[api] ICG: background report on Iraq
Russil Wvong
is: what happens if the US and its allies go to war with Iraq and
succeed in overthrowing Saddam Hussein? What happens next? How will
they govern Iraq?
The International Crisis Group has published a very detailed
background report describing the political situation in Iraq.
From the introduction:
This background report reviews the mechanics of Saddam Hussein's
rule, looks at the political dynamics that govern relations
between religious and ethnic entities, and describes the various
opposition groups and their potential role. It does not seek to
predict the course of events in Iraq or to argue for any
particular course of action. This is the first in a series of
reports and briefing papers that ICG intends to issue on the
challenges posed by Iraq, including the state of the country more
than a decade after the Gulf War; regional attitudes toward a
possible U.S. military offensive; the status of Iraqi Kurdistan;
and Iran's posture toward a U.S.-led war and Iraq after Saddam
Hussein.
While much public attention has been focused on the prospects of a
war and how it might unfold, far less has been devoted to the
question of Iraq's future -- with or without a military
confrontation. Yet the challenges of building a new political
order may be no less than those of tearing an old one down --
particularly in the case of a country emerging from a long period
of authoritarian rule. Understanding the nature of the challenges
that might emerge in the future requires understanding the nature
of the current regime and of the underlying tensions and
fault-lines within Iraqi society at large. From commentators and
policy-watchers several very different scenarios emerge:
- One tends to see in the efforts by the Iraqi opposition to
unify around a common pluralistic and federalist platform and
in the Iraqi people's aspiration for a different kind of
regime the possibility of building a stable and democratic
Iraq.
- Another focuses more on the tensions between Kurds and Arabs,
between Shiites and Sunnis and between tribes; on the
prospects for bloodletting and score-settling by Iraqis who
have suffered long years of dictatorship; and on the risks of
meddling by Iran, Turkey or Syria, and paints a far more
worrisome picture of civil war and chaos.
- A third imagines a continuation of authoritarian rule under a
new guise, the result of a coup by Saddam Hussein's inner
circle -- or what generally is referred to as Saddamism without
Saddam.
In many respects, the 1991 Gulf War was far from a finishing
chapter in the Iraqi saga. While Iraq's armed forces were forced
to leave neighbouring Kuwait, the Iraqi regime has continued to
thwart the will of the international community and to perpetuate
its hold on power. Evidence suggests that the regime is deeply
unpopular at home, but it has continued to rule through a
combination of fear, a sophisticated security network and various
measures of political and economic cooptation. It also has either
debilitated potential alternative centres of power or ensured that
they are constituted along narrow lines to make any alliance among
them unlikely. While the internationally imposed sanctions
undeniably have limited the resources available to it, the regime
has been able to establish increasingly sophisticated mechanisms
of contraband trade to circumvent them. Paradoxically, the
sanctions also have deepened the population's dependence on the
regime that they were designed to weaken.
The regime's ability to survive derives as well from structural
tensions within Iraqi society, some of which pre-date Saddam
Hussein's rule, most of which he has endeavoured to deepen since
the 1991 Gulf War, and many of which are likely to outlive his
tenure. These include important ethnic and religious
fault-lines. Iraqi Kurds have a long history of repression at the
hands of the central government and have suffered enormously under
the current regime, which has successfully manipulated
Arab-Kurdish as well as recurring intra-Kurdish tensions. Any
attempt to build a stable Iraq and preserve its territorial
integrity will need to address the Kurds' legitimate
grievances. Much of the Kurdish population has come to enjoy
considerable political autonomy from Baghdad as a result of the
direct flow of revenue from the UN Oil-for-Food Program, and they
are not about to accept a rollback of their new status. Fear of
losing this status coupled with Washington's historically
inconsistent record of support for the Kurds explains why many of
them, though deeply hostile to the regime, also are wary of the
impact of a U.S.-led regime change. An internationally-backed
formula for power-sharing, for example under some kind of federal
structure, may go some way to ensuring internal Iraqi stability
and minimising third party intervention (e.g., from Turkey or
Iran) prompted by the Kurdish question.
Shiites, who constitute a majority of the Iraqi population, are
increasingly assertive in rejecting their traditional marginal
status within society. Rifts between Shiites and Sunnis,
therefore, will need to be mended as part of an effort at national
reconciliation that must include an end to any form of
discrimination and intensified endeavours to rebuild the
predominantly Shiite south. At the same time, there is far less to
this division than generally assumed. Shiites are present at all
levels of the Iraqi government, including Saddam Hussein's inner
circle and the ruling Baath Party. While they undeniably suffer
from social and political discrimination, it is difficult to speak
of a strict Sunni or Shiite identity in Iraq. Among Shiites in
particular a wide variety of views about politics and religion,
contradicts the stereotypical image of a monolithic, radical and
pro-Iranian community. Playing up Shiite discontent with the
regime and encouraging a separate Shiite identity in the hope of
undermining Saddam Hussein runs the risk of exacerbating religious
tensions that, so far, have been kept relatively in check.
Other, less visible divisions are of equal importance. Tribalism
in particular is a significant but often neglected feature of the
political landscape. Even while Saddam Hussein has denounced it,
his power structure relies heavily on affiliations to his own clan
and on a network of Sunni tribes that constitute the core of the
Republican and Special Republican Guards.
Religious, ethnic, tribal but also class-based and ideological
splits will complicate attempts to rebuild Iraq. Already, they
have seriously complicated attempts to build the Iraqi
opposition. Having fled as a result of regime repression, and
therefore unable to function inside the country, most opposition
groups have had a hard time maintaining close links with the Iraqi
people. Moreover, the opposition has been hobbled by divisions
along the fault-lines mentioned above. In some instances,
opposition groups have served as little more than vehicles for
personal ambition. This situation, in turn, has made it easier for
the regime to keep dissent at bay.
The debilitated state of Iraq's political and civil society
combined with the ineffectiveness and divisiveness of the
opposition have led some to bank on a military coup to oust the
regime. Iraq's military, to be sure, has a history of intrusive
intervention in politics and is viewed by many Sunnis as a
potential bulwark against future Shiite predominance. But a
successful coup remains highly improbable in Saddam Hussein's
tightly controlled regime, particularly absent the impetus of
external military action. A concerted U.S. attack aimed at
unseating the regime, or a credible threat thereto, may make it
more likely that officers in Saddam Hussein's inner circle will
cross the barrier of fear that his police state has carefully
constructed over the years and seek to overthrow the regime. Yet
even a successful military coup may well lead to a narrowly-based
regime governing along tribal lines, with resultant political
instability.
The task of building a stable and pluralistic Iraq is
enormous. The country does not divide up as neatly as people often
assume, with a Shiite south, a Sunni centre and a Kurdish north,
and the Iraqi people do not necessarily feel represented by the
ethnically or religiously-based organisations that seek to speak
on their behalf. Instead, there are tribal, ideological, and class
rivalries that -- given Iraq's lack of familiarity with genuine
democracy and its surplus of experience with force as a means of
effectuating political change -- could produce violent
confrontations and a continued militarisation of politics. Finding
acceptable and representative leaders will in all likelihood be
complicated, not a matter simply of importing the exiled
opposition. As a result, the distribution of power and resources
will be difficult and the risks of chaos, instability, and
extra-judicial score-settling high.
The international community is only beginning to come to terms
with this task. A future government eventually will have to
address critical challenges -- attending to the structural problems
that have plagued Iraq for decades, establishing a functioning
democratic system, redressing and restructuring the economy,
addressing the Kurdish question, dealing with the difficult matter
of Iraq's borders, and promoting national reconciliation. Even in
the event of an outside intervention, and whatever regime succeeds
Saddam Hussein's in the short run, ultimately Iraqi political
forces, both inside and outside the country, will help answer
those questions and shape the character of the regime. It would be
far better to think about these issues carefully now than to react
hurriedly later, forced by swiftly moving events.
To a degree that knows few precedents in modern history, the
future of Iraq is likely to be an interactive process between, on
the one hand, Iraq and its citizens and, on the other hand, many
outside actors, including its immediate neighbours, the Arab
world, Western powers and the United Nations. Giving the great
numbers within Iraq who have been effectively disenfranchised by
the current regime a say in their own economic and political
future will be one of the most fundamental and difficult
challenges of all.
Amman/Brussels, 1 October 2002
The full report:
http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=786
Russil Wvong
Vancouver, Canada
alt.politics.international FAQ: www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/apifaq.html