The Self and its World
andy-k
"me" -- is not an object known through the senses but a conception
of the subject of sensation, perception, and conception. The self has
no substantial existence, but rather exists by virtue of its dependence
on sensation, perception, and conception. Furthermore, sensation,
perception, and conception exist by virtue of their dependence upon
the concept of the self. So there is no "self-in-itself" or "pure subject"
that exists in the absence of objects -- subject and object arise in
mutual relationship and in mutual dependence.
The physical world is a conception of the totality of objects known
through the senses. Consequently the physical world has no
substantial existence, but rather exists only by virtue of its dependence
on objects, sensation, perception, and conception. Furthermore,
objects, sensation, perception, and conception exist by virtue of their
dependence upon the concept of the physical world.
The self and its world, then, are abstract and opposing poles in a
framework of abstract and concrete concepts encompassing those
of objects, sensation, perception, and conception.
Craig Franck
> The "self" -- that which is referred to by the pronouns "I" and
> "me" -- is not an object known through the senses but a conception
> of the subject of sensation, perception, and conception. The self has
> no substantial existence, but rather exists by virtue of its dependence
> on sensation, perception, and conception. Furthermore, sensation,
> perception, and conception exist by virtue of their dependence upon
> the concept of the self.
I don't think the relationship between self and unity of consciousness
is commutative. You have the self's existence depending on perception,
but then you have perception depending on the self.
I think it only works one way: we have a concept of self due to the
unity of consciousness. But the self does not cause this unity.
> The physical world is a conception of the totality of objects known
> through the senses. Consequently the physical world has no
> substantial existence, but rather exists only by virtue of its dependence
> on objects, sensation, perception, and conception. Furthermore,
> objects, sensation, perception, and conception exist by virtue of their
> dependence upon the concept of the physical world.
>
> The self and its world, then, are abstract and opposing poles in a
> framework of abstract and concrete concepts encompassing those
> of objects, sensation, perception, and conception.
This seems reasonable. But there must be some substrate that is
not a conceptual abstraction that all this conceptualizing is a
manifestation of. It may be unknowable, but it can explain why we
have perceptions or exist as all.
--
Craig Franck
craig....@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
zinnic
The physical world to which you refer is a reflection constructed by
the self and it is circular to claim that this mind construct of the
world "has no substantial existence". It is trivial to claim that the
mind construct of the world came into existence only when the human
mind experiences it.
Before the expansion of humans throughout the 'world' (what world is
this?) it was experienced by 'lower' less conscious life forms. Did the
entity that was so experienced not exist independently of these life
forms. Surely all that you are saying is that the 'world' cannot be
experienced without some sort of awareness.
It seems nonsensical to me that an entity only springs into existence
when it interacts with an observer. Does the 'observer' only spring
into existence when something new is observed? Philosophy is playing
with words.
Zinnic
Zinic
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:a_0Kg.3274$WV2....@newsfe2-gui.ntli.net...
> The physical world is a conception of the totality of objects known
> through the senses. Consequently the physical world has no
> substantial existence, but rather exists only by virtue of its dependence
> on objects, sensation, perception, and conception.
The "physical world" may be a concept derived from sense experience, but how
do you go from that to the assertion that the physical world "exists by
virtue of its dependence on objects, sensation, perception, and conception."
Maybe the concept of a physical world depends on all that, but there is
no logical reason why we have to admit that the physical world itself exists
by virtue of all that. Do you really believe that?
I believe the earth was here before anyone had any concept of it and I
believe that the earth is part of the physical world. I also believe that it
will be here long after anyone is around to have a concept of the physical
world (assuming a black hole doesn't float by an annihilate earth and its
inhabitants simultaneously). Do you think otherwise?
> objects, sensation, perception, and conception exist by virtue of their
> dependence upon the concept of the physical world.
Huh? Sensation depends on the concept of the physical world? A frog
attacks a fly it sees. Was its sight dependent on its concept of the
physical world? Does the frog even have a concept of the physical world?
J P
It looks like you are back at solipsism 101.
Actually I think that you never left the solipsistic (sand) box and I
just got tricked to play your word games.
Enjoy your word games.
JP
andy-k
> The physical world to which you refer is a reflection
> constructed by the self
That is metaphysical speculation. I'm constraining my
argument to description and logical consistency only.
> and it is circular to claim that this mind construct of the
> world "has no substantial existence".
I'm using the word "substance" in the philosophical sense
and not in the mode of common speech.
> It is trivial to claim that the mind construct of the world came
> into existence only when the human mind experiences it.
That's not my claim.
> Before the expansion of humans throughout the 'world' (what world
> is this?) it was experienced by 'lower' less conscious life forms.
That's metaphysical speculation. I'm not interested in whether that was
or was not the case -- it is irrelevant to a purely descriptive account.
> Did the entity that was so experienced not exist independently of these
> life forms. Surely all that you are saying is that the 'world' cannot be
> experienced without some sort of awareness.
> It seems nonsensical to me that an entity only springs into existence
> when it interacts with an observer. Does the 'observer' only spring
> into existence when something new is observed? Philosophy is playing
> with words.
All of these objection spring from your tacit metaphysical presuppositions.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> The physical world is a conception of the totality of objects known
>> through the senses. Consequently the physical world has no
>> substantial existence, but rather exists only by virtue of its dependence
>> on objects, sensation, perception, and conception.
>
> The "physical world" may be a concept derived from sense experience, but
> how do you go from that to the assertion that the physical world "exists
> by virtue of its dependence on objects, sensation, perception, and
> conception." Maybe the concept of a physical world depends on all that,
> but there is no logical reason why we have to admit that the physical
> world itself exists by virtue of all that. Do you really believe that?
The physical world *is* a concept, which answers your first question.
Your second question seems to hinge on the belief that there is a physical
world "in itself" from which the concept of the physical world is derived.
That is metaphysical speculation, and my account is purely descriptive.
> I believe the earth was here before anyone had any concept of it and I
> believe that the earth is part of the physical world. I also believe that
> it will be here long after anyone is around to have a concept of the
> physical world (assuming a black hole doesn't float by an annihilate earth
> and its inhabitants simultaneously). Do you think otherwise?
The status of such beliefs is irrelevant to a purely descriptive account.
>> objects, sensation, perception, and conception exist by virtue of their
>> dependence upon the concept of the physical world.
>
> Huh? Sensation depends on the concept of the physical world? A frog
> attacks a fly it sees. Was its sight dependent on its concept of the
> physical world? Does the frog even have a concept of the physical world?
According to our conceptual model of the physical world, there is a self in
that world that senses that world, perceives that world, and conceives a
model of that world. Without a self to conceive that model, the model would
not exist. Without a world in which the self is embedded, the self would not
exist. The self and its conceptual model entail each other.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote
>> The "self" -- that which is referred to by the pronouns "I" and
>> "me" -- is not an object known through the senses but a conception
>> of the subject of sensation, perception, and conception. The self has
>> no substantial existence, but rather exists by virtue of its dependence
>> on sensation, perception, and conception. Furthermore, sensation,
>> perception, and conception exist by virtue of their dependence upon
>> the concept of the self.
>
> I don't think the relationship between self and unity of consciousness
> is commutative. You have the self's existence depending on perception,
> but then you have perception depending on the self.
>
> I think it only works one way: we have a concept of self due to the
> unity of consciousness. But the self does not cause this unity.
I think the introduction of the new term "unity of consciousness" might
take us off at a tangent Craig, so I'll stick with my original terminology.
If there were no perceived world then the self would not be a perceiver.
If there were no self as perceiver then there would be no perception of the
world. The perceiver and the perceived cannot exist as distinct substances
because they would lose all connection with each other -- i.e. we would have
the case of an unperceiving perceiver and of unperceived perceptions.
The self as perceiver and the perceived world are mutually dependent.
>> The physical world is a conception of the totality of objects known
>> through the senses. Consequently the physical world has no
>> substantial existence, but rather exists only by virtue of its dependence
>> on objects, sensation, perception, and conception. Furthermore,
>> objects, sensation, perception, and conception exist by virtue of their
>> dependence upon the concept of the physical world.
>>
>> The self and its world, then, are abstract and opposing poles in a
>> framework of abstract and concrete concepts encompassing those
>> of objects, sensation, perception, and conception.
>
> This seems reasonable. But there must be some substrate that is
> not a conceptual abstraction that all this conceptualizing is a
> manifestation of. It may be unknowable, but it can explain why we
> have perceptions or exist as all.
I was deliberately avoiding metaphysical speculation to see how far I can
get by strict description alone. You seem to be saying that my description
is accurate as far as it goes, but that now we need to indulge in
metaphysical speculation in order to get any further. Have I understood you
correctly?
Sir Frederick
The "self" probably makes use of the same processes as qualia.
A self quale if you will. Of course there are social definitions
and tools, but you seem interested in the experienced
self. The experience of self may be a cluster of quale,
some for experiencing body conditions, including the
senses, orthers for experiencing brain conditions, for
instance music or "feelings".
The experienced world is mostly the a combination of the
senses just mentioned and memory. Memory is another
whole topic.
So, what are quale? Is the answer to that mysterious or
mundane? Don't know yet.
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> The physical world *is* a concept, which answers your first question.
> Your second question seems to hinge on the belief that there is a physical
> world "in itself" from which the concept of the physical world is derived.
> That is metaphysical speculation, and my account is purely descriptive.
Isn't the claim that the physical world has no substantial existence or that
it is just a concept a thoroughly metaphysical claim?
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> The physical world *is* a concept, which answers your first question.
>> Your second question seems to hinge on the belief that there is a
>> physical world "in itself" from which the concept of the physical world
>> is derived. That is metaphysical speculation, and my account is purely
>> descriptive.
>
> Isn't the claim that the physical world has no substantial existence or
> that it is just a concept a thoroughly metaphysical claim?
No, it is the rejection of nonsensical metaphysics. There is no speculation
involved in description and in the rejection of logical inconsistencies.
Brian Fletcher
Subject: The Self and its World
Date: Saturday, 2 September 2006 6:45 AM
The "self" -- that which is referred to by the pronouns "I" and
"me" -- is not an object known through the senses but a conception
of the subject of sensation, perception, and conception.
***This is an ambiguous statement, if you take into account that "I" is the
source of ***the conception, but not the subject of same.
The self has
no substantial existence, but rather exists by virtue of its dependence
on sensation, perception, and conception.
***The self is not "of substance" but relies on senses to communicate.
Furthermore, sensation,
perception, and conception exist by virtue of their dependence upon
the concept of the self.
***Almost true. Not the concept of self, but self "itself". Senses can only
conceptualise.
So there is no "self-in-itself" or "pure subject".
***Not when you look using the senses.They have a sensual limit.
that exists in the absence of objects -- subject and object arise in
mutual relationship and in mutual dependence.
***Only within the world of the senses.
The physical world is a conception of the totality of objects known
through the senses.
***Would you not agree that the physical 'universe' seen through the infra
red spectrum is still physical, even though our senses dont pick it up?
Consequently the physical world has no
substantial existence, but rather exists only by virtue of its dependence
on objects, sensation, perception, and conception.
***you have described the brain/mind interaction.
Furthermore,
objects, sensation, perception, and conception exist by virtue of their
dependence upon the concept of the physical world.
***Like the physical eyes depend on light to function.
The self and its world, then, are abstract and opposing poles in a
framework of abstract and concrete concepts encompassing those
of objects, sensation, perception, and conception.
***This is how the "lesser self " sees "things". The authentic self can
observe such interaction.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> The physical world is a conception of the totality of objects known
>> through the senses.
>
> red spectrum is still physical, even though our senses dont pick it up?
"The universe" is a conceptual extrapolation that is *not* known
through the senses. What is known through the senses is the data
that leads us to abstract the idea of "the universe" -- that data being
both direct (like vision) and indirect (like infra-red telescopy).
Wordsmith
I know. It's so mysterious it's mundane. There.
W ; )
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> "The universe" is a conceptual extrapolation that is *not* known
> through the senses. What is known through the senses is the data
> that leads us to abstract the idea of "the universe" -- that data being
> both direct (like vision) and indirect (like infra-red telescopy).
Easier to say that we know the parts of the universe through sensation and
from these experiences, either direct or indirect, we create the notion of
the universe. We don't experience "data"!
Roger Johansson
andy-k wrote:
> The "self" -- that which is referred to by the pronouns "I" and
> "me" -- is not an object known through the senses but a conception
> of the subject of sensation, perception, and conception. The self has
> no substantial existence, but rather exists by virtue of its dependence
What most people calls the self is actually a strong ego, created by
other people in the social environment.
Young girls are often very stressed and very angry, because they are
forced to form a strong ego in their minds. Some are trained to become
very tough by their mothers, other are subjected to bullying, some are
put in special therapeutic homes of youth prisons, boot camps, etc..
The goal of all these social processes is to force a natural child to
become a strong ego, a mental idea about the own person as totally
isolated and forced to think only about itself in every situation.
These specially trained young women become socially very strong,
devious and manipulative compared to the boys of the same age.
They can make a boy fall in love with them, or play with the minds of
boys, use and abuse them. But they want a real man, who is stronger
than these girls, a man who can take these girls out of their boring
own ego, so they often send their boyfriend on a course to become a
real man.
The boy is mistreated and hardened for years while the girl stays out
of reach, until he has become a really strong ego, or is helped to
temporarily look like a strong ego.
If all goes well the boy who has been formed into a man returns and
takes his girl as a real man when she shows up again. She is fooled
into thinking that she needs him, while it is actually he that needs
her. The best treatment you can get as a neurotic man is to have a girl
who thinks that she needs the man, that means that she treats the man
as he needs to be treated.
This kind of traditional marriage is based on manipulation and violence
and it does not often work out so well in real life.
A lot of people are lost in the process.
Half of the young girls do not become strongly convinced and happy
ego-based beings, half of them become nervous wrecks or live the rest
of their lives as hard and bitter personalities.
Many of the boys do not become happily married, they are lost somewhere
during the process to become happily married men. Some become
criminals, violent personalities, serial killers, wife beaters,
alcoholics, socially isolated, insane or needing medicines to survive
socially and physically, some die from violence, suicide, accidents
caused by stress or alcohol.
But a number of people become happily married, socially strong and
powerful, economically successful, and rule the world at all levels,
among neighbors, in schools and workplaces, in the informal society, in
politics and in private enterprise, companies and corporations.
So this social system, based on creating very strong egos, continues to
have the power, generation after generation, for thousands of years.
The historical record of this ego-based culture is horrible, our
history is filled with slavery, human suffering, torture, conflicts,
fistfights, rape, terrorism, mental insanity, bullying, social and
economical inequality, social domination, dictaturship, wars, etc..
The situation in the world today is also catastrophical, just read the
newspapers or watch tv and you will se human suffering, violence and
all kinds of problems.
This ego-based culture, a superhuman ideal, is obviously not a good
system.
And we have been working for a long time to abolish this old cultural
pattern, and the traditions from the stone age it is based on.
We have made modern laws which make it illegal to use violence, it is
illegal to abuse children and youngsters mentally and physically, and
those laws make it impossible to continue with this ego-based culture,
because you cannot create such egos without using violence.
But a lot of people ignore these laws and continue with the old
traditions anyway, secretly.
Officially we have abolished this old culture hundreds of years ago,
but it is still upheld by people who enjoy an ego-based happiness, and
by people who are convinced that it is the best possible organisation
of a society.
The rich people support it through the media channels they own, because
this cultural pattern keep the poorer people occupied mentally and
socially, so the privileges of the rich are not threatened.
--
Roger J.
andy-k
> We don't experience "data"!
"Datum: thing known or assumed as basis for inference or reckoning."
-- Oxford English Dictionary.
andy-k
Incidentally, I looked up "data of experience" on Google and found 22,500
hits. The few I looked at were using the phrase in the same manner that I
do.
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>> "andy-k" wrote
I think I follow that. But the situation where the self can only perceive
itself seems like a logical possibility. (But it is true that, in such a
situation, the self cannot be imagined without it being seen as
opposite some non-self, which I believe is your point.)
James felt all that during mystical states individuals were tapping into
their own unconscious mind; whether it corresponded to anything
separate from the self was an open question.
>>> The physical world is a conception of the totality of objects known
>>> through the senses. Consequently the physical world has no
>>> substantial existence, but rather exists only by virtue of its
>>> dependence
>>> on objects, sensation, perception, and conception. Furthermore,
>>> objects, sensation, perception, and conception exist by virtue of their
>>> dependence upon the concept of the physical world.
>>>
>>> The self and its world, then, are abstract and opposing poles in a
>>> framework of abstract and concrete concepts encompassing those
>>> of objects, sensation, perception, and conception.
>>
>> This seems reasonable. But there must be some substrate that is
>> not a conceptual abstraction that all this conceptualizing is a
>> manifestation of. It may be unknowable, but it can explain why we
>> have perceptions or exist as all.
>
> I was deliberately avoiding metaphysical speculation to see how far I can
> get by strict description alone. You seem to be saying that my description
> is accurate as far as it goes, but that now we need to indulge in
> metaphysical speculation in order to get any further. Have I understood
> you
> correctly?
Yes. But the statement "The self has no substantial existence"
seems to have a rather large metaphysical component.
I made the point in another thread that refusing metaphysical
speculation makes the metaphysical point that the described world
is somehow more real than a metaphysically supposed one. It
could be the metaphysical world is concrete and our experiences
are imagined. With no metaphysics, describing our experiences
in a veridical fashion and making up false ones should be on equal
footing.
Craig Franck
> "andy-k" wrote
>> The physical world *is* a concept, which answers your first question.
>> Your second question seems to hinge on the belief that there is a
>> physical
>> world "in itself" from which the concept of the physical world is
>> derived.
>> That is metaphysical speculation, and my account is purely descriptive.
>
> Isn't the claim that the physical world has no substantial existence or
> that it is just a concept a thoroughly metaphysical claim?
Andy-k is rejecting metaphysical statements as nonsensical along
the lines that logical positivists attempted. They gave up the program
because it purged too many perfectly acceptable scientific statements.
Andy-k isn't so easily dissuaded.
But he needs to be careful because if statements like "the physical
world is a concept" are to be taken as descriptive and not speculative,
then they can simply be denied as meaningful since we need to
determine what is a valid description and what is fanciful speculation.
Anything beyond "There are experiences" could be considered
mumbo jumbo.
gibbs
"Craig Franck" <craig....@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:b13Lg.3524$RW2.3045@trndny04...
> Andy-k is rejecting metaphysical statements as nonsensical along
> the lines that logical positivists attempted.
One doesn't escape taking a metaphysical position.
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> "Datum: thing known or assumed as basis for inference or reckoning."
Very nice. But the point is that our experiences give us access to
something that is not an experience. That's the "data of experience".
Wordsmith
Philosophers gotta play with something. *shrug*
W : )
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> "Datum: thing known or assumed as basis for inference or reckoning."
>
> Very nice. But the point is that our experiences give us access to
> something that is not an experience. That's the "data of experience".
Experiencer, experiencing, and experienced exist only by virtue of their
mutual dependence, so experience is always experience *of* something.
Experience is therefore inhomogeneous, and the phrase "the data of
experience" pertains to those inhomogeneities.
andy-k
> One doesn't escape taking a metaphysical position.
One can come to realize that taking a metaphysical position is
not even an issue because the question itself is nonsensical.
andy-k
> Andy-k is rejecting metaphysical statements as nonsensical along
> the lines that logical positivists attempted. They gave up the program
> because it purged too many perfectly acceptable scientific statements.
> Andy-k isn't so easily dissuaded.
I claim that the question of "whether or not a world exists independently
of our ideas about it" is a non-issue for science.
> But he needs to be careful because if statements like "the physical
> world is a concept" are to be taken as descriptive and not speculative,
> then they can simply be denied as meaningful since we need to
> determine what is a valid description and what is fanciful speculation.
Sorry Craig I can't make any sense of this comment.
> Anything beyond "There are experiences" could be considered
> mumbo jumbo.
No, we most certainly experience a world -- that much is not in dispute.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote
>> a perceiver. If there were no self as perceiver then there would be no
>> perception of the world. The perceiver and the perceived cannot exist as
>> distinct substances because they would lose all connection with each
>> other -- i.e. we would have the case of an unperceiving perceiver and of
>> unperceived perceptions. The self as perceiver and the perceived world
>> are mutually dependent.
>
> I think I follow that. But the situation where the self can only perceive
> itself seems like a logical possibility. (But it is true that, in such a
> situation, the self cannot be imagined without it being seen as
> opposite some non-self, which I believe is your point.)
Self is a concept and so stands in opposition to the not-self (i.e. its
environment), and it is characterized by the ability to perceive that
not-self. The self cannot perceived itself since it cannot be part of the
not-self that it perceives, but rather the self is *conceived* as the
perceiver. This is at bottom of the old adage that the eye cannot see
itself (more precisely vision cannot see itself), and other such adages
like fire cannot burn itself, and the sword cannot cut itself.
>>>> The self and its world, then, are abstract and opposing poles in a
>>>> framework of abstract and concrete concepts encompassing those
>>>> of objects, sensation, perception, and conception.
>>>
>>> This seems reasonable. But there must be some substrate that is
>>> not a conceptual abstraction that all this conceptualizing is a
>>> manifestation of. It may be unknowable, but it can explain why we
>>> have perceptions or exist as all.
>>
>> I was deliberately avoiding metaphysical speculation to see how far I can
>> get by strict description alone. You seem to be saying that my
>> description is accurate as far as it goes, but that now we need to
>> indulge in metaphysical speculation in order to get any further. Have I
>> understood you correctly?
>
> Yes. But the statement "The self has no substantial existence"
> seems to have a rather large metaphysical component.
No, it follows from the rejection of substance-based metaphysics
on grounds of logical inconsistency.
> I made the point in another thread that refusing metaphysical
> speculation makes the metaphysical point that the described world
> is somehow more real than a metaphysically supposed one. It
> could be the metaphysical world is concrete and our experiences
> are imagined. With no metaphysics, describing our experiences
> in a veridical fashion and making up false ones should be on equal
> footing.
You're treating it as an "either-or" problem -- i.e. there either is a
world that is more real than the described world (realism) or there
isn't (idealism/solipsism). My claim is that the question ("is there a world
that exists independently of our ideas about it? -- answer yes or no")
is specious and misguided.
zinnic
andy-k wrote:
> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>
>
> > mumbo jumbo.
>
> No, we most certainly experience a world -- that much is not in dispute.
Are you claiming that we experience a "world" that is 'not a world in
itself''?.
How does that differ from the triviality that we experience
experience?
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>> Andy-k is rejecting metaphysical statements as nonsensical along
>> the lines that logical positivists attempted. They gave up the program
>> because it purged too many perfectly acceptable scientific statements.
>> Andy-k isn't so easily dissuaded.
>
> I claim that the question of "whether or not a world exists independently
> of our ideas about it" is a non-issue for science.
I understand, but a great many people feel some sort of realism is
a requirement for science to function.
A statement like "Antarctica existed prior to being discovered" can't
be viewed as nonsensical because it has the same logical structure
as many scientific statements that must have a truth value.
A good book on this topic:
http://www.amazon.com/Logical-Positivism-Library-Philosophical-Movements/dp/0029011302
>> But he needs to be careful because if statements like "the physical
>> world is a concept" are to be taken as descriptive and not speculative,
>> then they can simply be denied as meaningful since we need to
>> determine what is a valid description and what is fanciful speculation.
>
> Sorry Craig I can't make any sense of this comment.
A statement such as "I studied philosophy for five years before
realizing metaphysical statements were nonsensical" suffers from
the same logical problem as positing an external world: why do
you believe your memories correspond to actual events or things?
I am given, by animal intuition, the belief that the objects I perceive
are external to my mind and exist independently. And it is the same
intuition that leads me to believe my memories correspond to past
mental states.
It seems now both are fanciful speculations. If you believe in a
personal past history, you are dealing in metaphysics since I
don't see no past around anywhere I look.
>> Anything beyond "There are experiences" could be considered
>> mumbo jumbo.
>
> No, we most certainly experience a world -- that much is not in dispute.
Yes, but claiming something is a concept as opposed to a thought
in the mind of God needs justification. If someone were to say that
they don't experience concepts but something else entirely, I don't
see how they could be refuted if it's all description.
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> One can come to realize that taking a metaphysical position is
> not even an issue because the question itself is nonsensical.
And what question might that be?
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> Experiencer, experiencing, and experienced exist only by virtue of their
> mutual dependence, so experience is always experience *of* something.
Are you trying to tell me that without someone experiencing or something to
be experienced there is no experience? So?
> Experience is therefore inhomogeneous, and the phrase "the data of
> experience" pertains to those inhomogeneities.
"inhomogeneities"? What exactly does it mean that exerperience is
inhomogenous?
gibbs
> I understand, but a great many people feel some sort of realism is
> a requirement for science to function.
To say the least. Why investigate the way things are if there isn't a way
things are?
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> One can come to realize that taking a metaphysical position is
>> not even an issue because the question itself is nonsensical.
>
> And what question might that be?
What is the "really real"? -- the phenomenal world, or something else
that exists independently of and gives rise to those phenomena?
andy-k
> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>> I understand, but a great many people feel some sort of realism is
>> a requirement for science to function.
>
> To say the least. Why investigate the way things are if there isn't a way
> things are?
There *is* a way things are, so it's perfectly valid to investigate them.
In fact, were that not the case then there would be nobody to do the
investigation anyway.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> Experiencer, experiencing, and experienced exist only by virtue of their
>> mutual dependence, so experience is always experience *of* something.
>
> Are you trying to tell me that without someone experiencing or something
> to be experienced there is no experience? So?
The "so..." followed on from that comment, and here is a copy of the
original text again:
>> Experience is therefore inhomogeneous, and the phrase "the data of
>> experience" pertains to those inhomogeneities.
>
> "inhomogeneities"? What exactly does it mean that exerperience is
> inhomogenous?
Not homogeneous -- i.e. that there is contrast and detail in it.
This branch of the conversation is getting silly. If it wasn't already
obvious to some what I meant by that phrase, then it should have
been after I stipulated the way I'm using it. Further discussion on
this point would be without merit.
andy-k
That "there are experiences" -- i.e. inhomogeneities in the data of
experience -- is indisputable, but it is also indisputable that those
inhomogeneities take the form of a subjective perspective on an
objective world.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote
>> independently of our ideas about it" is a non-issue for science.
>
> I understand, but a great many people feel some sort of realism
> is a requirement for science to function.
The word "real" is the issue here. It is a word we learn to use through
social and cultural conditioning, and we fall into error when we make a
"thing" of it as in "reality". For the purpose of science an entity may be
considered "real" if our hypotheses concerning that entity show convergence.
This has nothing to do with postulating the existence of that entity in the
absence of any experience of it -- that is not science but metaphysics.
> A statement like "Antarctica existed prior to being discovered" can't
> be viewed as nonsensical because it has the same logical structure
> as many scientific statements that must have a truth value.
That's a good example of a reasonable use of the word "real".
> A statement such as "I studied philosophy for five years before
> realizing metaphysical statements were nonsensical" suffers from
> the same logical problem as positing an external world: why do
> you believe your memories correspond to actual events or things?
Adhering to pure description all I can say is that I have biographical
memories, that these memories condition my behavior, and that this
arrangement proves satisfactory for most practical purposes.
I say "most" because I'm showing the effects of age now and I know that
my memory is no longer as reliable as I remember it to have once been ;-)
> I am given, by animal intuition, the belief that the objects I perceive
> are external to my mind and exist independently. And it is the same
> intuition that leads me to believe my memories correspond to past
> mental states.
I'm not denying that we have these presuppositions.
> It seems now both are fanciful speculations. If you believe in a
> personal past history, you are dealing in metaphysics since I
> don't see no past around anywhere I look.
"The past" is just another concept. Past experiences are present
memories, and present memories condition present behavior.
>> we most certainly experience a world -- that much is not in dispute.
>
> Yes, but claiming something is a concept as opposed to a thought
> in the mind of God needs justification.
"Thought", "mind" and "God" are just more concepts -- they
don't make an appearance anywhere in the perceived world.
"Concept" and "percept" are also concepts.
> If someone were to say that they don't experience concepts but
> something else entirely, I don't see how they could be refuted
> if it's all description.
Why would it be necessary to refute their claim? -- all you can know
of them is their behavior (to head off an anticipated objection, I'm not
saying that there is or isn't anything more to them than their behavior --
to make either claim would be to fall into the same trap all over again).
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
>> "inhomogeneities"? What exactly does it mean that exerperience is
>> inhomogenous?
>
> Not homogeneous -- i.e. that there is contrast and detail in it.
>
> This branch of the conversation is getting silly. If it wasn't already
> obvious to some what I meant by that phrase, then it should have
> been after I stipulated the way I'm using it. Further discussion on
> this point would be without merit.
The problem, andy-k, is that I'm not so sure you are saying anything.
Contrast and detail in experience? Does this prohibit the sensible claim
that experiences give us access to that which isn't experience? I don't
think so...
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
>> There *is* a way things are, so it's perfectly valid to investigate them.
Great, welcome to the school of realism.
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
I don't know, I understand these sorts of questions. Metaphysics and
metaphysical positions covers a big territory. To sweep it all under the
rug as nonsensical is... nonsensical. Especially the parts that overlap
with physics (which is pretty much an ontological science).
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote in message
>> There *is* a way things are, so it's perfectly valid
>> to investigate them.
>
> Great, welcome to the school of realism.
It's also consistent with idealism, though I subscribe to neither.
andy-k
> The problem, andy-k, is that I'm not so sure you are saying anything.
> Contrast and detail in experience? Does this prohibit the sensible
> claim that experiences give us access to that which isn't experience?
> I don't think so...
You regard it as a sensible claim and I regard it as a specious claim.
I'm not saying that I think it's wrong, or that I think it's right.
I'm saying that the question is nonsensical.
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
True, realism takes the further step that there is a way things are
independent of how we represent it. Now that isn't consistent with
idealism! But you do seem to be a type of idealist, whether you
intentionally subscribe to it or not.
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
And how so? There is nothing logically prohibiting the idea that when we,
say, see something the perceptual experience is giving us direct access to
the object we are seeing. I think that makes a lot of sense and, in fact,
is the only possible way to have knowledge of the world.
That's what the sensory organs are for!
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> The word "real" is the issue here. It is a word we learn to use through
> social and cultural conditioning, and we fall into error when we make a
> "thing" of it as in "reality". For the purpose of science an entity may be
> considered "real" if our hypotheses concerning that entity show
> convergence.
> This has nothing to do with postulating the existence of that entity in
> the
> absence of any experience of it -- that is not science but metaphysics.
Do you really mean "experience" or do you mean "evidence"? I can't recall
the last time I experienced a neutrino.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> "gibbs" wrote:
>>> "andy-k" wrote in message
>>>> There *is* a way things are, so it's perfectly valid
>>>> to investigate them.
>>>
>>> Great, welcome to the school of realism.
>>
>> It's also consistent with idealism, though I subscribe to neither.
>
> True, realism takes the further step that there is a way things are
> independent of how we represent it. Now that isn't consistent with
> idealism! But you do seem to be a type of idealist, whether you
> intentionally subscribe to it or not.
No, it's not a "further" step but the converse step in an "either-or"
scenario. What is specious is the impression that there is no
alternative to this realism/idealism dichotomy.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> "gibbs" wrote:
>>> The problem, andy-k, is that I'm not so sure you are saying anything.
>>> Contrast and detail in experience? Does this prohibit the sensible
>>> claim that experiences give us access to that which isn't experience?
>>> I don't think so...
>>
>> You regard it as a sensible claim and I regard it as a specious claim.
>> I'm not saying that I think it's wrong, or that I think it's right.
>> I'm saying that the question is nonsensical.
>
> And how so? There is nothing logically prohibiting the idea that when we,
> say, see something the perceptual experience is giving us direct access
> to the object we are seeing. I think that makes a lot of sense and, in
> fact, is the only possible way to have knowledge of the world.
>
> That's what the sensory organs are for!
That much is not in dispute -- perceiver and perceived arise in mutual
dependence. What is in dispute is the idea that there is no alternative
to the realism/idealism dichotomy.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> The word "real" is the issue here. It is a word we learn to use through
>> social and cultural conditioning, and we fall into error when we make a
>> "thing" of it as in "reality". For the purpose of science an entity may
>> be considered "real" if our hypotheses concerning that entity show
>> convergence. This has nothing to do with postulating the existence of
>> that entity in the absence of any experience of it -- that is not science
>> but metaphysics.
>
> Do you really mean "experience" or do you mean "evidence"?
> I can't recall the last time I experienced a neutrino.
To be more precise, then, (though this is being somewhat pedantic) --
For the purpose of science an entity may be considered "real" if our
hypotheses concerning that entity show convergence. This has nothing
to do with postulating that the entity in question has an existence that is
independent of our ideas about it.
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> That much is not in dispute -- perceiver and perceived arise in mutual
> dependence. What is in dispute is the idea that there is no alternative
> to the realism/idealism dichotomy.
Are you trying to tell me that there is a way things are independent of how
some people try to conceive, frame, or represent it?
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> For the purpose of science an entity may be considered "real" if our
> hypotheses concerning that entity show convergence. This has nothing
> to do with postulating that the entity in question has an existence that
> is
> independent of our ideas about it.
I don't know. There are a lot of convergent hypotheses about subatomic
strings but whether or not they are real is an open question. If the
hypothetical strings were buttressed by a lot of solid evidence for their
existence it wouldn't be an open question. Whether or not there really are
subatomic strings, however, isn't up to us to say, even if we can't confirm
that they exist or not.
In any case, they are never going to be the sort of thing we experience.
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>> "andy-k" wrote
>>> I claim that the question of "whether or not a world exists
>>> independently of our ideas about it" is a non-issue for science.
>>
>> I understand, but a great many people feel some sort of realism
>> is a requirement for science to function.
>
> The word "real" is the issue here. It is a word we learn to use through
> social and cultural conditioning, and we fall into error when we make a
> "thing" of it as in "reality". For the purpose of science an entity may be
> considered "real" if our hypotheses concerning that entity show
> convergence.
> This has nothing to do with postulating the existence of that entity in
> the
> absence of any experience of it -- that is not science but metaphysics.
So I've been told. There is a kind of realism advocated by Moritz Schlick
that puts forth the idea that realist statements refer to relations between
our experiences, not necessarily anything external to them.
So, say, I hire someone to follow me around because I'm constantly
having mishaps of some sort or another, and they shout out as I'm
crossing the street that a bus is coming. A claim that the body guard
and bus are "real" means my experiences have a relation such that the
body guard keeps me from getting run over. This is in contrast to an
imaginary friend who I believe looks out for me.
What I find novel about this interpretation is experiences seem to have
a richness of interconnectedness to them; assuming I saw neither the
bus nor body guard prior to being warned, the experiences themselves
seem to be interacting. (Russell sees this sort of tortured thinking as a
repudiation of the entire project: realism can't be logically demonstrated
because the doubt itself is pathological.)
>> A statement like "Antarctica existed prior to being discovered" can't
>> be viewed as nonsensical because it has the same logical structure
>> as many scientific statements that must have a truth value.
>
> That's a good example of a reasonable use of the word "real".
>
>
>> A statement such as "I studied philosophy for five years before
>> realizing metaphysical statements were nonsensical" suffers from
>> the same logical problem as positing an external world: why do
>> you believe your memories correspond to actual events or things?
>
> Adhering to pure description all I can say is that I have biographical
> memories, that these memories condition my behavior, and that this
> arrangement proves satisfactory for most practical purposes.
Okay, then I have misunderstood your position. I thought statements
about the past would be metaphysical nonsense on a par with
talk of things being "really" real.
Remember, normally when one calls something nonsense, one means
there is no charitable interpretation to reform that statement. You're
converting some statements you should find highly suspect into
sensible comments.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote
>> social and cultural conditioning, and we fall into error when we make a
>> "thing" of it as in "reality". For the purpose of science an entity may
>> be considered "real" if our hypotheses concerning that entity show
>> convergence. This has nothing to do with postulating the existence of
>> that entity in the absence of any experience of it -- that is not science
>> but metaphysics.
>
> So I've been told. There is a kind of realism advocated by Moritz Schlick
> that puts forth the idea that realist statements refer to relations
> between our experiences, not necessarily anything external to them.
>
> So, say, I hire someone to follow me around because I'm constantly
> having mishaps of some sort or another, and they shout out as I'm
> crossing the street that a bus is coming. A claim that the body guard
> and bus are "real" means my experiences have a relation such that the
> body guard keeps me from getting run over. This is in contrast to an
> imaginary friend who I believe looks out for me.
>
> What I find novel about this interpretation is experiences seem to have
> a richness of interconnectedness to them; assuming I saw neither the
> bus nor body guard prior to being warned, the experiences themselves
> seem to be interacting. (Russell sees this sort of tortured thinking as a
> repudiation of the entire project: realism can't be logically demonstrated
> because the doubt itself is pathological.)
I think there's a problem with the comment "experiences themselves seem to
be interacting" that is better stated with your earlier comment "experiences
seem to have a richness of interconnectedness to them". The former comment
suggests that experiences are distinct *things* that interact (causally?),
whereas the latter suggests a much wider scheme of *process* wherein certain
relatively invariant aspects of that process may be abstracted to yield a
("conventional") division between the background (the conditions in which
these relatively invariant aspects arise) and the figures (the conditioned
relatively invariant aspects that are arising).
> Remember, normally when one calls something nonsense, one
> means there is no charitable interpretation to reform that statement.
> You're converting some statements you should find highly suspect
> into sensible comments.
"In the _Tractatus_ Wittgenstein's logical construction of a philosophical
system has a purpose -- to find the limits of world, thought and language;
in other words, to distinguish between sense and nonsense. "The book will
... draw a limit to thinking, or rather -- not to thinking, but to the
expression of thoughts .... The limit can ... only be drawn in language and
what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense" (_TLP_
Preface). The conditions for a proposition's having sense have been
explored, and seen to rest on the possibility of representation or
picturing. Names must have a _bedeutung_ (reference/meaning), but they can
only do so in the context of a proposition which is held together by logical
form. It follows that only factual states of affairs which can be pictured,
can be represented by meaningful propositions. This means that what can be
said are only propositions of natural science, and leaves out of the realm
of sense a daunting number of statements which are made and used in
language."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> That much is not in dispute -- perceiver and perceived arise in mutual
> dependence. What is in dispute is the idea that there is no alternative
> to the realism/idealism dichotomy.
Btw, I don't think there is a mutual dependence. The Appalachian Mountains
existed before there were any human perceivers, maybe before any perceivers
for all I know. The dependence works works one way: the perceiver needs
things to perceive, but the perceived doesn't need the perceiver.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> That much is not in dispute -- perceiver and perceived arise in
>> mutual dependence. What is in dispute is the idea that there is
>> no alternative to the realism/idealism dichotomy.
>
> Btw, I don't think there is a mutual dependence. The Appalachian
> Mountains existed before there were any human perceivers, maybe
> before any perceivers for all I know. The dependence works works
> one way: the perceiver needs things to perceive, but the perceived
> doesn't need the perceiver.
If the perceived has no perceiver then in what manner is it the perceived?
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> If the perceived has no perceiver then in what manner is it the perceived?
It isn't perceived, but that doesn't mean it doesn't exist. Or are you
saying that to be is to be perceived?
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> If the perceived has no perceiver then in what manner
>> is it the perceived?
>
> It isn't perceived, but that doesn't mean it doesn't exist.
> Or are you saying that to be is to be perceived?
My claim was that perceiver, perceiving, and perceived arise in mutual
dependence. You questioned the claim with the comment that "the
perceived doesn't need the perceiver", with the attendant absurd
implication that there are unperceived perceptions. Now you change
your approach and start talking instead about the unperceived.
How is this relevant to my claim that you began by questioning, to repeat,
that perceiver, perceiving, and perceived arise in mutual dependence?
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> My claim was that perceiver, perceiving, and perceived arise in mutual
> dependence. You questioned the claim with the comment that "the
> perceived doesn't need the perceiver", with the attendant absurd
> implication that there are unperceived perceptions. Now you change
> your approach and start talking instead about the unperceived.
> How is this relevant to my claim that you began by questioning, to repeat,
> that perceiver, perceiving, and perceived arise in mutual dependence?
No, I think you misunderstand. I don't advocate "unperceived perceptions",
whatever that means, but I don't see how what we perceive depends on us. If
you look at a cat is the cat (the perceived) dependent on you? The cat
isn't a perception, it's a cat. It's a cat that you may or may not have a
chance to see. Now the act of perception itself relies on there being some
object the perceiver perceives. But I don't see how the object is dependent
on the person (or other animal) doing the perceiving.
zinnic
So how does rejecting as nonsense the metaphysical concepts of
'reality in itself ' advance Philosophy? Surely, the same sort of
nonsense advances the utility of Philosophy?
Zinnic
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>> That "there are experiences" -- i.e. inhomogeneities in the data
>> of experience -- is indisputable, but it is also indisputable that
>> those inhomogeneities take the form of a subjective perspective
>> on an objective world.
>
> So how does rejecting as nonsense the metaphysical concepts
> of 'reality in itself ' advance Philosophy?
When one is laboring under a misapprehension, how can it be a
bad thing when that situation is eventually recognized for what it is?
> Surely, the same sort of nonsense advances the utility of Philosophy?
I can't see how nonsense "advances the utility of Philosophy" --
could you expand on this?
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> My claim was that perceiver, perceiving, and perceived arise in
>> mutual dependence. You questioned the claim with the comment
>> that "the perceived doesn't need the perceiver", with the attendant
>> absurd implication that there are unperceived perceptions. Now you
>> change your approach and start talking instead about the unperceived.
>> How is this relevant to my claim that you began by questioning, to
>> repeat, that perceiver, perceiving, and perceived arise in mutual
>> dependence?
>
> No, I think you misunderstand. I don't advocate "unperceived
> perceptions", whatever that means, but I don't see how what we
> perceive depends on us. If you look at a cat is the cat (the perceived)
> dependent on you? The cat isn't a perception, it's a cat. It's a cat that
> you may or may not have a chance to see.
Then your comment that "the perceived doesn't need the perceiver"
makes a completely different point to the point you wish to make.
If there were no perceiver then there would be no perceived, regardless
of the question of a thing's existence independent of our ideas about it.
> Now the act of perception itself relies on there being some object
> the perceiver perceives. But I don't see how the object is dependent
> on the person (or other animal) doing the perceiving.
What we perceive certainly does "depend on us" since we perceive a thing
according to the interpretive scheme we impose upon it -- e.g. in the light
of our past experience of that thing.
I suspect the point you wish to make is that you believe things to exist
independently of our ideas about them. That is the realist position, and
the contrary is the idealist position. My point is that this "either-or"
scenario is misguided -- i.e. that the question is specious.
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> Then your comment that "the perceived doesn't need the perceiver"
> makes a completely different point to the point you wish to make.
> If there were no perceiver then there would be no perceived, regardless
> of the question of a thing's existence independent of our ideas about it.
> independently of our ideas about them. That is the realist position, and
> the contrary is the idealist position. My point is that this "either-or"
> scenario is misguided -- i.e. that the question is specious.
No, that's not my point and this has nothing to do with idealism/realism but
how we understand perception. I think what you are doing is hypostatizing
both "perceived" into an object different that what is perceiving and
"perception" (perceiving) into another object and then making the claim that
all three are interrelated. A simpler, and I believe correct analysis, is
that there is a perceiver, like a person, who can perceive things, none of
which are dependent on the perceiver. "Perceived" designates an object, not
a free floating "perception" in the person's head. To be sure, perception
requires that there being something that is perceived and a person perceives
as a human being would (as opposed to how a frog perceives), but that
doesn't mean that what is perceived is different from the object perceived
(which is what you seem to be saying).
You keep saying "the question" is specious, nonsensical, etc. What
question? How is it specious? What on earth are you talking about? Can
you get the Wittgenstein-speak and say what you mean and instead of
handingout odd announcements?
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote:
>> Then your comment that "the perceived doesn't need the perceiver"
>> makes a completely different point to the point you wish to make.
>> If there were no perceiver then there would be no perceived, regardless
>> of the question of a thing's existence independent of our ideas about it.
>> I suspect the point you wish to make is that you believe things to exist
>> independently of our ideas about them. That is the realist position, and
>> the contrary is the idealist position. My point is that this "either-or"
>> scenario is misguided -- i.e. that the question is specious.
>
> No, that's not my point and this has nothing to do with idealism/realism
> but how we understand perception. I think what you are doing is
> hypostatizing both "perceived" into an object different that what is
> perceiving and "perception" (perceiving) into another object and then
> making the claim that all three are interrelated.
No, that's not what I'm doing -- I'm specifically rejecting any such
hypostatization. What I'm doing is claiming the opposite -- i.e. that there
are no independent "things-in-themselves" that mysteriously enter into
relationship with each other. "Things" have only a conventional existence
(terms already defined) wherein they are "carved out" as figure against
ground to yield a distinction between conditions and conditioned (terms
already defined).
> A simpler, and I believe correct analysis, is that there is a perceiver,
> like a person, who can perceive things,
No, it's not that a perceiver *can* perceive things -- i.e. has the capacity
to perceive things -- the perceiver *does* perceive things, else it's not a
perceiver.
> none of which are dependent on the perceiver.
Now you've deviated from description and entered into speculation.
> "Perceived" designates an object,
Agreed -- it designates an object given to us in perception. That much
is pure description. To go any further than this -- i.e. to claim that the
object has an existence as an "object-in-itself" that is independent of
any perception of it -- is to enter into speculation. I think this may be
the source of our communications failure on this point -- you seem
to be using the phrase "object of perception" to refer to just such a
conjectured "thing-in-itself" that you speculate to be the primary datum
for the process of perception (i.e. metaphysical realism), whereas I am
using the same phrase in a manner that obviates any such speculation.
> not a free floating "perception" in the person's head.
I'm operating on a descriptive level and not the metaphysical
level implicit in your claim.
> To be sure, perception requires that there being something that is
> perceived and a person perceives as a human being would (as opposed to how
> a frog perceives), but that doesn't mean that what is perceived is
> different from the object perceived (which is what you seem to be saying).
I can't make any sense of your statement after the comma.
> You keep saying "the question" is specious, nonsensical, etc.
> What question?
"Is there a way things are that is independent of our perceptions of them?"
> How is it specious? What on earth are you talking about?
I'm talking about you implicit metaphysical presupposition.
> Can you get the Wittgenstein-speak and say what you mean
> and instead of handingout odd announcements?
What on earth is this collection of words supposed to mean?
zinnic
andy-k wrote:
> "zinnic" wrote:
> > andy-k wrote:
> >> That "there are experiences" -- i.e. inhomogeneities in the data
> >> of experience -- is indisputable, but it is also indisputable that
> >> those inhomogeneities take the form of a subjective perspective
> >> on an objective world.
> >
> > So how does rejecting as nonsense the metaphysical concepts
> > of 'reality in itself ' advance Philosophy?
>
> When one is laboring under a misapprehension, how can it be a
> bad thing when that situation is eventually recognized for what it is?
I presume that it is not a bad thing in itself but my question was- is
it a good thing for the plain man? Or is it a 'Philosophy for
Philosophers that is in danger of the reductionism in Art and Music
that has in the extreme led to contemplation of blank canvases (Ar tfor
Artists) or long periods of uninterrupted silence (Music for
Musicians)?
> > Surely, the same sort of nonsense advances the utility of Philosophy?
>
> I can't see how nonsense "advances the utility of Philosophy" --
> could you expand on this?
I am suggesting that a language game that adopts the nonsense that our
senses interact with a real entity provides a useful 'a priori'
premiss on which to ground our inductive processes.
For example if I hear a noise from an inaccessible source, I
induce/deduce that it was caused by something real.
Zinnic
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>> When one is laboring under a misapprehension, how can it be a
>> bad thing when that situation is eventually recognized for what it is?
>
> I presume that it is not a bad thing in itself but my question was-
> is it a good thing for the plain man? Or is it a 'Philosophy for
> Philosophers that is in danger of the reductionism in Art and
> Music that has in the extreme led to contemplation of blank canvases
> (Ar tfor Artists) or long periods of uninterrupted silence (Music for
> Musicians)?
I guess we're all philosophers of a sort -- we all dwell on questions about
life and death, about freedom of the will, about the origin of the cosmos,
and so forth. We all love a mystery too, so I guess many people will view
the prospect of relinquishing those mysteries as too high a price to pay.
>> I can't see how nonsense "advances the utility of Philosophy" --
>> could you expand on this?
>
> I am suggesting that a language game that adopts the nonsense that our
> senses interact with a real entity provides a useful 'a priori' premiss
> on which to ground our inductive processes. For example if I hear a noise
> from an inaccessible source, I induce/deduce that it was caused by
> something real.
No such grounding is needed -- instinctive and conditioned responses
operate inductively without the need to conjecture the existence of
"things-in-themselves". It is only when reason gets in on the act that the
nonsense sets in. Whilst reason clearly conduces to survival and
reproduction, it also has a pathological offshoot -- the tendency to elevate
certain words (that have utility in common speech) to the status of
"things-in-themselves". A case in point is the word "real", which clearly
has utility in common speech but gets elevated to the nonsensical idea of
a "reality" that is independent of our ideas about it. The question then
arises as to whether or not such a "reality" ... "exists", and our language
has so beguiled us as to consider the question reasonable. The solution
is not "yes or no", but the vanishing of the question.
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> Agreed -- it designates an object given to us in perception. That much
> is pure description. To go any further than this -- i.e. to claim that the
> object has an existence as an "object-in-itself" that is independent of
> any perception of it -- is to enter into speculation. I think this may be
> the source of our communications failure on this point -- you seem
> to be using the phrase "object of perception" to refer to just such a
> conjectured "thing-in-itself" that you speculate to be the primary datum
> for the process of perception (i.e. metaphysical realism), whereas I am
> using the same phrase in a manner that obviates any such speculation.
Again, I don't see how it logically follows from what you've said that we
are prohibited from stating independent of our perception of it. It isn't a
question of metaphysics or speculation, but of epistemic sense. I think
you're just committed to an idealist epistemology.
Craig Franck
> "zinnic" wrote:
>> andy-k wrote:
>>> I can't see how nonsense "advances the utility of Philosophy" --
>>> could you expand on this?
>>
>> I am suggesting that a language game that adopts the nonsense that our
>> senses interact with a real entity provides a useful 'a priori'
>> premiss
>> on which to ground our inductive processes. For example if I hear a noise
>> from an inaccessible source, I induce/deduce that it was caused by
>> something real.
>
> No such grounding is needed -- instinctive and conditioned responses
> operate inductively without the need to conjecture the existence of
> "things-in-themselves". It is only when reason gets in on the act that the
> nonsense sets in. Whilst reason clearly conduces to survival and
> reproduction, it also has a pathological offshoot -- the tendency to
> elevate
> certain words (that have utility in common speech) to the status of
> "things-in-themselves". A case in point is the word "real", which clearly
> has utility in common speech but gets elevated to the nonsensical idea of
> a "reality" that is independent of our ideas about it. The question then
> arises as to whether or not such a "reality" ... "exists", and our
> language
> has so beguiled us as to consider the question reasonable. The solution
> is not "yes or no", but the vanishing of the question.
There is no refuting your argument, but now you're making judgments
as to the value an average, intelligent person would place on this line
of thought. It's not thought very highly of -- to the point of probably
being
the number one reason many intelligent people don't care for philosophy.
And you are mistaken as to how naive realism arises. That objects
exist independently of our minds is a basic phenomenologically given
fact. Intellectual analysis of borderline statements generates the view
that there are *not* in fact things-in-themselves, not that there *are*.
As a language game, you would need evidence that things don't
exist when we are not perceiving them. Realism is the default
assumption because it best supports the idea of a Being in the
World which arises from the basic socialization process.
I know this for a fact because your way of looking at things rarely
spontaneously develops on it's own in people with adequate reality
testing skills. Most children who I spring this on are *stunned* anyone
could believe it. (One particularly bright 10-year-old girl told me it
made her "feel like a ghost." Apparently, there is a need to think of
one's self as a thing-in-itself for other people.)
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote
>>> I am suggesting that a language game that adopts the nonsense that our
>>> senses interact with a real entity provides a useful 'a priori'
>>> premiss on which to ground our inductive processes. For example if I
>>> hear a noise from an inaccessible source, I induce/deduce that it was
>>> caused by something real.
>>
>> No such grounding is needed -- instinctive and conditioned responses
>> operate inductively without the need to conjecture the existence of
>> "things-in-themselves". It is only when reason gets in on the act that
>> the nonsense sets in. Whilst reason clearly conduces to survival and
>> reproduction, it also has a pathological offshoot -- the tendency to
>> elevate certain words (that have utility in common speech) to the status
>> of "things-in-themselves". A case in point is the word "real", which
>> clearly has utility in common speech but gets elevated to the nonsensical
>> idea of a "reality" that is independent of our ideas about it. The
>> question then arises as to whether or not such a "reality" ... "exists",
>> and our language has so beguiled us as to consider the question
>> reasonable. The solution is not "yes or no", but the vanishing of the
>> question.
>
> There is no refuting your argument, but now you're making judgments
> as to the value an average, intelligent person would place on this line
> of thought. It's not thought very highly of -- to the point of probably
> being the number one reason many intelligent people don't care for
> philosophy.
"Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works
are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answers to
questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical.
Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our
failure to understand the logic or our language [...] And it is not
surprising that the deepest problems are in fact _not_ problems at all."
-- Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 4.003
"Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is
not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists
essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical
propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without
philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task it to
make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries."
-- Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 4.111
"The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say
nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science --
i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy -- and then, whenever
someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him
that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions.
Although it would not be satisfying to the other person -- he would not have
the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy -- this method would be the
only strictly correct one."
-- Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.53
> And you are mistaken as to how naive realism arises. That objects
> exist independently of our minds is a basic phenomenologically given
> fact. Intellectual analysis of borderline statements generates the view
> that there are *not* in fact things-in-themselves, not that there *are*.
Naive realism (direct realism) is the view one takes on the world before
philosophizing about it. We learn very early in childhood that objects
continue to exist when they exit from direct perception -- there is no
philosophizing necessary here. When we start philosophizing we move
on to representational realism (indirect realism) as though it were an
improvement, with its world of "things-in-themselves". It is not.
[I note that here you are rejecting the idea of "things-in-themselves".]
> As a language game, you would need evidence that things don't
> exist when we are not perceiving them. Realism is the default
> assumption because it best supports the idea of a Being in the
> World which arises from the basic socialization process.
We do not perceive the unperceived, and there is no requirement to hold
a metaphysical position about it. We know that when a tiger disappears
behind a rock, the danger isn't past. We don't need to posit the existence
of a "tiger-in-itself" -- the plain ordinary tiger will do well enough.
> I know this for a fact because your way of looking at things rarely
> spontaneously develops on it's own in people with adequate reality
> testing skills. Most children who I spring this on are *stunned* anyone
> could believe it. (One particularly bright 10-year-old girl told me it
> made her "feel like a ghost." Apparently, there is a need to think of
> one's self as a thing-in-itself for other people.)
That doesn't surprise me at all Craig -- the culprit here is abstract
reasoning, which flourishes around the time of adolescence. Perhaps we
would do well to recapture some of that child-like obviousness about the
world and see it as it is, in contrast to the way we see it caked in layer
upon layer of abstraction until we reach a point where our models lose all
connectedness with the world.
[I note here that you now seem to be defending the idea of
"things-in-themselves", leaving me somewhat confused about your position.
I also don't quite know what you mean by "my way of looking at things"
and that children are stunned that anyone could believe "it" -- ?]
gibbs
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
> "Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works
> are not false but nonsensical.
No doubt the arrogant Wittgenstein excepted his own muddled pronouncements.
Fortunately, very few people really believe this.
Anthony G. Rubino
>
>"Most of the propositions and questions
>to be found in philosophical works are
>not false but nonsensical.
>
>
>No doubt the arrogant Wittgenstein
>excepted his own muddled
>pronouncements. Fortunately, very few
>people really believe this.
>
admission that it makes no sense to the claimant: i.e., that the
claimant does not understand whatever is claimed to make no sense.
What serious value can such a claim that dismisses what's not understood
have?
Tony, philosopher
http://www.geocities.com/trisector/
So many misconceptions, so little time.
zinnic
> "zinnic" wrote:
> > andy-k wrote:
> > is it a good thing for the plain man? Or is it a 'Philosophy for
> > Philosophers that is in danger of the reductionism in Art and
> > Music that has in the extreme led to contemplation of blank canvases
> > (Ar tfor Artists) or long periods of uninterrupted silence (Music for
> > Musicians)?
>
> I guess we're all philosophers of a sort -- we all dwell on questions about
> life and death, about freedom of the will, about the origin of the cosmos,
> and so forth. We all love a mystery too, so I guess many people will view
> the prospect of relinquishing those mysteries as too high a price to pay.
I guess what you are saying is that mystery is not real, not a 'thing
in itself'. That anything beyond a 'description of a thing' must
forever remain mysterious and therefore is irrelevant (nonsense, beyond
reason)?
> > I am suggesting that a language game that adopts the nonsense that our
> > senses interact with a real entity provides a useful 'a priori' premiss
> > on which to ground our inductive processes. For example if I hear a noise
> > from an inaccessible source, I induce/deduce that it was caused by
> > something real.
>
> No such grounding is needed -- instinctive and conditioned responses
> operate inductively without the need to conjecture the existence of
> "things-in-themselves". It is only when reason gets in on the act that the
> nonsense sets in. Whilst reason clearly conduces to survival and
> reproduction, it also has a pathological offshoot -- the tendency to elevate
> certain words (that have utility in common speech) to the status of
> "things-in-themselves". A case in point is the word "real", which clearly
> has utility in common speech but gets elevated to the nonsensical idea of
> a "reality" that is independent of our ideas about it. The question then
> arises as to whether or not such a "reality" ... "exists", and our language
> has so beguiled us as to consider the question reasonable. The solution
> is not "yes or no", but the vanishing of the question.
I accept the sense of your philosophy and assume that the "pathological
offshoot" refers to philosophical purity. However, the operation of
my "instinctive and conditioned responses" still has me grasping at a
'thing in itself'.
For example, two individuals have experiences/ perceptions/
conceptions of something such that their descriptions of the something
diverge to the extent of being contradictory. Are there then two 'not
in themselves' things or simply two perceptions of one 'in itself'
thing?
Zinnic
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
>> "zinnic" wrote:
>> about life and death, about freedom of the will, about the origin of the
>> cosmos, and so forth. We all love a mystery too, so I guess many people
>> will view the prospect of relinquishing those mysteries as too high a
>> price to pay.
>
> I guess what you are saying is that mystery is not real, not a 'thing
> in itself'. That anything beyond a 'description of a thing' must
> forever remain mysterious and therefore is irrelevant (nonsense,
> beyond reason)?
You misinterpret my use of the term "thing-in-itself" (more below).
Many mysteries are patterns in the data of experience that are awaiting
the making of a connection that admits of a more encompassing picture
of the way things are, and as such are the proper subject of scientific
investigation. But others are the result of linguistic error, and this
latter state of affairs is often difficult to distinguish from the former.
>> No such grounding is needed -- instinctive and conditioned responses
>> operate inductively without the need to conjecture the existence of
>> "things-in-themselves". It is only when reason gets in on the act that
>> the nonsense sets in. Whilst reason clearly conduces to survival and
>> reproduction, it also has a pathological offshoot -- the tendency to
>> elevate certain words (that have utility in common speech) to the status
>> of "things-in-themselves". A case in point is the word "real", which
>> clearly has utility in common speech but gets elevated to the nonsensical
>> idea of a "reality" that is independent of our ideas about it. The
>> question then arises as to whether or not such a "reality" ... "exists",
>> and our language has so beguiled us as to consider the question
>> reasonable. The solution is not "yes or no", but the vanishing of the
>> question.
>
> I accept the sense of your philosophy and assume that the "pathological
> offshoot" refers to philosophical purity. However, the operation of
> my "instinctive and conditioned responses" still has me grasping at a
> 'thing in itself'.
When I refer to a "thing-in-itself" I'm referring to the putative naked
bearer of the properties of that thing -- that which "has" these properties.
I doubt that your instinctive and conditioned responses leave you grasping
at any such thing -- you grasp at the collection of properties that identify
the thing. The idea of a naked bearer of properties is the result of
linguistic error and pathological reasoning.
> For example, two individuals have experiences/ perceptions/
> conceptions of something such that their descriptions of the something
> diverge to the extent of being contradictory. Are there then two 'not
> in themselves' things or simply two perceptions of one 'in itself'
> thing?
The two individuals concerned would be describing the thing as they
perceive it, and their different descriptions would be evidence that they
perceive the thing differently. Is there anything more that needs to be
said?
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>> "andy-k" wrote
>>> No such grounding is needed -- instinctive and conditioned responses
Perhaps. I'm reading Ray Monk's "Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of
Genius," so his opinion caries a great deal of weight; however, my
point was that the average individual judges nonsense quite differently.
>> And you are mistaken as to how naive realism arises. That objects
>> exist independently of our minds is a basic phenomenologically given
>> fact.
[Flawed]
>> Intellectual analysis of borderline statements generates the view
>> that there are *not* in fact things-in-themselves, not that there *are*.
>
> Naive realism (direct realism) is the view one takes on the world before
> philosophizing about it. We learn very early in childhood that objects
> continue to exist when they exit from direct perception -- there is no
> philosophizing necessary here. When we start philosophizing we move
> on to representational realism (indirect realism) as though it were an
> improvement, with its world of "things-in-themselves". It is not.
Fine, but this is a value judgment.
> [I note that here you are rejecting the idea of "things-in-themselves".]
Not at all. My point was reason doesn't generate naive realism or
direct realism. It is given in experience: objects that have a stable
existence when I perceive them do so *because* they have the same
existential properties when I do not. (The last part of the previous
quote was an example of flawed reasoning.)
>> As a language game, you would need evidence that things don't
>> exist when we are not perceiving them. Realism is the default
>> assumption because it best supports the idea of a Being in the
>> World which arises from the basic socialization process.
>
> We do not perceive the unperceived, and there is no requirement to hold
> a metaphysical position about it.
This is what I perceive as the flaw in this line of thought. I'm saying
objects exist when unperceived because the history of the universe
requires this. Perceiving the unperceived is logically impossible.
Objects existing prior to any minds is an empirical fact that comes
to us from many sources, cosmology being one.
Nothing makes any sense without this requirement of the world
being met.
>> I know this for a fact because your way of looking at things rarely
>> spontaneously develops on it's own in people with adequate reality
>> testing skills. Most children who I spring this on are *stunned* anyone
>> could believe it. (One particularly bright 10-year-old girl told me it
>> made her "feel like a ghost." Apparently, there is a need to think of
>> one's self as a thing-in-itself for other people.)
>
> That doesn't surprise me at all Craig -- the culprit here is abstract
> reasoning, which flourishes around the time of adolescence.
I believe abstract reasoning has nothing to do with this. It's the
natural attitude that comes from experience.
> [I note here that you now seem to be defending the idea of
> "things-in-themselves", leaving me somewhat confused about your position.
> I also don't quite know what you mean by "my way of looking at things"
> and that children are stunned that anyone could believe "it" -- ?]
They are stunned by the notion that objects don't continue to exist
when unperceived.
I've always held that believing in "things-in-themselves" is the most
coherent view point, even though I've entertained other notions to try
to understand them. (I may not have been clear enough in an earlier
paragraph.)
Craig Franck
> >andy-k quoted Wittgenstein:
>>
>>"Most of the propositions and questions
>>to be found in philosophical works are
>>not false but nonsensical.
>>
>>gibbs commented:
>>
>>No doubt the arrogant Wittgenstein
>>excepted his own muddled
>>pronouncements. Fortunately, very few
>>people really believe this.
>>
> It could also be noted that a claim that something is nonsense is an
> admission that it makes no sense to the claimant: i.e., that the
> claimant does not understand whatever is claimed to make no sense.
The idea was most of what has passed for philosophy does not
hold up to logical analysis. This is undoubtedly true. The
question is what does this mean.
> What serious value can such a claim that dismisses what's not understood
> have?
It represents an evolution of thought. Wittgenstein later changed his
mind in favor of a language-game interpretation of statements.
For example, most people believe in objects as "things-in-themselves"
because it lets us generate statements about an "objective world"
that subjective statements should conform to. This is the rational
basis for the concept of inter-subjectivity.
So the statement "other people see the same colors I do when they
look at objects" -- which I admit is complete nonsense from a strictly
logical POV, for it is logically impossible to tell whether this is the
case or not -- is the basis for empathy since most people have the
same kinds of experiences in similar situations.
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote
>> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>>> "andy-k" wrote
>>> as to the value an average, intelligent person would place on this line
>>> of thought. It's not thought very highly of -- to the point of probably
>>> being the number one reason many intelligent people don't care for
>>> philosophy.
>>
>> "Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical
>> works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any
>> answers to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are
>> nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise
>> from our failure to understand the logic or our language [...] And it is
>> not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact _not_ problems at
>> all."
>> -- Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 4.003
>
> Perhaps. I'm reading Ray Monk's "Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of
> Genius," so his opinion caries a great deal of weight; however, my
> point was that the average individual judges nonsense quite differently.
Then the issue is merely a semantic one. I'm using the word "nonsense"
in the Wittgensteinian sense.
>>> And you are mistaken as to how naive realism arises. That objects
>>> exist independently of our minds is a basic phenomenologically given
>>> fact.
>
> [Flawed]
>
>>> Intellectual analysis of borderline statements generates the view
>>> that there are *not* in fact things-in-themselves, not that there *are*.
>>
>> Naive realism (direct realism) is the view one takes on the world before
>> philosophizing about it. We learn very early in childhood that objects
>> continue to exist when they exit from direct perception -- there is no
>> philosophizing necessary here. When we start philosophizing we move
>> on to representational realism (indirect realism) as though it were an
>> improvement, with its world of "things-in-themselves". It is not.
>
> Fine, but this is a value judgment.
Are we speaking the same language here? I'm using the phrase to refer
to the putative naked bearer of the properties of a thing, the substrate in
which those properties are assumed to be grounded, and so synonymous
with substance-based metaphysics. The idea is logically inconsistent.
>> [I note that here you are rejecting the idea of "things-in-themselves".]
>
> Not at all. My point was reason doesn't generate naive realism or
> direct realism. It is given in experience: objects that have a stable
> existence when I perceive them do so *because* they have the same
> existential properties when I do not. (The last part of the previous
> quote was an example of flawed reasoning.)
Direct realism doesn't posit the existence of "things-in-themselves".
The continued existence of objects that have left the field of vision
is not the issue that I'm referring to as "inherent existence" --
i.e. as "things-in-themselves".
>>> As a language game, you would need evidence that things don't
>>> exist when we are not perceiving them. Realism is the default
>>> assumption because it best supports the idea of a Being in the
>>> World which arises from the basic socialization process.
>>
>> We do not perceive the unperceived, and there is no requirement to hold
>> a metaphysical position about it.
>
> This is what I perceive as the flaw in this line of thought. I'm saying
> objects exist when unperceived because the history of the universe
> requires this. Perceiving the unperceived is logically impossible.
> Objects existing prior to any minds is an empirical fact that comes
> to us from many sources, cosmology being one.
>
> Nothing makes any sense without this requirement of the world
> being met.
I suspect we are disputing at cross-purposes, and that the confusion
arises because of the ambiguous nature of the world "exists".
Things have no "inherent existence" as "things-in-themselves" but they
do have a "conventional existence" as groups of properties that we pick
out for special attention -- I went over this in my post on Existence and
Non-existence.
>>> I know this for a fact because your way of looking at things rarely
>>> spontaneously develops on it's own in people with adequate reality
>>> testing skills. Most children who I spring this on are *stunned* anyone
>>> could believe it. (One particularly bright 10-year-old girl told me it
>>> made her "feel like a ghost." Apparently, there is a need to think of
>>> one's self as a thing-in-itself for other people.)
>>
>> That doesn't surprise me at all Craig -- the culprit here is abstract
>> reasoning, which flourishes around the time of adolescence.
>
> I believe abstract reasoning has nothing to do with this. It's the
> natural attitude that comes from experience.
Direct realism is the natural attitude that comes from direct
experience. Indirect realism is an unnatural attitude that comes
from abstract reasoning.
>> [I note here that you now seem to be defending the idea of
>> "things-in-themselves", leaving me somewhat confused about your position.
>> I also don't quite know what you mean by "my way of looking at things"
>> and that children are stunned that anyone could believe "it" -- ?]
>
> They are stunned by the notion that objects don't continue to exist
> when unperceived.
A younger child loses interest in an object when it is obscured by
another, and regains interest when the obscuring object is removed.
All indications are that the continued existence of an object that leaves
the field of vision is a learned interpretation (conditioned response).
> I've always held that believing in "things-in-themselves" is the most
> coherent view point, even though I've entertained other notions to try
> to understand them. (I may not have been clear enough in an earlier
> paragraph.)
Are we speaking the same language here?
Craig Franck
> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>> "andy-k" wrote
>>> "Craig Franck" wrote:
>>>> And you are mistaken as to how naive realism arises. That objects
>>>> exist independently of our minds is a basic phenomenologically given
>>>> fact.
>>
>> [Flawed]
>>
>>>> Intellectual analysis of borderline statements generates the view
>>>> that there are *not* in fact things-in-themselves, not that there
>>>> *are*.
>>>
>>> Naive realism (direct realism) is the view one takes on the world before
>>> philosophizing about it. We learn very early in childhood that objects
>>> continue to exist when they exit from direct perception -- there is no
>>> philosophizing necessary here. When we start philosophizing we move
>>> on to representational realism (indirect realism) as though it were an
>>> improvement, with its world of "things-in-themselves". It is not.
>>
>> Fine, but this is a value judgment.
>
> Are we speaking the same language here?
In all likelihood not. Representationalism is a theory of perception
that holds, for example, that the volume of space in your visual
field that objects seem embedded in is in fact located in the visual
cortex of the brain. All you can ever know directly is the state of
your nervous system.
The realism part is that a world of mind-independently existing objects
cause our perceptual experiences through causal chains of events.
> I'm using the phrase to refer
> to the putative naked bearer of the properties of a thing, the substrate
> in
> which those properties are assumed to be grounded, and so synonymous
> with substance-based metaphysics. The idea is logically inconsistent.
I took it to mean a basic reality underlying observable phenomena
that is mind-independent and maintains its existence through
conservation laws.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noumenon
This part I consider absolutely absurd:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noumenon#Criticism_via_the_scientific_method
Also, I don't believe in substances. They have been replaced by the
notion of processes composed of events.
gibbs
"Craig Franck" <craig....@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:Fc1Ng.116$gN1.104@trndny08...
> The realism part is that a world of mind-independently existing objects
> cause our perceptual experiences through causal chains of events.
The very notion of representing assumes that there is something represented
(hence independent of representation), even without going into the physical
events that cause neuro-representation.
zinnic
andy-k wrote:
> "zinnic" wrote:
> > andy-k wrote:
> >
> > I guess what you are saying is that mystery is not real, not a 'thing
> > in itself'. That anything beyond a 'description of a thing' must
> > forever remain mysterious and therefore is irrelevant (nonsense,
> > beyond reason)?
>
> You misinterpret my use of the term "thing-in-itself" (more below).
> Many mysteries are patterns in the data of experience that are awaiting
> the making of a connection that admits of a more encompassing picture
> of the way things are, and as such are the proper subject of scientific
> investigation. But others are the result of linguistic error, and this
> latter state of affairs is often difficult to distinguish from the former.
>
> > offshoot" refers to philosophical purity. However, the operation of
> > my "instinctive and conditioned responses" still has me grasping at a
> > 'thing in itself'.
>
> When I refer to a "thing-in-itself" I'm referring to the putative naked
> bearer of the properties of that thing -- that which "has" these properties.
> I doubt that your instinctive and conditioned responses leave you grasping
> at any such thing -- you grasp at the collection of properties that identify
> the thing. The idea of a naked bearer of properties is the result of
> linguistic error and pathological reasoning.
Let me try again. A "thing in itself "..."the putative naked bearer of
the properties of that thing" . Are you saying that a thing does not
exist independently of its properties?
That, divorced from its properties, a whatever (thing-in-itself) has
no existence and so that whatever (thing-in-itself) is a nonsensical
concept?
I find it difficult not to regard this as trivial. For example, a
green apple does exist independent of its green-ness. It is then only
an apple. If we progressively divorce the apple from its remaining
properties we are left with a non-thing abstraction (nothing?).
> > For example, two individuals have experiences/ perceptions/
> > conceptions of something such that their descriptions of the something
> > diverge to the extent of being contradictory. Are there then two 'not
> > in themselves' things or simply two perceptions of one 'in itself'
> > thing?
>
> The two individuals concerned would be describing the thing as they
> perceive it, and their different descriptions would be evidence that they
> perceive the thing differently. Is there anything more that needs to be
> said?
But are you not playing Wittgenstein's language game when you use "the
thing "as a referent? The more that needs to be said (asked) is :- is
there a 'thing' that is perceived and described differently?
Zinnic
andy-k
> andy-k wrote:
> Let me try again. A "thing in itself "..."the putative naked bearer of
> the properties of that thing" . Are you saying that a thing does not
> exist independently of its properties?
Yes.
> That, divorced from its properties, a whatever (thing-in-itself) has
> no existence and so that whatever (thing-in-itself) is a nonsensical
> concept?
Yes.
> I find it difficult not to regard this as trivial. For example, a
> green apple does exist independent of its green-ness. It is then only
> an apple. If we progressively divorce the apple from its remaining
> properties we are left with a non-thing abstraction (nothing?).
Yes -- a thing is nothing more than a named collection of properties. This
is *nominalism* in contrast to *realism*, and has occupied quite a few
serious philosophers down through the ages.
>> > For example, two individuals have experiences/ perceptions/
>> > conceptions of something such that their descriptions of the something
>> > diverge to the extent of being contradictory. Are there then two 'not
>> > in themselves' things or simply two perceptions of one 'in itself'
>> > thing?
>>
>> The two individuals concerned would be describing the thing as they
>> perceive it, and their different descriptions would be evidence that they
>> perceive the thing differently. Is there anything more that needs to be
>> said?
>
> But are you not playing Wittgenstein's language game when you use "the
> thing "as a referent? The more that needs to be said (asked) is :- is
> there a 'thing' that is perceived and described differently?
There is a thing, but its existence is *conventional* (i.e. a named
collection of properties) and not *inherent* (i.e. an underlying substance
that bears these properties).
andy-k
> "andy-k" wrote
>>>> before philosophizing about it. We learn very early in childhood that
>>>> objects continue to exist when they exit from direct perception --
>>>> there is no philosophizing necessary here. When we start philosophizing
>>>> we move on to representational realism (indirect realism) as though it
>>>> were an improvement, with its world of "things-in-themselves". It is
>>>> not.
>>>
>>> Fine, but this is a value judgment.
>>
>> Are we speaking the same language here?
>
> In all likelihood not. Representationalism is a theory of perception
> that holds, for example, that the volume of space in your visual
> field that objects seem embedded in is in fact located in the visual
> cortex of the brain. All you can ever know directly is the state of
> your nervous system.
>
> The realism part is that a world of mind-independently existing objects
> cause our perceptual experiences through causal chains of events.
Then you must be able to see that it's not naive realism that I'm
undermining here but representational realism.
>> I'm using the phrase to refer to the putative naked bearer of the
>> properties of a thing, the substrate in which those properties are
>> assumed to be grounded, and so synonymous with substance-based
>> metaphysics. The idea is logically inconsistent.
>
> I took it to mean a basic reality underlying observable phenomena
> that is mind-independent and maintains its existence through
> conservation laws.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noumenon
>
> This part I consider absolutely absurd:
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noumenon#Criticism_via_the_scientific_method
>
> Also, I don't believe in substances. They have been replaced by the
> notion of processes composed of events.
Then it seems we're in complete agreement.