Stratfor: Al Qaeda and the Tale of Two Battlespaces
Don Gabacho
Al Qaeda and the Tale of Two Battlespaces
October 1, 2008
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart
Over the last year or so, a lot of debate has arisen over the physical
strength of al Qaeda. Some experts and government officials believe
that the al Qaeda organization is now stronger than at any time since
the 9/11 attacks, while others believe the core organization has lost
much of its leadership and operational capability over the past seven
years. The wide disparity between these two assessments may appear
somewhat confusing, but a significant amount of the difference between
the two can be found in the fundamental way in which al Qaeda is
defined as an entity.
Many analysts supportive of the view that al Qaeda has strengthened
tend to lump the entire jihadist world into one monolithic,
hierarchical organization. Others, like Stratfor, who claim al Qaeda’s
abilities have been degraded over the years, define the group as a
small vanguard organization and only one piece of the larger jihadist
pie. From Stratfor’s point of view, al Qaeda has evolved into three
different — and distinct — entities. These different faces of al Qaeda
include:
The core vanguard group: Often referred to by Stratfor as the al Qaeda
core, al Qaeda prime or the al Qaeda apex leadership, this group is
composed of Osama bin Laden and his close trusted associates. These
are highly skilled, professional practitioners of propaganda, militant
training and terrorism operations. This is the group behind the 9/11
attacks.
Al Qaeda franchises: These include such groups as al Qaeda in Iraq and
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Although professing allegiance
to bin Laden, they are independent militant groups that remain
separate from the core and, as we saw in the 2005 letter from al Qaeda
core leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, there can be a
great deal of tension and disagreement between them and the al Qaeda
core. These regional franchises vary in size, level of professionalism
and operational capability.
The broader grassroots jihadist movement: This group includes
individuals and small cells inspired by al Qaeda but who, in most
cases, have no contact with the core leadership.
Stratfor’s Current Assessment of al Qaeda
We believe, as we did last summer, that the core al Qaeda group has
weakened and no longer poses the strategic threat to the U.S. homeland
that it did prior to 9/11. However, this does not mean it is incapable
of re-emerging under less pressured circumstances.
On the franchise level, some groups — such as AQIM, the Yemen
franchises and the franchises in Pakistan and Afghanistan — have
gained momentum over the past few years. Others — such as those in
Iraq, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, the Sinai Peninsula and Morocco — have
lost steam. In our estimation, this ebb and flow has resulted in a
constant threat on the franchise level, though the severity has
migrated geographically as groups wax and wane in specific regions.
The franchises have done little to expand their operations outside of
their regions of interest and to conduct attacks against the “far
enemy” — that is, attacks in the United States or Europe.
At the grassroots level, homegrown jihadists have posed a fairly
consistent, though lower-level, threat. In the past, we have said that
these jihadists think globally, but act locally. While there are far
more grassroots jihadists than there are militants in the al Qaeda
franchises and vastly more than in the small al Qaeda core, the
grassroots jihadists tend to be highly motivated, but poorly equipped
to conduct sophisticated terror attacks.
Beyond the Physical Battlefield
We believe that any realistic analysis of al Qaeda’s strength must
assess more than a basic head count of militants willing and able to
conduct attacks. As we have noted previously, there are two
battlespaces in the war against jihadism: the physical and the
ideological. Although the campaign against al Qaeda has caused the
core group to become essentially marginalized in the physical
battlespace, the core has undertaken great effort to remain engaged in
the ideological battlespace.
In many ways, the ideological battlespace is more important than the
physical battlespace in the war against jihadism, and in the
jihadists’ war against the rest of the world. It is far easier to kill
people than it is to kill ideologies. We have recently seen this in
the resurgence of Bolivarian Revolution ideology in South America,
despite the fact that Simon Bolivar, Karl Marx and Ernesto “Che”
Guevara are long dead and buried. Ideology is the decisive factor that
allows jihadists to recruit new fighters and gather funding for
militant and propaganda operations. As long as the jihadists can
recruit new militants, they can compensate for the losses they suffer
on the physical battlefield. When they lose that ability, their
struggle dies on the vine. Because of this, al Qaeda fears fatwas more
than weapons. Weapons can kill people — but fatwas can kill the
ideology that motivates people to fight and finance.
We are not the only ones who believe the ideological battlespace is
critical. A video released earlier this month by al Qaeda mouthpiece
As-Sahab entitled “The Word is the Word of Swords,” one of al Qaeda’s
leading religious authorities, Abu Yahya al-Libi emphasized this point
from within the network.
In the video, al-Libi said the jihadist battle “is not waged solely at
the military and economic level, but is waged first and foremost at
the level of doctrine.” He also said that his followers are in a war
against an enemy that “targets all strongholds of Islam and invades
the minds and ideas in the same way it invades lands and dares to
destroy beliefs and meddle with the sacred things in the same way it
dares to spill blood.”
Interestingly, although the video recording is dedicated to detailing
the preparations for the attack on the Danish Embassy in Islamabad,
the bulk of the 64-minute video addresses the ideological war against
al Qaeda and how “true Islam” has been undermined by leaders such as
King Abdullah and the Saudi religious establishment.
In an ironic twist, the progress of the combatants is easier to assess
in the ideological rather than physical battlespace — largely because
most militants plotting terror attacks attempt to stay invisible until
they launch their operations, while the ideological battle is for the
most part conducted in plain sight.
One such visible indication on the ideological battlefield was a book
written by al Qaeda’s number two man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, which was
released in March. The book — known as “The Exoneration” — is a long
response to a book written by Sayyed Imam al-Sharif. Also known as Dr.
Fadl, al-Sharif is an imprisoned Egyptian radical and a founder (with
al-Zawahiri) of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
Published in 2007, al-Sharif’s book, “Rationalizing Jihadist Action in
Egypt and the World,” provides theological arguments that counter many
of the core jihadist teachings. Included among those teachings is the
concept of takfir, or the practice of declaring a Muslim to be an
unbeliever in order to justify an attack against him. Al-Sharif also
spoke out against killing non-Muslims in Muslim countries and
attacking members of other Muslim sects.
Al-Sharif was a significant player in the development of the jihadist
theology that shaped the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and eventually,
through al-Zawahiri and other EIJ members who became influential
members of al Qaeda, al-Sharif’s concepts became instrumental in
shaping the ideology of jihadism as promulgated by al Qaeda. One of
his books, “The Essentials of Making Ready for Jihad,” was reportedly
required reading for all new jihadist recruits at al Qaeda training
camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The renunciation of jihadist
ideology by such a pivotal figure was a significant threat — one
serious enough to spur al-Zawahiri’s refutation.
The Saudi ulema or Muslim scholars and former jihadist ideologues are
not the only people assailing the ideology of jihadism. Of course,
Western figures, such as Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders have been
highly critical of jihadism. But these outsiders have little ability
to sway Muslim opinion on the street — a critical objective in
fighting the ideological battle. In recent years, however, we have
seen more Muslim figures speak out against jihadism, which they
believe is a perversion of Islam. However, criticism is not without
danger. Figures such as Egyptian political analyst Diaa Rashwan have
been threatened with death because of their criticism of al Qaeda and
jihadist ideology.
In addition to the previously discussed video, As-Sahab has released
two other lengthy videos this month. The first, to commemorate the
9/11 anniversary, was called “The Harvest of Seven Years of Crusades.”
The second, called “True Imam,” was released Sept. 29. Essentially, it
was a tirade against the government of Pakistan and a tribute to Abdul
Rashid Ghazi, who was killed in the July 2007 storming of the Red
Mosque in Islamabad by the Pakistani military.
Overlap
Sometimes, things that emerge in the ideological battlespace can
provide indications of important developments in the physical
battlespace.
For example, one of the As-Sahab videos featured clips of Mustafa abu
al-Yazid (aka Sheikh Said al-Masri). An Egyptian al Qaeda military
commander, al-Yazid had reportedly been killed in an Aug. 8 operation
in Bajaur. But since al-Yazid makes reference in the video to the Aug.
18 resignation of former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, he
obviously was not killed 10 days earlier.
Two others noticeably absent from these three videos were Osama bin
Laden and Adam Gadahn. Bin Laden, who has not been heard from since a
May 18 audio message, is once again rumored to be dead. Gadahn may
also be dead, according to rumors that he was killed in a January
airstrike in Pakistan’s North Waziristan agency in which senior al
Qaeda military commander Abu Laith al-Libi was killed. Gadahn, who has
appeared in several al Qaeda video messages since emerging on the
scene in 2004, has been conspicuously absent from the organization’s
propaganda since the January strike.
Typically, al Qaeda has been fairly forthcoming in “declaring the
martyrdom” of fallen commanders like al-Libi. The death of a central
figure such as bin Laden, however, could be seen as severely
detrimental to the jihadist world’s morale. Therefore, the group could
be motivated to conceal his death. If bin Laden is still alive,
however, we anticipate a message from him by the U.S. presidential
elections Nov. 4, given his appearance before the 2004 presidential
elections.
It would be somewhat out of character, however, for al Qaeda to avoid
publicizing the death of a lesser figure such as Gadahn. With all the
rumors circulating about jihadists seeking to use European-looking
operatives in attacks against the West, one wonders if the silence
regarding the American-born jihadist’s fate is designed to keep U.S.
authorities in suspense — or if it is a real indication that Gadahn is
alive and has left his post in the ideological battlespace in order to
go operational on the physical battlefield.
Of course, the fate of these individuals, even a central figure such
as bin Laden, is not nearly as important as the fate of the ideology.
And we will continue to focus on the ideological battlefield for
significant developments there.
One place that needs to be watched carefully is Pakistan, where events
like the Red Mosque operation and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto
have potentially sown the seeds for a ripe ideological harvest for
both sides. It will be important to watch and see if the Marriott
bombing will, as some claimed, prove to be a watershed event that
marks a change in public opinion capable of rallying popular support
against the jihadist ideology in Pakistan.