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Modern Philosophy and Realism

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wri...@writemaster.com

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Aug 14, 2002, 9:32:25 AM8/14/02
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I am hoping someone can resolve a debate I was having with a current
graduate student in philosophy. I expressed my understanding that
most modern philosophers do not subscribe to what made be labelled as
"naive realism".

(Which I will summarize as: 1. The objective world is out there,
external to us, independent of our perception, extended in space and
persistent in time, with inherent cause and effect properties; 2.
Our senses perceive that external world with sufficient accuracy, and
using our reason we can understand that external, objective world. We
don't create reality with our senses or our thoughts, but we can
correctly understand reality and can modify it with our actions, which
are directed by our thoughts.)

My sense is that most modern philosophers, people teaching at the top
Universities, are still struggling with modern variations on Kant's
formulation that, in a sense, what we perceive is our own mind; and
perhaps, only distantly, filtered through our perceptions, is a real
world that we cannot truly grasp. For example, if I understand
correctly, phenomenology still has a major hold on academia, and that
philosophical school struggles with how we extract a sense of
"wholeness", or "the objectness of things", from the mere phenomena we
experience.

Now, I may have all of this totally wrong. So, PLEASE feel free to
enlighten me about where (the majority of) modern academics stand on
philosophical realism. (And correct my view of phenomenology if I
have that wrong.)

Thanks,
Steve
writer@REMOVE_THIS_SPAM_PROTECTIONwritemaster.com

Sir Frederick

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Aug 14, 2002, 9:44:23 AM8/14/02
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What did your "current graduate student in philosophy" espouse?
How did said student comment on (debate) your observations?


--
Best,
Frederick Martin McNeill
Poway, California, United States of America
mmcn...@fuzzysys.com
http://www.fuzzysys.com
*************************
Phrase of the week :
"Science comes from the knowing that you want to know."
-- Eli Siegel
:-))))Snort!)
*************************

Immortalist

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Aug 14, 2002, 11:41:45 AM8/14/02
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<wri...@writemaster.com> wrote in message
news:3d5a85af...@news.concentric.net...

> I am hoping someone can resolve a debate I was having with a current
> graduate student in philosophy. I expressed my understanding that
> most modern philosophers do not subscribe to what made be labelled as
> "naive realism".
>
> (Which I will summarize as: 1. The objective world is out there,
> external to us, independent of our perception, extended in space and
> persistent in time, with inherent cause and effect properties;

Our belief that the objective world is out there, external to us,


independent of our perception, extended in space and persistent in time,

with inherent cause and effect properties, continues to suffer the
possibility of being mistaken. Since it is logically possible, but highly
unlikely, that under exactly duplicate conditions these beliefs can be
wrong, certain knowledge cannot be attained. No matter how unlikely, if it
is still logically possible that you have a helmet on which is broadcasting
all your experiences by a sinister Dr. Braino, then any experiences and
perceptions about the external world could be duplicated but also false. If
the conditions, no matter how absurd, cannot be completely ruled out, they
are logically possible and so discount the notion that we have complete
justification or certain knowledge that our beliefs about the world
constitute knowing. Learn to live with it there is no escape sir, since our
human faculties cannot rule out all possibility for errors. Of course I
might believe in error, but that is the point!

> 2.
> Our senses perceive that external world with sufficient accuracy, and
> using our reason we can understand that external, objective world. We
> don't create reality with our senses or our thoughts, but we can
> correctly understand reality and can modify it with our actions, which
> are directed by our thoughts.)
>

The model of the world built up in our brains consists of a creative
patterning of data which allows our perceptions of reality to be
symbollically manipulated and shuffled around to predict possible outcomes.
These perceptions of reality can be mistaken as shown by drugs, dreams,
hallucinations, etc... So we create a model of the world not the world. As
we can be mistaken about our perceptions of the world, we can be mistaken
about this notion that we actually create the world. Obviously we can create
changes in the world by manipulating it physically.


> My sense is that most modern philosophers, people teaching at the top
> Universities, are still struggling with modern variations on Kant's
> formulation that, in a sense, what we perceive is our own mind; and
> perhaps, only distantly, filtered through our perceptions, is a real
> world that we cannot truly grasp. For example, if I understand
> correctly, phenomenology still has a major hold on academia, and that
> philosophical school struggles with how we extract a sense of
> "wholeness", or "the objectness of things", from the mere phenomena we
> experience.
>

It is simply a technical matter. We can be relatively certain that the world
outside of out experience exists as the strongest theory and the most
powerfull supporting evidence, even if it is a not possible to rule out the
very small possibility we could all be wrong, and we do not have
certain_knowledge with complete justification that the world actually exist,
for all intents and purposes the best theory we have makes it a *fact* that
the world exists. [*fact*] in this context means best possible knowledge and
best possible certainty in this human condition where certain_knowledge with
no possibility for error is not a possibility. (unless emotions constitute
evidence)

Sir Frederick

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Aug 14, 2002, 12:28:39 PM8/14/02
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Good response!
Very abstract, as is necessary, so most won't understand, even "writer".
Humans are mostly not intelligent enough or too folk lore constrained
to have any kind of scientific understanding of themselves.

wri...@writemaster.com

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Aug 14, 2002, 12:29:13 PM8/14/02
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The "current graduate student" said that modern academic philosophers
have no serious dispute with naive realism. I'd like to know if they
is a correct perception of the current views that are (generally) held
at places like Harvard, Cornell, etc.

For myself, I believe that "naive" realism is not naive, and is
self-evidently true. But again, I'm trying to get a signal on what
modern Ivy Leagers might say.

Steve O.

Immortalist

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Aug 14, 2002, 1:34:53 PM8/14/02
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"Sir Frederick" <mmcn...@fuzzysys.com> wrote in message
news:3D5A851B...@fuzzysys.com...

true the absolute sceptic is always asked how do you know that i dont know?
but i have a very good grasp of the above sir since i typed it without
reffering to one thing except my memory, though it is always possible i may
be mistaken, at least i remember typing it and actually looking a second
time for mispelling since epistemology is our sacred science right?

1Z

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Aug 14, 2002, 2:18:37 PM8/14/02
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> I am hoping someone can resolve a debate I was having with a current
> graduate student in philosophy. I expressed my understanding that
> most modern philosophers do not subscribe to what made be labelled as
> "naive realism".
>
> (Which I will summarize as: 1. The objective world is out there,
> external to us, independent of our perception, extended in space and
> persistent in time, with inherent cause and effect properties; 2.
> Our senses perceive that external world with sufficient accuracy, and
> using our reason we can understand that external, objective world. We
> don't create reality with our senses or our thoughts, but we can
> correctly understand reality and can modify it with our actions, which
> are directed by our thoughts.)
>
> My sense is that most modern philosophers, people teaching at the top
> Universities, are still struggling with modern variations on Kant's
> formulation that, in a sense, what we perceive is our own mind; and
> perhaps, only distantly, filtered through our perceptions, is a real
> world that we cannot truly grasp.

There are many contemporary
philosophers in of the anglophone/analytical/science-orientated
type do in fact believe in just the kind of realism you have described
(which I do not think is particulary naive).
Many philosophers of the continental/post-modernist variety disbeleive
in another kind or realism--the kind that says there is, or
could be, a priveleged theory or vocabulary which captures the very
essence of the way things are.

> For example, if I understand
> correctly, phenomenology still has a major hold on academia,

I don't think this is the case at all.

f...@attglobal.net

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Aug 15, 2002, 6:15:25 PM8/15/02
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On that criticism of Criticism:

Philosophical realism could mean, viewing the real world at the level of
philosophy,
it could not sensibly mean, viewing the real world ignoring the level of
philosophy.

While there has been a lot of common sense philosophy again in the 20th
century,
the fox of common sense did not grasp the sense of philosophical
argument.Thus be content with common sense, if You like, but do not
pretend it to be philosophy.

Nobody amongst philosophers will try to defend a non sensical statement to
the effect that "reality does not exist ... really ... ?!".

Neither Berkeley did, nor Kant.

Perhaps a review of what could be the force of epistemological criticism,
might help.

Take the short path
Aren't they realists ?

Say, Russell once (1910) contested something like:
... while the order of macroscopic things in space and/or time is
objective, measured distance or time need not be an objective nor precise
picture of the way, things are ...

Say, some physicians take into account some distortion of measurement
results by measurement process in general, not only and not especially for
very small objects.

Say, until nowadays physics cannot answer the question of ancient Greek
philosophy
on whether there a many (let alone: infinitely many things), or whether
countability of things is only an epiphenomenon of everyday and technical
life ...

There is - besides - a well known philosophical argument against
criticism, which, surprising enough, has been held by an rather esoteric
philosopher like G.W.F.Hegel as well as by an supposed common sense
philospher like G.E.Moore, Of course, szenario and wording is quite
different. The argument runs in both cases, that epistemological criticism
arises from a too exaggerate request for certainty in epistemologically
basic assertions.

But this does not imply, that common sense statements could replace
philsophical analysis without loss on knowledge .

The so called Founder of Common Sense Philosophy, Bishop Butler, is cited
to have stated frankly: "Anything is, what it is, and not another thing".

Well, let's conclude, this applies to philosophy, especially epistemology,
as well.

Regards
fwg

wri...@writemaster.com schrieb:

Ben H.

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Aug 25, 2002, 3:33:06 AM8/25/02
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<wri...@writemaster.com> wrote in message
news:3d5a85af...@news.concentric.net...

I'm sorry, this sounds like real Philosophy which is far too much work, or I
would have a degree.

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