[api] A "Must read" : Stability of a Unipolar World by William C. Wohlforth.
ngc175
http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/pdf/isec_24_01_5_0.pdf
from respected Professor William C. Wohlforth, and you will understand why :
-a- a unipolar world is possible,
-b- it already exists since 1991,
-c- it is intrinsically stable,
-d- it is desirable.
-e- USA is this undispensable pole.
Worth reading, though 37 pages long, intellectually hard to challenge, provides
the theoretical powerhouse of current U.S. foreign policy.
ngc175
Russil Wvong
> Jump to :
>
> http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/pdf/isec_24_01_5_0.pdf
Very interesting. I'd seen a shorter article by Wohlforth and Stephen
Brooks in Foreign Affairs, July/August 2002, "American Primacy in
Perspective":
http://tinyurl.com/2rup
> -a- a unipolar world is possible,
> -b- it already exists since 1991,
> -c- it is intrinsically stable,
> -d- it is desirable.
> -e- USA is this undispensable pole.
The article makes a pretty strong argument. I'll have to think about
this some more. One objection comes to mind: material factors aren't
the only important ones. Louis Halle on the importance of *consent*:
... real power is always something far greater than military power
alone. A balance of power is not a balance of military power
alone: it is, rather, a balance in which military power is one
element. Even in its crudest aspect, power represents a subtle
and intimate combination of force and consent. No stable
government has ever existed, and no empire has ever become
established, except with an immensely preponderant measure of
consent on the part of those who were its subjects. That consent
may be a half-grudging consent; it may be a consent based in part
on awe of superior force; it may represent love, or respect, or
fear, or a combination of the three. Consent, in any case, is the
essential ingredient in stable power--more so than physical force,
of which the most efficient and economical use is to increase
consent.
By using physical force in such a way as alienates consent one
constantly increases the requirements of physical force to replace
the consent that has been alienated. A vicious spiral develops
that, continued, ends in the collapse of power.
There may be consent to US power in Europe and Japan, and to some extent
in Russia, China, and India, but it's a different story in the Muslim
world.
Russil Wvong
Vancouver, Canada
alt.politics.international FAQ: www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/apifaq.html
ngc175
Russil Wvong wrote:
> ngc175 <mes...@altair.net> wrote:
>
>>Jump to :
>>
>> http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/pdf/isec_24_01_5_0.pdf
>>
>
[deleted for the sake of bandwidth, see above in the thread]
> There may be consent to US power in Europe and Japan, and to some extent
> in Russia, China, and India, but it's a different story in the Muslim
> world.
>
> Russil Wvong
> Vancouver, Canada
> alt.politics.international FAQ: www.geocities.com/rwvong/future/apifaq.html
>
This takes us to the concept of power. If you have references to studies on the
pure concept of power, please let us/me know, I'm a buyer.
I have an ad-hoc, somehow rule-of-the thumb empirical model to deal with the
complex problem of power, it is based on a three-tiers chessboard :
- military force : USA is the global overwhelming power, needless to discuss
further,
- economics and technological : again USA heading, but now closely challenged by
Europe,
- transnational : encompassing NGO, public opinion, especially when it uses the
Internet, social trends. This is the wilderness zone, where "soft power" is the
more efficient, and can make the difference in case of standoff in the two
previous chessboards.
Russil Wvong
> This takes us to the concept of power. If you have references to studies
> on the pure concept of power, please let us/me know, I'm a buyer.
I'd definitely recommend "Politics Among Nations", by Hans Morgenthau.
First published in 1948, now in its sixth edition. There's an excerpt
here, along with some other readings on political realism:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/realism.htm
If you want something in French, perhaps Raymond Aron?
Political realism is the school of political philosophy which focuses
on power as the most important factor in international politics.
> I have an ad-hoc, somehow rule-of-the thumb empirical model to deal
> with the complex problem of power, it is based on a three-tiers
> chessboard :
>
> - military force : USA is the global overwhelming power, needless to
> discuss further,
> - economics and technological : again USA heading, but now closely
> challenged by Europe,
> - transnational : encompassing NGO, public opinion, especially when
> it uses the Internet, social trends. This is the wilderness zone,
> where "soft power" is the more efficient, and can make the difference
> in case of standoff in the two previous chessboards.
Sounds very similar to what Joseph Nye says. Morgenthau makes an
interesting distinction between *material* factors -- military and
economic -- and *non-material* factors such as national character,
national morale, and diplomacy. I think non-material factors are
vital, perhaps even more important than material factors.
Jack Black
> ngc175 wrote:
> > - transnational : encompassing NGO, public opinion, especially when
> > it uses the Internet, social trends. This is the wilderness zone,
> > where "soft power" is the more efficient, and can make the difference
> > in case of standoff in the two previous chessboards.
>
> Sounds very similar to what Joseph Nye says. Morgenthau makes an
> interesting distinction between *material* factors -- military and
> economic -- and *non-material* factors such as national character,
> national morale, and diplomacy. I think non-material factors are
> vital, perhaps even more important than material factors.
Here is a good amazon review of Nye's _The_Paradox_of_American_Power_:
<begin quote>
My highest complement for a book used to be how many pens I broke on
it. This book leaps into a new category. I actually had to read it
three times, short as it is. It is brilliant, with paragraphs of such
substance that multiple readings are needed to "unzip" the
implications. This is not an undergraduate text although it could
certainly be used as such, to open deep discussions.
Among the strategic thoughts that I found most valuable were these: 1)
a plenitude of information leads to a poverty of attention; 2) in the
absence of time or means to actually review real-world information,
politics becomes a contest of competitive credibility (with the
Internet changing the rules of the game somewhat); 3) Japan has vital
lessons to teach Islamic nations--that one can adapt to the new world
while maintaining a unique culture; 4) we are failing to adapt our
democratic processes to the challenges of the Earth as well as the
opportunities of the Internet.
This last merits special attention. I found in this book an
intellectual and political argument for restoring democratic meaning
to our national policies. From its evaluation of the pernicious effect
of special interest groups on foreign policy; to its explanation
("When the majority are indifferent, they leave the battlefields of
foreign policy to those with special interests."); to its prescription
for healthy policies: a combination of national discussion (not just
polling), with a proper respect for the opinions of others (e.g.
foreigners), the author clearly sets himself apart from those who
would devise national policies in secret meetings with a few preferred
pals.
Throughout the book, but not given any special chapter as I would have
preferred, the author is clearly cognizant of the enormous
non-traditional challenges facing the community of nations--not just
terrorism and crime, but fundamentals such as water and energy
shortages, disease, genocide, proliferation, trade injustices,
etcetera.
Operationally, the book is slightly disappointing. Despite the fact
that the author has served as both the Chairman of the National
Intelligence Council (and perhaps left the operational bit to his Vice
Chairman, Greg Treverton, whose book, "Reshaping National Intelligence
for an Age of Information" I recommend be read in conjunction with
this one), and as an Assistant Secretary of Defense, I did not see two
things in this book that would have bridged the gap from strategic
reflection to operational implementation:
1) How must we change the manner in which our nation handles
information? What should our national information strategy be, to
include not only a vast new program for properly collecting,
processing, and understanding foreign language materials that are
openly available, for but improving our K-12 and undergraduate
education with respect to foreign affairs?
2) How must we change the manner in which our nation authorizes,
appropriates, allocates, and obligates the taxpayer budget? While
noting that we spend 16 times as much on military hard power as we do
on diplomatic soft power, the author left this issue largely on a
single page.
On the topic of values and accountability the author excelled.
Although I would disagree that values by themselves are the foundation
of national power ("knowing" the world, in my view, is the other side
of the coin of the realm), the author sounds very much like Noam
Chomsky with a social make-over--we have to be honest on human rights
and other core values, and not act nor permit our corporations to act
in ways that are antithetical to our true national commitment to
decency and honesty. The section on new forms of accountability and
transparency being made possible by changing in information tools and
practices are valuable--admitting non-governmental organizations to
all bodies; accelerating the release of records into the public
domain, and so on.
We learn from this book that the author is an avid admirer of The
Economist, that he thrives on Op-Ed reading (I have never seen a more
comprehensive use of Op-Eds in the notes), and that he is largely
accepting of the World Trade Organization and other multi-lateral
groups, most of which have not yet accommodated themselves to the new
world of citizen-centered policymaking. As good as the notes are, the
book would have benefited from a bibliography. The index is
acceptable.
If we part ways on any one thing, it would be that I am less sanguine
about any foreign policy, however much it might use "soft power,"
being successful if it persists with the notion that we can cajole and
seduce the world into wanting what we want. We've done that with
Hollywood, and McDonalds, and chlorine-based plastics, and it is not
working to our advantage. It may be that America must first recognize
its own demons, adjust its global goals accordingly, and interact with
the world rather than striving for a grander version of the "Office of
Strategic Influence" that recently got laughed into oblivion. We
appear to agree that the U.S. Information Agency must be restored as
our two-way channel between our people and all others. I would
dramatically expand USIA to also provide for a Global Knowledge
Foundation and a Digital Marshall Plan on the one hand, and the
education of all women on the other (Cf O'Hanlon's "A Half-Penny on
the Federal Dollar").
This book opens the great conversation, and in doing so, renders a
valuable service. Missing from the public conversation is the
Department of State. Both the politically-appointed and the
professionally-trained leadership of the diplomatic service appear to
have been cowed into silence by a mis-placed coda that confuses
abjectcompliance with loyalty to the larger national interest. If this
book can draw State back into the public service, into a public debate
on the urgency of protecting and expanding our most important soft
power tools, then the author's ultimate impact on the future of
American security and prosperity will be inestimable.
</end qoute>
The review of the Nye book is on the bottom third of the page. The
other reviews of Robert Steele (324 in all - so far) are also worth a
look: