr. Reinsch (BXA Head)
> > >> admitted the LORAL transfer and it's importance in modern weapons C4.
> > >> Thus, the reason why such systems ARE still part of the US Munitions
> > >> List.
>
> Excuse me, but ICBMs have on-board guidance systems so that they
> _won't_ need communications while in flight. In an high
> EMP environment, you _can't_ rely on such communications for
> basic mission capabilities.
Obviously, you have never studied the SS-18 Satan which has exactly that kind
of system you claim does not exist. Other missiles that can and often do use
"active" encrypted data links are interceptor such as Patriot, Standard and
ERINT. Obviously, you have little if any idea of the hardware at hand.
>
> > >> AND, you seem to have missed the use of US built super computers for
> > >> nuclear weapons (payload) design, and flight trajectory.
> >
> > >Hell, I'm using a "supercomputer" pretty much like the SGI stuff right
> > >now to send you this e-mail. You're a hoot, Mr. Smith.
> >
> > I am delighted that you take this so lightly. Of course, pointing
> > nuclear weapons at someone else sorta ruins the whole point. I thank
> > you for helping China and Russia develop better bombs. Your efforts for
> > world peace are most impressive.
>
> I'm just saying that you're a _real_ paranoid, with little grounding
> in the realities of modern electronics technology.
>
> [snip ad hominem]
>
> > AND I doubt that you are using a $7 million dollar machine to spin
> > email.
>
> No, but I can use a $100K one to do so, one that beats the pants
> off those SGI machines in horsepower. You can buy a lot more
> with a lot less with a couple of years time. . . . The point,
> which you failed to address, is that so-called "super-computer"
> technology is being fast outmoded by your your everyday PC.
> AFAIK, the latest "supercomputer" being bought by the DoD
> is just a huge bunch of Pentiums hooked together. Crays
> are dinosaurs now. . . At one point, the largest known prime
> number was found by a person that had hooked up a bunch of
> PCs in his home.
>
Tinker toys. $100,000? What do you use it for? Animation for South Park?
The three Amdahl units I play with cost 30 times that and can process 100
times your $100K AL2000 unit can. That is why we use them for a front ends
on the five engine IBM 3090. And as for obsolete... Perhaps you need to tell
DOD and Sandia labs that buying the TERAflop Intel unit was a waste of time.
Finally, when or if you can recreate a nuclear blast in real time on your
$100K AL2000 let me know. I am sure I know a few people who would love to see
you prove it.
1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775
Charles R. Smith
SOFTWAR
http://www.us.net/softwar
sof...@us.net
zu...@ix.netcom.com
In article <6jfqnm$ie4$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>,
Yeah, I spotted this in today's NYT article:
From an article in the N.Y. Times, by By Jeff Gerth and David
E. Sanger:
. . . A key issue was how to protect encryption
equipment, which is built into a satellite and interprets
instructions from ground controllers who manipulate the satellite
once it is in orbit. Similar devices are used to communicate with
American spy satellites, and the Pentagon and intelligence agencies
worried that anyone who could crack the code could take control of
the satellites themselves.
An Aug. 17, 1995, a memorandum prepared for the interagency group
noted that the chief executive of a satellite company told
Christopher that "once it is embedded in the satellite, the
encryption device has no military significance." Thus, the industry
argued, there was little risk that the Chinese would get their
hands on the encryption devices -- especially because American
military officials are supposed to watch the satellites with care
when they are in Chinese hands.
But, the memo went on, "the national security position" is that
"the nature of the device itself," not its location, "should be
used to determine whether it must be controlled as a military
item."
The encryption issue was one of the main reasons the interagency
group -- over the objections of the Commerce Department --
recommended that satellites remain on the munitions list.
Christopher concurred. . . .
As I suspected, and metioned in one recent post, they have
encryption on the satellite control uplink. This is almost
obligatory, to keep hackers or others from commandeering the
satellites. I don't think anyone would expect that we would
not have such, in particular on satellites that they are
launching for us. As long as we maintain control of the
satellite during prelaunch, there should be no problem
here, and AFAIK, there has been none.
As the article points out, these are in use for control of
the satellite _post-release_. This is _not_ a secure uplink
for the launch phase, which is what some confused folks around
the NGs have made it out to be. You included, Mr. Smith.
Whether such devices should be on satellites sold to
China for their use is a different question, but I see no
big problme with it. Encryption is no longer the big
secret it used to be, much to NSA's dismay. I'm not sure
that the concerns voiced above WRT their studying the
encryption used in commercial satellites sold to them is
going to tell them a lot about what we did with our
spy satellites; probably not much that they don't already
know. . . .
And as I pointed out, if we're _making_ the satellite, and
we provide the encryption, we know how the encryption works,
so we would have some tactical advantage WRT cracking the
codes on any satellites provided to them, should it prove
to be in our interests to do so. . . .
Sounds a bit to me like the NSA and their good buddies
are _still_ trying to get the barn door closed long
after the cows have gone to town. They have to grow up
one of these days, and realize that they are not the only
cryptography experts around, and that people other than
them, and the people they want to give their papal
blessing to, can have and use encryptation technology.
Ideas are free. It's the keys now that are the big
thing, so to speak. . . .
> > > >> . . . This item alone
> > > >> allows for automated ascent control using ground based computers.
Nope. See N.Y. Times snippet above.
> > > >> Secure computer communications are a vital part of any advanced
> > > >> missile - ESPECIALLY - nuclear tipped ICBM's. Mr. Reinsch (BXA Head)
> > > >> admitted the LORAL transfer and it's importance in modern weapons C4.
> > > >> Thus, the reason why such systems ARE still part of the US Munitions
> > > >> List.
> >
> > Excuse me, but ICBMs have on-board guidance systems so that they
> > _won't_ need communications while in flight. In an high
> > EMP environment, you _can't_ rely on such communications for
> > basic mission capabilities.
>
> Obviously, you have never studied the SS-18 Satan which has exactly
> that kind of system you claim does not exist. . . .
Then it's a shitty rocket.
> . . . Other missiles that can
> and often do use "active" encrypted data links are interceptor such
> as Patriot, Standard and ERINT. Obviously, you have little if any
> idea of the hardware at hand.
These aren't ICBMs. But, no matter, that wasn't what we gave
them. Unless you're telling me we gave spread-spectrum
transmitters to the Chinese for their use with satellites
we sold _them_ (which, AFAIK, no one has alleged, and which
probably wouldn't be permitted if attempted), I'm not too
worried here. What did we give the Chinese? Or is it
your concern about what we sent up in our satellites?
> > > >> AND, you seem to have missed the use of US built super
> > > >> computers for nuclear weapons (payload) design, and flight
> > > >> trajectory.
> > >
> > > >Hell, I'm using a "supercomputer" pretty much like the SGI
> > > >stuff right now to send you this e-mail. You're a hoot, Mr.
> > > >Smith.
> > >
> > > I am delighted that you take this so lightly. Of course,
> > > pointing nuclear weapons at someone else sorta ruins the
> > > whole point. . . .
Gee, does it make us _bad_ that _we_ did this for so many years?
> > > . . . I thank you for helping China and Russia develop
> > > better bombs. Your efforts for world peace are most impressive.
> >
> > I'm just saying that you're a _real_ paranoid, with little grounding
> > in the realities of modern electronics technology.
> >
> > [snip ad hominem]
> >
> > > AND I doubt that you are using a $7 million dollar machine to spin
> > > email.
> >
> > No, but I can use a $100K one to do so, one that beats the pants
> > off those SGI machines in horsepower. You can buy a lot more
> > with a lot less with a couple of years time. . . . The point,
> > which you failed to address, is that so-called "super-computer"
> > technology is being fast outmoded by your your everyday PC.
> > AFAIK, the latest "supercomputer" being bought by the DoD
> > is just a huge bunch of Pentiums hooked together. Crays
> > are dinosaurs now. . . At one point, the largest known prime
> > number was found by a person that had hooked up a bunch of
> > PCs in his home.
>
> Tinker toys. $100,000? What do you use it for? Animation for
> South Park?
I told you. E-mail. When it's not being used for compilations,
platform validation and load test. Whooptidoo.
> The three Amdahl units I play with cost 30 times that and can
> process 100 times your $100K AL2000 unit can. . . .
I dunno. First off, check the message headers and you might
stand a better chance of getting the machine architecture
right. One of our "supercomputers" here falls in the 2,000
MTOPs category mentioned in the Hyde letter. And we have a
DEC Alpha as well, which is also generally considered in that
category. Your Amdahls may have cost a lot, but that doesn't
mean diddly any more. My old clunker laptop cost a lot
when I got it, but that doesn't make it any less a clunker.
I stongly doubt your precious Amdahls can do 200,000 MTOPSs.
Hate to say it, but there aren't many machines that can
do that, AFAIK. But I'm glad you foolishly insist your
Amdahls _can_ do this. It just goes to show how ridiculous
your claim is that the SGI machines are "supercomputers".
> . . . That is why we use them for a front ends
> on the five engine IBM 3090.
"My machines bigger than your, machine, nya, nya, nya. . ."
I'm _duly_ impressed. My point is that _everyone_ has
"big" machines nowadays, and they're getting "bigger"
by the day. . . . The tried to prevent 8080 exports to
the Soviet Union long after it was pointless from a
national secuurity standpoint. The military is so
anal retentive about keeping technology secret, they
don't understand that technology is whizzing right by
them all over the world. Putting strict export controls
on this stuff is at best marginally productive WRT
military advantage, and tremendously unproductive WRT
commercial considerations. Which is _why_ the GLX
licences were created, and these various technologies
were moved from the restricted list. They are readily
available on the open market. . . . *sheesh*
> . . . And as for obsolete. . .
Your Amdahls? Or the IBM clunker?
> . . . Perhaps you need
> to tell DOD and Sandia labs that buying the TERAflop Intel
> unit was a waste of time.
No. What I need to do, and _did_ do, if you just look
at the last post, is point out that this TeraFLOP machine
is nothing more than a whole slew of Pentiums hooked together.
> Finally, when or if you can recreate a nuclear blast in real
> time on your $100K AL2000 let me know. I am sure I know a
> few people who would love to see you prove it.
ROFLMAO! No one _needs_ to "recreate a nuclear blast in real
time". One of the wonderful things about simulations is that
you get to control the clock speed. The point I've been making
is that such simulations can be done on _any_ machine with
enough memory and enough time. And when Pentiums are so
cheap and readily available, and there's so much stuff
known about how to parcel such computation out on multiple
processors, this technology is pretty much available to
anyone. . . . It's marginally more complicated; finite
element analysis, AFAIK, can benefit a little from vector
processing, but, as you should know from the TeraFLOP
machine, it wasn't enough of an advantage to make them
go with a vector processor architecture such as the
Crays were in their latest supercomputer purchase.
Cheers,
-- Arne Langsetmo