social "science"?
andy-k
discipline is a science, considering their attitude a form of "physics
envy" -- of wanting to be a member of the science "club" in order to gain
respectability by association.
Today I encountered somebody with qualifications in sociology who argued
that sociology is a science because sociologists employ the
hypothetico-deductive method in order to abstract laws.
I have my doubts that this is sufficient a description of science, but I'm
willing to be convinced. I know it all comes down to how we stipulate a
definition of the word, and I'd be interested to hear other people's views
on the subject.
Miller
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:LFOoc.178$_h1...@newsfe1-gui.server.ntli.net...
If you are looking for defintions, I'd say that there are millions of them
for science, all based on what the holder of that defintion wishes to
include or exclude. If you wish to exclude sociology, then that's your
definition. Is there really anything of substance beyond this to discuss?
Scott
Immortalist
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:LFOoc.178$_h1...@newsfe1-gui.server.ntli.net...
> discipline is a science, considering their attitude a form of "physics
> envy" -- of wanting to be a member of the science "club" in order to gain
> respectability by association.
>
What do you mean by science? Like hard physics or something? Politics is based
upon a social science and they call it political science. Social science is
undergoing a great change right now. The (standard social science model) SSSM is
being heavily attacked by biologists and other psychologists. The model is
changing as we speak but its all still science.
----------------------------
For people who don't "quote" in order to support their contentions and havn't yet
learned to "copy and paste" here is some back up information with a link to more
information if interested.
Why Are Algorithms Domain Specific?
Cosmides & Tooby (1994) pointed out that our ancestors faced a wide range of
adaptive problems:
Solicitation of parental assistance.
Parenting.
Language acquisition.
Modelling the spatial distribution of (food) objects.
Navigating.
Avoiding predators, food toxins, incest etc.
Co-operation and social exchange.
Social competition, deception and manipulation.
Understanding the intentions of others (particularly threats).
Finding a reproductively capable mate.
The more important the adaptive problem, the more intensely natural
selection will improve and specialise the mechanism for solving it, in this
way Darwinian algorithms become domain specific. E.g, vervet have evolved
cognitive mechanisms that produce and respond to a different alarm call for
different predators (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). A single, general-purpose
alarm call and response system would be inefficient and would not be
selected for.
So, it is argued that instead of
containing a few domain
general mechanisms
(as put forward by the SSSM,
the human mind includes many
functionally distinct adaptive
specialisations that are domain specific.
http://psych.unn.ac.uk/users/nick/EPlec02.htm
------------------------------------
What is sometimes called the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) assumes that
human culture varies, in principle, without limit. The two basic aspects that
Pinker identifies are:
Human behavior is determined by culture, not biology.
Humans are born with general learning abilities but no "innate knowledge."
The analogous model in linguistics, characteristic of the American structuralist
(or "descriptivist") tradition of the first half of the twentieth century, is
summarized by Martin Joos (1957: 96) in this passage (which refers to several
very influential linguists of the period):
An older term for the new trend in linguistics was "'structural". It is not idle
to consider how the term "descriptive" now came to replace it, even if not all
the reasons can be identified. The Sapir way of doing things could be called
structural, but the term was more often used for the stimulating new ideas that
were coming out of Europe, specifically from the Cercle Linguistique de Prague.
American linguistics owes a great debt to that stimulation; but in the long run
those ideas were not found to add up to an adequate methodology. Trubetzkoy
phonology tried to explain everything from articulatory acoustics and a minimum
set of phonological laws taken as essentially valid for all languages alike,
flatly contradicting the American (Boas) tradition that languages could differ
from each other without limit and in unpredictable ways, and offering too much of
a phonological explanation where a sober taxonomy would serve as well.
Children want explanations, and there is a child in each of us; descriptivism
makes a virtue of not pampering that child.
This tradition, allied with behaviorism in its rejection of any reference to
mental states (considered scientifically untestable), was dealt a severe blow the
same year by the publication of Noam Chomsky's Syntactic Structures and his
scathing review of B.F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior two years later. Joos'
rejection of explanation as a goal is a bit shocking from the modern perspective.
Today, in the tradition of generative linguistics begun by Chomsky, the main
goals are:
to discover the properties shared by all languages (the universals) and the
relatively narrow range of variation among them; and
to explain how it is that children can learn these complex languages without
formal instruction.
It's often assumed that what's universal is likely to be innate: the reason
children succeed at language-learning is that they are born knowing much of what
goes into constructing a language. But that's not always right.
http://www.ling.upenn.edu/courses/Spring_2003/ling001/14b.html
---------------------------------------
Now someone like Mr Wilkins may question Evolutionary Psychology like you would a
social science model but the point is that the SSSM is in decline and is being
expanded or even replaced by biological science now.
John Wilkins
First of all, I think that the elaborated n-d model of explanation
properly captures the nature of theories (and Derek, here, as disagreed
with me on many occasions :-); and this has been extended into social
explanation by two thinkers:
William Dray took the n-d model in the 1960s and generalised it to cover
retrodictions for historical cases, which became known as the "Covering
Law Model" of historiography. A lot of argument since has not defeated
that approach, in my mind.
Alan Garfinkel discussed the forms of explanation in social science in
his under-appreciated _Forms of Explanation_... in which he discusses
the nature of social explanations (and indeed of all scientific
explanations) as derivations from a contrast space and deduction from
some generalisations.
Both of these are more generally subsumed by the "semantic conception"
of theories which has been proposed for philosophy of science by Bas van
Fraassen and Patrick Suppe, both of whom are post-Kuhnian philosophers
of science. Under this view, a theory is a collection of models that are
supposed to cover an explanatory domain (not unlike Garfinkel's
constrast space).
So I think that it is entirely feasible to call a good explanation in
social sciences scientific in exactly the same general terms as a good
explanation in physics. That is not to say that the explanations have a
similar rigor in practice, or that they are suitably mathematical, but
they are not excluded in virtue of explanatory form, which is what the
Hempelian account deals with.
--
Dr John S. Wilkins, www.wilkins.id.au
"I never meet anyone who is not perplexed what to do with their
children" --Charles Darwin to Syms Covington, February 22, 1857
717
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:LFOoc.178$_h1...@newsfe1-gui.server.ntli.net...
I might have to stir up a few more IQ points
and I'm already isolated enough.
andy-k
news:1gdrnqf.i3nibj47jbmkN%john...@wilkins.id.au...
I was thinking along the lines that certain accidental situations admit of
generalizations that have a sort of temporary statistical predictive power,
and wondering if this was an adequate description of science. The problem I
came up against was that I would be happy to call biology a science, and
yet form and function in biology are also temporary given evolution by
natural selection. Physics seems to have the longest span (period of
validity for the abstracted invariants) -- e.g. we can take Newton's laws
to be eternal for all practical purposes (though they needed tweaking in
order to extend their domain into regions close to 'c'). Sociology, on the
other hand, seems to have a very short span (if we're not just talking
about population dynamics). Does it all just boil down to an arbitrary
opinion on an acceptably long span (i.e. prejudice), or is there something
more to it?
andy-k
news:iVVoc.46889$Z%5.43845@okepread01...
>
> I might be able to answer your question but
> I might have to stir up a few more IQ points
> and I'm already isolated enough.
If you get flamed then there's more here than just yourself that will learn
something from it, so be benevolent ;-)
rent@mob
John's answer sounds plausible in the abstract, but this doesn't help
- what is wanted is a worthwhile distinction between fact and fancy,
not a lecture on the consensual nature of fact. If the abstract
principles of a question prove slippery (as they do in this case) it's
always worth going back to see their development over human history.
In the case of science, the method only finally took hold once
theorists around Bacon's time recognised the value of falsifiability -
ie, making determinate predictions from theory, designing experiments
which test the validity of those predictions, and doing so in a way
which is methodologically robust. Disciplines in which it is possible
to do this can be considered science. Disciplines in which such
experimentation is practically impossible are more properly treated as
philosophy - they may be perfectly valid, but cannot ever claim to
offer empirical proof of their validity, only theoretical proofs.
Sociology straddles this divide. Aspects of it can be placed under a
microscope and methodically examined. Other aspects of it escape the
power of scientists to isolate and examine, because they only exist at
the level of whole societies in motion. For those aspects, neither
sociologists nor scientists can claim to have established empirical
evidence for their theories - the best that can be hoped for is
methodological consistency (which, BTW, Toobey and Cosmides lack -
see, for example, www.bostonreview.net/br23.2/berwick.html ).
Sociology shades over into politics. Biologists are not politicians
(or should not be).
rent@mob
andy-k
news:46d54aa3.04051...@posting.google.com...
Thanks for this, and the review article is interesting too.
You make an interesting point that sociology isn't a single edifice but has
parts that may be regarded as scientific and other parts that may not. I
guess, then, that "social science" must become a subset of "sociology". The
question for me is where the boundary lies.
When a discipline purports to be a science because it reveals regularity in
data sets, I find it all a bit worrisome. If that regularity is local and
temporary then the "discovery" doesn't seem to be "about" anything any more
than the temporary regularity in a rambling dream is "about" anything. What
bothers me about considering as "science" the study of such highly complex
systems as society is the existence of non-linearities, or the "butterfly
effect" -- even if a study of the data is suggestive of a hypothesis that
has retrodictive explanatory power, it seems to me that its capacity for
predictive explanatory power extends over time-scales too short to make a
lasting impression on the history of ideas (I believe that NASA still uses
little more than Newton's laws to accurately predict the configuration of
the solar system for centuries into the future).
Immortalist
"John Wilkins" <john...@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gdrnqf.i3nibj47jbmkN%john...@wilkins.id.au...
>
> > I've always been suspicious about the claim by sociologists that their
> > discipline is a science, considering their attitude a form of "physics
> > envy" -- of wanting to be a member of the science "club" in order to gain
> > respectability by association.
> >
> > Today I encountered somebody with qualifications in sociology who argued
> > that sociology is a science because sociologists employ the
> > hypothetico-deductive method in order to abstract laws.
> >
> > I have my doubts that this is sufficient a description of science, but I'm
> > willing to be convinced. I know it all comes down to how we stipulate a
> > definition of the word, and I'd be interested to hear other people's views
> > on the subject.
>
> First of all, I think that the elaborated n-d model of explanation
> properly captures the nature of theories (and Derek, here, as disagreed
> with me on many occasions :-); and this has been extended into social
> explanation by two thinkers:
>
Man at least put a link for us on obscure abbriviations, no mysteriously deep
implications without explainations please.
[nomological deductive theory]
One theory about explanation is called the nomological deductive (ND) theory, or
less pretentiously, the hypothetical deductive theory. Due to philosophers Karl
Popper and GC Hempel [cf Dray 1966, especially the essay by A Donagan], it has
the form:
Premises
Universal Law
--------------
Thing to be Explained
The idea is that if the thing to be explained is a logical, deductive,
consequence of the premises and the universal laws, then you have explained it.
Once you have a theory of this form, then you can predict that a phenomenon will
occur if the initial conditions are right, based on the universal laws of
physics, chemistry, etc:...
[cool page by you]
http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/evolphil/predict.html
Immortalist
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
I think he is defending Locke's tabula rasa so that we can supposedly teach
anyone anything his monied interest group prefers. Dishonest and shameful really
these bigots of sociology. They lose anyway, cool huh, science marches right on.
[them]
Immortalist
But even if, as you suppose, you have refuted Toobey and Cosmides, you have not
refuted the wider science which sociology and evolutionary psychology are a part
"Sociobiology."
All you can necessarily claim is weakness in some theorists ideas but not much
about sociobiology in general which has become evolutionary psychology.
Evolutionary psychology, being sociobiology, will do just fine with or without
Toobey and Cosmides.
You cherised liberal view of tabula rasa social engineering is over and done,
smoked baby, we take sociology from you, we steal it right out of your hands,
poof.
> rent@mob
andy-k
news:gb6dnYjS-Zx...@comcast.com...
>
> Man at least put a link for us on obscure abbriviations, no mysteriously
deep
> implications without explainations please.
>
> [nomological deductive theory]
>
> One theory about explanation is called the nomological deductive (ND)
theory, or
> less pretentiously, the hypothetical deductive theory. Due to
philosophers Karl
> Popper and GC Hempel [cf Dray 1966, especially the essay by A Donagan],
it has
> the form:
>
> Premises
> Universal Law
> --------------
> Thing to be Explained
>
> The idea is that if the thing to be explained is a logical, deductive,
> consequence of the premises and the universal laws, then you have
explained it.
> Once you have a theory of this form, then you can predict that a
phenomenon will
> occur if the initial conditions are right, based on the universal laws of
> physics, chemistry, etc:...
>
> [cool page by you]
> http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/evolphil/predict.html
Good link.
John -- why didn't you mention this?
Paul Bramscher
Having a degree in both a social science (anthropology) and a harder
science (computer science) I'll take a stab at it.
First of all, most all of the social sciences avoid making deterministic
law-based statements (whether psychology, anthropology, sociology, etc.)
So, immediately, we shouldn't expect the clean formulaic,
tautological, or cause-effect chains you'd expect in physics or chemistry.
Archaeology went through a fashion in the 1970's known as the
"processual approach" or somesuch, probably mirroring the rise of the
computer in many scientific disciplines, which really flirted with
trying to discover law-based generalities regarding an interpretation of
the archaeological record. The pendulum has swung somewhat the other
way, but archaeology with its sub-disciplines and related disciplines
such as forensic anthropology and paleobotany are highly scientific in
both their topic and their approach. Basically they are
interdisciplinary social sciences wedded to a harder science.
What makes a social science "scientific"? They typically utilize
statistical and sampling methods, computer modeling, experiments, field
work, equipment (such as microscopes, radiocarbon dating methods, etc.)
and other standard research methods common to the hard sciences. Like
the hard scientists, they publish in peer-reviewed journals, sometimes
get funding from similar sources, and contribute to their scholarly
bodies of knowledge.
So I wouldn't so easily dismiss the social sciences as bona fide
sciences. There are even some "hard scientists" who've delved deeply
into the atom and come back out wondering just how law-based the
universe really is. Perhaps quantum mechanics itself is not unlike some
of the social sciences. It can make predictions and educated
generalizations, but no guarantees.
Ri Yen
repeatable pattern given one or more absolute conditions. I guess.
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:LFOoc.178$_h1...@newsfe1-gui.server.ntli.net...
Ri Yen
"Ri Yen" <i don't know> wrote in message
news:10aagd7...@corp.supernews.com...
John Wilkins
I think that the scope of the generalisations of a discipline adapt, as
it were, to the breadth of successful explanations. We used to include
psychology, sociology and anthropology all into a single discipline
(what we'd now call political philosophy), but it was more effective to
divide them. Each explanation case follows a general structure, but the
generalisations are of limited scope (for example, explaining Caesar's
actions in terms of what else we know about his personality, or a
particular event in terms of the functional institutions of that
society).
But note that a lot of physics is also domain relative. Newtonian
mechanics doesn't apply at nano-scales; black holes have physics that do
not apply elsewhere; cosmology has proposed - I don't know how widely
this is accepted - that some constants haven't been over the entire
duration of the universe.
So it isn't quite arbitrary, in that we allow the universe to limit our
explanatory domains. But there's no a priori division that works.
John Wilkins
It's an introductory page for those who think evolution isn't science.
As we all do here, I thought it better to discuss generalities. Also, I
was much smarter then.
Immortalist
When it is useful for practical purposes to divide disciplines I see no problem
but at other times we may want to merge disciplines for other practical purposes.
I am curious what you might think of E.O. Wilsons ideas about
multi-disciplinarianism in these paragraphs below from;
On Human Nature - Edward O. Wilson 1978
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/067463442X/qid=1036537594/
...Because the guides of human nature must be examined with a complicated
arrangement of mirrors, they are a deceptive subject, always the philosopher's
deadfall. The only way forward is to study human nature as part of the natural
sciences, in an attempt to integrate the natural sciences with the social
sciences and humanities. I can conceive of no ideological or formalisric
shortcut. Neurobiology cannot be learned at the feer of a guru. The consequences
of genetic history cannot be chosen by legislatures. Above all, for our own
physical well-being if nothing else, ethical philosophy must not be left in the
hands of the merely wise. Although human progress can be achieved by intuition
and force of will, only hard-won empirical knowledge of our biological nature
will allow us to make optimum choices among the competing criteria of progress.
The important initial development in this analysis will be the conjunction of
biology and the various social sciences-psychology, anthropology, sociology, and
economics. The two cultures have only recently come into full sight of one
another. The result has been a predictable mixture of aversions,
misunderstandings, overenthusiasm, local conflicts, and treaties. The situation
can be summarized by saying that biology stands today as the antidiscipline of
the social sciences. By the word "antidiscipline" I wish to emphasize the special
adversary relation that often exists when fields of study at adjacent levels of
organization first begin to interact. For chemistry there is the anridiscipline
of many-body physics; for molecular biology, chemistry; for physiology, molecular
biology; and so on upward through the paired levels of increasing specification
and complexity.
In the typical early history of a discipline, its practitioners believe in the
novelty and uniqueness of their subject. They devote lifetimes to special
entities and patterns and during the early period of exploration they doubt that
these phenomena can be reduced to simple laws. Members of the anridiscipline have
a different attitude. Having chosen as their primary subject the units of the
lower level of organization, say atoms as opposed to molecules, they believe that
the next discipline above can and must be reformulated by their own laws:
chemistry by the laws of physics, biology by the laws of chemistry, and so on
downward. Their interest is relatively narrow, abstract, and exploitative. P.A.M.
Dirac, speaking of the theory of the hydrogen atom, could say that its
consequences would unfold as mere chemistry. A few biochemists are still content
in the belief that life is "no more" than the actions of atoms and molecules.
It it easy to see why each scientific discipline is also an antidiscipline. An
adversary relationship is probable because the devotees of the two adjacent
organizational levels-such as atoms versus molecules-are initially committed to
their own methods and ideas when they focus on the upper level (in this case,
molecules). By today's standards a broad scientist can be defined as one who is a
student of three subjects: his discipline (chemistry in the example cited), the
lower amidiscipline (physics), and the subject to which his specialty stands as
antidiscipline (the chemical aspects of biology). A well-rounded expert on the
nervous system, to take a second, more finely graded example, is deeply versed in
the structure of single nerve cells, but he also understands the chemical basis
of the impulses that pass through and between these cells, and he hopes to
explain how nerve cells work together to produce elementary patterns of behavior.
Every successful scientist treats differently each of the three levels of
phenomena surrounding his specialty.
The interplay between adjacent fields is tense and creative at the beginning, but
with the passage of time it becomes fully complementary. Consider the origins of
molecular biology. In the late i8oos the microscopic study of cells (cytology)
and the study of chemical processes within and around the cells (biochemistry)
grew at an accelerating pace. Their relationship during this period was
complicated, but it broadly fits the historical schema I have described. The
cytologists were excited by the mounting evidence of an intricate cell
architecture. They had interpreted the mysterious choreography of the chromosomes
during cell division and thus set the stage for the emergence of modern genetics
and experimental developmental biology. Many biochemists, on the other hand,
remained skeptical of the idea that so much structure exists at the microscopic
level. They thought that the cytologists were describing artifacts created by
laboratory methods of fixing and staining cells for microscopic examination.
Their interest lay in the more "fundamental" issues of tine chemical nature of
protoplasm, especially the newly formulated theory that life is based on enzymes.
The cytologists responded with scorn to any notion that the cell is a "bag of
enzymes."
In general, biochemists judged the cytologists to be too ignorant of chemistry to
grasp the fundamental processes, while the cytologists considered the methods of
the chemists inappropriate for the idiosyncratic structures of the living cell.
The revival of Mendelian genetics in 1900 and the subsequent illumination of the
roles of the chromosomes and genes did little at first to force a synthesis.
Biochemists, seeing no immediate way to explain classical genetics, by and large
ignored it.
Both sides were essentially correct. Biochemistry has now explained so much of
the cellular machinery on its own terms as to justify its most extravagant early
claims. But in achieving this fear, mostly since 1950, it was partially
transformed into the new discipline of molecular biology, which can be defined as
biochemistry that also accounts for the particular spatial arrangements of such
molecules as the DNA helix and enzyme proteins. Cytology forced the development
of a special kind of chemistry and the use of a battery of powerful new
techniques, including electrophoresis, chromatosraphy, density-gradient
centrifugation, and x-ray crystallography. At the same time cytology
metamorphosed into modern cell biology. Aided by the electron microscope, which
magnifies objects by-hundreds of thousands of times, it has converged in
perspective and language toward molecular biology. Finally, classical genetics,
by switching from fruit flies and mice to bacteria and viruses, has incorporated
biochemistry to become molecular genetics.
Progress over a large part of biology has been fueled by competition among the
various perspectives and techniques derived from cell biology and biochemistry,
the discipline and its antidisclpline. The interplay has been a triumph for
scientific materialism. It has vastly enriched our understanding of the nature of
life and created materials for literature more powerful than any imagery of
prescienrific culture.
I suggest that we are about to repeat this cycle in the blending of biology and
the social sciences and that as a consequence the two cultures of Western
intellectual life will be joined at last. Biology has traditionally affected the
social sciences only indirectly through technological manifestations, such as the
benefits of medicine, the mixed blessings of gene splicing and other techniques
of genetics, and the specter of population growth. Although of great practical
importance, these matters are trivial with reference to the conceptual foundation
of the social sciences. The conventional treatments of "social biology" and
"social issues of biology" in our colleges and universities present some
formidable intellectual challenges, but they are not addressed to the core of
social theory. This core is the deep structure of human nature, an essentially
biological phenomenon that is also the primary focus of the humanities.
It is all too easy to be seduced by the opposing view: that science is competent
to generate only a few classes of information, that its cold, clear Apollonian
method will never be relevant to the full Dionysian life of the mind, that
single-minded devotion to science is dehumanizing. Expressing the mood of the
counterculture, Theodore Roszak suggested a map of the mind "as a spectrum of
possibilities, all of which properly blend into one another ... At one end, we
have the hard, bright lights of science; here we find information. In the center
we have the sensuous hues of art; here we find the aesthetic shape of the world.
At the far end, we have the dark, shadowy tones of religious experience, shading
off into wave lengths beyond all perception; here we find meaning."
No, here we find obscurantism! And a curious underestimate of what the mind can
accomplish. The sensuous hues and dark tones have been produced by the genetic
evolution of our nervous and sensory tissues; to treat them as other than objects
of biological inquiry is simply to ami too low.
The heart of the scientific method is the reduction of perceived phenomena to
fundamental, testable principles. The elegance, we can fairly say the beauty, of
any particular scientific generalization is measured by its simplicity relative
to the number of phenomena it can explain. Ernst Mach, a physicist and forerunner
of the logical positivists, captured the idea with a definition: "Science may be
regarded as a minimal problem consisting of the completest presentation of facts
with the least possible expenditure of thought."
On Human Nature - Edward O. Wilson 1978
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/067463442X/qid=1036537594/
717
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
I meant stirring up some of my own I Q points.
Being smart is lonely for me, even though I am
not that smart. Even a few measley I Q points
above the norm is painful. At least that's the way
it is tonight.
AE
"hypothetico-deductive method" correctly.
Experimental science (in contrast to purely theoretical sciences like
mathematics) works generally the following way:
1) Create a hypothesis to explain past observations.
2) Try to predict future observations (for example the outcome of an
experiment) using this hypothesis.
3) Do this new observation (experiment).
It is undispensable this observation can be repeated by others.
4) If (3) disproves your hypothesis go back to (1) - your hypothesis
was wrong.
If (3) strengthens your hypothesis is might or might not be true.
If possible go back to (2) to strengthen your hypothesis even
further.
5) Publish hypothesis and observations (experiments) so it can be
checked by others.
6) In case others find severe flaws or are able to disprove your
hypothesis you should be more careful next time. In case your
hypothesis gets supported by the observations of other scientists
it becomes accepted as a law.
The main problem of social scienses is that there are simply too many
variables that can't be controlled or measured so it's hard to get
reliable observations:
Natural laws usually will stay good approximations in the context where
they were tested even when more general laws are found or the scope of
our observations grows - Newton's mechanics still is a good
approximation of relativistic mechanics for speeds much smaller than
speed of light and both are approximations of quantum mechanics for a
scale much larger than uncertainty.
Right the same should be true for social sciences, but probability for
context being more restrictive than expected is much higher than in
natural sciences.
As far as I can see there are fewer well-defined laws in social sciences
than in natural sciences - a hypothesis might get accepted before
being scrutinized.
Nevertheless the basic idea is right the same.
andy-k schrieb:
andy-k
unscrutinized prejudices.
rent@mob
> > Sociology shades over into politics. Biologists are not politicians
> > (or should not be).
> >
>
> But even if, as you suppose, you have refuted Toobey and Cosmides, you have not
> refuted the wider science which sociology and evolutionary psychology are a part
> "Sociobiology."
>
If it suits you to dress your political convictions up in the
trappings of science, camp it up, baby. We all appreciate a show.
> All you can necessarily claim is weakness in some theorists ideas but not much
> about sociobiology in general which has become evolutionary psychology.
> Evolutionary psychology, being sociobiology, will do just fine with or without
> Toobey and Cosmides.
>
All evolutionary psychology is bunk. You and I are both entitled to
such unsubstantiated claims.
> You cherised liberal view of tabula rasa social engineering is over and done,
> smoked baby, we take sociology from you, we steal it right out of your hands,
> poof.
'we take sociology from you'. What a remarkably candid statement of
your objectivity. Salut!
rent@mob
Immortalist
news:<2pOdnY4XtaN...@comcast.com>...
>
>
> > > Sociology shades over into politics. Biologists are not politicians
> > > (or should not be).
> > >
> >
> > But even if, as you suppose, you have refuted Toobey and Cosmides, you have
not
> > refuted the wider science which sociology and evolutionary psychology are a
part
> > "Sociobiology."
> >
>
> If it suits you to dress your political convictions up in the
> trappings of science, camp it up, baby. We all appreciate a show.
>
Too late to say that its already turned into a science with a complete literature
set and global paradigm. Do you imagine it would just go away? Besides its just
Sociobiology which never went away.
>
> > All you can necessarily claim is weakness in some theorists ideas but not
much
> > about sociobiology in general which has become evolutionary psychology.
> > Evolutionary psychology, being sociobiology, will do just fine with or
without
> > Toobey and Cosmides.
> >
>
> All evolutionary psychology is bunk. You and I are both entitled to
> such unsubstantiated claims.
>
When you say all evolutionary psychology and sociobiology is bunk all I have to
do is find one verifiable experiment and your refuted. You could claim some or
most but I reject this all of your right out of hand.
>
> > You cherised liberal view of tabula rasa social engineering is over and done,
> > smoked baby, we take sociology from you, we steal it right out of your hands,
> > poof.
>
> 'we take sociology from you'. What a remarkably candid statement of
> your objectivity. Salut!
>
Sounds like just how the existentialists actually thought they could stop
psychology decades ago. They lost big time because it was an adaptable science,
just like evolutionary psychology is now, in progress of finding biological
evidence for observations in sociology.
But this will hurt the liberals big time because they think humans have no human
nature and that humans can be bent to any institutional arrangement that profits
them.
> rent@mob
rent@mob
> > If it suits you to dress your political convictions up in the
> > trappings of science, camp it up, baby. We all appreciate a show.
> >
>
> Too late to say that its already turned into a science with a complete literature
> set and global paradigm. Do you imagine it would just go away? Besides its just
> Sociobiology which never went away.
>
Where evolutionary psychology *is* a science, it's actually just
CogSci - good, old-fashioned, pains-taking experimental research into
cognitive functions. Where it invents a prehistoric story to explain
regularities in modern human psyches, it is no more 'science' than
phrenology was. No quantity of august 'literature' will ever hide that
embarrassing fact from inquiring minds.
When excitable minds leap from a credulous skim-read of a pop science
book to declaring certain varieties of political philosophy
'disproven', there is *no* science involved whatsoever.
>
> > All evolutionary psychology is bunk. You and I are both entitled to
> > such unsubstantiated claims.
> >
>
> When you say all evolutionary psychology and sociobiology is bunk all I have to
> do is find one verifiable experiment and your refuted. You could claim some or
> most but I reject this all of your right out of hand.
>
You underestimate the profundity of Pinker's error - as profound as
the mistake made by the phrenologists a century ago. Evolution is a
process acting on DNA, a biological molecule. Psychology is a process
which takes place in the minds of homo sapiens, encultured within a
human society. These two levels are distinct, far removed, subject to
very different forces, yet your cherished discipline collapses them
together, without mediation. As a consequence, it is unscientific from
top to toe.
Of course I don't deny the uninteresting stuff - the retroengineering
one can carry out on any mammal. But that stuff has *no* bearing on
political issues. Give us a verifiable experiment which demonstrates
an evolved basis for a specifically human psychological state - say,
for a simple example, a gene for homosexuality.
> >
> But this will hurt the liberals big time because they think humans have no human
> nature and that humans can be bent to any institutional arrangement that profits
> them.
'Liberals' has a meaning in English it lacks in American. It means
people who take liberty seriously. Your political convictions do,
indeed, do violence to liberty as a political value. It delights you
to believe that humans are automatons, that the way things are is
therefore the way things have to be, that conservatives no longer have
a duty to account for the lack of progress in 20th century democracies
towards social justice.
This naturalistic politics of yours is indistinguishable from a feudal
mindset. In the UK, the old version is still regularly expressed by
the likes of Prince Charles and his old school chum Jonathan Porrit,
or old-Etonian Lord Peter Melchett. Nature has its place for us humans
(subtext: -us few- humans at the top of the dung heap can see that
better than you serfs).
With that version understandably discredited (though still popular
with some middle classes), your new political naturalism enthuses a
new generation of conservatives with hope for their otherwise battered
ideals: ideals which have been exposed as dangerous, self-serving cant
for a generation. You fantasise that science can save you from the
cultural onslaught from the centre Left. It can't.
rent@mob
rent@mob
> When a discipline purports to be a science because it reveals regularity in
> data sets, I find it all a bit worrisome. If that regularity is local and
> temporary then the "discovery" doesn't seem to be "about" anything any more
> than the temporary regularity in a rambling dream is "about" anything. What
> bothers me about considering as "science" the study of such highly complex
> systems as society is the existence of non-linearities, or the "butterfly
> effect" -- even if a study of the data is suggestive of a hypothesis that
> has retrodictive explanatory power, it seems to me that its capacity for
> predictive explanatory power extends over time-scales too short to make a
> lasting impression on the history of ideas (I believe that NASA still uses
> little more than Newton's laws to accurately predict the configuration of
> the solar system for centuries into the future).
I agree with your observation that correlation is too often mistaken
for causal explanation in social 'sciences', or at least in the
political response to sociology we have out here in the general public
/ media world. However, that is *not* to say that causal explanation
is never possible. All it suggests is that the 'lab coat' can only be
worn in certain parts of the Sociology faculty - in other parts,
impartiality renders explanation impossible. It becomes necessary to
adopt the perspective of a partial human being in order to forward a
causal explanation - definitions of what causes what in a given
society are political definitions.
Like any other humanities discipline, sociology is perfectly capable
of lifting the lid on its subject and delving into the structures
beneath. When it comes up with a way to grasp those structures which
is close to how they actually are, its explanatory - and predictive -
power can be formidable. But that 'way' will never be politically
neutral - there will always be another 'way' available - human
political arrangements are not a closed system.
rent@mob
Immortalist
news:<aZOdndXuINx...@comcast.com>...
>
>
> > > If it suits you to dress your political convictions up in the
> > > trappings of science, camp it up, baby. We all appreciate a show.
> > >
> >
> > Too late to say that its already turned into a science with a complete
literature
> > set and global paradigm. Do you imagine it would just go away? Besides its
just
> > Sociobiology which never went away.
> >
>
> Where evolutionary psychology *is* a science, it's actually just
> CogSci - good, old-fashioned, pains-taking experimental research into
> cognitive functions. Where it invents a prehistoric story to explain
> regularities in modern human psyches, it is no more 'science' than
> phrenology was. No quantity of august 'literature' will ever hide that
> embarrassing fact from inquiring minds.
>
You can look at all science like this and dismiss whichever your prejudace
desires. Lame refutation actually. Scientists invent theories and you are
claiming which are valid and which are not. At one time phrenology was pretty
good science, you deal in hindsight 20/20 monday morning quarterbacking here.
Shame on your embarrasing behavior.
Just say it honestly, "I do not like sociobiology." Then I would respect more
your reasons for disliking it. It is just more "empirical science."
Besides Cognitive Science is just another contemporary view with much evidence
from neuroscience. Cognitive science is not opposed to sociobiology as you would
wish it to be in order to prop up your socialist viewpoint.
> When excitable minds leap from a credulous skim-read of a pop science
> book to declaring certain varieties of political philosophy
> 'disproven', there is *no* science involved whatsoever.
>
In the late 1970s Sociobiology began. Those books weren't to popular then.
Evolutionary Psychology is a new name for decades old Sociobiology. What is the
political philosophy that is disproven and please give evidence for it's
connection to Sociobiology. You have not made yourself very clear what it is that
refutes this empirical and theoretical science.
>
> >
> > > All evolutionary psychology is bunk. You and I are both entitled to
> > > such unsubstantiated claims.
> > >
> >
> > When you say all evolutionary psychology and sociobiology is bunk all I have
to
> > do is find one verifiable experiment and your refuted. You could claim some
or
> > most but I reject this all of your right out of hand.
> >
>
> You underestimate the profundity of Pinker's error - as profound as
> the mistake made by the phrenologists a century ago. Evolution is a
> process acting on DNA, a biological molecule. Psychology is a process
> which takes place in the minds of homo sapiens, encultured within a
> human society. These two levels are distinct, far removed, subject to
> very different forces, yet your cherished discipline collapses them
> together, without mediation. As a consequence, it is unscientific from
> top to toe.
>
Do the genes direct the assembly of the brain? If so then there is a connection
between evolution and psychology. Yes, the genes do direct the assembly of the
brain. Sociobiology claims for a gene/culture interaction, and has for decades.
Evolutionary Psychology is just a new name for Sociobiology. You are refuted here
unless you can show that the genes do not direct the assembly of the brain.
> Of course I don't deny the uninteresting stuff - the retroengineering
> one can carry out on any mammal. But that stuff has *no* bearing on
> political issues. Give us a verifiable experiment which demonstrates
> an evolved basis for a specifically human psychological state - say,
> for a simple example, a gene for homosexuality.
>
How about genes for "critical periods" during adolescents and puberty which make
the organism more sensitive to particular stimuli in which permenant imprinting
takes place? If homosexuality is chosen then it could become like a permanent
language accent, never lost during the rest of the lifetime.
But you claim there is "no bearing" and you hang yourself by saying that. One
instance will refute you however small, and that instance? The genes direct the
assembly of the brain, your refuted. You must say "some" or "most" and cannot say
"no" bearing upon, for you have not presented all possible evidence.
>
> > >
> > But this will hurt the liberals big time because they think humans have no
human
> > nature and that humans can be bent to any institutional arrangement that
profits
> > them.
>
> 'Liberals' has a meaning in English it lacks in American. It means
> people who take liberty seriously. Your political convictions do,
> indeed, do violence to liberty as a political value. It delights you
> to believe that humans are automatons, that the way things are is
> therefore the way things have to be, that conservatives no longer have
> a duty to account for the lack of progress in 20th century democracies
> towards social justice.
>
Liberal does not lack the meaning you imply in America, you lack knowledge of
America freind. Liberal has two or more meanings here, a traditional and a
contemporary. You can't control how we use our words sorry. When I said liberal I
meant left wing socialist leaning blank slaters who are losing the debate big
time now with every advance in science. I figure your one of the losers right and
are either socialist or communist? LOL.
> This naturalistic politics of yours is indistinguishable from a feudal
> mindset. In the UK, the old version is still regularly expressed by
> the likes of Prince Charles and his old school chum Jonathan Porrit,
> or old-Etonian Lord Peter Melchett. Nature has its place for us humans
> (subtext: -us few- humans at the top of the dung heap can see that
> better than you serfs).
>
Your not going to make good science go away because science will change if shown
to be wrong but you historical dilemma there is set forever, therefore your
refuted.
> With that version understandably discredited (though still popular
> with some middle classes), your new political naturalism enthuses a
> new generation of conservatives with hope for their otherwise battered
> ideals: ideals which have been exposed as dangerous, self-serving cant
> for a generation. You fantasise that science can save you from the
> cultural onslaught from the centre Left. It can't.
>
What is discredited, you have not shown me how sociobiology is refuted. Its just
another theory like the rest that you can't get rid of, its just empirical
science. Besides if it finds problems it will upgrade itself like any other good
science. Your view is the hardened one that can't change and will sink to the
bottom of the sea when challenged by concurrent scientific evidence.
You would sacrifice good science for you personal preferences. We should not
trust what you say for you are biggoted and a lier when it suits your purposes.
No trust in that you dishonest person. If you show me wrong I will change but you
don't appear to have that capacity so far and I can't trust what you say.
> rent@mob
rent@mob
> > Where evolutionary psychology *is* a science, it's actually just
> > CogSci - good, old-fashioned, pains-taking experimental research into
> > cognitive functions. Where it invents a prehistoric story to explain
> > regularities in modern human psyches, it is no more 'science' than
> > phrenology was. No quantity of august 'literature' will ever hide that
> > embarrassing fact from inquiring minds.
> >
>
> You can look at all science like this and dismiss whichever your prejudace
> desires. Lame refutation actually. Scientists invent theories and you are
> claiming which are valid and which are not. At one time phrenology was pretty
> good science, you deal in hindsight 20/20 monday morning quarterbacking here.
> Shame on your embarrasing behavior.
>
Rather than exchanging bitch slaps, perhaps we should return to the
topic. My claim is that there are parts of the research conducted by
Pinker et al which are uncontroversial science - and parts which are
unwarranted leaps from that empirical foundation to political
conclusions. You have given me no grounds for your belief that
research into the brain as a biological entity entitles you to make
claims in the realm of sociology.
> Just say it honestly, "I do not like sociobiology." Then I would respect more
> your reasons for disliking it. It is just more "empirical science."
>
You place a lot of faith in the empirical status of sociobiology.
Perhaps you mistake the point I'm making. I'm not denying that
researchers have designed robust experiments poking electrodes into
monkey brains, etc. What I'm denying is the relevance of that
empirical record to the analysis of human societies, which are
significantly *historical* in character. Where 'sociobiologists'
believe that their data entitles them to make claims in that other
domain, they are all - to my knowledge - on shaky theoretical ground,
and tend not to be even slightly aware of the methodological problems
they're skipping over. From what I've seen here so far, that applies
to you, too.
> Besides Cognitive Science is just another contemporary view with much evidence
> from neuroscience. Cognitive science is not opposed to sociobiology as you would
> wish it to be in order to prop up your socialist viewpoint.
>
I do not need CogSci to be opposed to sociobiology - that would make
CogSci every bit as much a *political* orientation as Sociobiology is.
All I need for it to be is good science - methodologically
respectable.
I'm flattered that you've been off to stalk me and uncovered my red
politics. Since mine are on the table, what are yours, specifically?
> > When excitable minds leap from a credulous skim-read of a pop science
> > book to declaring certain varieties of political philosophy
> > 'disproven', there is *no* science involved whatsoever.
> >
>
> In the late 1970s Sociobiology began. Those books weren't to popular then.
>
Never heard of The Naked Ape, then, huh? How wet behind the ears are
we, here?
>
> Evolutionary Psychology is a new name for decades old Sociobiology.
>
I'm delighted you admit this openly - it's the equivalent of a modern
'white ethnicity' spokesman confessing that the race issues are still
his organisation's guiding light. Most EvPsychs I've encountered
wouldn't thank you for it, though. They seem to go to great lengths to
distance themselves from the crude, biological determinist route taken
by that first wave.
>
> What is the
> political philosophy that is disproven and please give evidence for it's
> connection to Sociobiology. You have not made yourself very clear what it is that
> refutes this empirical and theoretical science.
>
I apologise if my florid rhetorical style went over your head. It was
a flippant point you're welcome to ignore.
> >
> > You underestimate the profundity of Pinker's error - as profound as
> > the mistake made by the phrenologists a century ago. Evolution is a
> > process acting on DNA, a biological molecule. Psychology is a process
> > which takes place in the minds of homo sapiens, encultured within a
> > human society. These two levels are distinct, far removed, subject to
> > very different forces, yet your cherished discipline collapses them
> > together, without mediation. As a consequence, it is unscientific from
> > top to toe.
> >
>
> Do the genes direct the assembly of the brain? If so then there is a connection
> between evolution and psychology. Yes, the genes do direct the assembly of the
> brain. Sociobiology claims for a gene/culture interaction, and has for decades.
> Evolutionary Psychology is just a new name for Sociobiology. You are refuted here
> unless you can show that the genes do not direct the assembly of the brain.
One recurrent blind spot in EvPsych thinking is that believers
typically treat the mind and the brain as interchangeable terms for
precisely the same entity. This can only be due to philosophical
naievety.
Besides, however much our genes are involved in stacking up RNA and
proteins on the construction site of the brain, this does not make
them the architects. The interesting design features of the human mind
do not arise from genetically-determined brain structure, but from
culturally-constructed intelligence. So no, genes certainly do not
'direct', in the totalising sense you imply.
>
> > Of course I don't deny the uninteresting stuff - the retroengineering
> > one can carry out on any mammal. But that stuff has *no* bearing on
> > political issues. Give us a verifiable experiment which demonstrates
> > an evolved basis for a specifically human psychological state - say,
> > for a simple example, a gene for homosexuality.
> >
>
> How about genes for "critical periods" during adolescents and puberty which make
> the organism more sensitive to particular stimuli in which permenant imprinting
> takes place? If homosexuality is chosen then it could become like a permanent
> language accent, never lost during the rest of the lifetime.
>
And the verifiable experimental demonstration of this conjecture I
requested was where, precisely ...?
> But you claim there is "no bearing" and you hang yourself by saying that. One
> instance will refute you however small, and that instance? The genes direct the
> assembly of the brain, your refuted. You must say "some" or "most" and cannot say
> "no" bearing upon, for you have not presented all possible evidence.
>
See construction analogy above - you dramatically overestimate the
role played by construction workers here. I remain entitled to my
'no'.
> When I said liberal I
> meant left wing socialist leaning blank slaters who are losing the debate big
> time now with every advance in science. I figure your one of the losers right and
> are either socialist or communist? LOL.
I knew what you meant when you said liberal. I was attempting to
encourage you to recognise the threat to something else -
libertarianism, perhaps - inherent in your arguments. If you prefer to
return to name-calling rather than answering my questions, that's
entirely your call.
>
> Your not going to make good science go away because science will change if shown
> to be wrong but you historical dilemma there is set forever, therefore your
> refuted.
I do not follow this point. If it's a good one, you'd better spell it
out.
>
> What is discredited, you have not shown me how sociobiology is refuted. Its just
> another theory like the rest that you can't get rid of, its just empirical
> science. Besides if it finds problems it will upgrade itself like any other good
> science. Your view is the hardened one that can't change and will sink to the
> bottom of the sea when challenged by concurrent scientific evidence.
>
> You would sacrifice good science for you personal preferences. We should not
> trust what you say for you are biggoted and a lier when it suits your purposes.
> No trust in that you dishonest person. If you show me wrong I will change but you
> don't appear to have that capacity so far and I can't trust what you say.
>
Don't throw yer toys out of the pram, old boy. I have invited you to
recognise the methodological weaknesses in marrying two far-removed
levels of scientific explanation, and to respond to those problems as
best you can. Once you have engaged with that critique, perhaps we
will be entitled to measure which of us is most open to new evidence.
rent@mob
Immortalist
news:<m5CdnY2vudj...@comcast.com>...
>
>
> > > Where evolutionary psychology *is* a science, it's actually just
> > > CogSci - good, old-fashioned, pains-taking experimental research into
> > > cognitive functions. Where it invents a prehistoric story to explain
> > > regularities in modern human psyches, it is no more 'science' than
> > > phrenology was. No quantity of august 'literature' will ever hide that
> > > embarrassing fact from inquiring minds.
> > >
> >
> > You can look at all science like this and dismiss whichever your prejudace
> > desires. Lame refutation actually. Scientists invent theories and you are
> > claiming which are valid and which are not. At one time phrenology was pretty
> > good science, you deal in hindsight 20/20 monday morning quarterbacking here.
> > Shame on your embarrasing behavior.
> >
>
> Rather than exchanging bitch slaps, perhaps we should return to the
> topic. My claim is that there are parts of the research conducted by
> Pinker et al which are uncontroversial science - and parts which are
> unwarranted leaps from that empirical foundation to political
> conclusions. You have given me no grounds for your belief that
> research into the brain as a biological entity entitles you to make
> claims in the realm of sociology.
>
OK, then give me an example or two of where Pinker performs unwarrented leaps. He
makes plenty of leaps as do many "developmental psychologists" which are of
course leaps because its pretty much uncharted territory. Child psychologists are
the cutting edge with their critical stages and the imprinting that takes place
then.
>
> > Just say it honestly, "I do not like sociobiology." Then I would respect more
> > your reasons for disliking it. It is just more "empirical science."
> >
>
> You place a lot of faith in the empirical status of sociobiology.
> Perhaps you mistake the point I'm making. I'm not denying that
> researchers have designed robust experiments poking electrodes into
> monkey brains, etc. What I'm denying is the relevance of that
> empirical record to the analysis of human societies, which are
> significantly *historical* in character. Where 'sociobiologists'
> believe that their data entitles them to make claims in that other
> domain, they are all - to my knowledge - on shaky theoretical ground,
> and tend not to be even slightly aware of the methodological problems
> they're skipping over. From what I've seen here so far, that applies
> to you, too.
>
"Society is carried around biologically (i.e. genetically) in each individual"
Three Insights
There are three profound insights deriving from sociobiological research, the
implications of which reverberate throughout the social sciences and the
humanities. They are as follows:
(1) Society is not really external to the animal. It is not an abstract form,
superimposed on its members. Rather, it is carried around biologically (i.e.
genetically) in each individual. Granted, the biological underpinning of social
behavior does not take the same form for all species. Whereas the termite blindly
carries out his almost fully programmed role, a monkey has a variety of
emotionally directed interactions with his family and other individuals, such as
the alpha male, which results in group structure.
Nevertheless, the individual termite or monkey is bound to behave as a member of
his group, in such a way that the aggregate behavior of the members forms a
predictable pattern. That this is true of humans as well was not lost on
Aristotle who saw the organic nature of society; however it does seem to have
been lost somewhere in the shuffle of the last 2,500 years-leading to many
fanciful theories about the origin of society, and the nature of the state.
(2) Society adds a new 'layer' in evolution. Like the cell, and the individual
organism, society too is an emergent phenomenon, complete with properties of its
own. This should make it easier for us to understand how some astonishing human
capabilities could have evolved by natural selection. We now realize that a whole
new evolutionary phenomenon, namely, social behavior, intervenes between the
genes and the accomplishments of 'society in the round'. Wilson believes that
social behavior permits a quantum jump in biological organization. He says,
'There is a strict limit to what any single ant, wolf, or even human being is
able to accomplish. In contrast, the society can evolve to much greater
complexity . . . even without any increase in the powers of its individual
members.' Emile Durkheim, one of the founders of sociology, tried to account for
the advances of human culture and technology by offering the concepts of the
division of labor and the integration of society. Sociobiology, as we shall see,
agrees that these two concepts are crucial, and moreover, shows them to be
genetic rather than merely historical phenomena.
(3) The fact that society is ultimately carried around in individuals can help to
explain much about human nature. Wilson offers the suggestion that the tension
and turmoil felt in human life and so often portrayed in literature, could be a
reflection of the conflicting genetic pressures to behave selfishly, or
altruistically. The centers of the brain's emotional complex 'tax the conscious
mind with ambivalences wherever the organisms encounter stressful situations.
Love joins hate; aggression, fear; expansiveness, withdrawal; and so on; in
blends designed not to promote the happiness and survival of the individual' but
to work out a balance between the 'genetic demands' of the individual, the family
and the group.
Human Evolution - A Philosophical Anthropology
-- Mary Maxwell 1984
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0231059469/
Well that was twenty years ago and we don't quite say it like that now, but don't
that sound cool man?
>
> > Besides Cognitive Science is just another contemporary view with much
evidence
> > from neuroscience. Cognitive science is not opposed to sociobiology as you
would
> > wish it to be in order to prop up your socialist viewpoint.
> >
>
> I do not need CogSci to be opposed to sociobiology - that would make
> CogSci every bit as much a *political* orientation as Sociobiology is.
> All I need for it to be is good science - methodologically
> respectable.
>
I remember when Cognitive Psychology came out, us neurophysiology enthuisiests
laughed calling it pop neuroscience and anatomy. But we began to take it
seriously when the Fruedians began laughing saying that you can't claim nerve
cells have anything to do with psychological states. Now you don't know what to
think of the new sciences so you bash shit, while supporting the notion that
nerve cells have a relation to psychology and simualtainiously denying genetic
influences.
> I'm flattered that you've been off to stalk me and uncovered my red
> politics. Since mine are on the table, what are yours, specifically?
>
Moderate, center of the road [lane]. "Radical center," set to kill any extremes.
To err towards that extreme which I am lacking to remain centered. Mixed economy
mixed regime.
>
> > > When excitable minds leap from a credulous skim-read of a pop science
> > > book to declaring certain varieties of political philosophy
> > > 'disproven', there is *no* science involved whatsoever.
> > >
> >
> > In the late 1970s Sociobiology began. Those books weren't to popular then.
> >
> Never heard of The Naked Ape, then, huh? How wet behind the ears are
> we, here?
Bitch slap? and you imagine what I study and what my age is? Thought you wanted
to tone that down.
>
> >
> > Evolutionary Psychology is a new name for decades old Sociobiology.
> >
>
> I'm delighted you admit this openly - it's the equivalent of a modern
> 'white ethnicity' spokesman confessing that the race issues are still
> his organisation's guiding light. Most EvPsychs I've encountered
> wouldn't thank you for it, though. They seem to go to great lengths to
> distance themselves from the crude, biological determinist route taken
> by that first wave.
>
You have made the claim that sociobiology is a "social darwinist" science, how do
you defend this? If instincts and human nature become verified, by your logic we
must become social darwinists? Whats Spencer got to do with Wilson?
Is the mind simply the activities of the brain? If not please provide your
evidence?
> Besides, however much our genes are involved in stacking up RNA and
> proteins on the construction site of the brain, this does not make
> them the architects. The interesting design features of the human mind
> do not arise from genetically-determined brain structure, but from
> culturally-constructed intelligence. So no, genes certainly do not
> 'direct', in the totalising sense you imply.
>
This is supposed to show that changes in the genes cannot change the structure of
the brain?
> >
> > > Of course I don't deny the uninteresting stuff - the retroengineering
> > > one can carry out on any mammal. But that stuff has *no* bearing on
> > > political issues. Give us a verifiable experiment which demonstrates
> > > an evolved basis for a specifically human psychological state - say,
> > > for a simple example, a gene for homosexuality.
> > >
> >
> > How about genes for "critical periods" during adolescents and puberty which
make
> > the organism more sensitive to particular stimuli in which permenant
imprinting
> > takes place? If homosexuality is chosen then it could become like a permanent
> > language accent, never lost during the rest of the lifetime.
> >
>
> And the verifiable experimental demonstration of this conjecture I
> requested was where, precisely ...?
>
The Hegelian view, arrived at by the dialectic method, was that there were
fundamental laws which drove the development of a culture or a country; that
a culture or a country has a kind of a personality of its own, and its
development is to be explained in terms of its own character. Hegel also
supported the idea that men are dissatisfied or so alienated in their
practical life that they need to believe in illusory ideas such as religion
or nationalism.
http://www.blupete.com/Literature/Biographies/Philosophy/Hegel.htm
The Immediate and Development
I referred above to Being as a "motive force" which "drives" development.
This is a way of visualising the understanding that, like any other phase of
development of the Logic, Being does not just "terminate" and pass over into
another, but continues within the more developed process, as one of its
aspects.
For example, I remember reading Standford & Roak's book on group
development, which identified seven stages of group development (Beginning,
Norm Development, Conflict, Transition, Production, Affection and
Actualisation). The writers took care to point out that every time a new
member joined the group, and even to an extent every time you sit down to
begin a new meeting, all these stages had to be recapitulated, even if in
telescoped form!
The "materialised conception" which is the beginning of thinking, does not
stop when you first reflect upon it. On the contrary, it continues unabated.
Consequently, all the moments and stages of the Logic which flow from it
continue, and constitute an inner content of the development from beginning
to end.
...Piaget refers to the deduction of the Euclidean, Cartesian and
topological geometry from Burbakian structures; but these structures
represent a very developed Notion of mathematical form. The most general,
abstract mathematical forms always arise out of the synthesis of "special"
or limiting cases which are always historically prior. I think this is a
general law of development, and reflects the features of Hegel's Being -
Essence - Notion.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/mean02.htm
His [Piaget] researches in developmental psychology and genetic epistemology
had one unique goal: how does knowledge grow? His answer is that the growth
of knowledge is a progressive construction of logically embedded structures
superseding one another by a process of inclusion of lower less powerful
logical means into higher and more powerful ones up to adulthood. Therefore,
children's logic and modes of thinking are initially entirely different from
those of adults.
http://www.piaget.org/biography/biog.html
Genetic Epistemology (J. Piaget)
Overview:
Over a period of six decades, Jean Piaget conducted a program of
naturalistic research that has profoundly affected our understanding of
child development. Piaget called his general theoretical framework "genetic
epistemology" because he was primarily interested in how knowledge developed
in human organisms. Piaget had a background in both Biology and Philosophy
and concepts from both these disciplines influences his theories and
research of child development.
The concept of cognitive structure is central to his theory. Cognitive
structures are patterns of physical or mental action that underlie specific
acts of intelligence and correspond to stages of child development (see
Schemas). There are four primary cognitive structures (i.e., development
stages) according to Piaget: sensorimotor, preoperations, concrete
operations, and formal operations. In the sensorimotor stage (0-2 years),
intelligence takes the form of motor actions. Intelligence in the
preoperation period (3-7 years) is intutive in nature. The cognitive
structure during the concrete operational stage (8-11 years) is logical but
depends upon concrete referents. In the final stage of formal operations
(12-15 years), thinking involves abstractions.
Cognitive structures change through the processes of adaptation:
assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation involves the interpretation of
events in terms of existing cognitive structure whereas accommodation refers
to changing the cognitive structure to make sense of the environment.
Cognitive development consists of a constant effort to adapt to the
environment in terms of assimilation and accommodation. In this sense,
Piaget's theory is similar in nature to other constructivist perspectives of
learning (e.g., Bruner, Vygotsky)....
http://tip.psychology.org/piaget.html
Some developmental specialists believe that if 'critical periods' in brain
development are not utilized, opportunities are lost, never to be regained.
Others maintain that since brain growth continues after the age of three,
opportunities for growth do not shut down. It is their belief that emphasis
on providing early intervention services has resulted in neglect of
attention to older children. It seems that all too often facts and fiction
merge, and the details of research have been exaggerated and applied in
unfortunate ways. In order to find out what is actually known at the present
time about brains and early development and parenting, we interviewed
http://www.aboutourkids.org/articles/2000baby.html
Vulnerable periods during the development of the nervous system are
sensitive to environmental insults because they are dependent on the
temporal and regional emergence of critical developmental processes (i.e.,
proliferation, migration, differentiation, synaptogenesis, myelination, and
apoptosis). Evidence from numerous sources demonstrates that neural
development extends from the embryonic period through adolescence. In
general, the sequence of events is comparable among species, although the
time scales are considerably different. Developmental exposure of animals or
humans to numerous agents (e.g., X-ray irradiation, methylazoxymethanol,
ethanol, lead, methyl mercury, or chlorpyrifos) demonstrates that
interference with one or more of these developmental processes can lead to
developmental neurotoxicity. Different behavioral domains (e.g., sensory,
motor, and various cognitive functions) are subserved by different brain
areas. Although there are important differences between the rodent and human
brain, analogous structures can be identified. Moreover, the ontogeny of
specific behaviors can be used to draw inferences regarding the maturation
of specific brain structures or neural circuits in rodents and primates,
including humans. Furthermore, various clinical disorders in humans (e.g.,
schizophrenia, dyslexia, epilepsy, and autism) may also be the result of
interference with normal ontogeny of developmental processes in the nervous
system. Of critical concern is the possibility that developmental exposure
to neurotoxicants may result in an acceleration of age-related decline in
function. This concern is compounded by the fact that developmental
neurotoxicity that results in small effects can have a profound societal
impact when amortized across the entire population and across the life span
of humans. Key words: abnormal neurological development, apoptosis,
behavioral testing methodology, delayed neurotoxicity, differentiation,
migration, myelination, neurobiological substrates of function, neuronal
plasticity, neurotrophic factor, primate, rodent. -- Environ Health Perspect
108(suppl 3):511-533 (2000).
Secret Science of Development:
[DevelopmentalBiology]
http://tinyurl.com/b2nn
http://ecti.hbg.psu.edu/proNews.htm
http://tinyurl.com/tnbo
In species other than mammals, a similar pattern of critically timed
vulnerability for the nervous system also exists. The acquisition of bird
songs has been extensively studied in the context of what is inherited and
if critical windows of exposure exist for normal song to develop. Some birds
such as doves, who have a species specific cooing rhythm, are unaffected by
efforts to disrupt their learning. Their song must have a genetic model
which does not require environmental "priming". The sparrow, however, needs
to acquire a "model" or template for the species specific song sometime
during its first four months of life or it fails to produce a normal song
even with subsequent adult song exposure.(19)
http://www.accessexcellence.org/21st/SER/BE/whatd.html
-------------------------
L1 acquisition is genetically triggered at the most critical stage of the
child's cognitive development.
The 'engine' of language - its syntactic system - is 'informationally
encapsulated' - which means that children are not even aware of developing a
complex, rule-governed, hierarchical system. Most L1 speakers do not even
realise this is what they are using.
The L1 is typically acquired at the crucial period of cognitive development;
pre-puberty, when L1 and other crucial life-skills are also acquired or
learned.
Children never resist L1 acquisition, any more than they resist learning to
walk.
Given even minimal 'input' during critical pre-pubescent development, all
humans acquire the L1 of the society or social group they are born into as a
natural and essential part of their lives. Even brain-damaged and/or
retarded children usually acquire the full grammatical code of the language
of their society or social group.
In short, L1 acquisition is an essential, biologically-driven process. It is
part of every individual's evolutionary history and development in the most
critical stage of that individual's acquisition of essential life-skills.
------------------
Hegel states in the introduction to his Berlin course on the history of
philosophy: "The history we have before us is the history of the
self-discovery of thought" (Lectures on the History of Philosophy, ed
Hoffmeister 1940, Bd. I, S. 81, Anm.). "For the history of philosophy only
develops philosophy itself" (Hoffmeister a.a.O. S. 235f.). Accordingly, phil
osophy as the self-development of spirit into absolute knowledge and the
history of philosophy are identical. No philosophy prior to Hegel's had
acquired such a fundamental grounding of philosophy, enabling and requiring
philosophizing itself to simultaneously move within its history and be in
this movement philosophy itself. Philosophy however has, following a word of
Hegel's taken from the Introduction of his first course here in Heidelberg ,
as "purpose": "the truth" (Hoffmeister a.a.O. S. 14.).
http://www.morec.com/hegelgre.htm
>
> > But you claim there is "no bearing" and you hang yourself by saying that. One
> > instance will refute you however small, and that instance? The genes direct
the
> > assembly of the brain, your refuted. You must say "some" or "most" and cannot
say
> > "no" bearing upon, for you have not presented all possible evidence.
> >
>
> See construction analogy above - you dramatically overestimate the
> role played by construction workers here. I remain entitled to my
> 'no'.
>
You have not shown how a change in the genes that direct the assembly of the
brain cannot change the neural structures used for social interactions and
dealing with cultural artifacts.
>
> > When I said liberal I
> > meant left wing socialist leaning blank slaters who are losing the debate big
> > time now with every advance in science. I figure your one of the losers right
and
> > are either socialist or communist? LOL.
>
> I knew what you meant when you said liberal. I was attempting to
> encourage you to recognise the threat to something else -
> libertarianism, perhaps - inherent in your arguments. If you prefer to
> return to name-calling rather than answering my questions, that's
> entirely your call.
>
People often misunderstand centrists and construe them as being the opposite
extreme.
>
> >
> > Your not going to make good science go away because science will change if
shown
> > to be wrong but you historical dilemma there is set forever, therefore your
> > refuted.
>
> I do not follow this point. If it's a good one, you'd better spell it
> out.
>
The historical period you were referring to is pretty much set but the sciences
are always ready to go where the information and evidence goes and leads.
>
> >
> > What is discredited, you have not shown me how sociobiology is refuted. Its
just
> > another theory like the rest that you can't get rid of, its just empirical
> > science. Besides if it finds problems it will upgrade itself like any other
good
> > science. Your view is the hardened one that can't change and will sink to the
> > bottom of the sea when challenged by concurrent scientific evidence.
> >
> > You would sacrifice good science for you personal preferences. We should not
> > trust what you say for you are biggoted and a lier when it suits your
purposes.
> > No trust in that you dishonest person. If you show me wrong I will change but
you
> > don't appear to have that capacity so far and I can't trust what you say.
> >
>
> Don't throw yer toys out of the pram, old boy. I have invited you to
> recognise the methodological weaknesses in marrying two far-removed
> levels of scientific explanation, and to respond to those problems as
> best you can. Once you have engaged with that critique, perhaps we
> will be entitled to measure which of us is most open to new evidence.
>
Stalin killed some scientists who had research results he didn't like, you are
admitedly pro-socialist. Maybe I go to far.
But this methodological weakness you bandy about, please give me some examples to
work with and defend instead of just taking you word for it.
> rent@mob
rent@mob
> >
> OK, then give me an example or two of where Pinker performs unwarranted leaps.
How The Mind Works, p42:
"Our brains are adapted to that long-vanished way of life, not to
brand-new agricultural and industrial civilizations. They are not
wired to cope with anonymous crowds, schooling, written language,
government, police, courts, modern medicine, formal social
institutions, high technology, and other newcomers to the human
experience. Since the modern mind is adapted to the Stone Age, not the
computer age, there is no need to strain for adaptive explanations
for everything we do. Our ancestral environments lacked the
institutions that now entice us to non-adaptive choices ..."
Pinker makes two erratic moves here characteristic of EvPsych:
(a) Having noted that brains are 'products' of evolution, he
attributes all the 'wiring' of an individual brain to genetic causes.
Enculturation is excluded as a causal circumstance for the wiring of
an individual brain. So our wiring is maladaptive for the social
environment we and our immediate forefathers have constructed, from
the EvPsych point of view.
(b) Note how Pinker elides the concepts brain and mind, moving from
one to the other without pause for breath. Since this is an issue we
began to get our teeth into below, I'll save comment on why this is
philosophically problematic for that part of our conversation.
How The Mind Works, p561:
"Maybe philosophical problems are hard not because they are divine or
irreducible or meaningless or workaday science, but because the mind
of Homo sapiens lacks the cognitive equipment to solve them ....
perhaps we cannot solve conundrums like free will and sentience."
I forward this as an example of EvPsych's subtle political
assumptions. EvPsych - inasmuchas it is a cod science - extrapolates
from the capacities of the biological individual to define limits to
our social institutions. This is a philosophical stance common to
philosophers of a certain tradition - anglophone, analytical,
propertied - which reflects the political consciousness of a certain
class of people. Roughly speaking, it is that the tree makes the wood,
as opposed to the wood determining what the tree can be.
Conceived as biological units, it is clear that Homo sapiens is
incapable of much science at all. Organised into social institutions
with methodologies refined by decades and centuries of trial and
error, such limitations can be overcome. Which is to say, our systems
of cognition crucially involve social institutions, and are based on
them - they do not flow from what we are as biological units. The
genetic parameters of brain structure cannot tell us what minds can
and cannot grasp.
> He
> makes plenty of leaps as do many "developmental psychologists" which are of
> course leaps because its pretty much uncharted territory.
>
This speaks volumes. New science is not an unsupported leap of faith,
it is a leap of reason, backed-up by robust experimental data. Special
pleading for stuff that's new is pure hokum.
>
> Child psychologists are the cutting edge with their critical stages and the imprinting that takes place
> then.
>
Foundations for this claim would be interesting to see.
>
> (1) Society is not really external to the animal. It is not an abstract form,
> superimposed on its members. Rather, it is carried around biologically (i.e.
> genetically) in each individual.
>
Nobody denies that Homo sapiens is designed to be social. The question
here is whether or not the specific form of society must be coded for
by specific genes. In other words, is it your argument that changes in
the form of society follow changes in the human genome, or do you
allow that our genes make us flexible enough to have a range of
choices about the form of society we adopt? Or is it that you believe
social forms have not changed at all throughout history?
>
> (2) Society adds a new 'layer' in evolution. Like the cell, and the individual
> organism, society too is an emergent phenomenon, complete with properties of its
> own. This should make it easier for us to understand how some astonishing human
> capabilities could have evolved by natural selection. We now realize that a whole
> new evolutionary phenomenon, namely, social behavior, intervenes between the
> genes and the accomplishments of 'society in the round'. Wilson believes that
> social behavior permits a quantum jump in biological organization. He says,
> 'There is a strict limit to what any single ant, wolf, or even human being is
> able to accomplish. In contrast, the society can evolve to much greater
> complexity . . . even without any increase in the powers of its individual
> members.' Emile Durkheim, one of the founders of sociology, tried to account for
> the advances of human culture and technology by offering the concepts of the
> division of labor and the integration of society.
>
Wilson's strict limit is an odd idea, in the land of the Flynn Effect.
BTW, If you were considering trying to include memes in your schema,
my case will rest.
>
> Sociobiology, as we shall see,
> agrees that these two concepts are crucial, and moreover, shows them to be
> genetic rather than merely historical phenomena.
>
Does it now? This is startling news to me. How *precisely* does it
isolate evolved human capacities from encultured ones?
>
> (3) The fact that society is ultimately carried around in individuals can help to
> explain much about human nature. Wilson offers the suggestion that the tension
> and turmoil felt in human life and so often portrayed in literature, could be a
> reflection of the conflicting genetic pressures to behave selfishly, or
> altruistically. The centers of the brain's emotional complex 'tax the conscious
> mind with ambivalences wherever the organisms encounter stressful situations.
> Love joins hate; aggression, fear; expansiveness, withdrawal; and so on; in
> blends designed not to promote the happiness and survival of the individual' but
> to work out a balance between the 'genetic demands' of the individual, the family
> and the group.
>
How kind of Wilson to offer us this suggestion. Does he also offer us
experimental data to support the conjecture, or does he offer it as a
passing fancy, to amuse the imagination?
>
> Human Evolution - A Philosophical Anthropology
> -- Mary Maxwell 1984
> http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0231059469/
>
> Well that was twenty years ago and we don't quite say it like that now, but don't
> that sound cool man?
>
What this has to do with science beats me. I agree that,
stylistically, it's admirably blunt and to the point. But that doesn't
prevent the point being wrong.
> >
> Now you don't know what to
> think of the new sciences so you bash shit, while supporting the notion that
> nerve cells have a relation to psychology and simualtainiously denying genetic
> influences.
>
'The new sciences' are not always as radical as they can seem to those
baying for the blood of the old sciences. My primary interest is
philosophy, in which discipline we take care to define our terms. For
example, we don't generally make naive logical errors as a result of
confusing sufficiency with necessity.
>
> You have made the claim that sociobiology is a "social darwinist" science, how do
> you defend this? If instincts and human nature become verified, by your logic we
> must become social darwinists? Whats Spencer got to do with Wilson?
>
You appear to be confusing issues. Sociobiology, so far as I
understand your use of the term, claims that human social organisation
is reducible to the human genome. Human social behaviour, as an
expression of genes, is to be analysed along a simple Darwinist axis,
adaptive - non-adaptive. Did I get you wrong?
> >
> > One recurrent blind spot in EvPsych thinking is that believers
> > typically treat the mind and the brain as interchangeable terms for
> > precisely the same entity. This can only be due to philosophical
> > naievety.
> >
>
> Is the mind simply the activities of the brain? If not please provide your
> evidence?
>
Acting alone, brains do not produce minds. Minds only occur in brains
when those brains are encultured within a human society. Society
provides us with the tools of thought - sure, we may have basic mental
'limbs' to operate those tools, but without the tools themselves,
those limbs don't get us anywhere.
So yes, minds need brains to run, but they also require a semantic web
beyond the brain. Again, you seem to miss the difference between
sufficiency and necessity, here.
>
> > Besides, however much our genes are involved in stacking up RNA and
> > proteins on the construction site of the brain, this does not make
> > them the architects. The interesting design features of the human mind
> > do not arise from genetically-determined brain structure, but from
> > culturally-constructed intelligence. So no, genes certainly do not
> > 'direct', in the totalising sense you imply.
> >
>
> This is supposed to show that changes in the genes cannot change the structure of
> the brain?
>
Of course a different gene can result in a different brain. But quite
different brains can be encultured to adopt the same semantic design,
such that you and I with all our genetic variance are (more or less)
capable of communication, by virtue of enculturation in societies
which share English language usage. Our genes are not the architect of
this conversation - English (and other) education is.
> >
> > And the verifiable experimental demonstration of this conjecture I
> > requested was where, precisely ...?
> >
>
> The Hegelian [SNIP filibuster] http://www.morec.com/hegelgre.htm
>
Thanks for the show-and-tell through your philosophy scrapbook.
Interesting as it was, it appeared to have no bearing whatsoever on
the point in hand. I offered you a second chance to cite the science
to back your claims. I'll give you a third go, but baseball rules
apply.
>
> > See construction analogy above - you dramatically overestimate the
> > role played by construction workers here. I remain entitled to my
> > 'no'.
> >
>
> You have not shown how a change in the genes that direct the assembly of the
> brain cannot change the neural structures used for social interactions and
> dealing with cultural artifacts.
>
I neither need nor want to show this, as explained above. 'The genes
that direct the assembly of the brain' are not the architect of the
mind's faculties. Those genes build adaptive neural networks with
upwards of a trillion fluid connections which, via the mind, respond
to and are structured by the social environment. The final structure
is not the product of the genes, but of the mind's learning process.
> >
> > I knew what you meant when you said liberal. I was attempting to
> > encourage you to recognise the threat to something else -
> > libertarianism, perhaps - inherent in your arguments. If you prefer to
> > return to name-calling rather than answering my questions, that's
> > entirely your call.
> >
>
> People often misunderstand centrists and construe them as being the opposite
> extreme.
>
I couldn't mistake you for a libertarian. You still didn't answer the
question, here.
> >
>
> The historical period you were referring to is pretty much set but the sciences
> are always ready to go where the information and evidence goes and leads.
>
I'm still at a loss. What historical period am I getting left behind
with?
>
> Stalin killed some scientists who had research results he didn't like, you are
> admittedly pro-socialist. Maybe I go to far.
>
Being pro-socialist, I am anti-Stalin.
>
> But this methodological weakness you bandy about, please give me some examples to
> work with and defend instead of just taking you word for it.
>
Ah, the possibilites. I'll start you off with one from Wilson, since
you like the cut of his jib. In his 1978 book, On Human Nature, he
claims on p107 that the evidence of territoriality in all human
cultures is clear proof of an innate, genetic predisposition to defend
territory. Dennett points that one out on p487 of Darwin's Dangerous
Idea. The methodological weakness is this: his abstractions fail to
control for humans who are competent Subjects, capable of copying a
good trick when they see one.
rent@mob
"Sociobiology has two faces. One looks toward the social behaviour of
nonhuman animals. The eyes are carefully focused, the lips pursed
judiciously. Utterances are made only with caution. The other face is
almost hidden behind a megaphone. With great excitement, announcements
about human nature blare forth." - Philip Kitcher.
metaphor police
Bill. Do you know why he wrote an au revoir
post and hasn't posted since?
andy-k
news:dvyrc.4925$bF3.350@fed1read01...
> Andy, you seem to have a lot in common with
> Bill. Do you know why he wrote an au revoir
> post and hasn't posted since?
I was saddened to see Bill's au revoir since I found his posts very
informative and helpful, but I thought it best not to pester him -- he
seemed to be saying as much as he wanted to. I did once send him a personal
email and he did me the kindness of replying, so that avenue may still be
open if you want to approach him directly. If you do hear from him please
let me know how he is -- you can contact me on
breaker14(at)ntlworld(dot)com.
Immortalist
> "Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:<o_WdndWDKPE...@comcast.com>...
> > >
> > OK, then give me an example or two of where Pinker performs unwarranted
leaps.
>
> How The Mind Works, p42:
> "Our brains are adapted to that long-vanished way of life, not to
> brand-new agricultural and industrial civilizations. They are not
> wired to cope with anonymous crowds, schooling, written language,
> government, police, courts, modern medicine, formal social
> institutions, high technology, and other newcomers to the human
> experience. Since the modern mind is adapted to the Stone Age, not the
> computer age, there is no need to strain for adaptive explanations
> for everything we do. Our ancestral environments lacked the
> institutions that now entice us to non-adaptive choices ..."
>
> Pinker makes two erratic moves here characteristic of EvPsych:
> (a) Having noted that brains are 'products' of evolution, he
> attributes all the 'wiring' of an individual brain to genetic causes.
> Enculturation is excluded as a causal circumstance for the wiring of
> an individual brain. So our wiring is maladaptive for the social
> environment we and our immediate forefathers have constructed, from
> the EvPsych point of view.
He didn't claim all wiring is due to genetic causes necessarily. I don't see
where he eliminated learning as an influence upon neural organization. There are
many places in the book where he desceibes learning and influences upon neural
organization. Your grasping for straws and not ready to go where science and
discovery may go. You have set yourself up to be hurt if science discovers
something that goes against your preferences. That is not a good way to go bub.
> (b) Note how Pinker elides the concepts brain and mind, moving from
> one to the other without pause for breath. Since this is an issue we
> began to get our teeth into below, I'll save comment on why this is
> philosophically problematic for that part of our conversation.
>
"our brains are adapted..." and the "modern mind" are claimed to be necessarily
synonomous? Please include the text for that where he shows that anatomy is
necessarily the same as physiology (structure vs function).
> How The Mind Works, p561:
> "Maybe philosophical problems are hard not because they are divine or
> irreducible or meaningless or workaday science, but because the mind
> of Homo sapiens lacks the cognitive equipment to solve them ....
> perhaps we cannot solve conundrums like free will and sentience."
>
> I forward this as an example of EvPsych's subtle political
> assumptions. EvPsych - inasmuchas it is a cod science - extrapolates
> from the capacities of the biological individual to define limits to
> our social institutions. This is a philosophical stance common to
> philosophers of a certain tradition - anglophone, analytical,
> propertied - which reflects the political consciousness of a certain
> class of people. Roughly speaking, it is that the tree makes the wood,
> as opposed to the wood determining what the tree can be.
>
Sounds like Pinker is philosophically in line with Kant and the third antinomy,
for there may be limits to what we can know and this is only necessity not
neuroanatomy. HPO Jury claims people like you confuse analytic logic with
inductive science.
> Conceived as biological units, it is clear that Homo sapiens is
> incapable of much science at all. Organised into social institutions
> with methodologies refined by decades and centuries of trial and
> error, such limitations can be overcome. Which is to say, our systems
> of cognition crucially involve social institutions, and are based on
> them - they do not flow from what we are as biological units. The
> genetic parameters of brain structure cannot tell us what minds can
> and cannot grasp.
>
You have still not negated the possibility that there are limits to what humans
can concieve or perceive and you havn't shown that this is all Pinker was saying.
>
> > He
> > makes plenty of leaps as do many "developmental psychologists" which are of
> > course leaps because its pretty much uncharted territory.
> >
>
> This speaks volumes. New science is not an unsupported leap of faith,
> it is a leap of reason, backed-up by robust experimental data. Special
> pleading for stuff that's new is pure hokum.
>
Are you claiming that embryology and developmental biology are not backed up by
robust experimental data? Man, get a life, all evolutionary theory is lame
compared to analytical logic. You set your standards to high, embryology is an
established science you have not disproved in any way I can see.
> >
> > Child psychologists are the cutting edge with their critical stages and the
imprinting that takes place
> > then.
> >
>
> Foundations for this claim would be interesting to see.
>
What whould be the necessary conditions for evidence of critical periods or
critical stages in the developing human during the first 7 years of life?
In the embryo
http://www.erin.utoronto.ca/~w3bio380/Lectsked/Lect17/Critical.htm
Vulnerable periods during the development of the nervous system are sensitive to
environmental insults because they are dependent on the temporal and regional
emergence of critical developmental processes (i.e., proliferation, migration,
differentiation, synaptogenesis, myelination, and apoptosis). Evidence from
numerous sources demonstrates that neural development extends from the embryonic
period through adolescence. In general, the sequence of events is comparable
among species, although the time scales are considerably different. Developmental
exposure of animals or humans to numerous agents (e.g., X-ray irradiation,
methylazoxymethanol, ethanol, lead, methyl mercury, or chlorpyrifos) demonstrates
that interference with one or more of these developmental processes can lead to
developmental neurotoxicity. Different behavioral domains (e.g., sensory, motor,
and various cognitive functions) are subserved by different brain areas. Although
there are important differences between the rodent and human brain, analogous
structures can be identified. Moreover, the ontogeny of specific behaviors can be
used to draw inferences regarding the maturation of specific brain structures or
neural circuits in rodents and primates, including humans. Furthermore, various
clinical disorders in humans (e.g., schizophrenia, dyslexia, epilepsy, and
autism) may also be the result of interference with normal ontogeny of
developmental processes in the nervous system. Of critical concern is the
possibility that developmental exposure to neurotoxicants may result in an
acceleration of age-related decline in function. This concern is compounded by
the fact that developmental neurotoxicity that results in small effects can have
a profound societal impact when amortized across the entire population and across
the life span of humans.
Its stupid to even look for evidence for you. If you don't believe the evidence
for critical periods I say fuck you because your ignoring shit to sway and
idiotic argument some way or another... I give, go on in your delusionary state
loc...
> >
> > (1) Society is not really external to the animal. It is not an abstract form,
> > superimposed on its members. Rather, it is carried around biologically (i.e.
> > genetically) in each individual.
> >
>
> Nobody denies that Homo sapiens is designed to be social. The question
> here is whether or not the specific form of society must be coded for
> by specific genes. In other words, is it your argument that changes in
> the form of society follow changes in the human genome, or do you
> allow that our genes make us flexible enough to have a range of
> choices about the form of society we adopt? Or is it that you believe
> social forms have not changed at all throughout history?
>
Sounds like you've covered the range of possibilities, this is a waste of time
bigot.
Fuck your biological correctness, nobody denies that your a fuck face but yea are
little bitch motha fuck face. I should say the popular (pig fucker humper) you
talking shit with a mouth full of shit.
>
> >
> > (2) Society adds a new 'layer' in evolution. Like the cell, and the
individual
> > organism, society too is an emergent phenomenon, complete with properties of
its
> > own. This should make it easier for us to understand how some astonishing
human
> > capabilities could have evolved by natural selection. We now realize that a
whole
> > new evolutionary phenomenon, namely, social behavior, intervenes between the
> > genes and the accomplishments of 'society in the round'. Wilson believes that
> > social behavior permits a quantum jump in biological organization. He says,
> > 'There is a strict limit to what any single ant, wolf, or even human being is
> > able to accomplish. In contrast, the society can evolve to much greater
> > complexity . . . even without any increase in the powers of its individual
> > members.' Emile Durkheim, one of the founders of sociology, tried to account
for
> > the advances of human culture and technology by offering the concepts of the
> > division of labor and the integration of society.
> >
>
> Wilson's strict limit is an odd idea, in the land of the Flynn Effect.
> BTW, If you were considering trying to include memes in your schema,
> my case will rest.
>
You have not shown how the flynn effect negates the possibility that a cell
membrane added a new boundry that by limitation added more possibilities like
multi-celiarity socialist wankee man. who cares what socialists think of
evolutionary theory, not me, fuck you.
> >
> > Sociobiology, as we shall see,
> > agrees that these two concepts are crucial, and moreover, shows them to be
> > genetic rather than merely historical phenomena.
> >
>
> Does it now? This is startling news to me. How *precisely* does it
> isolate evolved human capacities from encultured ones?
>
You'll have to wait, can't you read regular English language socialist fucker? If
you say please I'll zoom ahead and copy that part for you.
> >
> > (3) The fact that society is ultimately carried around in individuals can
help to
> > explain much about human nature. Wilson offers the suggestion that the
tension
> > and turmoil felt in human life and so often portrayed in literature, could be
a
> > reflection of the conflicting genetic pressures to behave selfishly, or
> > altruistically. The centers of the brain's emotional complex 'tax the
conscious
> > mind with ambivalences wherever the organisms encounter stressful situations.
> > Love joins hate; aggression, fear; expansiveness, withdrawal; and so on; in
> > blends designed not to promote the happiness and survival of the individual'
but
> > to work out a balance between the 'genetic demands' of the individual, the
family
> > and the group.
> >
>
> How kind of Wilson to offer us this suggestion. Does he also offer us
> experimental data to support the conjecture, or does he offer it as a
> passing fancy, to amuse the imagination?
>
He offers experimental data to support the conjecture. You had better be pissed
that you didn't see it and now your entire left paridigm is fucked in the ass
hard baby.
> >
> > Human Evolution - A Philosophical Anthropology
> > -- Mary Maxwell 1984
> > http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0231059469/
> >
> > Well that was twenty years ago and we don't quite say it like that now, but
don't
> > that sound cool man?
> >
>
> What this has to do with science beats me. I agree that,
> stylistically, it's admirably blunt and to the point. But that doesn't
> prevent the point being wrong.
>
Some people even have hard times getting the joke to, its a mental thing I guess.
>
> > >
> > Now you don't know what to
> > think of the new sciences so you bash shit, while supporting the notion that
> > nerve cells have a relation to psychology and simualtainiously denying
genetic
> > influences.
> >
>
> 'The new sciences' are not always as radical as they can seem to those
> baying for the blood of the old sciences. My primary interest is
> philosophy, in which discipline we take care to define our terms. For
> example, we don't generally make naive logical errors as a result of
> confusing sufficiency with necessity.
>
There may be people like you describe but that doesn't show how all of the people
are. Beside that old shit you defend is dead and gone anyway. What difference
does it make communist?
>
> >
> > You have made the claim that sociobiology is a "social darwinist" science,
how do
> > you defend this? If instincts and human nature become verified, by your logic
we
> > must become social darwinists? Whats Spencer got to do with Wilson?
> >
>
> You appear to be confusing issues. Sociobiology, so far as I
> understand your use of the term, claims that human social organisation
> is reducible to the human genome. Human social behaviour, as an
> expression of genes, is to be analysed along a simple Darwinist axis,
> adaptive - non-adaptive. Did I get you wrong?
>
Yes.
>
> > >
> > > One recurrent blind spot in EvPsych thinking is that believers
> > > typically treat the mind and the brain as interchangeable terms for
> > > precisely the same entity. This can only be due to philosophical
> > > naievety.
> > >
> >
> > Is the mind simply the activities of the brain? If not please provide your
> > evidence?
> >
>
> Acting alone, brains do not produce minds. Minds only occur in brains
> when those brains are encultured within a human society. Society
> provides us with the tools of thought - sure, we may have basic mental
> 'limbs' to operate those tools, but without the tools themselves,
> those limbs don't get us anywhere.
>
I said activities of the brain and now you say activities of the brain and you
say I didn't say activities of the brain, fuckface lier.
> So yes, minds need brains to run, but they also require a semantic web
> beyond the brain. Again, you seem to miss the difference between
> sufficiency and necessity, here.
>
so yes blah blah blah,
> >
> > > Besides, however much our genes are involved in stacking up RNA and
> > > proteins on the construction site of the brain, this does not make
> > > them the architects. The interesting design features of the human mind
> > > do not arise from genetically-determined brain structure, but from
> > > culturally-constructed intelligence. So no, genes certainly do not
> > > 'direct', in the totalising sense you imply.
> > >
> >
> > This is supposed to show that changes in the genes cannot change the
structure of
> > the brain?
> >
>
> Of course a different gene can result in a different brain. But quite
> different brains can be encultured to adopt the same semantic design,
> such that you and I with all our genetic variance are (more or less)
> capable of communication, by virtue of enculturation in societies
> which share English language usage. Our genes are not the architect of
> this conversation - English (and other) education is.
>
duh duh duh
>
> > >
> > > And the verifiable experimental demonstration of this conjecture I
> > > requested was where, precisely ...?
> > >
> >
> > The Hegelian [SNIP filibuster] http://www.morec.com/hegelgre.htm
> >
>
> Thanks for the show-and-tell through your philosophy scrapbook.
> Interesting as it was, it appeared to have no bearing whatsoever on
> the point in hand. I offered you a second chance to cite the science
> to back your claims. I'll give you a third go, but baseball rules
> apply.
>
dinka do dinka do do shit
>
> >
> > > See construction analogy above - you dramatically overestimate the
> > > role played by construction workers here. I remain entitled to my
> > > 'no'.
> > >
> >
> > You have not shown how a change in the genes that direct the assembly of the
> > brain cannot change the neural structures used for social interactions and
> > dealing with cultural artifacts.
> >
>
> I neither need nor want to show this, as explained above. 'The genes
> that direct the assembly of the brain' are not the architect of the
> mind's faculties. Those genes build adaptive neural networks with
> upwards of a trillion fluid connections which, via the mind, respond
> to and are structured by the social environment. The final structure
> is not the product of the genes, but of the mind's learning process.
>
ah aha do ha do haus 8798defsdjh
>
> > >
> > > I knew what you meant when you said liberal. I was attempting to
> > > encourage you to recognise the threat to something else -
> > > libertarianism, perhaps - inherent in your arguments. If you prefer to
> > > return to name-calling rather than answering my questions, that's
> > > entirely your call.
> > >
> >
> > People often misunderstand centrists and construe them as being the opposite
> > extreme.
> >
>
> I couldn't mistake you for a libertarian. You still didn't answer the
> question, here.
>
sdhfiuashdfuhs
> > >
> >
> > The historical period you were referring to is pretty much set but the
sciences
> > are always ready to go where the information and evidence goes and leads.
> >
>
> I'm still at a loss. What historical period am I getting left behind
> with?
>
> >
> > Stalin killed some scientists who had research results he didn't like, you
are
> > admittedly pro-socialist. Maybe I go to far.
> >
>
> Being pro-socialist, I am anti-Stalin.
>
you is a bitch-
> >
> > But this methodological weakness you bandy about, please give me some
examples to
> > work with and defend instead of just taking you word for it.
> >
>
> Ah, the possibilites. I'll start you off with one from Wilson, since
> you like the cut of his jib. In his 1978 book, On Human Nature, he
> claims on p107 that the evidence of territoriality in all human
> cultures is clear proof of an innate, genetic predisposition to defend
> territory. Dennett points that one out on p487 of Darwin's Dangerous
> Idea. The methodological weakness is this: his abstractions fail to
> control for humans who are competent Subjects, capable of copying a
> good trick when they see one.
>
fuck your ass baby-no vasaline
I will start again but I aint playin this stretched out game, snip some and maybe
I'll respond to you lying.
> rent@mob
>
>
>
>
>
> "Sociobiology has two faces. One looks toward the social behaviour of
> nonhuman animals. The eyes are carefully focused, the lips pursed
> judiciously. Utterances are made only with caution. The other face is
> almost hidden behind a megaphone. With great excitement, announcements
> about human nature blare forth." - Philip Kitcher.
Fuck Kitcher whatever he said, in the ass with a dildo, I aint reading you losers
no mo. we won bitch face the experimental data
Kamerynn
andy-k wrote:
> I've always been suspicious about the claim by sociologists that their
> discipline is a science, considering their attitude a form of "physics
> envy" -- of wanting to be a member of the science "club" in order to gain
> respectability by association.
>
> Today I encountered somebody with qualifications in sociology who argued
> that sociology is a science because sociologists employ the
> hypothetico-deductive method in order to abstract laws.
>
> I have my doubts that this is sufficient a description of science, but I'm
> willing to be convinced. I know it all comes down to how we stipulate a
> definition of the word, and I'd be interested to hear other people's views
> on the subject.
Kam:
All of us are merely interested in finding the
truth, and scientists are distinguished from the rest
of truth seekers through the methods they use.
"Hard" science grew out of philosophy, as did the
social sciences - but some fields of social science
are still composed of the stuff of philosophy. For
example, personality psychology (explored by Freud
and Jung) is a field in which mere debate is still
popular. Behaviourism, however, generally proceeds
through hypothesizing that person A will act in a
manner, B, given conditions X, Y,and Z. Conditions
X, Y, and Z are set up, a "blind" actor tests the
hypothesis by acting uder those conditions, and "blind"
experimenters record the behaviour of the actor.
If the actor doesn't do B, then the hypothesis is
falsified. If he Bs, then the hypothesis is confirmed
and more testing is required.
The above is a simplification of how science is
used in psychology (or sociology). Such experiments
are in fact done statistically, a greater amount of
data adding to our confidence in the hypothesis.
To take an example from sociology, The "bystander effect"
refers to the diffusion of responsibility that occurs when people
fail to act in a way that they believe they should
because there are others around. The more people
that are together, the less likely it is that one
of them will take responsibility and, say, respond
to a call for help ("help me! someone is trying to
kill me!"). Because it is well documented (well tested),
sociologists now believe that it is better to be drowning
near a few people instead of near many. It is less likely
that one will be saved if one is drowning in the presence
of quite a few others. A more typical example of the
bystander effect, the one that, iirc, made sociologists
hypothesize about the effect, is the common failure of
people to call the police if someone else in their shared
living space (say, an apartment building) is yelling for
help. They simply think that someone else has probably
called the police. However, if someone is dying in
your living room, you'll likely act immediately.
The larger the statistical sample size, the more
generalizable the results. The more tested a hypothesis
is, the more confident we are in its veracity. What is
hypothesis confirmation if not a statistical/inductive
procedure that gives us confidence but not certainty?
While I think it's important to recognize that
many psychologists are doing nothing but philosophy,
I also think that it's important to recognize that
many are just as justified in being confident in their
beliefs as many scientists are in theirs.
Immortalist
"Kamerynn" <idon'tdoe...@sorry.com> wrote in message
news:10avho8...@corp.supernews.com...
Seems right, but isn't it better to have started somewhere at least instead of
sticking heads in the sand and saying we can't do anything? If we start with some
theory and test it and refine it, evolve it, seems better than simply saying I
always though social science was this or that?
>
rent@mob
>[SNIP]
Olé!
rent@mob
Immortalist
I was harsh man sorry, some of my best freinds are socialists! And this how our
argument end, bam, if you can't follow the research results, it ain't science no
mo. But a centrist of couse has some socialist elements in the mix with
everything else in a central position?
> rent@mob
rent@mob
>
> if you can't follow the research results, it ain't science no
> mo.
Quite.
rent@mob
Immortalist
If you refuse to follow where the research results go, then, it is science no mo?
> rent@mob
rent@mob
> > > if you can't follow the research results, it ain't science no
> > > mo.
> >
> > Quite.
> >
>
> If you refuse to follow where the research results go, then, it is science no mo?
To 'follow' research results, we cannot simply nod obediently whenever
a man in a white coat says 'I have found X'. Reason? Because other
people in white coats regularly find results which tell us something
contradictory to X (take a careful look at, eg:
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/dispomim.cgi?id=306995 ). To know which
results to follow and which to reject, it is necessary for us to have
some grasp of the methodologies involved, and the a priori experience
to distinguish between good methodologies and bad ones.
This is especially the case in 'new sciences', with scant experience
of what makes for good and bad methodologies. In these frontier areas,
it's all too easy to project one's prejudicial categories onto the
unfamiliar material and be delighted to 'discover' that the material -
so defined - confirms one's prejudices.
But what we do have in their case is experience of when to take new
science seriously. When a natural science begins to lay claim to
fields we do not normally consider to be within the realm of science -
predicting the future of human history, for example - this has
historically proven to be a good early-warning signal that the
methodology is misleading its practitioners into false conclusions.
Raising specific cases should not elicit merely defensive responses
from you - you rush to defensive stances without really noticing or
engaging with the *specifics* of the case being put. The foaming fit
that followed seemed to indicate to me that you have a primarily
emotional investment in your side of the debate, which would account
for the defensiveness.
If I am finding it tedious to point this methodological issue out over
and again, I'm sure it is doubly tedious listening to me. I suggest
you either try again with the post that provoked the tantrum, or quit
the field.
rent@mob
andy-k
> Raising specific cases should not elicit merely defensive responses
> from you - you rush to defensive stances without really noticing or
> engaging with the *specifics* of the case being put. The foaming fit
> that followed seemed to indicate to me that you have a primarily
> emotional investment in your side of the debate, which would account
> for the defensiveness.
I've enjoyed reading your posts r@m, and I think you make a valid point
here -- there is a great deal of emotional investment in our prejudices,
and I'm just as guilty as anybody else. The task in hand is to root them
out and eradicate them, no matter how painful that might be. Many thanks
for your deeply considered thoughts on these issues.
Immortalist
news:<gfCdnbwL1KI...@comcast.com>...
>
> > > > if you can't follow the research results, it ain't science no
> > > > mo.
> > >
> > > Quite.
> > >
> >
> > If you refuse to follow where the research results go, then, it is science no
mo?
>
> To 'follow' research results, we cannot simply nod obediently whenever
> a man in a white coat says 'I have found X'. Reason? Because other
> people in white coats regularly find results which tell us something
> contradictory to X (take a careful look at, eg:
> www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/dispomim.cgi?id=306995 ). To know which
> results to follow and which to reject, it is necessary for us to have
> some grasp of the methodologies involved, and the a priori experience
> to distinguish between good methodologies and bad ones.
>
Then you agree that you accept all of the results even though this makes
scientific conclusions vague at this time in that area. We don't want to push a
cultural agenda in some situations if there is no evidence either way.
Besides evolutionary psychology predicts that the propensity to be homosexual
varies amongst individuals. But the evolutionary psychologist believes
homosexuality is mostly imprinting at a critical stage when sexuality is being
discovered and myelination cements the preferences in a similar way as language
accents are cemented. A person born with large areas of the hypothalamus that
would more predispose one to homosexuality could negate all homosexuality at the
critical stage by never experiencing sex except with women.
http://images.google.com/images?q=myelin+sheath
> This is especially the case in 'new sciences', with scant experience
> of what makes for good and bad methodologies. In these frontier areas,
> it's all too easy to project one's prejudicial categories onto the
> unfamiliar material and be delighted to 'discover' that the material -
> so defined - confirms one's prejudices.
>
All you doing is advising caution because time will continue and results will
pile and experiments will be repeatable. But we already are cautious I don't see
your point. It takes up to ten years for a new drug to be ok'ed.
I agree that we should be cautious but a new science must prove itself worthy and
better than the cultural theory.
> But what we do have in their case is experience of when to take new
> science seriously. When a natural science begins to lay claim to
> fields we do not normally consider to be within the realm of science -
> predicting the future of human history, for example - this has
> historically proven to be a good early-warning signal that the
> methodology is misleading its practitioners into false conclusions.
>
A paradigm shift is alittle bit more complex than that. The new science must
explain better and survive the test of time before it can replace what is.
Besides even then it usually has to await a new generation of researchers before
it takes completely over. This process is sustained and regulated hevily in many
ways.
Immortalist
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message news:Cu6tc.595$Uy1.341@newsfe1-win...
Therefore you would be against new drugs that have been shown to cure particular
diseases but havn't been accepted by the government yet?
>
rent@mob
> Then you agree that you accept all of the results even though this makes
> scientific conclusions vague at this time in that area.
>
Perhaps what we have here is a simple comprehension problem. I thought
I made it abundantly clear that I do not accept all of the results, if
the methodologies used to generate those results are suspect.
>
> We don't want to push a
> cultural agenda in some situations if there is no evidence either way.
>
"You cherised liberal view of tabula rasa social engineering is over
and done, smoked baby, we take sociology from you, we steal it right
out of your hands, poof." Is this the sort of thing you mean by
'pushing a cultural agenda'?
>
> Besides evolutionary psychology predicts ...
>
Perhaps you don't understand the role of prediction in scientific
experiment. 'Predicting' what is already common knowledge serves no
scientific purpose. What's required is predicting something
determinate which is not common knowledge - say, for example, the
precise distribution of homosexuality among monozygotic twin pairs.
>
> All you doing is advising caution because time will continue and results will
> pile and experiments will be repeatable. But we already are cautious
>
"You cherised liberal view of tabula rasa social engineering is over
and done, smoked baby, we take sociology from you, we steal it right
out of your hands, poof." Is this the sort of thing you mean by being
cautious?
>
> A paradigm shift is alittle bit more complex than that. The new science must
> explain better and survive the test of time before it can replace what is.
>
So, presumably, you will allow that the claim: [[You cherised liberal
view of tabula rasa social engineering is over and done, smoked baby,
we take sociology from you, we steal it right out of your hands,
poof]] was just a tiny bit premature.
rent@mob
Immortalist
news:<XOadnfcCgdr...@comcast.com>...
>
>
> > Then you agree that you accept all of the results even though this makes
> > scientific conclusions vague at this time in that area.
>
> Perhaps what we have here is a simple comprehension problem. I thought
> I made it abundantly clear that I do not accept all of the results, if
> the methodologies used to generate those results are suspect.
>
Then you accept none of the results, either form science or cultural traditions,
in order to have a fiar an balance approach?
We need to learn about our drives so we can lift up the good and regulate the
bad, no need to ignore good research for the sake of personal prejudace.
> >
> > We don't want to push a
> > cultural agenda in some situations if there is no evidence either way.
> >
>
> "You cherised liberal view of tabula rasa social engineering is over
> and done, smoked baby, we take sociology from you, we steal it right
> out of your hands, poof." Is this the sort of thing you mean by
> 'pushing a cultural agenda'?
>
>
> >
> > Besides evolutionary psychology predicts ...
> >
>
> Perhaps you don't understand the role of prediction in scientific
> experiment. 'Predicting' what is already common knowledge serves no
> scientific purpose. What's required is predicting something
> determinate which is not common knowledge - say, for example, the
> precise distribution of homosexuality among monozygotic twin pairs.
>
> >
> > All you doing is advising caution because time will continue and results will
> > pile and experiments will be repeatable. But we already are cautious
> >
>
> "You cherised liberal view of tabula rasa social engineering is over
> and done, smoked baby, we take sociology from you, we steal it right
> out of your hands, poof." Is this the sort of thing you mean by being
> cautious?
>
> >
> > A paradigm shift is alittle bit more complex than that. The new science must
> > explain better and survive the test of time before it can replace what is.
> >
>
> So, presumably, you will allow that the claim: [[You cherised liberal
> view of tabula rasa social engineering is over and done, smoked baby,
> we take sociology from you, we steal it right out of your hands,
> poof]] was just a tiny bit premature.
>
Already taken from you. You really should read books from the 21st century.
Description of Straw Man
The Straw Man fallacy is committed when a person simply ignores a person's actual
position and substitutes a distorted, exaggerated or misrepresented version of
that position. This sort of "reasoning" has the following pattern:
Person A has position X.
Person B presents position Y (which is a distorted version of X).
Person B attacks position Y.
Therefore X is false/incorrect/flawed.
This sort of "reasoning" is fallacious because attacking a distorted version of a
position simply does not constitute an attack on the position itself. One might
as well expect an attack on a poor drawing of a person to hurt the person.
Examples of Straw Man
Prof. Jones: "The university just cut our yearly budget by $10,000."
Prof. Smith: "What are we going to do?"
Prof. Brown: "I think we should eliminate one of the teaching assistant
positions. That would take care of it."
Prof. Jones: "We could reduce our scheduled raises instead."
Prof. Brown: " I can't understand why you want to bleed us dry like that, Jones."
"Senator Jones says that we should not fund the attack submarine program. I
disagree entirely. I can't understand why he wants to leave us defenseless like
that."
Bill and Jill are arguing about cleaning out their closets:
Jill: "We should clean out the closets. They are getting a bit messy."
Bill: "Why, we just went through those closets last year. Do we have to clean
them out everyday?"
Jill: "I never said anything about cleaning them out every day. You just want too
keep all your junk forever, which is just ridiculous."
this is what your veiw of science is, face it you wankers are out of here along
with the 20th century.
> rent@mob
rent@mob
Talking of typical 'straw man' arguments, who here is an actual
advocate of a pure 'blank slate' position?
Immortalist, you are welcome to spit your high-school insults at me
all you like. If alternative political positions are so infuriating
for you to encounter, it's probably best to vent your frustrations
rather than bottling them up. I'm not going to be so put-off by your
make-believe alpha male dominance displays that I duck the issues, I
promise.
Once again, however, you evaded the substantive points under
discussion, however. This leaves me very little to add. The ball's in
your court, old bean. To recap, those outstanding issues in summary:
(a) Pinker's false attribution of modern wiring to Stone Age causal
circumstances.
(b) Pinker's elision of mind with brain.
(c) The unexamined political assumption in your extrapolations (and
many of professional EvPsych's) that the capabilities of the whole are
to be explained by the limitations of the parts.
(d) How you account for historical developments in social forms
against the background of an unchanging human genome.
(e) How you explain the Flynn Effect against the same background.
(f) How you distinguish between your position and social darwinism.
(g) A considered response to any one of the five case examples I have
offered you for you to demonstrate that you even understand the issues
at stake.
I'm taking a long weekend. Give yourself a while to think up something
more original than 'dinka do dinka do do shit', why not?
rent@mob
tg
> "Immortalist" <Reanima...@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<o_WdndWDKPE...@comcast.com>...
> > >
> > OK, then give me an example or two of where Pinker performs unwarranted leaps.
>
> How The Mind Works, p42:
> "Our brains are adapted to that long-vanished way of life, not to
> brand-new agricultural and industrial civilizations. They are not
> wired to cope with anonymous crowds, schooling, written language,
> government, police, courts, modern medicine, formal social
> institutions, high technology, and other newcomers to the human
> experience. Since the modern mind is adapted to the Stone Age, not the
> computer age, there is no need to strain for adaptive explanations
> for everything we do. Our ancestral environments lacked the
> institutions that now entice us to non-adaptive choices ..."
>
> Pinker makes two erratic moves here characteristic of EvPsych:
> (a) Having noted that brains are 'products' of evolution, he
> attributes all the 'wiring' of an individual brain to genetic causes.
> Enculturation is excluded as a causal circumstance for the wiring of
> an individual brain.
It isn't clear from the quote that this is what he does at all. One
can certainly interpret this as an observation about purely physical
conditions which result from different cultural conditions. Using the
term "wiring" is misleading; what is maladapted is probably chemistry,
in the sense that using more neurons to deal with more complex
interactions takes us away from some norm.
I have trouble adapting to cars and people after I spend a a few days
in the woods---it is obviously a matter of chemical response to
stimulus levels. Difficult to imagine that the "woods" state isn't the
way my body was designed.
No, this one doesn't make sense at all. Perhaps it is simply
question-begging, where you define science a certain way.
Individuals almost certainly made discoveries about the natural world,
in the sense of seeing patterns of cause and effect, when social
institutions or even language were quite simple or non-existent.
Consider tools, fire, and the like. As for philosophical problems, I'm
inclined to think that social institutions are what _prevent_ us from
dealing with them, but that's another story.
-tg
Immortalist
Did you try to date Pinker and get turned down or something? You'll have a very
hard time refuting his many thesis. Your list above doesn't really sound like
much, could you explain those points further?
SSSM: or Standard Social Science Model, represents a metaphorical model of the
mind that holds that the mind is a blank slate that is engraved solely by
environmental or experience. Depending upon who you quote, this doctrine is
believed by nearly everybody in the social sciences (as evolutionary
psychologists would tell you) or close to nobody (as everybody else would tell
you). The SSSM is useful for polarizing debate and groups of people in the mold
of us vs. them, liberals vs. conservatives, and now evolutionary psychologists
vs. the social science establishment, and has removed debate from the Socratic
discourse of old to the block headed rancor of present day talk radio and TV. .
http://www.homestead.com/flowstate/Dsssm.html
http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/views/vw201.htm
The appeal of the SSSM
The SSSM has had a powerful hold on the 20th century American social scientist,
and not without good reason. At its inception, it was a much needed reaction to
the racism of 19th and early 20th century social thought. A great deal of that
thought was founded on misconceptions of Darwinism. And now the most vocal
critics of the SSSM are Darwinists.
It is important to recognize that Darwinism has always had an unfortunate power
to attract the most unwelcome enthusiasts--demagogues and psychopaths and
misanthropes and other abusers of Darwin's dangerous idea. [Steven Jay] Gould has
laid this sad story bare in dozens of tales, about the Social Darwinists, about
unspeakable racists, and most poignently about basically good people who got
confused...It is all too easy to run off half cocked with some poorly understood
version of Darwinian thinking, and Gould has made it a major part of his life's
work to protect his hero from this sort of abuse. p. 264 [Dennett1995]
So, what are those misconceptions Gould wants us to avoid?
If we wish ``meekness and love'' to triumph over ``pride and violence'' (as
Tolstoy wrote to Gandhi), then we must repudiate Darwin's vision of nature...
This charge against Darwin is unfair for two reasons. First, nature (no matter
how cruel in human terms) provides no basis for our moral values. (Evolution
might, at most, help explain why we have moral feelings, but nature can never
decide for us whether any particular action is right or wrong.) Second, Darwin's
``struggle for existence'' is an abstract metaphor, not an explicit statement
about bloody battle. Reproductive success, the criterion of natural selection,
works in many modes: Victory in battle may be one pathway, but cooperation,
symbiosis, and mutual aid may also secure success in other times and contexts. p
327 [Gould1991a]
Many scholars reacted against both the racism and Social Darwinism that was being
``justified'' by science. Franz Boas in the first decade of the century correctly
taught his students (including Edward Sapir and Margerate Mead) that many of the
particular behaviors that appear in any particulary culture must be understood by
examining their relationship to other aspects of that culture. Each culture is as
rich and meaningful as our own, and our own contains rites and symbols, which we
as insiders often fail to recognize.
Boas and his students sought out diversity and they found it. They delighted in
showing how human societies could differ from one another and how what might be
anathema in one culture could be obligatory in another. A resurgence of racialist
anthropology in Europe and America in the 30s led Boas's students to redouble
their efforts. That we are monogomous and many native australian cultures are
polygomous is as arbitrary as the fact that our word for is ``water'' and theirs
might be ``bana''. Neither is more advanced or civilised than the other. They are
just different ways of doing things. We are as bizarre and barbaric to them as
they are to us.
To challenge the SSSM, and in particular to challenge it with evolutionary
thinking, has been to be branded as politically incorrect at best and unspeakable
at worst. Yet a search for human universals is probably the most anti-racist
thing anthropology and sociology can do. Furthermore, talking about inherited
psychologies runs the risk of being confused with those who talk about inherited
psychological differences. But that confusion, although apperently tempting,
should be avioded at all costs. We are not talking about inherited differences
between individuals and groups, instead the evolutionary psychologists (EPers)
are talking about those psychological predispositions and faculties, the output
of millions of years of evolution, which are shared by each and every human
being.
One universal is that we learn some practices and beliefs from the societies we
are raised in. Another may be that we try to adopt practices that distinguish our
group from others. These universals can easily be and often are argued for on an
evolutionary basis by the both EPers and its critics (e.g., [Dawkins1989,
Simon1990]). Does this mean that the SSSM is vindicated or that those particular
claims about universals defeat the universalist program? [Dennett1995] describes
his ``Only Slightly Nonstandard Social Science Model'' as differing from the SSSM
by stating that instead of believing the culture is completely autonomous, it is
merely largely autonomous. And ``Learning is not a general-purpose process, but
human beings have so many special-purpose gadgets, and learn to harness them with
such versatility, that learning often can be treated as if it where an entirely
medium-neutral and content-neutral gift of non-stupidity.''
In principle this is a viable alternative to the SSSM, but we believe that
Dennett, who otherwise sees things very clearly, has fallen victim to the
spectrum illusion. And we must not forget that variation is not the enemy of
universals. A snowflake, as a totally unrelated example, can have a large
(practically infinite) number of shapes and still be ``snowflake shapped''. Even
if every snowflake is unique, and there are an (almost) infinite number of
possible shapes they can take, the shape of a snowflake is still highly
constrained by the nature of how snowflakes are made and the laws of physics
involved. Just as there is a snowflake nature and a human nature, there may well
be a culture nature and an organization nature. Universals and diversity coexist
perfectly when we come to understand that universals are often best stated as
constraints on systems rather then claims that some superficial entity must
appear in every system [Goldberg and Markóczy1997a]. We don't demand that a
theory of snowflake nature should be able to predict the exact shape of any
snowflake; we only demand that it define and explain the (infinite) class of
possible shapes and tell us what can't be a possible snowflake. We should demand
no more and no less from a full theory of organizations.
http://www.goldmark.org/jeff/papers/ridley/html/node9.html
I like sociology more than these guys and me and you differ less than you wish
sucka. I believe that "broadly" speaking SSSM is right.
> rent@mob
sssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss
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The Blank Slate
The Modern Denial of Human Nature
Steven Pinker
Tacit Theory of Human Nature
Behavior controls human beings thoughts and beliefs
Base our thoughts of human nature on
Generalizations
Assumptions that everyone is like ourselves
What experts tell us to believe
Origins of the Theories of Human Nature
Religion: Judeo-Christian theory
Based on events that occurred in the Bible
Mind is an immaterial substance
Mind continues to exist after the body die
Believers
Popular among residents of the United States
Non-believers
Intellectuals
No evidence
Believe in the Blank Slate
Official Theories
The Blank Slate-John Locke
The mind is clear of ideas and beliefs
Molded by the environment and experiences
Each experience shapes who an individual becomes
By changing the one's environment and experience an individual can be shaped into
a different person
Official Theories
The Noble Savage-Rousseau
Humans are basically good
Evil is the result of civilization
Opposing views
Thomas Hobbes
Humans have a tendency to create war with each other
Avoid it by surrendering to a sovereign person
How it affects our daily lives
Respect natural things
Question things that are man-made
Official Theories
The Ghost in the Machine-Rene Descartes
Mind and body are different
Body is divisible
Mind is indivisible
Mind and body are combined until death
At death the mind continues to live
Cannot question the existence of our mind because by doing so, our minds exist
Can question the existence of our body because we can imagine ourselves as a
spirit
Philosophy
No respect
Plays an important role in society
Example
2001, George W. Bush decided not to fund embryonic stem cell research
Reason: By extracting embryos, scientist must destroy them
Dilemma: Argument that the soul develops at conception
By extracting embryos, considered to be a form of murder
Modern Day Social Sciences and Enlightenment Philosophy
Social sciences
Locke's "Blank Slate" theory/Tabula Rasa
Society impressed ideas on blank slate
Learning is associationism
Process inscribing ideas/sensations on blank slate
Appearing in succession, become associated with each other
Blank Slate= Standard Social Science Model
Psychology and the Social Sciences
Discount instinct and evolution
Focus= society
Differing opinions on study of mental entities (desires, feelings, ideas)
Banned in behavioral psychology
Studied in terms of society with rest of social sciences
Behavioral Psychology
Developed by John Watson
Locke's associationism into conditioning
Stimulus/Response
Punishment/ reward associations
Affect future behavior characteristics (ease, frequency, cessation)
Mental entities= subjective, immeasurable
Independent of biology
Utopic mentality
Behavioral Psychology
Rarely prescribed to now
Modern psychology and neuroscience:
Associationism
Studying of animals interchangeably
Still don't account for instinct
The Other Social Sciences
Culture and society create individuals
Humans endowed with the equal mental faculties
Differences are a result of culture
Use of faculties necessary to survival
Doctrine super organism
Individual unimportant
Individual 'mental entities' result of culture
'Sui Generis'= Culture explained in terms of culture
The Ghost in the Machine and Silly Putty
Utopic mentality
'mind arbiter of destiny'
'We' mold one another
But aren't 'we' 'silly putty' too???
(awww..how sad...what will we do?)
Seek Therapy (if you haven't done so already)
Cognitive Science
The study of the mind through empirical, scientific methods
First Idea
The mental world can be understood in physical terms through the concepts of
information, computation, and feedback
Every action is a string of patterns operating in the brain
World chess champion Garry Kasparov vs. Deep Blue
"Electric Brains"-reasoning, intelligence, imagination, and creativity are all
physical processes called information processing
Second Idea
The mind cannot be a blank slate because then it would have the ability to learn
or apply knowledge
The ability to absorb information and interpret its meaning must be innate
Humans have basic software or "standard equipment"
Jerry Fodor
all concepts are innate (even "camera" and "lampshade")
Naon Chomsky
Children "grow" language
Rumelhart, McClelland, Elman, Bater
Built a basic computer and put as much software as possible into it
Third Idea
An infinite range of behavior can occur all dependent on the combinatorial
programs found in the mind
Combinations of words are infinite
Language obeys rules and patterns
The number of thought and intentions is infinite
Fourth Idea
Universal mental mechanisms can exist despite variations found in different
cultures
Different cultures are actually all very similar
All cultures have language
Ease of children to acquire language without training
Ifaluk song vs. Western anger
Fifth Idea
The mind is a complex system with many interacting parts
Physical portrayals of emotion are universal
Affects programs for physical emotions are learned
Neuroscience
How the brain processes thought and emotions
Every thought, feeling, dream, and intention originates as physiological activity
in the brain
The effects of damage to the brain
Phineas Gage
Gassaniga and Sperry
Severance of left and right hemispheres
Paul Broca
Fold and wrinkles of the brain have a recognizable arrangement
Genes and prenatal development influence the anatomy of the brain
Variations in the brain structure lead to variations in behavior
Acquisition of knowledge causes changes in brain structure
Click to add title
Behavioral Genetics
How genes effect behavior
DNA contains all potential ability to think, learn, and feel
Common chimps vs. Bonobos
Identical Twins vs. Virtual Twins
Scientists hold genes responsible for half of behavior
Evolutionary Psychology
The study of phylogenetic history and adaptive functions of the mind
Adaptations are any trait which facilitate the continuation of the species
Evolution is not for the greater good
How do positive traits evolve?
Beauty = physical health and fertility
Sympathy, gratitude, guilt, and anger = cooperation
Proximate vs. Ultimate causes
Donald Brown and the Universal People
Hundreds of traits are cross-cultural
Attack of the Noble Savage
False stories about tribes that had never heard of war, violence, or conflict
South American and New Guinean tribes
10-60% of males killed in warfare
Brown includes conflict, rape, revenge, jealousy, dominance, and male coalitional
violence as universal traits
Conflict resolution is also universal
Critical Review
Interesting and Informative Points
Philosophy influences society
Silly Putty
Weak Case and Confusing Points
The author does not seem to represent opposing arguments clearly
Speaks little of dualism, and then expands on how machines and humans are not
alike
rent@mob
>
> It isn't clear from the quote that this is what he does at all. One
> can certainly interpret this as an observation about purely physical
> conditions which result from different cultural conditions.
>
So it's Stone Age culture that he's referring to here, huh? I think
that's bending his possible meanings way too far. I raised this quote
because it's a rare expression of EvPsych's central message - the one
everyone gets whenever they hear an EvPsych claim - that modern minds
are to a great extent determined by the genetic inheritance of
proto-mankind's selection conditions in prehistory.
>
> I have trouble adapting to cars and people after I spend a few days
> in the woods---it is obviously a matter of chemical response to
> stimulus levels. Difficult to imagine that the "woods" state isn't the
> way my body was designed.
>
Difficult for a solitary mind to overcome its sense impressions,
perhaps. That tg finds a more authentic sense of self whenever he cuts
himself off from human society is a fact that is open to several
explanations. Mine would focus on how society denies him that firm
identity in daily life, but we'd need to be much better acquainted.
>
> No, this one doesn't make sense at all. Perhaps it is simply
> question-begging, where you define science a certain way.
>
I define science in a fairly uncontroversial way, as a particular
system of knowledge creation. Not all knowledge is science. Religion
is also a system of knowledge creation. But it differs from science in
that it does not stand or fall on empirical proofs and peer review.
>
> As for philosophical problems, I'm
> inclined to think that social institutions are what _prevent_ us from
> dealing with them, but that's another story.
>
Ah, the noble savage speaks. History tested this proposition in the
New World. The higher organization won.
rent@mob
rent@mob
> > Once again, however, you evaded the substantive points under
> > discussion. This leaves me very little to add. The ball's in
> > your court, old bean. To recap, those outstanding issues in summary:
> >
> > (a) Pinker's false attribution of modern wiring to Stone Age causal
> > circumstances.
> > (b) Pinker's elision of mind with brain.
> > (c) The unexamined political assumption in your extrapolations (and
> > many of professional EvPsych's) that the capabilities of the whole are
> > to be explained by the limitations of the parts.
> > (d) How you account for historical developments in social forms
> > against the background of an unchanging human genome.
> > (e) How you explain the Flynn Effect against the same background.
> > (f) How you distinguish between your position and social darwinism.
> > (g) A considered response to any one of the five case examples I have
> > offered you for you to demonstrate that you even understand the issues
> > at stake.
> >
>
> You'll have a very
> hard time refuting his many thesis. Your list above doesn't really sound like
> much, could you explain those points further?
Those points are a summary of the same things, more exhaustively made
- and completely evaded by you - on the Social 'science'? thread.
Thanks for the tour through yet further pages of your fascinating
EvPsych-101 scrapbook. Regrettably, quantity does not make for
quality.
Your evasions are sounding ever more limp and listless. One more round
of this and you may succeed in boring me into silence.
rent@mob
Immortalist
I'm afraid you've lost my attention to. I havn't much changed any of my views
either since I am not clear what you are requesting. Maybe you could explain your
position on those point above and I would consider whatever your beef is with the
cutting edge of social science. Even with this I doubt much you can stop the
advance of science.
Are you trying defend some "blank slate" position where there are no instincts
peculiar to humans, no innate biases?
>
> rent@mob
rent@mob
>
> I'm afraid you've lost my attention to. I havn't much changed any of my views
> either since I am not clear what you are requesting. Maybe you could explain your
> position on those point above and I would consider whatever your beef is with the
> cutting edge of social science.
>
My beef is not with science, but with the false conclusions you twist
science to support. You cannot claim to be the cutting edge of
anything, until you engage with the questions of methodology I raised
for you on the Social 'science'? thread.
>
> Even with this I doubt much you can stop the
> advance of science.
>
See above. Your faith that your politics comes straight from the
science lab would be charmingly naive, if it wasn't for the arrogance.
>
> Are you trying defend some "blank slate" position where there are no instincts
> peculiar to humans, no innate biases?
If you had answered the first question of my last post but one, you'd
have your answer to this already. Nobody here seriously defends a pure
'blank slate' position. That is a straw man of EvPsych's invention.
rent@mob
Immortalist
news:<NLqdnZCTm9i...@comcast.com>...
>
>
> >
> > I'm afraid you've lost my attention to. I havn't much changed any of my views
> > either since I am not clear what you are requesting. Maybe you could explain
your
> > position on those point above and I would consider whatever your beef is with
the
> > cutting edge of social science.
> >
>
> My beef is not with science, but with the false conclusions you twist
> science to support. You cannot claim to be the cutting edge of
> anything, until you engage with the questions of methodology I raised
> for you on the Social 'science'? thread.
>
I am innocent till proven guilty here and to lazy to look back at your
communistic diatribes. Please copy and paste the relevant contentions out of the
massive dribble. You have a perfect right to be left leaning but I steps out of
the way please catch yourself befaore fallin'!
You want a date with Pinker right? I was talking Evolutionary Psychology and
Pinker ain't the greatest representative of that in my opinion. Some of his
positions would be easy prey if you propped him up as the only proof allowable
for all of sociobiology [evolutionary psychology]. Though I think most of what he
says and shows is truely great.
> >
> > Even with this I doubt much you can stop the
> > advance of science.
> >
>
> See above. Your faith that your politics comes straight from the
> science lab would be charmingly naive, if it wasn't for the arrogance.
>
> >
> > Are you trying defend some "blank slate" position where there are no
instincts
> > peculiar to humans, no innate biases?
>
> If you had answered the first question of my last post but one, you'd
> have your answer to this already. Nobody here seriously defends a pure
> 'blank slate' position. That is a straw man of EvPsych's invention.
>
I want to spank your slate!
> rent@mob
rent@mob
>
> I am innocent till proven guilty here and to lazy to look back at your
> communistic diatribes.
>
Again, you duck the issues. Plead the 5th if you want - I'll draw my
own conclusions.
rent@mob
Immortalist
state your case then
> rent@mob
rent@mob
> > Again, you duck the issues. Plead the 5th if you want - I'll draw my
> > own conclusions.
>
> state your case then
I'll restate the case you declined to answer on two previous
occasions:
(a) EvPsych attributes modern brain 'wiring' to Stone Age causal
circumstances. While most scientists identifying as EvPsych
researchers protest that they are *not* claiming to reduce all aspects
of human culture to Darwinian explanations, their explanatory
framework nonetheless has no place for causal chains flowing from
higher order structures to lower ones - for example, selective
breeding. This issue cannot be sidestepped by boxing-off
'non-adaptive' human behaviours - it speaks to the explanatory
framework itself.
(b) EvPsych frequently confuses brains with minds, or moves from one
to the other as if minds are uncontroversially reducible to brain
activity. Human minds are not reducible in this way. Their semanticity
is built out of intersubjective (social) behaviours which do not
reside in the individual brain. The simplest way to explore this issue
would be to discuss Peter Hobson's Cradle of Thought with you. Are you
familiar with this book?
(c) The last point is a specific instance of a systemic methodological
problem with EvPsych claims - roughly speaking, that the capabilities
of the whole are to be explained by the limitations of the parts.
EvPsych and all other sociobiology tends to suffer from this flaw,
because it applies a biological methodology to members of a social
entity, often with little knowledge of any philosophy or sociology
which has explored the irreducibility of this social aspect.
(d) According to most historians and sociologists, social forms have
changed dramatically over recorded history, and perhaps more so in
prehistory. Yet the human genome appears to have undergone no
corresponding change. So there are causal inputs from outside biology
- inputs which appear to be unaccounted for in the more controversial
EvPsych claims.
(e) More short term changes, eg the IQ increase known as the Flynn
Effect, demonstrate alterations in human capacities over spans of
decades which appear to have social/institutional causes. It might be
useful if you would state where such a case sits within your
explanatory system for human nature.
(f) You claim a distinction between your position, which seeks to
explain human social behaviour in darwinian terms, and social
darwinism. I would like to explore your grounds for that claim.
(g) The various case examples I offered you in the Social 'Science'?
thread, to get away from rhetoric with a look at the specifics of what
you claim as straightforward empirical questions, were all declined.
Perhaps you prefer to offer specific cases of your choosing for us to
anchor this debate? I am willing to examine any example.
rent@mob
tg
> tgde...@earthlink.net (tg) wrote in message news:<9e39ba1.04052...@posting.google.com>...
>
>
> >
> > It isn't clear from the quote that this is what he does at all. One
> > can certainly interpret this as an observation about purely physical
> > conditions which result from different cultural conditions.
> >
>
> So it's Stone Age culture that he's referring to here, huh? I think
> that's bending his possible meanings way too far. I raised this quote
> because it's a rare expression of EvPsych's central message - the one
> everyone gets whenever they hear an EvPsych claim - that modern minds
> are to a great extent determined by the genetic inheritance of
> proto-mankind's selection conditions in prehistory.
>
You don't make clear at all what _you_ think determines modern minds,
so it is difficult to understand your complaint. Nothing in your quote
it is unreasonable unless you believe in souls rather than neurons and
chemistry.
There are instinctual ("hard-wired") behaviors, there are optimized
brain structures, there is generalized functioning. There is
causality. One can reasonably assume that there is some range of input
outside of which the output is non-linear or non-optimal.
(Woods=quiet. City=noisy. Stone Age=Nx10^6. Industrial=500. Duh.)
> > No, this one doesn't make sense at all. Perhaps it is simply
> > question-begging, where you define science a certain way.
> >
>
> I define science in a fairly uncontroversial way, as a particular
> system of knowledge creation. Not all knowledge is science. Religion
> is also a system of knowledge creation. But it differs from science in
> that it does not stand or fall on empirical proofs and peer review.
>
You've snipped without answering my comment about individuals being
capable of doing science. If your definition if science is that it
requires a group, then you have said nothing. If not---humans
obviously created knowledge before there was peer review, so your
statement is refuted.
> >
> > As for philosophical problems, I'm
> > inclined to think that social institutions are what _prevent_ us from
> > dealing with them, but that's another story.
> >
>
> Ah, the noble savage speaks. History tested this proposition in the
> New World. The higher organization won.
>
Don't know what you are talking about. What philosophical problems
were resolved in the New World?
Your statements are really vague---you interchange mind and brain as
you see fit, you don't explain what you mean by "determined", and you
haven't said if you are talking about individuals or humans in
general. Other than that, a fine scientific argument.
-tg
> rent@mob
Immortalist
news:<EPOdnREhmIl...@comcast.com>...
>
> > > Again, you duck the issues. Plead the 5th if you want - I'll draw my
> > > own conclusions.
> >
I never ducked any issue. This is your fantasy.
> > state your case then
>
> I'll restate the case you declined to answer on two previous
> occasions:
>
I doubt if I declined to answer. I probably asked a question about one of them
and you took it as a dodge or I took your posting of them as your dodging some
issue. I normally don't dodge issues but sometimes I won't go back into some
stupidly long thread for someone unless they restate it.
> (a) EvPsych attributes modern brain 'wiring' to Stone Age causal
> circumstances. While most scientists identifying as EvPsych
> researchers protest that they are *not* claiming to reduce all aspects
> of human culture to Darwinian explanations, their explanatory
> framework nonetheless has no place for causal chains flowing from
> higher order structures to lower ones - for example, selective
> breeding. This issue cannot be sidestepped by boxing-off
> 'non-adaptive' human behaviours - it speaks to the explanatory
> framework itself.
>
See I don't get your position very well here. Sociobioloists like general
evolutionists claim that human behavior comes from the evolution of creatures
throughout history. They may note some influences in the pleisticine era when
evidence of culture comes up in archealogical digs. Sociobiologists claim that
cultural behavior passed on through generations becomes a selective pressure
along with other selctive pressures and can create a feedback that led to human
nature.
http://www.google.com/search?q=sociobiology
> (b) EvPsych frequently confuses brains with minds, or moves from one
> to the other as if minds are uncontroversially reducible to brain
> activity. Human minds are not reducible in this way. Their semanticity
> is built out of intersubjective (social) behaviours which do not
> reside in the individual brain. The simplest way to explore this issue
> would be to discuss Peter Hobson's Cradle of Thought with you. Are you
> familiar with this book?
>
<quote>
Imaginative and creative thought is what distinguishes humans from animals. It is
what defines us as Homo sapiens. What it means to have thoughts, and what gives
us the remarkable capacity to think, have been subjects of debate for centuries.
In The Cradle of Thought, Hobson presents a new theory about the nature and
origins of uniquely human thinking.
A prevailing opinion on the acquisition of thought and language is that babies
are born with pre-programmed modules in the brain. But this is too narrow and too
simplistic an explanation. Professor Hobson's radical view is that what gives us
the capacity to think is the quality of a baby's exchanges with other people over
the first 18 months of life. As part and parcel of an intellectual revolution in
the second year, the child achieves new insight into the minds of itself and
others. Human thought, language, and self-awareness are developed in the cradle
of emotional engagement between infant and caregiver; social contact has vital
significance for mental development.
</quote>
This guy claims to have negated all the evidence for "critical stages?" LOL!
http://www.ai.mit.edu/people/caroma/tidbits/DevToK/Development-of-Theory-of-Knowledge.html
http://www.zerotothree.org/startingsmart.pdf
You realize that this one guy you mention is coming against the entire science
called "Developmental Psychology?" Are you prepared to refute this entire global
branch of science loc? If you say yes, you must be a fool.
http://www.google.com/search?q=%22developmental+psychology%22
The Importance of Infant Development: What We Have Learned From Neuroscience and
Early Intervention ResearchThe Developing Brain. Recent advances in brain
research have provided great insight into how the brain, the most immature of all
organs at birth, continues to grow and develop during the first years of life.
Whereas this growth was once thought to be determined primarily by genetics,
scientists now believe that it is also highly dependent upon the child's
experiences beginning in the prenatal period. Research shows that, like protein,
fat, and vitaInins, interactions with other people and objects are vital
nutrients for the growing and developing brain and different experiences can
literally cause the brain to develop in different ways. It is this "plasticity"
of the brain, its ability to develop and change in response to the demands of the
environment, that enable children to be resilient in the face of change. The
baby's experience during the first years has a determining impact on the
architecture of their brain and the child's readiness to learn and develop
positive relationships with others.
How does this happen? It is believed that early experience affects how specific
brain circuitry becomes "wired." Connections between neurons in the brain are the
result of the production of synapses that connect the axon of one neuron to the
dendrite of another. It is estimated that by age 2 a child has 1,000 trillions
synapses; twice as manyas adults. By late adolescence half of these synapses have
been discarded. Thus, an important part of brain development is pruning away
synapses and we now know that "use it or lose it" applies to this process. Those
neurons that are repeatedly activated in development become exempt from
elimination and over time become the habits of thinking and behaving. An critical
part of this process is the development of the frontal lobe of the brain which it
Is the latest maturing part of the cortex and begins to develop between 8 months
of age and early adolescence. This part of the brain is associated with ability
to regulate and express emotions as well as to think and plan. During the infant
and toddler period the ability of caregivers to help children regulate their
emotions and develop healthy attachments is believed to directly influence
frontal lobe development.
> (c) The last point is a specific instance of a systemic methodological
> problem with EvPsych claims - roughly speaking, that the capabilities
> of the whole are to be explained by the limitations of the parts.
> EvPsych and all other sociobiology tends to suffer from this flaw,
> because it applies a biological methodology to members of a social
> entity, often with little knowledge of any philosophy or sociology
> which has explored the irreducibility of this social aspect.
>
Deveopmental Psychology isn't Evolutionary Psychology to start with. I will await
your refutation of "Developmental Psychology" before I answer this contention?
Please don't take this as avoidence.
> (d) According to most historians and sociologists, social forms have
> changed dramatically over recorded history, and perhaps more so in
> prehistory. Yet the human genome appears to have undergone no
> corresponding change. So there are causal inputs from outside biology
> - inputs which appear to be unaccounted for in the more controversial
> EvPsych claims.
>
If it takes this many centuries to put 2 + 2 together and "culturally evolve"
contemporary culture and technology I don't see how it would depend upon changes
in the genome after homo erectus became homo sapiens. If we isolated children in
the wilds it might take them thousands of years to likewise get to where we are.
But we observe mutations all the time inhospitals, are you saying these arn't
mutations and that these people don't pass them into the human genome?
> (e) More short term changes, eg the IQ increase known as the Flynn
> Effect, demonstrate alterations in human capacities over spans of
> decades which appear to have social/institutional causes. It might be
> useful if you would state where such a case sits within your
> explanatory system for human nature.
>
The results of intelligence tests in different countries show that over the past
century average IQ has been increasing at a rate of about 3 points per decade
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/FLYNNEFF.html
More of the same here, it is just that humans have not learned up to their
capacity yet. We continue to find cultural ways that increase IQ and havn't
exhausted our potential yet. You claim we already have reached out potential in
relation to tools we could discover?
> (f) You claim a distinction between your position, which seeks to
> explain human social behaviour in darwinian terms, and social
> darwinism. I would like to explore your grounds for that claim.
>
Do you mean social spencerianism? Spencer and Darwin were two different people.
But please explain this exploration, without sounding like a dodge, I don't
understand your intentions here. Are you claiming that all evolutionary theory
necessitate social darwinism?
> (g) The various case examples I offered you in the Social 'Science'?
> thread, to get away from rhetoric with a look at the specifics of what
> you claim as straightforward empirical questions, were all declined.
> Perhaps you prefer to offer specific cases of your choosing for us to
> anchor this debate? I am willing to examine any example.
>
I don't know what this paragraph is saying could you state it a bit more clearly?
If there are some examples somewhere please state them because I am not going
back to look at some past thread unless you provide a link.
> rent@mob
rent@mob
>
> You don't make clear at all what _you_ think determines modern minds,
> so it is difficult to understand your complaint.
>
In changing the argument from clarifying your beliefs to clarifying
mine, you appear to have overlooked that I was interested to know if
you truly interpreted the quote to be talking about Stone Age culture.
Just thought I'd note that oversight in passing.
>
> Nothing in your quote
> it is unreasonable unless you believe in souls rather than neurons and
> chemistry.
>
I believe that I am substantially a social being, not accounted for by
my exclusively biological inheritance. This does not require
ontologically laughable entities like souls. It only requires that we
recognise the extent to which my mental structures are the direct
result of my specific enculturation, not only a distant evolutionary
past.
Look at it this way. 30,000 genes, of which less than 2,000 can be
local to humans, are a pretty slim pipe for information to pass along.
Biology does wonders with that bandwidth, but it is not the only
medium available for humans - we also have a theoretically unlimited,
infinitely fat pipe of culture with which to pass on advantageous
information. This potentially infinite intergenerational bandwidth is
allotted minimal causal role in EvPsych explanatory frameworks, and
none whatsoever in the quote supplied. I find that, to say the least,
implausible.
>
> There are instinctual ("hard-wired") behaviors, there are optimized
> brain structures, there is generalized functioning. There is
> causality. One can reasonably assume that there is some range of input
> outside of which the output is non-linear or non-optimal.
> (Woods=quiet. City=noisy. Stone Age=Nx10^6. Industrial=500. Duh.)
>
I can't decode this gnomic calculus, but I can guess your general
point is that our genome hasn't had long to adapt to modernity,
compared to how long it had in the Pleistocene, or whatever. For the
reasons explained above, I fail to see the relevance of these
comparisons. How the genome responds to environmental changes ceased
to be relevant for humans a long time ago, to my way of thinking.
> > > No, this one doesn't make sense at all. Perhaps it is simply
> > > question-begging, where you define science a certain way.
> > >
> >
> > I define science in a fairly uncontroversial way, as a particular
> > system of knowledge creation. Not all knowledge is science. Religion
> > is also a system of knowledge creation. But it differs from science in
> > that it does not stand or fall on empirical proofs and peer review.
> >
>
> You've snipped without answering my comment about individuals being
> capable of doing science. If your definition if science is that it
> requires a group, then you have said nothing. If not---humans
> obviously created knowledge before there was peer review, so your
> statement is refuted.
>
I have not intentionally overlooked any substantive point. I explained
that I believe science is a specific system of knowledge creation, one
which uses collaborations to adjust for partisan beliefs before it can
arrive at its knowledge products. Your idea that science can be done
by individuals assumes a very loose definition of the genre - you'd
let it encompass natural philosophy and folk wisdom, for example, and
require no institutional procedure for testing its validity. I think
it's worth being a little more precise.
> > >
> > > As for philosophical problems, I'm
> > > inclined to think that social institutions are what _prevent_ us from
> > > dealing with them, but that's another story.
> > >
> >
> > Ah, the noble savage speaks. History tested this proposition in the
> > New World. The higher organization won.
> >
>
> Don't know what you are talking about. What philosophical problems
> were resolved in the New World?
>
I was being flippant. Unpacked, the point was only: If superior
philosophy was to be achieved by absenting ourselves from social
institutions, Europeans would have encountered a superior civilisation
when they landed on the North American continent. Consider it an ugly
troll and move on, is my advice.
>
> Your statements are really vague---you interchange mind and brain as
> you see fit, you don't explain what you mean by "determined", and you
> haven't said if you are talking about individuals or humans in
> general. Other than that, a fine scientific argument.
>
Interchanging mind and brain is an odd charge to lay at my door, after
I specifically pointed out that exact error in Pinker. Where have you
found my usage confusing, precisely?
I also don't recognise the 'determined' accusation. It was clear from
the quote that the causal circumstances explaining the wiring of the
modern brain are to be located by EvPsych firmly in the Stone Age -
ie, that the brain and its structure is the product of Stone Age
selection conditions. By 'determined', in that sentence, I clearly
meant nothing more philosophically fruity than 'fixed'.
Finally, I can't comprehend what your point is concerning 'individuals
or humans in general'. I suspect that it might be useful to clarify
that thought - I'll do my best to answer it if you do.
rent@mob
rent@mob
> See I don't get your position very well here. Sociobioloists like general
> evolutionists claim that human behavior comes from the evolution of creatures
> throughout history. They may note some influences in the pleisticine era when
> evidence of culture comes up in archealogical digs. Sociobiologists claim that
> cultural behavior passed on through generations becomes a selective pressure
> along with other selctive pressures and can create a feedback that led to human
> nature.
>
If that were *truly* all there is to sociobiology, I would have no
objections to it. Right here, you allow for culture to customize the
human genome. In which case, causal chains involving human behaviour
must be traced back to culture, not just to natural selection.
>
> > (b) EvPsych frequently confuses brains with minds, or moves from one
> > to the other as if minds are uncontroversially reducible to brain
> > activity. Human minds are not reducible in this way. Their semanticity
> > is built out of intersubjective (social) behaviours which do not
> > reside in the individual brain. The simplest way to explore this issue
> > would be to discuss Peter Hobson's Cradle of Thought with you. Are you
> > familiar with this book?
> >
>
>
> This guy claims to have negated all the evidence for "critical stages?" LOL!
>
Er, no, he doesn't have any claims to make on that subject. His claims
concern the intersubjective foundations of human mental constructs. In
non-jargon, that the fabric human thoughts are woven from is social,
not cellular. Why you should take this to be incompatible with your
cherished 'critical stages' is not at all clear.
>
> Are you prepared to refute this entire global
> branch of science loc? If you say yes, you must be a fool.
>
These ad hominems and appeals to authority are doing your argument few
favours. Please try to stick to the point.
>
> > (c) The last point is a specific instance of a systemic methodological
> > problem with EvPsych claims - roughly speaking, that the capabilities
> > of the whole are to be explained by the limitations of the parts.
> > EvPsych and all other sociobiology tends to suffer from this flaw,
> > because it applies a biological methodology to members of a social
> > entity, often with little knowledge of any philosophy or sociology
> > which has explored the irreducibility of this social aspect.
> >
>
> Deveopmental Psychology isn't Evolutionary Psychology to start with. I will await
> your refutation of "Developmental Psychology" before I answer this contention?
> Please don't take this as avoidence.
>
It may not be avoidance, but it is certainly missing the point of (c),
which has nothing whatsoever to do with developmental psychology, but
rather points out the methodological issues your reductionist program
needs to address.
> > (d) According to most historians and sociologists, social forms have
> > changed dramatically over recorded history, and perhaps more so in
> > prehistory. Yet the human genome appears to have undergone no
> > corresponding change. So there are causal inputs from outside biology
> > - inputs which appear to be unaccounted for in the more controversial
> > EvPsych claims.
> >
>
> If it takes this many centuries to put 2 + 2 together and "culturally evolve"
> contemporary culture and technology I don't see how it would depend upon changes
> in the genome after homo erectus became homo sapiens. If we isolated children in
> the wilds it might take them thousands of years to likewise get to where we are.
> But we observe mutations all the time inhospitals, are you saying these arn't
> mutations and that these people don't pass them into the human genome?
>
I'm asking if you believe genomic drift ought to be expected, to
account for changes in social forms over recorded history. It's a
simple kind of yes/no deal, I think. If you don't believe that the
genome needs to change for human society to change, I would be very
interested to hear precisley what other causes of human behaviour you
acknowledge.
> > (e) More short term changes, eg the IQ increase known as the Flynn
> > Effect, demonstrate alterations in human capacities over spans of
> > decades which appear to have social/institutional causes. It might be
> > useful if you would state where such a case sits within your
> > explanatory system for human nature.
> >
>
> it is just that humans have not learned up to their
> capacity yet. We continue to find cultural ways that increase IQ and havn't
> exhausted our potential yet. You claim we already have reached out potential in
> relation to tools we could discover?
>
Well, here again (following the concession you granted to a) you
appear to be conceding much larger chunks of territory than perhaps
you intend. If there is unrealised potential in humans which culture
can release, then not much about Stone Age causal circumstances can be
retro-extrapolated from our *current* behaviours - since these may or
may not be expressing the full pallette of our genetic inheritance.
The potential for 'unrealised' potentials to be further revealed by
cultural change is unlimited. EvPsych's political ramifications cease
to exist.
>
> > (f) You claim a distinction between your position, which seeks to
> > explain human social behaviour in darwinian terms, and social
> > darwinism. I would like to explore your grounds for that claim.
> >
>
> Do you mean social spencerianism? Spencer and Darwin were two different people.
> But please explain this exploration, without sounding like a dodge, I don't
> understand your intentions here. Are you claiming that all evolutionary theory
> necessitate social darwinism?
>
Not necessarily. I merely want to learn how you understand the
distinction between sociobiology and social darwinism, a distinction
you suggested in an earlier conversation without explanation.
>
> > (g) The various case examples I offered you in the Social 'Science'?
> > thread, to get away from rhetoric with a look at the specifics of what
> > you claim as straightforward empirical questions, were all declined.
> > Perhaps you prefer to offer specific cases of your choosing for us to
> > anchor this debate? I am willing to examine any example.
> >
>
> I don't know what this paragraph is saying could you state it a bit more clearly?
> If there are some examples somewhere please state them because I am not going
> back to look at some past thread unless you provide a link.
Your 12 candidates on another thread will probably suffice.
rent@mob
rent@mob
> See I don't get your position very well here. Sociobioloists like general
> evolutionists claim that human behavior comes from the evolution of creatures
> throughout history. They may note some influences in the pleisticine era when
> evidence of culture comes up in archealogical digs. Sociobiologists claim that
> cultural behavior passed on through generations becomes a selective pressure
> along with other selctive pressures and can create a feedback that led to human
> nature.
>
If that were *truly* all there is to sociobiology, I would have no
objections to it. Right here, you allow for culture to customize the
human genome. In which case, causal chains involving human behaviour
must be traced back to culture, not just to natural selection.
>
> > (b) EvPsych frequently confuses brains with minds, or moves from one
> > to the other as if minds are uncontroversially reducible to brain
> > activity. Human minds are not reducible in this way. Their semanticity
> > is built out of intersubjective (social) behaviours which do not
> > reside in the individual brain. The simplest way to explore this issue
> > would be to discuss Peter Hobson's Cradle of Thought with you. Are you
> > familiar with this book?
> >
>
>
> This guy claims to have negated all the evidence for "critical stages?" LOL!
>
Er, no, he doesn't have any claims to make on that subject. His claims
concern the intersubjective foundations of human mental constructs. In
non-jargon, that the fabric human thoughts are woven from is social,
not cellular. Why you should take this to be incompatible with your
cherished 'critical stages' is not at all clear.
>
> Are you prepared to refute this entire global
> branch of science loc? If you say yes, you must be a fool.
>
These ad hominems and appeals to authority are doing your argument few
favours. Please try to stick to the point.
>
> > (c) The last point is a specific instance of a systemic methodological
> > problem with EvPsych claims - roughly speaking, that the capabilities
> > of the whole are to be explained by the limitations of the parts.
> > EvPsych and all other sociobiology tends to suffer from this flaw,
> > because it applies a biological methodology to members of a social
> > entity, often with little knowledge of any philosophy or sociology
> > which has explored the irreducibility of this social aspect.
> >
>
> Deveopmental Psychology isn't Evolutionary Psychology to start with. I will await
> your refutation of "Developmental Psychology" before I answer this contention?
> Please don't take this as avoidence.
>
It may not be avoidance, but it is certainly missing the point of (c),
which has nothing whatsoever to do with developmental psychology, but
rather points out the methodological issues your reductionist program
needs to address.
> > (d) According to most historians and sociologists, social forms have
> > changed dramatically over recorded history, and perhaps more so in
> > prehistory. Yet the human genome appears to have undergone no
> > corresponding change. So there are causal inputs from outside biology
> > - inputs which appear to be unaccounted for in the more controversial
> > EvPsych claims.
> >
>
> If it takes this many centuries to put 2 + 2 together and "culturally evolve"
> contemporary culture and technology I don't see how it would depend upon changes
> in the genome after homo erectus became homo sapiens. If we isolated children in
> the wilds it might take them thousands of years to likewise get to where we are.
> But we observe mutations all the time inhospitals, are you saying these arn't
> mutations and that these people don't pass them into the human genome?
>
I'm asking if you believe genomic drift ought to be expected, to
account for changes in social forms over recorded history. It's a
simple kind of yes/no deal, I think. If you don't believe that the
genome needs to change for human society to change, I would be very
interested to hear precisley what other causes of human behaviour you
acknowledge.
> > (e) More short term changes, eg the IQ increase known as the Flynn
> > Effect, demonstrate alterations in human capacities over spans of
> > decades which appear to have social/institutional causes. It might be
> > useful if you would state where such a case sits within your
> > explanatory system for human nature.
> >
>
> it is just that humans have not learned up to their
> capacity yet. We continue to find cultural ways that increase IQ and havn't
> exhausted our potential yet. You claim we already have reached out potential in
> relation to tools we could discover?
>
Well, here again (following the concession you granted to a) you
appear to be conceding much larger chunks of territory than perhaps
you intend. If there is unrealised potential in humans which culture
can release, then not much about Stone Age causal circumstances can be
retro-extrapolated from our *current* behaviours - since these may or
may not be expressing the full pallette of our genetic inheritance.
The potential for 'unrealised' potentials to be further revealed by
cultural change is unlimited. EvPsych's political ramifications cease
to exist.
>
> > (f) You claim a distinction between your position, which seeks to
> > explain human social behaviour in darwinian terms, and social
> > darwinism. I would like to explore your grounds for that claim.
> >
>
> Do you mean social spencerianism? Spencer and Darwin were two different people.
> But please explain this exploration, without sounding like a dodge, I don't
> understand your intentions here. Are you claiming that all evolutionary theory
> necessitate social darwinism?
>
Not necessarily. I merely want to learn how you understand the
distinction between sociobiology and social darwinism, a distinction
you suggested in an earlier conversation without explanation.
>
> > (g) The various case examples I offered you in the Social 'Science'?
> > thread, to get away from rhetoric with a look at the specifics of what
> > you claim as straightforward empirical questions, were all declined.
> > Perhaps you prefer to offer specific cases of your choosing for us to
> > anchor this debate? I am willing to examine any example.
> >
>
> I don't know what this paragraph is saying could you state it a bit more clearly?
> If there are some examples somewhere please state them because I am not going
> back to look at some past thread unless you provide a link.
Your 12 candidates on another thread will probably suffice.
rent@mob
Immortalist
plonk
>
> rent@mob
Immortalist
"Philosophy," Ludwig Wittgenstein once said, "leaves everything as it is." It was
not his wisest remark. Man has always been eager for--and is often alarmed
by--new theories about the world: why and how it came to be and where it is
going. Philosophers--from Democritus through Plato to Marx and Nietzsche--have
rarely left things as they were. Marx, for instance, alleged that previous
philosophers had only described the world; his mission was to change it. In fact,
earlier philosophers had, in various ways, shaped the world he now proposed to
revolutionize.
Would Marx ever have believed that mankind was ripe for radical remodeling if
John Locke, two centuries earlier, had not maintained, with liberating
plausibility, that men are born with minds like blank slates? Experience alone,
Locke insisted, loads them with the information from which they later compose
images of reality. A consequence of the blank slate was that there could be no
inherited nobility. How could one newborn blank reasonably claim to be innately
better than another?
Locke came at the right moment for democracy. His views emboldened America's
Founding Fathers when it came to "self-evident" truths. He seemed to promise that
everyone began life at the same starting line. Although challenged in detail, his
empiricism appeared, for many decades, both common-sensical and scientific. It
may still appear the first; it is not the second. Science and common sense seldom
tell the same story.
Genetics has now established what Locke's contemporary, Gottfried Leibniz, had
immediately suspected: Men's and women's (and animals') minds are elaborately
"wired" long before they are born. And some have capacities that others do not.
In their "selfishness," genes do not invest in level playing fields or universal
human rights. Justice and fairness may be desirable; they are not natural.
If the theory of the blank slate is no longer tenable, must democratic theory
collapse with it? Fortunately, and unarguably, there is no logical connection
between how the world is and what values man chooses to impose on it and on
himself. The only link between ethics and facts is that "ought entails can": We
should not require of ourselves, or others, what it is beyond human capacity to
achieve. It is not within our power, for instance, to be identical to our
neighbors, neither more intelligent nor more comely; not even if our neighbor is
our clone. Absolute equality is contrary to human nature. Why would anyone have
to watch his back when saying something so matter-of-fact?
Steven Pinker, best-selling author of "The Language Instinct" and "How the Mind
Works," has written a big book, "The Blank Slate," that is built like a bouncer,
and it needs to be. "Human nature is human nature" is not the kind of tautology
some people are willing to take lying down. For ideological reasons, clever
people can still deny that their brains--but not their eventual contents or
use--are shaped by their parents' genes. The unreasonable fear is that to concede
unwanted truths will leave mankind with no logical resistance to fascism,
capitalism, racism, religious obscurantism, male dominance and the rest. If
Locke's theory generated democracy, how can rejecting it not rehabilitate
tyranny? Part of Pinker's mission is to repeat that there is no inescapable
correlation between facts and human value systems, good or bad.
Darwin's theory of natural selection was, in important ways, irrefutably right.
Yet its perversion, so-called social Darwinism, did not follow logically from it.
Natural selection--which involved what Richard Dawkins called, metaphorically,
the "selfish gene"--is not a warrant for genocide nor even for human selfishness
(altruism, like love, can be good for the future of you and your genes).
Opposition to genocide in no way requires us to deny undeniable evidence for
natural selection or for genetically programmed variety.
The use of new knowledge to challenge false theories (which are incompatible with
it) is what many of us call intellectual progress. Communism depends on the idea
that man is infinitely malleable ("The working classes are to Lenin what minerals
are to the metallurgist," said Maxim Gorky, toady-in-chief to the Bolsheviks).
If, therefore, it can be shown that men are not pieces of elemental putty ready
to be molded by Those Who Know, communism cannot be--as dialectical materialism
asserted--an inevitable result of the scheme of things.
Yet despite the Gulag, the Khmer Rouge and Mao Tse-tung's murderous legacy,
today's academia remains infatuated with Marxism. Many ranking
scientists--Pinker's hit-list is starry with well-known names--refuse to
extricate themselves from their implacable mind-sets. "Fascist" is their yelping
Pavlovian response to facts that challenge their fantasies. Yet the same men and
women deride the Nazis' idiotic denunciation of the theory of relativity as
"Jewish science." Pinker would like to have them recognize that "the problem is
not with the possibility that people might differ from each other, which is a
factual question that could turn one way or the other. The problem is with the
line of reasoning that says that if people do turn out to be different, then
discrimination, oppression or genocide would be OK."
The right can be as every bit as mutton-headed as the left. The "religious
right," which has corralled President George W. Bush into its pious camp, opposes
the use of 5-day-old human embryos in medical research. Why? Because it believes
in "ensoulment" at the moment of conception. Belief passes itself off, in modern
rhetoric, as an ultra-sincere form of knowledge. In a democracy, aren't we all
entitled to our beliefs and our opinions? Of course. And only a crackpot believes
that that makes them all equally valid or worthy of respect. The most sincere
politician of the last century was Adolf Hitler.
Pinker's retort to the card-carrying pro-lifer is unequivocal and very pro-life:
"I see no dignity in letting people die of hepatitis or be ravaged by Parkinson's
disease when a cure may lie in research on stem-cells that religious movements
seek to ban because it uses balls of cells that have made the 'ontological' leap
to 'spiritual souls.' Sources of immense misery ... will be alleviated not by
treating thought and emotion as manifestations of an immaterial soul, but by
treating them as manifestations of physiology and genetics."
Not exactly catchy prose, I grant, but elsewhere Pinker can be both terse and
witty. And when he comes to the point, he knows how to drive it home. He asks
what mainstream politician would dare to challenge so-called Judeo-Christian
religious theory when 76% of Americans believe (so polls promise) in the biblical
account of creation and the same proportion in angels, the devil and other
immaterial souls.
The sorry truth is that "most academics, journalists, social analysts and other
intellectually engaged people" hide their genuine opinions because they are
cowards and careerists. Christianity has, in truth, been a lot less unanimous in
its moral stance than official dogma would have us believe. One of the
president's men should check out what bishop Julian of Eclanum wrote, in the 5th
century, to that coercive centralizer, the great St. Augustine, about that
dignitary's lack of common humanity and civilized standards.
Pinker presents an unanswerable case for accepting that man can be, as he is,
both wired and free. Genes do not determine how we use our minds, only the kinds
of minds we have. No one has to propagate fairy tales in order to justify a
better world. Ashley Montagu's UNESCO resolution, stating that biology supports
an ethic of "universal brotherhood" is as baseless as Jean Jacques Rousseau's
myth of the noble savage. Man is good and bad; man is loving and savage; man is
thoughtful and impulsive. The ingredients vary with genetic inheritance. Too bad
if that doesn't suit left- or right-wing Utopians, but the good news is that man
is unrivaled in ingenuity and in ability to learn and adapt. An individual mind
can be closed (or held shut); the book of knowledge, and hence society itself,
can never be.
Is the "soul," or what philosopher Gilbert Ryle called "the ghost in the
machine," a plausible or a necessary adjunct to our idea of humanity? As for
religion, its alleged guarantor, why does a hard head such as Irving Kristol
insist that "no community can survive if it is persuaded--or even suspects--that
its members are leading meaningless lives in a meaningless universe"? Even if the
universe has no "meaning" (whatever that might mean), must it follow that human
life is meaningless? The values that civilized men attach to life, and to one
another, give it, and us, meaning.
Pinker bites off a lot, and some of it is, to put it mildly, more swallowed than
chewed. If he is excellent on genetically modified foods and the fatuous phobias
they excite (the president of Zambia would sooner his people starve than eat such
foods), he might have spared us his Panglossian assessment of the arts, in which
he quotes a ragbag of sources, such as George Bernard Shaw, with callow
deference. Nor is he wholly right about the universal aversion to incest: It was
a royal privilege in ancient Egypt and widely practiced by Greek tyrants (having
come to power, they wanted to keep it in the family).
More important, and much more unwise, he waxes dogmatic about educational
curricula. He recommends that the study of "economics, evolutionary biology and
probability and statistics" replace that of "the classics or foreign languages"
in high schools and colleges. As bridge players say, "Alert!" Americans (and the
English) are already fortified in their vanity by ignorance of foreign languages.
The despised classics, and the disinterested intelligence which should derive
from them, foster nonutilitarian values (which is what some vital values have to
be). How many squads of statisticians do we need?
What we certainly need are critics--as Pinker himself is--of reckless conclusions
drawn from statistics, or from anything else. Such characters used to be the
fruit of what was known as the humanities. And "The Blank Slate"--at once
tolerant and polemic, uncompromising and open-minded--offers a notable and
instructive contribution to them. As a brightly lighted path between what we
would like to believe and what we need to know, it is required reading.
Immortalist
Everyone has a theory of human nature. Everyone has to anticipate the behavior of
others, and that means we all need theories about what makes people tick. A tacit
theory of human nature-that behavior is caused thoughts and feelings-is embedded
in the very way we think about people. We fill out this theory introspecting on
our own minds and assuming that our fellows are like ourselves, and watching
people's behavior and filing away generalizations. We absorb still other ideas
from our intellectual climate: from the expertise of authorities and the
conventional wisdom of the day.
Our theory of human nature is the wellspring of much in our lives. We consult it
when we want to persuade or threaten, inform or deceive. It advises us on how to
nurture our marriages, bring up our children, and control our own behavior. Its
assumptions about learning drive our educational policy; its assumptions about
motivation drive our policies on economics, law, and crime. And because it
delineates what people can achieve easily, what they can achieve only with
sacrifice or pain, and what they cannot achieve at all, it affects our values:
what we believe we can reasonably strive for as individuals and as a society.
Rival theories of human nature are entwined in different ways of life and
different political systems, and have been a source of much conflict over the
course of history.
For millennia, the major theories of human nature have come from religion. The
Judeo-Christian tradition, for example, offers explanations for much of the
subject matter now studied biology and psychology. Humans are made in the image
of God and are unrelated to animals. Women are derivative of men and destined to
be ruled them. The mind is an immaterial substance: it has powers possessed no
purely physical structure, and can continue to exist when the body dies. The mind
is made up of several components, including a moral sense, an ability to love, a
capacity for reason that recognizes whether an act conforms to ideals of
goodness, and a decision faculty that chooses how to behave. Although the
decision faculty is not bound the laws of cause and effect, it has an innate
tendency to choose sin. Our cognitive and perceptual faculties work accurately
because God implanted ideals in them that correspond to reality and because he
coordinates their functioning with the outside world. Mental health comes from
recognizing God's purpose, choosing good and repenting sin, and loving God and
one's fellow humans for God's sake.
The Judeo-Christian theory is based on events narrated in the Bible. We know that
the human mind has nothing in common with the minds of animals because the Bible
says that humans were created separately. We know that the design of women is
based on the design of men because in the second telling of the creation of women
Eve was fashioned from the rib of Adam. Human decisions cannot be the inevitable
effects of some cause, we may surmise, because God held Adam and Eve responsible
for eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge, implying that they could have
chosen otherwise. Women are dominated men as punishment for Eve's disobedience,
and men and women inherit the sinfulness of the first couple.
The Judeo-Christian conception is still the most popular theory of human nature
in the United States. According to recent polls, 76 percent of Americans believe
in the biblical account of creation, 79 percent believe that the miracles in the
Bible actually took place, 76 percent believe in angels, the devil, and other
immaterial souls, 67 percent believe they will exist in some form after their
death, and only 15 percent believe that Darwin's theory of evolution is the best
explanation for the origin of human life on Earth. Politicians on the right
embrace the religious theory explicitly, and no mainstream politician would dare
contradict it in public. But the modern sciences of cosmology, geology, biology,
and archaeology have made it impossible for a scientifically literate person to
believe that the biblical story of creation actually took place. As a result, the
Judeo-Christian theory of human nature is no longer explicitly avowed most
academics, journalists, social analysts, and other intellectually engaged people.
Nonetheless, every society must operate with a theory of human nature, and our
intellectual mainstream is committed to another one. The theory is seldom
articulated or overtly embraced, but it lies at the heart of a vast number of
beliefs and policies. Bertrand Russell wrote, "Every man, wherever he goes, is
encompassed a cloud of comforting convictions, which move with him like flies on
a summer day." For intellectuals today, many of those convictions are about
psychology and social relations. I will refer to those convictions as the Blank
Slate: the idea that the human mind has no inherent structure and can be
inscribed at will society or ourselves.
That theory of human nature-namely, that it barely exists-is the topic of this
book. Just as religions contain a theory of human nature, so theories of human
nature take on some of the functions of religion, and the Blank Slate has become
the secular religion of modern intellectual life. It is seen as a source of
values, so the fact that it is based on a miracle-a complex mind arising out of
nothing-is not held against it. Challenges to the doctrine from skeptics and
scientists have plunged some believers into a crisis of faith and have led others
to mount the kinds of bitter attacks ordinarily aimed at heretics and infidels.
And just as many religious traditions eventually reconciled themselves to
apparent threats from science (such as the revolutions of Copernicus and Darwin),
so, I argue, will our values survive the demise of the Blank Slate.
The chapters in this part of the book (Part I) are about the ascendance of the
Blank Slate in modern intellectual life, and about the new view of human nature
and culture that is beginning to challenge it. In succeeding parts we will
witness the anxiety evoked this challenge (Part II) and see how the anxiety may
be assuaged (Part III). Then I will show how a richer conception of human nature
can provide insight into language, thought, social life, and morality (Part IV)
and how it can clarify controversies on politics, violence, gender, childrearing,
and the arts (Part V). Finally I will show how the passing of the Blank Slate is
less disquieting, and in some ways less revolutionary, than it first appears
(Part VI).
The Official Theory
"Blank slate" is a loose translation of the medieval Latin term tabula
rasa-literally, "scraped tablet." It is commonly attributed to the philosopher
John Locke (1632-1704), though in fact he used a different metaphor. Here is the
famous passage from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding:
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper void of all
characters, without any ideas. How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it that
vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an
almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge?
To this I answer, in one word, from experience.
Locke was taking aim at theories of innate ideas in which people were thought to
be born with mathematical ideals, eternal truths, and a notion of God. His
alternative theory, empiricism, was intended both as a theory of psychology-how
the mind works-and as a theory of epistemology-how we come to know the truth.
Both goals helped motivate his political philosophy, often honored as the
foundation of liberal democracy. Locke opposed dogmatic justifications for the
political status quo, such as the authority of the church and the divine right of
kings, which had been touted as self-evident truths. He argued that social
arrangements should be reasoned out from scratch and agreed upon mutual consent,
based on knowledge that any person could acquire. Since ideas are grounded in
experience, which varies from person to person, differences of opinion arise not
because one mind is equipped to grasp the truth and another is defective, but
because the two minds have had different histories. Those differences therefore
ought to be tolerated rather than suppressed. Locke's notion of a blank slate
also undermined a hereditary royalty and aristocracy, whose members could claim
no innate wisdom or merit if their minds had started out as blank as everyone
else's. It also spoke against the institution of slavery, because slaves could no
longer be thought of as innately inferior or subservient.
During the past century the doctrine of the Blank Slate has set the agenda for
much of the social sciences and humanities. As we shall see, psychology has
sought to explain all thought, feeling, and behavior with a few simple mechanisms
of learning. The social sciences have sought to explain all customs and social
arrangements as a product of the socialization of children the surrounding
culture: a system of words, images, stereotypes, role models, and contingencies
of reward and punishment. A long and growing list of concepts that would seem
natural to the human way of thinking (emotions, kinship, the sexes, illness,
nature, the world) are now said to have been "invented" or "socially
constructed."
The Blank Slate has also served as a sacred scripture for political and ethical
beliefs. According to the doctrine, any differences we see among races, ethnic
groups, sexes, and individuals come not from differences in their innate
constitution but from differences in their experiences. Change the experiences-
reforming parenting, education, the media, and social rewards-and you can change
the person. Underachievement, poverty, and antisocial behavior can be
ameliorated; indeed, it is irresponsible not to do so. And discrimination on the
basis of purportedly inborn traits of a sex or ethnic group is simply irrational.
The Blank Slate is often accompanied two other doctrines, which have also
attained a sacred status in modern intellectual life. My label for the first of
the two is commonly attributed to the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(1712-1778), though it really comes from John Dryden's The Conquest of Granada,
published in 1670:
I am as free as Nature first made man,]BRK Ere the base laws of servitude
began,]BRK When wild in woods the noble savage ran.
The concept of the noble savage was inspired European colonists' discovery of
indigenous peoples in the Americas, Africa, and (later) Oceania. It captures the
belief that humans in their natural state are selfless, peaceable, and
untroubled, and that blights such as greed, anxiety, and violence are the
products of civilization. In 1755 Rousseau wrote:
So many authors have hastily concluded that man is naturally cruel, and requires
a regular system of police to be reclaimed; whereas nothing can be more gentle
than him in his primitive state, when placed nature at an equal distance from the
stupidity of brutes and the pernicious good sense of civilized man. . . .
The more we reflect on this state, the more convinced we shall be that it was the
least subject of any to revolutions, the best for man, and that nothing could
have drawn him out of it but some fatal accident, which, for the public good,
should never have happened. The example of the savages, most of whom have been
found in this condition, seems to confirm that mankind was formed ever to remain
in it, that this condition is the real youth of the world, and that all ulterior
improvements have been so many steps, in appearance towards the perfection of
individuals, but in fact towards the decrepitness of the species.
First among the authors that Rousseau had in mind was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679),
who had presented a very different picture:
Here it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war
as is of every man against every man. . . .
In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is
uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of
the commodities that may be imported sea; no commodious building; no instruments
of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the
face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which
is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of
man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
Hobbes believed that people could escape this hellish existence only surrendering
their autonomy to a sovereign person or assembly. He called it a leviathan, the
Hebrew word for a monstrous sea creature subdued Yahweh at the dawn of creation.
Much depends on which of these armchair anthropologists is correct. If people are
noble savages, then a domineering leviathan is unnecessary. Indeed, forcing
people to delineate private property for the state to recognize-property they
might otherwise have shared-the leviathan creates the very greed and belligerence
it is designed to control. A happy society would be our birthright; all we would
need to do is eliminate the institutional barriers that keep it from us. If, in
contrast, people are naturally nasty, the best we can hope for is an uneasy truce
enforced police and the army. The two theories have implications for private life
as well. Every child is born a savage (that is, uncivilized), so if savages are
naturally gentle, childrearing is a matter of providing children with
opportunities to develop their potential, and evil people are products of a
society that has corrupted them. If savages are naturally nasty, then
childrearing is an arena of discipline and conflict, and evil people are showing
a dark side that was insufficiently tamed.
The actual writings of philosophers are always more complex than the theories
they come to symbolize in the textbooks. In reality, the views of Hobbes and
Rousseau are not that far apart. Rousseau, like Hobbes, believed (incorrectly)
that savages were solitary, without ties of love or loyalty, and without any
industry or art (and he may have out-Hobbes'd Hobbes in claiming they did not
even have language). Hobbes envisioned-indeed, literally drew-his leviathan as an
embodiment of the collective will, which was vested in it a kind of social
contract; Rousseau's most famous work is called The Social Contract, and in it he
calls on people to subordinate their interests to a "general will."
Nonetheless, Hobbes and Rousseau limned contrasting pictures of the state of
nature that have inspired thinkers in the centuries since. No one can fail to
recognize the influence of the doctrine of the Noble Savage in contemporary
consciousness. We see it in the current respect for all things natural (natural
foods, natural medicines, natural childbirth) and the distrust of the man-made,
the unfashionability of authoritarian styles of childrearing and education, and
the understanding of social problems as repairable defects in our institutions
rather than as tragedies inherent to the human condition.
The other sacred doctrine that often accompanies the Blank Slate is usually
attributed to the scientist, mathematician, and philosopher René Descartes
(1596-1650):
There is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is nature
always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. . . . When I consider the
mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking being, I cannot
distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clearly one and
entire; and though the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet if a
foot, or an arm, or some other part, is separated from the body, I am aware that
nothing has been taken from my mind. And the faculties of willing, feeling,
conceiving, etc. cannot be properly speaking said to be its parts, for it is one
and the same mind which employs itself in willing and in feeling and
understanding. But it is quite otherwise with corporeal or extended objects, for
there is not one of them imaginable me which my mind cannot easily divide into
parts. . . . This would be sufficient to teach me that the mind or soul of man is
entirely different from the body, if I had not already been apprised of it on
other grounds.
A memorable name for this doctrine was given three centuries later a detractor,
the philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976):
There is a doctrine about the nature and place of minds which is so prevalent
among theorists and even among laymen that it deserves to be described as the
official theory. . . . The official doctrine, which hails chiefly from Descartes,
is something like this. With the doubtful exception of idiots and infants in arms
every human being has both a body and a mind. Some would prefer to say that every
human being is both a body and a mind. His body and his mind are ordinarily
harnessed together, but after the death of the body his mind may continue to
exist and function. Human bodies are in space and are subject to mechanical laws
which govern all other bodies in space. . . . But minds are not in space, nor are
their operations subject to mechanical laws. . . . . . . Such in outline is the
official theory. I shall often speak of it, with deliberate abusiveness, as "the
dogma of the Ghost in the Machine."
The Ghost in the Machine, like the Noble Savage, arose in part as a reaction to
Hobbes. Hobbes had argued that life and mind could be explained in mechanical
terms. Light sets our nerves and brain in motion, and that is what it means to
see. The motions may persist like the wake of a ship or the vibration of a
plucked string, and that is what it means to imagine. "Quantities" get added or
subtracted in the brain, and that is what it means to think.
Descartes rejected the idea that the mind could operate physical principles. He
thought that behavior, especially speech, was not caused anything, but freely
chosen. He observed that our consciousness, unlike our bodies and other physical
objects, does not feel as if it is divisible into parts or laid out in space. He
noted that we cannot doubt the existence of our minds-indeed, we cannot doubt
that we are our minds-because the very act of thinking presupposes that our minds
exist. But we can doubt the existence of our bodies, because we can imagine
ourselves to be immaterial spirits who merely dream or hallucinate that we are
incarnate.
Descartes also found a moral bonus in his dualism (the belief that the mind is a
different kind of thing from the body): "There is none which is more effectual in
leading feeble spirits from the straight path of virtue, than to imagine that the
soul of the brute is of the same nature as our own, and that in consequence,
after this life we have nothing to fear or to hope for, any more than the flies
and the ants." Ryle explains Descartes's dilemma:
When Galileo showed that his methods of scientific discovery were competent to
provide a mechanical theory which should cover every occupant of space, Descartes
found in himself two conflicting motives. As a man of scientific genius he could
not but endorse the claims of mechanics, yet as a religious and moral man he
could not accept, as Hobbes accepted, the discouraging rider to those claims,
namely that human nature differs only in degree of complexity from clockwork.
It can indeed be upsetting to think of ourselves as glorified gears and springs.
Machines are insensate, built to be used, and disposable; humans are sentient,
possessing of dignity and rights, and infinitely precious. A machine has some
workaday purpose, such as grinding grain or sharpening pencils; a human being has
higher purposes, such as love, worship, good works, and the creation of knowledge
and beauty. The behavior of machines is determined the ineluctable laws of
physics and chemistry; the behavior of people is freely chosen. With choice comes
freedom, and therefore optimism about our possibilities for the future. With
choice also comes responsibility, which allows us to hold people accountable for
their actions. And of course if the mind is separate from the body, it can
continue to exist when the body breaks down, and our thoughts and pleasures will
not someday be snuffed out forever.
As I mentioned, most Americans continue to believe in an immortal soul, made of
some nonphysical substance, which can part company with the body. But even those
who do not avow that belief in so many words still imagine that somehow there
must be more to us than electrical and chemical activity in the brain. Choice,
dignity, and responsibility are gifts that set off human beings from everything
else in the universe, and seem incompatible with the idea that we are mere
collections of molecules. Attempts to explain behavior in mechanistic terms are
commonly denounced as "reductionist" or "determinist." The denouncers rarely know
exactly what they mean those words, but everyone knows they refer to something
bad. The dichotomy between mind and body also pervades everyday speech, as when
we say "Use your head," when we refer to "out-of-body experiences," and when we
speak of "John's body," or for that matter "John's brain," which presupposes an
owner, John, that is somehow separate from the brain it owns. Journalists
sometimes speculate about "brain transplants" when they really should be calling
them "body transplants," because, as the philosopher Dan Dennett has noted, this
is the one transplant operation in which it is better to be the donor than the
recipient.
The doctrines of the Blank Slate, the Noble Savage, and the Ghost in the
Machine-or, as philosophers call them, empiricism, romanticism, and dualism-are
logically independent, but in practice they are often found together. If the
slate is blank, then strictly speaking it has neither injunctions to do good nor
injunctions to do evil. But good and evil are asymmetrical: there are more ways
to harm people than to help them, and harmful acts can hurt them to a greater
degree than virtuous acts can make them better off. So a blank slate, compared
with one filled with motives, is bound to impress us more its inability to do
harm than its inability to do good. Rousseau did not literally believe in a blank
slate, but he did believe that bad behavior is a product of learning and
socialization. "Men are wicked," he wrote; "a sad and constant experience makes
proof unnecessary." But this wickedness comes from society: "There is no original
perversity in the human heart. There is not a single vice to be found in it of
which it cannot be said how and whence it entered." If the metaphors in everyday
speech are a clue, then all of us, like Rousseau, associate blankness with virtue
rather than with nothingness. Think of the moral connotations of the adjectives
clean, fair, immaculate, lily-white, pure, spotless, unmarred, and unsullied, and
of the nouns blemish, blot, mark, stain, and taint.
The Blank Slate naturally coexists with the Ghost in the Machine, too, since a
slate that is blank is a hospitable place for a ghost to haunt. If a ghost is to
be at the controls, the factory can ship the device with a minimum of parts. The
ghost can read the body's display panels and pull its levers, with no need for a
high-tech executive program, guidance system, or CPU. The more not-clockwork
there is controlling behavior, the less clockwork we need to posit. For similar
reasons, the Ghost in the Machine happily accompanies the Noble Savage. If the
machine behaves ignobly, we can blame the ghost, which freely chose to carry out
the iniquitous acts; we need not probe for a defect in the machine's design.
Philosophy today gets no respect. Many scientists use the term as a synonym for
effete speculation. When my colleague Ned Block told his father that he would
major in the subject, his father's reply was "Luft!"-Yiddish for "air." And then
there's the joke in which a young man told his mother he would become a Doctor of
Philosophy and she said, "Wonderful! But what kind of disease is philosophy?"
But far from being idle or airy, the ideas of philosophers can have repercussions
for centuries. The Blank Slate and its companion doctrines have infiltrated the
conventional wisdom of our civilization and have repeatedly surfaced in
unexpected places. William Godwin (1756-1835), one of the founders of liberal
political philosophy, wrote that "children are a sort of raw material put into
our hands," their minds "like a sheet of white paper." More sinisterly, we find
Mao Zedong justifying his radical social engineering saying, "It is on a blank
page that the most beautiful poems are written." Even Walt Disney was inspired
the metaphor. "I think of a child's mind as a blank book," he wrote. "During the
first years of his life, much will be written on the pages. The quality of that
writing will affect his life profoundly."
Locke could not have imagined that his words would someday lead to Bambi
(intended Disney to teach self-reliance); nor could Rousseau have anticipated
Pocahontas, the ultimate noble savage. Indeed, the soul of Rousseau seems to have
been channeled the writer of a recent Thanksgiving op-ed piece in the Boston
Globe:
I would submit that the world native Americans knew was more stable, happier, and
less barbaric than our society today. . . . there were no employment problems,
community harmony was strong, substance abuse unknown, crime nearly nonexistent.
What warfare there was between tribes was largely ritualistic and seldom resulted
in indiscriminate or wholesale slaughter. While there were hard times, life was,
for the most part, stable and predictable. . . . Because the native people
respected what was around them, there was no loss of water or food resources
because of pollution or extinction, no lack of materials for the daily
essentials, such as baskets, canoes, shelter, or firewood.
rent@mob
[SNIP filibuster]
That leaves no answer from you. It's a familiar pattern. Am I *now*
entitled to point out that you are ducking issues?
rent@mob
Immortalist
Sure. Anyhing you says boss. But the gist of what your saying is that since there
are competing explainations this somehow eliminates all explainations. But that
would invalidate ALL inductive reasoning and emirical science. All I see you
doing is offer some cometing hypothesis, no straight out disconfirmation.
I am working on those other claims but just put the other stuff as a commercial
break to break your punk ass. But the debate should be about the debate not how
much we can hide stuff and onl show stuff favorable to your position.
Communication experts contend that this is how dumb peopl communicate by
eliminating opposing views.
I'll be back, here is some killa ape stereotypes for your pleasure freind. This
here be some (pop) shit loc; dig it!
-----------------------
Evil - which manifests in violence, destructiveness and war - is woven into our
biological fabric. A corollary is that evil is a by-product of nature's strategy
to move the world to greater heights of organization and power as national or
religious groups follow ideologies that trigger lofty ideals as well as base
cruelty.
Why we kill each other,
Nation states, tribes, and other human conglomerates are "superorganisms" held
together by memes, that is to say, shared ideas. The health of the superorganism
is what counts and not the individual. Individuals are the cells of a larger
body. They are expendable, and indeed programed to die in order to serve the
collective good. The individual is simply a groupish commitment to savagery as
the way to settle differences.
This is an old and hoary thesis familiar to all who have studied history, and it
is from history that we recall a litany of genocides and murders from the brutal
campaigns of the Roman empire through the Crusades and the conquest of the
Americas to the Saddam Husseins, the Ayatollahs, and Pol Pots of today.
From the murderous tendencies of apes and the automatic homicides of ants and
other social insects, the pecking orders in chickens and rats are similar to
those in humans and that when these orders are disturbed or unsettled, violence
of the most savage sort ensues.
[unedited and un-reanimated gibberish]
I mean, hey, why waste space with so many kooky doooooo theories right?
We need a pecking order of superorganisms, and using this metaphor, attempts to
explain why various nations and religions have to this very day slaughtered one
another. Along the way he warns us to remain strong militarily and economically
against the barbarians at the gate.
...the tribal imperative under what I call the War System. His "superorganism" is
just a metaphor for a large and powerful tribe, a nation state, a religion, a
culture. Those who complain this is not "scientific" are correct. Bloom is
writing history, sociology and political science. These are disciplines in which
one does not "prove" assertions in a scientific sense but instead points to a
preponderance of evidence. I think he's done a good job in hanging the murderer
sign around our necks, but I don't think humans are as completely sown into the
fabric of the superorganism as he thinks.
Bloom allows himself to get carried away by the felicitous logic of his metaphors
(memes as the genes of cultural evolution; human organizations as organisms) to
the point where he forgets they are just metaphors; that is, handy ways of
talking, but not scientific fact. While some people are driven primarily by their
emotions and the mesmerizing mentality of the herd, other people are able to live
out their lives in relative peace and harmony. Bloom's intense concentration on
the violence in human beings blinds him to the fact that, even though history is
strewn with vile heaps of human carnage, the vast majority of people have killed
no one and are just trying to make a living. My belief is that the War System is
on its last legs, and I mean that in a historical sense. I will not live to see
its demise, nor will my grandchildren, but perhaps their grandchildren will.
Furthermore, there are powerful forces of change working in the world today from
microbiology, genetic engineering, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, etc.,
not to mention globalization, lead by the vested interests in the developed
world. These forces are changing humans and human culture so quickly that perhaps
in a few generations we will be very different from what we are today, and will
have no use for "The Lucifer Principle."
Aside from his overriding thesis, Bloom presents a number of compelling ideas,
one of which is that "Contrary to contemporary theory, evolution is not built
solely on competition between self-interested loners. It also relies on contests
between teams of individuals striving for group survival." He believes that group
selection explains "self-destruct mechanisms" within individuals. (p. 70) Another
is that when people experience prosperity the level of violence increases. He
gives some examples of this phenomena beginning on page 258 and explains it
through an increase in testosterone in the newly prosperous. The really
downtrodden, he avers, stay that way and have low testosterone levels.
Finally I must point to his prescient (this was written in the early 90s) and
compelling analysis of the situation in the Middle East where the tribal
mentality still reigns supreme and where most of its inhabitants are under the
spell of what Bloom calls a "killer culture." His indictment of Islam and the
Arab mentality goes a long way toward explaining 9/11 and the terrorist mind set.
He quotes Nobel Prize-winning novelist Elias Canetti who called Islam "a killer
religion, literally <a religion of War.>" (p. 225) He supports his indictment
with some rather astonishing quotes from Yasar Arafat and the late Ayatollah
Khomeini.
----------------------------
This is an intriguing read full of profound, albeit occasionally hyperbolic,
insights guaranteed to stimulate argument and conversation. "The Lucifer
Principle is a complex of natural rules, each working together to weave a fabric
that sometimes frightens and appalls us...Nature does not abhor evil; she
embraces it. She uses it to build. With it, she moves the human world to greater
heights of organization, intricacy, and power...[F]rom our best qualities come
our worst. From our urge to pull together comes our tendency to tear each other
apart. From our devotion to a higher good comes our propensity to the foulest
atrocities. From our commitment to ideals comes our excuse to hate...[E]vil is
woven into our most basic biological fabric." (2-3) The primal moving force of
evolution is not individual selection, but rather group competition. (5-6) "The
individual is a cell in the social superorganism." (56)
Obviously, this is outside the mainstream of conventional thought, but Bloom
supports his thesis well. He takes us on a psychological tour of the human
species. Along the way he reaches throughout history as well as throughout the
animal kingdom for examples and corollaries. Many are unexpected and some
challenge popular understanding (achieving group dominance via aggression and
infanticide among chimpanzees, for example).
Bloom identifies five concepts that "are the foundation underlying the Lucifer
Principle." (10) Paraphrasing, these are:
· Self-organizing systems - Bits of structure, such as genes, that function as
minifactories that crank out their goods so cheaply that the end results are
appallingly expendable. Among those expendable products are you and me.
· The superorganism - We are not the rugged individuals we would like to be. We
are, instead, disposable parts of a being much larger than ourselves - a larger
social organism. This can be a nation, an ethnic group, an ideology, and so on.
· The meme - A self-replicating cluster of ideas that become the glue that holds
together these superorganisms, giving each its distinctive culture.
· The neural net - The group mind whose eccentric mode of operation manipulates
our emotions and turns us into components of a massive learning machine.
· The pecking order - The key to despotism, this helps explain why the danger of
barbarians is real and why the assumptions of our foreign policies are often
wrong.
"Superorganism, ideas, and the pecking order - these are the primary forces
behind much of human creativity and earthly good. They are the holy trinity of
the Lucifer Principle." (326)
His is not an abstract anthropological survey. Bloom intends it to have sound
application in the interactions of groups (i.e., superorganism). In particular,
he is writing for the United States today. He says we have peaked as a nation and
are on the decline. Like all empires that came before, we will not stay on top of
the pecking order indefinitely.
I agree with this eventuality (we are, after all, part of history's sweep), but I
believe the US is still ascending. Events in the past several decades belay his
pessimism. Our first 100ish years were our childhood and adolescence. We began to
mature in the 1900s. As the 20th century opened we began flexing our
international muscles. We subsequently prevailed over the Great Depression, two
World Wars, and the Cold War. Along the way we developed the strongest economy
and technological base in history, and made, and continue to make, successful
inroads towards overcoming racial discrimination and other social ills. By the
end of the century we had become the strongest superpower the world has ever
known (including Rome) and the destination of choice for the majority of
immigrants worldwide. This is hardly the beginnings of a fall from grace. Our
time will eventually pass, to be sure, but unless we are swallowed up in a
demographic or holocaustic storm near-term, we are a long way from losing our
preeminence.
America's destiny notwithstanding, Bloom's arguments help explain what makes the
world go around. For example, he gives insight as to why our allies in Europe and
elsewhere want our protection yet often work at cross-purposes seemingly to
ensure that our power is curbed. He aptly applies human attributes to these
supraliminal processes as a way to explain them.
Of immediate relevance for us today, Bloom decries Islamic fundamentalism. He
sees a fundamental schism between dar al-Islam and the West. "Today's Islam is
the perfect example of a meme grown ravenous...where violence is elevated to a
virtue." (228 and 234) Given the Lucifer Principle, this schism will be overcome,
if at all, only by great sacrifice on both sides. Seeing parallels wit Rome, 19th
century China, and the British Empire, he is pessimistic about our ability to
prevail in this struggle. However, he wrote this book before our War on Terror
began. Accepting that we are still in the early rounds of this fight, it would be
interesting to learn how, if at all, his pessimism has changed. (I wonder if
perhaps key members of the current Bush Administration read this book before
9/11, took his pessimism to heart, and factored it into their formulation of
post-9/11 strategy.)
In the end Bloom is wrestling with such ageless, fundamental questions as: Why is
there pain and suffering in life? Why do people die in battle? Why do people give
their lives for others? His answer is that it is nature's way of stimulating
growth, development, and evolution. Evil is the flipside of goodness. It is the
combustible that brings efficiency and mechanical advantage to humanity's growth
engine. It is a critical component of that which inspires us to greatness and to
struggle toward our collective destiny. Without evil we wouldn't attain it.
This book is an intellectual journey through humanness, opening the door to new
ways of looking at our species, our role, and our purpose. It will stimulate
endless rounds of thought and conversation. Four stars, and a rousing "Bravo!"
for Howard Bloom.
--------------------------------
As a planet, we must learn to live together with respect for each of the
cultures. If we don't organize a planetary world order the result may be that we
blow ourselves up. Very plausible!
In formatting world order a conflict arises between competing tribes. The
evolution of our DNA and our brain, especially, begins billions of years ago and
our genetic material contains remnants of the first reptilian brain which was
programmed with basic motor skills and survival techniques. Mr. Bloom describes
the evolutionary process of the brain as first forming into a unit the size of a
peach seed and increasing in size with each level of evolution--evolving from
basic survival to an organism capable of calculating equations and having
sensitivity to our fellow man and the historical stages throughout time.
Unfortunately, it is the peach pit remnant in our brain that houses our innate
survival genes and which we revert to in tense situations and which causes us to
ultimately reach low-level tribal feelings of conflicts. However, during the
billion-year course of evolution, we developed filters in the brain which we have
learned to apply when we find ourselves in a warlike relationship. Easy to say,
but difficult to practice as history will teach us. One of the final developments
of the DNA and brain gave us the ability to dream and stratagize plans to build a
peaceful world. Again, easy to say: We live in a disparate world where third
world countries are struggling to find a piece of bread and it's very reasonable
for them to think that, "We have all the bread". Hence, we experience events such
as the World Towers Destruction. Note: This book was copyrighted in l995 before
the Towers fell and as such the Towers are not a part of this book. We all
understand the icon of the Towers and we learn from Mr. Bloom's historical
descriptions that these events have taken place for thousands, or millions, or...
of years all over the world.
In the first world countries we find we no longer are in a survival mode but are
on a higher plane of evolution and technology with time to create ideas which
lead to ideologies and Mr. Bloom terms these ideas as "memes". Individual
organisms do not exist alone by the very nature of man because we either die out
of lonliness which creates illness or we self-destruct. Instead the individual
organisms segregate themselves by "memes" and form superorganisms who debate and
fight for their individual ideas of religion or political systems.
We learn how we arrived at the threshhold of blowing ourselves up and by studying
we can see the process and the steps to be taken to achieve world order. We are
not promised early results, even after milleniums of history, but we have the
hope and no choice but to take that path to peace. Since l946 we have statistics
that show that the preferred way to achieve this world order is to form
democratic communities and nations. These stats show that democracies make fewer
attacks on their neighboring tribes or countries.
One of the important reasons to read this book is to gain a comprehension of the
historical process of the evolution of the socialization of our planet. By
gaining this understanding, we find a sense of control in our individual being
and the very accomplishment of being in control protects our health and quality
of life simply because we lessen the stress and anxiety such as posed by wars.
Read this book to learn how man developed through the ages and how this
development staged us for our predicaments today. Understand why this is and you
will eliminate a lot of worry and stress from your life.
-------------------------------------
We are giant competing blobs, October 19, 2002
Reviewer: Todd I. Stark (see more about me) from Philadelphia, Pa USA
This is a very provocative speculation about the nature of human beings and human
groups. It is built on biological science, but interpreted in a highly
idiosyncratic way. A definite page-turner, with a lot of scientific and some
scholarly references, but how accurate is it?
This is a selective but often chillingly familiar guided tour through human
history. Bloom cleverly and casually crosses fields of study, sometimes
metaphorically and sometimes making literal comparisons, and often being unclear
as to which he intends. The result is an intriguing mixture of science,
historical interpretation, and science fiction. The flavor is distinctly
Darwinian, but with a twist.
"The Lucifer Principle" itself is a simple acknowledgement that in the natural
world we take the bad with the good, often as the flip side of the good. The same
forces that promote cooperation also promote barbarity.
Bloom starts out with a vivid presentation of the Darwinian vision emphasizing
the competition of vehicles for the benefit of their replicators, the "selfish
gene" theme at its most lurid. "Survival of the fittest" has its way. At that
point, Bloom introduces the twist. He proposes something that sociologists
latched on to, but which most evolutionary theorists of recent years have avoided
like the plague. He raises the spectre of the "superorganism."
The superorganism was once a popular theme of old structuralist anthropologists
like Claude Levi-Strauss, who saw society as a complex machine driven with the
help of a common cognitive structure of individuals in terms of certain themes.
Bloom's superorganism is a much more ambiguous blob, held together by "memes"
which hook into our primitive drives.
The structuralists mostly saw the superorganism from the top-down, attempting to
find patterns in culture that revealed its nature. Bloom instead derives the
superorganism from the bottom-up by showing how people who share culture tend to
form alliances. The alliances take on the direction given by the "memes" which
exploit biological drives.
The idea that groups of organisms can share a fate so closely that they live or
die as a unit is something that evolutionary theorists backed off from because it
seemed that the genetic self-interest of organisms would nearly always tend to
overpower any tendency for traits to arise "for the good of the group." We might
end up with traits that help us exploit living in groups, which Matt Ridley calls
"groupishness" in contrast to
"selfishness," but it is still genetic self-interest.
Bloom departs from this mainstream view by making the argument that mechanisms
for suicide have evolved for both cells (apoptosis, programmed cell death) and
individual self-destruction. These same things are explained in very different
terms in mainstream evolutionary biology, as either artifacts of adaptations, or
adaptations for one set of conditions that become maladaptive in other
circumstances.
Evolutionary theorists tend to avoid seeing self-destruction as adaptive. The
common theme, Bloom points out, is loss of connectivity with the group. When
neurons can't hook up during the wiring of a nervous system, they commit
hara-kiri. When humans can't hook up with each other, Bloom theorizes, they also
tend to go off and remove themselves from the gene pool. An intriguing
possibility that make a new interpretation of "learned helplessness" and "stress"
research. This is perhaps Bloom's most interesting and potentially fruitful idea.
Bloom builds much better technically on the group selection aspects of his
thinking in "The Global Brain."
In "The Lucifer Principle," he just introduces the idea of the superorganism and
applies it to various selected historical events.
It is in explaining how individuals can be wired to self-destruct, that the
concept of group selection is raised, entirely without fanfare. The diseases we
attribute to "stress" Bloom says are nothing of the kind, but diseases of
disconnection from the superorganism.
The adaptive benefit would have to be to the superorganism rather than to the
genes of the individual in order for Bloom's argument to work. He doesn't mention
how controversial this idea is in the book, probably avoided for rhetorical
purposes.
Bloom is an entertaining writer who uses the most dramatic examples he can find
to make his points well. If there is a general weakness in his writing, it is
that he often avoids confronting how exceptional some of his ideas are.
The Lucifer Principle uses alternating chapters cleverly to introduce fundamental
biological themes like dominance hierarchies and recent extensions like memes,
and at the same time bring in Bloom's "superorganism" and apply those themes in a
novel way to groups rather than individuals. So we frequently end up with huge
groups of human beings compared dramatically in their behavior to individual
animals. We have superorganisms vying for their place in the pecking order,
having a collective shift in perception, becoming bullies when they are
frustrated. All illustrated with selective and sometimes idiosyncratic historical
accounts.
All in all, it works very well as narrative, and introduces some novel ideas that
could have profound implications. If Bloom is right about "superorganisms"
leveraging human primitive drives through bits of culture, the result doesn't
look good for our species. There is certainly a lot of food for thought here,
especially if Blooms sometimes radical caricatures are taken for their larger
lessons rather than as gospel.
Bloom is particularly hard on Islam, not as people but as a culture, both for the
success of its spread and the historical brutality of its adherents. He makes the
distinction
between extremists and the rest of us, to avoid stereotyping Muslims as violent
fanatics, but also points out that it is the extremists than often end up driving
the bus. Bloom also uses the "meme" concept very casually, and sometimes in
conflicting ways, in order to simplify his explanation of culture and build on
his main theme of superorganisms climbing the pecking order.
An anxiety-provoking and well-narrated book that I hope gets a lot of things
wrong, but I fear might be all too accurate. He certainly pulls together and
makes sense of an amazing diversity of ideas.
> rent@mob
tg
I think you are disagreeing with a "strong" interpretation and I am
defending a "weak" interpretation. That said, I can't resist trying to
pin you down a bit.
The term "wiring" is unclear.
Yes or no---the physical structure and chemistry of the brain is
approximately the same as it was (arbitrarily) 50k years ago?
-tg
> rent@mob
Immortalist
"tg" <tgde...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:9e39ba1.04060...@posting.google.com...
If thats the soft core version of [the two poles of instinct strength] is this
the hard core death metal version, rooooooooooaaaaaaaaaarrrrrr!?!
Once one starts to think about mental software instead of physical behavior, the
radical differences among human cultures become far smaller, and that leads to a
fourth new idea: Universal mental mechanisms can underlie superficial variation
across cultures. Again, we can use language as a paradigm case of the
open-endedness of behavior. Humans speak some six thousand mutually
unintelligible languages. Nonetheless, the grammatical programs in their minds
differ far less than the actual speech coming out of their mouths. We have known
for a long time that all human languages can convey the same kinds of ideas. The
Bible has been translated into hundreds of non-Western languages, and during
World War II the U.S. Marine Corps conveyed secret messages across the Pacific by
having Navajo Indians translate them to and from their native language. The fact
that any language can be used to convey any proposition, from theological
parables to military directives, suggests that all languages are cut from the
same cloth.
UNIVERSAL PEOPLE [GRAMMAR to]
...Researchers in the human sciences have begun to flesh out the hypothesis that
the mind evolved with a universal complex design. Some anthropologists have
returned to an ethnographic record that used to trumpet differences among
cultures and have found an astonishingly detailed set of aptitudes and tastes
that all cultures have in common. This shared way of thinking, feeling, and
living makes us look like a single tribe, which the anthropologist Donald Brown
has called the Universal People, after Chomsky's Universal Grammar. Hundreds of
traits, from fear of snakes to logical operators, from romantic love to humorous
insults, from poetry to food taboos, from exchange of goods to mourning the dead,
can be found in every society ever documented. It's not that every universal
behavior directly reflects a universal component of human nature-many arise from
an interplay between universal properties of the mind, universal properties of
the body, and universal properties of the world. Nonetheless, the sheer richness
and detail in the rendering of the Universal People comes as a shock to any
intuition that the mind is a blank slate or that cultures can vary without limit,
and there is something on the list to refute almost any theory growing out of
those intuitions. Nothing can substitute for seeing Brown's list in full; it is
reproduced, with his permission, as an appendix (see p. 435).
FROM: The Blank Slate:
The Modern Denial of Human Nature
by Steven Pinker
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0142003344/
sorry to intrude though since we need more people to debate this latest shit on
both sides but no one comes forth but me, you, and rent.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > rent@mob
rent@mob
>
> I think you are disagreeing with a "strong" interpretation and I am
> defending a "weak" interpretation.
>
Weak and strong cases are easily muddled, both in prosecutors' and
defenders' cases. If you attribute your sense of self to genetic
inheritance, you may be straying into a strong belief without meaning
to.
>
> That said, I can't resist trying to
> pin you down a bit.
>
>
> The term "wiring" is unclear.
>
> Yes or no---the physical structure and chemistry of the brain is
> approximately the same as it was (arbitrarily) 50k years ago?
>
Approximately? Yes, of course: I work on the basis of assuming
approximately zero genetic drift over that time. But the devil is in
the detail, as they say. The structure of a medieval banqueting hall
and a medieval chapel is *approximately* the same, but the finishing
details bestow radically different funtions on it.
I believe all the interesting semantic stuff happens in the fine
detail, the finishing stages of that structure. The majority of these
stages are only realised through enculturation - in the one case I'm
aware of that a brain was denied enculturation and then MRI-scanned,
huge areas of cortical structure atrophied, failed to develop.
The less interesting stuff - as a rule of thumb, any brain structure
held in common by most mammals - I have no objection to saying is a
matter for biology. If the 'weak' case as you understand it concurs,
you're right, this is a case of mistaken identity.
rent@mob
tg
> >> [SNIP]
> >
> > I think you are disagreeing with a "strong" interpretation and I am
> > defending a "weak" interpretation.
> >
>
> Weak and strong cases are easily muddled, both in prosecutors' and
> defenders' cases. If you attribute your sense of self to genetic
> inheritance, you may be straying into a strong belief without meaning
> to.
>
We're making progress. So what do you mean by identity?
Contrary to the assumptions of physics, I am neither a cow nor a
sphere. I have an identity in object-space, also in mammal-space.
So perhaps you are talking about human-space---are you saying that if
I have Down Syndrome or male-pattern-baldness, it does not identify
me?
-tg
rent@mob
> >
> > Weak and strong cases are easily muddled, both in prosecutors' and
> > defenders' cases. If you attribute your sense of self to genetic
> > inheritance, you may be straying into a strong belief without meaning
> > to.
>
> We're making progress. So what do you mean by identity?
>
I'm not convinced this was the most constructive point to pick up on.
There was another exchange of views in that last round which looked
more fruitful to me. But I'll play along ....
>
> Contrary to the assumptions of physics, I am neither a cow nor a
> sphere. I have an identity in object-space, also in mammal-space.
> So perhaps you are talking about human-space---are you saying that if
> I have Down Syndrome or male-pattern-baldness, it does not identify
> me?
>
I was more referring to your original observation: "I have trouble
adapting to cars and people after I spend a a few days in the
woods---it is obviously a matter of chemical response to stimulus
levels. Difficult to imagine that the "woods" state isn't the way my
body was designed."
A 'weak' position for genes allots them a minor or subordinate role in
human mental life (while accepting that they exist). I can't make
sense of this quote in those terms - it implies that you attribute
higher-order mental constructs, eg those concerning your sense of your
own personhood, to your Stone Age genetic inheritance. It's *that*
sense of identity that interests me: my case is that identity so
defined is entirely a product of socially-driven mental developments.
Whether or not these other things, Downs and baldness, define your
identity seems unlikely to clarify the issue. Some bald people will
actively embrace that marker as self-identifying, others will not feel
it to be central or even relevant to what they are. I'm not familiar
with how Downs impacts on a person's grasp of their personhood, but my
guess is that it would become definitional in a case of impaired
cognition (especially, if access to abstract thinking is blocked).
> > > Yes or no---the physical structure and chemistry of the brain is
> > > approximately the same as it was (arbitrarily) 50k years ago?
> > >
> >
> > Approximately? Yes, of course: I work on the basis of assuming
> > approximately zero genetic drift over that time. But the devil is in
> > the detail, as they say. The structure of a medieval banqueting hall
> > and a medieval chapel is *approximately* the same, but the finishing
> > details bestow radically different funtions on it.
> >
> > I believe all the interesting semantic stuff happens in the fine
> > detail, the finishing stages of that structure. The majority of these
> > stages are only realised through enculturation - in the one case I'm
> > aware of that a brain was denied enculturation and then MRI-scanned,
> > huge areas of cortical structure atrophied, failed to develop.
> >
> > The less interesting stuff - as a rule of thumb, any brain structure
> > held in common by most mammals - I have no objection to saying is a
> > matter for biology. If the 'weak' case as you understand it concurs,
> > you're right, this is a case of mistaken identity.
> >
This was the stuff I was more interested to hear your thoughts on.
rent@mob
tg
> tgde...@earthlink.net (tg) wrote in message news:<9e39ba1.04060...@posting.google.com>...
>
>
> > >
> > > Weak and strong cases are easily muddled, both in prosecutors' and
> > > defenders' cases. If you attribute your sense of self to genetic
> > > inheritance, you may be straying into a strong belief without meaning
> > > to.
> >
> > We're making progress. So what do you mean by identity?
> >
>
> I'm not convinced this was the most constructive point to pick up on.
> There was another exchange of views in that last round which looked
> more fruitful to me. But I'll play along ....
OK, two things at a time.
>
> >
> > Contrary to the assumptions of physics, I am neither a cow nor a
> > sphere. I have an identity in object-space, also in mammal-space.
> > So perhaps you are talking about human-space---are you saying that if
> > I have Down Syndrome or male-pattern-baldness, it does not identify
> > me?
> >
>
> I was more referring to your original observation: "I have trouble
> adapting to cars and people after I spend a a few days in the
> woods---it is obviously a matter of chemical response to stimulus
> levels. Difficult to imagine that the "woods" state isn't the way my
> body was designed."
>
> A 'weak' position for genes allots them a minor or subordinate role in
> human mental life (while accepting that they exist). I can't make
> sense of this quote in those terms - it implies that you attribute
> higher-order mental constructs, eg those concerning your sense of your
> own personhood, to your Stone Age genetic inheritance. It's *that*
> sense of identity that interests me: my case is that identity so
> defined is entirely a product of socially-driven mental developments.
>
> Whether or not these other things, Downs and baldness, define your
> identity seems unlikely to clarify the issue. Some bald people will
> actively embrace that marker as self-identifying, others will not feel
> it to be central or even relevant to what they are. I'm not familiar
> with how Downs impacts on a person's grasp of their personhood, but my
> guess is that it would become definitional in a case of impaired
> cognition (especially, if access to abstract thinking is blocked).
>
If you are saying that the very concept of identity is an abstraction,
and therefore requires language, which is a socially-driven mental
development, well sure. But that's a trivial conclusion.
My anecdote is in response to the idea that humans are "better
adapted" to stone-age conditions. Commuting to work in bad traffic is
stressful, and hiking isn't. I attribute that to the effect of sensory
input on my biochemistry. This observation is incorporated into my
sense of identity within the universe, cow, sphere, and all. It also
defines me in society-space---where I fit in among other
humans---since not all humans feel these effects equally. But I
suspect that testing would find my response to be general among
humans; bad hormones and good would correlate with conditions.
>
> > > > Yes or no---the physical structure and chemistry of the brain is
> > > > approximately the same as it was (arbitrarily) 50k years ago?
> > > >
> > >
> > > Approximately? Yes, of course: I work on the basis of assuming
> > > approximately zero genetic drift over that time. But the devil is in
> > > the detail, as they say. The structure of a medieval banqueting hall
> > > and a medieval chapel is *approximately* the same, but the finishing
> > > details bestow radically different funtions on it.
> > >
> > > I believe all the interesting semantic stuff happens in the fine
> > > detail, the finishing stages of that structure. The majority of these
> > > stages are only realised through enculturation - in the one case I'm
> > > aware of that a brain was denied enculturation and then MRI-scanned,
> > > huge areas of cortical structure atrophied, failed to develop.
> > >
> > > The less interesting stuff - as a rule of thumb, any brain structure
> > > held in common by most mammals - I have no objection to saying is a
> > > matter for biology. If the 'weak' case as you understand it concurs,
> > > you're right, this is a case of mistaken identity.
> > >
>
> This was the stuff I was more interested to hear your thoughts on.
It still isn't clear to me what your idea of a strong interpretation
is. I can only imagine that you conceive of human behavior to be
completely abstract, not driven by any physiological responses.
What if your medieval structure is required to serve as shelter as
the climate turns very cold? Is it as well-adapted as a yurt? Wouldn't
it be reasonable to hypothesize, as inheritors of this thing after 500
years, that it was built in a warmer time?
I think you don't make a clear distinction between social-space and
universe-space, and so we talk past each other. Pick one.
-tg
>
> rent@mob
rent@mob
>
> If you are saying that the very concept of identity is an abstraction,
> and therefore requires language, which is a socially-driven mental
> development, well sure. But that's a trivial conclusion.
>
I don't *think* I was being that trivial. It seemed to me that you
were claiming one experience as suiting you better than the other,
which I have no problem with. What bothered me was your unexplained
inference from the reality of your preference - to the claim that your
preference can only be nature-given. You present an idea of yourself
as a being whose blood and bone connects without cultural mediation to
the lives of his ancestors - such that he can 'feel' the difference
between what would have been right and wrong environments for his
ancestors. To me that's a beguiling but illusory romantic ideal.
>
> My anecdote is in response to the idea that humans are "better
> adapted" to stone-age conditions. Commuting to work in bad traffic is
> stressful, and hiking isn't. I attribute that to the effect of sensory
> input on my biochemistry.
>
The trouble with projecting backwards onto a basically speculative
prehistory is that it is all too easy to conjure up just those
selection conditions which turn out to be necessary to support the
case. Here, it seems to be assumed that hiking alone in the woods is
just the kind of thing Pleistocene Selection must have designed for,
and achieving a goal in concert/conflict with other noisy humans is
not. If we look at our primate cousins, the opposite would seem at
least *as* plausible.
>
> This observation is incorporated into my
> sense of identity within the universe, cow, sphere, and all. It also
> defines me in society-space---where I fit in among other
> humans---since not all humans feel these effects equally. But I
> suspect that testing would find my response to be general among
> humans; bad hormones and good would correlate with conditions.
>
I'm sceptical of this notion of hormones. But even allowing your
suspected scenario, this would not move our debate along. It would
only show that humans today react predictably to a given stimulus,
generating certain hormones. For example, your relief at taking a
break from the wearisome burdens and responsibilities you have in
human company can be just as responsible for whatever chemical blooms
occur in your cortex as genes could be.
>
> It still isn't clear to me what your idea of a strong interpretation
> is. I can only imagine that you conceive of human behavior to be
> completely abstract, not driven by any physiological responses.
>
Why do you fancy that the absence of physiological impulses leaves
something completely abstract? I am not denying objective social
determinants, or self-willed ones. My claim boils down to the idea
that adults, as distinct from children, are self-determining. Some may
want to be determined by whatever impulses they believe they discern
in their 'nature'. But it's not in our power *not* to make such
choices, so ultimately we cannot escape being the source of our own
being.
>
> What if your medieval structure is required to serve as shelter as
> the climate turns very cold? Is it as well-adapted as a yurt? Wouldn't
> it be reasonable to hypothesize, as inheritors of this thing after 500
> years, that it was built in a warmer time?
>
If your point is that arguments from analogy are easily denuded of
relevance, point made. My example was asking you to notice that the
fine detail of brain architecture is not supplied by biology, but by
cultural training. For this reason, the pertinent details of the brain
are not at all commensurable with hypothetical brain architectures of
the past.
Your tangent to that point was interesting. I think it aids rather
than harms my case. It reveals a central tenet of the EvPsych account,
that all mental adaptation ceased before history began - that we are
all now confined to living in obsolete mental structures. It's almost
a miracle that any historical developments occurred at all, without
humankind suffering a collective nervous breakdown.
>
> I think you don't make a clear distinction between social-space and
> universe-space, and so we talk past each other. Pick one.
>
A very suggestive terminology you're introducing me to, here. Are you
referring to what ordinary mortals distinguish as epistemological and
ontological?
rent@mob
PS: May I commend the following to you?:
www.kenanmalik.com/lectures/mechanism.html
andy-k
<snip>
Excellent link r@m thanks. Reminds me of Schrodinger's "objectivation" (his
word for the way that the scientific enterprise has a propensity to squeeze
the subject out of the picture).
tg
> tgde...@earthlink.net (tg) wrote in message news:<9e39ba1.04061...@posting.google.com>...
>
> >
> > If you are saying that the very concept of identity is an abstraction,
> > and therefore requires language, which is a socially-driven mental
> > development, well sure. But that's a trivial conclusion.
> >
>
> I don't *think* I was being that trivial. It seemed to me that you
> were claiming one experience as suiting you better than the other,
> which I have no problem with. What bothered me was your unexplained
> inference from the reality of your preference - to the claim that your
> preference can only be nature-given. You present an idea of yourself
> as a being whose blood and bone connects without cultural mediation to
> the lives of his ancestors - such that he can 'feel' the difference
> between what would have been right and wrong environments for his
> ancestors. To me that's a beguiling but illusory romantic ideal.
>
> prehistory is that it is all too easy to conjure up just those
> selection conditions which turn out to be necessary to support the
> case. Here, it seems to be assumed that hiking alone in the woods is
> just the kind of thing Pleistocene Selection must have designed for,
> and achieving a goal in concert/conflict with other noisy humans is
> not. If we look at our primate cousins, the opposite would seem at
> least *as* plausible.
>
>
> suspected scenario, this would not move our debate along. It would
> only show that humans today react predictably to a given stimulus,
> generating certain hormones. For example, your relief at taking a
> break from the wearisome burdens and responsibilities you have in
> human company can be just as responsible for whatever chemical blooms
> occur in your cortex as genes could be.
>
Let's drop the anecdote; you've obviously never spent time in the
wilderness, alone or with a couple of companions. And if you think of
rush-hour traffic as an example of cooperation, then you haven't much
experience there either.
Also, let me stipulate that I don't believe every discernible trait is
necessarily the result of selection pressure; I will replace "adapted"
with "suited" to avoid confusion. For my purpose, reasonableness, and
relative reasonableness, are sufficient tests for conjectures about
prehistory.
From previous:
tg:
"Yes or no---the physical structure and chemistry of the brain is
approximately the same as it was (arbitrarily) 50k years ago?"
rent:
"Approximately? Yes, of course: I work on the basis of assuming
approximately zero genetic drift over that time."
But now you say:
"You present an idea of yourself as a being whose blood and bone
connects without cultural mediation to the lives of his ancestors -
such that he can 'feel' the difference between what would have been
right and wrong environments for his ancestors. To me that's a
beguiling but illusory romantic ideal."
According to your previous statement blood and bone *do* connect to my
ancestors, and without cultural mediation.(NOTE 1)
Human bodies are more, less, or equally, suited to current conditions
compared to the conditions under which they evolved and survived
*without* modern culture for a long time.
It doesn't seem reasonable, or consistent with parsimony, to believe
other than that they are less suited.
> > It still isn't clear to me what your idea of a strong interpretation
> > is. I can only imagine that you conceive of human behavior to be
> > completely abstract, not driven by any physiological responses.
> >
>
> Why do you fancy that the absence of physiological impulses leaves
> something completely abstract? I am not denying objective social
> determinants, or self-willed ones. My claim boils down to the idea
> that adults, as distinct from children, are self-determining. Some may
> want to be determined by whatever impulses they believe they discern
> in their 'nature'. But it's not in our power *not* to make such
> choices, so ultimately we cannot escape being the source of our own
> being.
>
>
> If your point is that arguments from analogy are easily denuded of
> relevance, point made. My example was asking you to notice that the
> fine detail of brain architecture is not supplied by biology, but by
> cultural training. For this reason, the pertinent details of the brain
> are not at all commensurable with hypothetical brain architectures of
> the past.
>
> Your tangent to that point was interesting. I think it aids rather
> than harms my case. It reveals a central tenet of the EvPsych account,
> that all mental adaptation ceased before history began - that we are
> all now confined to living in obsolete mental structures. It's almost
> a miracle that any historical developments occurred at all, without
> humankind suffering a collective nervous breakdown.
>
> >
> > I think you don't make a clear distinction between social-space and
> > universe-space, and so we talk past each other. Pick one.
> >
>
> A very suggestive terminology you're introducing me to, here. Are you
> referring to what ordinary mortals distinguish as epistemological and
> ontological?
I thought my language was quite mundane. I'm trying to get you to
articulate which axis or axes of measurement or comparison you are
using. You seem to be avoiding the question.
Do you disagree with this?:
"Humans, unlike cheetahs, behave in a social fashion---individuals
cooperate in acquiring food, rearing children, and defense. Similar
behavior is observed among animals with limited or no evidence of
culture. It seems reasonable to assume that this difference is the
result of the different genetic makeup of cheetahs and humans."
If you don't disagree, then I'm trying to think of a similar statement
you might make to describe human behavior which would illustrate your
position. But perhaps you do disagree.
-tg
(NOTE 1) My understanding of "cultural" includes technology, so
perhaps e.g. my childhood diet was better. I don't think that's what
you meant by cultural mediation.
ps. I read the article.
rent@mob
Pleasure's mine. I'm a big fan of Malik's main book on the topic, Man,
Beast & Zombie. I haven't found another commentator who comes close to
his appreciation of the dialectical nature of subject/object systems.
rent@mob
rent@mob
> >
Backing away from the example now, after I've detailed the problems
that I believe it conceals, would be disappointing to me. I'd rather
you dealt with my specific observations than palmed me off with a
'you're just inexperienced/daft' type of answer. But of course I can't
insist.
> tg:
> "Yes or no---the physical structure and chemistry of the brain is
> approximately the same as it was (arbitrarily) 50k years ago?"
>
> rent:
> "Approximately? Yes, of course: I work on the basis of assuming
> approximately zero genetic drift over that time."
>
> But now you say:
>
> "You present an idea of yourself as a being whose blood and bone
> connects without cultural mediation to the lives of his ancestors -
> such that he can 'feel' the difference between what would have been
> right and wrong environments for his ancestors. To me that's a
> beguiling but illusory romantic ideal."
>
> According to your previous statement blood and bone *do* connect to my
> ancestors, and without cultural mediation.(NOTE 1)
>
Yes, in a trivial, fleshy sense, I can accept that. What I'm rejecting
is the claim that concepts existent in your mind arrive there via the
medium of genes, or directly out of the interaction of your genes with
a certain environment, ie 'the woods'. Here's the thesis: Your brain
cannot be identical to your ancestor's brain, since its mind has been
encultured in radically different ways. The meaning of 'woods' to you
is not and cannot be what it was to this ancestor. The woods represent
a complex of meanings to modern you, among which are escape from the
inauthenticity of modernity. But these meanings - and your emotional /
chemical responses to them - are learnt, and local to quite a small
historical era.
I used the terms 'blood' and 'bone' in a slightly cryptic short-hand,
there, to tip you off to the lurking dangers of Volkisch romantic
philosophy, which appears to overlap with what I can see of your
philosophical position, so far. As ideals, 'blood' and 'bone'
represent a powerful sentimental argument against rationality and
humanism. Whether consciously or otherwise, you appear to be following
in Heidegger's footsteps. Tread carefully!
>
> Human bodies are more, less, or equally, suited to current conditions
> compared to the conditions under which they evolved and survived
> *without* modern culture for a long time.
> It doesn't seem reasonable, or consistent with parsimony, to believe
> other than that they are less suited.
>
It seems eminently reasonable to me - we've had 10,000 years at least
of adapting the environment to fit our needs and desires. Most
evidence seems to suggest that, eg, our medical progress has
successfully tailored the environment to remove deadly threats like
smallpox. Would that not count as having become better suited?
Not avoiding - just making sure we both understand what's being asked,
before I try to answer.
>
> Do you disagree with this?:
>
> "Humans, unlike cheetahs, behave in a social fashion---individuals
> cooperate in acquiring food, rearing children, and defense. Similar
> behavior is observed among animals with limited or no evidence of
> culture. It seems reasonable to assume that this difference is the
> result of the different genetic makeup of cheetahs and humans."
>
> If you don't disagree, then I'm trying to think of a similar statement
> you might make to describe human behavior which would illustrate your
> position. But perhaps you do disagree.
>
I'm afraid I will have to nitpick with the quote. It uses 'social' to
refer to behaviours which various animals (including big cats, to an
extent) exhibit. With the word 'social' applied so promiscuously, we
could swap 'slime molds' for 'humans' in the quote and not
substantially change its intended point. I would prefer to reserve
'social' for something a wee bit more exotic than any old grex.
To me social implies organization from a higher level - ie, a
relatively static structure of relationships, through whose
established roles individuals pass, which shapes individuals and is
partly shaped by them in return. In Hom Sap, it implies a large chunk
of prehistory in which this structure actively customized the genome
until no further big refinements could be realized out of genetic
material - the plasticity of the phenotype having reached as near to
infinite as makes no difference to society. That's what I understand
by man being a social animal.
So yes, our genes are a necessary part of the picture, a part which
other animals lack - but our genes are substantially the product of
social organization.
> -tg
>
> (NOTE 1) My understanding of "cultural" includes technology, so
> perhaps e.g. my childhood diet was better. I don't think that's what
> you meant by cultural mediation.
>
Agreed.
>
> ps. I read the article.
>
Delighted to hear it. Any thoughts?
rent@mob
rent@mob
> Reminds me of Schrodinger's "objectivation" (his
> word for the way that the scientific enterprise has a propensity to squeeze
> the subject out of the picture).
I've had a quick shufti to familiarise with Schrodinger's case, and
found this:
"The material world has only been constructed at the price of taking
the self, that is, mind, out of it, removing it; mind is not part of
it; obviously, therefore, it can neither act on it nor be acted on by
any of its parts. Mind has erected the objective outside world of the
natural philosopher out of its own stuff. Mind could not cope with
this gigantic task otherwise than by the simplifying device of
excluding itself - withdrawing from its conceptual creation. Hence the
latter does not contain its creator."
The parallels are suggestive (I think I'll have to see the book). As
long as he's not claiming that Mind can *never* cope - which would
exclude almost everything in the Hegelian tradition - I'm right there.
Thanks for the tip.
rent@mob
tg
You give the impression of someone who would have to say the words
"I'm falling" before your heart could start to pound.
We do seem to be talking past each other, perhaps intentionally on
your part. I don't accept your premise that my response to an
activity must be dependent on some "meaning" which was transmitted to
me through language. This _is_ a daft idea, and I can't understand
how a person with normal experience could believe it.
That abstractions _can_ evoke emotions or physiological responses is
an important aspect of human behavior, but not relevant to this
example.
Can you suggest how my ancestor, not so cultured, would respond to the
two situations? Do you think that he would be _less_ stressed driving
at 65mph within inches of other cars, horns blaring, strapped into a
seat and unable to be inattentive for an instant?
My example is actually thought out a bit; it attempts to hold constant
variables which might influence the outcome, and it should be clear
what is being compared.
If you can't see it, you must not be looking very hard.
> I used the terms 'blood' and 'bone' in a slightly cryptic short-hand,
Aw shucks, thanks for explaining that to the noble savage.
> there, to tip you off to the lurking dangers of Volkisch romantic
> philosophy, which appears to overlap with what I can see of your
> philosophical position, so far. As ideals, 'blood' and 'bone'
> represent a powerful sentimental argument against rationality and
> humanism. Whether consciously or otherwise, you appear to be following
> in Heidegger's footsteps. Tread carefully!
>
> >
> > Human bodies are more, less, or equally, suited to current conditions
> > compared to the conditions under which they evolved and survived
> > *without* modern culture for a long time.
> > It doesn't seem reasonable, or consistent with parsimony, to believe
> > other than that they are less suited.
> >
>
> It seems eminently reasonable to me - we've had 10,000 years at least
> of adapting the environment to fit our needs and desires. Most
> evidence seems to suggest that, eg, our medical progress has
> successfully tailored the environment to remove deadly threats like
> smallpox. Would that not count as having become better suited?
This is barely worthy of a response. Diseases like smallpox are the
_result_ of post-historic culture.
This is close to an answer.
Now, can you explain what this "almost infinite" plasticity means?
Does it mean that (the average) human will respond the same to _any_
social system or social interaction or social condition? Tyranny or
freedom, torture or pleasure, poverty or wealth?
-tg
That's what I understand
> by man being a social animal.
>
> So yes, our genes are a necessary part of the picture, a part which
> other animals lack - but our genes are substantially the product of
> social organization.
>
>
> > -tg
> >
> > (NOTE 1) My understanding of "cultural" includes technology, so
> > perhaps e.g. my childhood diet was better. I don't think that's what
> > you meant by cultural mediation.
> >
>
> Agreed.
>
> >
> > ps. I read the article.
> >
>
> Delighted to hear it. Any thoughts?
>
Like this thread isn't cumbersome enough? Maybe later.
> rent@mob
rent@mob
> "I'm falling" before your heart could start to pound.
>
While you sound like someone who has to deny that astronauts could
relax in weightlessness. These caricatures don't get us too far,
though, do they? Clearly, I have never claimed that every single thing
we do is conscious. But unthinking responses come from training just
as well as genes.
>
> We do seem to be talking past each other, perhaps intentionally on
> your part.
>
Not to be too tetchy about it, it seems to me that I'm taking care to
address each of your points, while you select among mine for the ones
you prefer to think about. Perhaps that's just my partisan impression
of the conversation.
>
> I don't accept your premise that my response to an
> activity must be dependent on some "meaning" which was transmitted to
> me through language. This _is_ a daft idea, and I can't understand
> how a person with normal experience could believe it.
> That abstractions _can_ evoke emotions or physiological responses is
> an important aspect of human behavior, but not relevant to this
> example.
>
The daft idea you describe above is certainly daft - it's not mine,
though. I don't have to read a modern text about 'woods' before I can
have a modern experience of woods. Who I am and how I feel is
certainly in large part due to my location in modern human history and
Western culture. I experience things, from before birthÜ, through a
veil of cultural structures my genome requires me to soak in. Language
is only important in that it provides a semantic system for me to
internalise, granting me more powerful analytical structures to
process my experience (consciously or otherwise). But as long as I am
a sentient human being I will be dependent on those semantic
'subroutines', which were culturally acquired. If it seemed to me that
I, an entity built from this semantic material, can simply discard
that nature and gain direct access to a biological heritage by playing
Wild Man of the Woods, I'd have a lot of explaining to do. Last time I
tried, I decided I didn't have a case.
>
> Can you suggest how my ancestor, not so cultured, would respond to the
> two situations? Do you think that he would be _less_ stressed driving
> at 65mph within inches of other cars, horns blaring, strapped into a
> seat and unable to be inattentive for an instant?
>
I can't presume to make that suggestion, as I have *absolutely* no
evidence about our ancestor's mental faculties, either way. If you're
honest, you don't, either.
>
> My example is actually thought out a bit; it attempts to hold constant
> variables which might influence the outcome, and it should be clear
> what is being compared.
> If you can't see it, you must not be looking very hard.
>
Here you apply the trappings of science talk (constant variables) to a
situation which defies scientific method - unless you're concealing a
time-machine giving you access to the Stone Age. Maybe I'm looking
harder than I should.
>
> > I used the terms 'blood' and 'bone' in a slightly cryptic short-hand,
>
> Aw shucks, thanks for explaining that to the noble savage.
>
No offence intended - I just hadn't discerned any awareness in your
reply that this was my intention.
>
> > there, to tip you off to the lurking dangers of Volkisch romantic
> > philosophy, which appears to overlap with what I can see of your
> > philosophical position, so far. As ideals, 'blood' and 'bone'
> > represent a powerful sentimental argument against rationality and
> > humanism. Whether consciously or otherwise, you appear to be following
> > in Heidegger's footsteps. Tread carefully!
> >
And the rest of that was apparently too obvious to comment on, too,
huh?
> > >
> > > Human bodies are more, less, or equally, suited to current conditions
> > > compared to the conditions under which they evolved and survived
> > > *without* modern culture for a long time.
> > > It doesn't seem reasonable, or consistent with parsimony, to believe
> > > other than that they are less suited.
> > >
> >
> > It seems eminently reasonable to me - we've had 10,000 years at least
> > of adapting the environment to fit our needs and desires. Most
> > evidence seems to suggest that, eg, our medical progress has
> > successfully tailored the environment to remove deadly threats like
> > smallpox. Would that not count as having become better suited?
>
> This is barely worthy of a response. Diseases like smallpox are the
> _result_ of post-historic culture.
>
Ahh! So before all this silly historical stuff we got into, we all
lived happy healthy lifestyles, broken legs fixed themselves, there
were no bacteria, etc. If your point is that no, we have not adapted
the environment to make it less hazardous to us than a purely natural
environment, I think the palaeontological evidence is against you. Our
ancestors got all kinds of sick, and died painfully.
>
> > To me social implies organization from a higher level - ie, a
> > relatively static structure of relationships, through whose
> > established roles individuals pass, which shapes individuals and is
> > partly shaped by them in return. In Hom Sap, it implies a large chunk
> > of prehistory in which this structure actively customized the genome
> > until no further big refinements could be realized out of genetic
> > material - the plasticity of the phenotype having reached as near to
> > infinite as makes no difference to society.
>
>
> This is close to an answer.
> Now, can you explain what this "almost infinite" plasticity means?
> Does it mean that (the average) human will respond the same to _any_
> social system or social interaction or social condition? Tyranny or
> freedom, torture or pleasure, poverty or wealth?
>
No, indeed, the genome assumes that certain cultural systems are there
to complete the individual. Without them, as in the case of many
Romanian orphans for example, it is possible that development fails to
result in a competent human being. But beyond that basic minimum,
humans do indeed appear to be flexible. There was nothing in our
genome to prevent us accepting the fate of slaves - the burden for
that rests entirely on our political and social organization.
rent@mob
Ü I'm thinking of the common experience pregnant mothers have of
sudden foetal movements in response to statements uttered in an
unfamiliar language, whether by her or a third party. It's anecdotal,
but the evidence is there for some in-utero development being
responsive to cultural cues.
andy-k
>
> I've had a quick shufti to familiarise with Schrodinger's case, and
> found this:
> "The material world has only been constructed at the price of taking
> the self, that is, mind, out of it, removing it; mind is not part of
> it; obviously, therefore, it can neither act on it nor be acted on by
> any of its parts. Mind has erected the objective outside world of the
> natural philosopher out of its own stuff. Mind could not cope with
> this gigantic task otherwise than by the simplifying device of
> excluding itself - withdrawing from its conceptual creation. Hence the
> latter does not contain its creator."
>
> The parallels are suggestive (I think I'll have to see the book). As
> long as he's not claiming that Mind can *never* cope - which would
> exclude almost everything in the Hegelian tradition - I'm right there.
> Thanks for the tip.
>
> rent@mob
Schrodinger, E.
Mind and Matter.
Cambridge University Press, first published 1958.
Ch3: The Principle of Objectivation
"By this I mean the thing that is also frequently called the 'hypothesis of
the real world' around us. I maintain that it amounts to a certain
simplification which we adopt in order to master the infinitely intricate
problem of nature. Without being aware of it and without being rigorously
systematic about it, we exclude the Subject of Cognizance from the domain
of nature that we endeavour to understand. We step with our own person back
into the part of an onlooker who does not belong to the world, which by
this very procedure becomes an objective world. This device is veiled by
the following two circumstances. First, my own body (to which my mental
activity is so very directly and intimately linked) forms part of the
object (the real world around me) that I construct out of my sensations,
perceptions and memories. Secondly, the bodies of other people form part of
this objective world. Now I have very good reasons for believing that these
other bodies are also linked up with, or are, as it were, the seats of
spheres of consciousness. I can have no reasonable doubt about the
existence of some kind of actualness of these foreign spheres of
consciousness, yet I have absolutely no direct subjective access to any of
them. Hence I am inclined to take them as something objective, as forming
part of the real world around me. Moreover, since there is no distinction
between myself and others, but on the contrary full symmetry for all
intents and purposes, I conclude that I myself also form part of this real
material world around me. I so to speak put my own sentient self (which had
constructed this world as a mental product) back into it - with the
pandemonium of disastrous logical consequences that flow from the aforesaid
chain of faulty conclusions. We shall point them out one by one; for the
moment let me just mention the two most blatant antinomies due to our
awareness of the fact that a moderately satisfying picture of the world has
only been reached at the high price of taking ourselves out of the picture,
stepping back into the role of a non-concerned observer.
"The first of these antinomies is the astonishment at finding our world
picture 'colourless, cold, mute'. Colour and sound, hot and cold are our
immediate sensations; small wonder that they are lacking in a world model
from which we have removed our own mental person.
"The second is our fruitless quest for the place where mind acts on matter
or vice-versa [.] The material world has only been constructed at the price
of taking the self, that is, mind, out of it, removing it; mind is not part
of it; obviously, therefore, it can neither act on it nor be acted on by
any of its parts."
[.]
"Mind has erected the objective outside world of the natural philosopher
out of its own stuff. Mind could not cope with this gigantic task otherwise
than by the simplifying device of excluding itself - withdrawing from its
conceptual creation. Hence the latter does not contain its creator."
[.]
"While the stuff from which our world picture is built is yielded
exclusively from the sense organs as organs of the mind, so that every man'
s world picture is and always remains a construct of his mind and cannot be
proved to have any other existence, yet the conscious mind itself remains a
strange within that construct, it has no living space in it, you can spot
it nowhere in space. We do not usually realize this fact, because we have
entirely taken to thinking of the personality of a human being, or for that
matter also that of an animal, as located in the interior of its body. To
learn that it cannot really be found there is so amazing that it meets with
doubt and hesitation, we are very loath to admit it."
[.]
"It is the same elements that go to compose my mind and the world. This
situation is the same for every mind and its world in spite of the
unfathomable abundance of 'cross-references' between them. The world is
given to me only once, not one existing and one perceived. Subject and
object are only one. The barrier between them cannot be said to have broken
down as a result of recent experience in the physical sciences, for this
barrier does not exist." (AK: cf. Wm. James essay "Does Consciousness
Exist?")
tg
If it is dishonest for me to claim access to my ancestor's mental
faculties, why is it more honest for you? My science-talk is intended
to point out that you do exactly that when you talk about your
identity as a modern human. Compared to what?? How do you make the
claim that culture makes you a _different_ creature without knowing
that creature from which you are different?
Your response to my claim that the physical human body reacts
differently to different cultural conditions is to say "well, the body
isn't what makes me what I am". That doesn't refute my position, nor
the position described in your original quote from Pinker.
It is true that astronauts can relax in weightlessness if they take
enough Dramamine to stop vomiting. It is true that culture provides
bypass surgery and insulin for people who are sick because culture has
provided automobiles and abundant fat and salt and sugar. It is true
that culture provides Ritalin and Prozac for our children who have
watched endless TV, and eaten abundant fat and salt and sugar. So
what? Who is claiming otherwise?
If you believe that the system (human body + culture) is "almost
infinitely plastic", and you don't have a problem with that, then
there is nothing to debate. We don't have to know what our ancestors
were, or what we were 5 minutes ago. We simply say "I yam what I yam",
and so all must be well. However, if you wish to challenge my (or
Pinker's) ideas, which involve comparison of states, you must be
willing to articulate your own comparison. Of course that's up to you.
-tg
> > You give the impression of someone who would have to say the words
> > "I'm falling" before your heart could start to pound.
> >
>
> While you sound like someone who has to deny that astronauts could
> relax in weightlessness. These caricatures don't get us too far,
> though, do they? Clearly, I have never claimed that every single thing
> we do is conscious. But unthinking responses come from training just
> as well as genes.
>
> >
> > We do seem to be talking past each other, perhaps intentionally on
> > your part.
> >
>
> Not to be too tetchy about it, it seems to me that I'm taking care to
> address each of your points, while you select among mine for the ones
> you prefer to think about. Perhaps that's just my partisan impression
> of the conversation.
>
> >
> > I don't accept your premise that my response to an
> > activity must be dependent on some "meaning" which was transmitted to
> > me through language. This _is_ a daft idea, and I can't understand
> > how a person with normal experience could believe it.
> > That abstractions _can_ evoke emotions or physiological responses is
> > an important aspect of human behavior, but not relevant to this
> > example.
> >
>
> The daft idea you describe above is certainly daft - it's not mine,
> though. I don't have to read a modern text about 'woods' before I can
> have a modern experience of woods. Who I am and how I feel is
> certainly in large part due to my location in modern human history and
> Western culture. I experience things, from before birth?, through a
> ? I'm thinking of the common experience pregnant mothers have of
rent@mob
>
> If it is dishonest for me to claim access to my ancestor's mental
> faculties, why is it more honest for you? My science-talk is intended
> to point out that you do exactly that when you talk about your
> identity as a modern human. Compared to what?? How do you make the
> claim that culture makes you a _different_ creature without knowing
> that creature from which you are different?
>
I don't have to scry into prehistory - I make no claims depending on
such dodgy manouvres. We can trace (see, eg, Norbert Elias's The
Civilizing Process) the dramatic transformations of human
sensibilities which have taken place over *recorded* history, just
over the last few hundred years. My claim is a (relatively) simple
matter of record. Yours appears to me to remain intractably a matter
of conjecture.
>
> Your response to my claim that the physical human body reacts
> differently to different cultural conditions is to say "well, the body
> isn't what makes me what I am". That doesn't refute my position, nor
> the position described in your original quote from Pinker.
>
Having taken me out of context and re-presented whatever the issue was
in your own terms, I can't tell what your intended point is, here.
I've been back through our last round, but can't find a point where
you made a claim matching this description, or my apparently petulant
riposte. I don't recall staking my whole case on a single sentence
recently. This looks increasingly like bluster.
>
> It is true that astronauts can relax in weightlessness if they take
> enough Dramamine to stop vomiting. It is true that culture provides
> bypass surgery and insulin for people who are sick because culture has
> provided automobiles and abundant fat and salt and sugar. It is true
> that culture provides Ritalin and Prozac for our children who have
> watched endless TV, and eaten abundant fat and salt and sugar. So
> what? Who is claiming otherwise?
>
You began to claim that the advance of human social and technological
organization has had *zero* impact on overall human welfare. You
wisely stopped at smallpox, but this misanthropic diatribe about
working class lifestyles is not much of an improvement on the previous
vein. Quit while you're ahead, why not?
>
> If you believe that the system (human body + culture) is "almost
> infinitely plastic", and you don't have a problem with that, then
> there is nothing to debate. We don't have to know what our ancestors
> were, or what we were 5 minutes ago. We simply say "I yam what I yam",
> and so all must be well. However, if you wish to challenge my (or
> Pinker's) ideas, which involve comparison of states, you must be
> willing to articulate your own comparison. Of course that's up to you.
>
I have given fairly exhaustive grounds for being sceptical of greedy
reductionism in the Evolutionary <--> Psychology marriage, enough for
a fairminded reader, at least. Many of them are in the post underneath
this one, which your new top-posting tactic seems to have caused you
to overlook. Whether or not you are challenged by those reasons
depends on whether you allow yourself enough critical distance to
consider the words I have written, or prefer to reach directly for
your PeaceMaker. I'd settle for a meaningful comment on the Heidegger
issue I raised for you.
rent@mob
tg
>
> >
> > If it is dishonest for me to claim access to my ancestor's mental
> > faculties, why is it more honest for you? My science-talk is intended
> > to point out that you do exactly that when you talk about your
> > identity as a modern human. Compared to what?? How do you make the
> > claim that culture makes you a _different_ creature without knowing
> > that creature from which you are different?
> >
>
> I don't have to scry into prehistory - I make no claims depending on
> such dodgy manouvres. We can trace (see, eg, Norbert Elias's The
> Civilizing Process) the dramatic transformations of human
> sensibilities which have taken place over *recorded* history, just
> over the last few hundred years. My claim is a (relatively) simple
> matter of record. Yours appears to me to remain intractably a matter
> of conjecture.
>
Well, I must admit my embarrassment here. All along I've been feeling
that your position dealt too much with abstractions, and so fell into
circularity and triviality, and had not much to do with the topic. But
this paragraph shows me the error of my ways. The axis of measurement
I've been trying to elicit from you, this modern characterization that
gives us our identity and humanity, is, of course, our....
*sensibilities*!
Who knew? I was probably blinded by that 19th-century thinking of
mine.
(end sarcasm)
I think, as I did at the beginning, that you are arguing against some
strawman, and since I can't even get you to clearly articulate what
the strawman is, I'll leave you to your conversation with yourself.
-tg
rent@mob
> > >
> > > If it is dishonest for me to claim access to my ancestor's mental
> > > faculties, why is it more honest for you? My science-talk is intended
> > > to point out that you do exactly that when you talk about your
> > > identity as a modern human. Compared to what?? How do you make the
> > > claim that culture makes you a _different_ creature without knowing
> > > that creature from which you are different?
> > >
> >
> > I don't have to scry into prehistory - I make no claims depending on
> > such dodgy manouvres. We can trace (see, eg, Norbert Elias's The
> > Civilizing Process) the dramatic transformations of human
> > sensibilities which have taken place over *recorded* history, just
> > over the last few hundred years. My claim is a (relatively) simple
> > matter of record. Yours appears to me to remain intractably a matter
> > of conjecture.
> >
>
> Well, I must admit my embarrassment here. All along I've been feeling
> that your position dealt too much with abstractions, and so fell into
> circularity and triviality, and had not much to do with the topic. But
> this paragraph shows me the error of my ways. The axis of measurement
> I've been trying to elicit from you, this modern characterization that
> gives us our identity and humanity, is, of course, our....
> *sensibilities*!
>
> Who knew? I was probably blinded by that 19th-century thinking of
> mine.
>
> (end sarcasm)
>
sen新i搓il搏暗y (sns-bl-t) n.
1. The ability to perceive stimuli.
2. Mental or emotional responsiveness toward something, such as the
feelings of another.
3. Receptiveness to impression, whether pleasant or unpleasant;
acuteness of feeling.
4. The quality of being affected by changes in the environment.
I apologise if you find my vocabulary too archaic for your taste. The
sense remains exactly what it has been throughout our conversation to
date. I fail to see why that choice of word makes you so excitable
here. Unless, of course, this rhetorical flourish throws up just
enough chaff for you to feel entitled to evade the serious point at
issue above (or any of the others you again overlooked).
>
> I think, as I did at the beginning, that you are arguing against some
> strawman, and since I can't even get you to clearly articulate what
> the strawman is, I'll leave you to your conversation with yourself.
>
The object of my argument is:
>
> 'I have trouble adapting to cars and people after I spend a a few days
> in the woods---it is obviously a matter of chemical response to
> stimulus levels. Difficult to imagine that the "woods" state isn't the
> way my body was designed.'
>
In the course of arguing against this 'obviously', we have turned up
one or two associated or supporting arguments which I have also felt
it appropriate to scrutinize:
>
> (Woods=quiet. City=noisy. Stone Age=Nx10^6. Industrial=500. Duh.)
>
> I think you don't make a clear distinction between social-space and
> universe-space, and so we talk past each other. Pick one.
[clarification of terms pending]
>
>Human bodies are more, less, or equally, suited to current conditions
>compared to the conditions under which they evolved and survived
>*without* modern culture for a long time.
>It doesn't seem reasonable, or consistent with parsimony, to believe
>other than that they are less suited.
>
I appreciate that the above might seem like a caricature of a
scientific position, but I promise you, I couldn't make it up.
It's been clear for a few posts that you don't want to play any more.
That's your call, and I can respect it after a fashion - when someone
chucks in a casual Heidegger reference it's enough to make the best of
us consider whether life is long enough. But if you aim to explain
your quitting the field by reference to perceived foul play on my
part, I think I'm entitled to some evidence before accepting fault.
Otherwise I have to assume you're just sulking because the game's not
going your way.
rent@mob
rent@mob
> > >
> > > If it is dishonest for me to claim access to my ancestor's mental
> > > faculties, why is it more honest for you? My science-talk is intended
> > > to point out that you do exactly that when you talk about your
> > > identity as a modern human. Compared to what?? How do you make the
> > > claim that culture makes you a _different_ creature without knowing
> > > that creature from which you are different?
> > >
> >
> > I don't have to scry into prehistory - I make no claims depending on
> > such dodgy manouvres. We can trace (see, eg, Norbert Elias's The
> > Civilizing Process) the dramatic transformations of human
> > sensibilities which have taken place over *recorded* history, just
> > over the last few hundred years. My claim is a (relatively) simple
> > matter of record. Yours appears to me to remain intractably a matter
> > of conjecture.
> >
>
> Well, I must admit my embarrassment here. All along I've been feeling
> that your position dealt too much with abstractions, and so fell into
> circularity and triviality, and had not much to do with the topic. But
> this paragraph shows me the error of my ways. The axis of measurement
> I've been trying to elicit from you, this modern characterization that
> gives us our identity and humanity, is, of course, our....
> *sensibilities*!
>
> Who knew? I was probably blinded by that 19th-century thinking of
> mine.
>
> (end sarcasm)
>
sen新i搓il搏暗y (sns-bl-t) n.
1. The ability to perceive stimuli.
2. Mental or emotional responsiveness toward something, such as the
feelings of another.
3. Receptiveness to impression, whether pleasant or unpleasant;
acuteness of feeling.
4. The quality of being affected by changes in the environment.
I apologise if you find my vocabulary too archaic for your taste. The
sense remains exactly what it has been throughout our conversation to
date. I fail to see why that choice of word makes you so excitable
here. Unless, of course, this rhetorical flourish throws up just
enough chaff for you to feel entitled to evade the serious point at
issue above (or any of the others you again overlooked).
>
> I think, as I did at the beginning, that you are arguing against some
> strawman, and since I can't even get you to clearly articulate what
> the strawman is, I'll leave you to your conversation with yourself.
>
The object of my argument is:
>
> 'I have trouble adapting to cars and people after I spend a a few days
> in the woods---it is obviously a matter of chemical response to
> stimulus levels. Difficult to imagine that the "woods" state isn't the
> way my body was designed.'
>
In the course of arguing against this 'obviously', we have turned up
one or two associated or supporting arguments which I have also felt
it appropriate to scrutinize:
>
> (Woods=quiet. City=noisy. Stone Age=Nx10^6. Industrial=500. Duh.)
>
> I think you don't make a clear distinction between social-space and
> universe-space, and so we talk past each other. Pick one.
[clarification of terms pending]
>
>Human bodies are more, less, or equally, suited to current conditions
>compared to the conditions under which they evolved and survived
>*without* modern culture for a long time.
>It doesn't seem reasonable, or consistent with parsimony, to believe
>other than that they are less suited.
>
I appreciate that the above might seem like a caricature of a
scientific position, but I promise you, I couldn't make it up.
It's been clear for a few posts that you don't want to play any more.
That's your call, and I can respect it after a fashion - when someone
chucks in a casual Heidegger reference it's enough to make the best of
us consider whether life is long enough. But if you aim to explain
your quitting the field by reference to perceived foul play on my
part, I think I'm entitled to some evidence before accepting fault.
Otherwise I have to assume you're just sulking because the game's not
going your way.
rent@mob
> > >
rent@mob
> rent@mob wrote:
> >
> Schrodinger, E.
> Mind and Matter.
> Cambridge University Press, first published 1958.
> Ch3: The Principle of Objectivation
>
> "By this I mean the thing that is also frequently called the 'hypothesis of
This reads like as good a description as any I've seen of the basic
thesis/antithesis in mind/matter controversies. Does he go on to
suggest a synthesis?
rent@mob
andy-k
>
> This reads like as good a description as any I've seen of the basic
> thesis/antithesis in mind/matter controversies. Does he go on to
> suggest a synthesis?
Ch4: The Arithmetical Paradox: The Oneness of Mind
"The reason why our sentient, percipient and thinking ego is met nowhere
within our scientific world picture can easily be indicated in seven words:
because it is itself that world picture. It is identical with the whole and
therefore cannot be contained in it as part of it. But, of course, here we
knock against the arithmetical paradox; there appears to be a great
multitude of these conscious egos, the world however is only one. This
comes from the fashion in which the world-concept produces itself. The
several domains of 'private' consciousness partly overlap. The region
common to all where they all overlap is the construct of the 'real world
around us'. With all that an uncomfortable feeling remains, prompting such
questions as: Is my world really the same as yours? Is there one real world
to be distinguished from its pictures introjected by way of perception into
every one of us? And if so, are these pictures like unto the real world or
is the latter, the world 'in itself', perhaps very different from the one
we perceive?
"Such questions are ingenious, but in my opinion very apt to confuse the
issue. They have no adequate answers. They all are, or lead to, antinomies
springing from the one source, which I call the arithmetical paradox; the
many conscious egos from whose mental experiences the one world is
concocted. The solution of this paradox of numbers would do away with all
the questions of the aforesaid kind and reveal them, I dare say, as sham
questions.
"There are two ways out of the number paradox, both appearing rather
lunatic from the point of view of present scientific thought (based on
ancient Greek thought and thus thoroughly 'Western'). One way out is the
multiplication of the world in Leibniz's fearful doctrine of monads: every
monad to be a world by itself, no communication between them; the monad
'has no windows', it is 'incommunicado'. That none the less they all agree
with each other is called 'pre-established harmony'. I think there are few
to whom this suggestion appeals, nay who would consider it as a mitigation
at all of the numerical antinomy.
"There is obviously only one alternative, namely the unification of minds
or consciousnesses. Their multiplicity is only apparent, in truth there is
only one mind."
[.]
"Mind is by its very nature a singulare tantum. I should say: the over-all
number of minds is just one. I venture to call it indestructible since it
has a peculiar timetable, namely mind is always now. There is really no
before and after for mind. There is only a now that includes memories and
expectations (AK: cf. Augustine). But I grant that our language is not
adequate to express this, and I also grant, should anyone wish to state it,
that I am now talking religion, not science - a religion, however, not
opposed to science, but supported by what disinterested scientific research
has brought to the fore.
"Sherrington says: 'Man's mind is a recent product of our planet's side.'
"I agree, naturally. If the first word (man's) were left out, I would not.
We dealt with this earlier, in chapter 1. It would seem queer, not to say
ridiculous, to think that the contemplating, conscious mind that alone
reflects the becoming of the world should have made its appearance only at
some time in the course of this 'becoming', should have appeared
contingently, associated with a very special biological contraption which
in itself quite obviously discharges the task of facilitating certain forms
of life in maintaining themselves, thus favouring their preservation and
propagation: forms of life that were late-comers and have been preceded by
many others that maintained themselves without that particular contraption
(a brain). Only a small fraction of them (if you count by species) have
embarked on 'getting themselves a brain'. And before that happened, should
it all have been a performance to empty stalls? Nay, may we call a world
that nobody contemplates even that? When an archaeologist reconstructs a
city or a culture long bygone, he is interested in human life in the past,
in actions, sensations, thoughts, feelings, in joy and sorrow of humans,
displayed there and then. But a world existing for many millions of years
without any mind being aware of it, contemplating it, is it anything at
all? Has it existed? For do not let us forget: to say, as we did, that the
becoming of the world is reflected in a conscious mind is but a cliché, a
phrase, a metaphor that has become familiar to us. The world is given but
once. Nothing is reflected. The original and the mirror-image are
identical. The world extended in space and time is but our representation
(Vorstellung). Experience does not give us the slightest clue of its being
anything besides that - as Berkeley was well aware."
[.]
"Sometimes a painter introduces into his large picture, or a poet into his
long poem, an unpretending subordinate character who is himself [.] To me
this seems to be the best simile of the bewildering double role of mind. On
the one hand mind is the artist who has produced the whole; in the
accomplished work, however, it is but an insignificant accessory that might
be absent without detracting from the total effect.
"Speaking without metaphor we have to declare that we are here faced with
one of these typical antinomies caused by the fact that we have not yet
succeeded in elaborating a fairly understandable outlook on the world
without retiring our own mind, the producer of the world picture, from it,
so that mind has no place in it. The attempt to press it into it, after
all, necessarily produces some absurdities."
rent@mob
> rent@mob wrote:
> >
> > This reads like as good a description as any I've seen of the basic
> > thesis/antithesis in mind/matter controversies. Does he go on to
> > suggest a synthesis?
>
>
Again, most interesting. But I don't read this to be a solution to the
main problem - more a tantalising glimpse at how the main problem
might be approached, by dealing with a related issue.
>
>
> "There is obviously only one alternative, namely the unification of minds
> or consciousnesses. Their multiplicity is only apparent, in truth there is
> only one mind."
>
I liked this answer. I wouldn't use the term 'one mind', though, since
it will tend to make the reader think that a sort of 'supermind' is
being posited. All that's needed is the sense that individual minds
are woven from a shared thread - culture, or perhaps more generally,
society.
> [.]
> I also grant, should anyone wish to state it,
> that I am now talking religion, not science - a religion, however, not
> opposed to science, but supported by what disinterested scientific research
> has brought to the fore.
>
For the reason just stated, I wouldn't make a religion of this. The
necessary evidence seems likely to me to be discoverable in
disciplines from social sciences to developmental psychology, once we
get our questions straight.
rent@mob
tg
Since you posted twice, it must be important to you.
Ok, now that we have a definition, go ahead and give an example of how
*human sensibilities* have changed.
> >
> > I think, as I did at the beginning, that you are arguing against some
> > strawman, and since I can't even get you to clearly articulate what
> > the strawman is, I'll leave you to your conversation with yourself.
> >
>
> The object of my argument is:
> >
> > 'I have trouble adapting to cars and people after I spend a a few days
> > in the woods---it is obviously a matter of chemical response to
> > stimulus levels. Difficult to imagine that the "woods" state isn't the
> > way my body was designed.'
> In the course of arguing against this 'obviously',
And this is incomprehensible to me.
There's nothing controversial about the relationship among stress,
chemicals e.g. adrenalin, and the physiological symptoms I experience
in rush-hour traffic. Likewise for exercise in a quiet environment and
e.g. endorphins. Well studied, as I understand it.
What I would expect from a clever person like you would be something
like:
"Well that's the *obvious* explanation, but here's a better one."
But such an alternative must at least rise to the level of
testability, and I don't see anything in your writing which does.
-tg
andy-k
>
> Again, most interesting. But I don't read this to be a solution to the
> main problem - more a tantalising glimpse at how the main problem
> might be approached, by dealing with a related issue.
>
>> "There is obviously only one alternative, namely the unification of
>> minds or consciousnesses. Their multiplicity is only apparent, in
>> truth there is only one mind."
>
> I liked this answer. I wouldn't use the term 'one mind', though, since
> it will tend to make the reader think that a sort of 'supermind' is
> being posited. All that's needed is the sense that individual minds
> are woven from a shared thread - culture, or perhaps more generally,
> society.
>
>> that I am now talking religion, not science - a religion, however,
>> not opposed to science, but supported by what disinterested
>> scientific research has brought to the fore.
>
> For the reason just stated, I wouldn't make a religion of this. The
> necessary evidence seems likely to me to be discoverable in
> disciplines from social sciences to developmental psychology, once we
> get our questions straight.
Yes -- I think you are positing a different solution to that of
Schrodinger. I get the impression that Schrodinger *really is* talking
about an "overmind", and so *really is* talking religion. The reason, I
think, is that if this is not the case then we must introduce something
that is "not mind" in order to account for the agreement between minds, and
this just throws us back on Cartesian dualism. Schrodinger goes to great
lengths to discredit our common notion of matter so that he can jettison
substance dualism, and to validate the reality of subjective experience. In
the Epilogue of his book "What Is Life?" he writes:
"[... E]ach of us has the indisputable impression that the sum total of his
own experience and memory forms a unity, quite distinct from that of any
other person. He refers to it as 'I'. _What is this 'I'?_
"If you analyse it closely you will, I think, find that it is just a little
bit more than a collection of single data (experiences and memories),
namely the canvas _upon which_ they are collected. And you will, on close
introspection, find that what you really mean by 'I' is that ground-stuff
upon which they are collected."
rent@mob
> > > > I don't have to scry into prehistory - I make no claims depending on
> > > > such dodgy manouvres. We can trace (see, eg, Norbert Elias's The
> > > > Civilizing Process) the dramatic transformations of human
> > > > sensibilities which have taken place over *recorded* history, just
> > > > over the last few hundred years. My claim is a (relatively) simple
> > > > matter of record. Yours appears to me to remain intractably a matter
> > > > of conjecture.
> > > >
>>sen新i搓il搏暗y (sns-bl-t) n.
>>1. The ability to perceive stimuli.
>> 2. Mental or emotional responsiveness toward something, such as the
>> feelings of another.
>> 3. Receptiveness to impression, whether pleasant or unpleasant;
>> acuteness of feeling.
>> 4. The quality of being affected by changes in the environment.
> Ok, now that we have a definition, go ahead and give an example of how
> *human sensibilities* have changed.
>
This could go in all directions. Let's take the simple case of how
humans relate to other animals. We have powerful historical evidence
that humans were not generally affected by animal suffering until
150-200 years ago. Public burnings of baskets of cats were a
16th-century equivalent to a modern fireworks display.
You are welcome to argue that either (a) the historical record does
not prove a lack of emotional responsiveness to animal suffering or
that (b) nothing much has changed - cat torture remains a majority
pasttime. Please note, though: we will then be arguing over the
interpretation of *evidence*, not about conjectured pasts we know
nothing of. It is this *methodological* difference between our
entrenched positions which makes me confident that mine has the firmer
footing.
> > The object of my argument is:
> > >
> > > 'I have trouble adapting to cars and people after I spend a a few days
> > > in the woods---it is obviously a matter of chemical response to
> > > stimulus levels. Difficult to imagine that the "woods" state isn't the
> > > way my body was designed.'
>
> > In the course of arguing against this 'obviously',
>
> And this is incomprehensible to me.
>
> There's nothing controversial about the relationship among stress,
> chemicals e.g. adrenalin, and the physiological symptoms I experience
> in rush-hour traffic. Likewise for exercise in a quiet environment and
> e.g. endorphins. Well studied, as I understand it.
>
There is one giant controversial step in your original formulation -
that stimulus and response directly relate to one another, entirely
unmediated by our mental life. Yes, your adrenalins and endorphins
exist, affecting you physiologically and mentally. But where in the
literature has it been established that human bodies release these
chemicals in response to particular environments *independently* of
our mental experience of those environments? Why is our learned
response excluded from your account?
It's not enough to demonstrate that some chemicals are released in
response to sense cues which are not consciously registered, since
even these cues are processed in brain systems which are organized by
your past experience. Do you know of experiment which has managed to
figure out a way past these difficulties?
>
> What I would expect from a clever person like you would be something
> like:
>
> "Well that's the *obvious* explanation, but here's a better one."
>
> But such an alternative must at least rise to the level of
> testability, and I don't see anything in your writing which does.
>
If the problem was open to bench testing, it would not have occupied
legions of philosophers in one form or another for the last 500 years.
My point here is precisely that we have such an incomplete conception
of the field that experiment is, at present, extremely hard to design,
without creating false positives / false negatives. Some low-level,
'sciousness' research, where we can tamper with rat neural pathways,
etc, is evidently scientific - but beyond that, to the specifically
human features of consciousness... it's a much taller order than even
most scientists realize.
My opening contribution to this thread was concerned with what aspects
of human science can be treated as science, and what aspects have to
remain philosophy for the time being. All I intend to do here is point
out that those who believe science has already settled the matter have
been (in my experience) mislead by experiments which, even when they
are well-designed, fail to support the conclusions that are commonly
drawn from them, because those conclusions employ what philosophy
recognizes as problematic assumptions.
rent@mob
tg
I've tried to think about what you say here, and I still can't fit it
with my understanding of science. I suppose this _is_ about
reductionism, greedy or not.
People have been doing controlled stimulus-response experiments for a
long time, and the technology has been constantly improving. Let's set
up an experiment where we put the subject in a metal box, and pound on
the walls with varying degrees of intensity, duration, and so on. I'm
sure that even you will agree that we will see changes in body
chemistry (brain region activity as well, perhaps) associated with
those inputs, and in most cases there will be a pattern susceptible to
mathematical modeling.
You seem to be saying that there are factors beyond the obvious which
would affect the model _for different populations_. (Obvious would be
e.g. working in sheet-metal manufacturing, where you would expect at
least some shift in baselines.) We could certainly perform
experiments to control for any number of factors; we could go to
India/Pakistan and compare the responses of Hindu to Muslim
sheet-metal workers. But why? Despite your derision of my earlier
comment, this is contrary to the principle of parsimony. I can examine
an endless number of characteristics of my subjects, looking for
correlations with the outcomes, but resources are limited. So good
science says work with the theory that works, for now.
Do you feel that it should be otherwise?
-tg
>
> rent@mob
>
>
> > -tg
rent@mob
> with my understanding of science. I suppose this _is_ about
> reductionism, greedy or not.
>
> People have been doing controlled stimulus-response experiments for a
> long time, and the technology has been constantly improving. Let's set
> up an experiment where we put the subject in a metal box, and pound on
> the walls with varying degrees of intensity, duration, and so on. I'm
> sure that even you will agree that we will see changes in body
> chemistry (brain region activity as well, perhaps) associated with
> those inputs, and in most cases there will be a pattern susceptible to
> mathematical modeling.
>
I happily concede that such results are to be expected.
>
> You seem to be saying that there are factors beyond the obvious which
> would affect the model _for different populations_. (Obvious would be
> e.g. working in sheet-metal manufacturing, where you would expect at
> least some shift in baselines.) We could certainly perform
> experiments to control for any number of factors; we could go to
> India/Pakistan and compare the responses of Hindu to Muslim
> sheet-metal workers.
>
In fact, my point is to say that it's harder even than this. It's not
a matter of different populations - it's a matter of the extent to
which consciousness is a cause of the responses we observe. A
universal response only tells us that some aspects of humanity are
universal - it can't determine whether these are genetically or
culturally universal. I suppose we could render people unconscious and
then bang on some unconscious boxes and not others, comparing chemical
outputs. But I suspect neither of us would find this a satisfactory
approach, since (a) it excludes the interestingly human part of us,
our consciousness and (b) it would be to assume that unconscious
processes are entirely biological in origin.
>
> But why? Despite your derision of my earlier
> comment, this is contrary to the principle of parsimony. I can examine
> an endless number of characteristics of my subjects, looking for
> correlations with the outcomes, but resources are limited. So good
> science says work with the theory that works, for now.
>
> Do you feel that it should be otherwise?
>
I'm not sure what you intend by raising parsimony here. Perhaps a
passage I just read in Vygotsky's Thought and Language might help:
"Two essentially different modes of analysis are possible in the study
of psychological structures. It seems to us that one of them is
responsible for all the failures that have beset former investigators
of the old problem, which we about to tackle in our turn, and that the
other is the only correct way to approach it.
The first method analyzes complex psychological wholes into
_elements_. It may be compared to the chemical analysis of water into
hydrogen and oxygen, neither of which possesses the properties of the
whole and each of which possesses properties not present in the whole.
The student applying this method in looking for an explanation of some
property of water - why it extinguishes fire, for example - will find
to his surprise that hydrogen burns and oxygen sustains fire ....
In our opinion the right course to follow is to use the other type of
analysis, which may be called _analysis into units_.
By _unit_ we mean a product of analysis which, unlike elements,
retains all the basic properties of the whole and which cannot be
further divided without losing them. Not the chemical composition of
water but its molecules and their behaviour are the key to the
understanding of the properties of water ..."
It's a typically wordy Russian way of putting Einstein's dictum, that
'Things
should be simplified as much as possible, but no further'.
My concern is that your 'theory that works' accidentally simplifies
things to the point where the subject of interest disappears - it
'works' in that it can then declare 'Aha! This shows that the
mysterious subject does not, in fact, exist: case closed'. To me and
my ilk, this looks like a chemist holding up two hydrogen atoms and an
oxygen atom, and using them to demonstrate the fictional status of
water.
rent@mob
rent@mob
No comment?