Wittgenstein and the nihilation paradox
John Jones
negation I introduce a paradox associated with nihilation. I draw a
tenuous similarity between the elements of that paradox and
Wittgenstein's saying-showing distinction.
NEGATION supposes a community where one thing can take the place of
another. Not-A supposes B. For example, if it's not raining, then we
don't expect the weather to vanish. We expect it will be doing something
else, like snowing, perhaps.
We can make a general rule for negation: negation keeps the framework
which holds a community of possible objects, but switches objects within
that framework. In the example above, the framework is the weather. The
negation 'it is not raining' keeps the framework (the weather), but
changes the object (raining).
Often in negation we are not concerned about what object comes to take
the place of another. For example, we might not be concerned whether, in
place of not-raining, it is snowing or not, if all we want to know is
that it is not raining. Nevertheless, even if we don't state what
logical object is substituted for not-raining (such as snowing, sunny,
etc), that object is implicit. We simply don't talk about it. It is a
"failure to mention".
1) NIHILATION, on the other hand, does not suppose one thing in place of
another. Not-A does not suppose B. In nihilation both a framework and
its possible objects vanish. Unlike the 'negation' interpretation of
'not raining', the 'nihilation' interpretation does not imply the
weather is doing something else, like snowing. In that case, the weather
itself vanishes. Framework and object vanish in nihilation.
There is no "failure to mention" in nihilation. Indeed the nihilation
'not raining' is equivalent to saying nothing at all. For, whatever the
framework, and whatever the object (e.g. weather/rain, sound/music,
colour/red, etc) with the vanishing of both framework and object "saying
nothing at all" sums up each case in like manner.
THE PARADOX and WITTGENSTEIN
Obviously, there is no logical presentation where nothing is said. Yet,
quite clearly, we can see that nothing can be presented where both
framework and object are absent. Are we then to suppose that logic
cannot work with frameworks? that it can only work with objects
existing, vaguely, in a "magnolia matrix", a conveniently universal domain?
Notwithstanding the currently popular austere interpretation of
Wittgenstein's "saying-showing" distinction in logic as Wittgenstein
making an allusion to mere nonsense, I suggest that Wittgenstein's
distinction was substantive and that he was not refuting as nonsense the
idea that some things could not be said (or written) but only shown. I
leave it to the imagination of the interested reader to determine
whether Wittgenstein's saying-showing enigma, as it still appears to
many today, was an oblique reference to the problems of presenting or
"saying" both objects and their frameworks in logic, problems
highlighted by the negation-nihilation distinction.
Immortalist
> From a preliminary discussion on the distinction between nihilation and
> negation I introduce a paradox associated with nihilation. I draw a
> tenuous similarity between the elements of that paradox and
> Wittgenstein's saying-showing distinction.
>
> NEGATION supposes a community where one thing can take the place of
> another. Not-A supposes B. For example, if it's not raining, then we
> don't expect the weather to vanish. We expect it will be doing something
> else, like snowing, perhaps.
>
It seems that you are confusing "propositions" about events, with the
events themselves. Not-A in first order logic simply means, in
ordinary language; "it is not true that A is the case." You need to
construct a conditional rule in order for B to replace A, even in the
symbol spaces of rhetoric. If Not-A then B; translation to ordinary
language: If it is not the case that A is true then it is implied by
this rule, in need of justification itself, that the case of B being
true. (Simple Ordinary): At all time that A is not true then B is
true. This clears up where a lot of language game problems crop up.
John Jones
> On Nov 20, 3:34 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
>> NEGATION supposes a community where one thing can take the place of
>> another. Not-A supposes B. For example, if it's not raining, then we
>> don't expect the weather to vanish. We expect it will be doing something
>> else, like snowing, perhaps.
>>
>
> It seems that you are confusing "propositions" about events, with the
> events themselves. Not-A in first order logic simply means, in
> ordinary language; "it is not true that A is the case." You need to
> construct a conditional rule in order for B to replace A, even in the
> symbol spaces of rhetoric. If Not-A then B; translation to ordinary
> language: If it is not the case that A is true then it is implied by
> this rule, in need of justification itself, that the case of B being
> true. (Simple Ordinary): At all time that A is not true then B is
> true. This clears up where a lot of language game problems crop up.
>
Both propositions and events are discreet. There's no room for a
confusion on that point.
I don't need to construct a conditional rule for any B to replace A in
'not-A'. 'Not-A' already implies any B, but there is a 'failure to
mention' it.
heron stone
> confusion on that point.
.there are no "events"
."events" are figments of language
."events" only emerge in the domain of language
.there are no "events" in the experience of flies
--
unDO email address
___
Nature, heron stone
to be commanded, http://gendo.net
must be obeyed. mailto:her...@gendo.net
John Jones
>> Both propositions and events are discreet. There's no room for a
>> confusion on that point.
>
> .there are no "events"
> ."events" are figments of language
>
> ."events" only emerge in the domain of language
>
> .there are no "events" in the experience of flies
>
There's a danger, of course, in lumping all events together as an
experience. But we don't want to do that. I am saying that an experience
cannot be a list of events.
heron stone
wrote:
.i question the very idea of "an experience" (a discrete entity)
as distinct from "experience" (a more general reference)
Akira Bergman
Negation is relative to the framework's own zero. Nihilation refers to
the specific frame from the outside (as Immortalist also mentioned).
Nihilation seems to be about locality, and negation about the action
inside that locality. Maybe showing-saying distinction is like the
position-momentum duality. There may even be link to the uncertainty
pple here.