Bret:
Read this. Buy the book.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/books/its-even-worse-than-it-looks-how-the-american-constitutional-system-collided-with-the-new-politics-of-extremism-by-thomas-e-mann-and-norman-j-ornstein/2012/04/30/gIQA2ohKsT_print.html
‘It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System
Collided With The New Politics of Extremism’ by Thomas E. Mann and
Norman J. Ornstein
By Robert G. Kaiser, Published: April 30
Reading this book is a little like quaffing a double espresso on an
empty stomach — it’s a jolt. For this reader it was a welcome jolt.
Others will find it less palatable.
Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein have been Washington fixtures
for three decades. They are two of the brightest, best informed and
most scholarly students of our politics. They started out together as
graduate students of political science at the University of Michigan,
and decades ago took up residence at the Brookings Institution (Mann)
and the American Enterprise Institute (Ornstein). Both have cultivated
Democratic and Republican senators and House members to help them
figure out the workings of the legislative branch. They acknowledge
holding liberal views themselves, but throughout their careers they
have tried to uphold a scholarly, non-partisan standard. Republicans
once took them as seriously as Democrats did.
Six years ago they published a fine book on the problems of Congress,
“The Broken Branch.” Among its many admirers was Newt Gingrich, the
former speaker of the House, who gave it an enthusiastic “blurb” for
the book’s back cover: “The Broken Branch is a serious step toward
strengthening the Congress.”
That book was sharply critical of then-Speaker Dennis Hastert and
House Majority Leader Tom DeLay for running the House with minimal
regard for “regular order”— the traditional, bi-partisan way of doing
business by the rule book that Mann and Ornstein revere — and instead
putting political advantage ahead of careful legislating. Gingrich
praised their book despite its critical assessment of his fellow
Republicans.
Now Mann and Ornstein have decided that the time has come to abandon
the evenhandedness still fashionable among political journalists (as
opposed to the partisan talking heads and bloggers now so popular).
The blunt result will be invigorating for some readers, and
infuriating for others.
Their principal conclusion is unequivocal: Today’s Republicans in
Congress behave like a parliamentary party in a British-style
parliament, a winner-take-all system. But a parliamentary party —
“ideologically polarized, internally unified, vehemently oppositional”
— doesn’t work in a “separation-of-powers system that makes it
extremely difficult for majorities to work their will.”
These Republicans “have become more loyal to party than to country,”
the authors write, so “the political system has become grievously
hobbled at a time when the country faces unusually serious problems
and grave threats. . . . The country is squandering its economic
future and putting itself at risk because of an inability to govern
effectively.”
Today’s Republican Party has little in common even with Ronald
Reagan’s GOP, or with earlier versions that believed in government.
Instead it has become “an insurgent outlier — ideologically extreme;
contemptuous of the inherited social and economic policy regime;
scornful of compromise; unpersuaded by conventional understanding of
facts, evidence and science; and dismissive of the legitimacy of its
political opposition . . . all but declaring war on the government.”
Mann and Ornstein consider “the debt ceiling fiasco” of last summer
proof of these accusations. The idea of deliberately jeopardizing the
credit rating of the United States by toying with a purposeful default
on the country’s debt was a carefully planned strategy, they note —
the brainchild of Eric Cantor of Virginia, today’s majority leader of
the House.
After Republicans elected 87 new members in 2010 and took control of
the House, their nominal leader, John Boehner, clearly recognized that
the debt ceiling would have to be raised to keep the government
operating. Unlike Cantor and those new members, Boehner remembered the
political damage done in 1995 when Gingrich forced a shutdown of the
federal government in a spending dispute with Bill Clinton, probably
assuring Clinton’s 1996 reelection.
Mann and Ornstein quote Boehner from late 2010: “We’re going to have
to deal with [the debt ceiling] as adults. Whether we like it or not,
the federal government has obligations, and we have obligations on our
part.” Cantor disagreed. When the new Republican House majority
convened at a Baltimore retreat in January, 2011, “Cantor implored
them to use the coming debt limit vote as their golden opportunity.”
They quote Cantor in a story in The Post that revealed this episode:
“I’m urging you [Republican House members] to look at a potential
increase in the debt limit as a leverage moment when . . . President
Obama will have to deal with us” and accept deep spending cuts.
The showdown soon arrived. After weeks of anxious uncertainty, Senate
Republicans blinked. Their leader, Mitch McConnell of Kentucky,
acknowledged that deliberately putting the GOP in the position of
being blamed for a national default was a bad idea — not because of
the economic consequences, but the political ones. Allowing Obama to
blame the Republicans for forcing the country into default, McConnell
acknowledged, “is very bad positioning going into elections.”
Precariously, a deal was struck. President Obama agreed to make $38
billion in cuts to the current federal budget. In return Republicans
agreed to raise the debt ceiling enough to put off another fight on
the issue until after the 2012 elections. Well, some Republicans
agreed. Sixty-six Republicans in the House voted no; only Democratic
support saved the deal and prevented default.
Those of us who follow the Washington circus may have forgotten (I
had) that McConnell has already promised to repeat this drama early
next year, when the debt ceiling will have to be raised again. Mann
and Ornstein remind us that McConnell told Fox News, “We’ll be doing
it all over” in 2013.
It is this willingness to put perceived political advantage ahead of
good government that persuades the authors that we are living in a
novel time that is “even worse than it looks.” They acknowledge that
many of its features are not new, but all of them — from partisan
warfare to the impact of money on our politics — seem worse than at
any time in a century or more. Well-established, negative trends in
our politics have “passed a critical point, leading to something far
more troubling than we have ever seen.”
In recounting the history of how we got here, Mann and Ornstein
reserve a special place of dishonor for their one-time admirer,
Gingrich. His eagerness “to paint . . . his own institution [when
Democrats controlled it] as elitist, corrupt and arrogant . . .
undermined basic public trust in Congress and government. . . . His
attacks on partisan adversaries in the White House and Congress
created a norm in which colleagues with different views became mortal
enemies. . . . He helped invent the modern permanent campaign,
allowing electoral goals to dominate policy ones. . . . One has to
look back to Gingrich as the singular political figure who set the
tone that followed.” So no Gingrich blurb this time.
Mann and Ornstein rightly blame the news media for doing a mediocre
job covering the most important political story of the last three
decades: the transformation of the Republican Party. They are critical
of the conventions of mainstream journalism that lead to the
evenhandedness they have now abandoned themselves. They see a
“reflexive tendency of many in the mainstream press to use false
equivalence to explain outcomes,”when Republican obstructionism and
Republican rejection of science and basic facts have no Democratic
equivalents. It’s much easier to write stories “that convey an
impression that the two sides are equally implicated.”
The authors emphasize the deterioration of the American political
culture, corrupted by money and embittered by partisanship, affecting
not just Congress but also, they argue persuasively, the Supreme
Court. This spoiled culture has encouraged the cynicism of voters, now
a serious impediment to political reforms. Mann and Ornstein write at
length about both bad and good ideas for improving the situation in
four long chapters that are less passionate and a lot wonkier than
their more than 100-page indictment of the Republicans, which they
know is going to create a marketing problem for this book.
“Some readers may be struck by a lack of balance in our treatment of
the two major political parties,” they admit, but insist that they
hope not for Democratic hegemony, but for “two vibrant and
constructive political parties.” They mean, of course, two parties
that actually believe in the efficacy of government to help society, a
notion the tea party Republicans appear to reject.
Mann and Ornstein chose not to explore the history of today’s voters’
cynicism, a powerful ingredient in the poisonous brew they describe.
Doing so would have given them a chance to add some even-handedness to
their story. In 1964, on the eve of the disastrous Vietnam War, 77
percent of Americans expected their government do “do the right thing”
always or most of the time, according to opinion polls. Ten years
later, after Vietnam and Watergate, 77 percent had become 36. Today it
is less than 20 percent who have that confidence in the government.
The Vietnam War, largely the work of Democrats, and Richard Nixon
together destroyed Americans’ confidence in their governing
institutions. It has never been restored. Several generations have
grown up since reflexively distrusting their government.
And now, as Mann and Ornstein document so vividly, at a time when only
good government could help us rediscover our footing as a nation, our
Grand Old Party defines itself as the party of anti-government. This
is why the title of this book is so good: Our situation really is even
worse than it looks.