Closing of the leftist Democratic Mind
Dana
Closing of the Democratic Mind
The U.S. has lost momentum in opening up Middle Eastern societies
Michael Young
The Bush administration has lost the initiative on Middle Eastern
democratization. The gong of reality has apparently sounded. But just as
some officials overestimated how democracy would impose sudden serenity on
Iraq, those advocating a departure from democratization as a cornerstone of
American foreign policy misjudge just how much the Arab world has changed
since April 2003.
Things were different a year ago. In his second inaugural address, President
George W. Bush issued an inventory of liberal promises: "We will encourage
reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations
will require the decent treatment of their own people." (Applause.)
"America's belief in human dignity will guide our policies. Yet rights must
be more than the grudging concessions of dictators; they are secured by free
dissent and the participation of the governed. In the long run, there is no
justice without freedom, and there can be no human rights without human
liberty." (Applause.) . "Americans, of all people, should never be surprised
by the power of our ideals. Eventually, the call of freedom comes to every
mind and every soul. We do not accept the existence of permanent tyranny
because we do not accept the possibility of permanent slavery."
(Applause.) . "Democratic reformers facing repression, prison, or exile can
know: America sees you for who you are, the future leaders of your free
country." And so on.
In a much publicized speech in Cairo last June, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice applied this idealism to the Middle East, saying: "For 60
years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of
democracy in this region here in the Middle East-and we achieved neither.
Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic
aspirations of all people."
Then the masonry began to collapse. With the administration facing growing
domestic discontent over the war in Iraq (including, lately, from within the
GOP) and a salvo of rotten fruit for its performance after hurricane
Katrina, for nominating Harriet Miers to the Supreme Court, and for the
Valerie Plame affair, the idealism began sounding more like the clang of an
empty saucepan than an alarum rallying the liberal legions. On top of that,
more urgent priorities elbowed their way to the top of the agenda.
Last weekend, for example, after failing at a summit in Bahrain to persuade
Arab states to adopt a final statement promoting democracy, Rice traveled to
Saudi Arabia, and there had to put democratic values on the backburner. The
Americans and the Saudis effected a reconciliation of sorts, after deep
differences over Iraq. The two sides set up joint working groups on
terrorism, oil production, and the granting of U.S. visas to Saudi citizens,
among other things. This harked back to the tradeoff that for decades
ensured Washington would leave Arab despots alone: Whenever the U.S. has
regarded security and economic self-interest as paramount in the Middle
East, democracy has lost out.
Similarly, last week's bombings in Amman will almost certainly make less
likely American pressure on Jordan's King Abdullah to open up his police-run
system. The monarch has cleverly sought to peddle the line that now is the
time to let democracy flourish, but somehow that is unconvincing. Which Arab
leader has ever increased the repressive powers of his security agencies, as
the king intends to do through a tough anti-terrorism law currently being
drafted, while also giving his society more freedom?
The bombings took place as interest began waning in Jeffrey Goldberg's
much-talked-about profile of former National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft. Regurgitating the tenets of "realism", Scowcroft, who served
under President George H.W. Bush, expressed deep doubts about the
administration's democratization efforts. Quite why the congenitally
uninspired Scowcroft has been promoted to foreign policy sage is a mystery,
though his close relationship with the president's father offers part of the
answer. There is also the fact that realists, who had nothing to say after
9/11, have regained some credence as the administration falters in Iraq.
That's why Scowcroft was not alone: His former protégé, Richard Haass,
currently the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote an
opinion piece in The New York Times last week outlining what he sees as the
ideal foreign policy doctrine for the U.S. Haass affirmed that while
democracy promotion was a legitimate policy goal, "to make it a doctrine is
neither desirable nor practical." Before him, fellow realist Gideon Rose,
managing editor of Foreign Affairs magazine, argued that "the Bush doctrine
has collapsed, and the administration has consequently embraced realism,
American foreign policy's perennial hangover cure." How had things changed?
"In practice, the Bush administration has recently begun to pursue interests
rather than ideals and conciliation rather than confrontation."
Rose's diagnosis was incomplete: The administration has always mixed
interests and ideals, conciliation and confrontation, since no foreign
policy can ever be conducted on the basis of one without the other. But he
was indirectly right in another sense: When it comes to facing the dilemma
of advancing democracy against interests in the Arab world, the
administration has been willing to hold up odiously manipulated elections as
proof of progress-for example the recent presidential election in Egypt or
municipal elections in Saudi Arabia. In other words, the administration,
perhaps reluctantly, has intermittently fallen back on an old realist trick
of insisting things are better, providing counterfeit evidence of this, and
turning to more important items of business.
Yet now is as good a time as ever for the U.S. to make democratization a
basis of its foreign policy doctrine in the Middle East. Many Arabs have no
patience for Bush. But the center of gravity in the region has decisively
shifted in the direction of advancing liberty, as recent events have eroded
the legitemacy of Arab leaders: three relatively free elections this year in
Iraq (one of them forthcoming in December), another relatively free election
in Lebanon after the country saw an end to Syrian occupation, and growing
discontent with the fossilocracies in other parts of the region,
particularly Egypt or Tunisia, and with second-generation despotisms, such
as those in Syria and Jordan. For an administration to ignore such changes
and banish democracy to a secondary tier of priorities would display a
striking lack of ambition and foresight.
A more obvious parallel question is whether the U.S. can even return to the
cold realism that guided policy under the first Bush administration. As 9/11
showed, that approach posed a genuine national security threat, as
disgruntled Arabs, associating Washington with their own domestic
persecutors, retaliated against the U.S. Conversely, absolute, inflexible
devotion to democracy at the expense of more practical consideration of
interests is simply not sensible.
That leaves a third option: that the U.S. declare the spread of democracy a
strategic interest (not an open-ended desire), one that must be advanced
where and when possible, even if it is temporarily delayed by intervening
objectives. Arab regimes should be pushed to take specific measures within
specific timeframes to open up their societies, and the U.S. can tie this to
other forms of bilateral cooperation. Finally, no administration should ever
hail as progress what is patently an effort by dictatorships to sell it a
defective bill of democratic goods.
Is this certain to work? No, but any policymaker wanting to adapt to the new
realities in the Middle East is better off working according to these
guidelines, rather than by playing down democratic principles and helping
buttress the illegitimate, failing states that make a new 9/11 possible.
--
The fundamental principle of our Constitution . . . enjoins [requires] that
the will of the majority shall prevail.
George Washington
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The will of the majority [is] the natural law of every society [and] is the
only sure guardian of the rights of man. Perhaps even this may sometimes
err. But its errors are honest, solitary and short-lived
Though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be
rightful must be reasonable - the minority possess their equal rights which
equal law must protect
Thomas Jefferson