A weakness in Ayn Rand's strongest theory
Immortalist
One cannot deny something exists without
first accepting that thing exists to deny
without producing a contradiction.
Therefore existence is an axiomatic
principle of your knowledge, a fact
of reality and it doesn't matter
what we may call it.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivist_epistemology
[see "concept formation"]
The theory of Non-contradictory identification is an attempt to create
a foundationalist philosophy based on a single, undeniable truth which
is fixed and assured.
The first principle that "we cannot deny that something exists without
first accepting that thing exists to deny, i.e. without contradiction"
depends upon a logical structure which is really a second postulate.
This constitutes an unstated and hence unjustified claim that we can
trust our capacity to judge correctly, to distinguish the true from
the false and to determine what is contradictory or non-contradictory,
what cannot be mistaken or has no chance for error.
Therefore this non-contradictory identification remains theoretical,
but theoretically it seems like the best theory, that is all.
IF the capacity to judge correctly, to distinguish the true from the
false and to determine what is contradictory or non-contradictory, is
completely certain and cannot be mistaken, THEN it is the case that we
cannot deny that something exists without first accepting that thing
exists to deny, i.e. without contradiction.
Immortalist
THE CIRCLE GAME: "Descartes was a philosophical disaster!" Attacking
Descate's Cogito from within Descartes's own logical structure rather
than from a modern context.
Examining Descartes's philosophy from within its own logical
structure, we see that Descartes is unable to escape the necessity of
an observer in his attempt to find a foundation for his philosophy. As
I will show, he grounds his philosophy on the postulates of his
ability to discern truth from fiction and his own existence. Descartes
foundationalist philosophy fails, as a result, because neither the
infallibility and integrity of the observer nor the observer's
existence are certain.
Descartes attempts to create a foundationalist philosophy based on a
single, undeniable truth which he knows to be "fixed and assured". He
takes "I think, therefore I am" "as the first principle of the
philosophy I was seeking", believing that this is the only truth which
is necessary to found a philosophy. His logical structure , however,
relies on a second postulate. He claims that "the capacity to judge
correctly and to distinguish the true from the false is naturally
equal in all men". This postulate is more fundamental to his logical
structure than the cogito because without it, he cannot escape the
skepticism of his foundationalist structure.
Unpacking the significance of this postulate is somewhat of a
metaphysical thicket, but the effort is well rewarded. There is no
question that by thinking "I think, therefore I am", Descartes is
thinking. Beyond the statement of his existence, however, Descartes
cannot form any other conclusion unless he has the ability to discern
the truth of a thought-except the conclusion that he is, there is no
method to discern a true thought from a thought implanted into his
head by an other being unless he can make the distinction himself. If
he is to make any progress in his philosophy, he must rely on this
second postulate.
Even with this condition, Descartes's philosophy remains unstable. His
first postulate, the cogito, fails because it depends on the integrity
of the subject, the ego. Unlike a similar postulate of mathematics,
such as x+0=x, which does not depend on the integrity of the observer
in order to be true, Descartes's postulate is singularly tied to the
subject because the subject, the "I", is an integral part of the
statement. In the postulate, the "I" must be distinct since the cogito
makes no claims about the existence of anything outside the mind.
Descartes admits, however, that the mind is subject to failings caused
by the body:
"the mind depends so much on the temperament and on the disposition of
the organs of the body, that if it is possible to find some means of
rendering men as a whole wiser and more dexterous than they have been
hitherto, I believe it must be sought in medicine".
Furthermore, the mind cannot be sure of even its own state. Descartes
admits that "there are no conclusive signs by means of which one can
distinguish clearly between being awake and being asleep". Most
significantly, however, Descartes requires the fallibility of his mind
in order to prove the existence of God. Within his proof, Descartes
gives as an antecedent to his argument the observation that "my being
was not completely perfect" when it was created. But the infallible
ability to discern truth is, by nature of its indisputeability, a form
of perfection. He appears to be directly contradicting his second
postulate, the ability to discern truth from fiction. This logical
breakdown within Descartes's argument hints at a much greater problem,
however.
Descartes has a problem of authorship. That he exists and that he
conceives of his existence are synonymous according to the cogito
postulate. Furthermore, the existence of anything outside of his mind
depends on his own existence. He is assured of the existence of the
rest of the Universe by his perception of thinking of it. If the
observer stops observing himself, he ceases to exist, however. Thus
the reality of the Universe within Descartes's system depends on his
ability to conceive of it, which in turn requires that he exist. This
introduces a rather interesting problem in to his philosophy.
By the time he has completed his proof of the existence of God,
Descartes concludes that his own existence is dependent of the
existence of God. Because he creates a foundationalist philosophy,
Descartes must believe that the laws of the Universe are deriveable
from the cogito postulate. After attempting to establish the existence
of God, however, he admits that "I have observed certain laws which
God has so established in nature and of which he has impressed such
notions in our souls". According to his postulates, all that is in
Descartes's mind is the result of the fact that he thinks, yet here he
seems to be adding yet another subject to the set of actors upon which
his philosophy rests. The validity of the claims he has already made
are again questioned by further doubt over the author of existence:
"And who can give me the assurance that this God has not arranged that
there should be no earth, no heaven, no extended body, no figure, no
magnitude, or place, and that nevertheless I should have the
perception of all these things, and the persuasion that they do not
exist other than as I see them?"
Clearly, Descartes would not want to add dependency on a second
subject to his philosophy but he nonetheless accepts the notion that
not all existence can be attributed to his thoughts alone. God, he
qualifies, must also have authorship:
"if the objective reality of any one of my ideas is such that I know
clearly that it is not within me, either formally or eminently, and
that consequently I cannot myself be its cause, it follows necessarily
from this that I am not alone in the world, but that there is besides
some other being who exists, and who is the cause of this idea."
It is illogical that such a being, whose existence in the Universe is
dependent on the thoughts and observations of an observer could also
be the author of the same observer's thoughts. Surely Descartes
realized this but he seems to ignore its significance. He declares
"God is necessarily the author of my existence" and so falls into a
circular dependency, where his own existence is dependent on a God
whose existence in the Universe is dependent on Descartes's ability to
conceive of God and to determine the truth of such a perception.
Because the observer is thus permanently trapped within Descartes's
web of logic, the entire foundation of the structure is unsound.
With the foundation of Descartes carefully laid structure crumbling in
front of close examination, it appears, a philosophical failure. Such
an evaluation is made strong if it comes from within the logical
structure that Descartes presents. The job is easy, however, because
Descartes establishes such a dependent, recursive structure that his
entire fabrication falls under its own twisted weight.
bigfl...@gmail.com
> Cogito, Ergo Sum (The Circle Game) Descartes
>
One of the foundations of confusion in such matters, is based on the
belief of "healthy mind, healthy body".Im sure Hawking would
disagree!!!
How does 'healthy imagination, healthy emotion or healthy attitude'-
healthy body sound?Of course, 'healthy' in this context means to be
functional; of benefit to oneself and others, to fascilitate creative
fulfillment.
It is only when the understanding of 'healthy brain, healthy body' is
realized, that "things of the mind" can then be attended to.
If this wasnt the case, we could take disfunctional offenders such as
rapists, murderers etc, modify the offending part of their brain, and
still be left with a contributing funcional person, unlike the earlier
attempts at full frontal lobotomies. Of course,we would have to
defeat the bigpharma/psychiatry lobby. The last guy to try that was
thrown out of the country, and became world famous (his success was a
threat to that particular group)!!!
"I think as a consequence of my being" would be more accurate.
BOfL
BOfL
Giga
"Immortalist" <reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:25c5830e-2e02-47b3...@z35g2000prh.googlegroups.com...
=We can ask in what capacity something exists, purely as an idea or with its
own mind-independent reality. In both cases it exists.
Fred Weiss
> Non-contradictory identification;
>
> One cannot deny something exists without
> first accepting that thing exists to deny
> without producing a contradiction.
This is not a correct formulation of the principle.
Of course you can deny that *something* exists and doing so in no way
assumes its existence. That's absurd.
What you cannot deny is *existence itself*. Nor, for that matter, can
you deny the consciousness which is doing the denying. Not without
self-contradiction.
Fred Weiss
*Anarcissie*
Obviously, in order to use logic, one must believe
in it -- believe that it exists, and can be used to
produce reliable, understandable, and true results.
Kant seems to have believed that this was true
knowledge, not just belief, and was intrinsic in
our minds. However, it seems to me it could be
just another illusion.
As for "existence exists", to say that something
is or does something implies either that it could
not be or do that something. To say that X exists,
then, implies that possibly X could not exist. I
don't see how this statement could be made
about an abstraction derived from the verb
attributed to it, e.g. if anything exists "existence"
must exist -- it is a tautology. More succinctly,
'Being is.' But this doesn't tell us much. We
still haven't escaped from the Cartesian -
Philosophy 101 predicament. And we have
already used up a lot of belief-gas to get
here.
Immortalist
Existence doesn't assert anything, arguments humans create assert
something. You have a theory about existence and you have a theory
about consciousness, lets not confuse this with some kind of facts
man.
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm
1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose
justification does not depend on that of any further emperical
beliefs.
2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a
reason why it is likely to be true.
3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive
possession of such a reason.
4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he
believes with justification the premises from which it follows that
the belief is likely to be true.
5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least
one empirical premise.
6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends
on the justification of at least one other empirical belief,
contradicting 1.
7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs.
This seems to eliminate the possibility of emperical justification of
any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this untruthfullness
of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent "regress"
of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another and so
on:
If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
emperical beliefs, then it must either:
(1) terminate in unjustified beleifs
(2) go on infinitely (without circularity)
(3) circle back upon itself in some way. (begging the question on
steroids)
If there is no way to justify emperical beliefs apart from an appeal
to other justified emperical beliefs, and if an infinite sequence of
distinct justified beliefs is ruled out, then the presumably finite
system of justified emperical beliefs can only be justified from
within, by birtue of the relations of its component beliefs to each
other. Coherence theory is of the variey (3) seemingly circular if
veiwed in an linear fasion, merely indicated by whatever
"property" (or complex of properties) is requisite for the
justification of such a system of beliefs. Degrees of justification
emerge out of the relations of groups of beliefs.
> Fred Weiss
Immortalist
Again your just constructing arguments and then confusing them with
this theory of reality and being. "Being is" is not being, it is an
argument. This other argument that being and existence are necessary
for creating arguments in the first place is just another argument
which is not some fact. Hume would say that it is a theory that
something one minute is the same during another minute. This
"consistency" is always slipped in as some sort of hidden argument
which is supposed to be dogmatically unquestionable.
*Anarcissie*
Yes, I'm just constructing arguments, etc. What did
you think I was doing? Cleaning the cat box? I guess
I can understand the confusion.
I suppose you're hoping someone will defend poor
old Rand.
*Anarcissie*
It seems to me that doubting one's own existence
would require some pretty heavy lifting. Since one
experiences existence, that seems to be a justified
empirical belief. Assuming, of course, that "justified",
"empirical", "belief", "experience", "existence" and so
forth mean anything.
Immortalist
Actually seeing if anyone can figure out this way to defeat the
argument against Rand man;
Skeptic: "You claim that man gains knowledge of reality through his
senses, but' I submit that our sense are deceptive. Since we cannot
rationally defend the reliability of sensory evidence, we must place
trust in them as a matter of faith."
Antiskeptic: "Why do you say that?"
Skeptic: "Because our senses give us contradictory testimony, and even
you stress that contradictions cannot exist. Look, I'll prove it to
you by taking this pencil and placing it in ..."
Antiskeptic: "Excuse me for a moment. If I understand cor rectly, you
are going to demonstrate that our senses do not give us accurate
knowledge of reality. Is this correct?"
Skeptic: "Yes."
Antiskeptic: "Then you cannot start from the prior assumption that our
senses do give us accurate knowledge of reality, because this would
entail accepting the truth of the very proposition which you wish to
disprove. Do you agree?"
Skeptic: "Of course."
Antiskeptic: "Then you won't mind if, from this point on, I don't
grant you this assumption."
Skeptic: "Naturally. Now may I proceed with my demon stration?"
Antiskeptic: (staring in opposite directionno answer).
Skeptic: "I said, may I proceed?"
Antiskeptic: (startled). "Did I hear something?"
Skeptic: (irritated). "I'm talking to you."
Antiskeptic: "I beg your pardon."
Skeptic: "Are you going to be serious or not? Here I am trying to
carry on an intelligent philosophical conversation, and you're acting
silly."
Antiskeptic: (squinting his eyes). "It looks and sounds like you are
talking to me, but then I can't be certain, since I never trust what I
see and hear. In fact, I can't be sure that you are actually sitting
there."
Skeptic: "I insist that you behave reasonably!"
Antiskeptic: "If I could only trust what I see and hear, I might be
able to reply assuming of course that I could trust you, if you're
really there, to hear what I actually say. But, then, I couldn't be
sure that what I hear myself saying is what I've said, because ..."
Skeptic: "All right, you've made your point. Have it your way. Assume,
for the sake of argument, that we are communicating accurately. I
admit that it cannot be proven, but assume it for now."
Antiskeptic: "Why?"
Skeptic: "So I can make my point."
Antiskeptic: "I must assume, in other words, that my senses are not
deceptiveat least as they pertain to this conversationso that you can
get your argument off the ground to 'prove' that this entire
assumption is unfounded. If your argument is correct, you don't have
the means with which to make your point. Through your attempt at
communication and argument, you are admitting the validity of sense
perceptionand, there fore, by arguing that sense perception is
deceptive, you cut the ground from under your own feet and become
mired in a hopeless absurdity."
Skeptic: "I'll restate my argument somewhat. I don't deny that, for
practical purposes, we act on the assumption that our senses enable us
to perceive without deception. Language, as you have pointed out,
depends on this assumption. What I wish to argue is that our naive
trust in our senses is without logical foundations. Although we may
have faith in our senses from day to day, they are not as reliable as
the average person thinksand 1 can demonstrate this by showing you an
example where our senses are unreliable, because they give us
contradictory infor mation. If this is true, then we have no way of
ascertaining when we are being deceived and when we are not."
Antiskeptic: "Your argument hasn't changed any; you have merely
elaborated it. Like all skeptics, you seem to think that you can
assume as true the very thing you are trying to disprove, and you
attempt to skirt this problem by stipulating that you are doing so for
practical purposes because we make these assumptions in everyday life.
You claim that, as a philosopher, you have discovered reasons to doubt
the validity of sense perception. My point is this: regardless of
whether you call your use of language 'practical' or whatever, by
attempting to communicate you commit yourself to a certain philosophic
contextnamely, the context that makes communication possible. Once you
are working within this context, it is completely irrational to turn
around and declare that the founda tions of that context are
rationally unfounded. If the premise that our senses give us accurate
knowledge of reality has no basis in reason, then any argument that
occurs within that context has no basis in reason eitherwhich includes
your argument."
Skeptic: "I see your point, but I think I can convince you if you will
only watch my demonstration."
Antiskeptic: "Any attempted proof will itself depend on the prior
validity of sensory evidence, so you are again attempting the
absurd."
Skeptic: "But there are such obvious cases of deceptive sensory
appearance, it seems absurd to me to deny their existence. As I was
about to demonstrate before, if I take this straight pencil and place
it in ..."
Antiskeptic: "Straight pencil? How did you ascertain that it is
straight and that it is a pencil?"
Skeptic: "It's quite obvious."
Antiskeptic: "I agree, but you must presuppose the ability of your
senses to give you accurate knowledge of reality."
Skeptic: "I'll rephrase my argument. Here we have what appears to be a
straight pencil, although I'll admit that I cannot prove it. Mind you,
I'm not saying that it really is a straight pencil, but only that it
appears to be so. Now when I place what appears to be a straight
pencil in this glass of water ..."
Antiskeptic: "You mean, when you place what appears to be a straight
pencil in what appears to be a glass of water. . . ."
Skeptic: "Have it your way. Anyway, as you can now witness, the pencil
appears to be bent."
Antiskeptic: "Does it?"
Skeptic: "Well, you're not at a very good angle. Get down more level
with the water line."
Antiskeptic: "Do you mean to say that your monumental disproof of the
senses requires a certain angle?"
Skeptic: "Don't be smart, just look. You must admit that it now looks
bent."
Antiskeptic: "Yes, although a better description would be
'disjointed.' " (Long pause.)
Skeptic: "Well?"
Antiskeptic: "Well what?"
Skeptic: "What do you think now?"
Antiskeptic: "I told you what I think the pencil does look 'bent' in
water."
Skeptic: "Yes, go on." Antiskeptic: "With what?"
Skeptic: "With the conclusion, of course."
Antiskeptic: "But I already gave you my conclusion: the pencil does
appear to be bent under water."
Skeptic: "But what about the contradiction?"
Antiskeptic: "A contradiction?"
Skeptic; "Yes. The pencil appeared to be straight, and now it appears
to be bent. If I remove it from the water, it once again appears
straight."
Antiskeptic: "I agree with you on that point."
Skeptic: "But that's a contradiction!" Antiskeptic: "It is?"
Skeptic: "Of course! How can the same pencil be straight and bent?"
Antiskeptic: "We didn't say that it is straight and bent; we merely
said that it looks straight out of water and looks bent in water.
Where is the contradiction?"
Skeptic: "But that must be a contradiction."
Antiskeptic: "The Law of Contradictionwhich is one of the basic laws
of logicstates that an object cannot be A and non A at the same time
and in the same respect. You're showing me a pencil that looks
straight at one time and in one respect (out of water), but that looks
bent at another time and in another respect (in water). You must
remember the context. We are perceiving the pencil through two
different mediums, air and water. Since light travels more slowly
through water than through air, it takes longer for the light waves to
reach our eyes from the submerged portion. What we are perceiving is
not a contradiction, but simply a straight pencil that appears bent in
a specific context, i.e., in water. No defender of sensory experience
would claim that an object must appear the same in every situation,
but this has no effect whatsoever on the validity of the senses. For
example, if I placed the pencil in a glass of tar, would you then
express surprise because part of the pencil had 'disappeared'? Would
this show that we cannot trust our senses? On the contrary, it is
through our senses that we understand that the pencil is submerged in
tar, and it is through our senses that we discover that light will not
penetrate tar. In other words, it is through our senses that we gather
the information with which to explain why the same object appears
differently under different conditions. We solve the alleged instances
of 'sensory deception' through a further appeal to sensory evidence
just as you must presuppose the validity of the senses in the very
attempt to disprove the validity of the senses."
Skeptic: "Since you claim that I have not presented you with a
legitimate instance of a contradiction, I will appeal to another
version of this argument which will fulfill your requirements. If we
feel the pencil while it is in water, it will feel straight. The
pencil looks bent but feels straight at the same time and in the same
respect, i.e., while it is in water. That should cinch my argument."
Antiskeptic: "No, because we are dealing with two different sense
modalities, which again changes the context. Also, this demonstration,
like all others, presupposes the validity of sense perceptionwhich
renders your conclusion invalid. For example, in order for your
alleged contradiction to be a contradiction, it must be true that we
are seeing and feeling the same object. After all, if we were seeing
and feeling different objects, you would not even raise the
possibility of a contradiction. Now I must ask you how you know that
you are seeing and feeling the same object?"
Skeptic: "It's very simple to see that we are dealing with the same
pencil."
Antiskeptic: "Of course, but you must establish that you are seeing
and feeling the same object without recourse to the senses. And this,
I submit, is impossible. Furthermore, in order for you to maintain
that we are receiving contradictory evidence, you must assume that two
different sense modalities sight and touchcan furnish us with
information concerning the same aspect of the same object. This raises
the question: On what basis do you claim that there is a contradiction
between 'feeling straight' and ''looking bent'?"
Skeptic: "I must say again that it seems quite obvious."
Antiskeptic: "If it seems obvious, it is only because our past
experience has permitted us to make the correlation between what we
see and how an object feels. Without this previous sensory evidence,
no such correlation would be possible. Thus, your argument is
unintelligible without presupposing the vali dity of sensory
evidence."
Skeptic: "I don't understand what you're saying here. Are you claiming
that there is no problem whatsoever in the example I have presented?"
Antiskeptic: "It depends on what you mean by a 'problem.' There is a
kind of problem here, but it is scientific, not philosophical. Because
there is a change in perception when the pencil is submerged in water,
it calls for an explanation but this explanation, as I have pointed
out, consists of appealing to more sensory evidence in order to
establish why the pencil appears bent in water. A primitive man with
no knowledge of light refraction may be genuinely puzzled by our
phenomenon, but if he wishes to arrive at a solution, he can do so
only through more research. For him to blame his senses, aside from
being unjustified, would not solve or explain his dilemma.
"I would like to emphasize a major source of confusion in your
argument against sense perception. To speak of our senses 'deceiving'
us is, at best, a sloppy metaphor. Philosophically, it is nonsense.
Our senses are simply physical organs with no will of their own. To
say that they 'deceive' us makes no more sense than to claim that our
hearts or our lungs 'deceive' us. Sense organs respond to physical
stimuli from the external world; they have no capacity to deceive or
misrepresent. They simply transmit sensations according to their
physiological charac teristics, which our brains then automatically
integrate into percepts. We may misinterpret the basic data given to
us, but there can be no question about the validity of the data per
se. For example, a man may see what he believes to be a lake in the
middle of a desert, whereas what he actually sees is only a reflection
of light waves off the sand, or, in other words, a mirage. The man is
mistaken in his identification of the sensory evidencehe has not
properly interpreted the data given to himbut his senses have not
somehow 'deceived' him. The light waves that reach his eyes actually
do exist, but the man's interpretation as to the causal origin of
these waves is mistaken."
Skeptic: "It seems that you have opened the door for an entirely new
set of objections against the senses. Even if our senses, properly
speaking, do not 'deceive' us, how can we be sure that our
interpretation of sensory evidence is correct? To use your example,
how could the man in a desert decide if what he perceives is a real
lake or merely a mirage?"
Antiskeptic: "By appealing to more sensory evidence. In this case, he
may not be able to decide with certainty until he approaches the area
where the lake is supposed to be and sees that there isn't one."
Skeptic: "But isn't it possible for me to doubt my interpre tation of
sensory evidence in every instance? How can I ever be certain that
what I identify as the object of my perception is in fact the actual
object and not merely a mirage, illusion, or hallucination? Is it not
possible to doubt that you are really sitting there, even though I am
presented with the perception of a man? After all, you may be a mirage
as well."
Antiskeptic: "This throws us into the problem of universal skepticism,
which was refuted in the preceding section. Can you doubt every
instance of sense perception? On a practical level, this is
impossiblebut even if you were an exceptional person with the
psychological capacity to doubt everything, your uni versal doubt
would be blatantly irrational and self contradictory. To doubt every
interpretation of sensory evidence is logically absurd.
"You must realize that to talk of deception, whether in the form of a
mirage, illusion or hallucination, makes sense only in contrast to a
wider context of nondeception. In order to say that one's
interpretation of sensory evidence is incorrect, one must be able to
distinguish incorrect from correct interpre tations. Otherwise, what
would it mean to speak of mistaken identification? Mistaken as opposed
to what? What would it mean, for example, to speak of counterfeit
coins, unless in contradistinction to genuine coins?
Skeptic: "I understand your objection and I think I can respond to it.
I won't deny that in order for us to identify incorrect
interpretations of sensory evidence, we must be able to recog nize, in
principle, a case of genuine interpretation. But my point is this:
how, in any specific instance, can we be sure that we are correct? The
man in the desert, after all, may have felt abso lutely certain that
he was perceiving a lake, but he was wrong anyway. I may feel
absolutely certain that I am perceiving you right now, but isn't it
possible that I too am mistaken? It is perfectly conceivable that you
are a figment of my imagination. Can you demonstrate to me that you
are real and not merely a hallucination, or must I accept my
interpretations on faith?"
Antiskeptic: "Your demand that I somehow prove to you that I am not an
hallucination is totally inappropriate and unjustified. First of all,
since you admit that you must be able to identify correct
interpretations in order to distinguish incorrect interpre tations,
simply apply your criteria to this specific instance. Here I am
sitting next to you in plain view. You can see me, hear me, and even
touch me if you wish. If these conditions do not qualify this as a
case of genuine perception, I fail to see what conditions could
possibly satisfy you. "Doubt is not justified merely on the grounds
that you can somehow 'imagine' that you are mistaken. If in the face
of such overwhelming evidence you wish to doubt the correctness of
your judgment, then you must provide reasons for your doubt. If your
skepticism is to be more than empty rambling, you must justify your
doubt. This must consist of specifying why, in our particular
circumstance, there is reason to suppose that our perceptual judgment
is in error. Doubt cannot be applied indis criminately; it arises
contextually in specific circumstances when there is reason to suppose
that we may be mistaken.
"To illustrate the contextual nature of doubt, consider the case of
the mirage. If we are in the middle of a desert on a very hot day, and
if we see what appears to be a lake in the distance, I may say, 'There
is a lake,' and you may reply, 'Perhaps not; you may be mistaken. It
may be a mirage.' If I ask why you doubt that it is a lake, you may
reply: 'Because light waves often reflect off of the desert sand and
give the appearance of water. We are in a situation where this occurs
quite frequently, so I have reason to doubt.' Or perhaps you are very
familiar with the area and know for a fact that there is no lake, in
which case you would not simply doubt my assertion, but would claim
that I am positively mistaken. In either case, there is something
about our specific situation that causes you to doubt the veracity of
my perceptual identification. "Now suppose that we are in the middle
of a forest and we stumble across a lake. We decide to take a swim and
after an hour of splashing around, you suddenly declare, 'I doubt if
this is a real lake.' Your doubt in this context would be utter
nonsense. If I ask you why you doubt, and you reply, 'It's conceivable
that I am having a hallucination,' I will press you further by asking,
'But what reasons do you have for supposing that you are hallucinating
at this particular moment?' If you fail to offer reasons and merely
assert that a hallucination is con ceivable, I will reply (without
going into a detailed criticism of your use of 'conceivable' here)
that you are uttering an unsup ported, arbitrary propositionand you do
not deserve serious consideration until such time as you are prepared
to offer arguments in support of your claim. "You see, then, that
doubt is appropriate in some circum stances and inappropriate in
others. It should be quite clear that your doubt of my existence is
unfounded, and it must therefore be discarded as irrational. Our
context is such that there is no reason to doubt our interpretations
of sensory material. If you wish to cling to your doubt, you must
offer reasonsreasons that pertain to this specific contextas to why
doubt is necessary. If you fail to do so, then there is no reason why
anyone should listen to you."
Skeptic: "You've covered this ground thoroughly, so I want to move to
another (and in my opinion) more serious objection. You mentioned
earlier that our senses operate according to a physiological process.
Is this correct?"
Antiskeptic: "Yes, perception involves a causal chain of physiological
events."
Skeptic: "Precisely. But all that we are immediately aware of is the
end link of that causal chain. We are aware of percepts, but only as
they present themselves to our consciousness, i.e., only as they
interact with our sense organs. There is, for example, no such thing
as sound existing independently of consciousness; it is simply the
product of waves interacting with our ears. All of external reality is
filtered through our senses before it reaches us, and this prevents us
from ever perceiving reality accurately."
Anriskeptic: "There are two major flaws in your argument. First, it
involves the original stolen concept of depending on communication
which would be impossible if not for the assumption that we do
perceive reality correctly. Second, I would like to ask you how we
came to know of the causal chain involved in perception. After all, it
is not selfevident."
Skeptic: "It was a scientific discovery."
Antiskeptic: "You mean to say, then, that it is an accurate, true
discovery that describes the actual nature of sense perception?"
Skeptic: "Yes, of course."
Antiskeptic: "Then your use of the causal chain in perception commits
you to the position that we perceive reality accurately, since you are
claiming that this causal chain is objective fact and not merely an
idea in your mind."
Skeptic: "But don't you agree that all we ever have direct awareness
of is immediate sense data?"
Antiskeptic: "No. What we have direct awareness of is reality, and we
are given this awareness through perception. Perception is our means
of awareness, not the object of awareness. Every perception is
perception of something. "You want to argue that we are aware only of
ideas or perceptions in the mind rather than external reality. You
then claim that we need to infer the existence of the external world
using these perceptions as a starting point. I am arguing that no such
inference is necessary. We have direct and immediate contact with
reality through sense perception. "All that the causal nature of
perception tells us is that perception necessarily entails a means of
perception; certain causal conditions must be present before
perception is possible, and once these conditions are satisfied, we
have perception. Perception of what? There is only one possible
answer: of reality. There is no other alternative. If your perceptions
are not of reality, just what are they perceptions of?"
Skeptic: "They are perceptions of the interaction between the external
world and my senses."
Antiskeptic: "No. The interaction causes the perception; the
interaction is not the object of perception, but simply that which
makes perception possible. Again, I must ask you, what is it that you
are perceiving, if not reality?"
Skeptic: "I don't think I understand this argument." Antiskeptic:
"I'll rephrase it somewhat. You claim that our senses, because of the
physiological process involved in per ception, distort reality in some
way. Correct?" Skeptic: "Yes."
Antiskeptic: "Now is this distortion caused by our particular sense
organs1 mean, is there something peculiar about the sensory apparatus
of man? or will there be distortion whenever there is perception,
regardless of the nature of the organism involved?"
Skeptic: "Since all perception would involve a causal chain, there
would doubtless be distortion regardless of the nature of the sense
organs involved."
Antiskeptic: "So what you are actually telling me is this: While there
may be a reality out there, unfortunately we can never see it because
we have eyes, or we can never hear it because we have ears, or we can
never smell it because we have noses. In other words, you consider
sense organs to be an obstacle to per ception, rather than the means
of perception. "You must remember that man is a physical organism who
perceives through physical sense organs. These sense organs operate
according to specific physiological processes determined by their
natureand this must be true of any sensory apparatus, regardless of
the organism involved. Where you have perception, there must be a
means of perception. This is what makes perception possible. What you
wish to claim, however, is that our means of perception is what
invalidates perceptionthat any act of perceiving, by its very nature,
is not really perception but distortion. Aside from the many stolen
concepts in this line of thought, it strikes me as a blatantly absurd
argument."
Skeptic: "Even if you are correct, there are other arguments against
the senses."
Antiskeptic: "Yes, but they differ only in details, not in essen
tials. No man can escape the fact that his knowledge is gained through
sensory experience; all of his concepts, words and arguments depend on
and presuppose this fact. Whenever a man opens his mouth to
speakassuming that he intends to com municate intelligiblyhe is
admitting the validity of sensory experience. All of the socalled
arguments against the senses would not be possible without the prior
assumption that our senses are reliable. The skeptic cannot avoid
selfcontradiction."
Skeptic: "Even if I accept what you say, there is yet another
problemand this one is raised quite frequently by Christians. I'll
agree, as will many Christians, that we gain knowledge of reality
through our senses, and that this knowledge is accurate. This does not
prove, however, that our senses are our only method of perception. You
want to limit knowledge to that which is gained through sensory
experience, but this seems unjustifiably dogmatic. After all, the
Christian claims that he gains knowledge of God, not through his
senses, but through direct experience with the divine nature. As an
atheist, you will not grant credence to his claim. But why? How do you
know that we are limited to perception through our senses?"
Antiskeptic: "If the Christian has discovered a new means of
perception, I am perfectly willing to listen to his claim, pro vided
that he is willing to argue for his assertion. Perhaps man possesses
perceptual powers of which he is presently unaware. I don't see any
evidence for this, but I'll grant the possibility for the sake of
argument. My argument with the Christian is that he claims to have
experienced God, but he refuses to explain the process by which he, a
physical organism, experienced this supernatural being. I won't limit
him arbitrarily to the tra ditional five senses, but I will demand
that he present evidence for his new perceptual powers. Has he
discovered a new sense? Fine, then let him tell us about it so we can
test it. "No Christian has ever succeeded in explaining just how he
perceives his mysterious God. He claims to have knowl edge of a
mysterious, unknowable being, having gained this knowledge in some
mysterious, unknowable manner. This is totally unacceptable. "If the
Christian wishes to be taken seriously, he must explain, not only what
he claims to know, but how he claims to know it. If he did not acquire
his knowledge through the senses, by what means did he acquire it? The
burden of explanation lies with him. If he upholds his belief in the
absence of rational grounds, then he is the dogmatist, not the
atheist. The atheist simply wants to know what the theist believes in
and how he acquired his knowledge. If explanations are not
forthcoming, the atheist will remain an atheist."
From the beginning of this section of the book.
................................................................
George H. Smith ATHEISM The Case Against God
Chapter 4 Section 5 pages 147 to 162
Skepticism and Sense Perception
Perhaps the most concerted attack of skepticism is directed at the
validity of sense perception. Sense perception constitutes the
starting point, in effect, of knowledge, and to undercut the
reliability of sensory evidence is to undercut the basis of man's
knowledge. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that one will often
find a Christian theologian (usually a Protestant) em ploying
skeptical arguments against the senses to his advantage. If the
atheist demands sensory evidence of God's existence, the Christian
quickly points to the supposed unreliability of sense experience,
while suggesting that God transcends such crass and ineffective
methods of revealing himself. Instead, God chooses a purer way to
reveal himself; the Christian experiences God directly, without the
aid of intervening sense perception, and the Christian insists that
the knowledge of God gained in this manner far surpasses the flimsy
capacity of man's physical sense organs.
The following dialogue between a skeptic and an antiskeptic covers the
primary arguments against the senses. Although the specific issues arc
different from our previous discussions, it is instructive to note
that the skeptical fallacies remain basically the same. The informal,
conversational format of this dialogue will hopefully make for
interesting and entertaining reading.
Atheism: The Case Against God (Skeptic's Bookshelf)
by George H. Smith
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/087975124X/qid=1088111169/
Immortalist
Again "existence" itself asserts nothing. Arguments and theories about
ideas and experiences can be very strong but that it not my point. The
givenness of experience doesn't come with these arguments.
ZerkonXXXX
Starting from 'everything Exists' there is no counter point, there is
complete certainty. How does it exist becomes the issue. As a mistaken
idea, a good/bad opinion or as a yet to be seen thing?
A true/false test might be found in consequence. An existing falsehood
will have a different consequence than a existing truth but qualified by
object or subject.
"There is a river around the next bend" is different from "That band is
great" while both can be considered true. The "river around the next
bend" exists as does the "band being good" by expressed (or not) thought.
However, there is a certainty in consequence that comes after rounding
the next bend. The same is not true after hearing the band.
Might be this weakness is believing the absolute found around the next
bend is as absolute as that found in hearing the band.
I'd say her greatest weakness is the idea of the absolute and isolated
individual.
Anarcissie
<b0047a2a-3f53-4c7d...@s21g2000prm.googl
egroups.com>,
Immortalist <reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote:
Obviously, if people have agreed to play the game
of philosophy, they have already accepted language,
logic, and the other rules and implements of the game.
So there is no second postulate on the field.
If they were playing some other game, science, let us
say, there would be different rules and tools to play
with, and the game would go differently. In science,
experimenters are constantly coming up with
contradictory data which they have to try to sort out
and discover patterns in. Sometimes they come up
with whole contradictory systems both of which seem to
be supported by the available evidence. They slog
on anyway without having a religious crisis about it.
> Skeptic: "You claim that man gains knowledge of reality through his
> senses, but' I submit that our sense are deceptive. Since we cannot
> rationally defend the reliability of sensory evidence, we must place
> trust in them as a matter of faith." ...
This dialog was like watching a couple of old, fat
drunks trying to have a fight and falling all over
themselves.
Fred Weiss
> On Dec 17, 8:27 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > The theory of Non-contradictory identification is an attempt to create
> > a foundationalist philosophy based on a single, undeniable truth which
> > is fixed and assured.
And furthermore cannot be denied without at the same time assuming and
presupposing it in the attempt to deny it.
> > The first principle that "we cannot deny that something exists without
> > first accepting that thing exists to deny, i.e. without contradiction"
> > depends upon a logical structure which is really a second postulate.
As I've already explained to you that is not the correct statement of
the principle, nor even a valid principle. In fact it is absurd on its
face.
> > This constitutes an unstated and hence unjustified claim that we can
> > trust our capacity to judge correctly, to distinguish the true from
> > the false and to determine what is contradictory or non-contradictory,
> > what cannot be mistaken or has no chance for error.
>
> > Therefore this non-contradictory identification remains theoretical,
> > but theoretically it seems like the best theory, that is all.
If you go back and re-read carefully what you just wrote here you
should see that everything you say assumes and presupposes the very
thing you are questioning.
For example, what is an unjustified claim and how can you know it
without presupposing that you can differentiate justified from
unjustified, which in turn presupposes a point of reference which you
can know
> > IF the capacity to judge correctly, to distinguish the true from the
> > false and to determine what is contradictory or non-contradictory, is
> > completely certain and cannot be mistaken,
No one has ever made any such claim and certainly not Ayn Rand.
You are arguing against a strawman.
> Obviously, in order to use logic, one must believe
> in it -- believe that it exists, and can be used to
> produce reliable, understandable, and true results.
> Kant seems to have believed that this was true
> knowledge, not just belief, and was intrinsic in
> our minds. However, it seems to me it could be
> just another illusion.
The concept of "illusion" presupposes the concept of "real" which it
distorts in some way such that we misinterpret what we are perceiving.
Without the real you couldn't have illusion.
> ...To say that X exists,
> then, implies that possibly X could not exist.
No, it doesn't. However, whatever the nature of its existence, it
presupposes that there is an existence of which it is a part.
> ... We still haven't escaped from the Cartesian -
> Philosophy 101 predicament.
There is no "predicament". Descartes was merely engaged in "stealing
concepts" as I described above.
Fred Weiss
*Anarcissie*
> On Dec 18, 8:29 am, "*Anarcissie*" <anarcis...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Obviously, in order to use logic, one must believe
> > in it -- believe that it exists, and can be used to
> > produce reliable, understandable, and true results.
> > Kant seems to have believed that this was true
> > knowledge, not just belief, and was intrinsic in
> > our minds. However, it seems to me it could be
> > just another illusion.
>
> The concept of "illusion" presupposes the concept of "real" which it
> distorts in some way such that we misinterpret what we are perceiving.
> Without the real you couldn't have illusion.
Probably it would be more accurate to say that
without the _concept_ of the real one could not have
the _concept_ of illusion. However, in what I wrote
above I was not taking issue with the idea of the real,
just noting that I didn't agree with Kant who portrays
some concepts (of logic) as unquestionably "real".
(This is in the _Critique_of_Pure_Reason_ as I
recall.)
> > ...To say that X exists,
> > then, implies that possibly X could not exist.
>
> No, it doesn't. However, whatever the nature of its existence, it
> presupposes that there is an existence of which it is a part.
It does. Language works by the use of symbols
which divide the universe into the things which a
symbol may refer to and those which it does not.
"X exists" sets up a universe of discourse in which
there is "X exists" and "X does not exist" and we
happen to choose the former. In order for us to
make out that something exists, we require a
background of non-existence.
I think non-existence is the real problem. When
something exists, we might experience it; but
what can we say about something that doesn't
exist, or about non-existence? If existence
exists, does its dark twin non-existence not
exist?
I shall call up Gautama....
> > ... We still haven't escaped from the Cartesian -
> > Philosophy 101 predicament.
>
> There is no "predicament". Descartes was merely engaged in "stealing
> concepts" as I described above.
Descartes had several predicaments. The ones
I was thinking of were solopsism and the mind-
body problem.
Fred Weiss
> On Dec 19, 10:51 am, Fred Weiss <fredwe...@papertig.com> wrote:
> > > ...To say that X exists,
> > > then, implies that possibly X could not exist.
>
> > No, it doesn't. However, whatever the nature of its existence, it
> > presupposes that there is an existence of which it is a part.
>
> It does. Language works by the use of symbols
> which divide the universe into the things which a
> symbol may refer to and those which it does not.
> "X exists" sets up a universe of discourse in which
> there is "X exists" and "X does not exist" and we
> happen to choose the former. In order for us to
> make out that something exists, we require a
> background of non-existence.
But it is not our language which determines what does or doesn't
exist. That is a very Kantian-like view which you say you don't agree
with.
I have no idea what a "background of non-existence" could possibly be,
unless you are simply referring to the fact that we don't live in a
static, stationary existence. Things change and pass in and out of our
awareness.
> I think non-existence is the real problem. When
> something exists, we might experience it; but
> what can we say about something that doesn't
> exist, or about non-existence? If existence
> exists, does its dark twin non-existence not
> exist?
Yes, non-existence...umm...doesn't exist.
> > > ... We still haven't escaped from the Cartesian -
> > > Philosophy 101 predicament.
>
> > There is no "predicament". Descartes was merely engaged in "stealing
> > concepts" as I described above.
>
> Descartes had several predicaments. The ones
> I was thinking of were solopsism and the mind-
> body problem.
But those actually aren't predicaments.
Fred Weiss
Les Cargill
>
>> I think non-existence is the real problem. When
>> something exists, we might experience it; but
>> what can we say about something that doesn't
>> exist, or about non-existence? If existence
>> exists, does its dark twin non-existence not
>> exist?
>
> Yes, non-existence...umm...doesn't exist.
>
So you can't identify it, and therefore can't use it as a
production in any "proof".
HAHA! I have you now! HAHA!
(just kidding... it's perfectly reasonable to talk about
set-complements)
<snip>
--
Les Cargill
Michael Gordge
> Non-contradictory identification;
Nope, non-contradictory identification and integration of sensory
evidence.
> The theory of Non-contradictory identification is an attempt to create
> a foundationalist philosophy based on a single, undeniable truth which
> is fixed and assured.
Nope, its not a theory its a fact that two seperate entities can not
both exist where each other exists at the identical moment.
MG
Michael Gordge
> On Dec 17, 8:27 pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > Non-contradictory identification;
>
> > One cannot deny something exists without
> > first accepting that thing exists to deny
> > without producing a contradiction.
>
> This is not a correct formulation of the principle.
>
Wrong Fred, you can only identify that which is claimed to exist and
burdon of proof is always upon he who asserts the positive, its not
possible to prove a negative and irrational to demand it.
e.g. you identify what it is that the mystic's god exists as, and the
complete lack of any sensory evidence and the dopey contradictions
contained within its claimed identity, leave the mind of reason no
choice but to identify it as a dopey mind dependent hoax, identical in
every respect to the leftist retarded hoax that man can make the globe
cold by producing less Co2.
MG
Michael Gordge
> If existence
> exists, does its dark twin non-existence not
> exist?
Your knowledge of a specific subject / of specific matter / of a
specific event can be described as non-existent.
MG
*Anarcissie*
> On Dec 19, 12:22 pm, "*Anarcissie*" <anarcis...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > On Dec 19, 10:51 am, Fred Weiss <fredwe...@papertig.com> wrote:
> > > > ...To say that X exists,
> > > > then, implies that possibly X could not exist.
>
> > > No, it doesn't. However, whatever the nature of its existence, it
> > > presupposes that there is an existence of which it is a part.
>
> > It does. Language works by the use of symbols
> > which divide the universe into the things which a
> > symbol may refer to and those which it does not.
> > "X exists" sets up a universe of discourse in which
> > there is "X exists" and "X does not exist" and we
> > happen to choose the former. In order for us to
> > make out that something exists, we require a
> > background of non-existence.
>
> But it is not our language which determines what does or doesn't
> exist. That is a very Kantian-like view which you say you don't agree
> with.
Language determines whether we can play the
game of philosophy or not, and how we can play
it. I think it probably also determines how we can
think about the things philosophy deals with, but
I'm not prepared to "prove" that.
When I am confronted by a sentence like
"Existence exists" the first thing I have to think
about it what, if anything, it means. That is at
least initially a linguistic problem.
A very light reading of the _Critique_ did not
give me that idea that Kant thought that language
determined what exists, but anyway, I am not
critiquing the _Critique_.
>
> I have no idea what a "background of non-existence" could possibly be,
> unless you are simply referring to the fact that we don't live in a
> static, stationary existence. Things change and pass in and out of our
> awareness.
I mean if you say "X is (has the quality of) A" it
implies that there are other things that do not
have this quality. If everything has the quality
of A, and if it is unthinkable for anything to not
have the quality of A, then the sentence does
not convey any information. Therefore, it is
meaningless.
> > I think non-existence is the real problem. When
> > something exists, we might experience it; but
> > what can we say about something that doesn't
> > exist, or about non-existence? If existence
> > exists, does its dark twin non-existence not
> > exist?
>
> Yes, non-existence...umm...doesn't exist.
I don't know about that.
> > > > ... We still haven't escaped from the Cartesian -
> > > > Philosophy 101 predicament.
>
> > > There is no "predicament". Descartes was merely engaged in "stealing
> > > concepts" as I described above.
>
> > Descartes had several predicaments. The ones
> > I was thinking of were solopsism and the mind-
> > body problem.
>
> But those actually aren't predicaments.
They were for Descartes. For instance, he couldn't
explain how the mind could cause physical actions
without ringing in God. But once you do that you
can have God do anything you want -- mop the
floor, answer the phone, etc. The perfect servant.
Michael Gordge
> When I am confronted by a sentence like
> "Existence exists" the first thing I have to think
> about it what, if anything, it means. That is at
> least initially a linguistic problem.
You are not thinking, exists means 'to have identity'.
MG
Michael Gordge
> Obviously, if people have agreed to play the game
> of philosophy, they have already accepted language,
Idiot, language doesn't cause and plays no part in the differences
between the elephant and the ant.
MG
Michael Gordge
>
> Again "existence" itself asserts nothing.
It asserts identity, and your mission, should you ever choose to
awaken from your Kantian nightmare is to give each existing entity its
very own unshared identity.
MG
Anarcissie
<c3d0ef13-8b90-4655...@k19g2000pro.googl
egroups.com>,
Michael Gordge <mikeg...@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
Existence has identity? I don't know about
that. The test of identity is being able to
distinguish one thing from another. What can
you distinguish existence from?
Anarcissie
<3fd8fd3f-27cb-43db...@r24g2000prf.googl
I'm not talking about elephants and ants, however, I'm
talking about philosophy.
Shrikeback
> In article
> <c3d0ef13-8b90-4655-ad5f-47a9077a1...@k19g2000pro.googl
> egroups.com>,
> Michael Gordge <mikegor...@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
>
> > On Dec 20, 1:24 pm, "*Anarcissie*" <anarcis...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > When I am confronted by a sentence like
> > > "Existence exists" the first thing I have to think
> > > about it what, if anything, it means. That is at
> > > least initially a linguistic problem.
>
> > You are not thinking, exists means 'to have identity'.
>
> Existence has identity? I don't know about
> that. The test of identity is being able to
> distinguish one thing from another. What can
> you distinguish existence from?
A very interesting discussion. You can distinguish
existence from that which once existed, but is no
more, that which has suffered through the process
of unbecoming.
Shrikeback
But a the complement of a set is yet another subset
of whatever universal set the original set is a subset
of. It could be the empty set, I suppose, but in that
case, the set of everything that doesn't exist would
be empty, and everything would exist.
Michael Gordge
> I'm not talking about elephants and ants, however, I'm
> talking about philosophy.
Philosphy is about ants and elephants, philosophy is man's guide /
map / blueprint to identifying / understanding / dealing with reality,
there are no words in reality.
MG
Michael Gordge
> Existence has identity?
To exist means to have identity.
> I don't know about
> that.
Shrug, that doesn't change the fact that to exist means to have
identity.
> The test of identity is being able to
> distinguish one thing from another.
Which cant be done until / unless there is something existing to have
that identity, to apply non-contradiction to.
> What can
> you distinguish existence from?
You distinguish ants from elephants from cows from trucks from horses
from cars from houses, (matter from matter / entity from entity)
metaphysically there is no such thing as non-existence / nothing, they
are epistemological concepts.
MG
Les Cargill
No, that thing is just a member of "the set of all things
which are only concepts with no physical referent."
A very serious example here is Higgs boson, which is
projected based on symmetries to exist, but cannot
be pointed to yet.
--
Les Cargill
Keth
> Non-contradictory identification;
>
> One cannot deny something exists without
> first accepting that thing exists to deny
> without producing a contradiction.
>
> principle of your knowledge, a fact
> of reality and it doesn't matter
> what we may call it.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivist_epistemology
> [see "concept formation"]
>
> a foundationalist philosophy based on a single, undeniable truth which
> is fixed and assured.
>
> first accepting that thing exists to deny, i.e. without contradiction"
> depends upon a logical structure which is really a second postulate.
>
> trust our capacity to judge correctly, to distinguish the true from
> the false and to determine what is contradictory or non-contradictory,
> what cannot be mistaken or has no chance for error.
>
> Therefore this non-contradictory identification remains theoretical,
> but theoretically it seems like the best theory, that is all.
>
> false and to determine what is contradictory or non-contradictory, is
> cannot deny that something exists without first accepting that thing
> exists to deny, i.e. without contradiction.
Do not agree with this theory. I can claim that "XXZ: does not exist,
and it does not need to exist before I say that.
In reality, XXZ does not exist.
Michael Gordge
>
> ............. I can claim that "XXZ: does not exist,
Check your premises, idiot.
MG
*Anarcissie*
So we're back to existence's evil twin, non-
existence? It seems to keep hanging around
in the background grinning at us.
Tim
So, there are no words in reality, eh shagger. Well I guess what your
saying here has nothing to do with reality, eh shagger. You should
think before you speak - but don't speak with words if you're speaking
in reality.
*Anarcissie*
> On Dec 21, 1:35 pm, Anarcissie <anarcis...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Existence has identity?
>
> To exist means to have identity.
>
> > I don't know about
> > that.
>
> Shrug, that doesn't change the fact that to exist means to have
> identity.
>
> > The test of identity is being able to
> > distinguish one thing from another.
>
> Which cant be done until / unless there is something existing to have
> that identity, to apply non-contradiction to.
Again, I wasn't speaking about things that
happen to exist but existence itself, as in the
sentence "Existence exists." I don't see any
problem with the identity of the coffee-cup on
my desk, because I can distinguish it from
every other item in the universe if only by
its location in space and time. But there is
no way of distinguishing _existence_ itself
from anything. (Unless we say that
existence is merely a mental category,
like the set of pink unicorns presently
meeting on Ganymede.)
> > What can
> > you distinguish existence from?
>
> You distinguish ants from elephants from cows from trucks from horses
> from cars from houses, (matter from matter / entity from entity)
> metaphysically there is no such thing as non-existence / nothing, they
> are epistemological concepts.
So there is nothing to distinguish existence, and
therefore it has no identity itself.
Alternatively we could say that non-existence
exists, and distinguish existence from it in the
larger space of ontological status, which
contains both existence and non-existence.
*Anarcissie*
I don't know about anyone else, but I experience words,
concepts, perceptions and other mental phenomena as
unquestionably real. I experience them directly, in
unmediated form, unlike ants and elephants, which I
have to deduce from interpreting phenomena.
Philosophy may be a guide to dealing with ants and
elephants, but it does consist of words, and if we're
going to use it as a guide those words and the concepts
they stand for and the arrangements we make of them
have to be reasonably clear and self-consistent. I
don't find "Existence exists" to be very clear, although
I might under some interpretation. If _existence_ is
just the noun form of the verb _exist_ the sentence
is true but pretty trivial -- if anything exists, then
"existence" exists as a result of the grammar of the
English language. It's like saying "To exist exists"
to "'Exists' exists." I take it something more
substantial must be intended.
Shrikeback
I certainly hope so. It would be very lonely for
existence otherwise, which would be sad for her.
I'm not even sure they don't share some things
in common. I hate to bring physics into this,
but physicists have these things called virtual
particles, which kind of exist as a limited time
offer. We at least like to figure that at the
finest boundary of existence, there is a great
deal of uncertainty, and indistinctness. Also,
if there ever were a beginning to existence,
clearly, the nothing somethinged at that point.
Michael Gordge
> So, there are no words in reality, eh....
Yes thats right wanker, there are no words in reality, reality is
independent of the mind, whereas words are utterly dependent upon the
mind.
> ............. Well I guess.........
Of course ewe do, that is all ewe ever do, guess.
MG
Michael Gordge
>
> I don't know about anyone else, but I experience words,
> concepts, perceptions and other mental phenomena as
> unquestionably real.
Reality is independent of the mind, words aren't, there are no words
in reality, just as there are no numbers, no time, no measurements, no
volume in reality.
MG
Shrikeback
Ah, so does the set of all things which have physical
referents itself have a physical referent, or is it just
a void concept?
> A very serious example here is Higgs boson, which is
> projected based on symmetries to exist, but cannot
> be pointed to yet.
And what of virtual particles, to what class do they
belong? Perhaps they are just a fudge factor concept
with no real world referent. It's hard to say.
Les Cargill
SFAIK, It's a pure abstract. Pure notational
convenience.
But it may depend on whether or not your barber shaves
himself...
The whole insistence on universals puzzles me - after
all, we're merely interested in what the domain of a
map is. So quantify it all you want - don't cost anything.
It's kinda wankerish.
>> A very serious example here is Higgs boson, which is
>> projected based on symmetries to exist, but cannot
>> be pointed to yet.
>
> And what of virtual particles, to what class do they
> belong? Perhaps they are just a fudge factor concept
> with no real world referent. It's hard to say.
Exactly. They're like shadow columns in linear
algebra, unless you can snapshot one.
--
Les Cargill
Michael Gordge
> But there is
> no way of distinguishing _existence_ itself
> from anything.
You can not even begin to think nor be aware without there being
something existing to think and be aware of.
Existence is the only possible trigger of all and any thought /
awareness, and, you can not even deny that without it existing as
something to deny, i.e. without contradiction.
> So there is nothing to distinguish existence, and
> therefore it has no identity itself.
Are you hoping for readers to just ignore that statement as if it did
not exist? check your premises.
MG
Michael Gordge
> So, there are no words in reality,
Sticks and stones can break your bones but words can never hurt ewe,
ever wondered why? fucking idiot.
MG
*Anarcissie*
The mind, and words, are part of reality. I don't see
how you can doubt that you're reading this message
while you're reading it.
*Anarcissie*
> On Dec 21, 10:09 pm, "*Anarcissie*" <anarcis...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > But there is
> > no way of distinguishing _existence_ itself
> > from anything.
>
> You can not even begin to think nor be aware without there being
> something existing to think and be aware of.
Correct so far.
> Existence is the only possible trigger of all and any thought /
> awareness, and, you can not even deny that without it existing as
> something to deny, i.e. without contradiction.
>
> > So there is nothing to distinguish existence, and
> > therefore it has no identity itself.
>
> Are you hoping for readers to just ignore that statement as if it did
> not exist? check your premises.
No, I am perfectly happy if someone thinks my
statements exist. I was curious as to whether we
can say that existence itself has identity. To
review: identity is the quality of something that
enables us to distinguish it from other things.
If A and B are identical they are indistinguishable.
But from what can we distinguish existence?
The only thing I can think of is non-existence,
but this would mean that non-existence exists,
even if it's only the empty set.
Keth
Mr. smart, what's wrong with my premise?
-- Kith
*Anarcissie*
Well, physics is a total can of worms, if you
ask me. And very peculiar worms they are,
too, winking in and out of existence like
they do. Brrrr.
Actually, we're using the term existence in two
different ways, or at least I think we are. One
is as a synonym for "the universe" -- everything
that exists" -- and the other is just the noun
form of the verb, which exists as the result of
the workings of the English language. There
is another possibility as well: _existence_
could refer to some sort of ghostly quality or
attribute that everything that exists is
supposed to have. Hence I find the
proposition that "existence exists" pretty
ambiguous. Having chewed on it for awhile.
It's probably one of those deals like using
infinity in arithmetic, clearly a place where
the seams of the universe are showing
because they weren't neatly sewed
together.
Keth
There are probably only two kinds of existence: a physical existence
(object), and a mental existence associated with either an external
object (concept) or some kind of theory.
If I randomly pick a term XXY and claim that it exists, I have to
prove that a physical object associate with it or describe what theory
it is related to.
Otherwise XXY does not exist. It is a random term that I made up.
*Anarcissie*
The human mind can observe itself. I
don't think this is either an external
object or a theory.