Computers, Logic, and the Single Event
John Jones
single events. The accumulation of single events, in any form, never
amounts to goals, purposes, or meanings.
Meaning, goals, etc., are emergent phenomena, and emergent phenomena are
grounded in the human framework or context. Without emergent phenomena
the anthropomorphic structure we call "the computer" does not arise from
its single, accumulated events. And, we ought to remind ourselves, we
should never make the leap from anthropomorphism to animism by saying
that a computer has itself the goals it helps us with.
Similarly for logic, the mere accumulation of the syntactical symbols
never amounts to meaning, however they are accumulated. But unlike a
computer, we do not generally anthropomorphise the syntactical single
events of logic into an emergent structure.
Emergent forms, meanings, and goals, are functions of the human
recipient. They are supported by, but not derived from, the syntax of
multiple, single events.
John Stafford
On 7/1/09 3:09 PM, in article h2gfv0$k1s$1...@news.eternal-september.org, "John
Jones" <jonesc...@btinternet.com> wrote:
> A Computer, and syntactical logic, are built on an accumulation of
> single events. The accumulation of single events, in any form, never
> amounts to goals, purposes, or meanings.
Wuff!
Jan Burse
> A Computer, and syntactical logic, are built on an accumulation of
> single events. The accumulation of single events, in any form, never
> amounts to goals, purposes, or meanings.
You are arguing against artificial intelligence on grounds of the
von Neumann architecture of todays computers. So discretism is
the problem.
> Meaning, goals, etc., are emergent phenomena, and emergent phenomena are
> grounded in the human framework or context. Without emergent phenomena
> the anthropomorphic structure we call "the computer" does not arise from
> its single, accumulated events. And, we ought to remind ourselves, we
> should never make the leap from anthropomorphism to animism by saying
> that a computer has itself the goals it helps us with.
Aha, discretism is the problem because it cannot generate emergence.
Are you sure about that? Did you ever look into the many examples of
computer models of emergence.
http://www.googlesyndicatedsearch.com/u/jasss?q=Emergence+Model
> Similarly for logic, the mere accumulation of the syntactical symbols
> never amounts to meaning, however they are accumulated. But unlike a
> computer, we do not generally anthropomorphise the syntactical single
> events of logic into an emergent structure.
Aha, you view logic in the same way as computers, except for some
allegations on logic and some regulations on computers.
> Emergent forms, meanings, and goals, are functions of the human
> recipient. They are supported by, but not derived from, the syntax of
> multiple, single events.
Yes, sure, because humans are an image of god. And god is infinite.
What is the difference between support and derive?
Best Regards
Immortalist
> A Computer, and syntactical logic, are built on an accumulation of
> single events. The accumulation of single events, in any form, never
> amounts to goals, purposes, or meanings.
>
But biology works by the same principles, accumulation of single
events in chemistry, atoms and molecules. You must somehow show how
biological mechanisms like us are not in the same class as some sort
of range of computer architecture.
Errol
> On Jul 1, 1:09 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>
> > A Computer, and syntactical logic, are built on an accumulation of
> > single events. The accumulation of single events, in any form, never
> > amounts to goals, purposes, or meanings.
>
> But biology works by the same principles, accumulation of single
> events in chemistry, atoms and molecules. You must somehow show how
> biological mechanisms like us are not in the same class as some sort
> of range of computer architecture.
>
I dont think the two have anything to do with each other.
Single events in computer terms have to do with the application of
logic. These single processes are typically arithmetical (add the
contents of register A to register B) This is done by setting binary
switches into off and on positions based on the on off patterns within
the two registers.
Single events in biology have to do with the formation of life and not
consciousness and intelligence
Computers don't see the big picture. Programs that can play Go are
miserable failures because they cannot see the sub-patterns while
humans are excellent at this. Go programs try to make up for this by
processing the position as a whole at vast speeds, usually
pathetically, while humans divide the board into strategic areas with
separate strategies for each segment.
Humans are better at pattern recognition, common sense knowledge and
reasoning by orders of magnitude. This is because the neurons don't
fire in serial order to process information, but almost randomly based
on associations with items from long term memory and use their
physiology to create 3 dimensionsional relationships amongst each
other . (not single events). I.O.W.s length breadth and height have
meaning in neuron firing patterns
AI aims to achieve mainly non human types of intelligence. This is
probably achievable within decades
Attempts to emulate humans convincingly by machines are much further
away based on current rates of progress, however this does not rule
out earlier breakthroughs through good luck and serendipity.
Jan Burse
> Computers don't see the big picture. Programs that can play Go are
> miserable failures because they cannot see the sub-patterns while
> humans are excellent at this. Go programs try to make up for this by
> processing the position as a whole at vast speeds, usually
> pathetically, while humans divide the board into strategic areas with
> separate strategies for each segment.
So you are also voting that discretism cannot show
emergence? Or is it that you criticise that brute
force algorithms might not be a good choice for the
Go game.
I think all these issues are connected. First of
all it is clear that even when a single processor
is able to simulate emergence, or do something beyond
brute force, like genetic algorithms to learn patterns
of go play, still this single processor is a bottle neck.
So if we have n processors we will have a speed up
of something < n, because still the processors have to
be coordinated. And this is indeed done todays in some
Go game competitions, with the result that we are close
to the fact that the computer outperforms the human:
http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/shortsharpscience/2009/02/computers-get-go.html
Maybe not the right time to close the eyes and build
myths around AI and the supervenience of the human.
Bye
Errol
> Errol schrieb:
>
> > Computers don't see the big picture. Programs that can play Go are
> > miserable failures because they cannot see the sub-patterns while
> > humans are excellent at this. Go programs try to make up for this by
> > processing the position as a whole at vast speeds, usually
> > pathetically, while humans divide the board into strategic areas with
> > separate strategies for each segment.
>
> So you are also voting that discretism cannot show
> emergence? Or is it that you criticise that brute
> force algorithms might not be a good choice for the
> Go game.
>
I don't say it cannot, I say it doesn't now and won't for a helluva
long time
> I think all these issues are connected. First of
> all it is clear that even when a single processor
> is able to simulate emergence, or do something beyond
> brute force, like genetic algorithms to learn patterns
> of go play, still this single processor is a bottle neck.
>
> So if we have n processors we will have a speed up
> of something < n, because still the processors have to
> be coordinated. And this is indeed done todays in some
> Go game competitions, with the result that we are close
> to the fact that the computer outperforms the human:
Your quoted article says
Based on predictable advances in computing power, he reckons that a
program will beat the best professional Go players on even footing
within 28 years.
That is in line with what I wrote about decades before decent non-
human intelligence.
even worse is that the problem is solved through brute power and not
necessary with better command of strategy (or reasoning)
From Stanford
Machines with many processors are much faster than single processors
can be. Parallelism itself presents no advantages, and parallel
machines are somewhat awkward to program.
> http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/shortsharpscience/2009/02/computers...
>
> Maybe not the right time to close the eyes and build
> myths around AI and the supervenience of the human.
>
> Bye
What is special about this time?
Jan Burse
> even worse is that the problem is solved through brute power and not
> necessary with better command of strategy (or reasoning)
The article says it uses monte carlo simulation. Which made
me a little bit excited, for personal reasons. But also
probabilitic methods have there limitations, so maybe we
should take a second critical look.
> Machines with many processors are much faster than single processors
> can be. Parallelism itself presents no advantages, and parallel
> machines are somewhat awkward to program.
This is in accordance with what I wrote. There is only a linear
speed up in maximum. But still, a linear can also be of
advantage.
>> http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/shortsharpscience/2009/02/computers...
>>
>> Maybe not the right time to close the eyes and build
>> myths around AI and the supervenience of the human.
>>
>> Bye
>
> What is special about this time?
See my excitement above.
Andrew Tomazos
> A Computer, and syntactical logic, are built on an accumulation of
> single events. The accumulation of single events, in any form, never
> amounts to goals, purposes, or meanings.
>
> Meaning, goals, etc., are emergent phenomena, and emergent phenomena are
> grounded in the human framework or context. Without emergent phenomena
> the anthropomorphic structure we call "the computer" does not arise from
> its single, accumulated events. And, we ought to remind ourselves, we
> should never make the leap from anthropomorphism to animism by saying
> that a computer has itself the goals it helps us with.
I wrote an article a few years back comparing the neural activity of
the human brain with the functioning of a computer system...
The Human Brain and Computer as Cascading Computation
By Andrew Tomazos, 2005
http://www.tomazos.com/ikb-151.html
...physically, there are many more similarities than people realize.
Most notably the discrete (digital, off-on, boolean) way in which a
neuron fires - rather than providing a continuous analog signal as you
would expect from a biological system.
From studying the issue, I would conclude that in terms of raw
processing power the human brain and a a current desktop PC are
currently on-par. Further it has been shown that parallelism provides
no advantage (ie a parallel system is isomorphic to a serial one with
the same total processing power).
The main difference I suspect is that human brains are wired into the
body better. The relationship between the brain and physical world is
only human by virtue of the filtering of experience through the five
senses, and muscle control - (and because we tend to treat humans as
humans - they act like humans.)
Also, human brains are given more time to develop intelligence.
Recall that it takes at least 5 years of constant real-world
interactions before a human child is more human-like than our current
best AI software.
I think we will find in the not-too-distant future that what we call
"sentience" and "intelligence" is a very simple side-effect of a
mathematically-modelable physical reaction - in which a knowledge of
self and its relationship to the external world is encoded. We will
be able to develop software quite easily to create new sentient
beings. Humans will discover that they are "just" mundane machines -
in much the same way as they have discovered we are "just" on some
planet in some solar system that is one of billions of others.
Here is a YouTube video of SILVIA, a conversational AI software from
Cognitive Code Corporation...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tevmq_op-qQ
It is nowhere near adult human intelligence, but it is worth watching
anyway.
Enjoy,
Andrew.
Errol
>
> I think we will find in the not-too-distant future that what we call
> "sentience" and "intelligence" is a very simple side-effect of a
> mathematically-modelable physical reaction - in which a knowledge of
> self and its relationship to the external world is encoded.
This is the point I always try to make when discussing AI on these
threads with starry eyed posters who actually believe that computers
are already intelligent and sentient philosopher robots are just a
marketing program away from being released to the public. The
knowledge of self and its relationship to the outside world are one of
the key factors in differentiating between full consciousness and the
current state of AI. This is not a trivial problem.
Babies initially don't know that they are seperate from the rest of
the universe and the process of learning this (through brain and
nervous system) is one of the most traumatic experiences a human
undergoes.
Interesting article and post
ZerkonXXXX
If I understand you, it seems meaning is contained in the how and why
this accumulation happens. Is this what you are saying?
John Jones
> John Jones wrote:
>> A Computer, and syntactical logic, are built on an accumulation of
>> single events. The accumulation of single events, in any form, never
>> amounts to goals, purposes, or meanings.
>
> You are arguing against artificial intelligence on grounds of the
> von Neumann architecture of todays computers. So discretism is
> the problem.
I argue against artificial intelligence on the grounds that intentions
or tasks, as a denominator of intelligence, cannot be realised except
through life as a whole - and such a whole does not arise through the
consideration of an isolated task.
Discretism employs groups of symbols. These symbols/groups do not arise
through the accumulation of events that populate discretism.
The Von Neumann architecture employs single events. The non-Neumann
architecture employs emergent phenomena supported but not derived from
single Von Neumann single events. Their derivation is imposed on it
externally, by human values and goals.
>> Meaning, goals, etc., are emergent phenomena, and emergent phenomena
>> are grounded in the human framework or context. Without emergent
>> phenomena the anthropomorphic structure we call "the computer" does
>> not arise from its single, accumulated events. And, we ought to remind
>> ourselves, we should never make the leap from anthropomorphism to
>> animism by saying that a computer has itself the goals it helps us with.
>
> Aha, discretism is the problem because it cannot generate emergence.
> Are you sure about that? Did you ever look into the many examples of
> computer models of emergence.
> http://www.googlesyndicatedsearch.com/u/jasss?q=Emergence+Model
If an emergent phenomena arises through discretism it is not because of
any arrangement or accumulation of its isolated events. Such emergent
phenomena arise OUTSIDE the model of discretism. Emergent phenomena are
imposed upon single events. That is the only way in which discretism can
>> Emergent forms, meanings, and goals, are functions of the human
>> recipient. They are supported by, but not derived from, the syntax of
>> multiple, single events.
>
> Yes, sure, because humans are an image of god. And god is infinite.
> What is the difference between support and derive?
>
The difference between support and derive is that events can support an
emergent phenomena, as flowers support a bouquet; but the properties of
the emergent phenomena, or its description, cannot be derived from those
events.
John Jones
Objects are not their own source. For example, a bouquet is not found
among a set or accumulation of flowers.
Errol
> If an emergent phenomena arises through discretism it is not because of
> any arrangement or accumulation of its isolated events. Such emergent
> phenomena arise OUTSIDE the model of discretism. Emergent phenomena are
> imposed upon single events. That is the only way in which discretism can
>
But the very definition of emergent means an unpredictable
organisation of preexisting entities! What does OUTSIDE the model of
discretism mean then?
John Jones
An emergent phenomena is eg, like a bouquet from a set of flowers. A set
of flowers, however accumulated, cannot present a bouquet.
Emergent phenomena are not spatio-temporal but are forms that arise from
spatio-temporal forms. There are some difficulties with that idea. Kant
thought that spatio-temporality was itself not spatio-temporal or
subject to the laws associated with them, like causality. Some authors
hold that Wittgenstein thought that objects were just like a bouquet, an
emergent form - unanalysable ("wholes"), ineffable, independent, and
"structured" (structured-which I wouldn't go along with).
John Jones
But no matter HOW you describe or accumulate a set of flowers, no matter
HOW you elaborate the neuron and the brain, you WON'T get either a
bouquet or an intention!
Andrew Tomazos
> But no matter HOW you describe or accumulate a set of flowers, no matter
> HOW you elaborate the neuron and the brain, you WON'T get either a
> bouquet or an intention!
The meaning of your statement is ambiguous. Could you try to restate
it in a more direct, precise and rigorous fashion.
Also, you have given no indication as to the reasons why you believe
your statement to be true.
A consequence of one literal reading of your statement is that "there
is no way to accumulate a set of flowers to get a bouquet". Taken
literally I think most people would see this statement as false. ie
How can you possibly create a bouquet without gathering (accumulating)
a set of flowers?
Perhaps you were trying to say something figuratively, so please
restate.
-Andrew.
John Stafford
>
> If an emergent phenomena arises through discretism it is not because of
> any arrangement or accumulation of its isolated events. Such emergent
> phenomena arise OUTSIDE the model of discretism. Emergent phenomena are
> imposed upon single events.
Perhaps you could explain what you believe discretism means and how it
relates to emergence. And how does phenomena impose upon events?
John Jones
Whatever you do to a set of flowers, the set of flowers per se won't
make a bouquet. A bouquet is a manifestation that is not a property of
the set of flowers. So similarly, whatever you do to a set of neurons,
they won't make an intention or conscious act.
There is no way to accumulate a set of flowers to make a bouquet. A
bouquet is manifested by the human perceiver. A bouquet isn't a physical
property of a set of individual flowers.
Andrew Tomazos
> Whatever you do to a set of flowers, the set of flowers per se won't
> make a bouquet. A bouquet is a manifestation that is not a property of
> the set of flowers. So similarly, whatever you do to a set of neurons,
> they won't make an intention or conscious act.
>
> There is no way to accumulate a set of flowers to make a bouquet. A
> bouquet is manifested by the human perceiver. A bouquet isn't a physical
> property of a set of individual flowers.
Well that's just a trivial matter of definition. This is the "if a
tree falls in the forest with noone around, does it make a sound?"
debate:
Consider this: Suppose a florist arranges some flowers into a
bouquet. Then suppose a strong wind blows a random collection of
flowers into a configuration that is very similar to the bouquet. If
a perceiver were given a double blind test, he could not distinguish
between these two sets of flowers. Now lets suppose noone perceives
the randomly blown together set of flowers. Is this set of flowers
then a bouquet, or is it not? The answer will be the same as the tree
falling in the forest answer.
Debatable, trivial and of interest only to young children.
-Andrew.
Andrew Tomazos
> Debatable, trivial and of interest only to young children.
Actually let me clarify that last line a little. "The tree falling in
the forest" answer is trivial to debate either way - and thinking
about it is only of *use* to young children as they are first
discovering language.
I did not mean to suggest that you personally are a young child, or to
make any sort of "against the man" attack.
-Andrew.
MeAmI.org
http://mathforum.org/kb/message.jspa?messageID=6776178&tstart=0
The most powerful concepts are pretty basic by nature.
Next time please cite my theory if you are aware.
Lastly, I don't understand why some posters in this thread have
brought up Jews and Gas Chambers at this most inopportune moment. What
is particularly puzzling is how the rest of their comments seems
coherent and reasonable which leads me to believe the value of these
insane immoral and outlandish phrases serve some dual purpose as to
yet unseen.
--
Musatov
John Jones
The randomly blown set of flowers, and the set of flowers arranged into
a bouquet are each NOT a bouquet. Why? -
A bouquet is NOT a physical property. There is no physically measurable
"bouquet" property that is distinct from a set of flowers.
I am being a realist. You are attributing non-physical properties to the
physical, which is a sort of superstition.
MeAmI.org
>
> - Show quoted text -
P def. = ⋃ k⩾0. TIME(n k. ), and the recognition of its importance,
became another remarkable discovery of complexity theory, made before
the NP-era set ...
Time is a physical property pertaining to computation.
Listen to me:
ISPUB - Mentoring in Advanced Practice Nursing: The Use
of ...Coordinator, Graduate PNP Program School of Nursing ... The use
of metaphors, which link the essence of the unknown through analogy
with the known, stimulates a .... and I will guarantee to take any one
at random and train him to become any type .... The mentoring process
could be analogous to a bouquet of flowers. ...
Brain dynein crossbridges microtubules into bundlesphate (AMP-PNP)
plus MgSCt. Apyrase was not used to .... suggests that its shape is
not random. Its total length .... Isolated arms resemble bouquets of
two or three flowers, whose stems are connected at the base .... basal
region of bouquets is poorly defined (see. Fig. 7). By analogy with
axonemal dynein (see ...
Stanford ESP - Splash! Spring 2009... reductions, and understand the
biggest open question in computer science: does P=NP? ...... H290:
Arts and Craft - make your own foam flower bouquet, May Wah Sun, .....
Interested in politics or random thoughts? This course is designed
to ..... learn of analogies between Western and Chinese musical
instruments, ...
www.stanfordesp.org/learn/Splash/2009_Spring/catalog
The Comics Curmudgeon » Blog Archive » Dropping the reins,
holding ...Isn't that more the random deus ex machina that SM usually
gets? .... (At least that's how I read that absolutely obtuse analogy
in the final panel, .... you'll see PNP — which stands for “pediatric
nurse practioner”. .... No bouquet. No special flowers - why must
something die to celebrate our union? ...
INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSLATIONS The variety is not simply random,
however, as the careful construction of ... of the réception and Saint-
Vallier's analogy with Jacob and his son Joseph. .... the characters
carried real bouquets of the flowers they presented to Mother ...
Volpi, Charles P. de. Québec: Recueil iconographique / A Pictorial
Record. ...
missbeebotany Gorgeous variations in the grass, yellow flowers,
circular rings of ..... he used to pick my mom bouquets of
paintbrushes and bring them to her ... so I can only use analogies),
and several more ground cover plants, flowers, and shrubs. .... and
the ed materials here in the NP say the eruption was 7000 years
ago. ...
Cognitive Exploration of Language and LinguisticsFile Format: PDF/
Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML
ing for the action of calling people up (often at random) to sell them
something. ...... sequences, either an NP or a pronoun could be used,
but with different effects. ..... of so-called regular forms is caused
by the principle of analogy. But ..... as to emerge, and especially
the bouquet of 6000 flowers (= lan- ...
God, DotA, Leadership, Funny, SEO - PJ LightHouse » 2006 ...All
players start off with a random hero chosen out of both taverns. -
np ... Like a bouquet of lovely roses. Fragrance brightens up my
day ... In a cemetery: “PERSONS ARE PROHIBITED FROM PICKING FLOWERS
FROM ANY BUT THEIR OWN GRAVES.” .... Well, OK, the analogy sort of
falls apart there, but you get the idea. ...
A Novel Serum Protein Similar to C1q, Produced Exclusively in ......
by analogy to a similar modification in the structurally related ...
an 18-mer complex often referred to as a ``bouquet of
flowers'' (reviewed in (26) ). ...... W. Li, J. Tonelli, P. Kishore,
R. Owen, E. Goodman, P. E.
Stop taking things literally always. Stop judging. Look at the data
and think possibilities. No more whining. No more name calling. No
more accusations.
There is nothing more real than letters on a page.
Thank you.
--M.M.Musatov
Andrew Tomazos
It depends on your definition of bouquet. One definition of bouquet
could be "a sets of flowers that are bound together". That is a
measurable physical property. Clearly you are using some other
definition. Please define what you mean when you say the word
bouquet.
-Andrew.
I.N.R.I. Logic
Dear Mr. Andrew T.:
I am necessary in reference to bouquet so two pronged in my
definition.
Literally of course a bouquet is an arrangement of flowers given as a
present.
It also in the sense we have used it across USENET and Sci.Math refers
to statistics.
Namely,
Usage Statistics for abcgallery.com - August 2005 - Search String...
borovikovsky 11 0.00% botticelli calumny 11 0.00% bouquet of flowers
11 ..... gallery 7 0.00% arts of spain 7 0.00% ascension of christ 7
0.00% august ...... 3 0.00% victor borisov-musatov 3 0.00% vienna
kunsthistorisches museum van ...... greek nymph picture 1 0.00% aman-
1 0.00% amanda stevenson math 1 0.00% ...
www.abcgallery.com/webstat/search_200508.html
[PDF] /tardir/tiffs/a371829.tiff
Christ", even though officially it refuses to have anything to . do
with them. * . ..... The life of Lidiya Sergeyevna Musatov, a mother
of twe children, also ended sadly after she encountered that ......
bouquets of bright flowers in their hands. -/ ..... mathematics,
replies to letters from workers in which they ...
handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA371829
Make no comment on my faith. Today I am simply reasoning logic and
mathematics and I expect the same.
Do not be vague, as I stand firm against this last refuge of unknowing
cowardice and towards discovery of greather truth.
(Sounds like Julius Caesar, does it now?)
--
I.N.R.I. Logic
p.s. Have a little fun, but just find a way to make it make sense.
Find a truth in everything. Make it sing.
Paul E. Black
> Andrew Tomazos wrote:
>> On Jul 7, 3:06 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>>> Whatever you do to a set of flowers, the set of flowers per se won't
>>> make a bouquet. A bouquet is a manifestation that is not a property of
>>> the set of flowers.
>>>
>>> bouquet is manifested by the human perceiver. A bouquet isn't a physical
>>> property of a set of individual flowers.
>
> a bouquet are each NOT a bouquet. Why? -
>
> A bouquet is NOT a physical property. There is no physically measurable
> "bouquet" property that is distinct from a set of flowers.
Although you balk at considering "bouquet" a physically measurable
property, I don't see that your criterion can be consistently applied.
We have been speaking of bouquets and flowers. But is "flower" a
physically measurable property? After all, a flower is just an
arrangement of molecules. And I'm sure those with botanical
backgrounds could give examples of almost-flowers and
not-quite-flowers. Does "flower" include the stem? The roots? Any
internal parasites, micro- or macroscopic? How about symbiotes? Or
non-living inclusions? I bring up these points not to say that no
labels are possible or to disparage botanists (who, I'm sure have a
quite good definition of what is a flower), but to express my view
that most of what we do is label the world in neat categories, but the
world is under no obligation to fit those categories.
As an amateur metrologist, I've found that the notion of a "physical
property" is elusive, and we usually can (and must!) make do quite
nicely with less than Platonic ideals. It short, it is (or can be) as
reasonable to consider "bouquet" a physical property as to consider
"flower" or "red" or "mass" physical properties.
-paul-
--
Paul E. Black (p.b...@acm.org)
P.S. I know where your lap goes when you stand up. But I can't tell
you.
John Jones
Emergent phenomena are imposed on singular events. They are not created
by them.
John Jones
Time is a physical property?! How is it measured?
John Jones
That doesn't work, if only because "bound" isn't a property derived from
the set.
> That is a
> measurable physical property.
Only if it is defined from without. You have nerely substituted "bound"
for "bouquet".
> Clearly you are using some other
> definition. Please define what you mean when you say the word
> bouquet.
> -Andrew.
I use it in the way you use it.
John Jones
> On Tuesday 07 July 2009 17:23, John Jones wrote:
>> Andrew Tomazos wrote:
>>> On Jul 7, 3:06 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>>>> Whatever you do to a set of flowers, the set of flowers per se won't
>>>> make a bouquet. A bouquet is a manifestation that is not a property of
>>>> the set of flowers.
>>>>
>>>> There is no way to accumulate a set of flowers to make a bouquet. A
>>>> bouquet is manifested by the human perceiver. A bouquet isn't a physical
>>>> property of a set of individual flowers.
>> The randomly blown set of flowers, and the set of flowers arranged into
>> a bouquet are each NOT a bouquet. Why? -
>>
>> A bouquet is NOT a physical property. There is no physically measurable
>> "bouquet" property that is distinct from a set of flowers.
>
> Although you balk at considering "bouquet" a physically measurable
> property, I don't see that your criterion can be consistently applied.
> We have been speaking of bouquets and flowers. But is "flower" a
> physically measurable property?
No, a flower isn't a measurable property, yet my point still stands.
> After all, a flower is just an
> arrangement of molecules.
That's a tautology. Your "arrangement" is already a surrogate flower.
> And I'm sure those with botanical
> backgrounds could give examples of almost-flowers and
> not-quite-flowers. Does "flower" include the stem? The roots? Any
> internal parasites, micro- or macroscopic?
It means whatever you want it to mean. I can use your own definitions.
> I bring up these points not to say that no
> labels are possible or to disparage botanists (who, I'm sure have a
> quite good definition of what is a flower), but to express my view
> that most of what we do is label the world in neat categories, but the
> world is under no obligation to fit those categories.
That's all I'm saying.
>
> As an amateur metrologist, I've found that the notion of a "physical
> property" is elusive, and we usually can (and must!) make do quite
> nicely with less than Platonic ideals. It short, it is (or can be) as
> reasonable to consider "bouquet" a physical property as to consider
> "flower" or "red" or "mass" physical properties.
But my point is that the physical property is defined by ourselves.
Andrew Tomazos
> > It depends on your definition of bouquet. One definition of bouquet
> > could be "a sets of flowers that are bound together".
>
> That doesn't work, if only because "bound" isn't a property derived from
> the set.
>
> > That is a
> > measurable physical property.
>
> Only if it is defined from without. You have nerely substituted "bound"
> for "bouquet".
I don't know precisely what you mean by "a property derived from the
set" and something that is "defined from without". Could you go
through that in more detail.
-Andrew.
John Jones
For example, a set of cows isn't a herd, a set of flowers isn't a
bouquet. These forms do not arise as a summation of the individual
properties of the set.
Andrew Tomazos
> For example, a set of cows isn't a herd, a set of flowers isn't a
> bouquet. These forms do not arise as a summation of the individual
> properties of the set.
Ok - let's try and see if you are correct. How can we test whether a
set of cows is or isn't a herd?
-Andrew.
John Stafford
> For example, a set of cows isn't a herd, a set of flowers isn't a
> bouquet. These forms do not arise as a summation of the individual
> properties of the set.
You want word-salad, well now you have it. First, go back to your desk
and rewrite the above without using the word 'form'. It is unnecessary
to the posit, and undefined. Don't ever do that again.
Next try to justify why/how the existence of a member of a set arises
from the inclusion into a set, then is its properties. Tell us also what
"summation" of "individual" properties means. Write concisely and simply.
Next, write a love letter to your mate without violating your own
language rules.
Finally, practice this exercise: write one of your posits with the
logical put backwards. Read it. If it does not make sense, then discard
it. Keep in mind that this is an exercise. Repeat until you climb out of
the rabbit hole.
David Bernier
I like the "DRY" principle: Don't Repeat Yourself.
According to the Wikipedia article on _Don't_repeat_yourself_ ,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Don't_repeat_yourself:
<< DRY is a core principle of Andy Hunt and Dave Thomas's
book The Pragmatic Programmer. >>
Another quote from the same article:
<< The philosophy emphasizes that information should not
be duplicated, [...] . >>
David Bernier
John Jones
It can't be tested for it. It is a form that we impose on the parts or
elements. By "impose" I mean we give the set a property that is not
found in its parts, or in the summation of the parts. By "give" I mean
the way we publicly recognise the set as being a particular whole. A
herd is a whole, a bouquet is a whole. They are not totals.
John Jones
> On Jul 12, 4:55 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>
> > For example, a set of cows isn't a herd, a set of flowers isn't a
> > bouquet. These forms do not arise as a summation of the individual
> > properties of the set.
>
> You want word-salad, well now you have it. First, go back to your desk
> and rewrite the above without using the word 'form'. It is unnecessary
> to the posit, and undefined. Don't ever do that again.
I don't think calling a bouquet a form is obscure. You could call it the
name of a publicly recognised object. Or an Idea. You could call it a
template. A bouquet as a template.
>
> Next try to justify why/how the existence of a member of a set arises
> from the inclusion into a set, then is its properties. Tell us also what
> "summation" of "individual" properties means. Write concisely and simply.
'Set' is problematic.
But by summation I mean a total. If I total the flowers in a set, by
counting them for example, then I don't get a bouquet. A bouquet is not
configured among the properties of individual flowers.
Andrew Tomazos
> Andrew Tomazos wrote:
> > On Jul 12, 4:55 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@btinternet.com> wrote:
> >> For example, a set of cows isn't a herd, a set of flowers isn't a
> >> bouquet. These forms do not arise as a summation of the individual
> >> properties of the set.
>
> > Ok - let's try and see if you are correct. How can we test whether a
> > set of cows is or isn't a herd?
>
Very good. And now: because the difference cannot be tested for - it
is imperceptible by definition, right? As you just said, we have no
way to tell whether or not a set of cows is or isn't a herd. We can't
perceive the difference.
Given that we can't perceive the difference - of what use is the
knowledge that a set of cows is not a herd? If we think incorrectly,
that a set of cows is a herd, what impact would it have on our lives?
What should we do differently armed with this knowledge?
-Andrew.
John Jones
> On Jul 12, 9:06 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>> Andrew Tomazos wrote:
>>> On Jul 12, 4:55 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>>>> For example, a set of cows isn't a herd, a set of flowers isn't a
>>>> bouquet. These forms do not arise as a summation of the individual
>>>> properties of the set.
>>> Ok - let's try and see if you are correct. How can we test whether a
>>> set of cows is or isn't a herd?
>> It can't be tested for it.
>
> Very good. And now: because the difference cannot be tested for - it
> is imperceptible by definition, right? As you just said, we have no
> way to tell whether or not a set of cows is or isn't a herd. We can't
> perceive the difference.
Yes, we cannot tell whether a set of cows is a herd, just from an
examination of individual cows. The herd emerges as a phenomena that is
not configured in individual cows.
Andrew Tomazos
> > Very good. And now: because the difference cannot be tested for - it
> > is imperceptible by definition, right? As you just said, we have no
> > way to tell whether or not a set of cows is or isn't a herd. We can't
> > perceive the difference.
>
> > knowledge that a set of cows is not a herd? If we think incorrectly,
> > that a set of cows is a herd, what impact would it have on our lives?
> > What should we do differently armed with this knowledge?
>
> Yes, we cannot tell whether a set of cows is a herd, just from an
> examination of individual cows. The herd emerges as a phenomena that is
> not configured in individual cows.
You didn't answer my questions:
John Stafford
"John Jones" <jonesc...@btinternet.com> wrote:
> Andrew Tomazos wrote:
>> On Jul 12, 9:06 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>>> Andrew Tomazos wrote:
>>>> On Jul 12, 4:55 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>>>>> For example, a set of cows isn't a herd, a set of flowers isn't a
>>>>> bouquet. These forms do not arise as a summation of the individual
>>>>> properties of the set.
>>>> Ok - let's try and see if you are correct. How can we test whether a
>>>> set of cows is or isn't a herd?
>>> It can't be tested for it.
>>
>> Very good. And now: because the difference cannot be tested for - it
>> is imperceptible by definition, right? As you just said, we have no
>> way to tell whether or not a set of cows is or isn't a herd. We can't
>> perceive the difference.
>
> Yes, we cannot tell whether a set of cows is a herd, just from an
> examination of individual cows. The herd emerges as a phenomena that is
> not configured in individual cows.
Why the trivial name game?
John Jones
If we wanted food taken from a set of cows we might expect to have meat
taken from cows scattered across the world. But if I wanted meat from a
herd I might expect to get it from a single breed.
John Jones
It's not trivial. There are forms that emerge from collections or "sets"
that are important to us.
Andrew Tomazos
> >>> Very good. And now: because the difference cannot be tested for - it
> >>> is imperceptible by definition, right? As you just said, we have no
> >>> way to tell whether or not a set of cows is or isn't a herd. We can't
> >>> perceive the difference.
> >> Yes, we cannot tell whether a set of cows is a herd, just from an
> >> examination of individual cows. The herd emerges as a phenomena that is
> >> not configured in individual cows.
>
> > You didn't answer my questions:
>
> > Given that we can't perceive the difference - of what use is the
> > knowledge that a set of cows is not a herd? If we think incorrectly,
> > that a set of cows is a herd, what impact would it have on our lives?
> > What should we do differently armed with this knowledge?
>
> If we wanted food taken from a set of cows we might expect to have meat
> taken from cows scattered across the world. But if I wanted meat from a
> herd I might expect to get it from a single breed.
If that were true than couldn't we take a sample of meat from the set
of cows, and test whether or not it comes from the same breed?
Wouldn't this contradict your earlier assertion that the distinction
is not testable?
-Andrew.
Errol
I would presume you are saying that people impose the emergent
phenomena on singular events.
I think you misunderstand the concept of emergent phenomena.
Weak emergence is due to interactions at an elementary level
Strong emergence is when the system itself imposes on its elements
(mind being a good example)
Emergence is not a matter of people ascribing a different form or
intention (as you use the terms) onto a collection of the elements.
What emergent properties does a bouquet have that a pleasing
arrangement of flowers doesn't?
jbriggs444
> On Jul 7, 3:06 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>
> > Whatever you do to a set of flowers, the set of flowers per se won't
> > make a bouquet. A bouquet is a manifestation that is not a property of
> > they won't make an intention or conscious act.
>
> > bouquet is manifested by the human perceiver. A bouquet isn't a physical
> > property of a set of individual flowers.
>
> tree falls in the forest with noone around, does it make a sound?"
> debate:
>
> Consider this: Suppose a florist arranges some flowers into a
> bouquet. Then suppose a strong wind blows a random collection of
> flowers into a configuration that is very similar to the bouquet. If
> a perceiver were given a double blind test, he could not distinguish
> between these two sets of flowers. Now lets suppose noone perceives
> the randomly blown together set of flowers. Is this set of flowers
> then a bouquet, or is it not? The answer will be the same as the tree
> falling in the forest answer.
>
> Debatable, trivial and of interest only to young children.
> -Andrew.
That's not the "tree falling in the forest" question. That's an
evasion that some people use to avoid the "tree falling in the forest"
question. If you define "sound" to be the sensory impression that
people get when they hear something then clearly the tree makes no
sound. But this conclusion offers no insight into the question. The
interesting part has been defined away.
A direct answer to the tree falling in the forest question is "we
cannot know". If we're trying to consider a model of the way the
world works, this particular area is a blank slate. The model can say
anything at all about the sound made by such trees without fear of a
contrary observation.
Personally, I prefer to use models where the tree makes a sound. The
bigger the tree the louder the sound.
Andrew Tomazos
> That's not the "tree falling in the forest" question. That's an
> evasion that some people use to avoid the "tree falling in the forest"
> question. If you define "sound" to be the sensory impression that
> people get when they hear something then clearly the tree makes no
> sound. But this conclusion offers no insight into the question. The
> interesting part has been defined away.
It was my understanding that the purpose of the tree falling question
was to understand the ambiguity of the definition of "sound" as (a) a
sensory impression; or (b) that of vibrating air.
You seem to be also looking at it as a Schrödinger's cat type question
about observability.
In either case, I was referring to my interpretation when comparing it
to the OPs claims about the meaning of bouquet.
-Andrew.
Marshall
>
> > Time is a physical property pertaining to computation.
>
> Time is a physical property?! How is it measured?
When the big hand is on the 12 and the little hand is on
the three, then you can get your lunchbox and go home.
Marshall
Paul E. Black
> Andrew Tomazos wrote:
>> On Jul 12, 9:06 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>>> Andrew Tomazos wrote:
>>>> On Jul 12, 4:55 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@btinternet.com> wrote:
>>>>> For example, a set of cows isn't a herd, a set of flowers isn't a
>>>>> bouquet. These forms do not arise as a summation of the individual
>>>>> properties of the set.
>>>> Ok - let's try and see if you are correct. How can we test whether a
>>>> set of cows is or isn't a herd?
>>> It can't be tested for it.
>>
>> Very good. And now: because the difference cannot be tested for - it
>> is imperceptible by definition, right? As you just said, we have no
>> way to tell whether or not a set of cows is or isn't a herd. We can't
>> perceive the difference.
>
> Yes, we cannot tell whether a set of cows is a herd, just from an
> examination of individual cows. The herd emerges as a phenomena that is
> not configured in individual cows.
We cannot tell whether a set of atoms is a cow just from an
examination of individual atoms. So why is "cow" a physical property
and "herd of cows" is not?
John Jones
I thought it is a matter of it.
John Jones
Yes. So lets not belabour the old clock.
John Jones
When you test something you apply its elements against a different set
of conditions.
John Jones
Quite right. All objects are emergent properties of their elements. But
elements themselves are emergent properties.
John Jones
Well, how could we know when something is heard?
> If we're trying to consider a model of the way the
> world works, this particular area is a blank slate.
No its not. It's present and perfectly clear.
> The model can say
> anything at all about the sound made by such trees without fear of a
> contrary observation.
Anything? all it could say is that someone or something heard it. EVEN
THEN it's not down to the tree!
>
> Personally, I prefer to use models where the tree makes a sound. The
> bigger the tree the louder the sound.
Crikey.
Andrew Tomazos
> When you test something you apply its elements against a different set
> of conditions.
It was actually a rhetorical question. You have clearly contradicted
yourself. On one hand you have said that something is not
perceivable, and on the other hand you have said that it is. This
demonstrated that your position is not consistent and therefore at
least some of your statements must be false. Your argument has been
defeated.
-Andrew.